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
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
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**ON THE LAW OF**  
**PERSONS AND DOMESTIC**  
**RELATIONS**

**By WALTER C. TIFFANY**

**THIRD EDITION**

**By ROGER W. COOLEY, LL.M.**

**AUTHOR OF "BRIEFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,"  
PROFESSOR OF LAW, SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
AND LEGAL ADVISER UNITED STATES VETERANS' BUREAU**

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## PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

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IN preparing the third edition of this book the principal work of the editor has been to incorporate in the notes the later decisions. Though there have been here and there some slight alterations in the arrangement of the text, there has been but little departure from the plan adopted by Mr. Tiffany in the first edition and followed by the present editor in the second edition. The most noteworthy changes in the text are to be found in the chapter on Marriage and the chapter on Legitimacy and Adoption of Children. Though an important change in the relation of master and servant has been brought about by the passage of Workmen's Compensation Acts in a majority of the states, the scope of this book does not permit of any extended discussion of those statutes, and the editor has felt constrained to limit his treatment of that phase of the law to a few paragraphs added to the section dealing with the master's liability for injuries to the servant.

ROGER W. COOLEY.

UNITED STATES VETERANS' BUREAU,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 1, 1921.

## PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

---

IN the thirteen years that have elapsed since the first edition of this book appeared, there have been very few changes in the law of Persons and Domestic Relations. Even in the law of Master and Servant there have been no important departures from the doctrines laid down many years ago. The only branch of the law in which any marked changes may be observed is that branch which deals with the property and contract rights of married women, and these changes are purely statutory. Mr. Tiffany's treatment of the general subject was so excellent and has called forth so little criticism that, in the preparation of the second edition, very few changes have been made in the text. Some additions have been made for the purpose of rounding out the subject, and in a few instances there has been an alteration of the arrangement. The only material additions are in that portion of the work dealing with the separate property of married women and the addition of a section relating to the extraterritorial effect of divorce—a subject that has come into prominence in recent years. The principal work of the revisor has been to incorporate in the notes the later decisions.

ROGER W. COOLEY.

ST. PAUL, MINN., May 1, 1909.

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## PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

---

IN this book the same general plan has been followed as that adopted in the previous books of the Hornbook Series. A concise statement of the law precedes each subdivision of the subject, and is followed and illustrated by a fuller treatment in the subsidiary text.

The common law of the domestic relations, particularly the law of husband and wife, has been to a great extent modified by statutes, and in some states almost entirely superseded. These statutory changes have been by no means uniform, and there are probably few branches of the law in which there is to-day less uniformity. In a book of this scope it would be impossible to give in detail the law of each state as modified by statute. Since the common law is still in force excepting so far as changed by statute, a knowledge of the common, as well as of the statute, law, is necessary, in order to determine what the law is to-day. The plan followed has been, therefore, to state the common-law rule, and then the substance of such statutes as have been generally adopted, with the interpretation of such enactments by the courts, leaving it to the reader to ascertain what statutes are peculiar to his own state.

The original scope of this book was limited to the subjects of Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Infancy, and Guardian and Ward; but it has been thought advisable to add Master and Servant, Persons Non Compotes Mentis, and Aliens, and these additions are the work of Mr. William L. Clark, Jr. I am further under great obligations to Mr. Clark for valuable assistance in other parts of the book.

W. C. T.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., Sept. 5, 1896.



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ON THE LAW OF  
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC  
RELATIONS

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THIRD EDITION

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PART I  
HUSBAND AND WIFE

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MARRIAGE

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- 6-10. Reality of Consent.
  7. Fraud.
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## DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE

1. The term "marriage" is used in two senses:
  - (a) To designate the relation of a man and a woman legally united for life as husband and wife.
  - (b) To designate the act, as distinguished from the executory agreement to marry, by which the parties enter into the marriage relation.
2. Marriage, in the sense of the relation of husband and wife, is a status; and not a contract.
3. Marriage, in the sense of the act by which the parties become husband and wife, has been called a contract, but, strictly speaking, it is not so; it is the performance of their contract to marry, resulting in a change of status.

The term "marriage" has been used in two senses, and this double use of the term has resulted in some confusion. In one sense, it means the marriage relation; that is, the status of a man and woman legally united as husband and wife.<sup>1</sup> In another sense, it means the act or ceremony by which that relation is assumed, as distinguished from the executory contract to marry.<sup>2</sup> It is used in the first sense when it is said that a marriage has been dissolved, and in the second sense when it is said that a marriage has been celebrated, or has been proved.

### *Marriage as a Contract*

It is said by many of the text-writers, and it has often been said by the courts, that marriage is a "civil contract."<sup>3</sup> So, too, in many

<sup>1</sup> *Livingston v. Livingston*, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 61 L. R. A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600; *State v. Bittick*, 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325, 11 L. R. A. 587, 23 Am. St. Rep. 869; *People v. Case*, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N. E. 638, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 578. The essential feature of marriage is that the relation can exist only between one man and one woman. *Riddle v. Riddle*, 26 Utah, 268, 72 Pac. 1081; *Warrender v. Warrender*, 2 Clark & F. 532.

<sup>2</sup> *Noel v. Ewing*, 9 Ind. 37.

<sup>3</sup> *Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r*, 30 Mo. 72, 77 Am. Dec. 598; *Fornshill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344; *McKinney v. Clarke*, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 321, 58 Am. Dec. 59; *Barkshire v. State*, 7 Ind. 389, 65 Am. Dec. 738; *Reynolds v. United States*, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244; *In re Imboden's Estate*, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 263; *Nelson v. Brown*, 164 Ala. 397, 51 South. 360. The contract of marriage being a civil contract, the rules to be applied thereto must be, to a great extent, the same as are applied to other contracts. *Coad v. Coad*, 87 Neb. 290, 127 N. W. 455.

of the states the Legislature has undertaken to define marriage as a "civil contract";<sup>4</sup> but this is for the purpose of conveying the idea that mutual consent of the parties is essential, or that mutual consent alone, without formal celebration, is sufficient to constitute marriage, or for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that marriage is a civil, and not a religious, institution.<sup>5</sup> Such a statute cannot have the effect of making marriage a true contract.

Though the law defines marriage as a civil contract, it differs from all other contracts in its consequences to the body politic, and for that reason, in dealing with it, or with the status resulting therefrom, the state never stands indifferent, but is always a party whose interest must be taken into account.<sup>6</sup> Strictly speaking, however, marriage is not a contract, in either of the senses in which the term is used.<sup>7</sup> The question has arisen in a number of cases where the Legislature has undertaken to grant divorces, or to change the rights of parties who have married. It has been contended that such acts of the Legislature are unconstitutional, because they impair the obligation of contracts; but the courts have held that marriage is not a contract, within the meaning of this clause of the Constitution.<sup>8</sup> These decisions not only hold that the

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the following statutes: 2 Mills' Ann. St. Colo. 1891, § 2988; Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1914, § 8357; Gen. St. Kan. 1905, § 4194; Rev. Laws Minn. 1905, § 3552; Comp. St. Neb. 1905, § 4273; Domestic Relations Law N. Y. (Consol. Laws, c. 14) § 10; St. Wis. 1898, § 2328. In some states, too, the statutes declare that marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract. Civ. Code Cal. 1906, § 55; Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 50; Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, § 4357; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 34.

<sup>5</sup> See *Fornhill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344; *Wade v. Kalbfleisch*, 58 N. Y. 282, 17 Am. Rep. 250; *Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry (C. C.)* 20 Fed. 281; *Reaves v. Reaves*, 15 Okl. 240, 82 Pac. 490, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353.

<sup>6</sup> *Willits v. Willits*, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 767, 14 Ann. Cas. 883; *Tramwell v. Vaughan*, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S. W. 79, 51 L. R. A. 854, 81 Am. St. Rep. 302; *Coy v. Humphreys*, 142 Mo. App. 92, 125 S. W. 879.

<sup>7</sup> *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U. S. 14, 30, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366; *Maynard v. Hill*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 1; *Sottomayer v. De Barros*, 5 Prob. Div. 94; *Adams v. Palmer*, 51 Me. 481; *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87; *Wade v. Kalbfleisch*, 58 N. Y. 282, 17 Am. Rep. 250; *Moot v. Moot*, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 288; *Watkins v. Watkins*, 135 Mass. 83; *Maguire v. Maguire*, 7 Dana (Ky.) 181; *Green v. State*, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 739; *Noel v. Ewing*, 9 Ind. 37; *Magee v. Young*, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322. And see *Schouler's Law of Domestic Relations* (1905) § 13. This question may be a very important one. See post, pp. 4, 5.

<sup>8</sup> See the cases cited above in note 7.

marriage relation is not a contract, but they necessarily hold that the ceremony of marriage is not a contract, for a statute that would impair the obligations of the former would necessarily impair the obligations of the latter. That neither marriage, nor the marriage relation, is a contract, would seem obvious when the differences between them are noticed. In a contract the parties fix its terms, but marriage imposes its own terms. A contract may be terminated by mutual consent, but the marriage relation cannot be so terminated. An agreement to marry is necessary to a valid marriage, but when that agreement is carried out, by marrying, a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change.<sup>9</sup> Unlike a contract, also, the marriage relation cannot necessarily be terminated, even though one of the parties becomes incapable of performing his part; nor can it be terminated by an infant of marriageable age.<sup>10</sup> In these and many other respects it is irreconcilable with the ideas of contract.

Some confusion has arisen from confounding the contract to marry with the execution or performance of that contract, and with the relation that results from such performance. Where parties mutually agree to marry at some future time, there is a contract to marry. When they marry—that is, when they express their mutual consent with the formalities required by law, or when they informally assume the relation—they do not contract, but they perform their contract to marry, just as a conveyance of land, and payment therefor, is a performance of a previous contract to convey, on the one side, and to pay, on the other. When the contract to marry is performed by marriage, a relation or status, not a contract, results. Agreement is necessary to a valid marriage, and it is for this reason, no doubt, that writers and judges have spoken of it as a contract. But it must be remembered that something more than agreement is necessary to constitute a contract. The agreement must directly, and not remotely, contemplate and create a personal obligation, an obligation in personam, capable of enforcement by the courts in an action by one of the parties against the other. Marriage neither directly contemplates nor creates such an obligation.<sup>11</sup> It is otherwise, of course, with an agreement to marry. These considerations make it clear that marriage cannot, in either sense of

<sup>9</sup> *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U. S. 14, 30, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 22.

<sup>11</sup> See *Anson*, Cont. 3; *Clark*, Cont. 12.

the term, be regarded as a contract. The marriage relation is a status, and marriage is a change of status.<sup>12</sup>

"Marriage has been well said to be something more than a contract, either religious or civil; to be an institution."<sup>13</sup> "Marriage is a state or relation, depending for its existence upon the fact of parties competent to contract the relation, and their legal voluntary, present consent to do so, with such formalities as the law of the place requires for its valid solemnization."<sup>14</sup> "When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest, not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the state, statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. They are of law, not of contract. It was a contract that the relation should be established, but, being established, the power of the parties, as to its extent or duration, is at an end. Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sovereign, as evidenced by law. They can neither be modified nor changed by any agreement of parties."<sup>15</sup> "Marriage is not a contract, but one of the domestic relations. In strictness, though formed by contract, it signifies the relation of husband and wife, deriving both its rights and duties from a source higher than any contract of which the parties are capable, and, as to these, uncontrollable by any contract which they can make. When formed, this relation is no more a contract than 'fatherhood' or 'sonship' is a contract."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Linebaugh v. Linebaugh*, 137 Cal. 26, 69 Pac. 616.

<sup>13</sup> *Hyde v. Hyde*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 130, 133; *Coe v. Hill*, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949; *Bacon v. Bacon*, 43 Ind. App. 218, 86 N. E. 1030; *Gortia v. Rueda*, 35 Phil. Rep. 1053.

<sup>14</sup> *Story*, Conf. Laws, § 112a. And see *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 63 Misc. Rep. 580, 117 N. Y. Supp. 671; *Knost v. Knost*, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S. W. 665, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627; *Grigsby v. Reib*, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915E, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1011, affirming judgment (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027.

<sup>15</sup> *Adams v. Palmer*, 51 Me. 481, 483; *Maynard v. Hill*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 1; *Hilton v. Roylance*, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821. In Christian nations marriage is not treated as a mere contract to be suspended or dissolved, at pleasure, but rather as a status based on public necessity, and controlled by law for the benefit of society at large. *People v. Case*, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N. E. 638, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 578. A valid marriage cannot be contracted when either party is privileged to annul it by asserting a legal right; it being essential that the marriage be absolute. *Jordan v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co.*, 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432.

<sup>16</sup> *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87, 101.

*Power to Regulate and Control*

Marriage is a social institution or status, in which, because the foundations of the family and the domestic relations rest upon it, the commonwealth has a deep interest.<sup>17</sup> It is therefore within the legitimate exercise of the legislative power of the state to declare, as to its citizens, what shall be recognized as the marriage status.<sup>18</sup> The state has the right to control and regulate by reasonable laws the marriage relationship of its citizens,<sup>19</sup> and the wishes and desires, or even the immediate welfare, of the individual, must yield to the public policy of the state.<sup>20</sup>

**ESSENTIALS OF MARRIAGE—CLASSIFICATION**

4. The essentials of a valid marriage may be classified and treated as follows:
  - (a) Mutual consent, or agreement, under which head may be treated
    - (1) Intention generally.
    - (2) Reality of consent, or consent as affected by fraud, duress, or error.
  - (b) Parties capable of intelligent consent, under which head may be treated
    - (1) Insanity and intoxication.
    - (2) Nonage.
  - (c) Parties otherwise capable of entering into the marriage relation, under which may be treated the effect of
    - (1) Relationship between the parties—consanguinity or affinity.
    - (2) Physical incapacity.
    - (3) Civil conditions.
    - (4) Prior marriage.

<sup>17</sup> *Coe v. Hill*, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949; *Lauer v. Banning*, 152 Iowa, 99, 131 N. W. 783.

<sup>18</sup> *Schumacher v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*, 23 N. D. 231, 136 N. W. 85; *Cohen v. Cohen*, 3 Boyce (Del.) 361, 84 Atl. 122; *Blakeslee v. Blakeslee*, 41 Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950; *In re Gregorson's Estate*, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60, L. R. A. 1916C, 697, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1124; *Caras v. Hendrix*, 62 Fla. 446, 57 South. 345.

<sup>19</sup> *Maynard v. Hill*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 1; *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U. S. 14, 30, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366; *Kitzman v. Kitman*, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789.

<sup>20</sup> *Kitzman v. Kitman*, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789.

(d) **Formalities in the celebration of marriage, under which head may be treated informal marriages.**

While marriage, in the sense of the act or ceremony by which the relation of husband and wife is assumed, is no more a real contract than is the relation itself, still mutual consent or agreement is necessary, and this fact clothes marriage with a semblance of contract. Marriage and contract have the element of agreement in common, and anything that would exclude this element in contract would also exclude it in marriage. There are many principles, therefore, of the law of contract, that apply also in the case of marriage. The necessity for mutual consent, including the question of reality of consent, or consent as affected by fraud, duress, or mistake, gives rise to rules which are also applicable to the formation of contract. So, also, with the question of insanity or intoxication. But marriage also involves other essentials which have no place in the law of contract. Thus the parties must be physically capable; they must not be related to each other within the degrees within which marriage is prohibited; there must be no impediment of civil condition; and the parties must not be bound by a prior marriage. In some jurisdictions, also, certain formalities are prescribed by law, to be observed in the celebration of marriage; and, if such is the intent of the law, these formalities must be complied with. Contracts by an infant are voidable, but an infant of a certain age may enter into a marriage that will be absolutely binding on him. It will be seen, therefore, that the essentials of marriage differ widely from the essentials of contract.

**MUTUAL CONSENT**

**5. To constitute a valid marriage, there must be agreement or mutual consent to enter into the marriage relation.**

One of the elements common to both contract and marriage is the agreement or mutual consent of the parties. Though the marriage relation is an institution over which, when it has been entered into, the parties have little control, yet it lies entirely with them whether they shall assume that relation. Their agreement or mutual consent, therefore, is essential,<sup>21</sup> and anything that goes to show that

<sup>21</sup> *McClurg v. Terry*, 21 N. J. Eq. 225; *Clark v. Field*, 13 Vt. 460, 465; *Roszel v. Roszel*, 73 Mich. 133, 40 N. W. 858, 16 Am. St. Rep. 569; *State v.*

there was no real agreement, such as a lack of intent to assume the marriage relation,<sup>22</sup> shows that there was no valid marriage. Thus in *McClurg v. Terry*,<sup>23</sup> it appeared that a man and woman having capacity to enter into the marriage relation went through the formalities required by law, and were pronounced man and wife by a person who was authorized to perform the marriage ceremony. The parties, however, took this step merely as a joke—not intending it to be a marriage—and it was therefore held that there was no valid marriage.

*Worthingham*, 23 Minn. 528; *Rundle v. Pegram*, 49 Miss. 751; *Tartt v. Negus*, 127 Ala. 301, 28 South. 713; *Kutch v. Kutch*, 88 Neb. 114, 129 N. W. 169; *Corlgsby v. Reib*, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915E, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1011, affirming (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027; *Le Suer v. Le Suer*, 122 Minn. 407, 142 N. W. 593. The consent need not be expressed in any especial manner or by any prescribed form of words. *University of Michigan v. McGuckin*, 62 Neb. 489, 87 N. W. 180, 57 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6, affirmed on rehearing 64 Neb. 300, 89 N. W. 778, 57 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6. Evidence that a woman joined her hands with that of a man before a justice of the peace, stood mute during the marriage ceremony which the justice performed, and did not in any way dissent when the justice declared them man and wife, does not justify an inference that the woman refused her assent to the marriage. In *re Torrence's Estate*, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 509. Consent may be implied from the acts of the parties. *Hilton v. Roylance*, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821. But see *Hooper v. McCaffery*, 83 Ill. App. 341, where it was said that subsequent cohabitation while it will give character to words used or acts done, will not supply lack of consent.

<sup>22</sup> *University of Michigan v. McGuckin*, 62 Neb. 489, 87 N. W. 180, 57 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6, affirmed on rehearing 64 Neb. 300, 89 N. W. 778, 57 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605, 1 Ann. Cas. 199; *Dorgeloh v. Murtha*, 92 Misc. Rep. 279, 156 N. Y. Supp. 181. The intent may be gathered from the circumstances attending the consent or agreement, and mere mental reservations and the secret intent of one of the parties not to consider the marriage binding are ineffectual. *Imboden v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.*, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 263. If one party to a marriage induces the other to believe, in good faith, that the contract is made and is binding, the law will hold the party taking such advantage to the full terms of the agreement. *Coad v. Coad*, 87 Neb. 290, 127 N. W. 455. The statement of a man at the time of his marriage that he would not live with the woman, did not render the marriage void. *Wimbrough v. Wimbrough*, 125 Md. 619, 94 Atl. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 920.

<sup>23</sup> 21 N. J. Eq. 225. And compare *Barclay v. Commonwealth*, 116 Ky. 275, 76 S. W. 4, and *Lee v. State*, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 354, 72 S. W. 1005, 61 L. R. A. 904, where, to the knowledge and intent of the man, the marriage was a sham. But the mere fact that the parties to a marriage did not intend that the marital relation should be permanent, the marriage having been legally performed, does not affect its validity. *Donohue v. Donohue*, 159 Mo. App. 610, 141 S. W. 465.

### REALITY OF CONSENT—FRAUD, DURESS, AND MISTAKE

6. The mutual consent which is essential to a valid marriage must be real. There may be no real consent, because of
  - (a) Fraud.
  - (b) Duress.
  - (c) Mistake.
7. **FRAUD**—Fraud, to affect the validity of the marriage, must relate to some fact essential to the marital relation. A marriage is not invalidated by false representations as to rank, fortune, character, or health; nor by false representations as to chastity, except where the woman was pregnant by another man at the time of the marriage, and the husband was ignorant of the fact, and had not himself had intercourse with her. Deceit may invalidate a marriage, if it prevented the other party from understanding its nature, as in cases where advantage is taken by one party of the extreme youth or age of the other.
8. **DURESS**—A marriage is voidable if either party acted under duress.
9. **MISTAKE**—Mistake as to the nature and legal consequences of the ceremony, or as to the identity of the other party, renders the marriage voidable; but a marriage is not invalidated by mistake as to the rank, fortune, character, or health of one of the parties.
10. **EFFECT OF FRAUD, DURESS, OR MISTAKE**—A marriage is voidable on the ground of fraud, duress, or mistake, and not absolutely void; but it is voidable by act of the party, without the necessity for a decree of nullity. It can be avoided only by the party deceived, coerced, or mistaken.

#### *Fraud*

As in the case of contracts generally, in order to avoid a marriage for fraud, the false representation or concealment must affect some material fact essential to the marriage relation.<sup>24</sup> Thus it

<sup>24</sup> *Crane v. Crane*, 62 N. J. Eq. 21, 49 Atl. 734; *Beach v. Beach*, 160 Iowa, 346, 141 N. W. 921, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 216; *Moore v.*

has been held that entering into the marriage contract with the intent to abandon the spouse is a fraud justifying annulment.<sup>25</sup> So, too, it has been held that concealment of a prior subsisting marriage is a fraud justifying annulment,<sup>26</sup> and a false representation or concealment as to facts rendering the assumption of the marriage relation dangerous to health or life will furnish ground for avoidance.<sup>27</sup> Since the false representation or concealment must affect some material fact essential to the marital relation, it is the general rule that false representations as to rank, fortune, character, or health do not invalidate a marriage.<sup>28</sup> Whether this is be-

Moore, 94 Misc. Rep. 370, 157 N. Y. Supp. 819; *Thompson v. Thompson* (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 175; *Roth v. Roth*, 97 Misc. Rep. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99.

<sup>25</sup> *Anders v. Anders*, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N. E. 203, L. R. A. 1916E, 273; *Moore v. Moore*, 94 Misc. Rep. 370, 157 N. Y. Supp. 819. But compare *Beckermelster v. Beckermelster* (Sup.) 170 N. Y. Supp. 22. And see *Johnson v. Johnson*, 176 Ala. 449, 58 South. 418, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 518, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 828, holding that the fact that a husband in contracting a marriage did so to prevent his wife testifying against him in a prosecution for seducing her, and with the intention of abandoning her, does not constitute such fraud as renders the marriage void. A marriage will not be avoided on the ground of concealment of the wife's physical incapacity to bear children, when the facts so far as known to her were stated and the prospective husband was put in position to acquire exact information. *Wendel v. Wendel*, 30 App. Div. 447, 52 N. Y. Supp. 72. See, also, *Schroter v. Schroter*, 56 Misc. Rep. 69, 106 N. Y. Supp. 22.

<sup>26</sup> *Batty v. Greene*, 206 Mass. 561, 92 N. E. 715, 138 Am. St. Rep. 407; *Weill v. Weill*, 104 Misc. Rep. 561, 172 N. Y. Supp. 589. And see *Roth v. Roth*, 97 Misc. Rep. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99. But mere concealment of the fact of a previous marriage is not ground to avoid the marriage. *Boehs v. Hanger*, 69 N. J. Eq. 10, 59 Atl. 904; *Trask v. Trask*, 114 Me. 60, 95 Atl. 352; *Davis v. Whitlock*, 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 538; *Donnelly v. Strong*, 175 Mass. 157, 55 N. E. 892.

<sup>27</sup> *Lyon v. Lyon*, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E. 850, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 12 Ann. Cas. 25, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 11.

<sup>28</sup> *Ewing v. Wheatley*, 2 Hagg. Ecc. 175; *Wakefield v. Mackay*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 394; *Wier v. Still*, 31 Iowa, 107; *Carris v. Carris*, 24 N. J. Eq. 516; *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605; *Leavitt v. Leavitt*, 13 Mich. 456; *Long v. Long*, 77 N. C. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 449; *Scroggins v. Scroggins*, 14 N. C. 535; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323, 9 L. R. A. 505, 20 Am. St. Rep. 559, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 17; *Libman v. Libman*, 102 Misc. Rep. 443, 169 N. Y. Supp. 900; *Gumbiner v. Gumbiner*, 72 Misc. Rep. 211, 131 N. Y. Supp. 85; *Williamson v. Williamson*, 34 App. D. C. 536, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 301; *Fisk v. Fisk*, 12 Misc. Rep. 466, 34 N. Y. Supp. 33. Contra, *Keyes v. Keyes*, 6 Misc. Rep. 355, 26 N. Y. Supp. 910. In the last case a man had represented himself to be honest and industrious, whereas he was in fact a professional thief, whose picture was in the rogue's gallery; and the marriage was annulled on the ground of fraud. This case, however, is against the weight of authority. See *Wier v. Still*, and other

cause these qualities are not essentials of marriage;<sup>29</sup> or because the law presumes the exercise of due caution in a matter of such importance, and that these conditions are waived by marrying;<sup>30</sup> or because of grounds of public policy—the cases are almost uniform in holding that fraudulent representations in these particulars cannot be relied upon to defeat an otherwise valid marriage. So far as matters of health are concerned, the general rule has, however, been modified and the doctrine is recognized that the concealment of the existence of a loathsome or dangerous disease—dangerous to the other spouse and to the offspring of the union, if such there should be—is a fraud rendering the marriage voidable.<sup>31</sup>

The cases go so far as to hold that false representations as to previous chastity are not ground for annulling a marriage, even though the woman may have been a common prostitute.<sup>32</sup> When,

cases cited above. But in *Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo*, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609, where the woman, having given birth to a child, represented to plaintiff that he was the father, thus inducing him to consent to marriage to order to legitimate the child, it was held that this was a fraud, affording ground for annulment. In *Lewis v. Lewis*, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323, 9 L. R. A. 505, 20 Am. St. Rep. 559, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 17, it was held that a marriage is not voidable for fraud for concealment of the fact that the wife was at the time a kleptomaniac. That a husband concealed that he was afflicted with a taint of hereditary insanity is no ground for annulling the marriage for fraud. *Allen v. Allen*, 85 N. J. Eq. 55, 95 Atl. 363.

<sup>29</sup> 1 *Fraser*, Dom. Rel. 230; 1 *Kent*, Comm. 77.

<sup>30</sup> 1 *Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep.* § 460; *Wakefield v. Mackay*, 1 *Hagg. Consist.* 394.

<sup>31</sup> *Smith v. Smith*, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933, 41 L. R. A. 800, 68 Am. St. Rep. 440, where the husband was afflicted with syphilis in an incurable form. To the same effect, see *Svenson v. Svenson*, 178 N. Y. 54, 70 N. E. 120; *Jordan v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co.*, 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432; *Crane v. Crane*, 62 N. J. Eq. 21, 49 Atl. 734; *Sobol v. Sobol*, 88 Misc. Rep. 277, 150 N. Y. Supp. 248 (tuberculosis); *C— v. C—*, 158 Wis. 301, 148 N. W. 865, 5 A. L. R. 1013 (gonorrhea); *Anonymous*, 21 Misc. Rep. 765, 49 N. Y. Supp. 331. But see *Vondal v. Vondal*, 175 Mass. 383, 56 N. E. 586, 78 Am. St. Rep. 502, where the disease had not reached a contagious stage at the time of marriage, and the marriage had been consummated. The fact that one of the parties to a marriage believes he or she is afflicted with hereditary insanity, and does not communicate the belief to the other party, is no ground for annulment of the marriage, where there is no justification for such belief, though insanity did occur six years after the marriage. *Allen v. Allen*, 86 N. J. Eq. 441, 99 Atl. 309, affirming decree 85 N. J. Eq. 55, 95 Atl. 363.

<sup>32</sup> *Hedden v. Hedden*, 21 N. J. Eq. 61; *Farr v. Farr*, 2 *MacArthur* (D. C.) 35; *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 3 *Allen* (Mass.) 605; *Leavitt v. Leavitt*, 13 Mich. 452; *Wier v. Still*, 31 Iowa, 107; *Donnelly v. Strong*, 175 Mass. 157, 55 N. E. 892; *Shrady v. Logan*, 17 Misc. Rep. 329, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1010. But the contrary rule was recognized in *Entsminger v. Entsminger*, 99 Kan. 362, 161

however, the woman is pregnant by another man at the time of the marriage, the marriage is voidable.<sup>33</sup> The courts have placed their decision, where the case has arisen, on the ground that the ability to bear the husband a child of his loins is an essential of marriage, and that a pregnant woman is not able to carry out the agreement in this essential particular.<sup>34</sup> In order that the husband may be entitled to avoid the marriage on the ground of the wife's pregnancy by another man at the time of the marriage, he must have been ignorant of the fact; for otherwise there is no fraud, nor failure to consent.<sup>35</sup> Express denials by the woman, or overt acts of concealment, are not necessary. It is sufficient if her conduct was such that a reasonably cautious person might be misled.<sup>36</sup> If the husband had himself had antenuptial connection with the wife, he must be regarded as having been put upon his guard as to her chastity, and he will not be permitted to say that he was ignorant of her pregnancy by another man at the time of the marriage.<sup>37</sup>

Pac. 607; *Douischke v. Douischke*, 138 App. Div. 454, 122 N. Y. Supp. 892. In *Hull v. Hull*, 191 Ill. App. 307, it was held that false representations by a man before marriage, made to his intended wife, as to his not having had intercourse with other women, are not ground for annulment. See, also, *Glean v. Glean*, 70 App. Div. 576, 75 N. Y. Supp. 622.

<sup>33</sup> *Scott v. Shufeldt*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43; *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605; *Donovan v. Donovan*, 9 Allen (Mass.) 140; *Baker v. Baker*, 13 Cal. 87; *Montgomery v. Montgomery*, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 132; *Fontana v. Fontana*, 77 Misc. Rep. 28, 135 N. Y. Supp. 220; *Allen's Appeal*, 99 Pa. 196, 44 Am. Rep. 101; *Carris v. Carris*, 24 N. J. Eq. 516; *Sinclair v. Sinclair*, 57 N. J. Eq. 222, 40 Atl. 679; *Ritter v. Ritter*, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 81; *Frith v. Frith*, 18 Ga. 273, 63 Am. Dec. 289; *Gondoulin v. Gondoulin*, 14 Cal. App. 285, 111 Pac. 756; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 94 Mich. 559, 54 N. W. 275, 34 Am. St. Rep. 364. See *Long v. Long*, 77 N. C. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 449.

<sup>34</sup> In 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 486, the author has pointed out that this is inconsistent with the position taken by the courts in considering the disability of impotence, where the law is settled that copula, not fruitfulness, is the test, and that barrenness is no ground for nullity. Post, p. 29.

<sup>35</sup> *Foss v. Foss*, 12 Allen (Mass.) 26; *Crehore v. Crehore*, 97 Mass. 330, 93 Am. Dec. 98; *Butler v. Eschleman*, 18 Ill. 44; *Berry v. Bakeman*, 44 Me. 164. And see *Steele v. Steele*, 96 Ky. 382, 29 S. W. 17.

<sup>36</sup> *Donovan v. Donovan*, 9 Allen (Mass.) 140.

<sup>37</sup> *Sellheimer v. Sellheimer*, 40 N. J. Eq. 412, 2 Atl. 376; *Crehore v. Crehore*, 97 Mass. 330, 93 Am. Dec. 98; *Foss v. Foss*, 12 Allen (Mass.) 26; *Franke v. Franke*, 3 Cal. Unrep. 656, 31 Pac. 571, 18 L. R. A. 375; *Safford v. Safford*, 224 Mass. 392, 113 N. E. 181, L. R. A. 1916F, 526; *Lyman v. Lyman*, 90 Conn. 399, 97 Atl. 312, L. R. A. 1916E, 643; *Tait v. Tait*, 3 Misc. Rep. 218, 23 N. Y. Supp. 597. But see *Moss v. Moss*, 24 N. C. 56. It was held in *Gondoulin v. Gondoulin*, 14 Cal. App. 285, 111 Pac. 756, that a man who has been having illicit intercourse with a woman prior to his marriage with her cannot have the marriage annulled on the ground that it was brought about by the wo-

When consent is obtained by deceit, under such circumstances that the nature of the marriage is not understood, the marriage may be avoided. Such cases arise where one of the parties takes advantage of the extreme youth or age of the other.<sup>38</sup>

#### *Duress*

A marriage under duress or compulsion is without the consent necessary to its validity, and may be avoided.<sup>39</sup> It has, indeed, been said that the compulsion, to avoid the marriage, must cause fear of bodily harm.<sup>40</sup> So it has been said that duress which will invalidate a marriage must be fear of that degree of violence, threatened or actually inflicted, sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.<sup>41</sup> Probably this statement is

man falsely representing that she was pregnant by him. On the other hand, in *Gard v. Gard*, 204 Mich. 255, 169 N. W. 908, it was held that a marriage procured by the wife's false representations that she was pregnant by the husband, when she was pregnant by another man, to whose child she later gave birth, will be annulled at the husband's suit, though the wife informed him during acquaintance she had had intercourse with another.

<sup>38</sup> *Harford v. Morris*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 423; *Browning v. Reane*, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 70; *Rex v. Wakefield*, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 279; *Hull v. Hull*, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 589; *Clark v. Field*, 13 Vt. 460; *Gillett v. Gillett*, 78 Mich. 184, 43 N. W. 1101; *Lyndon v. Lyndon*, 69 Ill. 43; *Robertson v. Cole*, 12 Tex. 356; *Moot v. Moot*, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 288. In *Gillett v. Gillett*, supra, it appeared that complainant, a man of 75, blind, more or less deaf, and otherwise broken, who had just received a liberal pension, with a large amount of arrears, was induced, by putting him under the influence of liquors, and probably of drugs, to marry defendant, a woman less than half his age, who had a young child, and with whom he was very slightly acquainted, and for whom he entertained no attachment. It was held that the marriage was properly annulled. But see *Kutch v. Kutch*, 88 Neb. 114, 129 N. W. 169.

<sup>39</sup> *Scott v. Sebright*, 12 Prob. Div. 21; *Marsh v. Whittington*, 88 Miss. 400, 40 South. 326; *Shoro v. Shoro*, 60 Vt. 268, 14 Atl. 177, 6 Am. St. Rep. 118, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 15; *Willard v. Willard*, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 297, 32 Am. Rep. 529; *Bassett v. Bassett*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 696; *Houle v. Houle*, 100 Misc. Rep. 28, 166 N. Y. Supp. 67; *Quealy v. Waldron*, 126 La. 258, 52 South. 479, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 803, 20 Ann. Cas. 1374; *Anderson v. Anderson*, 74 Hun, 56, 26 N. Y. Supp. 492. That a marriage will not be annulled on the ground of duress, unless it is shown that the other party caused the duress, or knowingly used it or availed himself of it to procure the marriage, see *Sherman v. Sherman* (Com. Pl.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 414. But see *Marks v. Crume*, 29 S. W. 436, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 707. A marriage was invalid where the consent of the husband was not freely given, but was the result of a threat by the bride's father to kill him unless he married her. *Fowler v. Fowler*, 131 La. 1088, 60 South. 694. To the same effect, see *Simmons v. Stevens*, 132 La. 675, 61 South. 734.

<sup>40</sup> *Ayl. Par.* 362; *Stevenson v. Stevenson*, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 386; *Quealy v. Waldron*, 126 La. 258, 52 South. 479, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 803, 20 Ann. Cas. 1374.

<sup>41</sup> *Marre v. Marre*, 184 Mo. App. 193, 168 S. W. 636.

too broad and should not be taken literally. The better opinion is that, if either party is in a state of mental incompetency to resist pressure improperly brought to bear, there is no legal consent.<sup>42</sup> In *Scott v. Sebright*<sup>43</sup> the duress consisted in threatening one in financial distress with exposure, and the court held that, inasmuch as this resulted in depriving the party of her free will, there was no real consent, and the marriage was annulled.

On the other hand, it has been held that a threat that, unless the plaintiff consented to marry the defendant, he would involve her as an accomplice with a fugitive from justice after conviction of a crime, was not in itself sufficient to avoid the marriage.<sup>44</sup> The duress must clearly have dominated throughout the transaction, so as to disable the one influenced from acting as a free agent.<sup>45</sup> Where a man is illegally or maliciously, and without probable cause, arrested for bastardy or seduction, and marries the complainant to avoid imprisonment, it is held that he acts under such duress as will avoid the marriage; and the same is true in other cases of illegal arrest.<sup>46</sup> If, however, an arrest, or threatened arrest, for bastardy or seduction, is valid, a marriage to escape arrest or punishment is not under duress, for there can be no duress in compelling a man to perform a legal duty.<sup>47</sup> Threats or force which do not coerce are not duress.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *Scott v. Sebright*, 12 Prob. Div. 21; *Rex v. Wakefield*, 39 Am. Reg. 316; *Harford v. Morris*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 423; *Willard v. Willard*, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 297, 32 Am. Rep. 529; *Shepherd v. Shepherd*, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658; *Lyndon v. Lyndon*, 69 Ill. 43.

<sup>43</sup> 12 Prob. Div. 21.

<sup>44</sup> *Nicholson v. Nicholson*, 174 Cal. 391, 163 Pac. 219.

<sup>45</sup> *Beeks v. Beeks*, 66 Fla. 256, 63 South. 444.

<sup>46</sup> *Reg. v. Orgill*, 9 Car. & P. 80; *Shoro v. Shoro*, 60 Vt. 268, 14 Atl. 177, 6 Am. St. Rep. 118, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 15; *Soule v. Bonney*, 37 Me. 128; *Bassett v. Bassett*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 696; *Barton's Lessee v. Morris' Heirs*, 15 Ohio, 408.

<sup>47</sup> *Jackson v. Winne*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; *Honnett v. Honnett*, 33 Ark. 156, 34 Am. Rep. 39; *Marvin v. Marvin*, 52 Ark. 425, 12 S. W. 875, 20 Am. St. Rep. 191; *Blankenmlester v. Blankenmlester*, 106 Mo. App. 390, 80 S. W. 706; *Sickles v. Carson*, 26 N. J. Eq. 440; *State v. English*, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721, L. R. A. 1915F, 977; *Thorne v. Farrar*, 57 Wash. 441, 107 Pac. 347, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385, 135 Am. St. Rep. 995; *Copeland v. Copeland* (Va.) 21 S. E. 241; *Williams v. State*, 44 Ala. 24; *State v. Davis*, 79 N. C. 603; *Merrell v. Moore*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 104 S. W. 514; *Johns v. Johns*, 44 Tex. 40; *Medrano v. State*, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 214, 22 S. W. 684, 40 Am. St. Rep. 775; *Pray v. Pray*, 128 La. 1037, 55 South. 666; *Shepherd v.*

<sup>48</sup> See note 48 on following page.

*Mistake*

As false and fraudulent representations as to rank, fortune, character, or health are no ground for annulling a marriage that is otherwise valid,<sup>40</sup> it is clear that a mistake as to these particulars is not sufficient to invalidate it. These are not essentials of the marriage. If, however, a mistake is of such a nature as to prevent the party from understanding the nature of the marriage, it must nec-

Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658; *Wimbrough v. Wimbrough*, 125 Md. 619, 94 Atl. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 920; *Lacoste v. Guldroz*, 47 La. Ann. 295, 16 South. 836. In *Marvin v. Marvin*, supra, it was held that marriage cannot be avoided on the ground of duress where a man is lawfully arrested on process for seduction, and marries the woman to procure his discharge, and that the fact that he subsequently discovers that he could not have been convicted will not alter the case, if the prosecution was on probable cause, and not from malice merely. But abuse of lawful process may constitute duress. Thus, where an inexperienced boy of 18 was arrested on the charge of bastardy, and while under arrest was advised by the justice to marry the female making the charge, and, notwithstanding his assertions of innocence, was threatened with a conviction and confinement in the penitentiary, and the boy married the woman to avoid such punishment, the marriage was annulled on the ground of duress. *Smith v. Smith*, 51 Mich. 607, 17 N. W. 76.

<sup>40</sup> In a suit in England by a woman to annul a marriage, it appeared that the parties were Americans and cousins. Respondent had made an offer of marriage to the petitioner, which she had refused. On a Sunday, he being then under 21 and she 24 years of age, under the pretense of going to an afternoon service at a church, he took her to another church, and outside the church said to her suddenly, "You must come into the church and marry me, or I will blow my brains out, and you will be responsible." She testified that she was so alarmed that she did not know what she was doing, and went into the church, where the ceremony of marriage was performed, and she signed the register. Respondent had previously obtained a license, on a false declaration as to his own age and as to the petitioner's residence, and had made arrangements at the church for the marriage to be performed that day. The vicar who performed the ceremony stated that the petitioner went through it without showing any signs of unwillingness, repeated the responses in an audible tone, and signed the register in a clear, firm hand. The marriage was never consummated, and the parties never saw each other afterwards, though they corresponded, but always on the footing of cousins, and not as husband and wife. Petitioner never told her parents or friends of the marriage, because, as she said, she did not regard it as binding. Respondent, who did not appear in the suit, admitted that he had only married petitioner for her money, and that he did not care for her. There was evidence that the petitioner was of a weak, impressionable character, with not much power of resistance to a stronger will, but that she was not particularly disposed to fall into a "hysterical state," in the medical sense of the term. It was held that the facts were insufficient to rebut the presumption of consent, that the marriage was valid, and that the suit must be dismissed. *Cooper v. Crane*, [1891] Prob. Div. 369.

<sup>41</sup> Ante, p. 10. As to error, see 2 Kent, Comm. 77; *Benton v. Benton*, 1 Day (Conn.) 111; *Fielding's Case*, Burke, Cel. Trials, 63, 78.

essarily avoid it; for there can, in such a case, be no mutual consent. If a person should intend to marry one person, for instance, and by mistake should marry another, there would be no consent, and therefore no valid marriage.<sup>50</sup>

There is no mistake in identity, which will afford ground to avoid the marriage, if there has merely been an assumption of a false name without false personation.<sup>51</sup>

*Void or Voidable—Ratification*

Marriages induced by fraud or duress, or entered into under mistake are sometimes said to be void, and not merely voidable; but this is not true. They are not absolutely void, but voidable at the option of the party deceived, coerced, or mistaken.<sup>52</sup> If that party chooses to avoid the marriage, he or she may do so, and thereby render it void ab initio; and no suit for nullity is necessary. The other party clearly cannot avoid the marriage, for he would not be permitted to set up his own fraud or wrong to defeat it, and he could not set up a mistake on the part of the other party, of which the latter did not complain.<sup>53</sup> If the party coerced or deceived—and it would seem true, also, in the case of mistake—recognizes the marriage as valid, and cohabits with the other party, after discovery of the fraud, or when no longer under the duress, the marriage cannot afterwards be avoided.<sup>54</sup> Fraud, duress, or mistake cannot

<sup>50</sup> *Meyer v. Meyer*, 7 Ohio Dec. 627; *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Clark & F. 534, 785; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Burton-upon-Trent*, 3 Maule & S. 537; *Stayte v. Farquharson*, 3 Addams, Ecc. 282. See, also, *Delpit v. Young*, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 South. 547, holding that error as to the chastity of a wife before her marriage is not a "mistake in the person," within Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 91, 110.

<sup>51</sup> *Meyer v. Meyer*, 7 Ohio Dec. 627.

<sup>52</sup> *Jordan v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co.*, 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432; *Bostick v. State*, 1 Ala. App. 255, 55 South. 260.

<sup>53</sup> *Farley v. Farley*, 94 Ala. 501, 10 South. 648, 33 Am. St. Rep. 141.

<sup>54</sup> *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 20 Ill. App. 516; *Steimer v. Steimer*, 37 Misc. Rep. 26, 74 N. Y. Supp. 714; *Leavitt v. Leavitt*, 13 Mich. 452; *Millar v. Millar*, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, L. R. A. 1918B, 415, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 184; *Koehler v. Koehler*, 137 Ark. 302, 209 S. W. 283; *Hampstead v. Plaistow*, 49 N. H. 84; *Shepherd v. Shepherd*, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658; *Sherman v. Sherman*, 174 Iowa, 145, 156 N. W. 301; *Boutterle v. Demarest*, 126 La. 278, 52 South. 492, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805; *Scott v. Shufeldt*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43. In *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, supra, a man sought to avoid a suit by a woman for separate maintenance by showing that his marriage was procured by duress of imprisonment for seduction under promise of marriage. It was held that his claim could not be sustained, even though the arrest was unlawful, where the evidence showed that after the marriage he approved and ratified it, and never denied its validity until the suit for

be set up by third persons to defeat the marriage.<sup>55</sup> These considerations are sufficient to show that the marriage is not void, but voidable only. No decree of nullity, however, is necessary, unless required by statute. The marriage, as already stated, is sufficiently avoided if it is repudiated on discovery of the fraud or mistake, or when released from the duress.

### MENTAL CAPACITY OF THE PARTIES

11. To constitute a valid marriage, the parties must be capable of intelligently consenting. They may be incapable of intelligent consent by reason of
  - (a) Insanity or intoxication.
  - (b) Nonage.

### SAME—INSANITY AND INTOXICATION

12. A marriage is void, in the absence of a statute, if either party, by reason of defect or disease of the mind, was incapable of intelligently consenting. The parties must have been mentally capable of understanding the nature and consequences of marriage. The same rule applies where a party is drunk at the time of the marriage. In most states, by statute, such marriages are declared voidable, and not void; and in some states they are held voidable only, independently of any statute.

separate maintenance was brought. There is no ratification of a marriage invalidated by duress by subsequent cohabitation submitted to while the duress is still operative. *Avakian v. Avakian*, 69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 Atl. 521. To the same effect is *Fowler v. Fowler*, 131 La. 1088, 60 South. 694. A woman's fraudulent representations as to her reputation and virtue, inducing marriage, are not waived nor condoned by cohabitation, where she continues her misconduct, over husband's objection. *Entsminger v. Entsminger*, 99 Kan. 362, 161 Pac. 607. That defendant permitted his wife to live in the same house with him for 17 months is not a confirmation of the marriage, so as to bar annulment for her fraud, consisting of her infection with chronic gonorrhea. *O— v. O—*, 158 Wis. 301, 148 N. W. 865, 5 A. L. R. 1013.

<sup>55</sup> *McKinney v. Clarke*, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 321, 58 Am. Dec. 59; *Farley v. Farley*, 94 Ala. 501, 10 South. 646, 33 Am. St. Rep. 141. "If a marriage may be annulled for fraud, it must be such a fraud as operates upon one or the other of the immediate parties to the contract, and has the legal effect of vitiating the contract between the parties ab initio. But, as respects strangers, fraud cannot be predicated of a contract which the immediate parties thereto may lawfully enter into, which no principle of municipal law forbids, or can restrain the consummation of." *McKinney v. Clarke*, supra.

*Insanity*

Where by reason of defect of the mind, as in case of idiocy, or disease of the mind, as in case of lunacy, a person has not sufficient mental capacity to give an intelligent consent, he or she cannot enter into a valid marriage, for there can be no real consent.<sup>56</sup> And this is true, though the insanity be only temporary, the person generally being sane.<sup>57</sup> What degree of mental defect or disease is sufficient to invalidate a marriage is a question as to which the authorities are somewhat at variance. The rule generally laid down is that the party must be able to understand the nature of marriage, and its consequences.<sup>58</sup> This makes the test whether there is sufficient mental capacity to give an intelligent consent. "If the incapacity be such that the party be incapable of understanding the nature of the contract itself, and incapable, from mental imbecility, to take care of his or her own person or property, such person cannot dispose of his or her own person and property by the matrimonial contract, any more than by any other contract."<sup>59</sup> Mere mental weakness, if it does not deprive the party of capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the step he is taking, does not affect the validity of a marriage.<sup>60</sup> Nor is its validity af-

<sup>56</sup> *Foster v. Means*, Speer, Eq. (S. C.) 569, 42 Am. Dec. 332; *Hagenson v. Hagenson*, 258 Ill. 197, 101 N. E. 606; *Dunphy v. Dunphy*, 161 Cal. 87, 118 Pac. 445; *Holland v. Riggs*, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 116 S. W. 167; *True v. Ranney*, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164; *Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhabitants of Rochester*, 12 Mass. 364, and cases hereafter cited. The common-law rule that a marriage contracted by an insane person is void for want of assent has been changed by Code Miss. 1906, § 1669, par. 8, providing that insanity or idiocy is a ground for divorce, if the complaining party did not know of the infirmity. *Wilson v. Wilson*, 104 Miss. 347, 61 South. 453. And see *In re Jansa's Estate*, 169 Wis. 220, 171 N. W. 947, construing the Wisconsin statute declaring epileptics incapable of contracting marriage.

<sup>57</sup> *Parker v. Parker*, 6 Eng. Ecc. R. 165.

<sup>58</sup> *Browning v. Reane*, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 70; *Chapline v. Stone*, 77 Mo. App. 523; *True v. Ranney*, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164; *Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhabitants of Rochester*, 12 Mass. 363; *Anonymous*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 32; *Inhabitants of Atkinson v. Inhabitants of Medford*, 46 Me. 510; *Ward v. Dulaney*, 23 Miss. 410; *Coleman v. Coleman*, 85 Or. 99, 166 Pac. 47; *Waughop v. Waughop*, 92 Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444; *Adams v. Scott*, 93 Neb. 537, 141 N. W. 148; *Dunphy v. Dunphy*, 161 Cal. 380, 119 Pac. 512, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1230; *Cole v. Cole*, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 57, 70 Am. Dec. 275; *McElroy's Case*, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 451; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323, 9 L. R. A. 505, 20 Am. St. Rep. 559, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 17; *Pyott v. Pyott*, 191 Ill. 280, 61 N. E. 88, affirming 90 Ill. App. 210.

<sup>59</sup> *Browning v. Reane*, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 70.

<sup>60</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 76; *Browning v. Reane*, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 70; *Portsmouth v. Portsmouth*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 355; *Kern v. Kern*, 51 N. J. Eq. 574, 26 Atl. 837;

fectured by insanity or insane delusions or impulses on other subjects.<sup>61</sup> As was said in a case in which it was sought to annul a marriage on the ground that the woman was a kleptomaniac: "It was not proved, nor is it found by the court, that she was not otherwise sane, or that her mind was so affected by this peculiar propensity as to be incapable of understanding or assenting to the marriage contract. Whether the subjection of the will to some vice or uncontrollable impulse, appetite, passion, or propensity be attributed to disease, and be considered a species of insanity, or not, yet, as long as the understanding and reason remain so far unaffected and unclouded that the afflicted person is cognizant of the nature and obligations of a contract entered into by him or her with another, the case is not one authorizing a decree avoiding the contract. Any other rule would open the door to great abuses."<sup>62</sup>

The insanity must exist at the time of the marriage, to avoid it, neither prior nor subsequent insanity being sufficient.<sup>63</sup> Nor are both prior and subsequent insanity sufficient, if the marriage took place in a lucid interval.<sup>64</sup> As said by the Illinois court: "It would be a harsh rule indeed that would permit a man who has married a woman who later in life becomes insane to put her away on account of her inexpressibly sad misfortune. It is to the credit of our common humanity that there cannot be found, in all the range of judicial proceedings, a single case that holds that insanity is or could be a cause for divorce."<sup>65</sup>

*Aldrich v. Steen*, 71 Neb. 33, 98 N. W. 445, judgment modified on rehearing 71 Neb. 33, 100 N. W. 311; *Adams v. Scott*, 93 Neb. 537, 141 N. W. 148. That complainant, a girl of 14, "knew nothing of the heavy responsibilities incident to the marital status," and "was young, inexperienced, unlearned, and was persuaded and induced to enter into said marriage by defendant without reflection or consideration on her part," does not show her mental incapacity. *Green v. Green* (Fla.) 80 South. 739.

<sup>61</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 76; *Portsmouth v. Portsmouth*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 355.

<sup>62</sup> *Lewis v. Lewis*, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323, 9 L. R. A. 505, 20 Am. St. Rep. 559, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 17.

<sup>63</sup> *Turner v. Meyers*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 414; *Parnell v. Parnell*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 169; *Banker v. Banker*, 63 N. Y. 409; *Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher*, 159 Pa. 634, 28 Atl. 439; *Smith v. Smith*, 47 Miss. 211; *Ryals v. Ryals*, 130 La. 244, 57 South. 904; *Henderson v. Ressor*, 141 Mo. App. 540, 126 S. W. 203; *Hamaker v. Hamaker*, 18 Ill. 137, 65 Am. Dec. 705; *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 66 Ill. 87; *Wertz v. Wertz*, 43 Iowa, 534; *Baker v. Baker*, 82 Ind. 146.

<sup>64</sup> *Turner v. Meyers*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 414; *Parker v. Parker*, 6 Eng. Ecc. R. 165; *Smith v. Smith*, 47 Miss. 211; *Banker v. Banker*, 63 N. Y. 409; *Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher*, 159 Pa. 634, 28 Atl. 439.

<sup>65</sup> *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 66 Ill. 87. In a very few states it has been made a ground for divorce.

*Intoxication*

Intoxication of a person at the time of his or her marriage avoids it for the same reason that insanity avoids it—because there is no real consent.<sup>66</sup> The intoxication, however, must be so excessive as to prevent the party from giving an intelligent consent. If he understands the nature and consequences of his act, the fact that he is under the influence of liquor will not avail to avoid the marriage.<sup>67</sup>

*Void or Voidable—Ratification*

Some of the authorities hold that insanity renders a marriage voidable, and not void; that a person on regaining his reason, even temporarily, may affirm a marriage celebrated while he was insane, and thereby render it absolutely binding.<sup>68</sup> And there are authorities to the effect that, if the other party knew he was marrying an insane person, he cannot avoid the marriage.<sup>69</sup> This is the proper view, but it must be conceded that by the weight of authority, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, a marriage by a lunatic or idiot or drunken person is not merely voidable, but absolutely void, and therefore incapable of ratification, or of having any effect whatever.<sup>70</sup> Perhaps in most states this rule has been changed by statute, and such marriages are made voidable only, and not void.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Barber v. People*, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N. E. 93; *Gillett v. Gillett*, 78 Mich. 184, 43 N. W. 1101; *Prine v. Prine*, 36 Fla. 676, 18 South. 781, 34 L. R. A. 87; *Dunphy v. Dunphy*, 161 Cal. 380, 119 Pac. 512, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1230; *Clement v. Mattison*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 93. And see, as to contracts generally, 2 Kent, Comm. 451; Clark, Cont. p. 274.

<sup>67</sup> *Prine v. Prine*, 36 Fla. 676, 18 South. 781, 34 L. R. A. 87; *Scott v. Paquet*, L. R. 1 P. C. 582.

<sup>68</sup> *Dwight, Pers. & Pers. Prop.* 143; *Cole v. Cole*, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 57, 70 Am. Dec. 275; *Wiser v. Lockwood's Estate*, 42 Vt. 720; *Setzer v. Setzer*, 97 N. C. 252, 1 S. E. 558, 2 Am. St. Rep. 290. Some hold the marriage void until it is ratified, *Cole v. Cole*, supra; while others hold it valid until it is avoided, *Wiser v. Lockwood's Estate*, supra.

<sup>69</sup> *Hancock v. Peaty*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 335, 341.

<sup>70</sup> *Schouler, Dom. Rel.* § 18; *Inhabitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants of Troy*, 97 Me. 130, 53 Atl. 1008; *Sims v. Sims*, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407, 40 L. R. A. 737, 61 Am. St. Rep. 665; *Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhab-*

<sup>71</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6113; *Inhabitants of Goshen v. Inhabitants of Richmond*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 458; *Wiser v. Lockwood's Estate*, 42 Vt. 720; *Watters v. Watters*, 168 N. C. 411, 84 S. E. 703; *Bruns v. Cope*, 182 Ind. 239, 105 N. E. 471; *In re Gregorson's Estate*, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60, L. R. A. 1916C, 691, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1124; *Hamaker v. Hamaker*, 18 Ill. 137, 65 Am. Dec. 705.

### SAME—NONAGE

13. The parties must be of an age at which the law deems them capable of intelligently consenting to enter into the marriage relation. At common law the age of consent is 14 for males, and 12 for females, but in most states the age of consent has been raised by statute. The effect of marriages by infants is as follows:

- (a) Marriages after the age of consent are binding.
- (b) Marriages between the age of consent and the age of seven years are voidable on or before reaching the age of consent, and by either party.
- (c) Marriages below the age of seven are absolutely void.

The age of consent—that is, the age at which an infant could consent to marriage, so that it would be binding—was fixed at common law at 14 for males and 12 for females;<sup>72</sup> but the common law has been changed in this respect in many states by statute.<sup>73</sup>

itants of Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; *Foster v. Means*, Speer, Eq. (S. C.) 569, 42 Am. Dec. 332; *Inhabitants of Unity v. Inhabitants of Belgrade*, 76 Me. 419; *Holland v. Riggs*, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 116 S. W. 167; *Crump v. Morgan*, 38 N. C. 91, 40 Am. Dec. 447; *Rawdon v. Rawdon*, 28 Ala. 565; *Jenkins v. Jenkins' Heirs*, 2 Dana (Ky.) 102, 26 Am. Dec. 437; *Keyes v. Keyes*, 22 N. H. 553; *Ward v. Dulaney*, 23 Miss. 410. But see *Gross v. Gross*, 96 Mo. App. 486, 70 S. W. 393, which was a suit to annul a marriage on the ground of insanity of defendant existing when the marriage was solemnized, and it appeared that the parties lived together many years and that defendant had lucid intervals. It was held that the continuance of the marital relations was a ratification of the nuptial contract by both parties. See, also, *Barber v. People*, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N. E. 93, holding that intoxication does not render the marriage void, but only voidable.

<sup>72</sup> *Parton v. Hervey*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119; *Bennett v. Smith*, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 439; *Browning v. Browning*, 89 Kan. 98, 130 Pac. 852, L. R. A. 1916C, 1288, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1288; *Cushman v. Cushman*, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26, L. R. A. 1916C, 732; *Green v. Green* (Fla.) 80 South. 739. At common law the age at which persons are deemed competent to contract valid marriage was 14 years for the man and 12 years for the woman, and in the absence of statute this rule is adopted as a part of the common law of this state. *Green v. Green* (Fla.) 80 South. 739. There being no statute prescribing the age at which persons may marry in Kansas, the common law, fixing the ages at 14 and 12, respectively, governs. *Browning v. Browning*, 89 Kan. 98, 130 Pac. 852, L. R. A. 1916C, 737, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1288.

<sup>73</sup> To be able to contract a marriage a male person must, under Civ. Code Ga. 1910. § 2931, be at least 17 years of age. *Morgan v. Morgan*, 148 Ga. 625, 97 S. E. 675, 4 A. L. R. 925. Statutes designating the age at which per-

In some states the age of consent has been raised as high as 21 for males and 18 for females.<sup>74</sup> Marriages entered into by infants who are above the age of consent are binding on them, and cannot be avoided on their becoming of age.<sup>75</sup> Marriages entered into above the age of 7 and below the age of consent may be avoided on reaching the age of consent, or before.<sup>76</sup> Marriages entered into where either party is below 7 are absolutely void.<sup>77</sup> The fact that marriages entered into above the age of consent cannot, like the contracts of infants, be avoided on their attaining their majority, rests on the peculiar nature of marriage—on the fact that it is not a contract, but a status, involving important and far-reaching property rights, and interests of children and third persons, which pub-

sons may contract marriage are to be regarded as raising the age of consent as established by the common law. Section 3 of the Illinois Marriage Act, providing that a male minor of the age of 18 and upwards and a female minor of the age of 16 and upwards may marry under certain conditions, was intended by the Legislature to raise the age of consent or discretion from 14 and 12 years respectively, as established by the common law, to 18 and 16 years respectively. *Matthes v. Matthes*, 198 Ill. App. 515.

<sup>74</sup> Rem. & Bal. Code Wash. §§ 7150, 7162, 7164, providing that marriage may be entered into by males of the age of 21 and females of the age of 18, that a marriage may be avoided by a party incapable of consenting thereto, and that a marriage license shall not issue except on proof of legal age or consent of parents, did not change the common-law rule that males of 14 and females of 12 may consent to marriage. *Cushman v. Cushman*, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26, L. R. A. 1916C, 732.

<sup>75</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 78; Co. Litt. 79b; 1 Bl. Comm. 436; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 236; *Parton v. Hervey*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119; *White v. Hill*, 176 Ala. 480, 58 South. 444; *Pool v. Pratt*, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 254; *Governor v. Rector*, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 61. And see *Reifschneider v. Reifschneider*, 144 Ill. App. 119, judgment affirmed 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255.

<sup>76</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 78; Co. Litt. 33a, 79b; 2 Com. Dig. "Baron and Feme," 5; 1 Bl. Comm. 436; *Beggs v. State*, 55 Ala. 106; *McDeed v. McDeed*, 67 Ill. 545; *Macri v. Macri*, 177 App. Div. 292, 164 N. Y. Supp. 112; *Mundell v. Coster*, 80 Misc. Rep. 337, 142 N. Y. Supp. 142; *Koonce v. Wallace*, 52 N. C. 194; *Eliot v. Eliot*, 77 Wis. 634, 46 N. W. 806, 10 L. R. A. 568, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 19; notes 81, 82, *infra*. In *Aymar v. Roff*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 49, where a man had married a girl under 12 years of age, and the girl declared her ignorance of the nature and consequences of the marriage, and her dissent to it, a court of equity, on a bill by her next friend, ordered her to be placed under its protection as a ward of the court, and forbade the man to have any intercourse or correspondence with her, under pain of contempt. But see *Hardy v. State*, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 55, 38 S. W. 615, holding that, under a statute providing that males under 16 years and females under 14 years of age shall not marry, there can be no common-law marriage with a girl of 10.

<sup>77</sup> 2 Burn, Ecc. Law, 434a.

lic policy cannot allow to be jeopardized at the will of either party.<sup>78</sup> But an infant's promise to marry, though he be over the age of consent, may be avoided by him like any other contract, for none of the complications arising from the assumption of the status of marriage are thereby affected.<sup>79</sup> The marriage of infants between the age of 7 and the age of consent is not absolutely void, but is only inchoate and imperfect, and if on coming to the age of consent, but not before reaching that age,<sup>80</sup> they agree to continue together, they need not be married again,<sup>81</sup> and their continuing to live together after reaching the age of consent is a sufficient affirmance.<sup>82</sup>

It has been held in Ohio that a marriage by an infant under the age of consent is void until affirmed. "Marriages in this state," it was said by the Ohio court, "contracted by male persons under the age of 18, and female persons under 14, are invalid, unless confirmed by cohabitation after arriving at those ages, respectively. Such a marriage not thus confirmed does not subject a party to punishment for bigamy for contracting a subsequent marriage while the first husband or wife is living."<sup>83</sup>

This doctrine of the Ohio courts is however contrary to reason and the weight of authority. Thus it was held in Arkansas that, under an indictment for bigamy, evidence that the first marriage was within the age of legal consent is no defense, unless it also be shown that it was annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. "By the common law," it was said, "if he did not disaffirm the

<sup>78</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 20; 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 586; Parton v. Hervey, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119.

<sup>79</sup> Holt v. Ward Clarendoux, 2 Strange, 937; Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 15 Am. Dec. 475; Cannon v. Alsbury, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76, 10 Am. Dec. 700; Clark, Cont. 231, note, and cases cited.

<sup>80</sup> Elliot v. Elliot, 77 Wis. 634, 46 N. W. 806, 10 L. R. A. 568, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 19.

<sup>81</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 436; Elliott v. Gurr, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 16; Parton v. Hervey, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119; Koonce v. Wallace, 52 N. C. 194; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Nev. 63; State v. Cone, 86 Wis. 498, 57 N. W. 50.

<sup>82</sup> 2 Dane Abr. 301; Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791; Terry v. Terry, 96 Misc. Rep. 594, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1016; Americus Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 16 Ga. App. 17, 84 S. E. 493; Powers v. Powers, 138 Ga. 65, 74 S. E. 759; Matthes v. Matthes, 198 Ill. App. 515; Herrman v. Herrman, 93 Misc. Rep. 315, 156 N. Y. Supp. 688; Long v. Baxter, 77 Misc. Rep. 630, 138 N. Y. Supp. 505; State v. Parker, 106 N. C. 711, 11 S. E. 517. See, also, Canale v. People, 177 Ill. 219, 52 N. E. 310, holding that such marriage may be disaffirmed after arriving at the age of consent by ceasing to cohabit and marrying again.

<sup>83</sup> Shaffer v. State, 20 Ohio, 1. And see Crapps v. Smith, 9 Ga. App. 400, 71 S. E. 501.

marriage on reaching the age of legal consent, but cohabited with the wife after arriving at such age, it would be an affirmance of the marriage."<sup>84</sup>

Similarly in Alabama the Ohio doctrine has been disapproved as opposed to the great weight of authority; the court saying: "The statute serves the purpose of its enactment when construed as operating merely an enlargement of the age of consent from that fixed by the common law—of 12 in females and 14 in males—to 14 in females and 17 in males. The marriage of persons not of the statutory age is, as was the marriages between persons not of the age of consent at common law, imperfect, becoming perfect only by affirmance when the requisite age is obtained, until this affirmance, it is a marriage in fact, and the second marriage of either party is bigamy."<sup>85</sup>

The right to disaffirm a marriage on the ground of nonage is not limited to the party who was under the age of consent, where the other party was of a suitable age, but extends also to the latter. In this respect, marriage differs from contract.<sup>86</sup> A person under

<sup>84</sup> *Walls v. State*, 32 Ark. 565.

<sup>85</sup> *Beggs v. State*, 55 Ala. 108. And see *State v. Cone*, 86 Wis. 498, 57 N. W. 50, where the Ohio doctrine was rejected as unsupported "either in reason or authority." The rule that such marriages are voidable only is also recognized in *Willits v. Willits*, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 767, 14 Ann. Cas. 883; *People v. Souleotes*, 26 Cal. App. 309, 146 Pac. 903; *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 63 Misc. Rep. 580, 117 N. Y. Supp. 671; *Ex parte Hollometer*, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 847, 132 Am. St. Rep. 952, 17 Ann. Cas. 91; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 23 Okl. 490, 100 Pac. 541, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1202; *People v. Ham*, 206 Ill. App. 543; *Owen v. Coffey*, 201 Ala. 531, 78 South. 885; *Levy v. Downing*, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638 (construing New Hampshire Statute).

<sup>86</sup> *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. § 20; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 149; Co. Litt. 79; *Shaffer v. State*, 20 Ohio, 1. But see *People v. Slack*, 15 Mich. 193. "The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient to avoid all other contracts, on account of the imbecility of judgment in the parties contracting. A fortiori, therefore, it ought to avoid this, the most important contract of any. Therefore, if a boy under 14 or a girl under 12 years of age marries, this marriage is only inchoate and imperfect; and, when either of them comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree, and declare the marriage void, without any divorce or sentence in the spiritual court. This is founded on the civil law. But the canon laws pays a greater regard to the constitution, than the age, of the parties; for, if they are habiles ad matrimonium, it is a good marriage, whatever their age may be. And in our law it is so far a marriage that if, at the age of consent, they agree to continue together, they need not be married again. If the husband be of years of discretion, and the wife under 12, when she comes to years of discretion he may disagree as well as she may, for in contracts the obligation

the age of consent is not estopped from avoiding his marriage on reaching the age of consent by the fact that he fraudulently misrepresented his age.<sup>87</sup>

A marriage that is voidable because of nonage differs from a marriage that is voidable because of a canonical disability, in that it can be avoided by the act of the party or parties, and no decree of nullity is necessary.<sup>88</sup> As will be seen in another section, statutes raising the age of consent, though they may declare a marriage under the age of consent to be "void," are construed to mean "voidable," and to leave the effect of the marriage the same as at common law.<sup>89</sup> Consent of parents, as an essential of marriage, is referred to in another place.<sup>90</sup>

## CAPACITY OF PARTIES OTHERWISE THAN MENTALLY

14. The parties must be capable, in other respects than mentally, of entering into the marriage relation. There must be no impediment of

- (a) Relationship.
- (b) Physical incapacity.
- (c) Civil conditions.
- (d) Prior marriage.

must be mutual; both must be bound, or neither; and so it is, vice versa, when the wife is of years of discretion, and the husband under." 1 Bl. Comm. 436. It will be noticed that, in thus stating the law, Blackstone not only erroneously classes marriage as a contract, but by doing so he falls into error in attempting to support the rule allowing marriage to be avoided by either party, though one of them was above the age of consent, by reference to principles of the law of contract; that is, he erroneously assumes that, where an adult makes a contract with an infant, he, as well as the infant, may avoid it. This tends to show the difficulty and danger in considering marriage as a contract.

<sup>87</sup> See *Elliot v. Elliot*, 81 Wis. 295, 51 N. W. 81, 15 L. R. A. 259.

<sup>88</sup> Co. Litt. 79; 2 Burn, Ecc. Law, 500; 1 Bl. Comm. 436; *Walls v. State*, 32 Ark. 565, 570; *McDeed v. McDeed*, 67 Ill. 545; *People v. Slack*, 15 Mich. 183. But see *Owen v. Coffey*, 201 Ala. 531, 78 South. 885; *People v. Ham*, 206 Ill. App. 543; *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 63 Misc. Rep. 580, 117 N. Y. Supp. 671, holding that suit for annulment is necessary. The marriage is voidable only at the election of one of the parties, and not by a parent of one of them. *Wood v. Baker*, 43 Misc. Rep. 310, 88 N. Y. Supp. 854.

<sup>89</sup> Post, p. 56.

<sup>90</sup> Post, p. 37.

### SAME—RELATIONSHIP

15. The parties must not be within the prohibited degrees of kindred, either by consanguinity or affinity. In the absence of a statute, there can be no valid marriage within the Levitical degrees; that is, within the third degree of civil reckoning, inclusive, or, in other words, nearer than first cousins. In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, such marriages are voidable, and not void. The whole subject is now very generally regulated by statutes, defining the limits within which relations may not marry, and generally declaring marriages within the prohibited degrees absolutely void.

In England, prior to the reign of Henry VIII, the limits of the disqualification of relationship had been extended so far by the ecclesiastical courts that it became necessary to pass a statute defining the limits within which relations should not be permitted to intermarry; and the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38, was enacted. This statute prohibited the ecclesiastical courts from impeaching "any marriage without the Levitical degrees." Under this statute the impediment of consanguinity has been treated "as applicable to the whole ascending and descending line, and, further, as extending to the third degree of the civil reckoning, inclusive; or, in other words, so as to prohibit all marriages nearer than first cousins."<sup>91</sup> Under this statute the impediment of consanguinity, or blood relationship, would extend to a man's grandmother, his father's or mother's sister, his mother, or his daughter or granddaughter. And it would extend to a woman's grandfather, her father's or mother's brother, her father, her son, or her grandson.<sup>92</sup> The statute is old enough to have become a part of our common law, and it has been so recognized. In most states, however, statutes have been enacted.<sup>93</sup> In some states the limits have been

<sup>91</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. (5th Ed.) § 16.

<sup>92</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. (5th Ed.) § 16; *Harrison v. State*, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 551, 73 Am. Dec. 99. See, also, *Weisberg v. Weisberg*, 112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. Supp. 260.

<sup>93</sup> These statutes will not be construed as retroactive. *Weisberg v. Weisberg*, 112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. Supp. 260; *In re Wittick's Estate*, 164 Iowa, 485, 145 N. W. 913; *Schofield v. Schofield*, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 504.

extended.<sup>94</sup> The rule of consanguinity applies as well to the half blood as to the whole blood,<sup>95</sup> and to illegitimate as well as legitimate issue.<sup>96</sup>

Affinity is the relationship by marriage between the husband and the blood relations of the wife, and between the wife and the blood relations of the husband. "A husband is related by affinity to all the consanguinei of his wife, and, vice versa, the wife to the husband's consanguinei; for, the husband and wife being considered one flesh, those who are related to the one by blood are related to the other by affinity."<sup>97</sup> In English law the same impediment to marriage existed in the case of relationship by affinity as in the case of relationship by blood, so that a man could not marry his grandfather's wife, his wife's grandmother, his father's brother's wife, his mother's brother's wife, his wife's father's sister, his wife's mother's sister, his stepmother, his wife's mother, his wife's sister, or his stepdaughter. And a woman could not marry her grandmother's husband, her husband's grandfather, her father's sister's husband, her mother's sister's husband, her husband's father's

<sup>94</sup> See statutes of the several states. In some states the prohibition includes first cousins. See, for example, Act Pa. June 24, 1901 (P. L. 597); Rev. St. Ill. 1874, c. 89, § 1, as amended by Laws 1887, p. 225; Act Iowa, July 4, 1909, c. 212. Rem. & Bal. Code Wash. § 7151, prohibiting first cousins from marrying, is not repealed by implication by section 2455, defining incest, or by Laws Ex. Sess. 1909, c. 16, prohibiting marriages in certain cases; there being nothing in the last act indicating an intent to legalize marriages between persons nearer than second cousins. *State v. Nakashima*, 62 Wash. 686, 114 Pac. 894, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 220. A marriage between a man and the daughter of his half-sister is within the prohibition of section 1 of chapter 89 of the statutes (Hurd's Rev. St. Ill. 1913; Jones & A. Ann. St. 1913, par. 7345) of marriages between uncles and nieces. *Williams v. McKeene*, 193 Ill. App. 615.

<sup>95</sup> *Reg. v. Inhabitants of Brighton*, 1 Best & S. 447. In most states there are special enactments to this effect.

<sup>96</sup> *Reg. v. Chadwick*, 11 Q. B. 173; *Horner v. Liddiard*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 337, 352; *Morgan v. State*, 11 Ala. 289. Contra, *State v. Roswell*, 6 Conn. 446.

<sup>97</sup> *Gibs. Cod.* 412; 1 Bl. Comm. 435; *Butler v. Gastrill*, Gilb. Ch. 156; *Chinn v. State*, 47 Ohio St. 575, 26 N. E. 986, 11 L. R. A. 630; *Blodget v. Brinsmaid*, 9 Vt. 27. In some states it has been held that relationship by affinity is terminated by the dissolution by death or divorce of the marriage which produced it. *Blodget v. Brinsmaid*, 9 Vt. 27; *Kelly v. Neely*, 12 Ark. 657, 56 Am. Dec. 288; *Bock v. Bock*, 148 Iowa, 223, 125 N. W. 1009, L. R. A. 1916C, 752, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1025. The contrary rule was adopted in *Spear v. Robinson*, 29 Me. 531; and in *Paddock v. Wells*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 331, it is said that the relationship is not terminated by death if living issue of the marriage survives.

brother, her husband's mother's brother, her stepfather, her husband's father, her husband's brother, or her stepson."<sup>8</sup> In this country many of the courts have refused to follow the English law in this respect. In Vermont, for instance, it was held that a man could marry his deceased wife's sister."<sup>9</sup> In most states the impediment of relationship both by consanguinity and affinity is entirely regulated by statute.

Consanguinity and affinity, being canonical disabilities, render marriages voidable, and not void,<sup>1</sup> unless the rule has been changed by statute, and all the principles governing voidable marriages apply. In some states, by statute, marriage within the prohibited degrees of kindred are now declared to be not merely voidable, but void.<sup>2</sup> But statutes declaring such marriages to be void have been held in some courts to be simply declaratory of the English law, that is, to mean that they are void only upon a decree of court during the lives of the parties.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 16; *Hill v. Good*, Vaughan, 302; *Harris v. Hicks*, 2 Salk. 548.

<sup>89</sup> *Blodget v. Brinsmaid*, 9 Vt. 27; *Kelly v. Neely*, 12 Ark. 657, 56 Am. Dec. 288.

<sup>1</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 16; *Harrison v. State*, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658; *Schofield v. Schofield*, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564; *Tyler v. Andrews*, 40 App. D. C. 100; *State v. Smith*, 101 S. C. 293, 85 S. E. 958, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 149; *Boylan v. Delnzer*, 45 N. J. Eq. 485, 18 Atl. 119. A marriage between relations within forbidden degrees will be annulled at the instance of either party, though the applicant may have knowingly and willfully entered into the same. *Martin v. Martin*, 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120, 1 Ann. Cas. 612.

<sup>2</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6112; *McIlvain v. Schelbley*, 109 Ky. 455, 59 S. W. 498; *Fearnow v. Jones*, 34 Okl. 694, 126 Pac. 1015, L. R. A. 1916C, 720. Since the passage of Act June 24, 1901 (P. L. 597), prohibiting the marriage of first cousins, such a marriage is incestuous. *McClain v. McClain*, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 248. Under Rev. St. 1874, c. 89, § 1, as amended by Laws 1887, p. 225, and Cr. Code, div. 1, § 157 (Rev. St. 1874, c. 38), marriage of first cousins are void, and not merely voidable and there can be no estoppel against the right to allege the invalidity of the marriage. *Arado v. Arado*, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N. E. 816, 4 A. L. R. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Harrison v. State*, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658; *Bonham v. Badgley*, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 622; *Parker's Appeal*, 44 Pa. 309; *Com. v. Perryman*, 2 Leigh (Va.) 717; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 551, 73 Am. Dec. 99; post, p. 66.

### SAME—PHYSICAL INCAPACITY

16. The parties must be physically capable; but capacity to copulate, not fruitfulness, is the test. The incapacity must exist at the time of the marriage. Neither party can set up his or her own impotence to defeat the marriage. In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, impotence renders a marriage voidable, and not void.

The parties to a marriage must be physically capable. Ability to propagate the species is not, however, as might well be supposed, the test of the requisite physical condition. If the parties are able to have sexual intercourse, the requirements of the law are satisfied. Copula, not fruitfulness, is the test.<sup>4</sup> There must be an *impotentia copulandi* on the part of the man or of the woman, proceeding from malformation, frigidity, disease, or some other like cause. The law does not fail to recognize the procreation of children as one of the ends of matrimony, but it does refuse to annul a marriage merely because one of the parties is not capable of procreation.<sup>5</sup> Impotence must exist at the time of the marriage, to avoid it. If a party is physically capable of copulation at the time of the marriage, his or her subsequent impotency does not avoid the marriage.<sup>6</sup> Neither party will be permitted to set up his or her own impotence as a ground of nullity.<sup>7</sup> Nullity of marriage has been decreed on the

<sup>4</sup> *D— v. A—*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 298; *Anon.*, Deane & S. 296; *Briggs v. Morgan*, 3 Phillim. Ecc. 325; *Devanbagh v. Devanbagh*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 554, 28 Am. Dec. 443; *E— v. T—*, 33 Law J. Mat. Cas. 37; *J. G. v. H. G.*, 33 Md. 401, 3 Am. Rep. 183; *Keith v. Keith*, Wright (Ohio) 518; *Powell v. Powell*, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774; *Bascomb v. Bascomb*, 25 N. H. 267; *Norton v. Norton*, 2 Aiken (Vt.) 188; *Schroter v. Schroter*, 56 Misc. Rep. 69, 106 N. Y. Supp. 22; *Wendel v. Wendel*, 30 App. Div. 447, 52 N. Y. Supp. 72. The wife's epilepsy, limiting, but not preventing, copulation, is not, in the absence of fraud, ground for annulment of the marriage. *Elser v. Elser* (Supp.) 160 N. Y. Supp. 724. Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1752, authorizing an action to annul a marriage on the ground of physical incapacity by the party who is physically incapable, a wife may sue to annul her marriage because of her physical incapacity resulting from a hysterical condition accompanied by mental and emotional disturbances following attempts to consummate the marriage. *Anonymous v. Anonymous*, 69 Misc. Rep. 489, 126 N. Y. Supp. 149.

<sup>5</sup> *D— v. A—*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 298; *Schroter v. Schroter*, 56 Misc. Rep. 69, 106 N. Y. Supp. 22.

<sup>6</sup> *W— v. H—*, 30 Law J. Prob. Mat. & Adm. 73; *D— v. A—*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 298.

<sup>7</sup> *Norton v. Seton*, 3 Phillim. Ecc. 147.

ground of impotence, even when it was curable, where the party refused to submit to the necessary treatment to effect a cure.<sup>8</sup> Except in such a case, however, curable impotence does not render a marriage invalid.

In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, impotence, being a canonical impediment, renders a marriage voidable, and not absolutely void,<sup>9</sup> and the principles applicable to voidable marriages apply.<sup>10</sup> In some states this rule has been changed by statute.<sup>11</sup> But the same rule of construction applies to these statutes as has been mentioned as applicable to statutes in regard to relationship. As to whether a court of equity has jurisdiction, in this country, to annul a marriage on the ground of impotence is shown in another place.<sup>12</sup>

In several states statutes have been enacted for the purpose of preventing the marriage of persons afflicted with certain diseases.<sup>13</sup>

### SAME—CIVIL CONDITIONS—RACE, ETC.

17. The parties must not be disqualified by civil conditions. Thus, in many states, marriages between negroes, Indians, or Chinese, and white persons, are prohibited.

At common law, and in England to-day, no impediment to marriage exists on account of race, color, religion, or social rank.<sup>14</sup> In many of the United States, by statute, however, marriages between white persons and negroes, and in a few states between white per-

<sup>8</sup> *Devanbagh v. Devanbagh*, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 175; *L— v. L—*, 7 Prob. Div. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 19; *T. v. M. L. R.*, 1 Prob. & Div. 31; *A. v. B.*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 559; *T. v. D.*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 127; *Cavell v. Prince*, L. R. 1 Exch. 246; *Anonymous*, 24 N. J. Eq. 19; *P. v. S.*, 37 Law J. Mat. Cas. 80; *Smith v. Moorehead*, 59 N. C. 360; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 169 Ala. 618, 53 South. 986, L. R. A. 1916C, 693; *G— v. G—*, 67 N. J. Eq. 30, 56 Atl. 736.

<sup>10</sup> Post, p. 56.

<sup>11</sup> Stim. Am. St. Law, § 6112.

<sup>12</sup> Post, p. 59.

<sup>13</sup> Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, §§ 4373-4378; St. Wis. 1913, § 2339m. See *Peterson v. Widule*, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1040. But see *McGill v. McGill*, 179 App. Div. 343, 166 N. Y. Supp. 397, reversing judgment 99 Misc. Rep. 86, 163 N. Y. Supp. 462.

<sup>14</sup> 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 691.

sons and Indians or Chinese, are unlawful.<sup>15</sup> These statutes, as a rule, make such unions absolutely void, without the necessity of a judicial sentence, and leave either party free to enter into a subsequent marriage.

Slavery was formerly a further impediment. It was a rule that a slave, being a chattel, could not make any contract; and, as marriage was in the nature of a contract, slave marriages were therefore absolutely void.<sup>16</sup> But they have now very generally been legalized by statute, where cohabitation continued after emancipation.<sup>17</sup>

### SAME—PRIOR MARRIAGE

18. In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, a valid and undissolved prior marriage of either party renders a marriage absolutely void *ab initio*, even though the parties may have acted in good faith, and in a reasonable belief that the former spouse was dead or divorced.

It is the rule of the common law that a valid and undissolved prior marriage by either or both of the parties is an impediment to marriage. An attempted second marriage while a valid prior marriage is undissolved is absolutely void, and void *ab initio*, without any decree of court; the children of the second marriage being illegitimate, and the marriage being subject to collateral attack by any person, and at any time.<sup>18</sup> It is immaterial whether

<sup>15</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6112 F. See *State v. Brady*, 9 *Humph. (Tenn.)* 74; *State v. Hooper*, 27 *N. C.* 201; *Succession of Minvielle*, 15 *La. Ann.* 342; *Bailey v. Fiske*, 34 *Me.* 77; *Jones v. Jones*, 45 *Md.* 144; *Honey v. Clark*, 37 *Tex.* 687; *In re Walker's Estate*, 5 *Ariz.* 70, 46 *Pac.* 67; *Wilbur v. Bingham*, 8 *Wash.* 35, 35 *Pac.* 407, 40 *Am. St. Rep.* 886; *Carter v. Veith*, 139 *La.* 534, 71 *South.* 792. *Rev. St.* 1909, § 8290, declaring marriages between white persons and negroes absolutely void, has reference to blood or race, and not to color. A negro, within the statute, means a person having one-eighth portion or more of negro blood. *Marre v. Marre*, 184 *Mo. App.* 198, 168 *S. W.* 636.

<sup>16</sup> *Hall v. U. S.*, 92 *U. S.* 27, 23 *L. Ed.* 597; *Cantelou v. Doe*, 56 *Ala.* 519; *Napier v. Church*, 132 *Tenn.* 111, 177 *S. W.* 56; *Lemons v. Harris*, 115 *Va.* 809, 80 *S. E.* 740; *Merrick v. Betts*, 214 *Mass.* 223, 101 *N. E.* 131; *Howard v. Howard*, 51 *N. C.* 235.

<sup>17</sup> A slave marriage entered into in Georgia is ratified by continued cohabitation after emancipation. *Meyers v. Meyers*, 139 *La.* 752, 72 *South.* 218.

<sup>18</sup> *Riddlesden v. Wogan*, *Cro. Eliz.* 858; *Pride v. Earls of Bath*, 1 *Salk.* 121; *Plant v. Taylor*, 7 *Hurl. & N.* 211; *Miles v. Chilton*, 1 *Rob. Ecc.* 687; *In re Wilson's Trusts*, *L. R.* 1 *Eq.* 247; *Zahorka v. Geith*, 129 *Wis.* 498, 109 *N. W.*

the former marriage were formal or ceremonial marriage or an informal or common-law marriage.<sup>19</sup> And since such marriages are void they cannot be ratified.<sup>20</sup>

The common-law rule has been changed in some states by statutes providing, in substance, that if the second marriage was entered into in good faith, and on a reasonable belief that the former spouse was dead, the marriage is merely voidable, becoming void only on a declaration of nullity by a court of competent jurisdiction,<sup>21</sup> and that the issue shall be deemed the legitimate children

552; *Glass v. Glass*, 114 Mass. 563; *Martin's Heirs v. Martin*, 22 Ala. 86; *Fenton v. Reed*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; *Heffner v. Heffner*, 23 Pa. 104; *Jackson v. Claw*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 347; *Blossom v. Barrett*, 37 N. Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; *Higgins v. Breen*, 9 Mo. 497; *Grigsby v. Reib* (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027; *Ponder v. Graham*, 4 Fla. 23; *Tefft v. Tefft*, 35 Ind. 44; *Rhea v. Rhenner*, 1 Pet. 105, 7 L. Ed. 72; *Drummond v. Irish*, 52 Iowa, 41, 2 N. W. 622, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 24; *Dare v. Dare*, 52 N. J. Eq. 195, 27 Atl. 654; *Reeves v. Reeves*, 54 Ill. 332; *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *Emerson v. Shaw*, 56 N. H. 418; *Janes v. Janes*, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 141; *McCaig v. State*, 16 Ala. App. 581, 80 South. 155; *Williams v. State*, 44 Ala. 24; *Succession of Thomas*, 144 La. 25, 80 South. 186; *Clark v. Clark*, 115 Miss. 726, 76 South. 638; *Butler v. Butler*, 93 Misc. Rep. 258, 157 N. Y. Supp. 188; *McCullen v. McCullen*, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. S. 1069; *Evatt v. Mier*, 114 Ark. 84, 169 S. W. 817, L. R. A. 1916C, 759; *Goset v. Goset*, 112 Ark. 47, 164 S. W. 759, L. R. A. 1916C, 707; *Duenser v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum*, 262 Ill. 475, 104 N. E. 801, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, reversing judgment 178 Ill. App. 648; *In re Huston's Estate*, 48 Mont. 524, 139 Pac. 458.

<sup>19</sup>*Applegate v. Applegate*, 45 N. J. Eq. 116, 17 Atl. 293; *Cunningham v. Cunningham* (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 242; *Walton v. Walton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 188.

<sup>20</sup>*Pettit v. Pettit*, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001; *In re Graham* (N. J. Eq.) 46 Atl. 224; *Blanke v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 82 Miss. 203, 35 South. 570; *Earle v. Earle*, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317; *McCullen v. McCullen*, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1069; *Kinney v. Tri State Tel. Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1180. But see *Stein v. Stein*, 66 Ill. App. 526; *People v. Booth*, 121 Mich. 131, 79 N. W. 1100. The party at fault may be estopped to allege the invalidity of the second marriage. *Shrader v. Shrader*, 119 Miss. 526, 81 South. 227. And see *Rawson v. Rawson*, 156 Mass. 578, 31 N. E. 653.

<sup>21</sup>*Vigno v. Vigno* (N. H.) 106 Atl. 285; *Stokes v. Stokes*, 198 N. Y. 301, 91 N. E. 793; *Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Barnard*, 9 Ga. App. 71, 70 S. E. 678; *Brown v. Brown*, 153 App. Div. 645, 138 N. Y. Supp. 602; *Barker v. Barker*, 172 App. Div. 244, 158 N. Y. Supp. 413, modifying judgment 92 Misc. Rep. 390, 156 N. Y. Supp. 194; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 63 App. Div. 231, 71 N. Y. Supp. 411; *In re Del Genovese's Will*, 56 Misc. Rep. 418, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1033, affirmed 136 App. Div. 894, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1121; *Chittenden v. Chittenden*, 68 Misc. Rep. 192, 123 N. Y. Supp. 629. There must, however, be reasonable efforts made to ascertain the facts. *Gall v.*

of the parent not previously married.<sup>22</sup> In the absence of a statutory provision, however, the good faith of either or both of the parties is immaterial, in so far as the validity of the marriage and legitimacy of the children are concerned,<sup>23</sup> though in some jurisdictions a bona fide belief in the death of a husband or wife, under certain circumstances, may be a defense in a prosecution for bigamy.<sup>24</sup>

When a man and woman are legally married the woman continues to be his wife, notwithstanding her subsequent bigamous marriage during his lifetime.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, a void marriage, of course, is no marriage at all, and can impose no restraint on the right of the parties to marry again. Therefore, where an attempted marriage is void, a second marriage is perfectly valid, though the

Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E. 106, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 28. Where the second marriage occurred before the expiration of five years from the time of the abandonment, it is invalid from the beginning. In re Stanton (Sur.) 123 N. Y. Supp. 458. A woman whose husband had left her for over seven years may lawfully contract a common-law marriage. In re Spondre, 98 Misc. Rep. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943. Under Civ. Code 1902, § 2661, declaring that all marriages contracted while either of the parties has a former spouse living shall be void, but that the section shall not extend to a person whose husband or wife shall have been absent for seven years, the one not knowing the other to be living at that time, a second marriage, by a woman whose first husband was living, though he had been absent for more than seven years, was not valid, for, under the constitutional provision that no divorce shall be allowed, marriages are indissoluble, though the second marriage was entitled to a presumption of validity until the existence of the former spouse was established. Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 538. Where the husband was in the penitentiary, and the wife had not seen him for five years, there was no presumption of his death to support the good faith of the wife in marrying again. Alixanian v. Alixanian, 28 Misc. Rep. 638, 59 N. Y. Supp. 1068. Under Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 40) § 511, Domestic Relations Law (Consol. Laws, c. 14) §§ 6, 58, and in view of Prison Law (Consol. Laws, c. 43, as amended by Laws 1910, c. 703) §§ 212, 214, 215, and section 218 as amended by Laws 1912, c. 286, relating to a parole on discharge of persons given an indeterminate sentence, the wife of one convicted of second degree murder, sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years, could again marry. Gargan v. Sculley, 82 Misc. Rep. 667, 144 N. Y. Supp. 205.

<sup>22</sup> Stim. Am. St. Law, § 6116.

<sup>23</sup> In re Wilson's Trusts, L. R. 1 Eq. 247; Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260; Kenley v. Kenley, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 207; Heffner v. Heffner, 23 Pa. 104; Thomas v. Thomas, 124 Pa. 646, 17 Atl. 182; Webster v. Webster, 56 N. H. 3; Pain v. Pain, 37 Mo. App. 110.

<sup>24</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 309. See, also, Wilson v. Allen, 108 Ga. 275, 33 S. E. 975.

<sup>25</sup> Estes v. Merrill, 121 Ark. 361, 181 S. W. 136.

first marriage has not been judicially annulled.<sup>26</sup> But, for obvious reasons, it is desirable to have the validity of the prior marriage determined by sentence of nullity. A divorce a mensa et thoro, of course, does not entitle either party to marry again; but it is otherwise, in the absence of statutory prohibition, in the case of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. The divorce must of course be absolute. A decree nisi is not sufficient to entitle either party to marry.<sup>27</sup> And of course the divorce must be valid.<sup>28</sup> The presumption as to dissolution of the prior marriage by death or divorce are considered in a subsequent section.<sup>29</sup>

#### *Restrictions on Right to Marry after Divorce*

In many states statutes have been enacted placing restrictions on the right to marry after even an absolute divorce, as by prohibiting a marriage within a certain time,<sup>30</sup> or in case of divorce for

<sup>26</sup> *Patterson v. Gaines*, 6 How. 550, 12 L. Ed. 553; *Bruce v. Burke*, 2 Adams, Ecc. 471, 2 Eng. Ecc. R. 381; *Reg. v. Chadwick*, 12 Jur. 174, 11 Q. B. 173; *Appleton v. Warner*, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 270; *In re Bethune's Will*, 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 392; *McCaffrey v. Benson*, 38 La. Ann. 198; *Reeves v. Reeves*, 54 Ill. 332; *Drummond v. Irish*, 52 Iowa, 41, 2 N. W. 622, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 24; *Dare v. Dare*, 52 N. J. Eq. 195, 27 Atl. 654; *In re Eichhoff's Estate*, 101 Cal. 600, 36 Pac. 11; *In re Harrington's Estate*, 140 Cal. 244, 73 Pac. 1000, 98 Am. St. Rep. 51, rehearing denied 140 Cal. 294, 73 Pac. 1131, 74 Pac. 136.

<sup>27</sup> *Cook v. Cook*, 144 Mass. 163, 10 N. E. 749; *Pettit v. Pettit*, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001; *Wilson v. Burnett*, 105 Misc. Rep. 279, 172 N. Y. Supp. 673; *Dallman v. Dallman*, 159 Wis. 480, 149 N. W. 137; *In re Elliott's Estate*, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

<sup>28</sup> *McCreery v. Davis*, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178, 28 L. R. A. 655, 51 Am. St. Rep. 794; *State v. Westmoreland*, 76 S. C. 145, 56 S. E. 673, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842.

<sup>29</sup> Post, p. 62.

<sup>30</sup> Code Ala. 1907, § 3811 (sixty days); *Hurd's Rev. St. Ill.* 1909, c. 40, § 1a (one year; but the party guilty of adultery two years); Code Supp. Iowa 1913, § 3181 (one year); Gen. St. Kan. 1915, § 7582 (six months); Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 152, § 21 (guilty party two years); Gen. St. Minn. 1913, § 7090 (six months); Rev. Codes Mont. 1907, § 3657 (two years; guilty party three years); Gen. Laws Vt. 1917, § 3602 (guilty party three years); Rem. Code, Wash. 1915, §§ 991, 992 (six months or pending appeal); Code W. Va. 1916, c. 64, § 14 (Code Supp. 1918 [sec. 3648a]) (six months; the guilty party may be further prohibited for any period not to exceed five years); St. Wis. 1915, § 2330 (one year); Comp. St. Wyo. 1910, § 3951 (one year). In the District of Columbia only the innocent party may marry. Code of Law D. C. 1911, § 966. In several states the period within which the parties may marry may be fixed by the court in the decree. Comp. Laws Mich. 1915, § 11434; Comp. Laws, N. D. 1913, § 4379. In Georgia the period may be fixed by the jury. Park's Ann. Civ. Code Ga. 1914, § 2964. In Oregon the parties may not marry within the time for taking an appeal. L. O. L. 1910, § 515.

adultery by prohibiting the guilty party from marrying his or her paramour, or from marrying at all in the lifetime of the other party.<sup>31</sup> Though in a few jurisdictions it has been held that under such statutes a marriage within the period specified is voidable only and not void,<sup>32</sup> the general rule, sustained by the great weight of authority, is that marriages entered into in contravention of the provisions of the statute, are absolutely void.<sup>33</sup> But it has been

Of course, in those states where the statute provides for an interlocutory decree of divorce to become final only after the lapse of a fixed period the parties cannot marry until the decree becomes final. See Civ. Code Cal. §§ 61, 132; Laws Colo. 1917, pp. 183, 184; Code Del. 1915, § 3026; Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 152, § 18; Rev. St. Neb. 1913, § 1606; 2 Comp. St. N. J. 1910, p. 2035, §§ 20, 21; Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, c. 247, § 19. Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 40, § 1a, prohibiting remarriage of divorced persons within one year, since it applies alike to all persons similarly situated, does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1, as to equal protection of the laws. *Hobbs v. Hobbs*, 279 Ill. 163, 116 N. E. 629.

<sup>31</sup> *Hemingway's Code* Miss. 1917, § 1412; Laws N. Y. 1909, c. 19 (Consol. Laws, c. 14) § 8; Civ. Code S. D. 1913, p. 11, § 83; Code Tenn. 1918, § 4228; Code Va. 1904, § 2265.

<sup>32</sup> *Park v. Barron*, 20 Ga. 702, 65 Am. Dec. 641; *State v. Yoder*, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N. W. 10, L. R. A. 1916C, 686; *Lee v. Lee*, 150 Iowa, 611, 130 N. W. 128; *Crawford v. State*, 73 Miss. 172, 18 South. 848, 35 L. R. A. 224; *Woodward v. Blake*, 38 N. D. 38, 164 N. W. 156, L. R. A. 1918A, 88, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 552. A statutory prohibition to the effect that, in case of divorce on the ground of adultery, the guilty party can never marry his or her accomplice in adultery, is directed against marriage between the guilty spouse and the particular person or persons who are designated in the petition for the divorce, or described in the evidence in support of it, and upon which petition and evidence the decree of divorce is founded. *Succession of Hernandez*, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 South. 461, 24 L. R. A. 831.

<sup>33</sup> *White v. White*, 105 Mass. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 526; *State v. Shattuck*, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936; *Ovitt v. Smith*, 68 Vt. 35, 33 Atl. 769, 35 L. R. A. 223; *Rand v. Bogle*, 197 Ill. App. 476; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 98 Misc. Rep. 411, 162 N. Y. Supp. 365; *State v. Fenn*, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800; *Evans v. Evans*, 200 Ala. 329, 76 South. 95; *Szlauzis v. Szlauzis*, 255 Ill. 314, 99 N. E. 640, L. R. A. 1916C, 741, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 454; *Wilhite v. Wilhite*, 41 Kan. 154, 21 Pac. 173; *In re Elliott's Estate*, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439; *Wilson v. Cook*, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 365; *Snell v. Snell*, 191 Ill. App. 239; *Succession of Gabliso*, 119 La. 703, 44 South. 438, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082, 121 Am. St. Rep. 529; *Hooper v. Hooper*, 67 Or. 187, 135 Pac. 205, 525; *State v. Sartwell*, 81 Vt. 22, 69 Atl. 151, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1017; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 201 Ill. App. 615; *Thomas v. James* (Okla.) 171 Pac. 855; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605, 1 Ann. Cas. 199. Where the defendant was granted a decree of divorce during the forenoon of June 6, 1913, and was married to the complainant at 5 o'clock p. m., June 6, 1914, such marriage was within the provision of the statute prohibiting marriage "within one year from the time" a decree of divorce from a prior marriage was

held in California that a statute prohibiting divorced persons from marrying within the period in which an appeal may be taken applies only to residents of the state, and does not render invalid a marriage within the state of nonresidents, one or both of whom had been divorced in some other state.<sup>34</sup> The effect of marriages contracted outside of the state to evade the law restricting the right to marry after divorce will be considered in a subsequent section.<sup>35</sup>

### FORMALITIES IN CELEBRATION—INFORMAL MARRIAGES

19. The parties should comply with the statutory law in the celebration of marriage, but noncompliance does not necessarily render the marriage invalid. At common law no formalities are necessary; mutual consent, express or implied from conduct, being sufficient.
20. If a statute prescribes formalities for the celebration of marriage, it is not to be construed as rendering an informal marriage invalid, unless it expressly so declares.
21. Informal marriages may be *per verba de præsenti*—that is, by consent to live together presently as husband and wife—no copula being necessary. It is sometimes said that there may be a marriage *per verba de futuro cum copula*—that is, by an agreement to marry in the future, followed by copula in pursuance thereof. But it is believed that by the better authority a marriage can be effected *per verba de futuro cum copula* only when the circumstances are such that a present agreement at the time of the copula can be implied.

In most, if not all, of the states, statutes have been enacted prescribing certain formalities to be observed in the celebration of

granted, as the first day should be excluded, and the last included. *Kahlo v. Kahlo*, 204 Ill. App. 409.

<sup>34</sup> *People v. Woodby*, 22 Cal. App. 674, 136 Pac. 312. It has been held in Oregon that a marriage by the only party entitled to appeal from the decree of divorce is not void. *Wallace v. McDaniel*, 59 Or. 378, 117 Pac. 314, L. R. A. 1916C, 744. But compare *Hooper v. Hooper*, 67 Or. 187, 135 Pac. 205, 525.

<sup>35</sup> See post, p. 71.

marriages. These statutes usually provide either for the publication of banns or the giving of public notice of the intention to marry in some other manner,<sup>36</sup> or for the issuance of a license to marry by some officer authorized to issue such licenses.<sup>37</sup> In many, if not all, states, consent of the parents or guardians is required where the parties are minors.

The statutes relating to ceremonial marriages also contain express provisions as to the persons who may solemnize marriages, such as priests, ministers of the gospel, judges, justices of the peace, or other magistrates.<sup>38</sup> Usually the person solemnizing the marriage is required to make a return thereof to some officer designated to keep a record thereof.<sup>39</sup> It is not essential to the validity of a ceremonial marriage that any particular form of words be used. It is sufficient if the words employed show a present agreement.<sup>40</sup>

Though the formalities prescribed by the statutes should be substantially complied with,<sup>41</sup> in a large majority of the states the statutes, unless expressly made mandatory by their terms, or by necessary implication, are construed as directory merely, and not mandatory,<sup>42</sup> and a marriage, if in other respects valid, is not in-

<sup>36</sup> See Rev. St. Me. 1916, c. 64, § 4, providing that residents of the State intending to be joined in marriage shall cause notice of their intentions to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the town in which each resides, or, if nonresidents, the notice shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the town in which the parties intend to have the marriage solemnized.

<sup>37</sup> See the statutes of the several states.

<sup>38</sup> See the statutes of the several states. In Indiana the mayor of a city may solemnize marriages. Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8361. In Florida a notary public may act. Comp. Laws Fla. 1914, § 2575; and see also section 305. See, also, Civ. Code S. C. 1912, § 3751. Under the Georgia statute, the ordinary is a judge, and may lawfully perform marriage ceremony. Darrow v. Darrow, 201 Ala. 477, 78 South. 383.

<sup>39</sup> See the statutes of the several states.

<sup>40</sup> *Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester*, 7 Mass. 48; *In re Richard*, 133 Cal. 524, 65 Pac. 1034; *Patterson v. Gaines*, 6 How. 550, 12 L. Ed. 553; *Beamish v. Beamish*, 9 H. L. Cas. 274, 11 Eng. Rep. 735. Celebration of marriage may be proved by oral testimony *Santiago v. Cruz*, 19 Phil. Rep. 145.

<sup>41</sup> *Act Alaska May 3, 1917* (Laws 1917, c. 56), in effect August 1, 1917; Civ. Code Cal. § 55, as amended by Act March 26, 1895 (St. 1895, p. 121); Rev. St. Ky. 1852, c. 47, § 2; *Carroll's Ky. St. 1915*, § 2097; *Klenke v. Noonan*, 118 Ky. 436, 81 S. W. 241; *Estill v. Rogers*, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 62; *Bashaw v. State*, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 177; *Smith v. Bank*, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392.

<sup>42</sup> *Franklin v. Lee*, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78; *State v. Zichfeld*, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800; *Renfrow v.*

validated by a mere informality in its celebration. The mere fact that the statute prescribes certain formalities does not render invalid a marriage in which those formalities are not strictly observed.<sup>43</sup>

Renfrow, 60 Kan. 277, 56 Pac. 534, 72 Am. St. Rep. 350, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 25; State v. McGilvery, 20 Wash. 240, 55 Pac. 115; Connors v. Connors, 5 Wyo. 433, 40 Pac. 968; In re Love's Estate, 42 Okl. 478, 142 Pac. 305, L. R. A. 1915E, 109; Maggett v. Roberts, 112 N. C. 71, 18 S. E. 919; Shattuck v. Shattuck, 118 Minn. 60, 136 N. W. 410; Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E. 641; Godfrey v. Rowland, 16 Hawaii, 377; Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Atl. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017; Gardner v. Manchester, 88 Me. 249, 33 Atl. 990; State v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297, 13 Pac. 279, 59 Am. Rep. 556; Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 139, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Landry v. Bellanger, 120 La. 962, 45 South. 957, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463, 14 Ann. Cas. 952; In re Svendsen's Estate, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410. In the following cases the provisions of the statutes of the respective states were held to be mandatory: Schumacher v. Great Northern R. Co., 23 N. D. 231, 136 N. W. 85; Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Atl. 829, 33 L. R. A. 411; Northfield v. Plymouth, 20 Vt. 582; Smith v. North Memphis Savings Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392; Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S. E. 910. See, also, Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29 W. Va. 732, 3 S. E. 36, and In re Meade's Estate, 82 W. Va. 650, 97 S. E. 127. In Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Sawy. 99, Fed. Cas. No. 6638, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon held that the provisions of the Oregon statute are mandatory, but as the statement was not necessary to the decision it must be regarded as dictum. Moreover, the views of the judge are contrary to the principles laid down in Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826.

<sup>43</sup> Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826; Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 185, 18 L. Ed. 186; Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528; Overseers of Poor of Town of Newbury v. Overseers of Poor of Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 19 Am. Dec. 703; Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Ill. App. 165; Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Par-ton v. Hervey, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119; Hervey v. Moseley, 7 Gray (Mass.) 479, 68 Am. Dec. 515; Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester, 2 N. H. 268, 9 Am. Dec. 61; Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; Dumaresly v. Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; Cannon v. Alsbury, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76, 10 Am. Dec. 709; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; Holmes v. Holmes, 6 La. 463, 26 Am. Dec. 482; Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78; State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800; Renfrow v. Renfrow, 60 Kan. 277, 56 Pac. 534, 72 Am. St. Rep. 350, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 25; State v. McGilvery, 20 Wash. 240, 55 Pac. 115; Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 27 Sup. Ct. 563, 51 L. Ed. 865. See, also, Act Alaska May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 56), in effect Aug. 1, 1917; Code Miss. 1906, § 3249. Unless the statute expressly declares a marriage without the consent of the parents or other requirements of the statute to be a nullity, such statutes will be construed to be directory only in these respects, so that the marriage will be held valid, though the disobedience of the statute may entail penalties on the licensing or officiating officers. Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255, affirming judgment 144 Ill. App. 119.

If, however, the statute specifically or by necessary implication so provides, a failure to comply with its provisions will render the marriage void.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, a marriage celebrated in

That consent of parents is not necessary to the validity of a marriage, even though a statute prohibits a marriage without such consent, and imposes a penalty for violation of its provisions, see *Rex v. Inhabitants of Birmingham*, 8 Barn. & C. 29; *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724; *Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce*, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; *Parton v. Hervey*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 119; *Hervey v. Moseley*, 7 Gray (Mass.) 479, 66 Am. Dec. 515; *Goodwin v. Thompson*, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 329; *Smyth v. State*, 13 Ark. 696; *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791; *Wyckoff v. Boggs*, 7 N. J. Law, 138; *Hargroves v. Thompson*, 31 Miss. 211; *Cannon v. Alsbury*, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76, 10 Am. Dec. 709; *Browning v. Browning*, 89 Kan. 98, 130 Pac. 852, L. R. A. 1916C, 1288, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 174; *Hunter v. Milam* (Cal.) 41 Pac. 332; *In re Ambrose*, 170 Cal. 160, 149 Pac. 43; *People v. Ham*, 206 Ill. App. 543. But see *In re McLaughlin's Estate*, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699. That solemnization before a qualified minister or particular magistrate is not necessary to the validity of a marriage, though a statute declares that only ministers and magistrates shall be competent to perform the marriage ceremony, see *Meister v. Moore*, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826; *Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester*, 2 N. H. 268, 9 Am. Dec. 61; *Campbell's Adm'r v. Gullatt*, 43 Ala. 57; *Carmichael v. State*, 12 Ohio St. 553; *Holder v. State*, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 19, 29 S. W. 793; *Ross v. Sparks*, 81 N. J. Eq. 117, 88 Atl. 384, affirmed, 81 N. J. Eq. 211, 88 Atl. 385; *Hunter v. Milam* (Cal.) 41 Pac. 332. And as to want of a license required by statute not rendering a marriage invalid, see *Meister v. Moore*, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826; *Teter v. Teter*, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; *Campbell's Adm'r v. Gullatt*, 43 Ala. 57; *Askew v. Dupree*, 30 Ga. 173; *Hargroves v. Thompson*, 31 Miss. 211; *Stevenson v. Gray*, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; *Dumaresly v. Fishly*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; *Connors v. Connors*, 5 Wyo. 433, 40 Pac. 966; *Chapman v. Chapman*, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 32 S. W. 564; *Franklin v. Lee*, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78; *State v. Zichfeld*, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800; *Draughn v. State*, 12 Okl. Cr. 479, 158 Pac. 890, L. R. A. 1916F, 793; *In re Svendsen's Estate*, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410; *Feehley v. Feehley*, 129 Md. 565, 99 A. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017; *Davidson v. Ream*, 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *Melcher v. Melcher*, 102 Neb. 790, 169 N. W. 720, 4 A. L. R. 492. Comp. Laws, § 8602 et seq., as to marriage licenses, does not invalidate a marriage because the affidavit for the marriage license falsely states residence in the county where the license is issued. *Switchmen's Union of North America v. Gillerman*, 196 Mich. 141, 162 N. W. 1024, L. R. A. 1918A, 1117. That mere irregularities in issuing the license will not affect the validity of the marriage, see *State v. Day*, 108 Minn. 121, 121 N. W. 611; *Reifschneider v. Reifschneider*, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255, affirming judgment 144 Ill. App. 119. But see *Herd v. Herd*, 194 Ala. 613, 69 South. 885, L. R. A. 1916B, 1243.

<sup>44</sup> *Franklin v. Lee*, 300 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78; *Schumacher v. Great Northern R. Co.*, 23 N. D. 231, 136 N. W. 85; *Bashaw v. State*, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 177; *Smith v. Bank*, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392. And see the following statutes: *Alaska*, Act May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 56), in effect August 1, 1917;

conformity with the requirements of the statute is complete, though not followed by cohabitation,<sup>45</sup> and its validity is not affected by any secret reservation of one of the parties, unknown to the other,<sup>46</sup> or by other acts not affecting the essentials of the marriage, but calculated only to deceive the public.<sup>47</sup>

*Informal or Common-Law Marriage*

The term "common-law marriage" may be defined as a marriage contracted by consent of the parties only, without either a religious or a civil ceremony. Such marriages were recognized by the canon law prior to the decree of the Council of Trent in 1563, but since that date a solemnization by a priest in the presence of witnesses has been required in most Catholic countries. In England, however, the decree was not recognized, and for several centuries it was the accepted rule that no ceremony was necessary to create the marriage relation. This view of the English law was overthrown in 1844 by the decision in *Regina v. Millis*,<sup>48</sup> and by subsequent legislation.

In the United States the old rule had gained a foothold long before the decision of *Regina v. Millis*, and though some states have refused to recognize informal or common-law marriages,<sup>49</sup>

Illinois, Act May 13, 1905 (Laws Ill. 1905, p. 317); Utah, Comp. Laws 1907, § 1184; Wisconsin, St. 1917, § 2339n.

<sup>45</sup> *Potter v. Barclay*, 15 Ala. 439; *Williams v. Williams*, 71 Misc. Rep. 500, 130 N. Y. Supp. 875; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 202 S. W. 175, judgment modified on second motion for rehearing 203 S. W. 939.

<sup>46</sup> *Hilton v. Roylance*, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821; *Barker v. Barker*, 88 Misc. Rep. 300, 151 N. Y. Supp. 811.

<sup>47</sup> *State v. Tillinghast*, 25 R. I. 391, 56 Atl. 181. The fact that the parties agreed to conceal their marriage and not live together openly for two years does not affect an otherwise legal marriage. *Reifschneider v. Reifschneider*, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255, affirming judgment 144 Ill. App. 119.

<sup>48</sup> 10 Clark & F. 534, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 66.

<sup>49</sup> *Alaska*—Common-law marriages contracted in Alaska after August 1, 1917, are not valid. See Act May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 56), in effect August 1, 1917. Marriages contracted prior to that date are probably valid.

*Arizona*—Common-law marriages contracted since October 1, 1913, are not valid. Civ. Code 1913, par. 3844. Marriages contracted prior to that date are probably valid. See Civ. Code Ariz. 1901, par. 3098.

*Arkansas*—*Furth v. Furth*, 97 Ark. 272, 133 S. W. 1037, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 595; *Evatt v. Miller*, 114 Ark. 84, 169 S. W. 817, L. R. A. 1916C, 759.

*California*—Common-law marriages contracted since March 26, 1895, are not valid. Civ. Code Cal. § 55; *Norman v. Norman*, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343, 66 Am. St. Rep. 74. Prior to the date mentioned such marriages were valid. *White v. White*, 82 Cal. 427, 23 Pac. 276, 7 L. R. A. 799; *Estate of McCausland*, 52 Cal. 577.

*Connecticut*—Common-law marriages are probably not valid. The question

in a majority of the states such marriages are regarded as valid.<sup>50</sup>

has never been before the Supreme Court, but such would seem to be the effect of Gen. St. 1902, § 4538.

*Delaware*—The Supreme Court of Delaware has very recently held such marriages invalid. *Wilmington Trust Co. v. Hendrixson*, 114 Atl. 215. This case approves of the Massachusetts rule that, where the state legislates in respect to marriage, such legislation supersedes the common law. The case goes much farther, however. It holds that common-law marriage is inconsistent with and is not suited to our institutions and was never adopted as a part of our common law.

*Illinois*—Common-law marriages contracted since July 1, 1905, are not valid. Act May 18, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 317). See *Wilson v. Cook*, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 365. Marriages contracted prior to that date are valid. *Port v. Port*, 70 Ill. 484; *McKenna v. McKenna*, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E. 641.

*Kentucky*—Common-law marriages contracted since 1852 are not valid. *Estill v. Rogers*, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 62; *Klenke v. Noonan*, 118 Ky. 436, 81 S. W. 241. See Rev. St. 1852, c. 47, § 2; *Carroll's Ky. St. 1915*, § 2097. Such marriages were valid prior to 1852. See *Donnelly v. Donnelly's Heirs*, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 113.

*Louisiana*—*Johnson's Heirs v. Raphael*, 117 La. 967, 42 South. 470. See Civil Codes 1825 and 1870. While Louisiana was a Spanish colony, and up to 1825, celebration by a priest was not necessary. The decree of the Council of Trent was not extended to the Spanish colonies in America. Succession of Prevost, 4 La. Ann. 347.

*Maine*—Though the question has not been decided by the courts of Maine, probably common-law marriages would not be recognized. The law regarding marriages is similar to that of Massachusetts. *State v. Hodskins*, 19 Me. 156, 36 Am. Dec. 742.

*Maryland*—*Denison v. Denison*, 35 Md. 361.

*Massachusetts*—*Milford v. Worcester*, 7 Mass. 48; *Norcross v. Norcross*, 155 Mass. 425, 29 N. E. 506.

*New Hampshire*—*Dunbarton v. Franklin*, 19 N. H. 257. But see Pub. St. 1901, c. 174, § 15.

*North Carolina*—Pell's Revisal 1908, § 2081; *State v. Wilson*, 121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416.

*North Dakota*—*Schumacher v. Great Nor. R. Co.*, 23 N. D. 231, 136 N. W. 55. Common-law marriages were valid prior to July 1, 1890.

*Tennessee*—*Bashaw v. State*, 1 Yerg. 177; *State v. Bank*, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392.

*Utah*—Common-law marriages contracted since the Act of March 8, 1888 (Laws 1888, p. 88) are invalid. Prior to that act they were valid. See *Hilton v. Roylance*, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821.

*Vermont*—*Northfield v. Plymouth*, 20 Vt. 582; *Morrill v. Palmer*, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Atl. 829, 33 L. R. A. 411.

*Virginia*—*Offield v. Davis*, 100 Va. 250, 210 S. E. 910.

*Washington*—*In re McLaughlin's Estate*, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L.

<sup>50</sup> See note 50 on following page.

Subject to the qualification that in some states cohabitation following the agreement is essential, it may be stated as the general rule that, in those states where no formalities of celebration are

*R. A.* 609; *Summerville v. Summerville*, 31 Wash. 411, 72 Pac. 84; *Meton v. State Industrial Ins. Dept.*, 104 Wash. 652, 177 Pac. 696.

*West Virginia*—*Beverlin v. Beverlin*, 29 W. Va. 732, 3 S. E. 38.

*Wisconsin*—Common-law marriages are invalid since January 1, 1918, by virtue of Acts 1917, c. 218, § 3. Prior to that date they were valid.

Common-law marriages are not valid in the Philippine Islands or in Porto Rico.

<sup>50</sup>*Alabama*—*Campbell v. Gullatt*, 43 Ala. 57; *Herd v. Herd*, 194 Ala. 613, 69 South. 885, L. R. A. 1916B, 1243.

*Colorado*—*Klipfel v. Klipfel*, 41 Colo. 40, 92 Pac. 26, 124 Am. St. Rep. 96; *Mock v. Chaney*, 36 Colo. 60, 87 Pac. 538.

*District of Columbia*—*Travers v. Reinhardt*, 25 App. D. C. 567 (dictum).

*Florida*—*Daniel v. Sams*, 17 Fla. 487; *Warren v. Warren*, 66 Fla. 138, 63 South. 726.

*Georgia*—Common-law marriages valid, except for a short period between January 1, 1862, and December 14, 1863, during which period Code 1861, § 1658, was in force. *Askew v. Dupree*, 30 Ga. 173; *Smith v. Reed*, 145 Ga. 724, 89 S. E. 815, L. R. A. 1917A, 492.

*Hawaii*—*Jacobs v. Cummins*, 4 Hawaii, 113; *Godfrey v. Rowland*, 16 Hawaii, 377. And see *United States v. Lee Sa Kee*, 3 U. S. Dist. Ct. of Hawaii, 285.

*Idaho*—*Huff v. Huff*, 20 Idaho, 450, 118 Pac. 1080.

*Indiana*—*Teter v. Teter*, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.

*Indian Territory*—Common-law marriages contracted in Indian Territory, before it became part of Oklahoma in 1907, are valid. *Davis v. Pryor*, 3 Ind. T. 398, 58 S. W. 660; *Id.*, 112 Fed. 274, 50 C. C. A. 579; *Porter v. U. S.* 7 Ind. T. 616, 104 S. W. 855. And see *Clarkson v. Washington*, 38 Okl. 4, 131 Pac. 935.

*Iowa*—*Blanchard v. Lambert*, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; *Pegg v. Pegg*, 138 Iowa, 572, 115 N. W. 1027.

*Kansas*—*State v. Walker*, 36 Kan. 297, 12 Pac. 279, 59 Am. Rep. 556; *Schuchart v. Schuchart*, 61 Kan. 597, 60 Pac. 311, 50 L. R. A. 180, 78 Am. St. Rep. 342.

*Michigan*—*Hutchins v. Kimmell*, 81 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164; *Supreme Tent v. McAllister*, 132 Mich. 69, 92 N. W. 770, 102 Am. St. Rep. 382.

*Minnesota*—*State v. Worthingham*, 23 Minn. 528; *Hulett v. Carey*, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419.

*Mississippi*—*Hargroves v. Thompson*, 31 Miss. 211; *Howard v. Kelley*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 381, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230. There is, however, some doubt whether common-law marriages contracted between November 1, 1892, when the Code of 1892 went into effect, and October 1, 1906, when the Code of 1906 went into effect, are valid. See *Howard v. Kelley*, *supra*.

*Missouri*—*Dyer v. Brannock*, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; *State v. Bittick*, 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325, 11 L. R. A. 587, 23 Am. St. Rep. 869. But see *Act Mar. 31, 1921*, declaring common-law marriages void.

*Montana*—Rev. Codes 1907, § 3607.

*Nebraska*—*Gibson v. Gibson*, 24 Neb. 434, 39 N. W. 450; *University of Michigan v. McGuckin*, 62 Neb. 489, 87 N. W. 180, 57 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6; *Id.*, 64 Neb. 300, 89 N. W. 778, 57

required, all that is necessary to constitute a valid marriage is that the parties shall consent and agree to assume the relation of husband and wife presently. This is known as marriage "per verba

*L. R. A.* 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6; *Coad v. Coad*, 87 Neb. 290, 127 N. W. 455.

*Nevada*—*State v. Zichfield*, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800.

*New Jersey*—*Applegate v. Applegate*, 45 N. J. Eq. 118, 17 Atl. 293; *State v. Thompson*, 76 N. J. Law, 197, 68 Atl. 1068.

*New Mexico*—Common-law marriages contracted prior to January 1, 1906, are probably valid. As to marriages contracted since that date there is some doubt. See Code 1915, § 3444.

*New York*—*Clayton v. Wardell*, 4 N. Y. 230; *Ziegler v. Cassidy*, 220 N. Y. 98, 115 N. E. 471, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 248. But common-law marriages could not be legally contracted between January 1, 1902, and January 1, 1908. See Laws 1901, c. 333, repealed by Laws 1907, c. 942, § 6. And see *In re Biersack*, 96 Misc. Rep. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519; *In re Hinman*, 147 App. Div. 452, 131 N. Y. Supp. 861. Common-law marriages on the high seas within the three-mile limit are valid. *In re Spondre*, 98 Misc. Rep. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943.

*Ohio*—*Carmichael v. State*, 12 Ohio St. 553; *Unbenhower v. Labus*, 85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N. E. 832.

*Oklahoma*—*Reaves v. Reaves*, 15 Okl. 240, 82 Pac. 490, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353; *In re Love's Estate*, 42 Okl. 478, 142 Pac. 305, L. R. A. 1915E, 109.

*Oregon*—*Estate of Megginson*, 21 Or. 387, 28 Pac. 388, 14 L. R. A. 540 (dictum). But see *Holmes v. Holmes*, Fed. Cas. No. 6,638.

*Pennsylvania*—*Guardians of the Poor v. Nathans*, 2 Brews. (Pa.) 149; *Richard v. Brehm*, 73 Pa. 140, 13 Am. Rep. 733; *In re McCausland*, 213 Pa. 189, 62 Atl. 780, 110 Am. St. Rep. 540.

*Philippine Islands*—Common-law marriages are not valid. General Order No. 68, promulgated by military governor December 18, 1899. Solicitor General Araneta, in opinion December 20, 1905 (2 Op. Atty. Gen. P. I.), states that prior to the promulgation of General Order 68 marriage was celebrated according to canonical laws, and that "the general order does not recognize the common-law marriage." This order is still in force. St. 1907. §§ 3770-3773.

*Rhode Island*—Validity of common-law marriages has not been definitely decided; but, if the question were squarely presented, such marriages would probably be held valid. See *Wrynn v. Downey*, 27 R. I. 454, 63 Atl. 401, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 615, 114 Am. St. Rep. 63, 8 Ann. Cas. 912. And see *Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry (C. C.)* 20 Fed. 281.

*South Carolina*—*Fryer v. Fryer*, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85; *Rutledge v. Tunns*, 69 S. C. 400, 48 S. E. 287.

*South Dakota*—Civil Code 1913, §§ 34-59.

*Texas*—*Rice v. Rice*, 31 Tex. 174; *Edelstein v. Brown*, 100 Tex. 403, 100 S. W. 129, 123 Am. St. Rep. 816; *Grigsby v. Reib*, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915E, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1011, affirming (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027.

*Wisconsin*—Common-law marriages contracted prior to January 1, 1918, are valid, but by Acts 1917, c. 218, § 3, such marriages are made invalid. As to marriages prior to that date, see *Williams v. Williams*, 46 Wis. 464, 1

de præsenti."<sup>51</sup> The essential element is that the minds of the parties have met in mutual assent to the marriage.<sup>52</sup>

It is sometimes said that a common-law marriage may be effected "per verba de futuro cum copula"—that is to say, by an agreement to marry in the future, followed by intercourse in pursuance thereof.<sup>53</sup> But this statement is too broad. A mere agreement to marry in the future, though followed by cohabitation, is not a marriage,

N. W. 98, 32 Am. Rep. 722; *Becker v. Becker*, 153 Wis. 226, 140 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1915E, 56.

*Wyoming*—*Weidenhoft v. Primm*, 16 Wyo. 340, 94 Pac. 453.

<sup>51</sup> *Dickerson v. Brown*, 49 Miss. 357; *Jewell v. Jewell*, 1 How. 219, 11 L. Ed. 108; *Meister v. Moore*, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826; *Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry (C. O.)* 20 Fed. 281; *Teter v. Teter*, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; *Campbell's Adm'r v. Gullatt*, 43 Ala. 57; *Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r*, 30 Mo. 72; *Butterfield v. Ennis*, 193 Mo. App. 638, 186 S. W. 1173; *State v. Bittick*, 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325, 11 L. R. A. 587, 23 Am. St. Rep. 869; *Graham v. Bennet*, 2 Cal. 503; *White v. White*, 82 Cal. 427, 23 Pac. 276, 7 L. R. A. 799; *Smith v. People*, 64 Colo. 290, 170 Pac. 959; *Bowman v. Bowman*, 24 Ill. App. 165; *Com. v. Stump*, 53 Pa. 132, 91 Am. Dec. 198; *Askew v. Dupree*, 30 Ga. 173; *Bailey v. State*, 36 Neb. 808, 55 N. W. 241; *Port v. Port*, 70 Ill. 484; *Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth*, 98 Ill. 126; *Hutchins v. Kimmell*, 31 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164; *Williams v. Kilburn*, 88 Mich. 279, 50 N. W. 293; *Carmichael v. State*, 12 Ohio St. 553; *Goodrich v. Cushman*, 34 Neb. 460, 51 N. W. 1041; *Fenton v. Reed*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; *Jackson v. Winne*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; *Cheney v. Arnold*, 15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609; *Overseers of Poor of Town of Newbury v. Overseers of Poor of Town of Brunswick*, 2 Vt. 151, 19 Am. Dec. 703; *Hynes v. McDermott*, 91 N. Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677; *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 32; *Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 235; *Moller v. Sommer*, 86 Misc. Rep. 110, 149 N. Y. Supp. 103; *Davidson v. Ream*, 178 App. Div. 362, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1037; affirming 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *Parker v. De Bernardi*, 40 Nev. 361, 164 Pac. 645; *Thomas v. James (Okl.)* 171 Pac. 855; *Hargroves v. Thompson*, 31 Miss. 211; *Simon v. State*, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 186, 20 S. W. 399, 716, 37 Am. St. Rep. 802; *Haggin v. Haggin*, 35 Neb. 375, 53 N. W. 209; *Dyer v. Brannock*, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; *State v. Worthingham*, 23 Minn. 528; *Dumaresly v. Fishly*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; *Guardians of the Poor v. Nathans*, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 149; *Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester*, 2 N. H. 268, 9 Am. Dec. 61; *Blanchard v. Lambert*, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; *Jackson v. Banister*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 317, 105 S. W. 66; *Stevens v. Smith*, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 107 S. W. 141; *Burnett v. Burnett (Tex. Civ. App.)* 83 S. W. 238; *Bargna v. Bargna (Tex. Civ. App.)* 127 S. W. 1156.

<sup>52</sup> *In re Boyington's Estate*, 157 Iowa, 467, 137 N. W. 949; *Love v. Love (Iowa)* 171 N. W. 257; *Moller v. Sommer*, 86 Misc. Rep. 110, 149 N. Y. Supp. 103, judgment affirmed 165 App. Div. 990, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1097.

<sup>53</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 87; *Askew v. Dupree*, 30 Ga. 173 (dictum). See, also, *In re McCausland's Estate*, 52 Cal. 568, and *Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans*, 1 La. Ann. 98. In both of these cases, however, there was evidence of a present marriage.

unless such cohabitation is intended and understood by the parties as a consummation of the marriage, and as converting the executory agreement into a present actual marriage.<sup>54</sup> If the cohabitation is not in consummation of the marriage agreement, but is commenced in reliance upon a mere promise or agreement to marry in the future, a marriage per verba de futuro is not established.<sup>55</sup> The true doctrine seems to be that an agreement to marry in the future, followed by copula, is at best only prima facie evidence of marriage, and that the prima facie case may be rebutted by evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, tending to show that there was no present intent or agreement at the time of the copula to consummate a marriage or to convert the executory agreement into a present actual marriage.<sup>56</sup>

A marriage per verba de præsenti may be valid, though no express words were used. All that is necessary is that the parties shall intend to marry, and that their intention shall appear either by their words, or by their conduct.<sup>57</sup> "As the law stands, a valid

<sup>54</sup> *Robertson v. State*, 42 Ala. 509; *Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth*, 98 Ill. 126; *Lorimer v. Lorimer*, 124 Mich. 631, 83 N. W. 609; *Sorenson v. Sorenson*, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455; *Hill v. State*, 41 Ga. 484; *Cheney v. Arnold*, 15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 10 Ohio St. 181; *Grimm's Estate*, 131 Pa. 199, 18 Atl. 1061, 6 L. R. A. 717, 17 Am. St. Rep. 796; *Fryer v. Fryer*, Rich. Eq. Cas. (S. C.) 113.

<sup>55</sup> *Hill v. State*, 41 Ga. 484; *People v. Adams*, 162 Mich. 371, 127 N. W. 354; *Sorensen v. Sorensen*, 68 Neb. 500, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455; *Grimm's Estate*, 131 Pa. 199, 18 Atl. 1061, 6 L. R. A. 717, 17 Am. St. Rep. 796.

<sup>56</sup> *Reg. v. Mills*, 10 Clark & F. 534; *Stoltz v. Doering*, 112 Ill. 234; *Peck v. Peck*, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; *Port v. Port*, 70 Ill. 484; *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth*, 98 Ill. 126. See, also, *Duncan v. Duncan*, 10 Ohio St. 181, and *Cheney v. Arnold*, 15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609. The agreement per verba de futuro must be followed by cohabitation. *Sorensen v. Sorensen*, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455.

<sup>57</sup> *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. § 26; *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 54; *Francis v. Francis*, 31 Grat. (Va.) 283; *Hicks v. Cochran*, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 107; *Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 237; *Dickerson v. Brown*, 49 Miss. 357; *Thomas v. James* (Okla.) 171 Pac. 855; *In re Wittick's Estate*, 164 Iowa, 485, 145 N. W. 913; *Bowman v. Bowman*, 24 Ill. App. 165; *Gise v. Com.*, 81 Pa. 428; *Guardians of the Poor v. Nathans*, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 149; *In re Wells' Estate*, 123 App. Div. 79, 108 N. Y. Supp. 164; *State v. Hansbrough*, 181 Mo. 348, 80 S. W. 900. The contract requisite to the creation of the marriage relation need not be expressed in any special manner, or by any prescribed form of words, but may be sufficiently

marriage, to all intents and purposes, is established by proof of an actual contract *per verba de præsenti* between persons of opposite sexes, capable of contracting, to take each other for husband and wife; especially where the contract is followed by cohabitation. No solemnization or other formality, apart from the agreement itself, is necessary."<sup>58</sup> It is not essential that the contract should be entered into before witnesses.<sup>59</sup> The agreement being the essential element in these marriages, it may, like any other agreement, be proved by words or by conduct,<sup>60</sup> and by the testimony of the parties themselves or by the testimony of third persons.

It has also been held that, in order to constitute a valid marriage by agreement, it is not essential that the parties should, at the time the agreement is entered into, be in the presence of each other or even in the same jurisdiction. Thus it has been said that the agreement may be entered into by letter.<sup>61</sup> In a recent case<sup>62</sup> the United States Circuit Court of Appeals sustained a marriage where the parties were in different jurisdictions when the agreement was entered into. The plaintiff brought the action to recover for the death of her alleged husband, claiming to be his wife by common-law marriage. The deceased signed in Minnesota, where he resided, a contract of marriage in duplicate. He sent both copies to the plaintiff, who executed them in Missouri, returning one copy to the deceased and retaining the other. It did not appear that the parties thereafter lived together. The court said: "The state

evidenced by any clear and unambiguous language or conduct. *Reynoldson v. Reynoldson*, 96 Neb. 270, 147 N. W. 844. Where the words claimed to amount to a contract of marriage *per verba de præsenti* are ambiguous, the intent of the parties may be examined into, as in cases of other contracts, and, if the subsequent conduct clearly indicates that they intended matrimony, they are legally husband and wife. *Bey v. Bey* (N. J. Eq.) 90 Atl. 684. The remarriage of divorced parties may be shown by proof of facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *Thomas v. James* (Okla.) 171 Pac. 855.

<sup>58</sup> *Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 237.

<sup>59</sup> *Davis v. Stouffer*, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282; *Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 237; *Umbenhour v. Umbenhour*, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 317; *People v. Spencer*, 199 Mich. 395, 165 N. W. 921.

<sup>60</sup> See post, p. 49.

<sup>61</sup> 1 Bishop, *Marriage, Divorce and Separation*, §§ 323-325. Written contracts to marry were involved in *Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry* (C. C.) 20 Fed. 281, and in *Hulett v. Carey*, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419. See, also, *Kahn v. Kahn*, 62 Misc. Rep. 550, 115 N. Y. Supp. 1028, construing Laws N. Y. 1901, c. 339.

<sup>62</sup> *Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson*, 254 Fed. 683, 166 C. C. A. 181.

of Minnesota recognizes common-law marriages, but the contract is governed by the laws of the state of Missouri, where acceptance by plaintiff of the contractual offer made by deceased occurred. That state recognizes and enforces common-law marriages. \* \* \* In approaching the proposition that the parties must be together or within the same jurisdiction, it is to be noted that this matter of marriage is for the states, except in the District of Columbia and the territories,<sup>63</sup> and is to be determined by the law of the state where it was contracted or celebrated.<sup>64</sup> So far as the law on the point here involved has been defined by the adjudications of the Missouri courts, it will be followed, irrespective of the view which might be taken by this court, if the question were open. A careful examination of the above-cited Missouri cases, and of many others from that state, convinces that in that state the marriage contract possesses the elements of an ordinary contract and none others. That contract establishes a very important status, but the contract itself is in no respect peculiar. Mutual assent to the present institution of the status is all sufficient. No other act, such as cohabitation,<sup>65</sup> is necessary to complete the institution of the status where the mutual assent contemplates a marriage in presenti. Why should the physical presence of the parties be essential to the legality of this contract, any more than of any other? It is not for us to devise means of making common-law marriages difficult. It is our duty to recognize the law as it exists. Nor is there any reason why the parties should be within the same jurisdiction. The existence and validity of the contract must be determined by the law of the place where it is legally regarded as made. Here, however, there is no point in the suggestion, for both of the states involved approve common-law marriages."

When the consent to marry is manifested by words *de presenti*, a present assumption of the marriage status is necessary.<sup>66</sup> The

<sup>63</sup> *Davis v. Pryor* (8th Cir.) 112 Fed. 274, 50 O. C. A. 379; 26 Cyc. 829, and citations in notes 12 and 13 thereto.

<sup>64</sup> 26 Cyc. 829, and citations in note 14 thereto.

<sup>65</sup> *Davis v. Stouffer*, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282.

<sup>66</sup> *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 739, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *Hawkins v. Hawkins*, 142 Ala. 571, 38 South. 640, 110 Am. St. Rep. 53; *In re Svendsen's Estate*, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410. A mere agreement to become husband and wife without a present intention to assume that relation does not constitute a marriage; it being essential that the parties in good faith bind themselves to live apart from all others during their joint lives. *Grigsby v. Reib* (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027.

marriage must be complete at the time of the agreement, and not be left for the future. It is not sufficient to agree to present cohabitation, and a future regular marriage when more convenient, or when a husband or wife shall die, or when a license can be obtained, or a ceremony can be performed; but there must be a present marriage by the agreement.<sup>67</sup> The rule that a present assumption of the marriage status is necessary to constitute a valid common-law marriage does not, according to the weight of authority, mean that cohabitation as husband and wife must immediately follow the agreement,<sup>68</sup> though some jurisdictions hold that there is no marriage unless cohabitation follows.<sup>69</sup> As cohabitation is not essential in a ceremonial marriage,<sup>70</sup> there is no reason why, if the agreement is satisfactorily proved, cohabitation should be required in addition to the agreement in common-law marriages.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>67</sup> *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 739, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *In re Maher's Estate*, 204 Ill. 25, 68 N. E. 159; *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Clark & F. 534; *Robertson v. State*, 42 Ala. 509; *Clark v. Field*, 13 Vt. 460; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 10 Ohio St. 182; *Peck v. Peck*, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; *Beverson's Estate*, 47 Cal. 621; *Fryer v. Fryer*, Rich. Eq. Cas. (S. C.) 85; *Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 235.

<sup>68</sup> *Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson*, 254 Fed. 683, 166 C. C. A. 181; *Green v. Green* (Fla.) 80 South. 739; *Askew v. Dupree*, 30 Ga. 173 (dictum); *Port v. Port*, 70 Ill. 484; *Love v. Love* (Iowa) 171 N. W. 257; *Hulett v. Carey*, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419; *Shattuck v. Shattuck*, 118 Minn. 60, 136 N. W. 410; *Davis v. Stouffer*, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282; *Dies v. Winne*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; *Davidson v. Ream*, 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *Guardians of Poor v. Nathans*, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 149; *Richard v. Brehm*, 73 Pa. 140, 13 Am. Rep. 735; *Rutledge v. Tunns*, 69 S. C. 400, 48 S. E. 297.

<sup>69</sup> *Herd v. Herd*, 194 Ala. 885, 69 South. 885, L. R. A. 1916B, 1243; *Sharon v. Sharon*, 79 Cal. 633, 22 Pac. 26, 131; *Harron v. Harron*, 128 Cal. 308, 60 Pac. 932; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 Pac. 1049; *Lorimer v. Lorimer*, 124 Mich. 631, 83 N. W. 809; *People v. Spencer*, 199 Mich. 395, 165 N. W. 921; *O'Malley v. O'Malley*, 46 Mont. 549, 129 Pac. 501, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 662; *In re Svendsen's Estate*, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410; *Grigsby v. Reib*, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915E, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1011, affirming judgment (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1027; *Berger v. Kirby*, 105 Tex. 611, 153 S. W. 1130, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 182, affirming judgment (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 1122; *Melton v. State*, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 130, 158 S. W. 550. See, also, *Rev. Codes Idaho 1908*, § 2611. A "mutual and public assumption of the marital relation," within *Rev. Codes Mont.* § 3607, defining common-law marriage, means a course of conduct on the part of both man and wife toward each other and toward the world so that people generally take them to be married, and cohabitation is indispensable thereto. *O'Malley v. O'Malley*, 46 Mont. 549, 129 Pac. 501, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 662.

<sup>70</sup> *Ante*, p. 39.

<sup>71</sup> *Sheff, Mar. & Div.* 5-7; *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 54; *Jackson v. Winne*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; *Dumaresly v. Fish*.

It is generally recognized that it is not necessary that a marriage be consummated by intercourse, because "consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium."

*Cohabitation and Repute*

The numerous cases in which the question of the validity of informal marriages has arisen have turned principally on matters of evidence, as to whether the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties showed present consent. It is a question of fact, to be determined from all the circumstances of each case, whether the parties intended marriage or not. "A mere carnal commerce, without the intention of cohabiting and training up children, would not constitute marriage under any circumstances."<sup>72</sup> Mere cohabitation and repute do not in themselves constitute marriage,<sup>73</sup> but are merely facts from which it may be presumed that a marriage was entered into.<sup>74</sup> The presumption is always in favor of marriage, and acts and conduct which have the appearance of marriage will be construed as such, unless there are circumstances which preclude that construction.<sup>75</sup> So, if two persons live together as

ly, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Peck v. Peck, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth, 98 Ill. 126; Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821.

<sup>72</sup> Lindo v. Belisario, 1 Hagg. Consist. 216; Com. v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 91 Am. Dec. 198; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 235; State v. Kennedy, 207 Mo. 528, 106 S. W. 57; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 Pac. 1049; Lee v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 354, 72 S. W. 1005, 61 L. R. A. 904.

<sup>73</sup> People v. Adams, 162 Mich. 371, 127 N. W. 354; In re Boyington's Estate, 157 Iowa, 467, 137 N. W. 949; Gorden v. Gorden, 283 Ill. 182, 119 N. E. 312; Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S. C. 271, 94 S. E. 19, 2 A. L. R. 438; Nelson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 206 S. W. 361; Schwingle v. Keifer (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 194. A common-law marriage is not effected by occasional cohabitation after an express promise to have a marriage ceremony performed, which is not fulfilled. In re Callery's Estate, 226 Pa. 469, 75 Atl. 672.

<sup>74</sup> Osborne v. Ramsay, 191 Fed. 114, 111 C. C. A. 594; Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 24 South. 374; Norcross v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 425, 29 N. E. 506; Estes v. Merrill, 121 Ark. 361, 181 S. W. 136; In re Baldwin's Estate, 162 Cal. 471, 123 Pac. 267; In re Matteote's Estate, 59 Colo. 566, 151 Pac. 448; In re Boyington's Estate, 157 Iowa, 467, 137 N. W. 949; In re Callery's Estate, 226 Pa. 469, 75 Atl. 672; Severance v. Severance, 197 Mich. 327, 163 N. W. 924; Bishop v. Brittain Inv. Co., 229 Mo. 699, 129 S. W. 668, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 868; State v. St. John, 94 Mo. App. 229, 68 S. W. 374; O'Malley v. O'Malley, 46 Mont. 549, 129 Pac. 501, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 662; Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Griggs (Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 833.

<sup>75</sup> Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331; Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn.

husband and wife, holding themselves out to the public as such, and gain the reputation in the community of being married, this is very generally accepted as prima facie proof of marriage.<sup>76</sup> In some states this rule is expressly stated in the statutes.<sup>77</sup>

Cohabitation, necessary to raise the presumption of marriage, means, to live or dwell together, or to have the same habitation.<sup>78</sup>

528; *Hynes v. McDermott*, 91 N. Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677; *Guardians of the Poor v. Nathans*, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 149; *Blanchard v. Lambert*, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; *Linsey v. Jefferson* (Okl.) 172 Pac. 641; *Coad v. Coad*, 87 Neb. 290, 127 N. W. 455.

<sup>76</sup> 1 *Fraser*, Dom. Rel. 113; *De Thoren v. Attorney General*, 1 App. Cas. 686; *Davis v. Pryor*, 112 Fed. 274, 50 C. C. A. 579; *U. S. v. Engracio Villafuerte, et al.*, 4 Phil. Rep. 559; *Gall v. Gall*, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E. 106, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 28; *Plattner v. Plattner*, 116 Mo. App. 405, 91 S. W. 457; *Cramsey v. Sterling*, 111 App. Div. 568, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1082; *Eames v. Woodson*, 120 La. 1031, 46 South. 13; *Green v. State*, 59 Ala. 68; *Lowry v. Coster*, 91 Ill. 182; *Proctor v. Bigelow*, 38 Mich. 282; *Redgrave v. Redgrave*, 38 Md. 93; *Jones v. Reddick*, 79 N. C. 290; *Com. v. Stump*, 53 Pa. 132, 91 Am. Dec. 198; *Hicks v. Cochran*, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 107; *White v. White*, 82 Cal. 427, 23 Pac. 276, 7 L. R. A. 799; *Richard v. Brehm*, 73 Pa. 140, 13 Am. Rep. 733; *Fornshill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344; *Taylor v. Swett*, 3 La. 33, 22 Am. Dec. 156; *Arthur v. Broadnax*, 3 Ala. 557, 37 Am. Dec. 707; *Ohles v. Drake*, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 146, 74 Am. Dec. 406; *Allen v. Hall*, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 114, 10 Am. Dec. 578; *Holmes v. Holmes*, 6 La. 463, 26 Am. Dec. 482; *Sneed v. Ewing*, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 460, 22 Am. Dec. 41; *Stevenson's Heirs v. McReary*, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 9, 51 Am. Dec. 102; *Sprung v. Morton* (D. C.) 182 Fed. 330; *Farmer v. Towers*, 106 Ark. 123, 152 S. W. 993; *Smith v. People*, 64 Colo. 290, 170 Pac. 959; *Love v. Love* (Iowa) 171 N. W. 257; *Jackson v. Claypool*, 179 Ky. 662, 201 S. W. 2; *Rockcastle Mining, Lumber & Oil Co. v. Baker*, 167 Ky. 66, 179 S. W. 1070; *Marzette v. Cronk*, 141 La. 437, 75 South. 107; *In re Fitzgibbons' Estate*, 162 Mich. 416, 127 N. W. 313, 139 Am. St. Rep. 570; *In re Biersack*, 96 Misc. Rep. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519; *In re Hinman*, 147 App. Div. 452, 131 N. Y. Supp. 861; *Forbes v. Burgess*, 158 N. C. 131, 73 S. E. 792; *Coleman v. James* (Okl.) 169 Pac. 1064; *Clarkson v. Washington*, 38 Okl. 4, 131 Pac. 935; *In re Meade's Estate*, 82 W. Va. 650, 97 S. E. 127; *Suter v. Suter*, 68 W. Va. 690, 70 S. E. 705, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 405. Reputation and cohabitation are not competent to prove marriage, in an action for criminal conversation. *Frederick v. Morse*, 88 Vt. 126, 92 Atl. 16. Nor in a prosecution for bigamy. *U. S. v. Evangelista*, 29 Phil. Rep. 215.

<sup>77</sup> For example, see Act Alaska, May 3, 1917, c. 56, § 14; Civ. Code Ariz. 1901, par. 3098; Pub. St. N. H. 1901, c. 174, § 15; Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 1963. Presumption of marriage from conduct, declared by Code Civ. Proc. § 1963, subd. 30, can have no effect where it appears that the only attempt to marry was illegal and void; a legal solemnization being necessary under Civ. Code, § 55. *In re Elliott's Estate*, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

<sup>78</sup> *O'Malley v. O'Malley*, 46 Mont. 549, 129 Pac. 501, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 662; *Bishop v. Brittain Inv. Co.*, 229 Mo. 699, 129 S. W. 668, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 868.

No fixed or continuous period of time of cohabitation is, however, necessary.<sup>79</sup> Repute is of significance only in so far as it tends to show the intent of the parties, and consequently a divided opinion as to repute is without probative force.<sup>80</sup>

Cohabitation and repute may be shown for the purpose of raising the presumption of a prior ceremonial marriage,<sup>81</sup> and also to establish the existence of a common-law marriage, especially where at the time a ceremonial marriage was attempted, or an agreement per verba de præsenti was entered into, there was some impediment to a valid marriage, such as the existence of a living spouse undivorced. In many jurisdictions the continued cohabitation of the parties after the removal of the impediment raises the presumption of a valid common-law marriage.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *Walton v. Walton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 203 S. W. 133.

<sup>80</sup> In *re Boyington's Estate*, 157 Iowa, 467, 137 N. W. 949. Repute and cohabitation, necessary at common law to create a presumption of marriage, must be uniform and general, and can be established only by open and undoubted acts of the parties. In *re Baldwin's Estate*, 162 Cal. 471, 123 Pac. 267; In *re Patterson's Estate*, 237 Pa. 24, 85 Atl. 75.

<sup>81</sup> *Weatherall v. Weatherall*, 56 Wash. 344, 105 Pac. 822 (lack of authority of person solemnizing marriage). *Harlan v. Harlan* (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 950 (failure to obtain license).

<sup>82</sup> In *re Wells' Estate*, 123 App. Div. 79, 108 N. Y. Supp. 164, affirmed 194 N. Y. 548, 87 N. E. 1129; *Fenton v. Reed*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; *Haywood v. Nichols*, 99 Kan. 138, 160 Pac. 982; *Wilson v. Burnett*, 105 Misc. Rep. 279, 172 N. Y. Supp. 673; *Prince v. Edwards*, 175 Ala. 532, 57 South. 714; *Adger v. Ackerman*, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568; *Poole v. People*, 24 Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025, 65 Am. St. Rep. 245; *Smith v. Reed*, 145 Ga. 724, 89 S. E. 815, L. R. A. 1917A, 492; *Huff v. Huff*, 20 Idaho, 450, 118 Pac. 1080; *Schaffer v. Krestovnikow*, 89 N. J. Eq. 549, 105 Atl. 239, affirming 88 N. J. Eq. 523, 103 Atl. 913, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246; *Teter v. Teter*, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; *Schuchart v. Schuchart*, 61 Kan. 597, 60 Pac. 311, 50 L. R. A. 180, 78 Am. St. Rep. 342; In *re Fitzgibbons' Estate*, 162 Mich. 416, 127 N. W. 313, 139 Am. St. Rep. 570; *Barker v. Valentine*, 125 Mich. 336, 84 N. W. 297, 51 L. R. A. 787, 84 Am. St. Rep. 578; *State v. Worthingham*, 23 Minn. 528; *Busch v. Supreme Tent*, 81 Mo. App. 562; *University of Michigan v. McGuckin*, 62 Neb. 489, 67 N. W. 180, 37 L. R. A. 917, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 6; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605, 1 Ann. Cas. 199; *Parker v. De Bernardi*, 40 Nev. 361, 164 Pac. 645; *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 68 N. J. Eq. 736, 82 Atl. 680, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 111 Am. St. Rep. 658; In *re McCausland*, 213 Pa. 189, 62 Atl. 780, 110 Am. St. Rep. 540; *Davis v. Whitlock*, 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 538; *Gorman v. Gorman* (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 123; *Edelstein v. Brown*, 100 Tex. 403, 100 S. W. 123, 123 Am. St. Rep. 816. See Code Iowa 1897, § 3151; Rev. Laws Mass. c. 151, § 6; St. Wis. 1917, § 2339n24. But see *Compton v. Benham*, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365; *People v. Shaw*, 259 Ill. 544, 102 N. E. 1031, L. R. A. 1915E, 87; *Blanks v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 82 Miss. 703, 35 South. 570;

The rule is probably applicable only in cases where the parties, or at least one of them, acted in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the impediment. It has been held in several cases that, if the parties knew of the impediment, their relations were meretricious, and the presumption is that the illicit relation continued.<sup>83</sup> The presumption of the existence of a valid marriage thus arising from cohabitation and repute does not involve an assumption that the marriage took place at any particular place or time, or in any particular manner, but merely that a legal marriage existed.<sup>84</sup>

### *Presumption Not Conclusive*

Though the presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation and repute is very strong, it is not conclusive, but may be rebutted.<sup>85</sup> The presumption is rebutted, for instance, by proof that the parties separated without apparent cause, and one of them married some other person.<sup>86</sup> The presumption does not arise, or is rebutted and overcome, if it appears that the cohabitation was meretricious in its inception, and, when shown to have been illicit in its origin, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything showing otherwise, that its continuance was illegal; and the burden is on the person setting up the marriage to show it independently

Hilliard v. Baldwin, 76 N. H. 142, 80 Atl. 139; Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, L. R. A. 1917D, 829. But the rule in Wisconsin is probably changed by Rev. St. 1917, § 2339n24.

<sup>83</sup> Voorhees v. Voorhees, 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Atl. 172, 19 Am. St. Rep. 404; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun (N. Y.) 63; Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Ohio St. 181; Clark v. Barney, 24 Okl. 455, 103 Pac. 598; Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294; In re Morris' Estate, 92 Misc. Rep. 630, 157 N. Y. Supp. 472. But see University of Michigan v. McGuckin, 62 Neb. 489, 87 N. W. 180, 57 L. R. A. 917, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 6.

<sup>84</sup> In re Hinman, 147 App. Div. 452, 131 N. Y. Supp. 861.

<sup>85</sup> Forbes v. Countess of Strathmore, Ferg. Const. 113; Reg. v. Millis, 10 Clark & F. 534, 782; Robertson v. State, 42 Ala. 509; Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; Peck v. Peck, 12 R. I. 488, 34 Am. Rep. 702; Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234; Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth, 98 Ill. 126; Dumaresly v. Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 Pac. 26; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 235; Eames v. Woodson, 120 La. 1031, 46 South. 13; Nelson v. Carlson, 48 Wash. 651, 94 Pac. 477; In re Hinman, 147 App. Div. 452, 131 N. Y. Supp. 861; In re Baldwin's Estate, 162 Cal. 471, 123 Pac. 267; Le Suer v. Le Suer, 122 Minn. 407, 142 N. W. 593; Meehan v. Edward Valve & Mfg. Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265.

<sup>86</sup> Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548, 56 Am. Dec. 206; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391, 30 Am. Rep. 466; In re Campbell's Estate, 12 Cal. App. 707, 108 Pac. 669, rehearing denied 12 Cal. App. 707, 108 Pac. 676.

of the presumption.<sup>87</sup> But the presumption that the relations originally meretricious continue to be illicit may itself be overcome by positive evidence.<sup>88</sup> Thus it has been held in New Jersey that a cohabitation meretricious in its origin became matrimonial when, on information of the death of the woman's first husband, removing the only impediment to the marriage, the man declared to her that she was his wife, and thereafter both by habit, conduct, and declarations both held themselves out as husband and wife.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>87</sup> *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 10 Ohio St. 181; *Cheney v. Arnold*, 15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609; *Floyd v. Calvert*, 53 Miss. 37; *Randlett v. Rice*, 141 Mass. 385, 6 N. E. 238; *Harbeck v. Harbeck*, 102 N. Y. 714, 7 N. E. 408; *Appeal of Reading Fire Ins. & Trust Co.*, 113 Pa. 204, 6 Atl. 62, 57 Am. Rep. 448; *In re Gall's Will (Sur.)* 9 N. Y. Supp. 466; *Cram v. Burnham*, 5 Greenl. (Me.) 213, 17 Am. Dec. 218; *Peck v. Peck*, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; *Port v. Port*, 70 Ill. 484; *Stans v. Baitey*, 9 Wash. 115, 37 Pac. 316; *Van Dusan v. Van Dusan*, 97 Mich. 70, 56 N. W. 234; *Pearce v. Pearce*, 16 S. W. 271, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 67; *Drawdy v. Hesters*, 130 Ga. 161, 60 S. E. 451, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 190; *Adger v. Ackerman*, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568; *Pike v. Pike*, 112 Ill. App. 243; *Marks v. Marks*, 108 Ill. App. 371; *Bell v. Clarke*, 45 Misc. Rep. 272, 92 N. Y. Supp. 163; *Weatherall v. Weatherall*, 63 Wash. 526, 115 Pac. 1078; *In re Farley's Estate*, 91 Misc. Rep. 185, 155 N. Y. Supp. 63; *In re Elchler*, 84 Misc. Rep. 667, 146 N. Y. Supp. 846; *Bellinger v. Devine*, 269 Ill. 72, 109 N. E. 666; *Bey v. Bey*, 83 N. J. Eq. 239, 90 Atl. 684; *Spencer v. Spencer*, 84 Misc. Rep. 264, 147 N. Y. Supp. 111; *Wilson v. Burnett*, 105 Misc. Rep. 279, 172 N. Y. Supp. 673; *In re Svendsen's Estate*, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410; *Moller v. Sommer*, 86 Misc. Rep. 110, 149 N. Y. Supp. 103, judgment affirmed 165 App. Div. 990, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1097; *Howard v. Kelly*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230; *In re Fuller's Estate*, 250 Pa. 78, 95 Atl. 382; *In re Boyington's Estate*, 157 Iowa, 467, 137 N. W. 949; *Gorden v. Gordon*, 283 Ill. 182, 119 N. E. 312; *In re Patterson's Estate*, 237 Pa. 24, 85 Atl. 75; *Meehan v. Edward Valve & Mfg. Co.*, 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265; *Voorhees v. Voorhees*, 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Atl. 172, 19 Am. St. Rep. 404; *Clark v. Barney*, 24 Okl. 455, 103 Pac. 598.

<sup>88</sup> *Knecht v. Knecht*, 261 Pa. 410, 104 Atl. 676; *Schaffer v. Krestovnikow*, 89 N. J. Eq. 549, 105 Atl. 239, affirming 88 N. J. Eq. 523, 103 Atl. 913, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246; *Howard v. Kelly*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230. Where cohabitation was illicit in beginning, though burden of proof is upon those asserting a valid marriage, there is no presumption that relationship continued to be illicit, and a valid common-law marriage may be shown after impediment to marriage was removed. *Parker v. De Bernardi*, 40 Nev. 361, 164 Pac. 645. And see *Darling v. Dent*, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747.

<sup>89</sup> *Schaffer v. Krestovnikow*, 89 N. J. Eq. 549, 105 Atl. 239, affirming 88 N. J. Eq. 523, 103 Atl. 913, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246. And see *Bey v. Bey*, 83 N. J. Eq. 239, 90 Atl. 684.

*Marriage by Proxy*

Marriage by proxy has been recognized in some Oriental countries, and in Europe in some instances among members of royal families. Brissand, in his *History of French Private Law*, says that marriage through an agent was looked upon as lawful, calling attention to the marriage of Frederick III and Eleanor of Portugal and of Maximilian and Anne of Brittany. "After the Council of Trent, 1563, the celebration of a marriage through an agent has no meaning, for it does not do away with the necessity of another celebration taking place between the parties themselves, though a notable example of such marriage was that of Henry IV and Marie de Medici."<sup>90</sup>

Whatever may have been the law governing the right of one of the parties to a marriage to authorize another to act in his name, the modern tendency, as shown by dicta, is opposed to marriage by proxy, and is to the effect that the solemnization of marriage through an agent would not be tolerated. The act of marrying is too personal an obligation to be delegated to any person. An eminent authority has said: "Contracts to marry may doubtless be made through a messenger, but general authority to make marriage engagements would doubtless not be upheld, and as to the act of marriage the substitution of an agent or representative, while at times allowed to princes, would not be tolerated generally."<sup>91</sup>

*Indian Marriages*

Although an Indian tribe, recognized as such, may be located within state lines, yet so long as their tribal customs are adhered to, and the federal government manages their affairs by agents, they are not to be regarded as subject to state laws, so far as marriage is concerned; and therefore marriages between members of Indian tribes in tribal relations, valid by the customs and laws of the tribe, and contracted at a time when there was no law of the United States on the subject of Indian marriages must be recog-

<sup>90</sup> Brissand, *History of French Private Law* (Continental Legal History Series) vol. 2, pp. 103-106, note.

<sup>91</sup> 1 Mechem, *Agency* (2d Ed.) par. 126. The question has not been passed upon directly by the courts, but dicta may be found in *Commonwealth v. Farmers' & Shippers' Tobacco Warehouse Co.*, 107 Ky. 1, 52 S. W. 799; *Republic of Hawaii v. Li Shee*, 12 Hawaii, 329; *In re Lum Ling Ying* (D. C.) 59 Fed. 687.

nized as valid by the state courts though not in compliance with the laws of the state.<sup>22</sup>

## ANNULMENT AND AVOIDANCE OF MARRIAGES

22. Where a marriage is absolutely void, a suit to annul it is not necessary; but such a suit will lie, and is advisable, in order to have the invalidity of the marriage determined judicially.
23. Where a marriage, though not absolutely void, is voidable by the act of the parties, or one of them, as in case of nonage, fraud, duress, etc., a suit to annul the marriage is not necessary, unless required by statute; but it may be brought, as in the case of a void marriage, and is advisable.
24. In other cases of voidable marriage, a suit to annul the marriage is necessary. It cannot be attacked collaterally.
25. If a marriage is absolutely void, it may be annulled at any time, and may be attacked collaterally as well as directly, and by third persons as well as by the parties. But if a marriage is merely voidable, it must be annulled, if at all, in the lifetime of the parties.
26. Annulment of a voidable marriage renders it void ab initio, unless it is otherwise provided by statute.

Suits to annul a marriage must be distinguished from suits for a divorce, which will be considered in a subsequent chapter. A suit for a divorce supposes the existence of a valid marriage, and a decree of divorce annuls existing rights. A suit for nullity of a marriage, on the other hand, is on the theory that there is no valid

<sup>22</sup> *Boyer v. Dively*, 58 Mo. 529; *Yakima Joe v. To-Is-Lap* (O. C.) 191 Fed. 516; *Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co.*, 76 Mich. 498, 43 N. W. 602, and cases cited; *Earl v. Godley*, 42 Minn. 361, 44 N. W. 254, 7 L. R. A. 125, 18 Am. St. Rep. 517; *Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r*, 30 Mo. 72, 77 Am. Dec. 598; *Moore v. Nah-con-be*, 72 Kan. 169, 83 Pac. 400; *First Nat. Bank v. Sharpe*, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 33 S. W. 676; *Oklahoma Land Co. v. Thomas*, 34 Okl. 681, 127 Pac. 8; *James v. Adams*, 56 Okl. 450, 155 Pac. 1121; *Meagher v. Harjo* (Okl.) 179 Pac. 757; *Ortley v. Ross*, 78 Neb. 339, 110 N. W. 982. But compare *Roche v. Washington*, 19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376; *State v. Ta-chama-tah*, 64 N. C. 614. A marriage contracted according to the customs of an Indian tribe need not be contracted in the territory of the tribe, to be valid. *La Riviere v. La Riviere*, 97 Mo. 80, 10 S. W. 840. But see *Roche v. Washington*, 19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376, and *Banks v. Galbraith*, 149 Mo. 529, 51 S. W. 105.

marriage at all, and a decree of nullity declares that rights supposed to have arisen from the attempted marriage never in fact existed.<sup>93</sup> A decree of divorce annuls a marriage only from the time it is entered. A decree of nullity, unless a contrary rule is established by statute, annuls the marriage ab initio and, in effect, declares that there never has been any marriage.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless in a proper case a decree annulling a marriage may be entered when the relief asked is divorce, or under proper allegations by way of answer or cross-bill in a suit for divorce.<sup>95</sup>

As has been heretofore shown, a marriage may be absolutely void or only voidable. Thus a marriage between persons, one of whom has a spouse living under a prior, valid, and undissolved marriage, is not merely voidable, but absolutely void.<sup>96</sup> The same is true generally of a marriage between persons under disability by reason of race or other civil conditions.<sup>97</sup> By the weight of authority, also, marriages entered into by lunatics are absolutely void,<sup>98</sup> though there is some authority for holding them merely voidable. On the other hand, a marriage between persons within the prohibited degrees of relationship are not void, but voidable.<sup>99</sup>

So, too, lack of physical capacity renders the marriage voidable only, and not void.<sup>1</sup> Though, when one of the parties is under the age of seven, the marriage is void, generally the fact that the parties are under the age of consent renders the marriage voidable only.<sup>2</sup> And where one of the parties was induced to enter into the marriage by fraud, duress, or mistake, so that it is invalid, it is not absolutely void, but voidable merely.<sup>3</sup>

Where a marriage is absolutely void, and not merely voidable,

<sup>93</sup> *Millar v. Millar*, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, L. R. A. 1918B, 415, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 184. An action for divorce lies for causes subsequent to marriage; a suit in equity to annul a void or voidable marriage for those existing at or prior to it. *Henderson v. Ressor*, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175. See, also, *Taylor v. White*, 160 N. C. 38, 75 S. E. 941, L. R. A. 1916C, 704.

<sup>94</sup> *Stew. Mar. & Div.* § 141; *Rawdon v. Rawdon*, 28 Ala. 565; *Powell v. Powell*, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774; *Succession of Minvielle*, 15 La. Ann. 342; *Lincoln v. Lincoln*, 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 525; *Wightman v. Wightman*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343; *Smith v. Morehead*, 59 N. C. 380; *Patterson v. Gaines*, 6 How. 550, 582, 12 L. Ed. 553.

<sup>95</sup> *Bassett v. Bassett*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 696; *Nadra v. Nadra*, 79 Mich. 591, 44 N. W. 1046; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 173 N. Y. 266, 65 N. E. 1098.

<sup>96</sup> See ante, p. 31.

<sup>1</sup> See ante, p. 29.

<sup>97</sup> See ante, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> See ante, p. 21.

<sup>98</sup> See ante, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> See ante, p. 9.

<sup>99</sup> See ante, p. 28.

a suit to annul it is not necessary. The question of its validity may be raised at any time, either before or after the death of the parties, or of either of them, and collaterally as well as directly, and by strangers as well as by the parties themselves.<sup>4</sup> No rights whatever can arise out of a marriage that is absolutely void.

Voidable marriages may be avoided by the act of the parties themselves, without going into court and obtaining a decree of nullity; or they may be avoided only by a decree of the court, according to the ground of objection.<sup>5</sup> Thus, where one of the parties is under the age of consent, the marriage may be avoided by the act of the parties; no decree of nullity being necessary.<sup>6</sup> So it has been said that a marriage induced by fraud or duress may be avoided by the act of the party deceived or coerced.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, a marriage invalid because the parties were within the prohibited degrees of relationship is avoided only by decree of the court, and not by act of the parties themselves. The same is true of marriages voidable because of impotence.

Where a marriage is merely voidable, and voidable by a decree of nullity only, it is valid, unless a decree is obtained; and the decree must be made, if at all, during the lives of both parties.<sup>8</sup> Until

<sup>4</sup> Shelf. Mar. & Div. 479; 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 258; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; Wilson v. Brockley, 1 Phillm. Ecc. 132; Ferlat v. Gojon, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 478, 493, 14 Am. Dec. 554; Reeves v. Reeves, 54 Ill. 332; Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Bin. (Pa.) 405; Gathings v. Williams, 27 N. C. 487, 44 Am. Dec. 49; Hemming v. Price, 12 Mod. 432; Tefft v. Tefft, 35 Ind. 44; Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550, 592, 12 L. Ed. 553; Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344; Town of Mountholly v. Town of Andover, 11 Vt. 226, 34 Am. Dec. 685; Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565; Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhabitants of Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497; Smart v. Whaley, 6 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 308; Inhabitants of Unity v. Inhabitants of Belgrade, 76 Me. 419; Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175; In re Newlin's Estate, 231 Pa. 312, 80 Atl. 255; Williams v. McKeene, 193 Ill. App. 615; McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1069; Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 24. But see Fero v. Fero, 62 App. Div. 470, 70 N. Y. Supp. 742, and Wood v. Baker, 43 Misc. Rep. 310, 88 N. Y. Supp. 854, holding that, in a suit by a parent to annul the marriage of a minor child, the latter must be made a party. See, also, to the same effect, Aguilar v. Lavarro, 4 Phil. Rep. 735.

<sup>5</sup> A marriage contract is a nullity ab initio, requiring no judicial decree for its dissolution, only where expressly so declared by statute. State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N. W. 10, L. R. A. 1916C, 686.

<sup>6</sup> Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565, 570; People v. Slack, 15 Mich. 193; McDeed v. McDeed, 67 Ill. 545.

<sup>7</sup> See Fooley v. Fooley, 94 Ala. 501, 10 South. 646, 33 Am. St. Rep. 141.

<sup>8</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 434; Bonham v. Badgley, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 622; Cavell v.

it is made, the marriage is valid for all purposes.<sup>9</sup> The children are legitimate;<sup>10</sup> the parties are entitled, respectively, to curtesy and dower; and all the other incidents of a valid marriage attach.<sup>11</sup>

After a decree of nullity, however, in the lifetime of the parties, the marriage is void ab initio, and not merely from the date of the decree.<sup>12</sup> The children are rendered illegitimate,<sup>13</sup> the parties have no rights in each other's property,<sup>14</sup> and communications formerly made between them are no longer privileged.<sup>15</sup> In other words, it is just as if no marriage had ever taken place. The same doctrines apply to a great extent to marriages voidable by the act of the parties, without a decree of nullity.

In many respects the doctrines above stated have been ratified by statute or otherwise in the different states. So it has been held in some jurisdictions that a marriage invalid because induced by fraud can be avoided only by decree of annulment.<sup>16</sup> The same rule has been adopted in some states as to the avoidance of marriages because of nonage,<sup>17</sup> insanity,<sup>18</sup> and physical incapacity.<sup>19</sup> So, too,

Prince, L. R. 1 Exch. 246; *White v. Lowe*, 1 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 376; *Harrison v. State*, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658; *Combs v. Combs*, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 265; *Gathings v. Williams*, 27 N. C. 487, 44 Am. Dec. 49; *Henderson v. Resor*, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175; *Fornshill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344.

<sup>9</sup> *Elliott v. Gurr*, 2 Phillim. Ecc. 16.

<sup>10</sup> 2 Burn. Ecc. Law (Phillim. Ed.) tit. "Marriage"; 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 272.

<sup>11</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 434; *Rennington v. Cole*, Noy, 29.

<sup>12</sup> *Aughtie v. Aughtie*, 1 Phillim. Ecc. 201; *Perry v. Perry*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 501.

<sup>13</sup> *Aughtie v. Aughtie*, 1 Phillim. Ecc. 201. The common-law rule has been changed by statute in many states. See post, p. 295. As to custody and support of children, after decree of nullity, see *Mickels v. Fennell*, 15 N. D. 188, 107 N. W. 53.

<sup>14</sup> *Aughtie v. Aughtie*, 1 Phillim. Ecc. 201; *Kelly v. Scott*, 5 Grat. (Va.) 479; *Sellars v. Davis*, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 503. The court has authority, in a decree of nullity, to make an equitable division of property jointly accumulated by the parties while they lived together as husband and wife. *Werner v. Werner*, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127, 41 L. R. A. 349, 68 Am. St. Rep. 372.

<sup>15</sup> *Wells v. Fletcher*, 5 Car. & P. 12.

<sup>16</sup> *Jordan v. Missouri & K. Telephone Co.*, 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432; *McCullen v. McCullen*, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1069.

<sup>17</sup> *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 63 Misc. Rep. 560, 117 N. Y. Supp. 671; *People v. Ham*, 206 Ill. App. 543; *Owen v. Coffey*, 201 Ala. 531, 78 South. 885.

<sup>18</sup> *Wolf v. Gall*, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346, rehearing denied in Supreme Court, 163 Pac. 350; *In re Gregorson's Estate*, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60, L. R. A. 1916C, 697, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1124.

<sup>19</sup> Under Gen. St. Minn. 1913, §§ 7090, 7095, 7106, a marriage between par-

a marriage invalid because the parties were within the prohibited degrees of relationship can be avoided only by decree.<sup>20</sup>

The fact that a marriage is absolutely void, or is voidable by the act of the parties themselves, does not prevent the bringing of a suit to have it annulled, for the purpose of having its invalidity judicially established, and to fix the status of the parties. Such a suit is always advisable. As was said by Chancellor Kent, "Though marriage with an idiot or lunatic be absolutely void, and no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet, as well for the sake of the good order of society as for the peace of mind of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."<sup>21</sup>

### *Jurisdiction*

Originally in England, suits to annul marriages were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts only.<sup>22</sup> Since no courts in the United States have succeeded to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts,<sup>23</sup> and even courts of equity, as such, have no jurisdiction in cases of canonical disabilities,<sup>24</sup> suits to annul a marriage on these grounds depend entirely upon statutes in this country,<sup>25</sup> and the same has been held to be true in case of prior marriage of

ties, one of whom was an epileptic, is voidable only, and valid until dissolved by judicial decree. *Kitzman v. Kitzman*, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789.

<sup>20</sup> *Tyler v. Andrews*, 40 App. D. C. 100.

<sup>21</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 76; *Hayes v. Watts*, 3 Phillim. Ecc. 44; *Pertrels v. Ton-dear*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 138; *Crump v. Morgan*, 38 N. C. 91, 40 Am. Dec. 447; *McCullen v. McCullen*, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1069; *Rawdon v. Rawdon*, 28 Ala. 565; *Powell v. Powell*, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774.

<sup>22</sup> *Ridgely v. Ridgely*, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597, 25 L. R. A. 800.

<sup>23</sup> *Anonymous*, 24 N. J. Eq. 19; *Peugnet v. Phelps*, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 566; *Burtis v. Burtis*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 557, 565, 14 Am. Dec. 563; *Perry v. Perry*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 501; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 551, 73 Am. Dec. 99; *Le Barron v. Le Barron*, 35 Vt. 365.

<sup>24</sup> *Anonymous*, 24 N. J. Eq. 19; *Burtis v. Burtis*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 557, 565, 14 Am. Dec. 563; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 551, 73 Am. Dec. 99.

<sup>25</sup> *Roth v. Roth*, 97 Misc. Rep. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99; *Davidson v. Ream*, 178 App. Div. 362, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1037, affirming 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 13; *Stokes v. Stokes*, 198 N. Y. 301, 91 N. E. 793; *Kelley v. Kelley*, 161 Mass. 111, 36 N. E. 837, 25 L. R. A. 806, 42 Am. St. Rep. 389; *Ridgely v. Ridgely*, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597, 25 L. R. A. 800. An action to annul a marriage being purely statutory, when statutes expressly define exclusive method of bringing such an action, court may not assert its original equity jurisdiction, independently of statute, to annul a contract. *Reed v. Reed*, 106 Misc. Rep. 85, 175 N. Y. Supp. 264.

one of the parties.<sup>26</sup> Many states have statutes giving jurisdiction in suits for nullity of marriage.<sup>27</sup>

Where a marriage is invalid on other grounds than because of canonical disabilities, as on the ground of want of consent, arising from insanity, fraud, duress, mistake, or any other cause, or perhaps on the ground of some civil disability, like prior marriage, civil condition, or nonage, or on the ground of illegal celebration, it is held in this country that a suit to annul the marriage will lie, independently of any statutory authority therefor. Such suits are held to be within the ordinary jurisdiction of courts of equity.<sup>28</sup>

## POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO VALIDATE MARRIAGE

27. As the state has power to regulate and control marriages between its own citizens, the Legislature may confirm and make valid marriages which were before voidable.

Marriage, since it creates the most important relation in life, and is most closely interwoven with the very fabric of society, has al-

<sup>26</sup> *Kelley v. Kelley*, 161 Mass. 111, 36 N. E. 837, 25 L. R. A. 806, 42 Am. St. Rep. 389; *French v. French*, 74 Misc. Rep. 626, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1053.

<sup>27</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6112.

<sup>28</sup> *Rawdon v. Rawdon*, 28 Ala. 565, 567; *Tefft v. Tefft*, 35 Ind. 44, 50; *Powell v. Powell*, 18 Kan. 371, 373, 26 Am. Rep. 774; *Bassett v. Bassett*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 696, 697; *Fornshill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 483, 18 Am. Dec. 344; *Helms v. Franciscus*, 2 Bland (Md.) 544, 579, 20 Am. Dec. 402; *True v. Ranney*, 21 N. H. 52, 53, 53 Am. Rep. 164; *Keyes v. Keyes*, 22 N. H. 553, 558; *Henderson v. Ressor*, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175; *Wimbrough v. Wimbrough*, 125 Md. 619, 94 Atl. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 920; *Roth v. Roth*, 97 Misc. Rep. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99; *Beckermelster v. Beckermelster* (Sup.) 170 N. Y. Supp. 22; *McClurg v. Terry*, 21 N. J. Eq. 226, 229; *Anonymous*, 24 N. J. Eq. 19, 20; *Carris v. Carris*, 24 N. J. Eq. 516; *Selah v. Selah*, 23 N. J. Eq. 185; *Avakian v. Avakian*, 69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 Atl. 521; *Wightman v. Wightman*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343, 345; *Burtis v. Burtis*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 557, 567, 14 Am. Dec. 563; *Ferlat v. Gojon*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 478, 494, 14 Am. Dec. 554; *Perry v. Perry*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 501, 503; *Scott v. Shufeldt*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43, 44; *Johnson v. Kincade*, 37 N. C. 470, 475; *Crump v. Morgan*, 38 N. C. 91, 98, 40 Am. Dec. 447; *Waymire v. Jetmore*, 22 Ohio St. 271, 274; *Jelineau v. Jelineau*, 2 Desaus. (S. C.) 45, 50; *Almond v. Almond*, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662, 666, 15 Am. Dec. 781; *Clark v. Field*, 13 Vt. 460, 465; *Le Barron v. Le Barron*, 35 Vt. 365, 366. But see *Pitcairn v. Pitcairn*, 201 Pa. 368, 50 Atl. 963, holding that Pennsylvania courts have no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a marriage alleged to be void on account of lunacy of one of the contracting parties, since this power has never been conferred on them by statute.

ways been subject to regulation and control by the state;<sup>29</sup> and it is well settled that the Legislature has power to validate or confirm by statute a marriage theretofore voidable because of some statutory disability or neglect of some statutory requirement. This question arose, and was carefully considered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in *Harrison v. State*,<sup>30</sup> where the validity of a statute validating marriages between persons related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity, and which were before voidable, was attacked as unconstitutional as applied to prior marriages. The act was upheld, however, as a valid exercise of legislative power, like special acts of divorce. There are decisions in many of the other states to the same effect.<sup>31</sup>

### PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

28. A marriage is presumed to be valid until the contrary is made to appear.

Though the burden of proving the existence of a marriage is generally on the person who asserts it,<sup>32</sup> yet, when the celebration of a marriage is once shown, the law will presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the mutual consent of the parties, the reality of consent, the capacity of the parties, and in fact everything essential to the validity of the marriage, and the burden of proving facts rendering it invalid is upon him who seeks to avoid it.<sup>33</sup> The presumption applies in the case of a common-law marriage or a marriage by Indian custom, as well as in the case of a

<sup>29</sup> See ante, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658. "Such legislation," it was said, "is neither extraordinary, unconstitutional, nor unjust, but conservative, essential, and salutary; being the only adequate means of healing or preventing inevitable wrongs, public and private."

<sup>31</sup> *Inhabitants of Town of Goshen v. Inhabitants of Stonington*, 4 Conn. 209, 10 Am. Dec. 121; *Balty v. Cranfill*, 91 N. C. 293, 49 Am. Rep. 641; *Moore v. Whitaker*, 2 Har. (Del.) 50; *Andrews v. Page*, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 653. But see *White v. White*, 105 Mass. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 526.

<sup>32</sup> *Wilson v. Allen*, 108 Ga. 275, 33 S. E. 975; *In re Davis*, 204 Pa. 602, 54 Atl. 475; *Gorden v. Gorden*, 283 Ill. 182, 119 N. E. 312; *Americus Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman*, 16 Ga. App. 17, 84 S. E. 493; *Adams v. Wm. Cameron & Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 161 S. W. 417.

<sup>33</sup> *Cartwright v. McGown*, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; *McGaugh v. Mathis*, 131 Ark. 221, 198 S. W. 1147; *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 171 Cal. 770, 155 Pac. 95; *In re Hughson's Estate*, 173 Cal. 448, 160 Pac. 548; *Appeal of Eva*, 93 Conn. 38, 104 Atl. 238; *Caujolle v. Ferrie*, 26 Barb. (N.

ceremonial marriage.<sup>34</sup> The strength of the presumption depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each particular case.<sup>35</sup> While the presumption may be rebutted, the rebutting evidence must be strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive.<sup>36</sup>

Since the presumption is always in favor of the validity of a marriage, a person who attacks a marriage as invalid on the ground that one of the parties had been previously married to another person does not fully meet the burden of proof that is upon him by showing that there was a former valid marriage as he contends;<sup>37</sup> but he must go further, and show affirmatively that the marriage had not been dissolved, either by the death of the other party, or by a decree of divorce. Death of the former spouse, or a divorce, will be presumed, unless the contrary is made to appear, and the burden is on the person attacking the second marriage to rebut this presumption.<sup>38</sup> "When it is shown that a mar-

Y.) 177; *Fleming v. People*, 27 N. Y. 329; *Strode v. Magowan's Heirs*, 2 Bush (Ky.) 627; *People v. Calder*, 30 Mich. 85; *State v. Kean*, 10 N. H. 347, 34 Am. Dec. 162; *Adger v. Ackerman*, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568; *Murchison v. Green*, 128 Ga. 339, 57 S. E. 709, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702; *Bruns v. Cope*, 182 Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471; *In re Lando's Estate*, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940; *Wilson v. Burnett*, 105 Misc. Rep. 279, 172 N. Y. Supp. 673; *Marone v. Marone*, 105 Misc. Rep. 371, 174 N. Y. Supp. 151; *Copeland v. Copeland* (Okla.) 175 Pac. 764; *Kinney v. Tri-State Tel. Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1180; *Barber v. People*, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N. E. 93; *Senge v. Senge*, 106 Ill. App. 140; *Sparks v. Ross*, 72 N. J. Eq. 762, 65 Atl. 977; *Potter v. Potter*, 45 Wash. 401, 88 Pac. 625; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 53 Wash. 297, 101 Pac. 865. Where the plaintiff established the fact that the celebration of the marriage of her father and mother had taken place publicly before witnesses and before a regular minister, and that the courthouse had subsequently been destroyed by fire, the presumption is that the proper preliminaries, such as the obtaining of a license, etc., had been complied with, and that it was a valid marriage. *Clayton v. Haywood*, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 571, 133 S. W. 1082. See, also, *Ollschlager's Estate v. Widmer*, 55 Or. 145, 105 Pac. 717.

<sup>34</sup> *Howard v. Kelly*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230; *Crickett v. Hardin*, 60 Okl. 57, 159 Pac. 275. The presumption, arising from cohabitation and repute, that a marriage was entered into, has been considered elsewhere. See, ante, p. 49.

<sup>35</sup> *Schubert v. Barnholdt*, 177 Iowa, 232, 158 N. W. 662.

<sup>36</sup> *Matthes v. Matthes*, 198 Ill. App. 515.

<sup>37</sup> The presumption in favor of the legality of the second marriage is not overcome by mere proof of a prior marriage. *Lewis v. Lewis*, 60 Okl. 60, 158 Pac. 368; *Kinney v. Tri-State Telephone Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1180; *Town of Roxbury v. Town of Bridgewater*, 85 Conn. 198, 82 Atl. 193.

<sup>38</sup> *Potter v. Clapp*, 203 Ill. 592, 68 N. E. 81, 96 Am. St. Rep. 322; *In re Thewlis' Estate*, 217 Pa. 307, 66 Atl. 519; *Murchison v. Green*, 128 Ga. 339,

riage has been consummated in accordance with the forms of law, it is to be presumed that no legal impediments existed to their entering into matrimonial relations; and the fact, if shown, that either or both of the parties had been previously married, and, of course, at a former time having a wife or husband living, does not destroy the prima facie legality of the last marriage. The natural inference in such cases is that the former marriage has been legally dissolved, and the burden of showing that it has not been, rests upon the party seeking to impeach the last marriage. The law does not impose upon every person contracting a second marriage the necessity of preserving the evidence that the former marriage has been dissolved, either by death of their former consort or by decree of court, in order to protect themselves against a bill for divorce or a prosecution for bigamy."<sup>29</sup>

So it has been held that when the presumption of validity of the second marriage conflicts with the presumption of the continuance of life, and neither presumption is aided by proof of facts or circumstances corroborating it, the presumption of the validity of the marriage will prevail over the presumption of continuance of

57 S. E. 709, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702; *Smith v. Fuller* (Iowa) 108 N. W. 765; *Estes v. Merrill*, 121 Ark. 361, 181 S. W. 136; *McLaughlin v. McLaughlin*, 201 Ala. 482, 78 South. 388; *In re Biersack*, 96 Misc. Rep. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519; *Town of Roxbury v. Town of Bridgewater*, 85 Conn. 196, 82 Atl. 193; *Turner v. Williams*, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N. E. 110, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1199, 132 Am. St. Rep. 511; *Gamble v. Rucker*, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S. W. 499; *Winter v. Dibble*, 251 Ill. 200, 95 N. E. 1093; *Goset v. Goset*, 112 Ark. 47, 164 S. W. 759, L. R. A. 1916C, 707; *In re Hughson's Estate*, 173 Cal. 448, 160 Pac. 548; *Copeland v. Copeland* (Okl.) 175 Pac. 764; *Thomas v. James*, (Okl.) 171 Pac. 855; *Howard v. Kelly*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230; *Schaffer v. Richardson's Estate*, 125 Md. 88, 93 Atl. 391, L. R. A. 1915E, 186; *Maler v. Brock*, 222 Mo. 74, 120 S. W. 1167, 133 Am. St. Rep. 513; *Same v. Waters*, 222 Mo. 102, 120 S. W. 1174; *Killackey v. Killackey*, 156 Mich. 127, 120 N. W. 680; *Tanton v. Tanton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W. 429; *Ricard v. Ricard*, 143 Iowa, 182, 121 N. W. 525, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 500, 136 Am. St. Rep. 762, 20 Ann. Cas. 1346; *In re Salvin's Will*, 106 Misc. Rep. 111, 173 N. Y. Supp. 897; *Price v. Tompkins* (Sup.) 171 N. Y. Supp. 844, order affirmed 186 App. Div. 915, 172 N. Y. Supp. 915; *Jones v. Jones* (Okl.) 164 Pac. 463, L. R. A. 1917E, 921; *Schaffer v. Krestovnikov*, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246; *McGaugh v. Mathis*, 131 Ark. 221, 198 S. W. 1147; *In re Meehan's Estate*, 150 App. Div. 681, 135 N. Y. Supp. 723; *Jackson v. Phalen*, 237 Mo. 142, 140 S. W. 879; *Id.*, 237 Mo. 153, 140 S. W. 882; *Wingo v. Rudder* (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 S. W. 1073. But see *Succession of Thomas*, 144 La. 25, 80 South. 186; *Staley v. State*, 87 Neb. 539, 127 N. W. 878.

<sup>29</sup> *Harris v. Harris*, 8 Ill. App. 57.

the particular life, though the time elapsing since the last knowledge of the former spouse and the second marriage is much less than seven years.<sup>40</sup> And where the former spouse is still living it will be presumed that the prior marriage has been dissolved by divorce.<sup>41</sup> This presumption is so strong that the one attacking the legality of the second marriage must prove that neither party to the first marriage obtained a divorce, though this involves proving a negative.<sup>42</sup> It is generally sufficient to overcome the presumption if it is shown that the records of the courts of the county or counties in which the parties lived show no divorce.<sup>43</sup>

The presumption of the validity of the second marriage is, of

<sup>40</sup> *Murchison v. Green*, 128 Ga. 339, 57 S. E. 709, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Twynning*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 386; *Greensboro v. Underhill*, 12 Vt. 604; *Harris v. Harris*, 8 Ill. App. 57; *Yates v. Houston*, 3 Tex. 449; *Senser v. Bower*, 1 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 450; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 114 Ill. 611, 3 N. E. 232, 55 Am. Rep. 883; *Dixon v. People*, 18 Mich. 84; *Commonwealth v. Boyer*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 306; *In re Biersack*, 96 Misc. Rep. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519; *Howard v. Kelly*, 111 Miss. 285, 71 South. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230; *Sullivan v. Grand Lodge, K. P.*, 97 Miss. 218, 52 South. 360; *Spears v. Burton*, 31 Miss. 547; *Wilkie v. Collins*, 48 Miss. 496; *Cash v. Cash*, 67 Ark. 278, 54 S. W. 744; *Vreeland v. Vreeland*, 78 N. J. Eq. 256, 79 Atl. 336, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940.

<sup>41</sup> *Schmisseeur v. Beatrice*, 147 Ill. 210, 35 N. E. 525; *Harvey v. Carroll*, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 23 S. W. 713; *Squire v. State*, 46 Ind. 459; *Boulden v. McIntire*, 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445, 12 Am. St. Rep. 453; *Blanchard v. Lambert*, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; *Klein v. Laudman*, 29 Mo. 259; *Hull v. Rawls*, 27 Miss. 471; *McCarty v. McCarty*, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 6, 47 Am. Dec. 585; *Carroll v. Carroll*, 20 Tex. 731; *In re Edwards' Estate*, 58 Iowa, 431, 10 N. W. 793; *Wenning v. Teeple*, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600; *McCord v. McCord*, 13 Ariz. 377, 114 Pac. 968; *Ross v. Sparks*, 79 N. J. Eq. 649, 83 Atl. 1118, affirming order *Sparks v. Ross*, 79 N. J. Eq. 99, 80 Atl. 932; *James v. Adams*, 56 Okl. 450, 155 Pac. 1121; *Copeland v. Copeland (Okl.)* 175 Pac. 764; *Aldridge v. Aldridge*, 116 Miss. 385, 77 South. 150; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 60 Okl. 60, 158 Pac. 368; *Gamble v. Rucker*, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S. W. 499; *Huff v. Huff*, 20 Idaho, 450, 118 Pac. 1080; *Shepard v. Carter*, 86 Kan. 125, 119 Pac. 533, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568; *Lyon v. Lash*, 79 Kan. 342, 99 Pac. 598; *Maier v. Brock*, 222 Mo. 74, 120 S. W. 1167, 133 Am. St. Rep. 529; *Maier v. Waters*, 222 Mo. 102, 120 S. W. 1174; *Wingo v. Rudder (Tex. Civ. App.)* 120 S. W. 1073.

<sup>42</sup> *Lewis v. Lewis*, 60 Okl. 60, 158 Pac. 368; *Winter v. Dibble*, 251 Ill. 200, 95 N. E. 1093; *Estes v. Merrill*, 121 Ark. 361, 181 S. W. 136; *Chancey v. Whinnery (Okl.)* 147 Pac. 1036. A divorce should not be presumed, where the evidence is positive it does not exist, and party alleging it shows only an alleged declaration of the deceased spouse to that effect during his lifetime. *Succession of Thomas*, 144 Ia. 25, 80 South. 186.

<sup>43</sup> *Schmisseeur v. Beatrice*, 147 Ill. 210, 35 N. E. 525; *Barnes v. Barnes*, 90 Iowa, 282, 57 N. W. 851; *Smith v. Fuller*, 138 Iowa, 91, 115 N. W. 912, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98.

course, rebuttable; but it can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.<sup>44</sup>

## CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

29. Statutes governing marriages are to be construed in the light of the law as it existed prior to their enactment; and, unless the intention of the Legislature to that effect is clear, they will not be held to avoid marriages that were valid at common law, or to otherwise change the common law.

It has been seen, in treating of formalities in the celebration of a marriage, that at common law none were required, and that where the Legislature prescribes formalities, as where it requires a license, or consent of parents, or designates persons who shall be competent to perform the marriage ceremony, the statute is not to be construed as invalidating common-law, informal marriages, unless it expressly declares that failure to observe the formalities prescribed shall render the marriage void.<sup>45</sup> An intent to change the common law must be clear. "Though in most, if not all, the United States, there are statutes regulating the celebration of marriage rites, and inflicting penalties on all who disobey the regulations, yet it is generally considered that, in the absence of any positive statute declaring that all marriages not celebrated in the prescribed manner shall be void, or that none but certain magistrates or ministers shall solemnize a marriage, any marriage regularly made according to the common law, without observing the statute regulations, would still be a valid marriage."<sup>46</sup> "A statute may declare that no marriages shall be valid unless they are solemnized in a prescribed manner; but such an enactment is a very different thing from a law requiring all marriages to be entered into in the presence of a magistrate or a clergyman, or that it be preceded by a license or publication of banns, or be attested to by witnesses. Such for-

<sup>44</sup> *Gamble v. Rucker*, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S. W. 499; *Schaffer v. Krestovnikow*, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246; *In re Salvin's Will*, 106 Misc. Rep. 111, 173 N. Y. Supp. 897; *Schubert v. Barnholdt*, 177 Iowa, 232, 158 N. W. 662; *Jackson v. Phalen*, 237 Mo. 142, 140 S. W. 879; *Same v. Phelan*, 237 Mo. 153, 140 S. W. 882.

<sup>45</sup> *Ante*, p. 37, and cases there collated. But see *In re McLaughlin's Estate*, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699.

<sup>46</sup> 2 Greenl. Ev. § 460, quoted with approval in *Meister v. Moore*, 96 U. S. 79, 24 L. Ed. 826.

mal provisions may be construed as merely directory, instead of being treated as destructive of a common-law right to form the marriage relation by words of present assent. And such, we think, has been the rule generally adopted in construing statutes regulating marriage. Whatever directions they may give respecting its formation or solemnization, courts have usually held a marriage good at common law to be good notwithstanding the statutes, unless they contain express words of nullity."<sup>47</sup>

On the same principle of construction, it has been held that a statute which declares a marriage void (as for canonical disabilities), but does not express any intention on the part of the Legislature to change the pre-existing law, will not be construed as rendering absolutely void a marriage which was formerly only voidable by a decree of nullity in the lifetime of the parties. It was said, in a case holding this principle: "The disabilities enumerated are all canonical disabilities, and not those known to the law as 'civil disabilities.' Canonical disabilities were such as render the marriage voidable, and not void. They require the judgment of an ecclesiastical court, during the lives of the parties, to make them effective as causes of a divorce. On the other hand, civil disabilities, such as arose *pro defectu consensus*, for want of a capacity to contract, or mental infirmity, *ipso facto* avoided marriage without the action of the courts. When the Legislature declared by statute that persons laboring under canonical disabilities should not marry under certain penalties, but such marriages should be void, and gave jurisdiction to the general court to hear and determine upon such marriages, it is to be supposed they designed to put persons laboring under such disabilities in the same position they were at common law—viz. they should be void, when established by the judgment of a court, in the life of the parties to the marriage—not to confound canonical and civil disabilities, and destroy the distinction between them."<sup>48</sup>

So, also, where a statute declared that persons under the age of 17 should not be capable of marrying, and that the marriage of persons incapable of marrying should be void, it was held that a

<sup>47</sup> *Meister v. Moore*, 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. Ed. 826. And see cases cited ante, p. 39.

<sup>48</sup> *Harrison v. State*, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658. And see *Bonham v. Badgley*, 2 Gillman (Ill.) 622; *Parker's Appeal*, 44 Pa. 309; *Com. v. Perryman*, 2 Leigh (Va.) 717; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 551, 73 Am. Dec. 99.

marriage by a boy 16 years of age could be confirmed and ratified by him on reaching his seventeenth year.<sup>49</sup> The court construed the statute as not changing the common-law rule as to the effect of marriages by persons under the age of consent.

### CONFLICT OF LAWS

**30. As a rule, the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where it was entered into.**

It is well settled that, as a general rule, the validity of a marriage is to be determined by the law of the place where it is entered into.<sup>50</sup> As it is generally expressed, a marriage that is valid where made is valid everywhere, and a marriage that is void where made is void everywhere.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> *Smith v. Smith*, 84 Ga. 440, 11 S. E. 496, 8 L. R. A. 362. And see *Hervey v. Moseley*, 7 Gray (Mass.) 479, 66 Am. Dec. 515; *Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce*, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791, and cases above cited.

<sup>50</sup> The law of the state where a marriage takes place governs its legality, rather than that of the residence of the parties. *Reifschneider v. Reifschneider*, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255, affirming judgment 144 Ill. App. 119; *Henderson v. Ressor*, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175. And see cases cited in note. Where a man sent a woman residing in Missouri a written contract, signed by him, stating that the parties would henceforth be husband and wife and so conduct themselves, the laws of Missouri, where the woman accepted the contractual offer, govern. *Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson*, 254 Fed. 683, 168 C. O. A. 181. It is a settled rule of private international law that the statutes as to marriage of a foreigner in his own country would be recognized in any other country which he may select as his place of abode. *Miller v. Miller*, 70 Misc. Rep. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787. See also *In re Lando's Estate*, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940. In this case the parties were citizens of Minnesota, but the acts constituting the contract of marriage took place in Germany. The German law provides that the validity of a marriage of aliens is to be determined by the law of the country of which the parties were subject. As the acts relied on to show a marriage would have been sufficient if performed in Minnesota, it was held that the marriage was valid.

<sup>51</sup> *Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Ves. Sr. 159; *Warrender v. Warrender*, 2 Clark & F. 458; *Harding v. Alden*, 9 Greenl. (Me.) 140, 23 Am. Dec. 549; *In re Lum Lin Ying* (D. C.) 59 Fed. 682; *Stevenson v. Gray*, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; *Dumaresny v. Fishly*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368; *True v. Ranney*, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164; *Hutchins v. Kimmell*, 31 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164; *Van Voorhis v. Brintnall*, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505; *Moore v. Hegeman*, 92 N. Y. 521, 44 Am. Rep. 408; *Thorp v. Thorp*, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am. Rep. 189; *Fornshill v. Murray*, 1 Bland (Md.) 479, 18 Am. Dec. 344; *Fensterwald v. Burk*, 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562; *Tyler v. Andrews*, 40 App. D. C. 100; *Schofield v. Schofield*, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564; *Petrus v. Petrar*

The law of the place where the marriage was entered into governs with respect to the matrimonial capacity of the parties, as well as with respect to the manner or form of solemnization of the marriage.<sup>52</sup> Thus it has been held that a marriage of first cousins, valid in the state of their residence, will be regarded as valid in another state, though the marriage of first cousins is prohibited in the latter state and the marriage, if entered into there, would have been invalid.<sup>53</sup> Similarly it has been held in Florida that, though marriages between whites and negroes are invalid in that state, yet if a marriage between a white person and a negro takes place in a state where such marriages are valid, it will be recognized as a valid marriage in Florida.<sup>54</sup>

A marriage invalid in the country or state where it was made may be valid as a common-law marriage in another state. Thus in a New York case it was held that a marriage between a man and a

(Del. Super.) 105 Atl. 835; *In re Lando's Estate*, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940; *Oillschlager's Estate v. Widmer*, 55 Or. 145, 105 Pac. 717; *Nehring v. Nehring*, 164 Ill. App. 527; *Powell v. Powell*, 207 Ill. App. 292, judgment affirmed 282 Ill. 357, 118 N. E. 786; *Sutton v. Warren*, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 451; *Com. v. Graham*, 157 Mass. 75, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255; *Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce*, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; *Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r*, 30 Mo. 72, 77 Am. Dec. 598; *Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham*, 16 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752; *Hills v. State*, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836, 57 L. R. A. 153; *Darling v. Dent*, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747; *McHenry v. Brackin*, 93 Minn. 510, 101 N. W. 960; *Travers v. Reinhardt*, 25 App. D. C. 567; *Reid v. Reid*, 72 Misc. Rep. 214, 129 N. Y. Supp. 529; *In re Kutter's Estate*, 79 Misc. Rep. 74, 139 N. Y. Supp. 693; *Davidson v. Ream*, 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *In re Spondre*, 98 Misc. Rep. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943; *Donohue v. Donohue*, 63 Misc. Rep. 111, 116 N. Y. Supp. 241; *Miller v. Miller*, 76 W. Va. 352, 85 S. E. 542; *Thompson v. Thompson* (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 175, judgment modified on second motion for rehearing 203 S. W. 939. Marriages between people of Greek Orthodox faith and non-Christians in Russia, being deemed illegal under its laws, are so regarded elsewhere. *Schaffer v. Krestovnikow*, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246.

<sup>52</sup> *Hastings v. Douglass* (D. C.) 249 Fed. 378; *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] Prob. 46. See, also, *Com. v. Lane*, 113 Mass. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 509; *Ex parte Chace*, 26 R. I. 351, 58 Atl. 978, 69 L. R. A. 493, 3 Ann. Cas. 1050, *Coooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 35; *State v. Shattuck*, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936.

<sup>53</sup> *People v. Siems*, 198 Ill. App. 342; *Garcia v. Garcia*, 25 S. D. 645, 127 N. W. 586, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 621. And see *Fensterwald v. Burk*, 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562, where a marriage between uncle and niece was involved.

<sup>54</sup> *Whittington v. McCaskill*, 65 Fla. 162, 61 South. 236, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1001.

woman whose former husband had not been heard from or known to be living for more than five years prior to such marriage, solemnized in Canada, and void under the laws of that country, because of the possible existence of such former husband, could be treated in New York, where both the parties were then domiciled, as a marriage per verba de præsenti, and valid when followed by cohabitation as husband and wife.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, it has been held in Missouri that, if common-law marriages are not recognized in the state where the acts alleged to show a common-law marriage took place, the Missouri courts will not recognize such marriage as having been entered into, though common-law marriages are valid in Missouri, and the acts shown, had they taken place in Missouri, would have established a common-law marriage.<sup>56</sup>

To this general rule that a marriage valid where made is valid everywhere there are, however, some exceptions. For example, a marriage entered into in one state or country will not be recognized as valid by the courts of another state or country if it is opposed to morality or religion or the law of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries<sup>57</sup> such as a polygamous or incestuous marriage;<sup>58</sup> or, secondly, if it is a marriage which the local law-making power has declared invalid as contrary to the settled policy of the state.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>55</sup> *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 32. And see cases in note 51, supra.

<sup>56</sup> *Jordan v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co.*, 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432.

<sup>57</sup> *Commonwealth v. Lane*, 113 Mass. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 509; *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724; *State v. Fenn*, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800; *Earle v. Earle*, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317; *Davidson v. Ream*, 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *True v. Ranney*, 21 N. H. 52, 53 Am. Dec. 164 (where the marriage of an imbecile was involved).

<sup>58</sup> *Conway v. Beazley*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 639; *Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham*, 16 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131; *Stevenson v. Gray*, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; *Schofield v. Schofield*, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564; *Roche v. Washington*, 19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376; *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724; *State v. Fenn*, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417. The marriage must, however, be incestuous by the common consent of Christendom; i. e., marriages in the direct line of consanguinity and in the collateral line between brothers and sisters. *Sutton v. Warren*, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 451; *Stevenson v. Gray*, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193.

<sup>59</sup> *Pennegar v. State*, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S. W. 305, 2 L. R. A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724; *Brook v. Brook*, 9 H. L. Cas. 193; *Succession of Gabliso*, 119 La. 704, 44 South. 438, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082, 121 Am. St. Rep. 529, 12 Ann. Cas. 574; *Newman v. Kimbrough* (Tenn. Ch. App.) 59 S. W. 1061, 62 L. R. A. 668; *State v. Fenn*, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 37 L. R. A.

While there seem to be no differences of opinion as to cases arising under the first exception, there is an apparent conflict between the courts where the decision has turned on questions arising under the second exception, especially when the parties have gone out of the state in which they live for the purpose of evading its laws. The courts of some states have held that in such instances the marriage will not be declared invalid on the return of the parties into the state, if it was valid in the state or country where it took place.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, in other jurisdictions the contrary rule has been announced.<sup>61</sup>

It is to be observed, however, that the conflict is more apparent than real, and that in nearly every case the decision turns on the question whether the particular provision of the law which it was sought to evade was or was not an expression of the distinctive public policy of the state. This becomes manifest if a comparison is made of the decisions, apparently conflicting, from the same jurisdiction,<sup>62</sup> or of decisions from different jurisdictions where local conditions have given rise to distinctive public policies.<sup>63</sup>

(N. S.) 800; *Davidson v. Ream*, 97 Misc. Rep. 89, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73; *People v. Siems*, 198 Ill. App. 342; *Kitzman v. Kitman*, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789; *People v. Steere*, 184 Mich. 556, 151 N. W. 617.

<sup>60</sup> *Com. v. Graham*, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255; *Levy v. Downing*, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638; *Thorp v. Thorp*, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am. Rep. 189; *Inhabitants of West Cambridge v. Inhabitants of Lexington*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 506, 11 Am. Dec. 231; *Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham*, 16 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131; *State v. Hand*, 87 Neb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 753; *Courtright v. Courtright*, 26 Wkly. Law Bul. (Ohio) 309; *Petit v. Petit*, 45 Misc. Rep. 155, 91 N. Y. Supp. 979; *Ex parte Chace*, 26 R. I. 351, 58 Atl. 978, 69 L. R. A. 493, 3 Ann. Cas. 1050, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 35. And see cases cited in note 68.

<sup>61</sup> *Dupre v. Boulard's Ex'r*, 10 La. Ann. 411; *Babin v. Le Blanc*, 12 La. Ann. 367; *Maillefer v. Saillot*, 4 La. Ann. 375; *Saul v. His Creditors*, 5 Mart. (N. S. La.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212; *Succession of Caballero v. Executor*, 24 La. Ann. 573; *McLennan v. McLennan*, 31 Or. 480, 50 Pac. 802, 38 L. R. A. 863, 65 Am. St. Rep. 835; *In re Stull's Estate*, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16, 39 L. R. A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776; *Durocher v. Degre*, Rap. Jud. Que. 20 C. S. 456. And see cases cited in note 71. There are statutes in some states to the same effect. See, for example, Civ. Code Ga. § 2424; *Burns' Ann. St. Ind.* 1914, § 8367; *Rev. St. Me. c. 64, § 9*.

<sup>62</sup> Compare *McLennan v. McLennan*, 31 Or. 480, 50 Pac. 802, 38 L. R. A. 863, 65 Am. St. Rep. 835, and *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724. Compare, also, *Tyler v. Tyler*, 170 Mass. 150, 48 N. E. 1075, and *Com. v. Graham*, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255. The good faith of the parties was regarded as an element in *Whippen v. Whippen*, 171 Mass. 560, 51 N. E. 174.

<sup>63</sup> Compare *Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham*, 16 Mass.

It is generally held that, if the statutory prohibition relates only to matters of form and ceremony, the general rule applies,<sup>64</sup> and the marriage will be held valid, even though the parties were married in another state in order to evade the law of their own state.<sup>65</sup> Thus, too, it has been held that a marriage between first cousins, entered into outside the state of residence of the parties, is nevertheless valid in the state of residence, though the parties went out of the state to evade its laws.<sup>66</sup> On the other hand, it has been held in New York that where residents of that state, incapable of marrying in New York because under age, went over into New Jersey and were married there to evade the law of New York, such marriage would be annulled.<sup>67</sup>

*Extraterritorial Effect of Restrictions on Right to Marry after Divorce*

There is a great difference of opinion as to the extraterritorial effect of statutes prohibiting divorced persons from marrying for a definite period or during the lifetime of the complaining spouse. As a general rule such statutes have no extraterritorial effect, and a marriage in another state of a divorced person within the period prohibited by the statute of the state where the divorce was granted, if valid by the law of the state where the marriage took place, will be recognized as valid in the state where the divorce was

157, 8 Am. Dec. 131, in which the marriage of a white person with a negro was involved, with *Kinney v. Commonwealth*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 690, and *State v. Kennedy*, 76 N. C. 251, 22 Am. Rep. 683. In this connection see, also, *Minor*, *Conf. of Laws*, pp. 151-153.

<sup>64</sup> *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple*, 2 Hagg. Consist. 54; *In re Lum Lin Ying* (D. C.) 59 Fed. 682; *Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce*, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752; *Id.*, 82 Md. 17, 33 Atl. 317, 24 L. R. A. 773; *Com. v. Graham*, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255.

<sup>65</sup> *Pennegar v. State*, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S. W. 305, 2 L. R. A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; *Sturgis v. Sturgis*, 51 Or. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724; *Ex parte Chace*, 28 R. I. 351, 58 Atl. 978, 69 L. R. A. 493, 3 Ann. Cas. 1050, *Cooley*, *Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 35. But see *Norman v. Norman*, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343, 66 Am. St. Rep. 74, holding that where parties go on the high seas, where no law exists, to be married, so as to evade the laws of the state wherein they are domiciled, and immediately after the marriage return and continue to reside in such state, the laws of their domicile apply to the marriage.

<sup>66</sup> *Leeffeld v. Leeffeld*, 85 Or. 287, 166 Pac. 953; *Schofield v. Schofield*, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564. But, contra, see *Johnson v. Johnson*, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179.

<sup>67</sup> *Cunningham v. Cunningham*, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355, reversing judgment 145 App. Div. 919, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1109; *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 63 Misc. Rep. 580, 117 N. Y. Supp. 671.

granted.<sup>68</sup> This general rule has been upheld, though the parties went outside the state where the divorce was granted, that being their domicile, merely to evade the law of such state.<sup>69</sup> The fact that the state in which the marriage took place has a statute similar to the statute of the state where the divorce was granted does not as a rule affect the question.<sup>70</sup>

On the other hand, in a number of states where the statute expressly declares that a marriage entered into in contravention thereof shall be deemed void, the general rule has been rejected, and, on the theory that the statute establishes a distinct and definite public policy, marriages in contravention of the statute are held to be invalid, no matter where celebrated.<sup>71</sup>

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has gone to the extreme in its application of the rule that statutes declaring a distinct public policy will render invalid a marriage in contravention of that policy contracted in another state. In *Hall v. Industrial Commission* <sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> *State v. Shattuck*, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936; *Crouse v. Wheeler*, 62 Colo. 51, 158 Pac. 1100, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1074; *In re Eichler*, 84 Misc. Rep. 667, 146 N. Y. Supp. 846; *McLaughlin v. McLaughlin*, 201 Ala. 482, 78 South. 388; *People v. Woodley*, 22 Cal. App. 674, 136 Pac. 312; *Griswold v. Griswold*, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 560; *Dudley v. Dudley*, 151 Iowa, 142, 130 N. W. 785, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170; *State v. Weatherby*, 43 Me. 258, 69 Am. Dec. 59; *Dimpfel v. Wilson*, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180, 15 Ann. Cas. 753; *In re Crane*, 170 Mich. 651, 136 N. W. 587, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 765, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1173; *Thorp v. Thorp*, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am. Rep. 189; *Moore v. Hegeman*, 92 N. Y. 521, 44 Am. Rep. 408.

<sup>69</sup> *Ponsford v. Johnson*, Fed. Cas. No. 11268; *Griswold v. Griswold*, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 560; *Dudley v. Dudley*, 151 Iowa, 142, 130 N. W. 785, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170; *State v. Hand*, 87 Neb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 753; *State v. Shattuck*, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936.

<sup>70</sup> *Dudley v. Dudley*, 151 Iowa, 142, 130 N. W. 785, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170; *Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Madrid*, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114, 12 L. R. A. 862, 23 Am. St. Rep. 770.

<sup>71</sup> *Wilson v. Cook*, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 365; *Hahn v. Hahn*, 104 Wash. 227, 176 Pac. 3; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 232 Mass. 253, 122 N. E. 308; *White v. White*, 167 Wis. 615, 168 N. W. 704; *Rand v. Bogle*, 197 Ill. App. 476; *Peerless Pacific Co. v. Burckhard*, 90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037, L. R. A. 1917C, 353, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 247; *Severa v. National Slavonic Society of the United States*, 138 Wis. 144, 119 N. W. 814; *In re Stull's Estate*, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16, 39 L. R. A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776; *Pennegar v. State*, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S. W. 305, 2 L. R. A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; *Williams v. Oates*, 27 N. C. 535; *State v. Fenn*, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800; *Lanham v. Lanham*, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1085.

<sup>72</sup> 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, L. R. A. 1917D, 829.

it appeared that W. was divorced from her husband in Illinois in October, 1911. The decree, in accordance with the provisions of the Illinois statute,<sup>73</sup> declared that neither party should marry within one year. In July, 1912, W. and H., both residents of Illinois, went into Indiana and were married. They went immediately to Wisconsin, remaining there two months. They then returned to Illinois, and after residing in Illinois about two years again took up their residence in Wisconsin. In an action brought by Mrs. H. under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Supreme Court held that she was not the widow of H., as the marriage in Indiana was invalid. The court, though recognizing the general rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, held that as the marriage was invalid by Illinois law, and Wisconsin had a statute similar to the Illinois statute, the general principle of comity justified the court in refusing to recognize the Indiana marriage, though the marriage was valid under the Indiana law. The court said: "The statute of Illinois, with its judicial construction, must be deemed imported into plaintiff's divorce decree, and since such statute and construction are substantially the same as ours, and since they declare a public policy similar to our own, no good reason is perceived why this court should not take cognizance of plaintiff's evasion of the laws of our sister state, and apply the same rule to their infraction that we would apply to a violation of our own like laws."

The decision is remarkable in that it is contrary to the great weight of authority, and to the well-recognized general rule that it is only the public policy of the state of the forum that should be considered in cases of this character, and not the public policy of some other state or country.<sup>74</sup> It is only by the utmost stretch of the imagination and a juggling with the meaning of words that an act committed in Indiana in violation of a statute of Illinois can be regarded as in contravention of the public policy of Wisconsin.

The general rule stated above is based in some cases on the fundamental doctrine that a marriage valid where entered into is valid everywhere,<sup>75</sup> and in other instances on the theory that the statutes

<sup>73</sup> Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 40, § 1a.

<sup>74</sup> *Southern Pac. Co. v. Dusablon*, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 106 S. W. 766; *Kaufman v. Geoson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 591.

<sup>75</sup> See ante, p. 67.

restricting the right to marry after divorce are penal in their nature and therefore have no extraterritorial effect.<sup>76</sup>

In view of the theory that the statutes are penal in their nature, it has been held that if residents of one state go into another state and marry, contrary to the restrictive statutes of the latter state, intending to return, and in fact returning, to the state of their residence, where the marriage would have been valid, the marriage will be there upheld. Thus it was held by the Louisiana court that the prohibition of the New York statute to the effect that no second or other subsequent marriage should be contracted by any person during the lifetime of any former husband or wife of such person, in case the former marriage was dissolved on the ground of adultery, had no extraterritorial effect, being a penal statute, and that it could not be given the effect of annulling a marriage between persons at the time residing abroad, and intending to continue to reside abroad, notwithstanding it was solemnized in New York.<sup>77</sup> So, also, in a Maine case it was held that where a husband obtained a divorce from his wife for her fault, by the decree of a court of another state, which prohibited the wife from remarrying, the wife still residing in Maine, the prohibition to remarry was in the nature of a penalty, and had no force as a disability to remarry in another state, and therefore such disability did not attach to the person of the wife in Maine.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> *Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Madrid*, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114, 12 L. R. A. 862, 23 Am. St. Rep. 770; *Ponsford v. Johnson*, Fed. Cas. No. 11266.

<sup>77</sup> *Succession of Hernandez*, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 South. 461, 24 L. R. A. 831. See, also, *Frame v. Thormann*, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N. W. 39; *Snuffer v. Karr*, 197 Mo. 182, 94 S. W. 983, 7 Ann. Cas. 780; *State v. Shattuck*, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936.

<sup>78</sup> *Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Madrid*, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114, 12 L. R. A. 862, 23 Am. St. Rep. 770. It was also held in this case that the prohibition to marry contained in the statutes of one state did not apply to divorces granted in another state.

## CHAPTER II

### RIGHTS AND DUTIES INCIDENT TO COVERTURE IN GENERAL

- 31. Right to Cohabitation and Intercourse.
- 32-33. Restraint and Correction of Wife.
- 34-35. Support of Wife and Family.
- 36. Right to Determine Family Domicile.
- 37. Crimes of Married Women.
- 38. Crimes as between Husband and Wife.
- 39-42. Torts of Married Women.
- 43. Torts as between Husband and Wife.
- 44. Torts Against Married Women.
- 45-46. Actions for Enticing, Harboring, or Alienation of Affection.
- 47. Action for Criminal Conversation.

"By marriage," says Blackstone, "the husband and wife are one person in law. The very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover she performs everything; and is therefore called, in our law French, a 'feme covert'—'fœmina viro co-operta'; is said to be 'covert baron,' or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her 'coverture.' Upon this principle of a union of person in husband and wife depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities that either of them acquire by the marriage"<sup>1</sup>

### RIGHT TO COHABITATION AND INTERCOURSE

- 31. Marriage mutually entitles the husband and wife to cohabitation and intercourse, but in this country there is no way in which this right can be judicially enforced.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 442. "Coverture" is the legal condition of a married woman. *Perkins v. Blethen*, 107 Me. 443, 78 Atl. 574, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1148. At common law the husband and wife are one person in law, and the wife's legal existence is suspended during the marriage and consolidated into that of her husband. *Heyman v. Heyman*, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25. In proceedings which from their very nature make a husband and wife opposite parties, the legal fiction of unity of person by marriage will not be followed to destroy the rights of either. *State ex rel. Taubman v. Davis*, 199 Mo. App. 439, 203 S. W. 654.

Marriage entitles the husband and wife to each other's society; that is, they are mutually entitled to cohabitation.<sup>2</sup> And, in addition to this, they are mutually entitled to sexual intercourse.<sup>3</sup> The law, in this country at least, cannot, as could be done in England, enforce the right to cohabitation and intercourse in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.<sup>4</sup> But the right is essential to the marriage state, and is the basis of many of the personal rights of the spouses. It is recognized by the law in many ways. Thus a promise by a husband to his wife to pay her money if she will cohabit with him, or permit him to have sexual intercourse, would be void for want of consideration, as the only consideration therefor is the doing by the wife of something which she is already bound in law to do.<sup>5</sup> Other illustrations of the recognition of the right to co-

<sup>2</sup> The right of "consortium" is a right growing out of the marital relation, which the husband and wife have, respectively, to enjoy the society and companionship and affection of each other in their life together. *Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291. Right of either husband or wife to consortium of their respective spouse, as distinguished from right of service belonging to husband or right of support belonging to wife, is property, although of a somewhat sentimental character. *Larisa v. Tiffany* (R. I.) 105 Atl. 739. As against third persons, either spouse has the right of custody of the person of the other. *Ex parte Chace*, 26 R. I. 351, 58 Atl. 978, 69 L. R. A. 493, 3 Ann. Cas. 1050, *Cooley*, Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 35; *State ex rel. Scott v. Lowell*, 78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877, 46 L. R. A. 440, 79 Am. St. Rep. 358, *Cooley*, Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 22.

<sup>3</sup> In law "cohabitation" is properly used to designate the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife, though the term is often erroneously used in the sense of sexual intercourse. Properly speaking, "cohabitation" does not necessarily imply sexual intercourse. 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1669, and note; *Yardley's Estate*, 75 Pa. 207; *Pollock v. Pollock*, 71 N. Y. 137, 141. Marriage is a civil contract, and the wife owes to the husband the same full performance of marital duties that he owes to her. *Richardson v. Richardson* (Sup.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 912. A husband and wife are "living together" when they dwell under the same roof, eat at the same table, and hold themselves out to the world and conduct themselves towards each other as husband and wife, and it is incorrect to say that they are not living as husband and wife when they do not occupy the same room or have sexual intercourse. *Levy v. Goldsoll*, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 257, 131 S. W. 420.

<sup>4</sup> Schouler, *Husb. & W.* §§ 482, 483; 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 69.

<sup>5</sup> *Roberts v. Frisby*, 38 Tex. 219; *Reithmaier v. Beckwith*, 35 Mich. 110. There may be circumstances under which a promise by a wife to continue to cohabit with her husband would constitute a consideration for his promise given in return. This would be so in any case where the conduct of the husband had been such as to entitle the wife to leave him. In *Phillips v. Meyers*, 82 Ill. 67, 25 Am. Rep. 295, for instance, a note executed by a husband for the benefit of his wife, in consideration of her discontinuing a suit for divorce on the ground of his drunkenness and abuse, was upheld.

habitation and intercourse are in the fact that a marriage may be annulled on the ground of impotence existing at the time of the marriage, that desertion is very generally made a ground for divorce, and that it is not rape for a husband to have intercourse with his wife by force, and against her will. While a husband is thus entitled to sexual intercourse with his wife, he cannot compel her to submit when not in a condition to do so, as where she is ill. Nor can he compel her to submit to excessive intercourse, endangering her health, or to intercourse with him while he is diseased. This would be cruelty, and in some states a ground for divorce.<sup>6</sup>

A wife may be justified, under certain circumstances, in leaving her husband, and living apart from him. Extreme cruelty or adultery on his part would justify her in taking such a course. Any cause that would entitle her to sue for a divorce would undoubtedly justify her. And, though there is some doubt on the subject, it is held in some jurisdictions that she may be so justified by causes which are not sufficient to entitle her to a divorce.<sup>7</sup> In like manner, a husband may be justified in leaving his wife.<sup>8</sup> The question is one of great importance; for, if either husband or wife deserts the other without justification, the statutes very generally entitle the deserted spouse to a divorce.<sup>9</sup> In addition to this, there are statutes in some jurisdictions rendering a husband liable to a criminal prosecution if he abandons his wife without just cause.<sup>10</sup> A deserted wife may also sue for maintenance,<sup>11</sup> and she has the pow-

<sup>6</sup> See post, p. 249.

<sup>7</sup> *Watts v. Watts*, 160 Mass. 464, 36 N. E. 479, 23 L. R. A. 187, 39 Am. St. Rep. 509.

<sup>8</sup> *McClurg's Appeal*, 66 Pa. 366.

<sup>9</sup> See post, p. 257.

<sup>10</sup> *State v. Schweitzer*, 57 Conn. 532, 18 Atl. 787, 6 L. R. A. 125; *State v. Fuchs*, 17 Mo. App. 458; *State v. Broyer*, 44 Mo. App. 393; *State v. Witham*, 70 Wis. 473, 35 N. W. 934; *Cuthbertson v. State*, 72 Neb. 727, 101 N. W. 1031; *Virtue v. People*, 122 Ill. App. 223; *Spencer v. State*, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N. W. 462, 122 Am. St. Rep. 989, 13 Ann. Cas. 969.

<sup>11</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6351; *Kinsey v. Kinsey*, 37 Ala. 393; *Simpson v. Simpson*, 31 Mo. 24; *McMullen v. McMullen*, 10 Iowa, 412; *Elliott v. Elliott*, 48 N. J. Eq. 231, 21 Atl. 381; *Smith v. Smith*, 35 Ind. App. 610, 74 N. E. 1008; *Rhoades v. Rhoades*, 78 Neb. 495, 111 N. W. 122, 126 Am. St. Rep. 611. In Iowa it has been held that a suit for separate maintenance cannot be maintained except for a cause that would warrant a decree of divorce. *Shors v. Shors*, 133 Iowa, 22, 110 N. W. 16. But see *Mellanson v. Mellanson*, 113 Ill. App. 81, holding that a wife, in order to obtain separate maintenance, need not show a statutory ground for divorce; but it is sufficient if

er to bind her husband for necessities to a much greater extent than when living with him, and being supported by him.<sup>12</sup>

### RESTRAINT AND CORRECTION OF WIFE

32. A husband has no right to restrain his wife of her liberty, except where restraint is necessary, either:

EXCEPTIONS—(a) To prevent her from committing a crime.

(b) To prevent her from committing adultery.

(c) Perhaps, to prevent her from committing a tort for which he, as her husband, would be liable.

(d) Perhaps, to prevent her interference with his parental authority over his children.

33. A husband has no right to chastise his wife in any case.

#### *Restraint*

The text-books generally state that the husband has the right to restrain his wife's person. Kent says that the law has given the husband a reasonable superiority and control over her person, and that he may even put gentle restraint upon her liberty.<sup>13</sup> The early cases support this view,<sup>14</sup> and the right has been recognized in a recent English case,<sup>15</sup> where it was held that the law places the wife under the guardianship of the husband, and entitles him, for the sake of both, to protect her from the danger of unrestricted intercourse with the world, by enforcing cohabitation and a common residence. Here, the wife having left her husband, he brought suit for restitution of conjugal rights, and she failed to answer. Thereupon he decoyed her to his house, and restrained her there against her will. It was held that he was justified in thus forcibly detaining her. This case, however, has been recently overruled by the court of appeal in a case where the husband, having obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, caused his wife to be

a persistent, unjustifiable course of conduct on the part of the husband be shown which necessarily renders the life of the wife miserable.

<sup>12</sup> See post, p. 176.

<sup>13</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 181.

<sup>14</sup> *Rex v. Lister*, 1 Strange, 478. In this case it was said that when a wife makes undue use of her liberty, either by squandering away the husband's estate, or going into lewd company, it is lawful for the husband to lay such a wife under restraint.

<sup>15</sup> *In re Cochrane* (1840) 8 Dowl. 631.

seized in the street, and confined in his house.<sup>16</sup> The Master of the Rolls said in that case: "I do not believe that an English husband has, by law, any such right over his wife's person as has been suggested. I do not say that there may not be occasions on which he would have a right of restraint, though not of imprisonment. For instance, if the wife were about immediately to do something which would be to the dishonor of her husband, as if that he saw his wife in the act of going to meet a paramour, I think that he might seize her and pull her back."

The limits of the doctrine of the husband's right of restraint over his wife are very shadowy and undefined. In this country the right has been recognized so far as to allow a husband to restrain his wife from committing a crime,<sup>17</sup> or from interfering with his exercise of parental authority over his children.<sup>18</sup> But it is not probable that any court would go as far as the English court in the first case mentioned above, and allow a husband to restrain his wife merely to compel cohabitation with him, or to prevent her from doing acts not criminal, nor adulterous or tortious, nor interfering with his parental authority.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps, as it would be only reasonable, he would be permitted to prevent her from committing a tort for which he, as husband, would be civilly liable.<sup>20</sup> A man, it was said by the Pennsylvania court, has a right to a reasonable control of his wife's actions. "It is a sickly sensibility which holds that a man may not lay hands on his wife, even rudely, if necessary, to prevent the commission of some unlawful or criminal purpose."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Reg. v. Jackson*, [1891] 1 Q. B. Div. 671.

<sup>17</sup> *Richards v. Richards*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 389.

<sup>18</sup> *Gorman v. State*, 42 Tex. 221; *Barber v. Barber*, 168 App. Div. 212, 153 N. Y. Supp. 256.

<sup>19</sup> 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1624; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 45. "In this country," says Dr. Bishop, "where we reject the suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, repudiating, therefore, by implication, the principle of a compelled cohabitation, whereon it is founded, there is apparently no just ground for permitting a husband to confine, even in his own house, a sane wife, who is simply unwilling to dwell with him. It is believed that none of our courts will recognize this authority. Still the husband must, with us, be permitted to exercise some restraint; for our law makes him criminally responsible for her acts of crime committed in his presence, and civilly for her torts, whether he is present or absent. And it would be absurd to deny him all means of avoiding these heavy liabilities. He must have the right to the physical control over her necessary to free himself." 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1624.

<sup>20</sup> 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1624.

<sup>21</sup> *Richards v. Richards*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 389.

*Chastisement*

According to Blackstone, and some of the early cases, the husband formerly had the right to give his wife moderate correction.<sup>22</sup> No such right, however, is recognized to-day. Chastisement is unlawful in any case, and will render the husband guilty of assault and battery.<sup>23</sup> Further than this, if sufficiently severe, or often repeated, under the statutes, it may entitle the wife to a divorce on the ground of cruelty.<sup>24</sup> As was said by Chancellor Walworth in a New York case: "Whatever may be the common law on the subject, the moral sense of this community, in our present state of civilization, will not permit the husband to inflict personal chastisement on his wife, even for the grossest outrage."<sup>25</sup>

**SUPPORT OF WIFE AND FAMILY**

34. At common law, and under the statutes of many states, it is the duty of the husband to support and maintain his wife and family, if he is able to do so.
35. By statute, in some states, the husband and wife are made jointly liable for family expenses; but these statutes do not relieve the husband from his primary liability for necessities.

*In General*

As a necessary incident to the marital relation there is imposed on the husband the duty to support and maintain his wife and family, if he is able to do so.<sup>26</sup> This duty of the husband to support his

<sup>22</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 445. "The husband hath by law power and dominion over his wife, and may keep her by force within the bounds of duty, but not in a violent or cruel manner." Bac. Abr. tit. "Baron and Feme," B. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N. C. 453, 98 Am. Dec. 78.

<sup>23</sup> 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1617; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 44; Com. v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 11 Am. Rep. 383; Pearman v. Pearman, 1 Swab. & T. 601; Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 501; Reg. v. Jackson (1891) 1 Q. B. Div. 671; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 70; Jones v. Jones, 173 N. C. 279, 91 S. E. 960; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27; Com. v. Barry, 2 Green, Cr. Rep. 286, note; People v. Winters, 2 Parker, Cr. R. (N. Y.) 10; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307, 29 Am. Dec. 664.

<sup>24</sup> See post, p. 249.

<sup>25</sup> Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 501.

<sup>26</sup> This duty exists both at common law and under the statutes in many states. Clifton v. Clifton, 83 W. Va. 149, 98 S. E. 72; Heyman v. Heyman, 19-

wife does not rest on contract but springs from the matrimonial relation.<sup>27</sup> It is based on considerations of public policy<sup>28</sup> and cannot be evaded by contract.<sup>29</sup> The common-law liability of a husband to support his wife cannot be extended by implication from the written law as to the support of other persons, but only by statute plainly so intended.<sup>30</sup> The duty of the husband is conditioned on her willingness to perform the duty she owes him to live with and make a home for him,<sup>31</sup> and if she separates herself from him, and refuses to live with him without just cause, he is absolved from his duty to support her.<sup>32</sup> The support which the husband must furnish is such as is reasonable and suitable to his condition and station in life and according to his means.<sup>33</sup>

Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25; *In re Simonson's Estate*, 164 Wis. 590, 160 N. W. 1040; *Clisby v. Clisby*, 160 Ala. 572, 49 South. 445, 135 Am. St. Rep. 110; *Underhill v. Mayer*, 174 Ky. 229, 192 S. W. 14; *McConnell v. McConnell*, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S. W. 931, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074; *Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll*, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 380; *McCaddin v. McCaddin*, 116 Md. 567, 82 Atl. 554; *Fitzmaurice v. Buck*, 77 Conn. 390, 59 Atl. 415; *De Brauwere v. De Brauwere*, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, affirming 144 App. Div. 521, 129 N. Y. Supp. 587; *State v. McPherson*, 72 Wash. 371, 130 Pac. 481, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 587; *Towery v. McGaw* (Ky.) 56 S. W. 727; *Finkelstein v. Finkelstein*, 174 App. Div. 416, 161 N. Y. Supp. 166; *In re Carroll*, 65 Ind. App. 146, 116 N. E. 844. The duty exists, though the husband is an infant. See post, p. 481. He cannot escape that duty by deserting her without cause. *Merriam v. Merriam*, 75 Wash. 389, 134 Pac. 1058.

<sup>27</sup> *American Mill Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois*, 279 Ill. 560, 117 N. E. 147; *Boehm v. Boehm*, 88 N. J. Eq. 74, 101 Atl. 423. If finding that common-law marriage existed between parties was warranted by facts, husband was liable for wife's maintenance and support. *Knecht v. Knecht*, 261 Pa. 410, 104 Atl. 676.

<sup>28</sup> *In re Ryan's Estate*, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 491, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1025; *In re Simonson's Estate*, 164 Wis. 590, 160 N. W. 1040.

<sup>29</sup> *In re Simonson's Estate*, 164 Wis. 590, 160 N. W. 1040; *In re Ryan's Estate*, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 491, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1025; *Weiserbs v. Weiserbs* (Sup.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 111.

<sup>30</sup> *Richardson v. Stuesser*, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N. W. 261, 69 L. R. A. 829, 4 Ann. Cas. 784. The husband is not bound to support the child of his wife by a former marriage. *McMahill v. McMahon*, 113 Ill. 461; *Gay v. Ballou*, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 406, 21 Am. Dec. 158.

<sup>31</sup> *Sturm v. Sturm*, 80 Misc. Rep. 277, 141 N. Y. Supp. 61.

<sup>32</sup> *McKee v. Cunningham*, 2 Cal. App. 684, 84 Pac. 260; *Isaacs v. Isaacs*, 71 Neb. 537, 99 N. W. 268; *Richardson v. Stuesser*, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N. W. 261, 69 L. R. A. 829, 4 Ann. Cas. 784; *Barefoot v. Barefoot*, 83 N. J. Eq. 685, 93 Atl. 192; *Wirth v. Wirth*, 184 App. Div. 643, 172 N. Y. Supp. 309; *Kientz v. Kientz*, 104 Ark. 381, 149 S. W. 86; *State v. Hill*, 161 Iowa, 279, 142 N. W. 231; *Pearson v. Pearson*, 104 Misc. Rep. 675, 173 N. Y. Supp. 563; *Rutledge v. Rutledge*, 177 Mo. App. 469, 119 S. W. 489.

<sup>33</sup> *State v. McPherson*, 72 Wash. 371, 130 Pac. 481, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 587;

The common-law duty of a husband to support his family has not been changed by the legislation relating to married women.<sup>34</sup> Nor is he relieved from liability because the wife has adequate means of her own, or a separate estate.<sup>35</sup> He is still presumptively liable unless the wife by express contract charges herself personally.<sup>36</sup> In some states statutes have been passed making the husband and wife jointly liable for family expenses,<sup>37</sup> but even these statutes do not relieve the husband from his primary liability.<sup>38</sup>

#### *Failure of Husband to Furnish Support*

If the husband fails or neglects to support his wife, she may under certain limitations bind him for necessities as his agent. The conditions under which she becomes the agent of her husband in this respect are discussed in a subsequent section.<sup>39</sup>

#### *Same—Proceedings to Compel Support*

Though it has been held in some states that the wife cannot maintain an action against her husband for support,<sup>40</sup> in most of the states by statute a wife who has been deserted or abandoned by her husband, or who is living apart from him because of his

*De Brauwere v. De Brauwere*, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 503, affirming 144 App. Div. 521, 129 N. Y. Supp. 587; *Kemp v. Kemp*, 144 La. 671, 81 South. 221.

<sup>34</sup> *Grandy v. Hadcock*, 85 App. Div. 173, 83 N. Y. Supp. 90; *Ruhl v. Heintze*, 97 App. Div. 442, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1031. A statute authorizing a married woman to contract does not abrogate the common-law liability of the husband to support her. *Ponder v. Morris & Bros.*, 152 Ala. 531, 44 South. 651; *Flynn v. Messenger*, 28 Minn. 208, 9 N. W. 759, 41 Am. Rep. 279.

<sup>35</sup> *Poole v. People*, 24 Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025, 65 Am. St. Rep. 245; *Israel v. Silsbee*, 57 Wis. 222, 15 N. W. 144; *Rabb v. Flenniken*, 32 S. C. 189, 10 S. E. 943; *State v. Hill*, 161 Iowa, 279, 142 N. W. 231; *American Mill Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois*, 279 Ill. 560, 117 N. E. 147; *H. G. Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois*, 278 Ill. 164, 115 N. E. 855.

<sup>36</sup> *Grandy v. Hadcock*, 85 App. Div. 173, 83 N. Y. Supp. 90; *Ruhl v. Heintze*, 97 App. Div. 442, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1031; *Flurschelm v. Rosenthal* (Sup.) 112 N. Y. Supp. 1118.

<sup>37</sup> See post, p. 84.

<sup>38</sup> *Hudson v. Sholem*, 65 Ill. App. 61; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 54 Or. 560, 103 Pac. 524; *In re Kosanke's Estate*, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N. W. 1060. Compare *Underhill v. Mayer*, 174 Ky. 229, 192 S. W. 14.

<sup>39</sup> See post, p. 175.

<sup>40</sup> *Irwin v. Irwin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 322. And see *Trotter v. Trotter*, 77 Ill. 510, holding that wife cannot maintain a bill for maintenance where she seeks no other relief. A woman cannot maintain action for damages on the ground that defendant, while he was her husband, wantonly refused to supply her with necessities. *Decker v. Kedley*, 148 Fed. 681, 79 C. C. A. 305.

fault, may maintain a suit in equity or an action in the nature of a suit in equity for maintenance.<sup>41</sup> So, too, it has been held that, if the wife is obliged to maintain herself out of her separate estate, she may recover from the husband the amount so expended.<sup>42</sup> In many states, too, it is by statute made a criminal offense for the husband to abandon his wife, thus leaving her without means of support.<sup>43</sup>

### *Effect of Contract of Wife*

At common law the wife could not bind herself personally on her contract even for necessities,<sup>44</sup> but under modern statutes in most, if not all, states, it is competent for a married woman to bind herself and her separate estate for necessities.<sup>45</sup> It must, however, appear clearly that she intended to bind herself.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup> See the statutes of the various states. And see *Hiner v. Hiner*, 153 Cal. 254, 94 Pac. 1044; *Bauer v. Bauer*, 2 N. D. 108, 49 N. W. 418; *Judson v. Judson*, 171 Mich. 185, 137 N. W. 103; *Jones v. Jones*, 174 Ala. 461, 57 South. 376; *Brewer v. Brewer*, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W. 161, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 222; *Ellett v. Ellett*, 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1215; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 39 Okl. 407, 135 Pac. 397. In some states it seems to be the rule that courts of equity base inherent power to decree separate maintenance, irrespective of statute. *Cureton v. Cureton*, 117 Tenn. 103, 98 S. W. 608; *State v. Superior Court*, 85 Wash. 72, 147 Pac. 436.

<sup>42</sup> *Pearson v. Pearson*, 104 Misc. Rep. 675, 173 N. Y. Supp. 563; *Sodowsky v. Sodowsky*, 51 Okl. 689, 152 Pac. 390; *Weiserbs v. Weiserbs* (Sup.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 111.

<sup>43</sup> See the statutes of the various states. Such abandonment was not an offense at common law. *Grantland v. State*, 8 Ala. App. 319, 62 South. 470; *State v. Witham*, 70 Wis. 473, 35 N. W. 934.

<sup>44</sup> *Underhill v. Mayer*, 174 Ky. 229, 192 S. W. 14.

<sup>45</sup> *Howe v. North*, 60 Mich. 272, 37 N. W. 213; *Miller v. Brown*, 47 Mo. 504, 4 Am. Rep. 345; *Crisfield v. Banks*, 24 Hun, 159; *Heugh v. Jones*, 32 Pa. 432; *Lavole v. Dube*, 229 Mass. 87, 118 N. E. 179; *Bell v. Rossignol*, 143 Ga. 150, 84 S. E. 542, L. R. A. 1915D, 1184, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 576; *Edminston v. Smith*, 13 Idaho, 645, 92 Pac. 342, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 871, 121 Am. St. Rep. 294; *Speckmann v. Foote* (Sup.) 138 N. Y. Supp. 380; *Lipinsky v. Revell*, 167 N. C. 506, 83 S. E. 320; *Adair v. Arendt*, 126 Ark. 246, 190 S. W. 445; *Wilder v. Brokaw*, 141 App. Div. 811, 126 N. Y. Supp. 932; *Underhill v. Mayer*, 174 Ky. 229, 192 S. W. 14; *Charron v. Day*, 228 Mass. 305, 117 N. E. 347; *Sherry v. Littlefield*, 232 Mass. 220, 122 N. E. 300; *Carstens v. Hanselman*, 61 Mich. 426, 28 N. W. 159, 1 Am. St. Rep. 606; *Bonebrake v. Tauer*, 67 Kan. 827, 72 Pac. 521; *Mayer v. Lithauer*, 28 Misc. Rep. 171, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1064; *Bazemore v. Mountain*, 121 N. C. 59, 28 S. E. 17. But see *June v. Labadie*, 132 Mich. 135, 92 N. W. 937, where it was held that a contract to

<sup>46</sup> *Felner v. Boynton*, 73 N. J. Law, 136, 62 Atl. 420, *Cooley*, Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 84; *Quisenberry v. Thompson* (Ky.) 43 S. W. 723; *Stevens v. Hush*, 104 Misc. Rep. 69, 171 N. Y. Supp. 41; *Strawbridge v. Wolff*, 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 328.

*Joint Liability of Husband and Wife for Family Expenses*

In several states, statutes have been enacted declaring that the husband and the wife shall be jointly liable for family expenses, such as necessary food, clothing, education of the children, etc.<sup>47</sup> These statutes are for the benefit of creditors only, and do not change the rule as to the primary liability of the husband.<sup>48</sup> Since either the husband or the wife must be primarily chargeable with the debt before liability can exist under the statute, there can be no liability for goods purchased on the credit of a third person.<sup>49</sup>

In order to charge either spouse under these statutes, the relation of husband and wife must exist, and the expense must be a "family" expense.<sup>50</sup> So, to charge the wife under such statutes for

pay the board of an adult sister and her child was invalid, as not having reference to the possessor's separate estate. See, also, *Chickering-Chase Bros. Co. v. L. J. White & Co.*, 127 Wis. 83, 106 N. W. 797, holding that she has no power to contract for board and lodging while living with her husband.

<sup>47</sup> Rev. St. Colo. 1908, § 3021; Hurd's Rev. St. Ill. 1915-16, c. 68, § 15; Gen. St. Minn. 1913, § 7146; Comp. Laws, Utah, 1907, § 1206; Comp. Laws, N. D., 1913, § 4414; Code Iowa, § 3165; Comp. St. Neb. c. 53, § 1; Lord's Oregon Laws, § 7039. A somewhat similar statute formerly existed in Alabama, but has been repealed. *Ernst v. Hollis*, 89 Ala. 638, 8 South. 122. These statutes are not retroactive and do not apply to expenses incurred prior to their enactment. *Kelly v. Canon*, 6 Colo. App. 465, 41 Pac. 833. The statute is in derogation of the common law. *Mandel Bros. v. Ringstrom*, 189 Ill. App. 564. While it should receive reasonable construction, it should not be extended by implication to matters not fairly inferable from the words used. *Staver Carriage Co. v. Beaudry*, 138 Ill. App. 147. Under the statute there may be a joint or several judgment against the husband and wife. *Keefer v. Amicone*, 45 Colo. 110, 100 Pac. 594. The provision of Const. § 213, that a wife's separate property shall not be liable for her husband's debts does not render unconstitutional the statute providing for joint liability for family expenses. *Banner Mercantile Co. v. Hendricks*, 24 N. D. 16, 138 N. W. 993.

<sup>48</sup> *In re Skillman's Estate*, 146 Iowa, 601, 125 N. W. 343, 140 Am. St. Rep. 295; *In re Kosanke's Estate*, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N. W. 1060; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 54 Or. 560, 103 Pac. 524; *Hudson v. Sholem*, 65 Ill. App. 61.

<sup>49</sup> *Parker v. Joslin Dry Goods Co.*, 52 Colo. 238, 120 Pac. 1042, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 633.

<sup>50</sup> *Berow v. Shields*, 48 Utah, 270, 159 Pac. 538. Servants are members of the family within the statute. *Pippin v. Jones*, 52 Ala. 161. Children of husband by a former marriage are not members of the family for whose expenses the wife can be held liable as for family expenses. *May v. Smith*, 48 Ala. 483. A widow after the death of her husband became the head of the family, and her estate was liable for the family necessities purchased by any member of the family, though over age, whether prior or subsequent to the husband's death. *Graham & Corry v. Work*, 162 Iowa, 383, 141 N. W. 428.

goods furnished to the husband, it must appear that the husband and wife are living together as a family.<sup>51</sup> If the family relation has once existed, a tradesman who sells goods without knowledge or means of knowledge that the relation has ceased by separation, can nevertheless hold the husband and wife jointly liable.<sup>52</sup> Such joint liability exists for goods sold while the husband and wife are living together, though they are not delivered until the day of separation, if the seller is ignorant of the contemplated separation.<sup>53</sup>

The liability thus imposed on the wife is not dependent on her having a separate estate,<sup>54</sup> nor is it dependent on the consent or authorization of the spouse sought to be charged.<sup>55</sup> It has been held in Iowa that a creditor who has obtained a judgment against the husband for a family expense may in an equitable action subject the property of the wife to the payment thereof, without first recovering a judgment against her;<sup>56</sup> but this doctrine has been rejected in Nebraska, on the ground that, under the statute, the liability of the wife is, in effect, that of a surety only, and that she is entitled to her day in court before any judgment can be recovered against her. She may be able to show that the goods furnished were not a family expense, or that they were sold on the exclusive credit of the husband, or some other fact exempting her from liability.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Gilman v. Mathews*, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 Pac. 366; *O'Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co. (Colo.)* 173 Pac. 544; *Berow v. Shields*, 48 Utah, 270, 159 Pac. 538. A family still exists, though there is a mere temporary separation, but not if the separation is permanent. *Berow v. Shields*, 48 Utah, 270, 159 Pac. 538.

<sup>52</sup> *Stoutenborough v. Rammel*, 123 Ill. App. 487. But compare *Hudson v. Sholem*, 65 Ill. App. 61, holding that household furnishings sold to the wife in contemplation of separation and intended for her personal use are not a family expense within the statute. The wife cannot be held liable as for a "family expense" for the board of her husband, where he has left home in contemplation of a separation. *Vase v. Myott*, 141 Iowa, 506, 120 N. W. 58, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 277.

<sup>53</sup> *Arnold v. Kell*, 81 Ill. App. 237.

<sup>54</sup> *Banner Mercantile Co. v. Hendricks*, 24 N. D. 16, 138 N. W. 993.

<sup>55</sup> *Mandel Bros. v. Ringstrom*, 189 Ill. App. 564; *Hudson v. King*, 23 Ill. App. 118. Compare *Haggard v. Holmes*, 90 Iowa, 308, 57 N. W. 871, holding that, where the husband purchased an atlas and history against the protest of the wife, she cannot be held, in the absence of evidence that it was family expense.

<sup>56</sup> *Boss v. Jordan*, 118 Iowa, 204, 89 N. W. 1070, 92 N. W. 111; *Frost v. Parker*, 65 Iowa, 178, 21 N. W. 507 (holding that the assignee of the judgment may enforce it against the wife).

<sup>57</sup> *George v. Edney*, 36 Neb. 604, 54 N. W. 586. And see also *Janney v. Buell*, 55 Ala. 408.

A note given by the husband for family expenses is not conclusive on the wife, either as to existence of the debt or the amount thereof.<sup>58</sup> If the claim has become barred by the running of the statute of limitations, it cannot be revived, as against the wife, by the husband without her consent.<sup>59</sup>

### *What are Family Expenses*

Family expenses, within the meaning of the statutes, are expenses incurred for something used in the family, or beneficial to the family.<sup>60</sup> The term is not necessarily synonymous with "necessaries."<sup>61</sup> The term includes expenses incurred for food,<sup>62</sup> clothing,<sup>63</sup> household utensils<sup>64</sup> and hire of domestic servants,<sup>65</sup> rent

<sup>58</sup> *McCartney & Sons' Co. v. Carter*, 129 Iowa, 20, 105 N. W. 339, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 145; *Dale v. Marvin*, 76 Or. 528, 148 Pac. 1116, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 557, rehearing denied 76 Or. 528, 148 Pac. 1151. If the original debt is an existing claim not barred by the statute of limitations, the wife would be liable on a note given by the husband for the debt. *Lawrence v. Sinnamon*, 24 Iowa, 80.

<sup>59</sup> *Lewis v. Lynch*, 61 Ill. App. 476. Compare *Vest v. Kramer* (Iowa) 114 N. W. 886, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032, holding that a wife's liability for physicians' services rendered in her husband's last sickness was a statutory liability enforceable against her by ordinary action within five years, though the physicians' claim against the husband's estate was barred by their failure to prove the same in time.

<sup>60</sup> *Straight v. McKay*, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60 Pac. 1106; *Fitzgerald v. McCarty*, 55 Iowa, 702, 8 N. W. 646; *Hyman v. Harding*, 162 Ill. 357, 44 N. E. 754. In an action against husband and wife under the statute, it need not be proved that every article furnished was of a domestic character, but deductions may be made for those that were not. *Meler & Frank Co. v. Mittlehner*, 75 Or. 331, 146 Pac. 796. A dress made for the wife which she refused to accept is not a family expense, it not having been bought for family use or actually used or kept for use in the family. *Robertson v. Warden*, 197 Ill. App. 478. In the absence of proof that it was a family expense, a wife cannot be held for an atlas bought by her husband against her protest. *Haggard v. Holmes*, 90 Iowa, 306, 57 N. W. 871.

<sup>61</sup> *Mandel Bros. v. Ringstrom*, 189 Ill. App. 564; *Ross v. Johnson*, 125 Ill. App. 65; *Berow v. Shields*, 48 Utah, 270, 159 Pac. 538.

<sup>62</sup> *Hayden v. Rogers*, 22 Ill. App. 557. The wife is not liable for beer furnished to the husband. *O'Neill v. Cardina*, 159 Iowa, 78, 140 N. W. 196, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175.

<sup>63</sup> *Ross v. Johnson*, 125 Ill. App. 65. No recovery may be had against a husband for a dress made on the order of his wife which she has refused to accept; it not having been bought for family use and actually used or kept for use in the family. *Robertson v. Warden*, 197 Ill. App. 478.

<sup>64</sup> *Tinn v. Rose*, 12 Iowa, 565 (cook stove); *McDaniels v. McClure*, 142 Iowa, 370, 120 N. W. 1031, 134 Am. St. Rep. 424 (heating stove and other utensils).

<sup>65</sup> *Perkins v. Morgan*, 36 Colo. 360, 85 Pac. 640; *Campbell v. Heuer*, 139 Ill. App. 631.

of dwelling actually occupied by the family,<sup>66</sup> but not otherwise.<sup>67</sup> Medical services rendered to members of the family are also a family expense within the statute.<sup>68</sup> Expenses incurred for musical instruments,<sup>69</sup> for a buggy for the use of the family,<sup>70</sup> and for jewelry<sup>71</sup> have been held to be family expenses. It has, however, been held that money borrowed to pay family expenses is not within the statute.<sup>72</sup> Of course, the term "family expenses" cannot be extended to apply to expenses incurred in the management of a business conducted by either spouse, or both of them.<sup>73</sup>

#### *Duty of Wife to Support Husband*

At common law the wife is under no duty to support her husband;<sup>74</sup> but she may be made responsible for his support by statute.<sup>75</sup> Thus it has been held in North Dakota<sup>76</sup> that under the

<sup>66</sup> *Houghteling v. Walker* (C. C.) 100 Fed. 253, affirmed *Walker v. Houghteling*, 107 Fed. 619, 46 C. C. A. 512 (applying Illinois statute); *Straight v. McKay*, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60 Pac. 1106; *McDonnell v. Solomon*, 64 Colo. 226, 170 Pac. 951. But see *Lewis v. France*, 137 Minn. 333, 163 N. W. 656, L. R. A. 1917F, 860.

<sup>67</sup> *Schurz v. McMenemy*, 82 Iowa, 432, 48 N. W. 806. Rent after premises were vacated and claim for damage to furniture were not family expense. *Straight v. McKay*, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60 Pac. 1106.

<sup>68</sup> *Murdy v. Skyles*, 101 Iowa, 549, 70 N. W. 714, 63 Am. St. Rep. 411; *Leake v. Lucas*, 65 Neb. 359, 93 N. W. 1019, 62 L. R. A. 190; *Mueller v. Kuhn*, 59 Ill. App. 353; *Vest v. Kramer* (Iowa) 114 N. W. 886, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032.

<sup>69</sup> *Smedley v. Felt*, 41 Iowa, 588; *Frost v. Parker*, 65 Iowa, 178, 21 N. W. 507. But compare *Jones-Rosquist-Killen Co. v. Nelson*, 98 Wash. 539, 167 Pac. 1130.

<sup>70</sup> *Houck v. La Junta Hardware Co.*, 50 Colo. 228, 114 Pac. 645, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 939; *McDaniels v. McClure*, 142 Iowa, 370, 120 N. W. 1031, 134 Am. St. Rep. 424.

<sup>71</sup> *Marquardt v. Flaughner*, 60 Iowa, 148, 14 N. W. 214 (ring); *Measham v. McNair*, 103 Iowa, 695, 72 N. W. 773, 38 L. R. A. 847, 64 Am. St. Rep. 202, holding that a diamond shirt stud worn by the husband for personal use and adornment is a family expense within the statute. But see *Hyman v. Harding*, 162 Ill. 357, 44 N. E. 754, affirming *Harding v. Hyman*, 54 Ill. App. 434, holding that a ring was not a family expense, and *Otto v. Matthie*, 70 Ill. App. 54, holding that diamond earrings are not.

<sup>72</sup> *Davis v. Ritchey*, 55 Iowa, 719, 8 N. W. 669.

<sup>73</sup> *Chamberlain v. Townsend*, 72 Or. 207, 142 Pac. 782, 143 Pac. 924 (farm expenses); *Martin Bros. v. Vertres*, 130 Iowa, 175, 106 N. W. 516 (feed for horse used in business); *Staver Carriage Co. v. Beaudry*, 138 Ill. App. 147 (carriage used by physician).

<sup>74</sup> *Wyllly v. Collins*, 9 Ga. 223; *Blackhawk County v. Scott*, 111 Iowa, 190, 82 N. W. 492.

<sup>75</sup> *Hickle v. Hickle*, 6 Ohio Civ. Ct. R. 490; *Santos v. Sweeney*, 4 Phil.

<sup>76</sup> *Hagert v. Hagert*, 22 N. D. 290, 133 N. W. 1035, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 925.

statute of that state <sup>77</sup> an equitable action at the suit of the husband will lie to compel the wife, who is amply able to do so, to support the husband; he being unable to gain his own livelihood by reason of age or other infirmity.

## RIGHT TO DETERMINE FAMILY DOMICILE

36. The husband has a right to fix or to change the family domicile, and refusal of his wife to follow him, without sufficient excuse, will amount to desertion.

The general rule is that on marriage the domicile of the wife merges in that of her husband, and changes with his during the coverture.<sup>78</sup> He has the power to establish the family domicile, and it is the duty of the wife to follow him, and her refusal to do so without sufficient excuse amounts to desertion.<sup>79</sup> Even a promise before marriage not to take her away from the neighborhood of her mother and friends is not binding, and does not justify her refusal to accompany him to a new domicile.<sup>80</sup>

Rep. 79. And see *Livingston v. Conant*, 119 Cal. xvii, 51 Pac. 859, holding that under Civ. Code Cal. §§ 155, 176, a wife may be required to support her infirm husband. But see *Blackhawk County v. Scott*, 111 Iowa, 190, 82 N. W. 492, holding that, under the Iowa statute making husband and wife jointly liable for family expenses, a wife is not bound to pay the expense of keeping her insane husband in an asylum.

<sup>77</sup> Rev. Codes 1906, § 4077 (Comp. Laws 1913, § 4409).

<sup>78</sup> *Dolphin v. Robins*, 7 H. L. Cas. 390; *Greene v. Greene*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 410; *Pennsylvania v. Ravenel*, 21 How. 103, 16 L. Ed. 33; *Davis v. Davis*, 30 Ill. 180; *Hackettstown Bank v. Mitchell*, 28 N. J. Law, 516.

<sup>79</sup> *Hair v. Hair*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 163; *Price v. Price*, 75 Neb. 552, 106 N. W. 657, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 41; *Birmingham v. O'Neil*, 116 La. 1085, 41 South. 323; *Winkles v. Powell*, 173 Ala. 46, 55 South. 536; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 61 Fla. 630, 54 South. 390; *Purnell v. Purnell* (N. J.) 70 Atl. 187; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 91 Vt. 54, 99 Atl. 254; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 29 N. J. Eq. 96; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 87 Ill. 250; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111. And see *Klein v. Klein*, 96 S. W. 848, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1042, holding that it is the duty of the wife to accept such residence as the husband may select without unwarranted parsimony or stubbornness on his part. See, also, *Richardson v. Stuesser*, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N. W. 261, 69 L. R. A. 829, 4 Ann. Cas. 784, holding that the common-law liability of a husband to support his wife does not extend to supporting her outside the matrimonial home reasonably chosen by him, unless he refuses to do so there, or she resides away therefrom by his consent.

<sup>80</sup> *Jac. Dom.* §§ 215, 216; *Schouler, Dom. Rel.* §§ 37, 38; *Franklin v. Franklin*, 154 Mass. 515, 28 N. E. 681, 13 L. R. A. 843, 26 Am. St. Rep. 266.

While the cases generally state the rule to be that the husband has the absolute right to establish the domicile in any part of the world, yet the right is undoubtedly not an arbitrary one, but one that must be exercised with discretion, according to the exigencies and conditions of the case.<sup>81</sup> Thus it was said in a Vermont case:<sup>82</sup> "While we recognize fully the right of the husband to direct the affairs of his own house, and to determine the place of abode of the family, and that it is in general the duty of the wife to submit to such determinations, it is still not an entirely arbitrary power which the husband exercises in these matters. He must exercise reason and discretion in regard to them. If there is any ground to conjecture that the husband requires the wife to reside where her health or her comfort will be jeopardized, or even where she seriously believes results will follow which will almost of necessity produce the effect, and it is only upon that ground that she separates from him, the court cannot regard her desertion as continued from mere willfulness."<sup>83</sup>

An exception to the general rule that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband arises in cases where the husband abandons the wife and removes to another state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, or when the wife by reason of the misconduct of the husband has been compelled to leave him. In such cases the wife can acquire a domicile of her own distinct from that of the husband.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>81</sup> 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. §§ 1713, 1714; Gleason v. Gleason, 4 Wis. 64; Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 14 Cal. 654; Boyce v. Boyce, 23 N. J. Eq. 337; Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. 412; Molony v. Molony, 2 Addams, Ecc. 249; Keech v. Keech, 38 Law J. Prob. & Mat. 7; Powell v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148; Albee v. Albee, 141 Ill. 550, 31 N. E. 153. See, also, In re Baurens, 117 La. 136, 41 South. 442, where it is held that the obligation of a husband to provide for his wife and children at the matrimonial domicile is not discharged if, by reason of his cruelty, the wife is compelled to seek shelter with her minor children at the residence of her father in a neighboring parish.

<sup>82</sup> Powell v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148.

<sup>83</sup> See, also, McKay v. McKay, 192 Mo. App. 221, 182 S. W. 124. The universally recognized right of the husband to select his own domicile must be reasonably and not arbitrarily exercised; the question in each case to be determined on the peculiar facts and circumstances there existing. Spafford v. Spafford (Ala.) 74 South. 354, L. R. A. 1917D, 773.

<sup>84</sup> See post, p. 245.

### CRIMES OF MARRIED WOMEN

37. A married woman is responsible, as if sole, for crimes voluntarily committed by her. If she commits an offense in the presence of her husband, or, though not in his immediate presence, near enough to be under his immediate influence and control, she is presumed to have acted, not voluntarily, but under his coercion; and he is responsible, while she is excused. This presumption may always be rebutted by showing that there was no coercion. In some jurisdictions it is held that the rule does not apply to treason, murder, or robbery.

As a general rule, a married woman is answerable personally for her crimes, as if she were sole.<sup>85</sup> Where, however, she commits an offense in the presence of her husband, she is presumed to have acted under his coercion, and he must suffer therefor, while she is excused on the ground of compulsion. An early case on this point, decided in 1352, was a case in which a woman was indicted for larceny. The jury found "that she did it by coercion of her husband, in spite of herself," and she was acquitted.<sup>86</sup> The fact that the wife was active in committing the crime, or even more active than her husband, does not necessarily render her guilty, though this fact, of course, may tend to rebut the presumption of coercion; for her guilt depends, not upon the fact of her activity, but upon whether that activity was voluntary, or caused by her husband's

<sup>85</sup> A married woman cannot be held criminally liable for the violation of a contract under a statute declaring such violation an offense, if the contract is void. *State v. Robinson*, 143 N. C. 620, 50 S. E. 918. Since a husband and wife are in law one person, they cannot between themselves be guilty of conspiracy. *People v. Miller*, 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934; *Merrill v. Marshall*, 113 Ill. App. 447. The wife may be convicted of keeping a bawdy-house, though husband rented the house. *Barker v. State*, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 106, 141 S. W. 529. See, also, *Hudson v. Jennings*, 134 Ga. 373, 67 S. E. 1037; *State v. Gill*, 150 Iowa, 210, 129 N. W. 821.

<sup>86</sup> *Anon.*, Lib. Ass. 137, pl. 40. And see *Clark*, Cr. Law, 77; *Clark*, Or. Cas. 141; *Anon.*, Kelyng, 31; *Reg. v. Dykes*, 15 Cox, Or. Cas. 771; *Rex v. Price*, 8 Car. & P. 19; *Com. v. Neal*, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105; *Davis v. State*, 15 Ohio, 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559; *State v. Houston*, 29 S. C. 108, 6 S. E. 943; *Com. v. Daley*, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N. E. 579; *State v. Harvey*, 130 Iowa, 394, 106 N. W. 938; *State v. Kelly*, 74 Iowa, 589, 38 N. W. 503; *State v. Bell*, 29 Iowa, 316; *Roberts v. People*, 19 Mich. 401; *Mulvey v. State*, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684; *State v. Baker*, 110 Mo. 7, 19 S. W. 222, 33 Am. St. Rep. 414.

coercion.<sup>87</sup> The rule, according to the weight of authority, does not apply to treason or murder.<sup>88</sup> "As to murder, if husband and wife both join in it, they are both equally guilty."<sup>89</sup> It has, however, been applied even in the case of murder; and, on principle, there is no reason why it should not be.<sup>90</sup> It applies to assault with intent to kill,<sup>91</sup> to burglary,<sup>92</sup> and, by the weight of opinion, to robbery.<sup>93</sup>

This presumption does not arise from the mere command of her husband. She must have been in his presence, or so near that he could have exerted an immediate influence and control over her. There is no "legal presumption that acts done by a wife in her husband's absence are done under his coercion or control. Indeed if she, in his absence, do a criminal act, even by his order or procurement, her coverture will be no defense."<sup>94</sup> She need not, however, have been in his immediate presence, but it is sufficient if she was near enough to be under his influence and control. It was so held where a woman was indicted for an unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, and it appeared that when she made the sale her husband was not in the room with her, but was on the premises.<sup>95</sup> In order to establish the fact of the husband's presence, it is not necessary to show that the act was done literally in his sight. If he was near enough for the wife to be under his immediate influence and control, it is sufficient, though he may not have been

<sup>87</sup> *State v. Houston*, 29 S. C. 108, 6 S. E. 943.

<sup>88</sup> At common law, a married woman was not responsible for crimes committed in the presence of her husband, except murder and treason; but for crimes committed out of her husband's presence, she was as responsible as if single. *Morton v. State*, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644, 4 A. L. R. 284.

<sup>89</sup> *Anon.*, Kelyng, 31. And see *Davis v. State*, 15 Ohio, 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559; *Bibb v. State*, 94 Ala. 31, 10 South. 506, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88. See dictum in *Com. v. Neal*, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105.

<sup>90</sup> *State v. Kelly*, 74 Iowa, 589, 38 N. W. 503.

<sup>91</sup> *Roberts v. People*, 19 Mich. 401.

<sup>92</sup> *Anon.*, Kelyng, 31; *State v. Bell*, 29 Iowa, 316.

<sup>93</sup> *Reg. v. Dykes*, 15 Cox. Cr. Cas. 771; *People v. Wright*, 38 Mich. 744, 31 Am. Rep. 331; *Miller v. State*, 25 Wis. 384; *Com. v. Daley*, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N. E. 579; *Davis v. State*, 15 Ohio, 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559. Contra: *Bibb v. State*, 94 Ala. 31, 10 South. 506, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88.

<sup>94</sup> *Com. v. Butler*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 4; *Com. v. Feeney*, 13 Allen (Mass.) 560; *State v. Potter*, 42 Vt. 495; *Com. v. Munsey*, 112 Mass. 287; *State v. Shee*, 13 R. I. 535; *Rex v. Morris*, Russ. & R. 270; *Seiler v. People*, 77 N. Y. 411.

<sup>95</sup> *Com. v. Burk*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 437; *Com. v. Munsey*, 112 Mass. 287.

in the same room; for if he was on the premises, and near at hand, a momentary absence from the room, or a momentary turning of his back, might still leave her under his influence."<sup>96</sup> "No exact rule, applicable to all cases, can be laid down as to what degree of proximity will constitute such presence, because this may vary with the varying circumstances of particular cases; and where the wife did not act in the direct presence of her husband, or under his eye, it must usually be left to the jury to determine incidentally whether his presence was sufficiently immediate or direct to raise the presumption. But the ultimate question, after all, is whether she acted under his coercion or control, or of her own free will, independently of any coercion or control by him; and this is to be determined in view of the presumption arising from his presence, and of the testimony or circumstances tending to rebut it, if any such exist."<sup>97</sup>

From what has been said, it will be seen that the presumption of coercion is not conclusive, even where the wife acted in the immediate presence of her husband; but it may always be rebutted by showing to the satisfaction of the jury that she acted of her own free will, and not under coercion."<sup>98</sup>

In some states the common-law rule exempting a married woman from criminal liability for acts done in the presence of her husband, in the absence of a showing that she acted without coercion, has been changed by statute. In Georgia, for instance, by statute, a wife is not excused by the mere presence of her husband; but it must be made to appear, in order to excuse her, that "violent threats, commands, or coercion were used" by him."<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> *Com. v. Munsey*, 112 Mass. 287.

<sup>97</sup> *Com. v. Daley*, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N. E. 579.

<sup>98</sup> *Reg. v. Cruse*, 8 Car. & P. 553; *Blakeslee v. Tyler*, 55 Conn. 397, 11 Atl. 855; *People v. Wright*, 38 Mich. 744, 31 Am. Rep. 331; *Miller v. State*, 25 Wis. 384; *State v. Cleaves*, 59 Me. 298, 8 Am. Rep. 422; *Reg. v. Torpey*, 12 Cox, Cr. Cas. 45; *State v. Nowell*, 156 N. C. 648, 72 S. E. 590; *Morton v. State*, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644, 4 A. L. R. 264; *Wagener v. Bill*, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 321; *Com. v. Eagan*, 103 Mass. 71; *U. S. v. Terry* (D. C.) 42 Fed. 317. As by showing that the husband was crippled, and incapable of coercion. *Reg. v. Cruse*, *supra*.

<sup>99</sup> *Bell v. State*, 92 Ga. 49, 18 S. E. 186. In view of the Married Woman's Act of 1913 (Acts 1913, c. 26), there is no longer any presumption that the wife in committing a crime acts under coercion of husband. *Morton v. State*, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644, 4 A. L. R. 264.

### CRIMES AS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

38. Generally, husband and wife are criminally liable for criminal acts committed against each other. Because of the relation, however, at common law

- (a) Neither can commit larceny, burglary, or arson against the other; nor is one who assists the wife guilty of larceny.

**EXCEPTION**—This does not apply where the wife is an adulteress, or elopes for the purpose of adultery, and steals her husband's property.

- (b) The husband cannot commit a rape upon his wife, except:

**EXCEPTION**—As principal in the second degree, or as accessory, by abetting or assisting another to ravish her.

The principle that, in the eye of the law, husband and wife are one person, prevents certain acts by the one or the other of them from being a crime, though it would be otherwise were the same act committed against a stranger. It is well settled, for instance, that at common law neither a husband nor a wife can commit larceny from the other.<sup>1</sup>

And so far is this doctrine carried that a third person who assists a wife in taking her husband's property is not guilty of larceny.<sup>2</sup> An exception to this rule is made in cases where a wife becomes an adulteress. If she then takes her husband's property, *animo furandi*, she commits larceny; and so does her paramour, if he assists her in taking it.<sup>3</sup> "The general rule of law is that a

<sup>1</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 247; Reg. v. Kenny, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas. 397, 2 Q. B. Div. 307; Reg. v. Tollett, Car. & M. 112; Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162; Snyder v. People, 28 Mich. 106, 12 Am. Rep. 302; Com. v. Hartnett, 3 Gray (Mass.) 450; Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616; State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197; Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317. But under the married women's property act (St. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), §§ 12, 16, the wife may be convicted of larceny of her husband's goods wrongfully taken when leaving, deserting, or about to leave or desert him. Rex v. James, 71 Law J. K. B. 211, [1902] 1 K. B. 540, 86 Law T. 202, 50 Wkly. Rep. 286, 66 J. P. 217, 20 Cox, Cr. Cas. 156. And see Beasley v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35, 46 Am. St. Rep. 418, holding that under married woman's property statutes husband may be guilty of larceny of wife's goods.

<sup>2</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 247; Reg. v. Tollett, Car. & M. 112; and cases in the following note.

<sup>3</sup> Reg. v. Avery, 8 Cox, Cr. Cas. 184; Reg. v. Thompson, 2 Craw. & D. 491; Rex v. Clark, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 376, note; Reg. v. Featherstone, 6 Cox, Cr. Cas. 376; Rex v. Tolfree, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 243; Reg. v. Tollett, Car. & M. 112; State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197, 198; People v. Schuyler, 6 Cow.

wife cannot be found guilty of larceny for stealing the goods of her husband, and that is upon the principle that the husband and wife are, in the eye of the law, one person; but this rule is properly and reasonably qualified when she becomes an adulteress. She thereby determines her quality of wife, and her property in her husband's goods ceases."<sup>4</sup>

On the same principle of unity of husband and wife, with the consequent right of each to the joint possession and use of the other's property, neither husband nor wife can commit burglary or arson, as against the other's dwelling house.<sup>5</sup>

A husband has a legal right to sexual intercourse with his wife, and therefore he cannot be guilty of rape, in having intercourse with her forcibly and against her will.<sup>6</sup> He may, however, be guilty as a principal in the second degree, or as accessory, according to the circumstances, if he aids or abets another in a rape upon her.<sup>7</sup>

With the exceptions above stated, husband and wife are generally liable to the criminal law for criminal acts committed against each other. If either kills the other, he or she is liable for the homicide. So either of them is criminally liable for an assault and battery on the other.<sup>8</sup>

(N. Y.) 572; Clark, Cr. Law, 247, 248. This, it has been said, does not apply where the wife merely carries away her necessary apparel. *State v. Banks*, 48 Ind. 197, 198. But see *Reg. v. Tollett*, Car. & M. 112.

<sup>4</sup> *State v. Banks*, 48 Ind. 197, 198.

<sup>5</sup> *Snyder v. People*, 26 Mich. 106, 12 Am. Rep. 302; *Rex v. March*, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 182; *State v. Toole*, 29 Conn. 342, 76 Am. Dec. 602; *Adams v. State*, 62 Ala. 177; Clark, Cr. Law, 229; Clark, Cr. Cas. 307. Contra, under modern statutes. *Garrett v. State*, 109 Ind. 527, 10 N. E. 570. But see cases cited above, in which it is shown that the married women's acts are not to be construed as changing the common law.

<sup>6</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 190.

<sup>7</sup> *Strang v. People*, 24 Mich. 13; *People v. Chapman*, 62 Mich. 280, 23 N. W. 896, 4 Am. St. Rep. 857; *State v. Dowell*, 106 N. C. 722, 11 S. E. 525, 8 L. R. A. 297, 19 Am. St. Rep. 568.

<sup>8</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 212, 213; *Com. v. McAfee*, 108 Mass. 458, 11 Am. Rep. 383; *State v. Oliver*, 70 N. C. 60; *State v. Finley*, 4 Pennewill (Del.) 29, 55 Atl. 1010; *Kulgham v. State*, 46 Ala. 143; *Reg. v. Jackson*, [1891] 1 Q. B. Div. 671. Where a husband, concealing from his wife that he has syphilis, an infectious disease, communicates it to her, he is guilty of an assault and battery. *State v. Lankford*, 6 Boyce (Del.) 594, 102 Atl. 63. A husband may be convicted of slandering his wife under Revisal 1905, § 3640, providing that, if any person shall attempt in a wanton and malicious manner to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by words written or spoken which amount to a charge of incontinency, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. *State v. Fulton*, 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145.

### TORTS OF MARRIED WOMEN

39. At common law a husband, during coverture, is liable for the torts committed by his wife, either before or during coverture. This liability ceases, however, when the coverture is determined by the death of either party, or by a divorce.
40. The rules governing a wife's liability for her own torts are these:
- (a) She is liable, jointly with her husband during coverture, and solely after his death or a divorce,
    - (1) For torts committed in his absence, whether committed by his direction or command, or not.
    - (2) For torts committed in his presence, but not by his direction or command, express or implied.
  - (b) She is not liable at all for torts committed in his presence, and by his direction or command, but is excused on the ground of coercion.
  - (c) Torts committed by a wife in her husband's actual or constructive presence are presumed to have been committed by his direction or command; but this presumption is prima facie only, and may be rebutted.
41. Where a married woman's tort is so connected with an attempted contract by her that to hold her liable therefor would be to recognize the contract, neither she nor her husband is liable at common law.
42. These rules of the common law have been greatly modified by modern statutes, in most jurisdictions, removing the disabilities of married women, and by those taking from the husband the rights which the common law gave him in respect to his wife's property. Thus—
- (a) In some states a husband is no longer liable for the torts of his wife, unless he participated in their commission.
  - (b) In other states he is liable for her personal torts, like slander or assault, but not for torts committed in the control of her separate property.
  - (c) Where married women have by statute been given the power to contract, they may be liable for torts in connection with their contracts.

*Common-Law Doctrine*

At common law a husband is liable for the frauds and other torts of his wife, whether they were committed by her before marriage,<sup>9</sup> or during coverture.<sup>10</sup> One of the reasons for this doctrine was that the unity of husband and wife rendered the wife incapable of being sued alone. Her husband had to be joined in all actions against her.<sup>11</sup> Another reason was that the husband became the absolute owner of his wife's personal property, and had the right to receive her earnings and the rents and profits of her real estate, so that it was only just to hold him liable for her torts.<sup>12</sup> Another consideration was that he should not permit her to commit torts.<sup>13</sup> The liability, however, was not based on any idea that he was himself guilty of her torts, even in contemplation of law.<sup>14</sup> The liability exists even where the husband is separated from his wife, so long as the marriage has not been dissolved.<sup>15</sup>

Where a wife acts in the absence of her husband, either by or without his command,<sup>16</sup> or where she acts in his presence, but of her own volition, and without any coercion by him,<sup>17</sup> she also is

<sup>9</sup> Macq. Husb. & W. 72; Schouler, Husb. & W. § 134; *Palmer v. Wakefield*, 3 Beav. 227; *Hawk v. Harman*, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 43; *Hubble v. Fogartie*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 413, 45 Am. Dec. 775; *Phillips v. Richardson*, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 212; *Kowing v. Manly*, 49 N. Y. 192, 10 Am. Rep. 346.

<sup>10</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 149; *Kowing v. Manly*, 49 N. Y. 192, 10 Am. Rep. 346; *Head v. Briscoe*, 5 Car. & P. 484; *Flesh v. Lindsay*, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374; *Jag. Torts*, 216-223; *Baker v. Young*, 44 Ill. 42, 92 Am. Dec. 149; *Fowler v. Chichester*, 26 Ohio St. 9; *Wright v. Kerr*, Add. (Pa.) 13; *Vine v. Saunders*, 5 Scott, 359; *Ball v. Bennett*, 21 Ind. 427, 83 Am. Dec. 356; *Hinds v. Jones*, 48 Me. 348; *Dalley v. Houston*, 58 Mo. 361; *Carleton v. Haywood*, 49 N. H. 314; *Jackson v. Kirby*, 37 Vt. 448; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772; *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791; *Heckle v. Lurvey*, 101 Mass. 344, 3 Am. Rep. 366.

<sup>11</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 217; *Baker v. Braslin*, 16 R. I. 635, 18 Atl. 1039, 6 L. R. A. 718.

<sup>12</sup> *Martin v. Robson*, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am. Rep. 578.

<sup>13</sup> *Martin v. Robson*, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am. Rep. 578.

<sup>14</sup> *Baker v. Braslin*, 16 R. I. 635, 18 Atl. 1039, 6 L. R. A. 718.

<sup>15</sup> *Head v. Briscoe*, 5 Car. & P. 485; *Ferguson v. Neilson*, 17 R. I. 81, 20 Atl. 229, 9 L. R. A. 155, 33 Am. St. Rep. 855.

<sup>16</sup> *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178; *Head v. Briscoe*, 5 Car. & P. 484; *Catterall v. Kenyon*, 3 Q. B. 310; *Whitmore v. Delano*, 6 N. H. 543; *Matthews v. Tiestel*, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 90; *Handy v. Foley*, 121 Mass. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 270; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772; *Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Hell*, 115 Pa. 487, 8 Atl. 616, 2 Am. St. Rep. 575; *Smith v. Taylor*, 11 Ga. 22; *Marshall v. Oakes*, 51 Me. 308; *Heckle v. Lurvey*, 101 Mass. 344, 3 Am. Rep. 366.

<sup>17</sup> *Hyde v. S.*, 12 Mod. 246; *Vine v. Saunders*, 5 Scott, 359; *Roadcap v.*

liable; and they not only may, but must, be sued jointly. At common law this liability is joint, and renders it necessary to sue the husband and wife jointly. It is not enough to sue either the wife or the husband alone.<sup>18</sup>

Where, however, a tort is committed by a wife in the presence of her husband, and by his command or coercion, she is not liable at all. He only is liable, and must be sued alone.<sup>19</sup> To thus exempt a married woman from liability for her tortious acts, two things must concur: she must have been in her husband's presence, actually or constructively; and she must have acted by his express or implied command. An act by his command, but not in his presence, renders her liable, and so it is if she does an act in his presence, but of her own volition, and not by his command.<sup>20</sup>

If it is shown that the tort was committed by the wife in her husband's presence, and nothing further appears, the presumption of law is that she acted under coercion by him, so as not to be liable herself.<sup>21</sup> But the presumption is *prima facie* only, and may always be rebutted, so as to render her liable by showing that she acted of her own free will, and not by her husband's direction;

Spe, 6 Grat. (Va.) 213; *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178; *Marshall v. Oakes*, 51 Me. 308; *Carleton v. Haywood*, 49 N. H. 314; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772; *Simmons v. Brown*, 5 R. I. 299, 73 Am. Dec. 66; *Henderson v. Wendler*, 39 S. C. 555, 17 S. E. 851.

<sup>18</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 295; *Mitchinson v. Hewson*, 7 Term R. 348; *Marshall v. Oakes*, 51 Me. 308. "For any wrong committed by her, she is liable, and her husband cannot be sued without her. Neither can she be sued without her husband." Per Erle, C. J., in *Capel v. Powell*, 34 Law J. C. P. 168, 17 O. B. (N. S.) 743. And see the cases in the two preceding notes.

<sup>19</sup> *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178; *Kosminsky v. Goldberg*, 44 Ark. 401; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772; *Johnson v. McKeown*, 1 McCord (S. C.) 578, 10 Am. Dec. 698; *Ball v. Bennett*, 21 Ind. 427, 53 Am. Dec. 356; *Doherty v. Madgett*, 58 Vt. 323, 2 Atl. 115; *Flesh v. Lindsay*, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374; *Dalley v. Houston*, 58 Mo. 361.

<sup>20</sup> "The authorities are clear that, when a tort or felony of any inferior degree is committed by the wife in the presence and by the direction of her husband, she is not personally liable. To exempt her from liability, both of these concurrent circumstances must exist, to wit, the presence and the command of the husband. An offense by his direction, but not in his presence, does not exempt her from liability; nor does his presence, if unaccompanied by his direction." *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178.

<sup>21</sup> *Cooley*, Torts, 115; *Emmons v. Stevane*, 73 N. J. Law, 349, 64 Atl. 1014; *Kosminsky v. Goldberg*, 44 Ark. 401; *Marshall v. Oakes*, 51 Me. 308; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772; *Carleton v. Haywood*, 49 N. H. 314; *Seller v. People*, 77 N. Y. 411; *Hildreth v. Camp*, 41 N. J. Law, 306.

and, of course, this may, and generally must, be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act.<sup>22</sup> "His presence furnishes evidence and affords a presumption of his direction, but it is not conclusive, and the truth may be established by competent evidence."<sup>23</sup>

In order that an act may be said to have been committed by the wife in her husband's presence, it is not necessary that it shall have been done in his sight. It is sufficient if she was near enough to be under his immediate influence and control. No exact rule, applicable to all cases, can be laid down as to what degree of proximity will constitute such presence, because this may vary with the varying circumstances of each case.<sup>24</sup> The question has already been considered, in treating the crimes of married women.<sup>25</sup>

The liability of a husband for his wife's torts, not in any way participated in by him, whether committed before or after marriage, is not based on any idea that the husband is a tort-feasor; but one of the chief reasons of it is because the wife cannot, at common law, be sued alone. It follows, in so far as this reason is concerned, that the husband's liability continues only during coverture. And it is held that if not reduced to judgment before her death, or a divorce, the cause of action ceases, as against him.<sup>26</sup> On his death she is solely liable, and, as there is nothing to prevent her being sued alone, the cause of action survives against her.<sup>27</sup> Of course, if it is shown that the husband actually commanded his wife to com-

<sup>22</sup> *Marshall v. Oakes*, 51 Me. 308; *Brazil v. Moran*, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 88 Am. Dec. 772; *Roadcap v. Sipe*, 6 Grat. (Va.) 213; *Simmons v. Brown*, 5 R. I. 299, 78 Am. Dec. 66; *Griffin v. Reynolds*, 17 How. 609, 15 L. Ed. 229; *Carleton v. Haywood*, 49 N. H. 314; *Handy v. Foley*, 121 Mass. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 270; *Miller v. Swetzer*, 22 Mich. 391; *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178; *Heckle v. Lurvey*, 101 Mass. 344, 3 Am. Rep. 366; *McElfresh v. Kirkendall*, 36 Iowa, 224; *Fowler v. Chichester*, 26 Ohio St. 9; *Estill v. Fort*, 2 Dana (Ky.) 237; *Henderson v. Wendler*, 39 S. O. 555, 17 S. E. 851.

<sup>23</sup> *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178.

<sup>24</sup> *Com. v. Munsey*, 112 Mass. 287.

<sup>25</sup> *Ante*, p. 90, and cases there cited.

<sup>26</sup> *Cooley*, Torts, 115; *Jag*, Torts, 217; *Wright v. Leonard*, 11 O. B. (N. S.) 258, 266; *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. 100; *Phillips v. Richardson*, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 212; *Ferguson v. Collins*, 8 Ark. 241; *Capel v. Powell*, 17 O. B. (N. S.) 743; *Kowing v. Manly*, 49 N. Y. 192, 10 Am. Rep. 346. But see *Johnson v. McKeown*, 1 McCord (S. C.) 578, 10 Am. Dec. 698; *Cassin v. Delany*, 38 N. Y. 178.

<sup>27</sup> *Rigley v. Lee*, Oro. Jac. 356; *Baker v. Braslin*, 16 R. I. 635, 18 Atl. 1039, 6 L. R. A. 718; *Appeal of Franklin's Adm'r*, 115 Pa. 534, 6 Atl. 70, 2 Am. St. Rep. 583.

mit the tort, or otherwise actually participated in its commission, he is liable as an actual tort-feasor, and not merely because he is her husband.<sup>28</sup> It follows that he could be sued therefor after her death; the action being for his own tort, and not for hers. Further than this, if a husband authorizes his wife to act for him as agent, he will be liable for her acts as agent.<sup>29</sup>

#### *Torts Connected with Contracts*

At common law, since a married woman was incapable of binding herself by contract, she could not be held liable for a tort when this would have the effect of indirectly making her liable on contract. For instance, it has been held that an action cannot be maintained at common law against a husband and wife for her false and fraudulent representation that she was a widow at the time she executed a bond and mortgage.<sup>30</sup> In *Fairhurst v. Liverpool Adelpi Association*,<sup>31</sup> where it was held that a husband and wife could not be sued in tort for a false and fraudulent representation by the wife that she was sole at the time of signing a note, Pollock, C. B., said: "A feme covert is unquestionably incapable of binding herself by a contract. It is altogether void, and no action will lie against her husband or herself for the breach of it. But she is undoubtedly responsible for all torts committed by her during coverture, and the husband must be joined as a defendant. They are liable, therefore, for frauds committed by her on any person, as for any other personal wrongs. But when the fraud is directly connected with the contract with the wife, and is the means of effecting it, and parcel of the same transaction, the wife cannot be held responsible, and the husband be sued for it together with the wife."<sup>32</sup> On the same principle it has been held that a married woman, even though living

<sup>28</sup> See *Handy v. Foley*, 121 Mass. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 270; *Flesh v. Lindsay*, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374.

<sup>29</sup> *Taylor v. Green*, 8 Car. & P. 316.

<sup>30</sup> *Keen v. Coleman*, 39 Pa. 299, 30 Am. Dec. 524.

<sup>31</sup> 9 Exch. 422, 23 Law J. Exch. 163.

<sup>32</sup> And see *Wright v. Leonard*, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 258; *Cooper v. Witham*, 1 Lev. 247; *Woodward v. Barnes*, 46 Vt. 332, 14 Am. Rep. 626; *Trust Co. v. Sedgwick*, 97 U. S. 304, 24 L. Ed. 954; *Kowing v. Manly*, 49 N. Y. 192, 10 Am. Rep. 346; *Ferguson v. Neilson*, 17 R. I. 81, 20 Atl. 229, 9 L. R. A. 155, 33 Am. St. Rep. 835; *Keen v. Hartman*, 48 Pa. 497, 36 Am. Dec. 606, 38 Am. Dec. 472; *Owens v. Snodgrass*, 6 Dana (Ky.) 229; *Curd v. Dodds*, 6 Bush (Ky.) 681. For the same principle as applied to infants, see *Jennings v. Rundall*, 8 Term R. 335; *Clark*, Cont. 260; post, p. 525.

apart from her husband, and maintaining a separate establishment with her own means, is not liable for the tort of a servant hired by her; for, as she is incapable of contracting, she cannot occupy the position of a master or principal, and the rule respondeat superior therefore cannot apply.<sup>33</sup> "The general principle that, for the torts or frauds of the wife, an action may be sustained against her and her husband, applies only to torts simpliciter, or cases of pure, simple tort, and not where the substantive basis of the tort is the contract of the wife."<sup>34</sup>

This rule has been rendered inapplicable to some extent by the statutes giving married women a power to contract.<sup>35</sup>

#### *Effect of Modern Statutes*

The common-law disabilities of a married woman, and the liability of her husband for her torts, remain at this time, both in England and in this country, except in so far as they have been modified by statute. Modern statutes have been enacted, both in England and in this country, removing, to a greater or less extent, the disabilities of married women; taking away from the husband rights which he had at common law, and either expressly or by implication relieving him from liabilities imposed upon him by the common law by reason of the marriage. Even if these statutes do not expressly refer to the husband's liability for the torts of his wife, it is very obvious that they must modify it to some extent. If the liability is based on the right of the husband to control the conduct of his wife, then to take away this right would seem clearly to take away the liability, of the principle, "Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex." If the liability is based on the fact that the wife cannot be sued without joining her husband, it would seem to cease when, by statute, a married woman is allowed to sue and be sued as a feme sole. If the liability is based on the husband's rights in the property of his wife,

<sup>33</sup> *Ferguson v. Neilson*, 17 R. I. 81, 20 Atl. 229, 9 L. R. A. 155, 33 Am. St. Rep. 855. But see *Schmidt v. Keehn*, 57 Hun, 585, 10 N. Y. Supp. 267, where a married woman was held liable for the negligence of her agent in making improvements on her separate property, and *Flesh v. Lindsay*, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374, where a distinction is drawn between the terms "agent" and "servant," and it is said that, though a married woman may not have an agent, in regard to her fee-simple property, she may have a servant, and be liable for his acts in relation to the property.

<sup>34</sup> *Woodward v. Barnes*, 46 Vt. 332, 14 Am. Rep. 626.

<sup>35</sup> See *Dobbin v. Cordiner*, 41 Minn. 165, 42 N. W. 870, 4 L. R. A. 333, 16 Am. St. Rep. 683.

then the liability ought not to exist when these rights are taken away from him. This is only reasonable and just.<sup>36</sup>

The statutes commonly known as the "Married Women's Acts" vary so much in the different states, and the judges have differed so widely in their opinions as to their effect, that no universal statement as to a husband's liability for his wife's torts can be made. The reader must consult the statutes and decisions of his state. In many of the states the courts have been very conservative—perhaps too much so—in adopting innovations in the common-law doctrine. They require that the intention of the Legislature to make such changes must be clearly and unambiguously expressed. Even where, by statute, a wife's separate estate is liable for her torts, it has been held that her husband's joint liability for her personal torts still remains. In New York and a number of other states, for instance, a husband is still liable as at common law for slanderous words spoken by his wife, though spoken in his absence, and though he in no manner participated therein; and the same is true of assault and battery, or any other personal tort.<sup>37</sup> The decision in all of these cases proceeds upon the ground that statutes changing the common law are to be strictly construed, and the latter will be held to be no further abrogated than the clear import of the language used in the statutes absolutely requires, and hence that the common-law disabilities and liabilities incident to the relation of hus-

<sup>36</sup> *Martin v. Robson*, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am. Rep. 578. See, also, *Schuler v. Henry*, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009, where it was said that a statute which vests a married woman with the absolute dominion over her property and person, and which authorizes her to sue and be sued as if sole, etc., impliedly repeals the rule of the common law which makes a husband liable for the torts of his wife committed during coverture, without his presence, and in which he in no manner participated. In view of emancipation of married women by Rev. St. 1909, §§ 8304-8309, indicating absence of reason for old rule relating to husband's common-law liability for his wife's torts, rule is no longer recognized. *Claxton v. Pool*, 197 S. W. 349, L. R. A. 1918A, 512, affirming judgment 182 Mo. App. 13, 167 S. W. 623.

<sup>37</sup> *Kowing v. Manley*, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 479; *Baum v. Mullen*, 47 N. Y. 577; *Mangam v. Peck*, 111 N. Y. 401, 18 N. E. 617; *Fitzgerald v. Quann*, 33 Hun, 652; *Id.*, 109 N. Y. 441, 17 N. E. 354; *Jackson v. Williams*, 92 Ark. 486, 123 S. W. 751, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 840; *Kellar v. James*, 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S. E. 939, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 46; *Choen v. Porter*, 66 Ind. 195; *Fowler v. Chichester*, 26 Ohio St. 9; *Ferguson v. Brooks*, 67 Me. 251; *McQueen v. Fulgham*, 27 Tex. 463; *Luse v. Oaks*, 36 Iowa. 562; *McElfresh v. Kirkendall*, *Id.* 224; *Quick v. Miller*, 103 Pa. 67. See, also, *Kellar v. James*, 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S. E. 939, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003.

band and wife still exist, except in so far as they have been swept away by express enactments.<sup>38</sup>

In other states it is held that the statutes removing the disabilities of a married woman to sue and to be sued, and taking from the husband his common-law rights in her property, and to her earnings, impliedly remove his common-law liability for her torts committed in his absence and without his participation, even though the tort has no connection with the management and control of her separate property. It is held, for instance, that he is not liable for slanderous words spoken by her in his absence, and without his participation.<sup>39</sup> In Illinois the statutes give a married woman the sole control of her separate property and estate acquired in good faith from any person other than her husband, and the right to her own earnings; and it has been held in that state that the effect of these statutes is to remove the husband's liability for the torts of his wife, if he is not present when they are committed, and in no manner participates in them. The court said that so long as the husband was entitled to the property of the wife and to her industry, so long as he had the power to direct and control her, and thus prevent her from the commission of torts, there was some reason for the rule, but, as the reason had been removed, so also should the rule. A "liability," it was said, "which has for its consideration rights conferred, should no longer exist, when the consideration has failed. If the relations of husband and wife have been so changed as to deprive him of all right to her property and to the control of her person and her time, every principle of right would be violated, to hold him still responsible for her conduct. If she is emancipated, he should no longer be enslaved."<sup>40</sup> To the same effect are the

<sup>38</sup> Common-law rule as to husband's civil liability for torts of his wife in action where they are joined and charged with conspiring to commit a wrong is not changed by Rev. St. 1909, § 8304, authorizing a married woman to sue and be sued without joining her husband. *Aronson v. Ricker*, 185 Mo. App. 528, 172 S. W. 641.

<sup>39</sup> *Martin v. Robson*, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am. Rep. 578; *Hinski v. Stein*, 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 441.

<sup>40</sup> *Martin v. Robson*, *supra*. Under the express provisions of Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 68, § 4 (*Jones & A. Ann. St. 1913*, par. 6141), the husband is not responsible for the wife's torts except where he would be jointly responsible with her if the marriage did not exist. *Christensen v. Johnston*, 207 Ill. App. 209. But the husband will be liable if under similar circumstances he would be liable for the tort of another, as, for instance, on the theory of respondeat superior. Thus in *McNemar v. Cohn*, 115 Ill. App. 31, it was held that the husband was liable where the wife, acting as his agent,

decisions in some of the other states. These decisions all proceed on the principle of the common law, "Cessante ratiōe, cessat ipsa lex."<sup>41</sup>

Even in those states where, as in New York, a husband is still held liable as at common law for the personal torts of his wife, like slander, assault and battery, etc., it is very generally held that his liability is limited to torts of this character, and does not extend to torts committed by his wife in the management and control of her separate property, as where she permits a nuisance on her land,<sup>42</sup> suffers her cattle to stray on her neighbor's land,<sup>43</sup> commits a fraud in the sale of her separate property,<sup>44</sup> or is guilty of any other tortious act or omission in relation to her separate property.<sup>45</sup> If the wife is by statute capable of managing and controlling her sepa-

was negligent in the performance of her duties, to the injury of a third person. Under doctrine of respondeat superior, a husband is liable for negligent operation of an automobile owned by him and driven by his wife with his acquiescence and consent for business or pleasure of family. *Vannett v. Cole* (N. D.) 170 N. W. 663. But see *Killingsworth v. Keen*, 89 Wash. 597, 154 Pac. 1096, holding that under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5929, negativing liability of a husband for his wife's torts, a chauffeur, whose wife took his employer's car and damaged it, is not liable for her tortious act. A married woman is not liable for a tort committed by her husband on the theory of respondeat superior. *Missio v. Williams*, 129 Tenn. 504, 167 S. W. 473, L. R. A. 1915A, 500. See, also, *Curtis v. Dinneen*, 4 Dak. 245, 30 N. W. 148.

<sup>41</sup> *Norris v. Corkill*, 32 Kan. 409, 4 Pac. 862, 49 Am. Rep. 489, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 44; *Berger v. Jacobs*, 21 Mich. 215; *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260; *Ricci v. Mueller*, 41 Mich. 214, 2 N. W. 23; *Schuler v. Henry*, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009; *Gustine v. Westenberger*, 224 Pa. 455, 73 Atl. 913; *Fadden v. McKinney*, 87 Vt. 316, 89 Atl. 351; *Musselman v. Galligher*, 32 Iowa, 383; *Pancoast v. Burnell*, Id. 394; *Mewhirter v. Hatten*, 42 Iowa, 288, 20 Am. Rep. 618; *Kuklence v. Vocht* (Pa.) 13 Atl. 198; *Vocht v. Kuklence*, 119 Pa. 365, 13 Atl. 199.

<sup>42</sup> *Fiske v. Bailey*, 51 N. Y. 150; *Quilty v. Battie*, 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47, 17 L. R. A. 521.

<sup>43</sup> *Rowe v. Smith*, 45 N. Y. 230.

<sup>44</sup> *Baum v. Mullen*, 47 N. Y. 577.

<sup>45</sup> *Ferguson v. Brooks*, 67 Me. 251; *Leros v. Parker*, 79 W. Va. 700, 91 S. E. 660; *Hageman v. Vanderdoes*, 15 Ariz. 312, 138 Pac. 1053, L. R. A. 1915A, 491, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1197; *Boutell v. Shellabarger*, 264 Mo. 70, 174 S. W. 384, L. R. A. 1915D, 847; Id., 264 Mo. 81, 174 S. W. 387; *Harrington v. Jagmetty*, 83 N. J. Law, 548, 83 Atl. 880. Keeping on her premises a vicious dog. *Quilty v. Battie*, 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47, 17 L. R. A. 521; *Missio v. Williams*, 129 Tenn. 504, 167 S. W. 473, L. R. A. 1915A, 500. Where she is guilty of a conversion, in seizing property on which she claims a lien, the husband not interfering in any way. *Peak v. Lemon*, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 295. But see *Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Hell*, 115 Pa. 487, 8 Atl. 616, 2 Am. St. Rep. 575.

rate property; so as to be thus liable for her torts committed in relation thereto, she may be liable for the torts of her husband in relation thereto, where he is acting as her agent under authority from her.<sup>46</sup>

Of course, the husband is solely liable for torts committed by himself alone in relation to his wife's separate property, and if he participates with her in the commission of any tort he is liable as a joint tort-feasor. The fact, for instance, that the property on which a man lives with his wife belongs to her does not render her liable as a keeper and harbinger of his vicious dogs, but the liability is solely on him.<sup>47</sup>

The statutes, as has already been remarked, vary greatly in the different states. In some states they are not nearly so broad as in others, and in many cases, therefore, apparently conflicting decisions may be reconciled. In some states it is expressly declared by statute that a husband shall not be liable for the torts of his wife unless he directed them, or otherwise participated therein.<sup>48</sup>

The married women's acts do not change the rule stated on a preceding page, that a woman who commits a tort in the presence of her husband is presumed to have acted under his coercion, and is not liable therefor unless it is affirmatively shown that she did not act under coercion. Prima facie the husband is solely liable.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Ferguson v. Brooks*, 67 Me. 251; *Rowe v. Smith*, 45 N. Y. 230; *Baum v. Mullen*, 47 N. Y. 577; *Barber v. Keeling* (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 139; *Knappen v. Freeman*, 47 Minn. 491, 50 N. W. 533. A wife is not liable for negligence of husband in operating her automobile for his own purposes, she not being present. *Brenner v. Goldstein*, 184 App. Div. 268, 171 N. Y. Supp. 579.

<sup>47</sup> *Bundschuh v. Mayer*, 81 Hun, 111, 30 N. Y. Supp. 622. And see *Strouse v. Leipf*, 101 Ala. 433, 14 South. 667, 23 L. R. A. 622, 46 Am. St. Rep. 122; *McLaughlin v. Kemp*, 152 Mass. 7, 25 N. E. 18.

<sup>48</sup> *Story v. Downey*, 62 Vt. 243, 20 Atl. 321; *Kuklence v. Vocht* (Pa.) 13 Atl. 198; *Vocht v. Kuklence*, 119 Pa. 365, 13 Atl. 199; *Strouse v. Leipf*, 101 Ala. 433, 14 South. 669, 23 L. R. A. 622, 46 Am. St. Rep. 122; *Austin v. Cox*, 118 Mass. 58.

<sup>49</sup> Ante, p. 97.

**TORTS AS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE**

43. At common law neither spouse is liable to the other, either during coverture or after divorce, for wrongful acts committed during coverture; but—
- (a) The husband in such a case could sue third persons who assisted his wife, but the wife could not sue third persons who assisted her husband.
  - (b) The rule has in some states been modified by statute.

Since the unity of husband and wife at common law rendered it impossible for the wife to sue the husband, it necessarily followed that she could not sue him for a tort committed against her; as, for instance, for slander, or for an assault and battery.<sup>50</sup> He was amenable, if at all, to the criminal law only. No cause of action arose at all in favor of the wife, and it followed that she could not even after a divorce, sue him for a tort committed during coverture. In a Maine case<sup>51</sup> it was sought to sustain an action by a wife against her husband, after a divorce, for an assault committed upon her during coverture, on the ground that coverture merely suspends the right of action, and does not destroy it, but it was held that this contention was unsound. "The error in the proposition," said the court, "is the supposition that a cause of action, or a right of action, ever exists in such a case. There is not only no civil remedy, but there is no civil right, during coverture, to be redressed at any time. There is, therefore, nothing to be suspended. Divorce cannot make that a cause of action which was not a cause of action before divorce. The legal character of an act of violence by husband upon wife, and of the consequences that flow from it, is fixed by the condition of the parties at the time the act is done. If there be no cause of action at the time, there never can be any."<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 463; *Abbott v. Abbott*, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27; *Phillips v. Barnet*, 1 Q. B. Div. 436; *Freethy v. Freethy*, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; *Longendyke v. Longendyke*, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 366; *Peters v. Peters*, 42 Iowa, 182; *Main v. Main*, 46 Ill. App. 106; *Lfbby v. Berry*, 74 Me. 286, 43 Am. Rep. 589; *Nickerson v. Nickerson*, 65 Tex. 281; *Schultz v. Schultz*, 89 N. Y. 644; *Kujek v. Goldman*, 9 Misc. Rep. 34, 29 N. Y. Supp. 294; *Abbe v. Abbe*, 22 App. Div. 483, 48 N. Y. Supp. 25.

<sup>51</sup> *Abbott v. Abbott*, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27.

<sup>52</sup> See *Strom v. Strom*, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 191, 116 Am. St. Rep. 387. And see *Phillips v. Barnet*, 1 Q. B. Div. 436.

Nor can a woman, either before or after divorce, maintain an action against persons who assisted her husband to commit a tort against her, like assault and battery, for instance, during coverture. Such an action could only be maintained, if at all, during coverture, in the name of both the husband and wife; and as he could not maintain it, no cause of action arises in her favor.<sup>53</sup>

The same principle will prevent an action by a husband, either during coverture or after divorce, against his wife, for her wrongful acts during coverture. It would not, however, prevent the husband from suing third persons who assisted the wife, and he could bring such an action during coverture as well as after a divorce.

### *Effect of Modern Statutes*

In some states it has been held that the statutes removing the disabilities of married women have so changed the common-law rule as to authorize a wife to maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort; <sup>54</sup> but in other states it is held that these statutes do not necessarily give the wife the right to sue her husband for personal torts.<sup>55</sup> Statutes giving a married woman the

<sup>53</sup>Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27.

<sup>54</sup>Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 70; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657, L. R. A. 1916B, 907; Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okl. 124, 140 Pac. 1022, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189; Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 South. 335, 6 A. L. R. 1031. Under Acts Ark. 1915, p. 684, removing the disabilities of married women, the representatives of a married woman may maintain an action against her husband for wrongful death under Kirby's Dig. § 6289. Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W. 832, 187 S. W. 460, L. R. A. 1917B, 774, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 772.

<sup>55</sup>Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182; Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, 21 Ann. Cas. 921, affirming 31 App. D. C. 567, 14 Ann. Cas. 879; Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S. W. 295, 137 S. W. 374; Lilliankamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628, L. R. A. 1916B, 881, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 901; Wilson v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.) 154 S. W. 322. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5926, which abolishes as to a wife all civil disabilities not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband, negatives any intention to emancipate the wife to a greater degree than the husband; and, as the husband had neither a common-law nor statutory right to sue the wife for a tort committed during coverture, the statute confers no such right upon her. Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780. Under Code 1904, § 2286a (Acts 1899-1900, c. 1139), a wife cannot sue her husband for damages for assault, nor can her personal representative sue the husband for damages for her death.

power to acquire, hold, and dispose of property free from the control of her husband have been construed as giving a married woman a right of action for torts committed by her husband upon her separate property, as trespass or conversion.<sup>56</sup> In some of the cases, however, the courts have denied this construction. It was said by the Pennsylvania court, in reference to a separate property act: "As the only object of the act was to afford a protection to the estates of married women, we may assume that it was not intended that she should so fully own her separate property as to impair the intimacy of the marriage relation. It was not intended to declare that her property should be so separate that her husband could be guilty of larceny of it, or liable in trespass or trover for breaking a dish or a chair, or using it without her consent."<sup>57</sup>

### TORTS AGAINST MARRIED WOMEN

44. When a tort is committed against a married woman, damages may be recovered.

(a) For the injury to the wife—as for her mental and physical suffering.

(1) At common law in a joint action by husband and wife, and only in such an action, and the cause of action abates on the death of the wife.

(2) By statute, in most states, by the wife suing alone.

(b) For the injury to the husband—as for the loss of the wife's society and services, and for his disbursements—in an action by the husband suing alone, at common law, and in such an action only. By statute in some states, such damages can be recovered in the joint action. This cause of action does not abate on the wife's death.

When a tort is committed against a married woman, two actions may lie—one for the injury to the wife and one for the injury to the

*Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs*, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439. Under Civ. Code Ga. 1910, §§ 2993, 2994, 3652, a wife cannot recover of a husband, with whom she is living in lawful wedlock, for a tort arising from his negligent operation of an automobile in which they were riding at time of injury. *Heyman v. Heyman*, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25.

<sup>56</sup> *Mason v. Mason*, 66 Hun, 386, 21 N. Y. Supp. 306; *Ryerson v. Ryerson*, 55 Hun, 611, 8 N. Y. Supp. 738; *Smith v. Smith*, 20 R. I. 556, 40 Atl. 417; *Eshom v. Eshom*, 18 Ariz. 170, 157 Pac. 974.

<sup>57</sup> *Walker v. Reamy*, 36 Pa. 410.

husband by reason of his loss of her services and society, or by reason of being put to expense.<sup>58</sup>

*Injury to the Wife—Joint Action*

At common law, as will presently be explained more at length, marriage confers upon the husband an absolute right to all of his wife's personal property in possession, and to her choses in action if he reduces them to possession during coverture.<sup>59</sup> Claims of the wife for damages growing out of torts committed by third persons against her person or character, such as assault and battery, negligent personal injury, libel, slander, etc., are choses in action within this rule.<sup>60</sup> At common law an action for such injuries must be brought in the name of the husband and wife jointly; during coverture neither can sue alone.<sup>61</sup> The damages recovered in such an action are for the injury to the wife, and not for any injury to the husband; but they belong to the husband, when recovered.<sup>62</sup> For this reason it has been held that he may release or compromise the claim. If the husband dies pending the action, it does not abate, but may proceed to judgment in the name of the wife alone; and, if the husband dies before commencing an action, the wife may enforce the claim by an action in her own name.<sup>63</sup> On the death of the wife the cause of action ceases, and the husband therefore cannot afterwards commence an action in his own name, nor continue with an action which has already been commenced.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Chicago & M. Electric Ry. Co. v. Krempel*, 116 Ill. App. 253; *Mageau v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*, 103 Minn. 290, 115 N. W. 651, 946, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 511, 14 Ann. Cas. 551; *Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.*, 191 Mass. 563, 77 N. E. 1036; *Thompson v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.*, 135 Mo. 217, 36 S. W. 625.

<sup>59</sup> Post, pp. 123, 131.

<sup>60</sup> *Anderson v. Anderson*, 11 Bush (Ky.) 327.

<sup>61</sup> *Cooley*, Torts, 227; *Dengate v. Gardiner*, 4 Mees. & W. 6; *Berger v. Jacobs*, 21 Mich. 215; *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman*, 28 Mich. 441; *Laughlin v. Eaton*, 54 Me. 156; *Hooper v. Haskell*, 56 Me. 251; *Saltmarsh v. Candia*, 51 N. H. 71; *Harper v. Pinkston*, 112 N. C. 293, 17 S. E. 161; *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; *Smith v. City of St. Joseph*, 55 Mo. 456, 17 Am. Rep. 680; *King v. Thompson*, 87 Pa. 365, 30 Am. Rep. 364. Refusal of the husband to bring the action does not entitle the wife to sue alone. *Rice v. Railroad Co.*, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 130, 27 S. W. 921.

<sup>62</sup> *Dengate v. Gardiner*, 4 Mees. & W. 6; *Meese v. City of Fond du Lac*, 48 Wis. 323, 4 N. W. 406.

<sup>63</sup> *Newton v. Hatter*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1208; *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. § 77.

<sup>64</sup> *Bac. Abr.*, "Baron and Feme," k, 60; *Meese v. City of Fond du Lac*, 48 Wis. 323, 4 N. W. 406; *Purple v. Railroad Co.*, 11 N. Y. Super. Ct. 74; *Hodg-*

The recovery in the joint action is confined to damages for the injury to the wife, such as her mental and physical suffering; and damages to the husband, as the expenses of medical attendance, loss of wages, services, etc., in the case of personal injuries to the wife, must be recovered by the husband suing alone.<sup>65</sup>

#### *Under Modern Statutes*

In most states the common-law rules with regard to actions for torts against married women have been modified by statute; and it is very generally provided that a married woman may sue alone for injuries to her person or character, and recover her damages for her own benefit.<sup>66</sup> Such statutes are not retroactive, so as to af-

man v. Railroad Corp., 7 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 492; Butler v. Railroad Co., 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 110; Meech v. Stoner, 19 N. Y. 26.

<sup>65</sup> *Dengate v. Gardiner*, 4 Mees. & W. 6; *Meese v. City of Fond du Lac*, 48 Wis. 323, 4 N. W. 406. But by statute in some states all damages may be recovered in the one action. See post, p. 112.

<sup>66</sup> *Stevenson v. Morris*, 37 Ohio St. 10, 41 Am. Rep. 481; *Hey v. Prime*, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N. E. 141, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 570; *McGovern v. Interurban Ry. Co.*, 136 Iowa, 13, 111 N. W. 412, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 476, 125 Am. St. Rep. 215; *Engle v. Simmons*, 148 Ala. 92, 41 South. 1023, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96, 121 Am. St. Rep. 59, 12 Ann. Cas. 740; *Times-Democrat Pub. Co. v. Mozee*, 136 Fed. 761, 69 C. C. A. 418; *Worez v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.*, 175 Iowa, 1, 156 N. W. 867; *Matthew y. Railroad Co.*, 63 Cal. 450; *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman*, 28 Mich. 440; *City of Bloomington v. Annett*, 16 Ill. App. 199; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn*, 52 Ill. 260, 4 Am. Rep. 600; *Hennies v. Vogel*, 66 Ill. 401; *Pavlovski v. Thornton*, 89 Ga. 829, 15 S. E. 822; *Fife v. City of Oshkosh*, 89 Wis. 540, 62 N. W. 541; *City of Chadron v. Glover*, 43 Neb. 732, 62 N. W. 62; *Barnett v. Leonard*, 66 Ind. 422; *Sims v. Sims*, 79 N. J. Law, 577, 76 Atl. 1063, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*; *Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge*, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W. 885; *Engle v. Simmons*, 148 Ala. 92, 41 South. 1023, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96, 121 Am. St. Rep. 59, 12 Ann. Cas. 746; *McGovern v. Interurban Ry. Co.*, 136 Iowa, 13, 111 N. W. 412, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 476, 125 Am. St. Rep. 215; *Kovacs v. Mayoras*, 175 Mich. 582, 141 N. W. 662; *Casteel v. Brooks*, 46 Okl. 189, 148 Pac. 158; *Coulter v. Hermitage Cotton Mills (S. C.)* 98 S. E. 846. In some states the wife must sue alone under the statute. *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman*, supra; *Story v. Downey*, 62 Vt. 243, 20 Atl. 321; *Foot v. Card*, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. St. Rep. 258; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553. In others the statute does not prevent, but merely renders unnecessary, the joinder of the husband. *East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Cox*, 57 Ga. 252; *Davis v. Public Service Corp.*, 77 N. J. Law, 275, 72 Atl. 82; *Id.*, 72 Atl. 83; *Warth v. Jackson County Court*, 71 W. Va. 184, 76 S. E. 420; *Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co.*, 57 W. Va. 132, 49 S. E. 1030, 68 L. R. A. 901. The husband must join in the action. *Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Electric Co.*, 158 Cal. 514, 111 Pac. 530, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 642; *Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.*, 13 Idaho, 477, 90 Pac. 984, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184. The wife may recover medical expenses paid or contracted for by her in consequence

fect a right of action which had already vested in the husband prior to the passage thereof.<sup>67</sup> In some states the statutes only allow her to sue in her own name in relation to her separate property. She can, under these statutes, sue for a trespass upon, or a conversion of, her separate property;<sup>68</sup> but for injuries to her person or character she can only sue jointly, as at common law.<sup>69</sup>

*Injury to Husband—Action by Husband Alone*

In addition to this joint action for torts committed against his wife, the husband may sue alone, "per quod consortium amisit," as it is expressed, for injuries to her which render her less able to perform services. In such an action he can recover his own damages, and such damages only—as, in case of personal injuries, for the loss of her society and services, moneys necessarily expended by him for care and attendance, and other incidental expenses.<sup>70</sup>

of the injury, though the husband is ordinarily chargeable therefor. *Ashbey v. Elsberry & N. H. Gravel Road Co.*, 111 Mo. App. 79, 85 S. W. 957; *Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kidd*, 167 Ind. 402, 79 N. E. 347, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, 10 Ann. Cas. 942. Under *Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St.* 1914, art. 1839, providing that the husband may sue for recovery of any separate property of the wife, he may sue for personal injuries to her, recovery therefor being, by Acts 34th Leg. c. 54, declared her separate property. *Texarkana Telephone Co. v. Burge* (Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 807.

<sup>67</sup> *St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Purcell*, 135 Fed. 499, 68 C. C. A. 211; *Snyder v. Jett*, 138 Tenn. 211, 197 S. W. 488. The marriage of a woman after receiving an injury in a railroad wreck does not divest her of the right to recover damages for the total or partial loss of her earning capacity. *Georgia Northern Ry. Co. v. Sharp*, 19 Ga. App. 503, 91 S. E. 1045.

<sup>68</sup> *Duncan v. Duncan*, 6 Cal. App. 404, 92 Pac. 310; *Bondy v. American Transfer Co.*, 15 Cal. App. 746, 115 Pac. 965; *Cox v. St. Louis, M. & S. E. Ry. Co.*, 123 Mo. App. 356, 100 S. W. 1096; *Willis v. J. G. White & Co.*, 150 N. C. 199, 63 S. E. 942, 134 Am. St. Rep. 906.

<sup>69</sup> *Lamb v. Harbaugh*, 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56; *Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.*, 13 Idaho, 477, 90 Pac. 984, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184. But see *Duncan v. Duncan*, 6 Cal. App. 404, 92 Pac. 310, holding that a married woman deserted by her husband may sue alone to recover damages for her personal injuries, although such damages when recovered are community property. And compare *Schmelzer v. Chester Traction Co.*, 218 Pa. 29, 66 Atl. 1005; *Saunders Transfer Co. v. Underwood* (Fla.) 81 South. 105.

<sup>70</sup> 3 Bl. Comm. 140; *Moore v. Bullock*, Cro. Jac. 501; *Cooley*, Torts, 226; 1 Jag. Torts, 469; *Hyatt v. Adams*, 16 Mich. 180; *Hey v. Prime*, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N. E. 141, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 570; *Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.*, 191 Mass. 563, 77 N. E. 1036; *Birmingham Southern Ry. Co. v. Lintner*, 141 Ala. 420, 38 South. 363, 109 Am. St. Rep. 40, 3 Ann. Cas. 461; *Booth v. Manchester St. Ry.*, 73 N. H. 529, 63 Atl. 578; *Lyons v. New York City Ry. Co.*, 49 Misc. Rep. 517, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1033; *Wright v. City of Omaha*, 78 Neb. 124, 110 N. W. 754; *Berger v. Jacobs*, 21 Mich. 215; *Mewhlirter v. Hatten*, 42 Iowa, 288, 20 Am. Rep. 618; *Matteson v. Railroad Co.*, 35

The loss of services is not to be measured as if she were a mere servant; but the frugality, industry, usefulness, and attention of the wife and mother are elements to be taken into consideration.<sup>71</sup> So, too, the damages that may be recovered are not confined to the value of her services in the household, but may include the value of her services rendered in her husband's business;<sup>72</sup> and if the injuries are permanent the damages may include a fair compensation for her future diminished capacity.<sup>73</sup> He cannot, in such an action,

N. Y. 487, 81 Am. Dec. 67; *Hoard v. Peck*, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202; *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; *People's Home Telephone Co. v. Cockrum*, 182 Ala. 547, 62 South. 86; *Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge*, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W. 885; *Moody v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 167 Cal. 786, 141 Pac. 388; *Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder*, 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N. E. 101; *Kimberly v. Howland*, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 549; *Bailey v. Long*, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809, L. R. A. 1917B, 708; *Flintjer v. Kansas City* (Mo. App.) 204 S. W. 951; *Morrison v. Clark*, 196 Ala. 670, 72 South. 305; *Smith v. City of St. Joseph*, 55 Mo. 456, 17 Am. Rep. 660; *King v. Thompson*, 87 Pa. 365, 30 Am. Rep. 364; *Barnes v. Martin*, 15 Wis. 240, 82 Am. Dec. 670. Thus an action may be maintained by the husband per quod consortium amisit, under this rule, for the following injuries, among others, against the wife: Assault and battery. *Berger v. Jacobs*, 21 Mich. 215. Sale to her of a drug like laudanum, opium, or morphine, which the seller knows she is in the habit of using to excess. *Hoard v. Peck*, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 292. Malpractice by physician or surgeon. *Hyatt v. Adams*, 16 Mich. 180; *Mewhirter v. Hatten*, 42 Iowa, 288, 20 Am. Rep. 618; *Mowry v. Chaney*, 43 Iowa, 609. Negligence resulting in personal injuries. *Matteson v. Railroad Co.*, 35 N. Y. 487, 91 Am. Dec. 67; *Smith v. City of St. Joseph*, 55 Mo. 456, 17 Am. Rep. 660; *Hopkins v. Railroad Co.*, 86 N. H. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 287; *Fuller v. Railroad Co.*, 21 Conn. 557. Libel or slander of wife, where there is a loss of services or society to the husband, as where she is prevented from obtaining employment, the wages of which would go to the husband. *Dengate v. Gardner*, 4 Mees. & W. 6. And see *Van Vacter v. McKillip*, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 578. Malicious prosecution. *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483. The enabling statute does not abridge husband's right of consortium of wife and accompanying right to sue for loss thereof through her personal injury by negligence of another. *Elling v. Blake-McFall Co.*, 85 Or. 91, 166 Pac. 57; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kinman*, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S. W. 880; *Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry.*, 78 N. H. 289, 99 Atl. 298, L. R. A. 1917C, 410.

<sup>71</sup> *Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodman*, 62 Pa. 329. As to the measure of damages generally, see note, 48 Am. Dec. 620, 621.

<sup>72</sup> *Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Tice*, 124 Ga. 450, 52 S. E. 916, 4 Ann. Cas. 200; *Standen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 214 Pa. 189, 63 Atl. 467, 6 Ann. Cas. 408; *Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. Twiname*, 121 Ind. 375, 23 N. E. 159, 7 L. R. A. 352; *Blair v. Chicago & A. R. Co.*, 89 Mo. 334, 1 S. W. 367. But see *Kirkpatrick v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.*, 129 Mo. App. 524, 107 S. W. 1025.

<sup>73</sup> *Kimberley v. Howland*, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545; *Kirkpatrick v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.*, 129 Mo. App. 524, 107 S. W. 1025.

recover for the mental or physical suffering of his wife.<sup>74</sup> Damages for injuries personal to the wife must be recovered in the joint action, and damages for injuries to the husband must be recovered in an action by the husband alone.<sup>75</sup> In some states this has been changed by statute, and all damages, whether to the wife or to the husband, may be recovered in a joint action.<sup>76</sup> The death of the wife either before or during an action by the husband for his damages for loss of services, expenses, etc., will not defeat the action.

In case of injuries resulting in his wife's death, the husband cannot recover at common law for the loss of society or services resulting from her death, but only for the loss between the injuries and her death.<sup>77</sup> Under the statutes, however, giving a right of action, where a death is caused by the wrongful act of another, the husband, when a beneficiary under the statute, may recover for the loss of services resulting from his wife's death.<sup>78</sup>

*Personal Injuries to Husband—No Right of Action in Wife*

In the case of personal injuries to the husband it is the almost universal rule that the wife has no right of action against the person causing the injury for loss or damages she may have sustained because of the impairment of his earning capacity or loss of consortium.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Hooper v. Haskell, 56 Me. 251; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Chicago & M. Electric Ry. Co. v. Krempel, 116 Ill. App. 253.

<sup>75</sup> See the cases cited above. And see, particularly, Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 Mees. & W. 6; Fuller v. Naugatuck R. Co., 21 Conn. 557; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240, 82 Am. Dec. 670; Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville, 24 Wis. 618; King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. 365, 30 Am. Rep. 364.

<sup>76</sup> Meese v. City of Fond du Lac, 48 Wis. 323, 4 N. W. 406; Standen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 214 Pa. 189, 63 Atl. 467, 6 Ann. Cas. 408. By express provision of Code Civ. Proc. § 427, subd. 8, the husband and wife may incorporate in one cause of action a statement of the damages sustained by the wife on account of personal injuries, and a statement of the consequential damages suffered by the husband. Meek v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 175 Cal. 53, 164 Pac. 1117.

<sup>77</sup> Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493; Green v. Railroad Co., 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 77 Am. Dec. 72; Nixon v. Ludlam, 50 Ill. App. 273.

<sup>78</sup> Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270, 20 L. Ed. 571; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. 308, 18 Atl. 330.

<sup>79</sup> Glenn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1 Ga. App. 821, 58 S. E. 83; Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Ill. App. 24; Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236; Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291; Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S. W.

## ACTIONS FOR ENTICING, HARBORING, OR ALIENATION OF AFFECTION

45. A husband has a right of action for damages against any one who entices away or harbors his wife, or who alienates her affections, though there is no enticing away.

**EXCEPTIONS**—(a) A person who harbors a wife, not from improper motives, but from motives of humanity, as where she has been forced to leave her husband from fear of bodily harm, is not liable.

(b) Parents are not liable for advising a daughter to leave her husband, or for harboring her, where they act from proper motives; and, in this class of cases, proper motives will be presumed until the contrary appears. The same rule has been applied to the case of parent and son.

46. In most, but not all, jurisdictions, a wife has a right of action against one who entices away, or alienates the affections of, her husband; at least, where her disability to sue alone has been removed by statute. According to the weight of opinion, the right exists even at common law.

### *Action by Husband*

Since a husband is entitled to his wife's society and services, he has a right of action against one who alienates her affections from him, or who deprives him of her society and services by enticing her to leave him, or by harboring her.<sup>80</sup> It is not necessary to the

1019; *Kosciulek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co.*, 81 Or. 517, 160 Pac. 132; *Emerson v. Taylor*, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538, 5 A. L. R. 1045; *Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co.*, 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204, L. R. A. 1916E, 700, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 206. But see *Flandermeyer v. Cooper*, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 360, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 983, holding that a person who knowing that a husband by constant use of morphine is weakened in body and mind, after repeated protests of the wife, continues to sell morphine to the husband until his mind is destroyed and it becomes necessary to confine him in an asylum, is liable to the wife in damages. To the same effect, see *Moberg v. Scott*, 38 S. D. 422, 161 N. W. 998, L. R. A. 1917D, 732.

<sup>80</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 466; *Winsmore v. Greenbank*, Willes, 577; *Smith v. Kaye*, 20 Times Law R. 261; *Hutcheson v. Peck*, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 196; *Rinehart v. Bills*, 82 Mo. 534, 52 Am. Rep. 385; *Modisett v. McPike*, 74 Mo. 636; *Hadley v. Heywood*, 121 Mass. 236; *Gilchrist v. Bale*, 8 Watts (Pa.) 355, 34 Am. Dec. 469; *Barbee v. Armstead*, 32 N. C. 530, 51 Am. Dec. 404; *Higham v. Vanosdol*, 101 Ind. 161; *Rudd v. Rounds*, 64 Vt. 432, 25 Atl. 438; *Tasker v. Stanley*, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468; *Heermance v.*

husband's cause of action that the wife shall have been enticed away from him. An action will lie for alienation of her affections, although she has not left his house, and he has suffered no pecuniary loss. "It is perhaps true that the theory of such an action was originally the loss of services, for it was presumed that by the seduction or alienation the wife's services were rendered less valuable. But whatever may have been the principle, originally, upon which this class of actions was maintained, it is certain that the weight of modern authority bases the action on the loss of the consortium; that is, the society, companionship, conjugal affections, fellowship, and assistance. The suit is not regarded in the nature of an action by a master for the loss of the services of his servant, and it is not necessary that there should be any pecuniary loss whatever."<sup>81</sup>

The husband's right of action in this class of cases is not defeated by showing that he and his wife did not live happily together.<sup>82</sup>

James, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 120; *Smith v. Rice*, 178 Iowa, 673, 160 N. W. 6; *Boland v. Stanley*, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 114; *Francis v. Outlaw*, 127 Md. 315, 96 Atl. 517; *Huot v. Wise*, 27 Minn. 68, 6 N. W. 425; *Fratini v. Caslini*, 66 Vt. 273, 29 Atl. 252, 44 Am. St. Rep. 843. A valid common-law marriage will entitle a party thereto to maintain a suit for alienation of affections as in the case of a statutory marriage. *Butterfield v. Ennis*, 193 Mo. App. 638, 186 S. W. 1173. The right to recover damages for the alienation of a wife's affections does not have to rest upon alienation, which culminates in divorce. *Eklund v. Hackett*, 106 Wash. 287, 179 Pac. 808. It is not necessary, to recover for alienation of a wife's affections, that her debauchment be shown. *Linden v. McClintock* (Mo. App.) 187 S. W. 82; *Ireland v. Ward*, 51 Or. 102, 93 Pac. 932.

<sup>81</sup> *Adams v. Main*, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792, 50 Am. St. Rep. 266; *Dodge v. Rush*, 28 App. D. C. 149, 8 Ann. Cas. 671; *Heermance v. James*, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 120; *Rinehart v. Bills*, 82 Mo. 534, 52 Am. Rep. 385; *Bigaquette v. Paulet*, 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307; *Sikes v. Tippins*, 85 Ga. 231, 11 S. E. 662; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553. The gist of the action is not the loss of assistance; but is the loss of consortium, under which term is included the person, affection, assistance, and aid of the spouse. *McGregor v. McGregor* (Ky.) 115 S. W. 802; *Jenness v. Simpson*, 84 Vt. 127, 78 Atl. 886.

<sup>82</sup> *Bailey v. Kennedy*, 148 Iowa, 715, 126 N. W. 181; *Philpott v. Kirkpatrick*, 171 Mich. 495, 137 N. W. 232. A defendant in a suit for alienation of affections will not be exonerated merely because plaintiff's husband is more blamable than defendant. *Rott v. Goehring*, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N. W. 294, L. R. A. 1916E, 1086, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 643. While the husband's neglect of his wife or even his adultery would not alone justify another in enticing her away, yet, if he had thereby already lost her entire affection, there could be no recovery. *Smith v. Rice*, 178 Iowa, 673, 160 N. W. 6. But see *Miller v. Pearce*, 86 Vt. 322, 85 Atl. 620, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332.

But if, on account of their unhappy relations, the wife's comfort and society are of less moment to the husband, the state of their relations may be shown in mitigation of damages.<sup>83</sup> Such evidence, however, must be confined to the time prior to her relations with the defendant.<sup>84</sup>

In these cases, whether there was malice or an improper motive is always a material consideration.<sup>85</sup> Thus, where a woman is forced to leave her husband from fear of bodily harm, or other sufficient cause, no action will lie against one who receives her from motives of humanity.<sup>86</sup> The grounds that will be sufficient to justify a stranger in interfering, and harboring another's wife, must be extreme. For instance, it has been held that ill treatment, in order to justify a person, not a near relative, in harboring another's wife to secure her from such treatment by her husband, must be of so cruel a character as to endanger her personal safety, and to force her to remain away from her husband, and the burden of proving that it is so is on such party.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>83</sup> *Willis v. Bernard*, 8 Bing. 376; *Morris v. Warwick*, 42 Wash. 480, 85 Pac. 42, 7 Ann. Cas. 382; *Humphrey v. Pope*, 1 Cal. App. 374, 82 Pac. 223; *Palmer v. Crook*, 7 Gray (Mass.) 418; *Hadley v. Heywood*, 121 Mass. 236; *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791; *Gilchrist v. Bale*, 8 Watts (Pa.) 355, 34 Am. Dec. 469; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 94 Iowa, 598, 63 N. W. 341.

<sup>84</sup> *Fratini v. Caslini*, 66 Vt. 273, 29 Atl. 252, 44 Am. St. Rep. 843.

<sup>85</sup> The motive with which the defendant acted is a controlling element in an action for alienating affections. *Ellsworth v. Shimer*, 71 Misc. Rep. 576, 128 N. Y. Supp. 883. Malice is the gist of the cause of action for alienating affections. *Hostetter v. Green*, 150 Ky. 551, 150 S. W. 652. In an action for alienation of a wife's affections, the term "malice" does not necessarily mean that which must proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but, if the conduct was unjustifiable and actually caused the injury, malice in law will be implied. *Boland v. Stanley*, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 114.

<sup>86</sup> *Philp v. Squire*, 1 Peake, 82; *Berthon v. Cartwright*, 2 Esp. 480; *Johnson v. Allen*, 100 N. C. 131, 5 S. E. 666; *Bennett v. Smith*, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 439; *Barnes v. Allen*, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 663; *Tasker v. Stanley*, 153 Mass. 148, 28 N. E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468; *Turner v. Estes*, 3 Mass. 317. And see *Modisett v. McPike*, 74 Mo. 636. One allowing his wife's mother to remain in his house against her husband's wishes is not liable to the husband on account of the mere failure to expel her, where there is no concealment, denial of free access, or attempt to influence her to remain. *Turner v. Estea*, 3 Mass. 317.

<sup>87</sup> *Johnson v. Allen*, 100 N. C. 131, 5 S. E. 666. See, also, *Smith v. Kaye*, 20 Times Law R. 261, where it is said that in an action for enticing the questions the jury have to consider are whether the defendant persuaded, induced, or incited the wife to leave, or procured her leaving, and whether in consequence thereof she did leave. If the wife merely asked the defendant

The question of motive most frequently arises in cases where a parent induces a daughter to leave her husband, or harbors her after she has left him. The rule is that, in the absence of improper motives, the parent is not liable to the husband. And stronger proof is necessary as against a parent than as against a stranger. Mr. Schouler states the legal doctrine to be "that honest motives may shield a parent from the consequences of indiscretion, while adding nothing to the right of actual control—the intent with which the parent acted being the material point, rather than the justice of the interference; that a husband forfeits his right to sue others for enticement, where his own misconduct justified and actually caused the separation; but that otherwise his remedy is complete against all persons whomsoever who have lent their countenance to any scheme for breaking up his household."<sup>88</sup> In the case of a father harboring his daughter, Chancellor Kent held that stronger proof is necessary against a father than against a stranger, and that it ought to appear either that he detains the wife against her will, or that he enticed her away from her husband from improper motives.<sup>89</sup> "A father's house," he said, "is always open to his children. Whether they be married or unmarried, it is still to them a refuge from evil, and a consolation in distress. Natural affection establishes and consecrates this asylum."

The rule, therefore, is well settled that a husband cannot maintain an action against his wife's parents for enticing her away from him, or for harboring her, unless it is both alleged and proved that they acted from improper motives.<sup>90</sup> As was said by the Tennessee

for advice, and the defendant merely approved of her leaving, the defendant will not be liable if such advice was given in good faith; it might be different if the advice was volunteered. A stranger in blood inducing a wife to leave her husband, or taking her away with or without her consent, and encouraging her to remain away from him, does so at his peril, and the burden is on him to show good cause, good faith, and justification for such acts. *Lulck v. Arends*, 21 N. D. 614, 132 N. W. 353; *Boland v. Stanley*, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 114.

<sup>88</sup> Schouler, *Husb. & W.* § 64.

<sup>89</sup> *Hutcheson v. Peck*, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 196.

<sup>90</sup> *Reed v. Reed*, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638, 51 Am. St. Rep. 310; *Powell v. Benthall*, 136 N. C. 145, 48 S. E. 598; *Miller v. Miller*, 122 Mo. App. 693, 99 S. W. 757; *Multer v. Knibbs*, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N. E. 762, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 322, 9 Ann. Cas. 958; *Payne v. Williams*, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 585; *Glass v. Bennett*, 89 Tenn. 478, 14 S. W. 1085; *Francis v. Outlaw*, 127 Md. 315, 96 Atl. 517; *Fronk v. Fronk*, 159 Mo. App. 543, 141 S. W. 692; *Beisel v. Gerlach*, 221 Pa. 232, 70 Atl. 721, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 516; *Hutcheson v. Peck*, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 196; *Rabe v. Hanna*, 5 Ohio, 530; *Huling v.*

court: "There can be no law to restrain the parent from honestly and sincerely endeavoring to protect his daughter, by means of counsel and warning, from impending ruin or disgrace, or wreck of her happiness or usefulness for life. There is a marked distinction between the rights and privileges of a parent, in such cases, and those of a mere intermeddling stranger. A father has no right to restrain his daughter from returning to her husband, if she desires to do so. On the other hand, he may lawfully give counsel and honest advice for her own good, and shelter her in his own house, if she chooses to remain with him."<sup>91</sup>

The same doctrine, it has been held applies where a wife seeks to recover from her husband's parent for enticing him away.<sup>92</sup> And there is no reason why it should not apply where a brother advises and harbors his sister, or where a wife is advised or harbored by one who has stood in loco parentis towards her.<sup>93</sup>

Huling, 32 Ill. App. 519; *Bennett v. Smith*, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 439; *Burnett v. Burkhead*, 21 Ark. 77, 76 Am. Dec. 358; *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791; *Turner v. Estes*, 3 Mass. 317; *Friend v. Thompson*, *Wright* (Ohio) 636; *Westlake v. Westlake*, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep. 397; *Smith v. Lyke*, 13 Hun, 204; *White v. Ross*, 47 Mich. 172, 10 N. W. 189. Parents who act without malice in giving counsel and advice to a daughter, who has contracted a marriage with a man believed by them wholly unfitted to make her happy, cannot be held liable for alienation. *Kleist v. Breitung*, 232 Fed. 555, 146 C. C. A. 513, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1014.

<sup>91</sup> *Payne v. Williams*, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 585; *Jones v. Monson*, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N. W. 179, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1082; *Pooley v. Dutton*, 165 Iowa, 745, 147 N. W. 154. To the same effect, see *Multer v. Knibbs*, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N. E. 762, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 322, 9 Ann. Cas. 958, and *Barton v. Barton*, 119 Mo. App. 507, 94 S. W. 574. In the last case it was said that circumstances will excuse a parent for advising a son regarding his domestic affairs and influencing a separation from his wife, especially when he is a minor, which will not excuse like interference by another. A parent, while excluding from his home the spouse of a child, may yet receive his own child therein. *Smith v. Smith*, 192 Mich. 566, 159 N. W. 349.

<sup>92</sup> *Reed v. Reed*, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638, 51 Am. St. Rep. 310; *Gregg v. Gregg*, 37 Ind. App. 210, 75 N. E. 674; *Workman v. Workman*, 43 Ind. App. 382, 85 N. E. 997; *Heisler v. Heisler*, 151 Iowa, 503, 131 N. W. 676; *Cooper v. Cooper*, 102 Kan. 378, 171 Pac. 5. The circumstance that a child is married does not sever his relations with his parents, who may counsel him, if in good faith, even relating to matters between himself and wife. *Moir v. Moir*, 181 Iowa, 1005, 165 N. W. 221. While a mother, if acting in good faith, may counsel her son as to his relations with his wife, yet, if she maliciously interferes with his domestic affairs, she may be liable for wrongfully alienating his affections from his wife. *Allcock v. Allcock*, 174 Ky. 665, 192 S. W. 853.

<sup>93</sup> See *Glass v. Bennett*, 89 Tenn. 478, 14 S. W. 1085; *Powell v. Benthall*,

A parent or person in loco parentis will only be protected under this doctrine where he acted from proper motives. Even a mother is liable to her son-in-law if she entices her daughter away from him, or harbors her, not from proper motives, but because she does not like him.<sup>94</sup>

A person may render himself liable under this doctrine by inducing a woman to obtain a divorce from her husband, or vice versa. It has been held that, though a wife may have just cause for, and may obtain, a divorce from her husband, yet, if she would not have obtained the divorce except for the unsolicited interference of a third person, the divorce does not constitute any defense to an action by the husband for loss of his wife's society, though it would be otherwise if the wife sought the advice of her own motion.<sup>95</sup>

#### *Action by Wife*

There is a conflict of opinion as to the right of the wife to maintain an action at common law against another for enticing away her husband, or alienating his affections. In some jurisdictions has been held that neither at common law<sup>96</sup> nor under the statute allowing married women to sue<sup>97</sup> can such an action be maintained. On the other hand in many well-considered cases, right of the wife to sue at common law has been recognized

136 N. C. 145, 48 S. E. 598; *Ratcliffe v. Walker*, 117 Va. 569, 85 S. E. 1 Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1022; *Baird v. Carle*, 157 Wis. 565, 147 N. W. 834.

<sup>94</sup> *Holtz v. Dick*, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791. And see *Railsback v. Railsback*, 12 Ind. App. 659, 40 N. E. 276, 1119, and *Klein v. Klein*, S. W. 382, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 28.

<sup>95</sup> *Modisett v. McPike*, 74 Mo. 636.

<sup>96</sup> *Duffies v. Duffies*, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N. W. 522, 8 L. R. A. 420, 20 Am. St. Rep. 79. (Cassoday, J., dissenting.) In this case the question is considered at length, and many authorities are collated. See, also, *Doe v. Roe*, 82 Me. 503, 20 Atl. 83, 8 L. R. A. 833, 17 Am. St. Rep. 499; *Morgan v. Martin*, 92 Me. 190, 42 Atl. 354; *Hodge v. Wetzler*, 69 N. J. Law, 490, 55 Atl. 49; *Crocker v. Crocker* (C. C.) 98 Fed. 702; *Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff* (C. C.) 26 Fed. 13; *Houghton v. Rice*, 174 Mass. 386, 54 N. E. 843, 47 L. R. A. 310, 75 Am. St. Rep. 351.

<sup>97</sup> *Duffies v. Duffies*, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N. W. 522, 8 L. R. A. 420, 20 Am. St. Rep. 79; *Hodge v. Wetzler*, 69 N. J. Law, 490, 55 Atl. 49.

<sup>98</sup> *Noxon v. Remington*, 78 Conn. 296, 61 Atl. 693; *Foot v. Card*, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. St. Rep. 258; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553; *Haynes v. Nowlin*, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389, 14 L. R. A. 787, 28 Am. St. Rep. 213; *Holmes v. Holmes*, 133 Ind. 386, 32 N. E. 932; *Seaver v. Adams*, 66 N. H. 142, 19 Atl. 776, 49 Am. St. Rep. 597; *Lynch v. Knight*, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 5 Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 291.

though it must be confessed that in a majority of the cases so holding the opinion thus expressed is in the nature of dictum. The reasoning of these cases is "that, inasmuch as the husband has the right to sue for the loss of the consortium of the wife, there can be no intelligent reason why she should not possess the right to sue for the loss of the society, companionship, affections, and protection of the husband, which the law has vouchsafed to her." <sup>99</sup> "It was the boast of the common law that 'there is no right without a remedy,' and in the main this boast was not an idle one, but was made good by the vindication of legal rights in almost all instances where the right was appropriately presented for judicial consideration and determination. \* \* \* The principle outlined in the maxim quoted requires that even where the common law, as it now exists, prevails, it should be held that a wife may have an action against the wrongdoer who deprives her of the society, support, and affections of her husband. If there is any such thing as legal truth and legal right, a wronged wife may have her action in such a case as this; for, in all the long category of human rights, there is no clearer right than that of the wife to her husband's support, society, and affection. An invasion of that right is a flagrant wrong, and it would be a stinging and bitter reproach to the law if there were no remedy."<sup>1</sup>

Whatever may have been the rule at common law, however, it is well settled by the weight of authority that since the loss of service is not necessary to the action, and the right to each other's society and comfort is reciprocal,<sup>2</sup> the wife may maintain such an action when her common-law disability to sue alone has been removed by statute.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>99</sup>Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792, 50 Am. St. Rep. 266.

<sup>1</sup>Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389, 14 L. R. A. 787, 28 Am. St. Rep. 218.

<sup>2</sup>Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. D. C. 149, 8 Ann. Cas. 671; Gregg v. Gregg, 37 Ind. App. 210, 75 N. E. 674.

<sup>3</sup>Weber v. Weber, 113 Ark. 471, 169 S. W. 318, L. R. A. 1915A, 67, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 743; Work v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343, 128 Pac. 943, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 581; Workman v. Workman, 43 Ind. App. 382, 85 N. E. 997; Gross v. Gross, 70 W. Va. 317, 73 S. E. 961, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261; Sims v. Sims, 79 N. J. Law, 577, 76 Atl. 1063, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 52, reversing 77 N. J. Law, 251, 72 Atl. 424; Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N. W. 294, L. R. A. 1916E, 1086, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 643; Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 South. 479; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553; Smith v. Gillapp, 123 Ill. App. 121; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)

### ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION

47. An action for damages, known as an "action for criminal conversation," lies by a husband against one who has intercourse with his wife without his consent.

Closely allied to suits for enticing and harboring, and still more closely connected with suits for alienation of affection, are suits for criminal conversation. In such an action a husband can recover damages against any one who has intercourse with his wife without his consent.<sup>4</sup> "Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime, left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts, yet, considered as a civil injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction to the husband for it by action of trespass *vi et armis* against the adulterer wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary."<sup>5</sup> This action does not, like actions for enticing, harboring, or aliena-

643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605, 6 Ann. Cas. 658; *Keen v. Keen*, 49 Or. 362, 90 Pac. 147, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504, 14 Ann. Cas. 45; *Warren v. Warren*, 89 Mich. 123, 50 N. W. 842, 14 L. R. A. 545; *Westlake v. Westlake*, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep. 397; *Haynes v. Nowlin*, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389, 14 L. R. A. 787, 28 Am. St. Rep. 213; *Adams v. Main*, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792, 50 Am. St. Rep. 266; *Holmes v. Holmes*, 133 Ind. 386, 32 N. E. 932; *Reed v. Reed*, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638, 51 Am. St. Rep. 310; *Railsback v. Railsback*, 12 Ind. App. 659, 40 N. E. 276, 1119; *Seaver v. Adams*, 66 N. H. 142, 19 Atl. 776, 49 Am. St. Rep. 597; *Bassett v. Bassett*, 20 Ill. App. 543; *Huling v. Huling*, 32 Ill. App. 519; *Williams v. Williams*, 20 Colo. 51, 37 Pac. 614; *Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff* (C. C.) 26 Fed. 13; *Waldron v. Waldron* (C. C.) 45 Fed. 315; *Price v. Price*, 91 Iowa, 693, 60 N. W. 202, 29 L. R. A. 150, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 94 Iowa, 598, 63 N. W. 341; *Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson*, 43 Neb. 269, 61 N. W. 577, 27 L. R. A. 120, 47 Am. St. Rep. 759; *Brelman v. Paasch*, 7 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 249; *Baker v. Baker*, 16 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 293; *Jaynes v. Jaynes*, 39 Hun, 40; *Clow v. Chapman*, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S. W. 328, 26 L. R. A. 412, 46 Am. St. Rep. 468.

<sup>4</sup> 3 Bl. Comm. 139; *Add. Torts*, 589; 1 *Jag. Torts*, 465, 467, and cases cited; 1 *Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep.* § 1365; *Smith v. Hockenberry*, 138 Mich. 129, 101 N. W. 207; *Id.*, 146 Mich. 7, 109 N. W. 23, 117 Am. St. Rep. 615, 10 Ann. Cas. 60; *Hadley v. Heywood*, 121 Mass. 236; *Winter v. Henn*, 4 Car. & P. 498; *Croze v. Rutledge*, 81 Ill. 266; *Scott v. O'Brien*, 129 Ky. 1, 110 S. W. 260, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 742, 130 Am. St. Rep. 419; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 23; *Egbert v. Greenwalt*, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 Am. Rep. 260; *Dalton v. Dregge*, 99 Mich. 250, 58 N. W. 57; *Wood v. Mathews*, 47 Iowa, 409; *Van Vacter v. McKillip*, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 578; *Ferguson v. Smethers*, 70 Ind. 519, 36 Am. Rep. 186; and cases hereafter cited.

<sup>5</sup> 3 Bl. Comm. 139. The term "criminal conversation," in its general and comprehensive sense, is synonymous with "adultery"; but in its more lim-

tion of affection, rest on the loss of the wife's society, affection, or services; but it rests on the injury sustained by the defilement of the marriage bed, the invasion of the husband's exclusive right to marital intercourse, and the suspicion cast upon the legitimacy of the offspring.<sup>6</sup> One who commits rape is liable in this action.<sup>7</sup> The intercourse need not have been the result of seduction.<sup>8</sup> It is true that, as in actions for enticing, harboring, etc., the husband may, in an action for criminal conversation, show the alienation of his wife's affection, and the loss of her services, society, etc., but this only goes in aggravation of damages.<sup>9</sup> It need not necessarily be shown, for the action is not based on any pecuniary loss.<sup>10</sup> The relations in which the spouses lived, whether happy or otherwise, and previous acts of adultery, either by the husband or the wife, may always be shown, as bearing on the question of damages.<sup>11</sup>

ited and technical signification it may be defined as adultery in the aspect of a tort. *Turner v. Heavrin*, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W. 23, 4 A. L. R. 562.

<sup>6</sup> *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 90; *Cooley*, Torts, 224; *Kroessin v. Keller*, 60 Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438, 27 L. R. A. 685, 51 Am. St. Rep. 533; *Bigaouette v. Paulet*, 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307; *Johnston v. Disbrow*, 47 Mich. 59, 10 N. W. 79; *Egbert v. Greenwalt*, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 Am. Rep. 260; *Yundt v. Harttrunft*, 41 Ill. 9; *Wood v. Mathews*, 47 Iowa, 409; *Bedan v. Turney*, 99 Cal. 649, 34 Pac. 442.

<sup>7</sup> *Egbert v. Greenwalt*, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 Am. Rep. 260; *Bigaouette v. Paulet*, 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307.

<sup>8</sup> *Weedon v. Timbrell*, 5 Term R. 360; *Wales v. Miner*, 89 Ind. 118; *Wood v. Mathews*, 47 Iowa, 409; *Hadley v. Heywood*, 121 Mass. 236.

<sup>9</sup> The cause of action for criminal conversation exists independently of a cause of action for alienation of the affections. *Barlow v. Barnes*, 172 Cal. 98, 155 Pac. 457. In the action for criminal conversation, proof of alienation of the affections is unnecessary. *Merritt v. Cravens*, 168 Ky. 155, 181 S. W. 970, L. R. A. 1917F, 935. But alienation of affections may be shown in aggravation of damages. *Stark v. Johnson*, 43 Colo. 243, 95 Pac. 930, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 127 Am. St. Rep. 114, 15 Ann. Cas. 868. The gist or gravamen of the charge is the criminal conversation, the alienation of the spouse's affections being incidental and material only in so far as it affects the quantum of damages. *Watkins v. Lord*, 31 Idaho, 352, 171 Pac. 1133.

<sup>10</sup> See cases above cited. And see *Prettyman v. Williamson*, 1 *Pennell* (Del.) 224, 39 Atl. 731; *Long v. Booe*, 106 Ala. 570, 17 South. 718.

<sup>11</sup> 3 *Suth. Dam.* 745; *Add. Torts*, 593; 2 *Greenl. Ev.* § 56; *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 91; *Winter v. Henn*, 4 *Car. & P.* 494; *Bromley v. Wallace*, 4 *Esp.* 237; *Coleman v. White*, 43 *Ind.* 429; *Browning v. Jones*, 52 *Ill. App.* 597; *Hadley v. Heywood*, 121 *Mass.* 236; *Conway v. Nicol*, 34 *Iowa*, 533; *Dance v. McBride*, 43 *Iowa*, 624; *Dalton v. Dregge*, 99 *Mich.* 250, 58 *N. W.* 57; *Smith v. Masten*, 15 *Wend. (N. Y.)* 270; *Shattuck v. Hammond*, 46 *Vt.* 466, 14 *Am. Rep.* 631; *Norton v. Warner*, 9 *Conn.* 172; *Rea v. Tucker*, 51 *Ill.* 110, 99 *Am. Dec.* 539; *Torre v. Summers*, 2 *Nott & McC. (S. C.)* 267, 10 *Am. Dec.* 597. In mitigation of damages, it may be shown that the wife

But they cannot be relied upon to defeat the husband's action entirely. A husband may sue for criminal conversation, though he is living apart from his wife, and leading a dissolute life.<sup>12</sup>

It is, of course, a good defense to the action, on the principle, "*Volenti non fit injuria*," that the husband consented to the particular act of intercourse complained of, or that he gave his wife a general license to conduct herself with other men as she saw fit, or allowed her to live as a common prostitute.<sup>13</sup>

But continued cohabitation after knowledge of acts of adultery, though amounting to condonation, barring an action for divorce,<sup>14</sup> is not a defense to the action for criminal conversation.<sup>15</sup>

When we consider the grounds upon which the action for criminal conversation rests, it would seem clear that a wife could not maintain such an action against another woman for having intercourse with her husband, and it has been so held.<sup>16</sup> There are cases to the contrary, or apparently so; but in these cases the court relied, as authority for their decision, upon those cases which uphold an action by a wife for alienation of her husband's affection, or for enticing him away.<sup>17</sup> As we have seen, the grounds for these different kinds of action are different. Because a wife is allowed to

was the seducer. *Elsam v. Faucett*, 2 Esp. 562; *Ferguson v. Smethers*, 70 Ind. 519, 36 Am. Rep. 186.

<sup>12</sup> *Browning v. Jones*, 52 Ill. App. 597; *Evans v. Evans*, 68 Law J. Prob. 70, [1899] Prob. 195, 81 Law T. (N. S.) 60.

<sup>13</sup> *Winter v. Henn*, 4 Car. & P. 494; *Hodges v. Windham*, 1 Peake, 38; *Bunnell v. Greathead*, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 106; *Morning v. Long*, 109 Iowa, 288, 80 N. W. 390; *Rea v. Tucker*, 51 Ill. 110, 99 Am. Dec. 539; *Stumm v. Hummel*, 39 Iowa, 478; *Cook v. Wood*, 30 Ga. 891, 76 Am. Dec. 677; *Sanborn v. Neilson*, 4 N. H. 501; *Schorn v. Berry*, 63 Hun, 110, 17 N. Y. Supp. 572; *Fry v. Drestler*, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 278. Connivance by a husband, sufficient to bar an action for criminal conversation, must be such conduct as when, subjected to the test of reasonable human transactions, shows an intention to connive, evidenced by his active or passive assent to transactions tending to convince an ordinarily prudent person of his wife's offense. *Kohlhoss v. Mobley*, 102 Md. 199, 62 Atl. 236, 5 Ann. Cas. 865.

<sup>14</sup> See post, p. 277.

<sup>15</sup> *Smith v. Hockenberry*, 138 Mich. 129, 101 N. W. 207; *Id.*, 146 Mich. 7, 109 N. W. 23, 117 Am. St. Rep. 615, 10 Ann. Cas. 60; *Sanborn v. Neilson*, 4 N. H. 501; *Clouser v. Clapper*, 59 Ind. 548; *Verholf v. Van Houwenlengen*, 21 Iowa, 429; *Sikes v. Tippins*, 85 Ga. 231, 11 S. E. 662; *Powers v. Powers*, 10 Prob. Div. 174.

<sup>16</sup> *Kroessin v. Keller*, 60 Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438, 27 L. R. A. 685, 51 Am. St. Rep. 533.

<sup>17</sup> *Seaver v. Adams*, 66 N. H. 142, 19 Atl. 776, 49 Am. St. Rep. 597; *Haynes v. Nowlin*, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389, 14 L. R. A. 787, 28 Am. St. Rep. 213; *Dodge v. Rush*, 28 App. D. C. 149, 8 Ann. Cas. 671.

maintain an action against a woman who entices her husband away from her, or alienates his affections without enticing him away, is no reason for holding that a wife can maintain an action against a woman for criminal conversation with her husband.<sup>18</sup> To entitle a wife to maintain an action against one who has intercourse with her husband, she must show something more than the mere fact of intercourse. She must show an enticing away, or alienation of the affection of, her husband. A husband can maintain an action for criminal conversation against one who commits a rape upon his wife. Assuming the possibility of a woman compelling a man, against his will, to have intercourse with her, it would hardly be contended that this alone would give the man's wife a right of action.

On the other hand, in *Dodge v. Rush*,<sup>19</sup> the court, holding that the right of action existed, said: "While the injurious consequences of a wife's adultery may be more far reaching, because of probable difficulties and embarrassments in respect of the legitimacy of children, her conjugal rights are in principle the same, substantially, as his. Whatever the ancient doctrine may have been, modern morals and law recognize the equal obligation and right of husband and wife."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See *Kroessin v. Keller*, 60 Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438, 27 L. R. A. 685, 51 Am. St. Rep. 533; *Doe v. Roe*, 82 Me. 503, 20 Atl. 83, 8 L. R. A. 833, 17 Am. St. Rep. 499.

<sup>19</sup> 28 App. D. C. 149, 8 Ann. Cas. 671.

<sup>20</sup> In view of Married Women's Act of 1894, empowering the wife to sue for the protection of her rights, without the husband's consent, the wife has right of action for criminal conversation. *Turner v. Heavrin*, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W. 23, 4 A. L. R. 562.

### CHAPTER III

#### RIGHTS IN PROPERTY AS AFFECTED BY COVERTURE

- 48. Wife's Earnings.
- 49. Wife's Personalty in Possession.
- 50-51. Wife's Choses in Action.
- 52. Administration of Wife's Estate.
- 53. Wife's Chattels Real.
- 54. Wife's Estates of Inheritance—Curtesy.
- 55. Wife's Estates for Life.
- 56-57. Modification of Common-law Rules.
- 58. Wife's Rights in Husband's Property—Dower and Thirds.
- 59. Estates by the Entirety.
- 60. Community Property.

As has already been stated, the effect of marriage, at common law, is to suspend the legal existence of the wife, for most purposes, during coverture, and merge it in that of the husband. Upon this principle depend many of the rules relating to property and property rights owned or acquired by the wife. Of course the husband's legal existence is not affected by marriage, and, therefore, property and property rights, owned or acquired by him, are not during his life affected by the marriage, though certain rights therein are given the wife on his death, and in some states by statute the doctrine of community property has been adopted from the civil law. As will appear, however, in this and subsequent chapters, the common-law rules respecting the rights of the wife have been materially modified by statute, so that her rights and powers are in many states equal to those of the husband.

#### WIFE'S EARNINGS

- 48. At common law the husband is entitled absolutely to his wife's earnings, but under modern statutes she is generally entitled to earnings derived from services apart from the household or business of the husband.

At common law, the husband is entitled to the earnings of his wife. He takes all the proceeds of her industry, whether it is in

the form of money paid her, or other property.<sup>1</sup> The rule not only applies to earnings which have actually been received by him or by her, but it also applies to earnings which are due, unless there is an express promise to the wife. The husband alone is entitled to receive such earnings, and he must sue therefor in his own name.<sup>2</sup> In case of his death the action cannot be maintained by the wife, as she has never been entitled to the earnings, but must be brought by the personal representatives of the husband.<sup>3</sup> The rules are different if the wife can show an express promise to her by the debtor. In such a case an action to recover the earnings may be maintained by the husband and wife,<sup>4</sup> or by the wife alone after the death of the husband.<sup>5</sup>

It follows from this doctrine that the husband only can release the debtor from liability for the wife's earnings. The debtor cannot discharge his liability by paying the wife, and taking her separate receipt, unless the payment has been authorized by the husband.<sup>6</sup> As will be seen in another place, the husband may appoint

<sup>1</sup> *Offley v. Clay*, 2 Man. & G. 172; *Buckley v. Collier*, 1 Salk. 114; *Russell v. Brooks*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 65; *McDavid v. Adams*, 77 Ill. 155; *Schwartz v. Saunders*, 46 Ill. 18; *Bear v. Hays*, 36 Ill. 280; *Prescott v. Brown*, 23 Me. 305, 39 Am. Dec. 623; *Seitz v. Mitchell*, 94 U. S. 580, 24 L. Ed. 179; *Yopst v. Yopst*, 51 Ind. 61; *Turtle v. Muncy*, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 82; *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 32 Miss. 279; *Skillman v. Skillman*, 15 N. J. Eq. 478, 82 Am. Dec. 279; *Bucher v. Ream*, 68 Pa. 421; *Reynolds v. Robinson*, 64 N. Y. 589; *Carleton v. Rivers*, 54 Ala. 467; *Hawkins v. Railroad Co.*, 119 Mass. 596, 20 Am. Rep. 353; *Ewell*, Lead. Cas. 355, and cases there cited. "By the common law, the earnings of the wife, the product of her skill and labor, belong to the husband. They do not become the property of the wife, even in equity, without a clear, express, irrevocable gift, or some distinct affirmative act of the husband, divesting himself of them or setting them apart for her separate use." *Skillman v. Skillman*, 15 N. J. Eq. 478, 82 Am. Dec. 279. And see *McLemore v. Pinkston*, 31 Ala. 268, 68 Am. Dec. 169. The rule, of course, applies to the joint earnings of husband and wife, as where they work together in carrying on a boarding house, hotel, or any other business. *Shaeffer v. Sheppard*, 54 Ala. 244; *Bowden v. Gray*, 49 Miss. 547; *Reynolds v. Robinson*, 64 N. Y. 589; *Carleton v. Rivers*, 54 Ala. 467. Property purchased by the wife with the proceeds of her labor is within the rule. *Hawkins v. Railroad Co.*, 119 Mass. 596, 20 Am. Rep. 353; *Carleton v. Rivers*, 54 Ala. 467.

<sup>2</sup> *Buckley v. Collier*, 1 Salk. 114; *Offley v. Clay*, 2 Man. & G. 172; *Russell v. Brooks*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 65; *McDavid v. Adams*, 77 Ill. 155; *Gould v. Carlton*, 55 Me. 511.

<sup>3</sup> *Prescott v. Brown*, 23 Me. 305, 39 Am. Dec. 623; *Buckley v. Collier*, 1 Salk. 114.

<sup>4</sup> *Prat v. Taylor*, Cro. Eliz. 61; *Brashford v. Buckingham*, Cro. Jac. 77, 205; *Weller v. Baker*, 2 Wills. 424.

<sup>5</sup> *Prescott v. Brown*, 23 Me. 305, 39 Am. Dec. 623.

<sup>6</sup> *Offley v. Clay*, 2 Man. & G. 172; *Russell v. Brooks*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 65.

his wife his agent to receive her earnings; and subject to restrictions as to creditors, he may give them to her.

### *Effect of Modern Statutes*

'The right of the husband to the services and earnings of the wife is not changed by the general statutes relating to the property of married women.' In many states, however, the statute expressly provides that the earnings of the wife shall be her separate property, and under such statutes earnings derived from services other than those rendered in the household or business of the husband belong to her.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394; Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 99 Ga. 572, 27 S. E. 159, 59 Am. St. Rep. 243; Blaechinska v. Howard Mission & Home for Little Wanderers, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755, 15 L. R. A. 215, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 57; McClintic v. McClintic, 111 Iowa, 615, 82 N. W. 1017.

<sup>a</sup> Code Ala. 1907, § 4487; Kirby's Dig. Ark. 1904, § 5214; Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1908, § 7867; Rev. St. Me. 1908, c. 63, § 3; Rev. Laws Minn. 1905, § 3606; Larkin v. Woosley, 109 Ala. 253, 19 South. 520; Stevens v. Cunningham, 181 N. Y. 454, 74 N. E. 434; Blaechinska v. Howard Mission & Home for Little Wanderers, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755, 15 L. R. A. 215, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 57; Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343; Nuding v. Ulrich, 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl. 409, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 61; Grant v. Sutton, 90 Va. 771, 19 S. E. 784; Emerson-Talcott Co. v. Knapp, 90 Wis. 34, 62 N. W. 945; Turner v. Davenport, 63 N. J. Eq. 288, 49 Atl. 463. See, also, Elliott v. Hawley, 34 Wash. 585, 76 Pac. 93, 101 Am. St. Rep. 1016; Garver v. Thoman, 15 Ariz. 33, 135 Pac. 724 (commissions as agent); Elliott v. Atkinson, 45 Ind. App. 290, 90 N. E. 779 (keeping boarders); In re Lewis' Estate, 156 Pa. 337, 27 Atl. 35 (keeping boarders); Perry v. Blumenthal, 119 App. Div. 663, 104 N. Y. Supp. 127 (keeping boarders). But see Cory v. Cook, 24 R. I. 421, 53 Atl. 315, holding that where board is furnished in a household, it is to be presumed, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, or evidence that the wife furnished it from her separate estate, that the husband is entitled to compensation therefor. But even where the husband keeps a house of entertainment, so that the services of the wife in connection with the keeping of boarders would belong to the husband, she is, nevertheless, entitled to compensation for extra labor performed for such boarders, such, as making, mending, or washing clothes. Vincent v. Ireland, 2 Pennewill (Del.) 580, 49 Atl. 172. In Turner v. Davenport, 63 N. J. Eq. 288, 49 Atl. 463, it was held that the wife could recover for services rendered to a partnership of which her husband was a member. And see Baker v. Jewel Tea Co., 152 Iowa, 72, 131 N. W. 674, where wife rendered services for a corporation. Under the statutes of California (Civ. Code, §§ 158, 159), relating to the rights of married women, a wife may contract with her husband to perform services for him outside the family relation for wages which are to be her separate property. Moore v. Crandall, 205 Fed. 689, 124 C. C. A. 11. Without an agreement to the contrary, the earnings and profits of the labor of a wife are her separate property, under Rev. Laws, c. 153, § 4. Briggs v. Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N. E. 436.

As to those services rendered in the household or the business of the husband, the earnings, in the absence of a special agreement, belong to the husband,<sup>9</sup> and in some states it is held that, unless the statute gives the wife the right to contract as a feme sole with any person, including her husband, she cannot, even under a contract with the husband, acquire the right to her earnings derived from services rendered him in his business,<sup>10</sup> though as to services rendered independently the earnings are her property.<sup>11</sup>

### *Wife as Sole Trader*

As will presently be seen, the wife may, by the aid of a court of equity, under an agreement with her husband, carry on a separate

<sup>9</sup> *Coleman v. Burr*, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160; *Brooks v. Schwerin*, 54 N. Y. 343; *Standen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 214 Pa. 189, 63 Atl. 467, 6 Ann. Cas. 406; *Kennedy v. Swisher*, 34 Ind. App. 676, 73 N. E. 724; *Snickles v. City of St. Joseph*, 155 Mo. App. 308, 136 S. W. 752; *Rockwell v. Robinson's Estate*, 158 Wis. 319, 148 N. W. 868; *Larisa v. Tiffany (R. I.)* 105 Atl. 739; *Monahan v. Monahan*, 77 Vt. 133, 59 Atl. 169, 70 L. R. A. 935. It is, however, held in some states that if the parties so agree the wife may be entitled to her earnings derived from her services in the household or her husband's business. *Nuding v. Ulrich*, 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl. 409, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 61; *Bodkin v. Kerr*, 97 Minn. 301, 107 N. W. 137; *Vansickle v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (C. C.)* 105 Fed. 16.

<sup>10</sup> *Blaechinska v. Howard Mission & Home for Little Wanderers*, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755, 15 L. R. A. 215, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 57 (under *Laws 1884*, p. 465, c. 351). See, also, *Lee v. Savannah Guano Co.*, 99 Ga. 572, 27 S. E. 159, 59 Am. St. Rep. 243. But see *Turner v. Davenport*, 63 N. J. Eq. 288, 49 Atl. 463, holding that a married woman may contract with a firm in which her husband is a member, and recover in equity for wages for her personal services under such contract. An express contract between a husband and wife that she should receive reasonable compensation for extra and unusual services rendered outside her domestic duties is valid. *In re Cormick's Estate*, 100 Neb. 669, 160 N. W. 989, L. R. A. 1917D, 265.

<sup>11</sup> *Kennedy v. Swisher*, 34 Ind. App. 676, 73 N. E. 724; *Hamilton v. Hamilton's Estate*, 26 Ind. App. 114, 59 N. E. 344; *Turner v. Davenport*, 63 N. J. Eq. 288, 49 Atl. 463. Where circumstances forced a wife to become the executive and working head of a family, and the husband for years recognized her right to earn and disburse money, he himself doing business with her as with a stranger, and she has sought to acquire for their sons a business in which they could earn their living and has exercised good judgment in seeing to it that the husband did not interfere in the management thereof, he is not entitled to the ownership of the earnings of the wife. *Pearl v. Pearl Advertising Co.*, 162 Mich. 439, 127 N. W. 264. A wife may, where her husband consents, maintain a suit to recover her earnings. *Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Cheney*, 20 Ga. App. 393, 93 S. E. 42. Under Code Pub. Civ. Laws, art. 45, § 5, empowering married women to engage in any business and to contract and sue as if unmarried, a married woman may in her own name instead of that of her husband maintain a suit against an executrix to recover for personal serv-

trade or business for her own use and benefit, in which case, in equity, she will be entitled to hold the profits therefrom to her separate use.<sup>12</sup>

### WIFE'S PERSONALTY IN POSSESSION

49. At common law, the wife's personalty in possession vests exclusively in her husband, without any act on his part, and on his death passes to his personal representatives. This is true as to personalty owned by her at the time of the marriage, and personalty acquired during coverture, and as to personalty in her actual possession, and personalty in the actual possession of some third person not holding adversely.

**EXCEPTIONS**—The rule does not apply to the wife's paraphernalia; that is, such articles of wearing apparel, personal ornament, or convenience as are suitable to her rank and condition. These belong to the husband, like other personalty in possession; but, if undisposed of by him, they belong to the wife on his death.

At common law, all the personal property of a woman, including money, and goods and chattels of every description, which she has in possession at the time of her marriage, vests absolutely in her husband, and becomes as much his as if it had been originally acquired by him. He may dispose of it as he sees fit; it may be seized by his creditors and subjected to the payment of his debts; and on his death it will go to his personal representatives, even though the wife may be the survivor.<sup>13</sup> The same rule applies to

ices rendered decedent, with her husband's consent, for a consideration passing to her personally. *Neudecker v. Leister*, 132 Md. 571, 104 Atl. 47.

<sup>12</sup> Post, p. 162.

<sup>13</sup> 2 Kent. Comm. 143; Co. Litt. 351b; 2 Bl. Comm. 434; *Lamphir v. Creed*, 8 Ves. 599; *Ellington v. Harris*, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134, 119 Am. St. Rep. 320; *Legg v. Legg*, 8 Mass. 99; *Jordan v. Jordan*, 52 Me. 320, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 63; *Crosby v. Otis*, 32 Me. 256; *Carleton v. Lovejoy*, 54 Me. 445; *Hawkin's Adm'r v. Craig*, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 254; *Morgan v. Bank*, 14 Conn. 99; *Tune v. Cooper*, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 296; *Snyder v. Jett*, 138 Tenn. 211, 197 S. W. 488; *Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy*, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67, L. R. A. 1918C, 1009; *Ellington v. Harris*, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134, 119 Am. St. Rep. 320; *Hoskins v. Miller*, 13 N. C. 360; *Caffey v. Kelly*, 45 N. C. 48; *Cropsey v. McKinney*, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; *Hyde v. Stone*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 230, 18 Am. Dec. 501; *Colbert v.*

personalty acquired by the wife during coverture, whether by gift, bequest, purchase, or by her own labor.<sup>14</sup> And it applies to money received as the proceeds of her real estate, either as rent or as purchase money on a sale thereof.<sup>15</sup> If the wife's interest was that of a tenant in common, the husband assumes the same relation in her place.<sup>16</sup> Personalty in possession, though settled to the separate use of the wife, passes to him personally, on her death, *jure mariti*; for a wife's separate estate lasts only during coverture.<sup>17</sup>

Personal property which is constructively in the wife's possession vests in the husband equally with that in her actual possession. In legal contemplation, personalty of the wife, in the hands of another person, whose possession is not adverse, is in her possession. Thus a chattel in the hands of another under a contract for hire is in the wife's possession, since the possession of a bailee is that of the bailor.<sup>18</sup> Likewise the possession of her agent is that of the wife;<sup>19</sup> the possession of a guardian is that of the ward;<sup>20</sup> the possession of a donor retaining possession for life is that of the

Daniel, 32 Ala. 314, 327; *Rixey's Adm'r v. Deltrick*, 85 Va. 42, 6 S. E. 615. But the husband may waive his right and permit the wife to own and control such personalty as of her separate estate. *Boldrick v. Mills*, 98 S. W. 524, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 852. Mere admissions by a husband who has purchased realty with personalty belonging originally to his wife, but which has vested in him by his marriage, that he holds the land for the benefit of the heirs of his wife, will not divest the title of his heirs, unless there has been during the lifetime of the wife a gift to her of the chattels, title to which the husband acquired by the marriage, or such a gift of the proceeds of the sale of such chattels before the same were invested in land. *Ellington v. Harris*, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134, 119 Am. St. Rep. 320.

<sup>14</sup> *Newlands v. Paynter*, 4 Mylne & C. 408; *Carne v. Brice*, 7 Mees. & W. 183; *Leslie v. Bell*, 73 Ark. 338, 84 S. W. 491; *Shirley v. Shirley*, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 363; *Vreeland's Ex'rs v. Ryno's Ex'r*, 26 N. J. Eq. 160; *Kensington v. Dollond*, 2 Mylne & K. 184; *Ewing v. Helm*, 2 Tenn. Ch. 368. As to earnings of the wife, see *ante*, p. 124.

<sup>15</sup> *Plummer v. Jarman*, 44 Md. 632; *Lichtenberger v. Graham*, 50 Ind. 288; *Hamlin v. Jones*, 20 Wis. 536; *Crosby v. Otis*, 32 Me. 256; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 N. Y. 473; *Sheriff of Fayette v. Buckner*, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 126; *Thomas v. Chicago*, 55 Ill. 403.

<sup>16</sup> *Hyde v. Stone*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 230, 18 Am. Dec. 501; *Hopper v. McWhorter*, 18 Ala. 229.

<sup>17</sup> 2 Macq. Husb. & W. 288; *Molony v. Kennedy*, 10 Sim. 254; *Brown's Adm'rs v. Brown's Adm'rs*, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 127.

<sup>18</sup> *Whitaker v. Whitaker*, 12 N. C. 310; *Magee v. Toland*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 36; *Morrow v. Whitesides' Ex'r*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411; *Armstrong v. Simonton's Adm'r*, 6 N. C. 351; *Dade v. Alexander*, 1 Wash. (Va.) 30.

<sup>19</sup> *Crosby v. Otis*, 32 Me. 256.

<sup>20</sup> *Magee v. Toland*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 36; *Davis v. Rhame*, 1 McCord, Eq. (S. C.) 191; *Sallee v. Arnold*, 32 Mo. 532, 82 Am. Dec. 144; *Miller v. Blackburn*,

donee;<sup>21</sup> and so generally chattels in the hands of another, not under a hostile claim, are in the possession of the owner.<sup>22</sup> In Alabama it has been held that the possession of the wife must be actual, and not constructive;<sup>23</sup> but the great weight of authority is against such a view.

When the property is in the hands of another, whose relations to the wife are those of a debtor, and not a bailee or servant, his possession is not the wife's possession. She has only a right to possession or a chose in action. For instance, money in bank is the property of the bank, and the wife has only a chose in action, the relation being purely that of debtor and creditor.<sup>24</sup> So where a person received money from another to be appropriated to a married woman, the court held that, nothing having been done to vest any property in any coin as a chattel, the money did not vest in the husband, but remained a chose in action in the wife.<sup>25</sup> The rules relating to the wife's choses in action are explained in a subsequent section.

The husband's right to his wife's personalty in possession is the result of the marriage, and depends upon nothing else. It lasts as long as the marriage relation lasts. He does not lose the right by a divorce a mensa et thoro, or judicial separation,<sup>26</sup> though it is otherwise in the case of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, for that puts an end to the relation. The husband does not lose this right even by deserting his wife and living in adultery.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Wife's Paraphernalia*

The wife's paraphernalia, being such articles of wearing apparel, personal ornament, or convenience as are suitable to her rank,<sup>28</sup> which she had at the time of marriage, or which are given to her by

14 Ind. 62; *Daniel v. Daniel*, 2 Rich. Eq. (S. O.) 118, 44 Am. Dec. 244; *McDaniel v. Whitman*, 16 Ala. 343; *Chambers v. Perry*, 17 Ala. 726; *Davis' Appeal*, 60 Pa. 118.

<sup>21</sup> *Banks' Adm'rs v. Marksberry*, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 275.

<sup>22</sup> *Wallace v. Burden*, 17 Tex. 467; *Caffey v. Kelly*, 45 N. C. 48; *Brown v. Fitz*, 13 N. H. 283; *Sausey v. Gardner*, 1 Hill (S. O.) 191.

<sup>23</sup> *Mason v. McNeill's Ex'rs*, 23 Ala. 214; *Hair v. Avery*, 28 Ala. 273.

<sup>24</sup> *Carr v. Carr*, 1 Mer. 543, note.

<sup>25</sup> *Fleet v. Perrins*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 536; *Id.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500.

<sup>26</sup> *Glover v. Proprietors of Drury Lane*, 2 Chit. 117; *Washburn v. Hale*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 429; *Prescott v. Brown*, 23 Me. 305, 39 Am. Dec. 623.

<sup>27</sup> *Vreeland's Ex'rs v. Ryno's Ex'r*, 26 N. J. Eq. 160; *Russell v. Brooks*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 65; *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 32 Miss. 279; *Turtle v. Muncy*, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 82.

<sup>28</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 436.

her husband during coverture, follow a different rule. Like other personalty in possession, they belong to the husband; but, if not disposed of by him during his life, they become her absolute property,<sup>20</sup> subject, however, to the claims of the husband's creditors.<sup>20</sup> In most states there are statutes making similar provisions for the widow.

### WIFE'S CHOSES IN ACTION

50. A husband is entitled to his wife's choses in action if he reduces them to possession during coverture, but not otherwise. To reduce them to possession he must exert some act of ownership over them, with the intention of converting them to his own use.
51. EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT—If necessary to ask the aid of a court of equity to reduce the wife's choses in action to possession, the husband must make suitable provision for the maintenance of the wife and children.

While the wife's personal property in possession vests absolutely in the husband by virtue of the marriage alone, without any act on his part, it is otherwise with her choses in action. These do not vest in him unless he does some act during the coverture by which he appropriates them to himself, or, as it is expressed, reduces them to possession.<sup>21</sup> If he fails to reduce them to possession during coverture, and dies before his wife or is divorced, they remain her property, and pass to her representatives.<sup>22</sup> If she dies first, and

<sup>20</sup> *Tipping v. Tipping*, 1 P. Wms. 730; *Schouler, Husb. & W.* § 431. The common-law rule was not changed by the New Jersey statute (Gen. St. p. 2012) *Farrow v. Farrow*, 72 N. J. Eq. 421, 65 Atl. 1009, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389, 129 Am. St. Rep. 714. 16 Ann. Cas. 507. As to a different rule in the Philippine Islands, see *Castillo v. Castillo*, 17 Phil. Rep. 517.

<sup>20</sup> *Howard v. Menifee*, 5 Ark. 668.

<sup>21</sup> The choses in action of a wife belonged to the husband at common law only after he had reduced them to possession. *Smith v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank*, 57 Or. 82, 110 Pac. 410; *Williford v. Phelan*, 120 Tenn. 589, 113 S. W. 365.

<sup>22</sup> *Co. Litt.* 351b; 2 Kent. Comm. 135; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 447; *Langham v. Nenny*, 3 Ves. 467; *Scawen v. Blunt*, 7 Ves. 294; *Wells v. Tyler*, 25 N. H. 340; *Tritt's Adm'r v. Colwell's Adm'r*, 31 Pa. 228; *Legg v. Legg*, 8 Mass. 99; *Needles v. Needles*, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85; *Burleigh v. Coffin*, 22 N. H. 118, 53 Am. Dec. 236; *In re Kintzinger's Estate*, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 455; *Polindexter v. Blackburn*, 36 N. C. 286; *Keagy v. Trout*, 85 Va. 390, 7 S. E. 329. In another place it will be seen that by

before they have been reduced to possession, they pass to her representatives.<sup>33</sup> If they are reduced to possession during coverture, they become, in most cases, absolutely his.<sup>34</sup> The rule applies to choses in action owned by the wife at the time of the marriage, as well as to those acquired during coverture.<sup>35</sup>

*What are Choses in Action*

A chose in action has been defined as a right to be asserted by action at law. But the term may include a right to be asserted in equity.<sup>36</sup> It includes all claims arising from contract, duty, or wrong, to enforce which resort may be had either to an action at law or to a suit in equity.<sup>37</sup> The term has never been satisfactorily defined by the courts; but since all personalty is either in possession or a chose in action, there is generally little difficulty in determining, in any particular case, whether the personalty in question is a chose in action. Stocks and bonds,<sup>38</sup> bills of exchange and prom-

statute, from a very early period, the husband has been entitled to administer on his wife's estate, and to recover the same for his own use, acting as administrator, subject, however, to the payment of her debts contracted before the marriage. In effect, therefore, he does acquire the right to his wife's choses in action, though not reduced to possession in her lifetime; but he takes the benefit of them burdened with liability for her debts *dum sola*. Post, p. 183.

<sup>33</sup> Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 3 Q. B. 536; Walker's Adm'r v. Walker's Adm'r, 41 Ala. 353; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85; Burleigh v. Coffin, 22 N. H. 118, 53 Am. Dec. 236; Tritt's Adm'r v. Colwell's Adm'r, 81 Pa. 228.

<sup>34</sup> 2 Kent. Comm. 135; Little v. Marsh, 37 N. C. 18; Tritt's Adm'r v. Colwell's Adm'r, 81 Pa. 228. Of course, they then become personalty in possession, and subject to the rules laid down in the preceding section. Ante, p. 128. In case of an infant husband, the rule is the same, though he may die before reaching majority. Ware v. Ware's Adm'r, 28 Grat. (Va.) 670. At common law and prior to the passage of the statute relating to the property of married women, a wife's property was not her separate estate, and her personal property, when reduced to possession by her husband, became absolutely his. Miller v. Keown, 176 Ky. 117, 195 S. W. 430; Copeland v. Jordan, 147 Ga. 601, 95 S. E. 13; Whiteman v. Whiteman (Del. Super.) 105 Atl. 787.

<sup>35</sup> Bond v. Conway, 11 Md. 512; Wilder v. Aldrich, 2 R. I. 518; Lenderman v. Talley, 1 Houst. (Del.) 523; Hayward v. Hayward, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 517. See, also, Arnold v. Limeburger, 122 Ga. 72, 49 S. E. 812. As to the effect of modern statutes, see Johnson v. Johnson's Committee, 122 Ky. 13, 90 S. W. 964, 121 Am. St. Rep. 449, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 66.

<sup>36</sup> Note 58, *infra*.

<sup>37</sup> Schouler, *Husb. & W.* § 153.

<sup>38</sup> Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 155; Slaymaker v. Bank, 10 Pa. 373; Wells v. Tyler, 25 N. H. 340, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 64.

issory notes,<sup>39</sup> and other debts owing to the wife,<sup>40</sup> claims for damages for personal injuries, slander, or other torts against the wife,<sup>41</sup> checks and certificates of deposit,<sup>42</sup> are all choses in action within this rule. Though there is some authority to the contrary,<sup>43</sup> by the great weight of opinion legacies and distributive shares are also within the rule.<sup>44</sup>

#### *Reduction to Possession*

To vest his wife's choses in action in himself by reduction to possession, the husband must exert some positive act of dominion over them, with the intention of converting them to his own use.<sup>45</sup> The intention to take possession, without actually doing so, is not sufficient.<sup>46</sup> Nor is the actual taking possession sufficient, if there is no intent to convert to his own use.<sup>47</sup> Taking possession, however, is,

<sup>39</sup> *Gaters v. Madeley*, 6 Mees. & W. 428; *Hayward v. Hayward*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 517; *Phelps v. Phelps*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 556; *Lenderman v. Talley*, 1 Houst. (Del.) 523.

<sup>40</sup> *Clapp v. Inhabitants*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 463, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 69.

<sup>41</sup> *Anderson v. Anderson*, 11 Bush (Ky.) 327.

<sup>42</sup> *Rodgers v. Bank*, 69 Mo. 560.

<sup>43</sup> *Holbrook v. Waters*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 354; *Wheeler v. Bowen*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 563; *Albee v. Carpenter*, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 382; *Griswold v. Penniman*, 2 Conn. 564.

<sup>44</sup> *Schouler, Husb. & W.* § 153; 2 Kent, Comm. 185; *Garforth v. Bradley*, 2 Ves. Sr. 675; *Carr v. Taylor*, 10 Ves. 574; *Arnold v. Limeburger*, 122 Ga. 72, 49 S. E. 812, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 71; *Tucker v. Gordon*, 5 N. H. 564; *Schuyler v. Hoyle*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 196; *Howard v. Bryant*, 9 Gray (Mass.) 239; *Probate Court v. Niles*, 32 Vt. 775; *Smilie's Estate*, 22 Pa. 130; *Wheeler v. Moore*, 13 N. H. 478; *Curry v. Fulkinson's Ex'rs*, 14 Ohio, 100; *Keagy v. Trout*, 85 Va. 390, 7 S. E. 329; *Jones v. Davenport*, 44 N. J. Eq. 83, 13 Atl. 652; *Hooper v. Howell*, 50 Ga. 165.

<sup>45</sup> *Blount v. Bestland*, 5 Ves. 515; *Baker v. Hall*, 12 Ves. 497; *Parker v. Lechmere*, 12 Ch. Div. 256; *In re Hinds' Estate*, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 138, 34 Am. Dec. 542; *Mayfield v. Clifton*, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 375; *Standeford v. Devol*, 21 Ind. 404, 83 Am. Dec. 351; *Needles v. Needles*, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85; *Brown v. Bokee*, 53 Md. 155; *Cox v. Scott*, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 305; *George v. Goldsby*, 23 Ala. 326; *Sale v. Saunders*, 24 Miss. 24, 57 Am. Dec. 157; *Moyer's Appeal*, 77 Pa. 482; *Greibill's Appeal*, 87 Pa. 105; *Williams v. Sloan*, 75 Va. 137; *Arrington v. Yarbrough*, 54 N. C. 72; *Hooper v. Howell*, 50 Ga. 165.

<sup>46</sup> *Blount v. Bestland*, 5 Ves. 515; 1 Bright, Husb. & W. 36.

<sup>47</sup> *Baker v. Hall*, 12 Ves. 497; *Wall v. Tomlinson*, 16 Ves. 413; *In re Hinds' Estate*, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 138, 34 Am. Dec. 542; *Mayfield v. Clifton*, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 375; *Hall v. Young*, 37 N. H. 134; *Standeford v. Devol*, 21 Ind. 404, 83 Am. Dec. 351; *Moyer's Appeal*, 77 Pa. 482; *Miller v. Aram*, 37 Wis. 142; *Barber v. Slade*, 30 Vt. 191, 73 Am. Dec. 299; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375. A husband exercising his common-law right during coverture to acquire title to his wife's choses in action must intend by the act whereby he possess-

in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to be with such an intent, and a reduction to possession.<sup>48</sup>

"That reduction into possession which made the chose absolutely, as well as potentially, the husband's, was a reduction into possession not of the thing, but of the title to it."<sup>49</sup> As to what acts are to be deemed a sufficient reduction to possession of his wife's chose in action by a husband, Chancellor Kent says:<sup>50</sup> "The rule is that, if the husband appoints an attorney to receive the money, and he receives it;<sup>51</sup> or if he mortgages the wife's choses in action, or assigns them without reservation, for a valuable consideration;<sup>52</sup> or if he recovers her debt by a suit in his own name; or if he releases the debt by taking a new security in his own name—in all these cases, upon his death, the right of survivorship in the wife to the property ceases. And if the husband obtains a judgment or decree as to money to which he was entitled in right of his wife, and the suit was in his own name alone, the property vests in him by the recovery, and is so changed as to take away the right of survivorship in the wife. If the suit was in their joint names, and he died before he had reduced the property to possession, the wife,

uses himself of the property to make it his own; otherwise it remains hers. *Southern Bank of Fulton v. Nichols*, 235 Mo. 401, 138 S. W. 881. Possession by husband as administrator de bonis non of estate to which wife was entitled is not such a possession as would vest ownership in him, as the possession must be by virtue of the marital relation. *Hauser v. Murray*, 256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W. 376. That a husband who had a certificate of deposit made payable to himself and wife retained it in his possession does not show a reduction to possession destroying the wife's rights of survivorship. *Smith v. Haire*, 133 Tenn. 343, 181 S. W. 161, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 529. A husband, taking his wife's personal property and using it in the purchase of a farm, and taking title in her name with reversion to his heirs, thereby reduced it to possession. *Neel's Ex'r v. Noland's Heirs*, 166 Ky. 455, 179 S. W. 430.

<sup>48</sup> *Johnston's Adm'r v. Johnston*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 468; *In re Hinds' Estate*, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 138, 34 Am. Dec. 542.

<sup>49</sup> *Tritt v. Colwell*, 31 Pa. 228.

<sup>50</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 137.

<sup>51</sup> As to receipt by attorney or agent, see *Turton v. Turton*, 6 Md. 375; *Alexander v. Crittenden*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 342. The agent or attorney must be acting for the husband, and not for the wife, nor for the husband and wife. See *Fleet v. Perrins*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 536; *Hill v. Hunt*, 9 Gray (Mass.) 66.

<sup>52</sup> *Carteret v. Paschal*, 3 P. Wms. 197; *Bates v. Dandy*, 2 Atk. 206; *Jewson v. Moulson*, Id. 417; *Schuyler v. Hoyle*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 196; *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 464; *Udell v. Kenney*, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 590; *Lowry v. Houston*, 3 How. (Miss.) 394; *Case of Siter*, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 468; *Tritt's Adm'r v. Colwell's Adm'r*, 31 Pa. 228. It is otherwise where there is no consideration for the assignment. *Burnett v. Kinnaston*, 2 Vern. 401; *Hartman*

as survivor, would take the benefit of recovery.<sup>53</sup> \* \* \* If he takes possession in the character of trustee, and not of husband, it is not such a possession as will bar the right of the wife to the property if she survives him. The property must come under the actual control and possession of the husband, quasi husband, or the wife will take, as survivor, instead of the personal representatives of the husband."

Assignees in bankruptcy of the husband possess the same rights as the husband to reduce the wife's choses in action to possession, but they possess no greater rights; and, if the husband dies before they have reduced them to possession, they survive to the wife.<sup>54</sup>

Reduction to possession of a part of a claim due the wife is not a reduction of the whole, so as to bar the wife's right, as survivor, to the residue. Collection of interest, for instance, is not a reduction of the principal to possession.<sup>55</sup> The same is true of the receipt of a partial payment on the principal,<sup>56</sup> the receipt of dividends on stock,<sup>57</sup> etc.

#### *Wife's Equity to a Settlement*

Whenever it was necessary for the husband, or one claiming in his right, as an assignee, for instance, to ask the aid of a court of equity to reduce the wife's personalty to possession, the court, in pursuance of the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity, required of the husband that he make a suitable settlement for the maintenance of the wife and children, unless they were already sufficiently provided for. This right of the wife is called the wife's equity to a settlement, or the wife's equity.<sup>58</sup> There is much doubt

v. Dowdel, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 279. Indorsement and transfer of bill or note. *Mason v. Morgan*, 2 Adol. & E. 30; *Evans v. Secrest*, 3 Ind. 545.

<sup>53</sup> *Hilliard v. Hambridge*, Ayleyn, 36; *McDowl v. Charles*, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 132; *Searing v. Searing*, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 283.

<sup>54</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 138; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87; *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 64, 25 Am. Dec. 516; *Outcalt v. Van Winkle*, 2 N. J. Eq. 516.

<sup>55</sup> *Howman v. Corie*, 2 Vern. 190; *Stanwood v. Stanwood*, 17 Mass. 57; *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336.

<sup>56</sup> *Nash v. Nash*, 2 Madd. 133.

<sup>57</sup> *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336.

<sup>58</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 135-143; *Story*, Eq. Jur. § 1402 et seq.; *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 464; *Udell v. Kenney*, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 590; *Parsons v. Parsons*, 9 N. H. 309, 32 Am. Dec. 362 (an elaborate examination into the history and doctrine of the wife's equity); *Howard v. Moffatt*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 206; *Duvall v. Bank*, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 282, 23 Am. Dec. 553; *Whitesides*

and conflict as to the circumstances under which a court of equity can thus interfere to compel a provision for the wife out of her property. Story says: "The principal, if not the sole, cases, in which courts of equity now interfere to secure the wife her equity to a settlement are: First, where the husband seeks aid or relief in regard to her property; secondly, where he makes an assignment of her equitable interests; thirdly, where she seeks the like relief as plaintiff against her husband or his assignees in regard to her equitable interests."<sup>59</sup> The last class includes the first two in effect, for, if she may proceed against him, or his assignees, in all cases, it covers the whole ground.<sup>60</sup> While there are some cases which seem to limit the power of courts of equity, in enforcing the wife's equity, to cases in which the husband or his assignee is seeking the aid of the court to reduce the wife's property to possession, the great weight of authority is against any such limitation, and in favor of the statement which is above quoted from Story. In an early New York case it was said: "If the husband can lay hold of the property without the aid of a court of equity, he may do it; the court has not the means of enforcing a settlement by interfering with his remedies at law."<sup>61</sup> And there are other statements to the same effect.<sup>62</sup> In a later New York case, however, Chancellor Kent said: "It is now understood to be settled that the wife's equity attaches upon her personal property when it is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and is the object of the suit, into whosoever's hands it may have come, or in whatever manner it may have been transferred. The same rule applies whether the application be by the husband or his representatives or assignees to obtain possession of the property, or whether it be by the wife or her trustee, or by any person partaking of that character, praying for that provision out of that property."<sup>63</sup> This broader jurisdiction of courts to enforce the wife's equity is amply supported by authority.<sup>64</sup>

*v. Dorris*, 7 Dana (Ky.) 106; *Perryclear v. Jacobs*, 2 Hill, Eq. (S. C.) 509; *Dearin v. Fitzpatrick*, Meigs (Tenn.) 551.

<sup>59</sup> 2 Story, Eq. 633.

<sup>60</sup> *Parsons v. Parsons*, 9 N. H. 309, 32 Am. Dec. 362.

<sup>61</sup> *Howard v. Moffatt*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 206.

<sup>62</sup> See *Bryan v. Bryan*, 16 N. C. 47.

<sup>63</sup> *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 464; *Udell v. Kenney*, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 590.

<sup>64</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 139-142; *Dumond v. Magee*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 318;

The jurisdiction extends to restraining the husband, or one claiming in his right, as assignee or otherwise, from obtaining possession of the wife's property by an action at law, and thereby defeating her equity to a settlement. As was said by Chancellor Walworth: "If the wife is entitled to such an equity upon a bill filed by a husband or his assignee, or by a third person, as all the cases upon this subject admit, I see no valid objection in principle against granting her similar relief where the husband, or the general assignee in bankruptcy, is endeavoring to deprive her of that equity by an unconscientious proceeding at law."<sup>66</sup> It is well settled that the wife's equity may be enforced against assignees of the husband.<sup>66</sup>

This protection to the wife by enforcing a settlement out of her property cannot be afforded in some of the states, either because there is no court of chancery, or because the court upon which equity jurisdiction has been conferred is limited in its powers, so that it cannot exercise full equity jurisdiction.<sup>67</sup>

A wife may waive her equity to a settlement, if she does so apart from her husband, and under the direction of the court.<sup>68</sup> And she loses the right thereto if she is guilty of adultery.<sup>69</sup> No allowance will be made to her out of her property, if her husband has made an adequate settlement upon her.<sup>70</sup>

*Dearlin v. Fitzpatrick*, Meigs (Tenn.) 551; *Salter v. Salter*, 80 Ga. 178, 4 S. E. 391, 12 Am. St. Rep. 249.

<sup>66</sup> *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 74, 25 Am. Dec. 516. For cases in which the court has interfered by restraining the husband or his assignee from proceeding in a court of law or probate to reduce a debt or legacy due the wife to his possession, etc., see 2 Kent, Comm. 139-142; *Fry v. Fry*, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 462; *Dumond v. Magee*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 318.

<sup>67</sup> 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1412; *Moore v. Moore*, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 259.

<sup>68</sup> *Yohe v. Barnet*, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 358; *In re Miller's Estate*, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 323; *Parsons v. Parsons*, 9 N. H. 309, 32 Am. Dec. 362; *Allen v. Allen*, 41 N. C. 293.

<sup>69</sup> *Schouler*, Husb. & W. § 162; *Coppedge v. Threadgill*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 577.

<sup>70</sup> *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. Jr. 191; *Fry v. Fry*, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 462; *Carter v. Carter*, 14 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 59.

<sup>71</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 142, 143.

### ADMINISTRATION OF WIFE'S ESTATE

52. Under very early statutes, and perhaps even at common law, the husband is entitled to administer on his wife's estate. He may, as administrator, recover her choses in action for his own benefit; but he takes subject to her debts contracted *dum sola*.

As has just been shown, if the wife dies, leaving her husband surviving her, before he has reduced her chose in action to possession, it goes to her personal representative.<sup>71</sup> The husband, therefore, does not take it strictly as survivor. Because of another doctrine, however, he does acquire it in effect. He is entitled to recover it to his own use, by acting as her administrator. Her personal property in possession goes to him, as has been seen, as survivor strictly, and not as her administrator, for such property vests in him absolutely.<sup>72</sup> Her choses in action not reduced to possession by him before her death he must recover as her administrator. When he has so recovered them, he is entitled to take them for his own use, *jure mariti*.<sup>73</sup> It has been said that this right probably existed at common law.<sup>74</sup> At any rate, it was conferred by statute at an early period. It was given in England by the statute of distributions of 22 & 23 Car. II. and the twenty-fifth section of the statute of 29 Car. II. c. 3, in explanation thereof; and these statutes were substantially re-enacted in this country.<sup>75</sup>

This right of the husband extends to choses in action which were settled to the separate use of the wife, unless previously disposed

<sup>71</sup> Ante, p. 181.

<sup>72</sup> Ante, p. 128.

<sup>73</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 515; 2 Kent, Comm. 136; *Watt v. Watt*, 3 Ves. 244; *Garforth v. Bradley*, 2 Ves. Sr. 675; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 447; *Whitaker v. Whitaker*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 112; *Hoskins v. Miller*, 13 N. C. 360; *Humphrey v. Bullen*, 1 Atk. 458; *Squibb v. Wyn*, 1 P. Wms. 380; *Judge of Probate v. Chamberlain*, 3 N. H. 129.

<sup>74</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 515, 516; *Hoskins v. Miller*, 13 N. C. 360.

<sup>75</sup> "The foundation of this claim has been variously stated. By some it is said to be derived from St. 31 Edw. III., on the ground of the husband's being 'the next and most lawful friend' of his wife, while there are other authorities which insist that the husband is entitled at common law, *jure mariti*, and independently of the statute. But the right, however founded, is now unquestionable, and is expressly confirmed by St. 29 Car. II. c. 3." 1 Williams, Ex'rs, 410. See *Judge of Probate v. Chamberlain*, 3 N. H. 129. Kent, however, bases the right on the statutes of 22 & 23 Car. II., and 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 25, as stated in the text.

of by her, for her separate estate lasts only during coverture.<sup>76</sup> The right is subject to this qualification: that the estate of the wife is liable to the payment of her debts contracted *dum sola*, and the husband takes subject to this liability.<sup>77</sup>

In many of the states this doctrine has been abolished by statute, and the husband, if he administers on his wife's estate, must account. He cannot recover for his own use.<sup>78</sup>

### WIFE'S CHATTELS REAL

**53. The husband has the enjoyment of his wife's chattels real—leases and terms for years—during his life, with the power to dispose of and incumber them, and they are liable for his debts. If undisposed of on his death, they go to the wife. On the wife's death they go to him.**

Leases and terms for years are known as "chattels real." The husband is entitled to the enjoyment of his wife's chattels real, and may sell, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of them during his life,<sup>79</sup> and they are liable for his debts.<sup>80</sup> He cannot dispose of them by will so as to debar a surviving wife, though his disposition by will is valid if his wife is not the survivor.<sup>81</sup> The wife's chattels real which have not been appropriated by the husband during his life, or taken by his creditors, belong to the wife in her own right, if she is the survivor, like her choses in action, and belong absolutely to the husband, if he is the survivor, like her personalty in possession.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>76</sup> 2 Macq. Husb. & W. 288; Schouler, Husb. & W. § 196; *Proudley v. Fielder*, 2 Mylne & K. 57; *Ransom v. Nichols*, 22 N. Y. 110.

<sup>77</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 136; *Heard v. Stamford*, 3 P. Wms. 409; *Donnington v. Mitchell*, 2 N. J. Eq. 243.

<sup>78</sup> *Curry v. Fulkinson's Ex'rs*, 14 Ohio, 100; *Baldwin v. Carter*, 17 Conn. 201, 42 Am. Dec. 735. And see *Leakey v. Maupin*, 10 Mo. 368, 47 Am. Dec. 120. See, also, post, p. 183.

<sup>79</sup> Co. Litt. 36b; 2 Kent, Comm. 135; *Grute v. Locroft*, Cro. Ellz. 287; *Jackson v. McConnell*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 32 Am. Dec. 439.

<sup>80</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 135; *Miles v. Williams*, 1 P. Wms. 258.

<sup>81</sup> Co. Litt. 351a; 2 Kent, Comm. 135; *Garforth v. Bradley*, 2 Ves. Sr. 675; *Schuyler v. Hoyle*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 196; *Parsons v. Parsons*, 9 N. H. 309, 32 Am. Dec. 387.

<sup>82</sup> Co. Litt. 351a; 2 Kent, Comm. 135; *Doe v. Polgrean*, 1 H. Bl. 535.

## WIFE'S ESTATES OF INHERITANCE

54. The husband acquires by marriage the usufruct of his wife's estates of inheritance
- (a) During coverture, and
  - (b) When there is issue of the marriage born alive, then for life, as tenant by the curtesy.

Where at the time of marriage or during coverture a woman is seised of an estate of inheritance in land, the husband is entitled to its usufruct. His estate lasts at least during coverture; and in case there is issue of the marriage born alive capable of inheriting her estate, his estate continues as tenant by the curtesy initiate during the wife's life, and as tenant by the curtesy consummate, after her death, for the remainder of his life.<sup>83</sup> The husband's estate extends only to the use of the land. He is entitled to the

<sup>83</sup> Co. Litt. 351a; 2 Bl. Comm. 126; 2 Kent, Comm. 130; *Beale v. Knowles*, 45 Me. 479; *Breeding v. Davis*, 77 Va. 639, 46 Am. Rep. 740; *Butterfield v. Reall*, 3 Ind. 203; *Junction R. Co. v. Harris*, 9 Ind. 184, 68 Am. Dec. 618; *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 366, 31 Am. Dec. 257; *Litchfield v. Cudworth*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 23; *Thomas v. Sheppard*, 2 McCord, Eq. (S. C.) 36, 16 Am. Dec. 632; *Ables v. Ables*, 86 Tenn. 333, 9 S. W. 692; *Clarke's Appeal*, 79 Pa. 376; *Rogers v. Brooks*, 30 Ark. 612; *Laidley v. Land Co.*, 30 W. Va. 505, 4 S. E. 705; *Sharpe v. Baker*, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627, 99 N. E. 44; *Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co.*, 85 Vt. 141, 81 Atl. 454, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1163; *Arnold v. Limeburger*, 122 Ga. 72, 49 S. E. 812, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 71; *Winestine v. Ziglatzki-Marks Co.*, 77 Conn. 404, 59 Atl. 496. In *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, supra, it was held that the court cannot, even in equity, interfere with the husband's rights as tenant by the curtesy initiate, even where the husband is improvident, and to allow him to dispose of his interest, or to allow it to be taken by his creditors, would expose the wife and children to beggary. There are four requisites of an estate by the curtesy, namely: (1) Marriage, (2) seisin of the wife, (3) birth of issue alive, and (4) death of the wife. During the wife's life, after issue born alive, the husband is said to be tenant by the curtesy initiate. It is only upon her death that he becomes tenant by the curtesy consummate. *Breeding v. Davis*, 77 Va. 639, 46 Am. Rep. 740. The estate of the husband as tenant by the curtesy has been abolished in some states, but not in all. See, for example, Code Civ. Proc. S. C. 1902, § 2670. As to the effect of the married women's acts, see *Breeding v. Davis*, supra. The husband's common-law estate *jure uxoris* has been so materially modified by legislative enactments that only a bare privilege is left to the husband to rent out his wife's land and to collect the rents for the benefit of the family in the capacity of governor of the family and not for himself individually, *Henderson Grocery Co. v. Johnson*, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S. W. 723.

rents, issues, and profits,<sup>84</sup> and upon his death the emblements growing upon the land go to his representatives.<sup>85</sup>

He may alienate the land, so as to convey his interest.<sup>86</sup> At common law, alienation by feoffment of a greater estate than that to which he was entitled forfeited his estate;<sup>87</sup> but this doctrine is not now recognized to any extent, if at all. His deed conveys whatever interest he has.<sup>88</sup> He cannot in any way alienate the land so as to cut off the rights of the wife and her heirs on the termination of his estate by his death before the wife or by divorce.<sup>89</sup> He may also encumber the property, but only to the extent of his estate therein. On his death his wife or her heirs take clear from any incumbrance made by him.<sup>90</sup> The husband's interest in his wife's realty is liable for his debts, and may be taken and sold on execution.<sup>91</sup> But any such sale is subject to the rights of the wife or her heirs on the husband's death or a divorce.<sup>92</sup>

For any injury to the profits, or to the mere possession, of the land, the husband may sue in his own name.<sup>93</sup> But, as his es-

<sup>84</sup> Co. Litt. 29a; 2 Kent, Comm. 130; *Clapp v. Inhabitants*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 463; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 69; *Jones v. Patterson*, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 572.

<sup>85</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 131; *Reeve, Dom. Rel.* 31, 32; *Weems v. Bryan*, 21 Ala. 302; *Spencer v. Lewis*, 1 Houst. (Del.) 223. The husband's tenant has the same right upon the husband's death. *Rowney's Case*, 2 Vern. 322; *Gould v. Webster*, 1 Tyler (Vt.) 409.

<sup>86</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 133; *Trask v. Patterson*, 29 Me. 502; *Dejarnatte v. Allen*, 5 Grat. (Va.) 499; *Miller v. Shackelford*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 291.

<sup>87</sup> Co. Litt. 251b, 252a; 2 Inst. 309; 4 Kent, Comm. 83; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 142; *French v. Rollins*, 21 Me. 372.

<sup>88</sup> *Miller v. Shackelford*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 291; *Meraman's Heirs v. Caldwell's Heirs*, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 32, 46 Am. Dec. 537; *Flagg v. Bean*, 25 N. H. 49, 63; *Dennett v. Dennett*, 40 N. H. 505; *Miller v. Miller, Melgs* (Tenn.) 484, 33 Am. Dec. 157; *Butterfield v. Beall*, 3 Ind. 203; *Munnerlyn v. Munnerlyn*, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 2; *McKee's Lessee v. Pfout*, 3 Dall. (Pa.) 486, 1 L. Ed. 690.

<sup>89</sup> Cases cited above, and *Huff v. Price*, 50 Mo. 228; *Barber v. Root*, 10 Mass. 260; *Jones v. Carter*, 73 N. C. 148.

<sup>90</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 133; *Goodright v. Straphan*, 1 Cowp. 201; *Drybutter v. Bartholomew*, 2 P. Wms. 127; *Miller v. Shackelford*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 291; *Barber v. Harris*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; *Kay v. Whittaker*, 44 N. Y. 565; *Boykin v. Rain*, 28 Ala. 332, 65 Am. Dec. 349.

<sup>91</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 133; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 141; *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 366, 31 Am. Dec. 257; *Litchfield v. Cudworth*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 23.

<sup>92</sup> *Mattocks v. Stearns*, 9 Vt. 326; *Canby's Lessee v. Porter*, 12 Ohio, 79; *Sale v. Saunders*, 24 Miss. 24, 57 Am. Dec. 157; *Babb v. Perley*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 6; *Barber v. Root*, 10 Mass. 260.

<sup>93</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 131; *Tallmadge v. Grannis*, 20 Conn. 296; *Alexander v. Hard*, 64 N. Y. 228.

tate is merely usufructuary, his wife must join in a suit for an injury to the inheritance.<sup>94</sup> He cannot himself impair the inheritance, as by committing waste. If he does so, the coverture would prevent the wife from suing him at common law to recover damages;<sup>95</sup> but he would be liable in an action at law by the heir.<sup>96</sup> And a court of equity would enjoin him in a suit by the wife for that purpose.<sup>97</sup>

Where the real property of the wife is sold by her husband and herself, and converted into money or choses in action, these proceeds do not retain the character of realty, but become personalty, and subject to the rules governing the wife's personalty in possession, or her choses in action, according to the character of the proceeds.<sup>98</sup> This is also true where the conversion is by operation of law.<sup>99</sup>

### WIFE'S ESTATES FOR LIFE

#### 55. The husband, in right of his wife, becomes seised of her life estates, whether for her own life or for the life of another.

If the wife at the time of her marriage has an estate for life, or for the life of another person, the husband becomes seised of such an estate in right of his wife, and is entitled to the profits. On the death of the wife, the estate for her own life ceases, and, of course, the husband has no further interest. If she has an estate for the life of some other person, who survives her, the husband becomes a special occupant of the land during the life of such other person. The husband can dispose of or incumber the estate to the extent

<sup>94</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 131; *Weller v. Baker*, 2 Wils. 414, 423; *Thacher v. Phinney*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 146; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Grable*, 46 Ill. 445; *Wyatt v. Simpson*, 8 W. Va. 394.

<sup>95</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 131; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 118. She could sue a creditor of the husband, who has taken the land on execution, and could sue the husband's assignee or grantee. *Babb v. Perley*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 6; *Mattocks v. Stearns*, 9 Vt. 326.

<sup>96</sup> It seems that the heir cannot sue the assignee of the husband for waste, because of want of privity. See 2 Kent, Comm. 131; *Walker's Case*, 3 Coke, 22; *Bates v. Shraeder*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 260.

<sup>97</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 131; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 125; *Stroebe v. Fehl*, 22 Wis. 337; *Porch v. Fries*, 18 N. J. Eq. 204.

<sup>98</sup> *Barber v. Slade*, 30 Vt. 191, 73 Am. Dec. 299; *Hall v. Young*, 37 N. H. 134; *Johnson v. Bennett*, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 237; *Thomas v. City of Chicago*, 55 Ill. 403.

<sup>99</sup> *Graham v. Dickinson*, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 170; *Jones v. Plummer*, 20 Md. 416.

of his interest in it. His representatives take as emblements the crops growing at his death.<sup>1</sup>

### MODIFICATION OF COMMON-LAW RULES

56. The common-law rules as to the rights of the husband to the property of the wife have been modified.
- (a) In equity, when by agreement with her husband a married woman becomes a sole trader.
  - (b) In equity, by creating the equitable separate estate of married women.
57. By modern statutes in all the states certain property owned or acquired by married women, and in some states all the property owned or acquired by them, remains their separate property.

#### *Wife as Sole Trader*

The common-law rule, giving the husband an absolute right to his wife's earnings, is so far modified in equity that by the aid of equity she is enabled to carry on a separate trade or business, and hold the property connected with such trade or business, and the profits therefrom, to her separate use. When a husband has agreed with his wife that she may carry on a separate trade for her own use and benefit, equity will protect the wife's interests, and treat the husband, when no trustees have been appointed, as trustee for the wife as to her stock in trade and the profits of the business. In another chapter this doctrine will be considered more at length.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Equitable Separate Estate*

As will be explained in a subsequent chapter, in order to mitigate the hardships arising from the rules of the common law giving to the husband rights in his wife's property, equity has created a doctrine by which a married woman may acquire and hold a separate estate, both real and personal, independently of her husband, and free from his control. For this purpose equity treats married women, in relation to their separate property, as if sole. The doctrine is a creature of equity only, and is unknown to the common law.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Post, p. 162.

<sup>3</sup> See post, p. 185.

*Statutory Separate Estate*

In all of the states, statutes have been enacted changing the common-law rules in so far as they give the husband rights in his wife's property. In none of the states is the old common law in force to the full extent. Perhaps by statute in all the states the real property owned by a woman at the time of her marriage remains her separate property. In many states real property acquired by her after marriage by descent, devise, or purchase, and in some states real property acquired by her in any way, becomes and remains her separate property. In most states the personal property owned by a woman at the time of her marriage remains her separate property. In most states, also, personal property acquired by her after marriage, by bequest or descent, and in some states by purchase, becomes and remains her separate property. The effect of these statutes will be considered at length in a subsequent chapter.<sup>4</sup>

**WIFE'S RIGHTS IN HUSBAND'S PROPERTY**

58. At the death of the husband the wife is entitled at common law, or under an early English statute, or similar statutes in this country—

- (a) As her dower, at common law, to one-third of all lands of which he was seised at any time during the coverture, and which her issue might have inherited.
- (b) As her thirds, if the husband died intestate, under the statute of 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 10, to one-third of his personal property, if he left children or their issue living; otherwise to one-half.

Corresponding to the husband's rights by curtesy, the surviving wife has in most states certain rights in her husband's lands, known as dower.<sup>5</sup> She is entitled, as her dower, to one-third of all lands and tenements of which her husband was seised at any time during the coverture,<sup>6</sup> and which any issue which she might have

<sup>4</sup> Post, p. 192.

<sup>5</sup> Dower has been abolished in some states. See, for example, Code Iowa 1897, § 3366; Laws Colo. 1903, p. 469, § 1; Laws Neb. 1907, p. 197, c. 49.

<sup>6</sup> In Tennessee (Shannon's Code 1896, § 4139) and Vermont (P. St. 1906, § 2921) the widow has dower only in the lands of which the husband was seised at the time of his death. So, too, in some states a nonresident widow has dower only in the lands of which the husband was seised at the time of

had could have inherited.<sup>7</sup> Dower and curtesy differ in important particulars, and principally in that dower is independent of the birth of issue.

But, corresponding to this essential of curtesy is the restriction that the wife can be endowed of such lands only as her issue might have inherited. Thus, where the husband is seised of lands entailed in favor of the heirs of a particular woman, the issue of a second wife could not inherit, and she has no right of dower in such lands. A further important difference between dower and curtesy is that in some states by statute dower is not restricted to the life of the wife, but is absolute,<sup>8</sup> though extending to only one-third of her husband's real estate. At common law it is only a life estate. Before the death of the husband, the wife has an inchoate interest, which may ripen into dower, and any alienation by the husband will be subject to such interest,<sup>9</sup> unless, as she is very generally allowed by statute to do, she joins him in the conveyance for the purpose of barring her dower. In some states, by statute, on a judicial sale of a husband's real estate vesting an absolute title in the purchaser, the wife's inchoate interest vests as it would on his death.<sup>10</sup>

Under St. 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10, which is the basis of the statutes of distribution in this country, and which has been closely followed in many of the states, the widow was entitled, in case of her husband dying intestate, to one-third of his personal property, after payment of his debts, in case he left children or their issue surviving, and, in default of surviving children or their issue, to one-half. In the latter case the remaining half went to the husband's next of kin, if any; otherwise to the crown.<sup>11</sup> In many states statutes have been enacted, varying more or less in the different states, changing the common-law rules.

his death. Michigan: Comp. Laws 1897, § 8938; *Ligare v. Semple*, 82 Mich. 438. Wisconsin: St. 1898, § 2160; *Bennett v. Harms*, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222. Oregon: B. & C. Comp. § 5535; *Thornburn v. Doscher* (C. C.) 82 Fed. 811.

<sup>7</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 130; *Dickin v. Hamer*, 1 Drew. & S. 284.

<sup>8</sup> In Iowa (Code 1897, § 3366) and in Minnesota (Rev. Laws 1905, § 3648) the widow takes her distributive share in lieu of dower, in fee.

<sup>9</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 132; *Lowe v. Walker*, 77 Ark. 103, 91 S. W. 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Elliott v. Cale*, 113 Ind. 383, 14 N. E. 708, 16 N. E. 390.

<sup>11</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 515; 2 Kent, Comm. 427; *Cave v. Roberts*, 8 Sim. 214.

### ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY

59. When land is conveyed or devised to husband and wife jointly, they take as tenants by the entirety. Each is seised of the whole, and the land goes to the survivor. This doctrine has been abolished in some states by statute.

Where land is conveyed or devised to husband and wife jointly, they take, at common law, not as joint tenants or tenants in common, but as tenants by the entirety.<sup>12</sup> Neither of them has an

<sup>12</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 132; *Marshall v. Lane*, 27 App. D. C. 276; *Oliver v. Wright*, 47 Or. 322, 83 Pac. 870; *Naler v. Ballew*, 81 Ark. 328, 99 S. W. 72; *Booth v. Fordham*, 100 App. Div. 115, 91 N. Y. Supp. 406, affirmed in 185 N. Y. 535, 77 N. E. 1182; *Wilson v. Frost*, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S. W. 375, 105 Am. St. Rep. 619, 2 Ann. Cas. 557; *Wales v. Coffin*, 13 Allen (Mass.) 213; *Fisher v. Provin*, 25 Mich. 347; *Vinton v. Beamer*, 55 Mich. 559, 22 N. W. 40; *McDuff v. Beauchamp*, 50 Miss. 531; *Bates v. Seely*, 46 Pa. 248; *Zorntlein v. Bram*, 100 N. Y. 12, 2 N. E. 388; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 361; *Wright v. Saddler*, 20 N. Y. 320; *Healey Ice Machine Co. v. Green* (C. C.) 181 Fed. 890, affirmed 191 Fed. 1004, 111 C. C. A. 668; *English v. English*, 68 Fla. 427, 63 South. 822; *Dotson v. Faulkenburg*, 186 Ind. 417, 116 N. E. 577; *Hoag v. Hoag*, 213 Mass. 50, 99 N. E. 521, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 886; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 122 Ark. 363, 183 S. W. 967; *Harris v. Carolina Distributing Co.*, 172 N. O. 14, 89 S. E. 789; Ann. Cas. 1918C, 329; *Young v. Brown*, 136 Tenn. 184, 188 S. W. 1149; *Smith v. Russell*, 172 App. Div. 793, 159 N. Y. Supp. 169; *Lang v. Wilmer*, 131 Md. 215, 101 Atl. 706, 2 A. L. R. 1698. An estate by the entirety is recognized in Oregon. *Chase v. McKenzie*, 81 Or. 429, 159 Pac. 1025. And in New York, *Mardt v. Scharmach*, 65 Misc. Rep. 124, 119 N. Y. Supp. 449.

"A conveyance of lands to a man and his wife, made after their intermarriage, creates and vests in them an estate of a very peculiar nature, resulting from that intimate union, by which, as Blackstone says 'the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.' The estate, correctly speaking, is not what is known in the law by the name of joint tenancy. \* \* \* The very name, joint tenants, implies a plurality of persons. It cannot, then, aptly describe husband and wife, nor correctly apply to the estate vested in them; for in contemplation of law they are one person. \* \* \* Of an estate in joint tenancy, each of the owners has an undivided moiety or other proportional part of the whole premises; each a moiety if there are only two owners, and if there are more than two each his relative proportion. They take and hold by moieties or other proportional parts; in technical language, they are seised per my et per tout. Of husband and wife, both have not an undivided moiety, but the entirety. They take and hold, not by moieties, but each the entirety. Each is not seised of an undivided moiety, but both are, and each is seised of the whole. They are seised not per my et per tout, but solely and simply per tout. The same words of conveyance which make two other persons joint tenants will make

undivided half of the land, or any absolute inheritable interest, but each has an interest in the whole,<sup>13</sup> and whatever will defeat the interest of one will defeat the interest of the other.<sup>14</sup>

husband and wife tenants of the entirety." *Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh*, 10 N. J. Law, 42, 18 Am. Dec. 371.

Tenancy by the entirety is not created by a conveyance to a man and a woman who are not married, though they are so described in the instrument, but they are tenants in common, even though believed by themselves and by the grantor to be husband and wife. *McKee v. Bevin*, 138 Tenn. 249, 197 S. W. 563.

It does not affect the result whether the consideration was furnished partly by both or entirety by one of them. *Stalcup v. Stalcup*, 137 N. C. 305, 49 S. E. 210. Compare *Frost v. Frost*, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep. 689, *Cooley*, *Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 74. A conveyance by a husband to himself and his wife does not, by operation of law, make them tenants by the entirety. *Saxon v. Saxon*, 46 Misc. Rep. 202, 93 N. Y. Supp. 191. A life lease to a man and his wife created an estate by entirety, giving neither party a right, title, or interest which may be incumbered or conveyed away by his or her sole act; the survivor taking the whole estate, the duration of which is measured by the survivor's life. *Truitt v. City of Battle Creek*, 206 Mich. 180, 171 N. W. 338.

In equity an estate conveyed jointly to husband and wife, without the wife's consent, will not be an estate by entirety if the lands were purchased with the wife's separate funds. *Donovan v. Griffith*, 215 Mo. 149, 114 S. W. 621, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, 128 Am. St. Rep. 458, 15 Ann. Cas. 724. Where in partition between a married woman and others, her share is conveyed to her and her husband, they do not hold by entireties, but she retains her actual interest in the land. *Stoffal v. Jarvis*, 235 Pa. 50, 83 Atl. 609.

Estates by entirety may be created in personalty as well as in realty. *Rezabek v. Rezabek*, 196 Mo. App. 673, 192 S. W. 107; *In re Sloan's Estate*, 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966. Where a deposit in bank stands in the joint names of the husband and the wife, they hold by entirety, and, on the death of either, the survivor takes the whole. *In re Klenke's Estate*, 210 Pa. 572, 60 Atl. 166. Where certificates of deposit in a bank are payable to husband or wife, as well as where they are payable to husband and wife, it is a joint deposit with right of survivorship, being held in either case by entireties. *In re Sloan's Estate*, 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966. And see *Dupont v. Jonet*, 165 Wis. 554, 162 N. W. 664. Where a note is made payable to a husband and wife, they are owners by the entireties. *In re Greenwood's Estate*, 201 Mo. App. 39, 208 S. W. 635. In Michigan, there can be no estate by entirety in personal property. *In re Berry* (D. C.) 247 Fed. 700. Nor in New York. *In re Baum*, 121 App. Div. 496, 106 N. Y. Supp. 113.

<sup>13</sup> *Frost v. Frost*, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep. 689. *Cooley*, *Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 74; *Sharpe v. Baker*, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627, 99 N. E. 44; *Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy*, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67, L. R. A. 1918C, 1009; *Simmons v. Meyers*, 61 Ind. App. 403, 112 N. E. 31; *In re Village of Holcomb*, 97 Misc. Rep. 241, 162 N. Y. Supp. 848; *In re McKelway's Estate*, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348, L. R. A. 1917E, 1143, reversing order *In re McKelway*, 176 App. Div. 929, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1129; *Ades v. Caplin*, 132 Md. 66, 103 Atl. 91, L. R. A. 1918D, 276.

<sup>14</sup> *Manwaring v. Powell*, 40 Mich. 371. A judgment against a husband

During coverture both take the same and an inseparable interest in the whole property.<sup>15</sup> Neither has such a separate interest as he or she can sell, incur, or devise, and neither can by a separate transfer affect the rights of the other.<sup>16</sup> On the death of either, the whole estate goes to the survivor.<sup>17</sup>

In a few states the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety has not

does not affect property he and his wife hold as tenants by entireties. *Masterman v. Masterman*, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537. Land held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not subject to levy under execution on judgment rendered against either alone; but a joint judgment against husband and wife, based upon their alleged fraud in exchange of realty, may be satisfied out of real estate held by them as tenants by entireties and independent of homestead and statutory exemptions. *Sanford v. Bertrau*, 204 Mich. 244, 169 N. W. 880. Where a judgment is entered against both husband and wife who hold land by entirety, the property is subject to execution, but where the lien and judgment against the husband's interest becomes void because of his bankruptcy, levy on the property cannot be made during his life. *Ades v. Caplin*, 132 Md. 66, 103 Atl. 94, L. R. A. 1918D, 276.

<sup>15</sup> *Frost v. Frost*, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep. 689, *Cooley, Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 74. Where a husband and wife hold an estate as tenants by entireties, and are divorced, the tenancy does not thereby become a tenancy in common. *Alles v. Lyon*, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463, 116 Am. St. Rep. 791, 9 Ann. Cas. 137.

<sup>16</sup> *Wales v. Coffin*, 13 Allen (Mass.) 213; *Fisher v. Provin*, 25 Mich. 347; *In re Berry* (D. C.) 247 Fed. 700; *Masterman v. Masterman*, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537; *Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy*, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67, L. R. A. 1918C, 1009; *In re Village of Holcomb*, 97 Misc. Rep. 241, 162 N. Y. Supp. 848; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 361; *Zornitein v. Bram*, 100 N. Y. 12, 2 N. E. 388; *Jackson v. McConnell*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 32 Am. Dec. 439; *Hubert v. Traeder*, 139 Mich. 69, 102 N. W. 283, holding that a contract by the husband alone, whereby another was to have the farm at the husband's death, and a will executed by the husband to carry out the contract, were ineffectual to vest any title as against the surviving wife. But see *Bynum v. Wicker*, 141 N. C. 95, 53 S. E. 478, 115 Am. St. Rep. 675, holding that where a husband, by deed in which the wife does not join, conveys an estate held by entireties, both he and his wife are estopped from interfering with the possession of the premises during their joint lives.

<sup>17</sup> *Barber v. Harris*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; *Pierce v. Chace*, 108 Mass. 254; *Bates v. Seeley*, 46 Pa. 248; *Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy*, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67, L. R. A. 1918C, 1009; *Ades v. Caplin*, 132 Md. 66, 103 Atl. 94, L. R. A. 1918D, 276; *Maxey v. Logan*, 131 Ark. 593, 198 S. W. 270; *Dotson v. Faulkenburg*, 186 Ind. 417, 116 N. E. 577; *Church v. McLennan*, 163 Wis. 424, 158 N. W. 89; *Naler v. Ballew*, 81 Ark. 328, 99 S. W. 72; *Oliver v. Wright*, 47 Or. 322, 83 Pac. 870; *Frost v. Frost*, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep. 689; *Cooley, Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 74; *Young v. Blehl*, 166 Ind. 357, 77 N. E. 406; *Boland v. McKowen*, 189 Mass. 563, 76 N. E. 206, 109 Am. St. Rep. 663; *French v. Mehan*, 56 Pa. 286; *Ætna Ins. Co. v. Resh*, 40 Mich. 241; *Manwaring v. Powell*, 40 Mich. 371; *Allen v. Allen*, 47 Mich. 74, 10 N. W. 113. In a late Pennsylvania case, husband and wife, who were tenants by entireties, mortgaged the land so held. After the wife's death it was sold under a judgment against the husband

been recognized, it seems;<sup>18</sup> and in some states it has been abolished, or modified by statute, so that a conveyance to husband and wife makes them joint tenants or tenants in common; the statutes varying somewhat in the different states.<sup>19</sup> In many states, however, the doctrine still obtains.

It has been held that the wife's interest, in view of its nature, in property thus held by the entirety, cannot be regarded as her separate property within the meaning of statutes giving married women the power to hold separate property, and convey the same, or contract with reference to it.<sup>20</sup>

entered prior to the mortgage. It was held that, as the wife's estate terminated at her death, the purchaser at the execution sale took a good title as against the mortgage. *Fleek v. Zillhaver*, 117 Pa. 213, 12 Atl. 420. Where a husband and wife owned land by the entireties, the wife can, after death of husband, make a valid and binding agreement for the sale of same and convey good title. *Ginn v. Edmundson*, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 699. Where, after a conveyance to husband and wife in fee by entireties, a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted, and the husband died before the wife, the husband's heirs were not entitled to any part of the land, but the entire estate descended to the wife's heirs. *Freeman v. Belfer*, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486, L. R. A. 1917E, 886.

<sup>18</sup> See *Sergeant v. Steinberger*, 2 Ohio, 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553; *Whittlesey v. Fuller*, 11 Conn. 337; *Swan v. Walden*, 156 Cal. 195, 103 Pac. 931, 134 Am. St. Rep. 118, 20 Ann. Cas. 194.

<sup>19</sup> See *Gresham v. King*, 65 Miss. 387, 4 South. 120; *Bassler v. Rewodlinski*, 130 Wis. 26, 109 N. W. 1032, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; *Holmes v. Holmes*, 70 Kan. 892, 79 Pac. 163. A husband's common-law rights in leasehold property held by himself and his wife as tenants by entireties were materially changed by Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1888, art. 45, §§ 1, 2, as amended by Acts 1892, c. 267, and Acts 1890, c. 394, and section 12, protecting the wife's property from her husband's debts and allowing her to sue and be sued concerning it. *Masterman v. Masterman*, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537. Some courts hold that the doctrine is impliedly abolished by the married women's acts giving them separate property rights. *Cooper v. Cooper*, 76 Ill. 57; *Green v. Cannady*, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832; *Clark v. Clark*, 56 N. H. 105. Pub. Acts 1913, c. 26, emancipating married women, abolished estates by the entireties, and deed of land to husband and wife created tenancy in common; joint tenancy having been abolished by *Thomp. Shan. Code*, § 3677. *Gill v. McKinney*, 140, Tenn. 549, 205 S. W. 416. But the weight of authority is to the contrary. *Pray v. Stebbins*, 141 Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824, 55 Am. Rep. 462; *Bilder v. Robinson*, 73 N. J. Eq. 169, 67 Atl. 828; *McDuff v. Beauchamp*, 50 Miss. 531; *Gresham v. King*, 65 Miss. 387, 4 South. 120; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 361; *McCurdy v. Canning*, 64 Pa. 39; *Marburg v. Cole*, 49 Md. 402, 33 Am. Rep. 266; *Fisher v. Provin*, 25 Mich. 347; *Flaherty v. Columbus*, 41 App. D. C. 525; *Craig v. Bradley*, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S. W. 1081; *Jones v. W. A. Smith & Co.*, 149 N. C. 318, 62 S. E. 1092, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1037, 128 Am. St. Rep. 661; *Diver v. Diver*, 56 Pa. 106; *Hetzel v. Lincoln*, 216 Pa. 60, 64 Atl. 866.

<sup>20</sup> *Speier v. Opfer*, 73 Mich. 35, 40 N. W. 909, 2 L. R. A. 345, 16 Am. St. Rep. 556; *Curtis v. Crowe*, 74 Mich. 99, 41 N. W. 876. But see *Dreutzer*

## COMMUNITY PROPERTY

60. In some states, by statute, property acquired by husband and wife, or by either of them, during coverture, otherwise than in certain excepted ways specified in the statute, is declared to be common property. These statutes create a kind of partnership between husband and wife in regard to property. The doctrine was adopted from the civil law, and was unknown to the common law.

The community property doctrine was unknown to the common law, and it seems was equally unknown to the Roman law. It had its origin among Teutonic peoples,<sup>21</sup> and, becoming ingrafted on the French and Spanish law, was carried to the colonies of France and Spain in the New World. By adoption from the Codes of those countries it now prevails in Louisiana, Texas, California, Washington, and a few other Western and Southwestern states. The general scheme of these statutes is the same, but they vary widely in details, and it is not possible to state general rules which will be applicable in all the states. The statutes and decisions must be consulted. In most instances all the property acquired during coverture by either the husband or the wife, or by both, is declared to be common or community property;<sup>22</sup> but generally

v. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N. W. 423. And see *Citizens' Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jenkins*, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250, holding that under P. S. 3040, 3041, the wife's interest in an estate by entirety is her separate property and not subject to her husband's debts.

<sup>21</sup> *Cole v. Cole's Ex'rs*, 7 Mart. N. S. (La.) 41, 18 Am. Dec. 241.

<sup>22</sup> *Otto v. Long*, 144 Cal. 144, 77 Pac. 885; *Pancoast v. Pancoast*, 57 Cal. 320; *Moody v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 167 Cal. 786, 141 Pac. 388; *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796; *In re Slocum's Estate*, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204; *Knoblock & Rainold v. Posey*, 126 La. 610, 52 South. 847; *Wade v. Wade* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. w. 188; *Merrell v. Moore*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 104 S. W. 514; *Edwards v. White* (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 S. W. 914; *Newman v. Newman* (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 635; *Sweeney v. Taylor Bros.*, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 92 S. W. 442; *Crochet v. McCamant*, 116 La. 1, 40 South. 474, 114 Am. St. Rep. 538; *Pior v. Giddens*, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 South. 337.

Property to which title is acquired by adverse possession by husband and wife is community property. *Villescas v. Arizona Copper Co.*, 20 Ariz. 268, 179 Pac. 963. A government homestead patented to a husband is community property under the law of Washington. *Buchser v. Morss*, 202 Fed. 854, 121 C. C. A. 212, affirming decree (D. C.) 196 Fed. 577, and decree affirmed *Buchser v. Buchser*, 231 U. S. 157, 34 Sup. Ct. 46, 58 L. Ed. 166. But title acquired by homestead entryman after the death of his wife does not re-

property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is excepted, and becomes the separate property of the spouse by whom it is acquired.<sup>23</sup> So, too, property held by either husband or wife at the time of the marriage, and property acquired by means of the separate property of either spouse, does not become community property.<sup>24</sup>

The general rule is that the character of the property as community or separate property is determined as of the time of its

late back to the community which formerly existed. *Wadkins v. Producers' Oil Co.*, 130 La. 308, 57 South. 937, judgment affirmed *Same v. Producers' Oil Co.*, 227 U. S. 368, 33 Sup. Ct. 380, 57 L. Ed. 551. And see, also, *Baker v. Saxon*, 24 N. M. 531, 174 Pac. 991, where title to public lands was acquired after divorce.

Money saved by a wife from a monthly household allowance is community property, in the absence of an agreement or understanding between the spouses that it was to be the wife's separate property. *McMurray v. Bodwell*, 16 Cal. App. 574, 117 Pac. 627. In the absence of an understanding or agreement at the time, money borrowed by either the husband or wife is community property. *Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Brothers* (Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 608. The earnings of the wife are community property, in the absence of an agreement that they shall be her separate property. *Moore v. Crandall*, 205 Fed. 689, 124 C. C. A. 11 (under California statute); *Lilly v. Yeary* (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 823; *Marsh v. Fisher*, 69 Wash. 570, 125 Pac. 951. Right of action for damages for personal injury to wife is community property. *Moody v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 167 Cal. 786, 141 Pac. 388; *Schneider v. Biberger*, 76 Wash. 504, 136 Pac. 701, 6 A. L. R. 1056; *City of San Antonio v. Wildenstein*, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 514, 109 S. W. 231. Crops grown on separate property become community property. *Hanks v. Leslie* (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 1056. Increase of cattle given to wife is community property. *Barr v. Simpson*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 105, 117 S. W. 1041. Otherwise under Idaho Code. *Bank of Nez Perce v. Pindel*, 193 Fed. 917, 113 C. C. A. 545. *Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St.* 1914, arts. 4621, 4622, as amended March 21, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 32), do not make the rents from the separate real estate of the wife her separate property, but merely gives her control thereof, and the rents received from such property are community property. *Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Brothers* (Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 608. Policies of life insurance issued to the husband some time before his marriage form part of his separate estate, and the proceeds were properly placed to the credit of his property. *Succession of Verneville*, 120 La. 605, 45 South. 520. To the same effect, *Jones v. Jones* (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 265.

<sup>23</sup> *Wade v. Wade* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 188; *Merrell v. Moore*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 104 S. W. 514; *Bollinger v. Wright*, 143 Cal. 292, 76 Pac. 1108; *Stockstill v. Bart* (C. C.) 47 Fed. 231; *Lake v. Bender*, 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac. 74; *Allen v. Allen*, 6 Rob. (La.) 104, 39 Am. Dec. 553; *Hurst v. W. B. Thompson & Co.*, 118 La. 57, 42 South. 645; *Winters v. Winters*, 84 Nev. 323, 123 Pac. 17, 1135; *Cotten v. Friedman* (Tex. Civ. App. 158 S. W. 780; *Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer*, 48 Wash. 422, 93 Pac. 1065. The husband may give or convey to the wife community property,

<sup>24</sup> See note 24 on following page.

acquisition.<sup>25</sup> So, too, the question whether personal property is community or separate is determined by the law of the matrimonial domicile at the time of its acquisition,<sup>26</sup> and where property which, under the law of the domicile, is the separate property of the husband or the wife, is removed into another state where the

and thereby make it her separate property, when it is not done in fraud of creditors, and such a gift is good against subsequent creditors of the husband. *Amend v. Jahns* (Tex. Civ. App.) 184 S. W. 729; *Collett v. Houston & T. C. R. Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W. 232; *Printz v. Brown*, 31 Idaho, 443, 174 Pac. 1012.

<sup>24</sup> *Oaks v. Oaks*, 94 Cal. 66, 29 Pac. 330; *Smith v. Smith*, 12 Cal. 216, 73 Am. Dec. 533; *In re Dargie's Estate*, 179 Cal. 418, 177 Pac. 165; *Booker v. Booker* (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 675; *Letot v. Peacock* (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. 1121; *Wade v. Wade* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 188; *Love v. Robertson*, 7 Tex. 6, 56 Am. Dec. 41; *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796; *Graves v. Columbia Underwriters*, 93 Wash. 196, 160 Pac. 436; *Freeburger v. Gazzam*, 5 Wash. 772, 32 Pac. 732. But in Louisiana such property, as a rule, becomes community property, subject to a claim to the amount of the separate property so used in favor of the spouse whose separate estate furnished the consideration. *Moore v. Stancel*, 36 La. Ann. 819; *Le Blanc v. Le Blanc*, 20 La. Ann. 206.

If the husband acquires lands with money belonging to him before his marriage, such land is his "separate property," and other land purchased with the proceeds thereof is also his "separate property." *Worden v. Worden*, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501. To the same effect, see *Dyment v. Nelson*, 166 Cal. 38, 134 Pac. 988; *O'Farrell v. O'Farrell*, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 51, 119 S. W. 899; *Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer*, 48 Wash. 422, 93 Pac. 1065. Where a husband, after marriage, conveyed to his wife land acquired by him before marriage, and she reconveyed it to him, land which originally was his separate property again became his separate property, under Rem. Code 1915, § 8766. *Brown v. Davis*, 98 Wash. 442, 167 Pac. 1095. Where plaintiff at her marriage owned two lots, and one of the houses thereon was built by her husband, employed by her and paid out of her separate funds, the husband had no community interest in the improvement. *Glaze v. Pullman State Bank*, 91 Wash. 187, 157 Pac. 488. Where wife takes conveyance of property purchased in part with her separate estate and partly with community funds, deed having nothing to show property is conveyed to wife as her separate estate, there being no agreement that it shall be her separate property, the wife has a separate interest proportionate to amount her separate estate contributed. *Ochoa v. Edwards* (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 1022; *In re Finn's Estate*, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103. An automobile, bought by a wife out of her separate property on a separate property transaction, was not community property, and was not subject to attachment in an action against the husband. *Rhoades v. Lyons*, 34 Cal. App. 615, 168 Pac. 385.

<sup>25</sup> *Folsom v. Folsom*, 106 Wash. 315, 179 Pac. 847; *Union Savings & Trust Co. v. Manney*, 101 Wash. 274, 172 Pac. 251; *Stiles v. Hawkins* (Tex. Com. App.) 207 S. W. 89, reversing *Hawkins v. Stiles* (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 1011. Proceeds of life insurance payable to executors, administrators, or assigns of assured are either community or separate property of the assured, depending on whether he was married or single when the contract was made. *Succession of Le Blanc*, 142 La. 27, 76 South. 223, L. R. A. 1917F, 1137.

<sup>26</sup> *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796.

law of community property exists, its character as separate property will not be changed.<sup>27</sup>

The central idea of the community system is that marriage creates a partnership in property between husband and wife, and that all property resulting from the labor of either or both of them, and all property vesting in either or both of them, except in the ways expressly excepted by the statute, inures to the benefit of both of them; and, though community property has not all the incidents of partnership property, it has many of them, and is commonly called "partnership property."<sup>28</sup>

The presumption of law is that property purchased during the existence of the marriage relation, whether it is purchased in the name of both spouses or in the name of one only, is community property.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> In *re Niccoll's Estate*, 164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278; *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796; *Brookman v. Durkee*, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 921, 123 Am. St. Rep. 944, 13 Ann. Cas. 839. The separate personal property enjoyed under the law of the domicile by one of the spouses when it was acquired is not lost by its investment in realty in another jurisdiction where the law of community property is in force. In *re Warner's Estate*, 167 Cal. 686, 140 Pac. 583; *Meyers v. Albert*, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003; *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796. In determining whether land acquired under homestead laws of the United States falls into a community already dissolved by the death of the wife, the laws of the United States and not the laws of the state apply. *Wadkins v. Producers' Oil Co.*, 130 La. 308, 57 South. 937, judgment affirmed *Same v. Producer Oil Co.*, 227 U. S. 368, 33 Sup. Ct. 380, 57 L. Ed. 551.

<sup>28</sup> 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 350, 354. See *De Blane v. Lynch*, 23 Tex. 25; *Meyer v. Kinzer*, 12 Cal. 247, 73 Am. Dec. 538; *Clark v. Norwood*, 12 La. Ann. 598; *Cooke v. Bremond*, 27 Tex. 457, 86 Am. Dec. 626; *Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs*, 20 Tex. 389, 70 Am. Dec. 394. Community status, like partnership, has elements of gains and losses based on presumed labors of each, irrespective of real industry of either. *Briggs v. McBride* (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 1123. Where there has been no lawful marriage, there can be no community property. In *re Sloan's Estate*, 50 Wash. 86, 96 Pac. 684, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 960. A divorce determines the community estate, and thereafter the spouses are tenants in common rather than copartners. *Johnson v. Garner* (D. C.) 233 Fed. 756. Where, when a man married, he had, as at all times thereafter, a living and undivorced wife, property purchased by him and the second putative wife with joint earnings, deeds naming both as grantees, was not community property, but joint or partnership property of the two. *Little v. Nicholson* (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 506.

<sup>29</sup> *Meyer v. Kinzer*, 12 Cal. 247, 73 Am. Dec. 538; In *re Pepper's Estate*, 158 Cal. 619, 112 Pac. 62, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092; *Latour v. Guillory*, 130 La. 570, 58 South. 341; *Kin Kald v. Lee*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 622, 119 S. W. 342; *Love v. Robertson*, 7 Tex. 6, 56 Am. Dec. 41; *Morris v. Hastings*, 70 Tex. 26, 7 S. W. 649, 8 Am. St. Rep. 570; *Smalley v. Lawrence*, 9 Rob. (La.) 211; *Stauffer v. Morgan*, 39 La. Ann. 632, 2 South. 98; *Lake v. Ben-*

But the presumption may be rebutted. When property is purchased in the wife's name she may rebut the presumption by showing that the purchase was made by investment of her paraphernal or separate property.<sup>30</sup> And in like manner the husband may show that he made a purchase with his separate funds.<sup>31</sup> In either case the proof, to rebut the presumption, must be clear.<sup>32</sup> It is not necessary to prove that property is in fact the product of the joint efforts of husband and wife to establish its character as community property. If it is acquired after the marriage by either alone, but not in a way excepted by the statute, it belongs to the community.<sup>33</sup> Community property is made liable for community debts.<sup>34</sup> Though the wife has as much interest in the community

der, 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac. 74; *Yesler v. Hochstettler*, 4 Wash. 349, 30 Pac. 398; *Hoopes v. Mathis*, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 121, 89 S. W. 36; *Smith v. Weed*, 75 Wash. 452, 134 Pac. 1070; *York v. Hilger* (Tex. Civ. App.) 84 S. W. 1117.

<sup>30</sup> *Stauffer v. Morgan*, 39 La. Ann. 632, 2 South. 98; *Booker v. Castillo*, 154 Cal. 672, 98 Pac. 1067.

<sup>31</sup> *Estate of Higgins*, 65 Cal. 407, 4 Pac. 389; *York v. Hilger* (Tex. Civ. App.) 84 S. W. 1117; *Douglas v. Douglas*, 22 Idaho, 336, 125 Pac. 796.

<sup>32</sup> *Morris v. Hastings*, 70 Tex. 26, 7 S. W. 649, 8 Am. St. Rep. 570; *Morgan v. Lones*, 78 Cal. 58, 20 Pac. 248; *Brusle v. Dehon*, 41 La. Ann. 244, 6 South. 31; *Smith v. Weed*, 75 Wash. 452, 134 Pac. 1070.

<sup>33</sup> *Lake v. Bender*, 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac. 74.

<sup>34</sup> *Kerley's Succession*, 18 La. Ann. 583; *Shuey v. Adair*, 24 Wash. 378, 64 Pac. 536; *Moor v. Moor*, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 137, 71 S. W. 794; *Dever v. Selz*, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 558, 87 S. W. 891; *Floding v. Denholm*, 40 Wash. 463, 82 Pac. 738; *Williamson v. McElroy* (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 998; *McLean v. Burginger*, 100 Wash. 570, 171 Pac. 518; *Johnson v. Garner* (D. C.) 233 Fed. 756; *William v. Beebe*, 79 Wash. 133, 139 Pac. 867. It is also generally liable for husband's debts. *Schuyler v. Broughton*, 70 Cal. 282, 11 Pac. 719; *Davis v. Compton*, 13 La. Ann. 396; *Lee v. Henderson*, 75 Tex. 190, 12 S. W. 981; *Holt v. Empey*, 32 Idaho, 106, 178 Pac. 703; *Ohchoa v. Edwards* (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 1022. But in Washington real estate is exempt, though personal property is liable. *Gund v. Parke*, 15 Wash. 393, 46 Pac. 408; *Ross v. Howard*, 31 Wash. 393, 72 Pac. 74; *Levy v. Brown* (C. C.) 53 Fed. 568. But see *Huyvaerts v. Roedtz*, 105 Wash. 657, 178 Pac. 801.

A "community debt" is a liability made by a husband during marriage. *Word v. Colley* (Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S. W. 257. A debt of the husband as surety is not a community debt. *American Surety Co. v. Sandberg* (D. C.) 225 Fed. 150, affirmed 244 Fed. 701, 157 C. C. A. 149; *J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Wiley*, 89 Wash. 301, 154 Pac. 437. Community property is not liable for a debt created by a tort of either spouse, or for a debt not for benefit of community. *Floding v. Denholm*, 40 Wash. 463, 82 Pac. 738; *Milne v. Kane*, 64 Wash. 254, 116 Pac. 659, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 88, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 318; *Wilson v. Stone*, 90 Wash. 365, 156 Pac. 12. Community property is liable for the antenuptial debts of the wife. *Dunlap v. Squires* (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W. 843. Community property is not bound for the

property as the husband, and an equal right to its beneficial use,<sup>35</sup> during coverture the husband has the management and control of it,<sup>36</sup> and in some states he can assign or convey or incumber it without the consent of the wife.<sup>37</sup> In other states, he cannot do so unless she joins him.<sup>38</sup>

payment of postnuptial debts contracted by the wife for the benefit of her separate property. *Hall v. Johns*, 17 Idaho, 224, 105 Pac. 71.

<sup>35</sup> *Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co.*, 108 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139, affirming judgment (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 330; *Davis v. Davis* (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W. 775; *Ewald v. Hufton*, 31 Idaho, 373, 173 Pac. 247.

<sup>36</sup> *Warburton v. White*, 176 U. S. 484, 20 Sup. Ct. 404, 44 L. Ed. 555; *Schaadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 2 Cal. App. 715, 84 Pac. 249; *Spreckels v. Spreckels*, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228, 36 L. R. A. 497, 58 Am. St. Rep. 170; *Newman v. Newman* (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 635; *Merriam v. Patrick*, 103 Wash. 442, 174 Pac. 641; *Briggs v. McBride* (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 1123; *Bowers v. Good*, 52 Wash. 384, 100 Pac. 848. Where community property of husband and wife became a valid homestead, it thereupon ceased to be community property, and the husband's right of absolute control over the same, as authorized by Civ. Code, § 172, immediately ceased. *Yardley v. San Joaquin Valley Bank*, 3 Cal. App. 651, 86 Pac. 978.

<sup>37</sup> *Spreckels v. Spreckels*, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228, 36 L. R. A. 497, 58 Am. St. Rep. 170; *Strauss v. Canty*, 169 Cal. 101, 145 Pac. 1012; *Wits-Keets-Poo v. Rowton*, 28 Idaho, 193, 152 Pac. 1064; *First Nat. Bank v. Meyers*, 39 Nev. 235, 150 Pac. 308, 40 Nev. 284, 161 Pac. 929; *Watts v. Snodgrass* (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 1149; *Simon v. Meaux*, 143 La. 760, 79 South. 330; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 6 Idaho, 597, 57 Pac. 708; *Cotton v. Cotton*, 34 La. Ann. 858; *Schaadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York*, 2 Cal. App. 715, 84 Pac. 249; *Zuckerman v. Munz*, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 337, 107 S. W. 73; *Sweeney v. Taylor Bros.*, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 92 S. W. 442. Under Civ. Code, § 172, a husband's deed of community property, made without consideration is not binding upon his wife. *Winchester v. Winchester*, 175 Cal. 391, 165 Pac. 965. Although by statute the husband is made manager with power to sell and dispose of community personalty, he cannot waste it or give it away, especially to evil associates. *Marston v. Rue*, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111, 129.

A wife, with the authority and consent of her husband, may make a valid conveyance of community property, though the husband does not join therein. *Roos v. Basham*, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 551, 91 S. W. 656. The husband being by statute the managing head of the family appointed to make conveyances of community property, a deed by the wife alone is void, unless the facts exist which create an exception in extreme cases. *Lasater v. Jamison* (Tex. Civ. App.) 203 S. W. 1151; *McAlpine v. Kohler & Chase*, 96 Wash. 146, 164 Pac. 755. Where a husband abandoned his wife and she and children of the marriage are in necessitous circumstances, she may, without the husband's joinder or consent, convey community property passing good title. *Hadnot v. Hicks* (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 359. A wife may, if reasonable prudence require, sell perishable personalty of the community in case of husband's absence. *Marston v. Rue*, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111.

<sup>38</sup> *Kimble v. Kimble*, 17 Wash. 75, 49 Pac. 216; *Olson v. Springer*, 60 Wash. 77, 110 Pac. 807.

## CHAPTER IV

## CONTRACTS, CONVEYANCES, ETC., AND QUASI CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

- 61. Contracts of Wife.
- 62, 63. Wife as a Sole Trader.
- 64-67. Conveyances, Sales, and Gifts by Wife.
- 68. Contracts of Husband.
- 69, 70. Contracts by Wife as Husband's Agent.
- 71. Husband's Liability for Wife's Funeral Expenses.
- 72. Husband's Liability for Wife's Antenuptial Debts.

## CONTRACTS OF WIFE

61. Except in the following cases, a married woman has no power or capacity to contract. Her attempted contracts are not voidable merely, but are absolutely void.

**EXCEPTIONS**—(a) She can contract and sue and be sued as a feme sole, even at common law, when her husband has been banished, has abjured the realm, is a nonresident alien, or has been transported.

(b) In equity, with the consent of her husband, she may carry on a separate trade or business, and contract with reference thereto.

(c) In equity she may contract with reference to her separate estate, so as to bind it, but not so as to bind herself personally.

(d) Under modern statutes, her disability to contract has been removed to a greater or less extent in the different states.

As a result of the common-law principle that the legal existence of a woman is lost during coverture, the attempted contracts of a married woman are, with few exceptions, absolutely void. She cannot, during coverture, enter into a contract that will bind her personally, either during coverture or after her coverture has been determined by death or divorce; and the rule is the same at law and in equity.<sup>1</sup> In a Delaware case a married woman sold certain lands

<sup>1</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 150; *Socket v. Wray*, 4 Brown, Ch. 483, 487; *Kenge v. Delavall*, 1 Vern. 326; *Ross v. Singleton*, 1 Del. Ch. 149, 12 Am. Dec. 86; *Marshall v. Rutton*, 8 Term R. 547; *Fairhurst v. Liverpool Adelphi Loan Ass'n*, 23 Law J. Exch. 163; *Pittam v. Foster*, 1 Barn. & C. 248; *Lowell v.*

to another, both she and the purchaser erroneously believing that her husband was dead, the probability being that such was the case. After the husband's death the purchaser brought a suit in equity to compel the woman to make him a deed to the land, and to restrain her from enforcing a judgment in ejectment which she had obtained against him. It was held that he was not entitled to relief, even though the purchase was in good faith, and though he had made valuable improvements on the land. The contract, being by a married woman, it was said, was absolutely void, and a court of equity could not give validity to a contract void at law.<sup>3</sup> She cannot be rendered liable on her attempted contracts, either directly or indirectly. She cannot, therefore, be estopped to attack their validity by reason of her conduct in entering into them, or by her acts or admissions in relation to them. To hold her thus estopped would be to indirectly enforce her contracts.<sup>3</sup>

*New Promise after Death of Husband or Divorce*

Since the contracts of a married woman during coverture are absolutely void, on principle they should have no effect whatever. By the weight of authority, therefore, a promise by a married woman, after her coverture has been determined either by death or divorce, to perform a promise given by her during coverture, is void for want of consideration. In other words, she cannot, after the death of her husband or a divorce, ratify a contract entered into by her during coverture, and thereby render it binding upon her.<sup>4</sup> Some of the

Daniels, 2 Gray (Mass.) 161, 61 Am. Dec. 448; Remis v. Call, 10 Allen (Mass.) 512; Pierce v. Chace, 108 Mass. 254, 259; Butler v. Buckingham, 5 Day (Conn.) 492, 5 Am. Dec. 174; Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 125; Hollis v. Francols, 5 Tex. 195, 51 Am. Dec. 760; Norris v. Lantz, 18 Md. 260; Glidden v. Strupler, 52 Pa. 400; Love v. Love (Pa.) 12 Atl. 498; Tracy v. Keith, 11 Allen (Mass.) 214; Farrar v. Bessey, 24 Vt. 89, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 79; Rodemeyer v. Rodman, 5 Iowa, 426; Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N. E. 1028, 10 Ann. Cas. 710; Hall v. Johns, 17 Idaho, 224, 105 Pac. 71; French v. Slack, 89 Vt. 514, 96 Atl. 6; Pond v. Carpenter, 12 Minn. 430 (Gil. 315). See, also, Burns v. Cooper, 140 Fed. 273, 72 C. C. A. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Ross v. Singleton, 1 Del. Ch. 149, 12 Am. Dec. 86.

<sup>4</sup> See the cases above cited. And see Pierce v. Chace, 108 Mass. 254, 259; Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24, 17 L. Ed. 780; Merriam v. Boston, C. & F. Railroad Co., 117 Mass. 241.

<sup>5</sup> Meyer v. Haworth, 8 Adol. & El. 467; Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Strange, 94; Lennox v. Eldred, 1 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 140; Hayward v. Barker, 52 Vt. 429, 86 Am. Rep. 762; Hubbard v. Bugbee, 58 Vt. 172, 2 Atl. 594; Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456; Candy v. Coppock, 85 Ind. 594; Porterfield v. Butler, 47 Miss. 165, 12 Am. Rep. 329; Clark, Cont. 203, and cases there cited.

courts have sustained such a ratification on the ground that she is under a moral obligation to perform the contract, and that this obligation is a sufficient consideration to support her promise after coverture.<sup>5</sup> This, however, is directly contrary to the well-settled rule of the law of contract that a mere moral obligation is no consideration for a promise.<sup>6</sup>

*Exceptions to the Rule of Common Law*

There were exceptions to the rule at common law in regard to contracts of married women in cases where the husband had been banished, or had abjured the realm, or was a nonresident alien, or was under sentence of transportation or of penal servitude for a term of years or for life. In these cases he was regarded as civilly dead, and the wife had the power to contract, and could sue and be sued, as a feme sole.<sup>7</sup> These doctrines have been adopted with some modifications in this country.<sup>8</sup> It has been very generally held that a married woman has power to contract, and to sue and be sued in relation to her contracts, where her husband has abandoned her and the country; and residence in another state, with intention to abandon her, has been regarded as equivalent to residence in a foreign country.<sup>9</sup> The rule has even been applied in cases where the husband has abandoned his wife, without leaving the state.<sup>10</sup> To give rise to the exception, the husband must have renounced all his marital rights and relations.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36; Brown v. Bennett, 75 Pa. 420; Sharpless' Appeal, 140 Pa. 63, 21 Atl. 239; Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604; Hubbard v. Bugbee, 55 Vt. 506, 45 Am. Rep. 637.

<sup>6</sup> Clark, Cont. 180, 203.

<sup>7</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 443; 2 Kent, Comm. 154 (where the question is considered at length, and the English cases are collected and discussed); Carrol v. Blencow, 4 Esp. 27; Belknap v. Lady Weyland, Co. Litt. 132b, 133a; Derry v. Duchess of Mazarine, 1 Ld. Raym. 147.

<sup>8</sup> Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105, 7 L. Ed. 72; Robinson v. Reynolds, 1 Aikens (Vt.) 174, 15 Am. Dec. 673, and cases hereafter cited.

<sup>9</sup> Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 89; Osborn v. Nelson, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 375; Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105, 7 L. Ed. 72; Arthur v. Broadnax, 3 Ala. 557, 37 Am. Dec. 707; Krebs v. O'Grady, 23 Ala. 727, 58 Am. Dec. 312; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa, 321, 68 Am. Dec. 137; Rose v. Bates, 12 Mo. 30; Rosenthal v. Mayhugh, 33 Ohio St. 155; Starrett v. Wynn, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 130, 17 Am. Dec. 654; Bean v. Morgan, 4 McCord (S. O.) 148.

<sup>10</sup> Love v. Moynehan, 16 Ill. 277, 63 Am. Dec. 306.

<sup>11</sup> Ayer v. Warren, 47 Me. 217; Gregory v. Pierce, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 478; Beckman v. Stanley, 8 Nev. 257.

*Exceptions in Equity*

Courts of equity recognize certain exceptions to the rule that a married woman cannot enter into a contract. Thus in equity, as will be seen in a subsequent section, a wife may, with the consent of her husband, carry on business as a sole trader, and may contract with reference to her separate trade or business.<sup>12</sup>

As was stated in a preceding chapter, in equity a married woman may acquire and hold an estate to her sole and separate use. In relation to this estate, she may to some extent make contracts which a court of equity will enforce against the separate property. She cannot, however, even in equity, much less at law, make a contract in relation to such separate estate which will be binding upon her personally. The extent to which a married woman may contract so as to bind her equitable separate estate will be shown at some length in a subsequent chapter.<sup>13</sup>

*Under Modern Statutes*

In recent years the Legislatures of the different states have enacted laws removing to a greater or less extent the common-law disability of a married woman to contract.<sup>14</sup> In some states the disability has been wholly removed, so that she can now contract and sue and be sued as a feme sole; while in others the disability has been only partially removed, and she can contract only to a limited extent.<sup>15</sup> In most states she can contract with her husband,<sup>16</sup> but

<sup>12</sup> Post, p. 162.

<sup>13</sup> Post, p. 189.

<sup>14</sup> Such statutes have no retroactive effect and do not validate contracts made before their enactment. In re Scully's Estate, 199 Mich. 181, 165 N. W. 688; Akin v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 S. W. 625.

<sup>15</sup> Code Ala. 1907, §§ 4492, 4493 (but she may not contract as surety, section 4497); Hurd's Rev. St. Ill. 1908, c. 86, § 6; Code Pub. Gen. Laws, Md. 1904, art. 45, § 5; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 4335 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 2378); Bates' Ann. St. Ohio 1906, § 3112; B. & C. Comp. Or. § 5249; Pierce's Code Wash. § 3873 (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4504); Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108; Caldwell v. Blanchard, 191 Mass. 489, 77 N. E. 1036; Young v. Hart, 101 Va. 480, 44 S. E. 703; Dempsey v. Wells, 109 Mo. App. 470, 84 S. W. 1015. In a few states it seems to be the rule that the common-law disability to contract remains except as removed by statute. Meier & Frank Co. v. Bruce, 30 Idaho, 732, 168 Pac. 5; Fadden v. Fadden, 92 Vt. 350, 103 Atl. 1020. But the better rule seems to be that her capacity to contract is the rule, except as restricted by statute. Bartholomew v. Allentown Nat. Bank, 260 Pa. 509, 103 Atl. 954; Townsend v. Huntzinger, 41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N. E. 619; Bogle v. Nelson, 151 Ky. 443, 152 S. W. 250. A married woman has the same status as her husband as to the right to contract. Farmers' State Bank of Ada v. Keen (Okla.) 167 Pac. 207. She may contract for her

<sup>16</sup> See note 16 on following page.

in some she cannot.<sup>17</sup> In some states she is prohibited from entering into contracts of suretyship,<sup>18</sup> or to convey land.<sup>19</sup> In all the

services. *Gerdas v. Niemeier*, 193 Ill. App. 574; *Elliott v. Atkinson*, 45 Ind. App. 290, 90 N. E. 779; *Garver v. Thoman*, 15 Ariz. 38, 135 Pac. 724. And for necessities. *Adair v. Arendt*, 126 Ark. 246, 190 S. W. 445; *Wilder v. Brokaw*, 141 App. Div. 811, 126 N. Y. Supp. 932. See ante, p. 126. She may appoint an agent. *Barber v. Keeling* (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 139; *Baker v. Thompson*, 214 Mo. 500, 114 S. W. 497. In Minnesota she can make all contracts as if sole, except contracts to convey her homestead. *Rev. Laws 1905, § 3607*. The capacity of a married woman to contract does not depend on her holding separate property. *Barrows v. Dugan's Estate*, 88 Vt. 441, 92 Atl. 927. A wife's coverture is no defense to a note executed by her as maker. *McDaniel v. Jonesboro Trust Co.*, 127 Ark. 61, 191 S. W. 916. Under Pub. St. N. H. 1901, c. 176, § 2, a married woman is liable on a contract made with third persons for the benefit of a partnership composed of herself and her husband. *Orr & Rolfe Co. v. Merrill*, 78 N. H. 175, 98 Atl. 303. See, also, *Freret v. Taylor*, 119 La. 307, 44 South. 26, 121 Am. St. Rep. 522, holding that where a married woman is authorized under the law of her domicile to enter into a contract as a feme sole, and to sue and be sued without her husband being joined as a party, her status as to contracting and as to suing and being sued accompanies her to this state unless controlled by considerations of public policy.

<sup>18</sup> *Crowley v. Crowley*, 167 Mo. App. 414, 151 S. W. 512; *Leimgruber v. Leimgruber*, 172 Ind. 370, 86 N. E. 73, 88 N. E. 593; *Perkins v. Blethen*, 107 Me. 443, 78 Atl. 574, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1148; *Tuttle v. Shutts*, 43 Colo. 534, 96 Pac. 260; *Krouse v. Krouse*, 48 Ind. App. 3, 95 N. E. 262; *Coleman v. Coleman*, 142 Ky. 36, 133 S. W. 1003; *Potter v. Mobley* (Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 205. But such contracts will be carefully scrutinized. *Koopman v. Mansolf*, 51 Mont. 48, 149 Pac. 491; *Leimgruber v. Leimgruber*, 72 Ind. 370, 86 N. E. 73, 88 N. E. 593. It was held in *Appeal of Spitz*, 56 Conn. 184, 14 Atl. 776, 7 Am. St. Rep. 303, that the provision of the Connecticut statute (Gen. St. 1902, § 4545) declaring that a married woman may contract with third persons does not prohibit contracts with her husband. The wife had the right in equity to contract with her husband, and as the statute is silent on the subject the right is not taken away. She may enter into a partnership contract with her husband. *Butler v. Frank*, 7 Ga. App. 655, 67 S. E. 884; *Jones v. Jones*, 99 Miss. 600, 55 South. 361. Wife, loaning proceeds of her separate property to her husband, becomes one of his creditors, and her rights are the same as those of any other creditor. *Bates v. Papesh*, 30 Idaho, 529, 166 Pac. 270.

A wife after marriage has the same capacity to contract with her husband that she had before, and may enforce such contract by an action at law. *McDowell v. McDowell*, 37 N. D. 367, 164 N. W. 23; *Hendrickson v. Hendrickson*, 198 Ill. App. 442; *Regal Realty & Investment Co. v. Gallagher* (Mo.) 188 S. W. 151.

<sup>17</sup> *Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 153, § 2*; Pub. St. N. H. 1901, c. 176, § 2; *Spurlock v. Spurlock*, 80 Ark. 37, 96 S. W. 753; *Crosby v. Clem*, 209 Mass. 193, 95 N. E. 297. The right of a married woman to enter into a partnership contract with her husband is denied in some cases. See *Haggett v. Hurley*, 91 Me. 542, 40 Atl. 561, 41 L. R. A. 362; *Voss v. Sylvester*, 203 Mass. 233, 89

<sup>18, 19</sup> See notes 18 and 19 on following page.

states statutes have been enacted allowing a married woman to acquire and hold property as her separate estate, and under these statutes she has more or less general power to contract in relation to her separate estate. The effect of these statutes will be considered in a separate chapter.<sup>20</sup> It is, however, generally held that such statutes do not, of themselves, give married women unlimited capacity to contract.<sup>21</sup>

N. E. 241; *People's Trust Co. v. Merrill*, 78 N. H. 329, 99 Atl. 650. Except as modified by Act No. 94 of 1916, law of Louisiana prohibits all contracts between husband and wife, including those entered into while they are temporarily in another jurisdiction. *Marks v. Loewenberg*, 143 La. 196, 78 South. 444.

<sup>18</sup> Code Ala. 1907, § 4497; Code Ga. 1895, §§ 2488, 2492; *Burns' Ann. St. Ind.* 1914, §§ 7851, 7855; *Ky. St.* 1908, § 2127; *Pub. St. N. H.* 1901, c. 176, § 2; *P. & L. Dig. Pa.* p. 2890, par. 2. See, also, *Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin*, 14 Idaho, 75, 93 Pac. 504, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 676; *Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Belinke*, 41 Ind. App. 288, 81 N. E. 119; *Goldsmith Bros. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Moore*, 108 Ark. 362, 157 S. W. 733; *Thompson v. Wilkinson*, 9 Ga. App. 367, 71 S. E. 678; *Baker v. Owensboro Savings Bank & Trust Co.'s Receiver*, 140 Ky. 121, 130 S. W. 969; *Keystone Brewing Co. v. Varzaly*, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 155; *Wilson v. Dearborn* (Tex. Civ. App.) 179 S. W. 1102, denying rehearing 174 S. W. 296; *Bryant v. Jones*, 183 Ky. 298, 209 S. W. 30; *Milton v. Setze*, 146 Ga. 26, 90 S. E. 469. In Indiana the statute confers on married women power to contract as if sole, except that she cannot bind herself as surety or convey her real estate, unless her husband joins in the conveyance. *Townsend v. Huntzinger*, 41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N. E. 619; *Kennedy v. Swisher*, 34 Ind. App. 676, 73 N. E. 724; *Anderson v. Citizens' Nat. Bank*, 38 Ind. App. 190, 76 N. E. 811; *Isphording v. Wolfe*, 36 Ind. App. 250, 75 N. E. 598; *Ft. Wayne Trust Co. v. Sihler*, 34 Ind. App. 140, 72 N. E. 494; *Field v. Campbell*, 164 Ind. 389, 72 N. E. 260, 108 Am. St. Rep. 301. But the statute prohibiting a married woman to bind herself as surety does not render the enforcement, in the courts of Indiana, of an Illinois contract of suretyship entered into by a married woman residing in that state, which is valid by the laws thereof, against public policy. *Garrigue v. Keller*, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. 523, 69 L. R. A. 870, 108 Am. St. Rep. 324. She may not become surety for her husband. *Grosman v. Union Trust Co.*, 228 Fed. 610, 143 C. C. A. 132, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 613, affirmed 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368 (construing Texas statute); *Elkins v. Bank of Henry*, 180 Ala. 18, 60 South. 96; *First Nat. Bank v. Bertoli*, 87 Vt. 297, 89 Atl. 359, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 590. But see *Royal v. Southerland*, 168 N. C. 405, 84 S. E. 708, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 623, and *Duty v. Sprinkle*, 64 W. Va. 39, 60 S. E. 882, holding that a wife may bind herself for her husband's debt. Under Rev. Laws Okl. 1910, § 3353, a married woman may become surety on an appearance bond under the same conditions as a feme sole. *Temple v. State* (Okl.) 178 Pac. 113.

<sup>19</sup> Rev. Laws Minn. 1905, § 3607. And see post, p. 202.

<sup>20</sup> Post, p. 203.

<sup>21</sup> *Yale v. Dederer*, 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; *Conway v. Smith*, 13 Wis. 140; *Carpenter v. Mitchell*, 50 Ill. 470; *Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin*, 14 Idaho, 75, 93 Pac. 504, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 676; *Union State Bank of Har-*

## WIFE AS A SOLE TRADER

62. In equity, by agreement with her husband, a wife may carry on a separate trade or business, and contract with reference thereto, and the stock in trade and profits will be treated as her separate property.
- (a) As against the husband, though the agreement was voluntary.
  - (b) As against the husband's creditors, if the agreement was based on a valuable consideration.
  - (c) The husband will be liable for the debts of his wife's separate business, when it is conducted with his express consent, or where his consent may be implied; as where he takes part in its management, or shares in its profits. But he is not liable if it is conducted without his consent, express or implied.
63. In most states the right of married women to engage in business is controlled by statute.

While at common law a wife could make no contracts, and her husband was entitled to her separate earnings, she was nevertheless, by the aid of equity, enabled to carry on a separate trade or business. When a husband has agreed with his wife that she may carry on a separate trade for her own use and benefit, equity will protect the wife's interests, and treat the husband, when no trustees have been appointed, as trustee for the wife as to her stock in trade and the profits of the business.<sup>22</sup> Where the agreement is supported by a valuable consideration, it will be supported in favor of the wife even against her husband's creditors.<sup>23</sup> If the agreement is entered into before marriage, and in consideration thereof, the marriage is

*vard v. McKelvie*, 91 Neb. 728, 136 N. W. 1021; *Williams v. Hugunin*, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; *Palliser v. Gurney*, L. R. 19 Q. B. Div. 519; *Thompson v. Minnich*, 227 Ill. 430, 81 N. E. 336 (holding that a married woman could not by virtue of the statute contract to adopt a child and provide for it out of her estate). See, also, post, p. 203.

<sup>22</sup> *Macq. Husb. & W.* 328; *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 1387; *Ashworth v. Outram*, 5 Ch. Div. 923; *Partridge v. Stocker*, 36 Vt. 108, 84 Am. Dec. 664; *James v. Taylor*, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 530; *Penn v. Whitehead*, 17 Grat. (Va.) 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478. By the "custom of London" a wife could trade as a *feme sole*. 2 *Roper, Husb. & W.* 124.

<sup>23</sup> *Story, Eq. Jur.* §§ 1385-1387; 2 *Roper, Husb. & W.* 171; *Penn v. Whitehead*, 17 Grat. (Va.) 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478.

a valuable consideration. If it is not entered into until after marriage, there must be some other consideration. The husband's agreement may be either in express words or may be established from his acquiescence in his wife's acts.<sup>24</sup> He may, however, withdraw his consent at any time, unless supported by a valuable consideration, and assert his common-law rights.<sup>25</sup> Where, under such agreement, the property is vested in a trustee, it will be supported in law as well as in equity.<sup>26</sup>

While the wife may conduct a separate business under an agreement with her husband which would be supported in equity as against her husband, nevertheless the debts incurred in such business, although contracted in the name of the wife, are his debts, and he is liable for them;<sup>27</sup> and where there is no agreement, if he participates in the benefits of the business,<sup>28</sup> or assists her in the management of it, he thereby ratifies her authority to incur debts, and renders himself liable for them.<sup>29</sup> But when he has no connection with the business, and there is no evidence that he ever assented to it, he is not liable for debts contracted by the wife in its management.<sup>30</sup>

#### *Under Modern Statutes*

The wife's right to conduct a separate business is generally confirmed and regulated by statute in the various states.<sup>31</sup> In some instances married women are permitted to trade as if unmarried,<sup>32</sup> while in others her capacity to act as sole trader is limited and

<sup>24</sup> *Ashworth v. Outram*, 5 Ch. Div. 923; *Partridge v. Stocker*, 36 Vt. 108, 84 Am. Dec. 664; *Tillman v. Shackleton*, 15 Mich. 447, 98 Am. Dec. 198; *Jones v. Woher*, 90 Ky. 230, 13 S. W. 911.

<sup>25</sup> *Cropsey v. McKinney*, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; *Conkling v. Doull*, 67 Ill. 355.

<sup>26</sup> *Story*, Eq. Jur. §§ 1385, 1386.

<sup>27</sup> *Cropsey v. McKinney*, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; *Lovett v. Robinson*, 7 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 105.

<sup>28</sup> *Macq. Husb. & W.* 333; *Petty v. Anderson*, 3 Bing. 170.

<sup>29</sup> *Curtis v. Engel*, 4 N. Y. Super. Ct. 287.

<sup>30</sup> 2 *Roper, Husb. & W. c.* 18, § 4; *Tuttle v. Hoag*, 46 Mo. 38, 2 Am. Rep. 481; *Jenkins v. Flinn*, 37 Ind. 349.

<sup>31</sup> The Legislature may declare when and how a married woman may become a free trader. *Scott-Sparger Co. v. Ferguson*, 152 N. C. 346, 67 S. E. 750.

<sup>32</sup> *Trieber v. Stover*, 30 Ark. 727; *Tallman v. Jones*, 13 Kan. 438; *Wayne v. Lewis* (Pa.) 16 Atl. 862; *Norwood v. Francis*, 25 App. D. C. 463, 4 Ann. Cas. 865; *Elliott v. Hawley*, 34 Wash. 585, 76 Pac. 93, 101 Am. St. Rep. 1016; *Scott v. Cotten*, 91 Ala. 623, 8 South. 783. A married woman has the same status as her husband as to the right to engage in business. *Farmers' State Bank of Ada v. Keen* (Okla.) 167 Pac. 207.

conditions imposed requiring the consent of the husband, judicial permission, or the like.<sup>83</sup> The general property acts do not as a rule authorize her to engage in trade or business on her own account, except in so far as she is allowed to contract in relation to her separate property.<sup>84</sup>

When a married woman is by statute authorized to carry on a trade or business, she may purchase goods on credit,<sup>85</sup> execute notes,<sup>86</sup> appoint agents,<sup>87</sup> form partnerships<sup>88</sup> and corporations,<sup>89</sup> and generally perform such acts as are necessarily incident to the business.

### CONVEYANCES, SALES, AND GIFTS BY WIFE

**64. AT COMMON LAW**—At common law, a married woman could not, by a conveyance, either transfer her own real property, or bar her right of dower in the real property of her husband.

**65. IN EQUITY**—In equity, in most jurisdictions, it is held that a married woman has the power to convey or otherwise dispose of her equitable separate estate, real or personal, unless prohibited by the instrument creating it. In all jurisdictions she has the power if conferred by the instrument creating it.

**66. BY STATUTE**—Under modern statutes married women generally have the power to dispose of their separate property, real or personal.

<sup>83</sup> *Snow v. Sheldon*, 126 Mass. 332, 30 Am. Rep. 684; *Lockwood v. Corey*, 150 Mass. 82, 22 N. E. 440; *Cruzen v. McKaig*, 57 Md. 454; *Azbill v. Azbill*, 92 Ky. 154, 17 S. W. 284; *Horton v. Hill*, 138 Ala. 625, 36 South. 465; *Williams v. Walker*, 111 N. C. 604, 16 S. E. 706; *McDonald v. Rozen*, 8 Idaho, 352, 69 Pac. 125; *In re Coles*, 230 Pa. 162, 79 Atl. 254; *Council v. Pridgen*, 153 N. C. 443, 69 S. E. 404; *Taylor v. Minigus*, 66 Ill. App. 70. See, also, the statutes of the various states.

<sup>84</sup> *Kuster v. Dickson* (C. C.) 45 Fed. 91; *Hitchcock v. Richold*, 5 Mackey (D. C.) 414; *Glover v. Alcott*, 11 Mich. 470; *Taylor v. Wands*, 55 N. J. Eq. 491, 37 Atl. 315, 62 Am. St. Rep. 818.

<sup>85</sup> *Tallman v. Jones*, 13 Kan. 438.

<sup>86</sup> *Barton v. Beer*, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 78. See, also, *Bovard v. Kettering*, 101 Pa. 181; *Frecking v. Rolland*, 53 N. Y. 422.

<sup>87</sup> *Taylor v. Wands*, 55 N. J. Eq. 491, 37 Atl. 315, 62 Am. St. Rep. 818.

<sup>88</sup> *Norwood v. Francis*, 25 App. D. C. 463; *Butler v. Frank*, 7 Ga. App. 655, 67 S. E. 884; *Elliott v. Hawley*, 34 Wash. 585, 76 Pac. 93, 101 Am. St. Rep. 1016. See, also, Code Pub. Gen. Laws Md. 1904, art. 45, § 20.

<sup>89</sup> *Good Land Co. v. Cole*, 131 Wis. 467, 110 N. W. 895, 120 Am. St. Rep. 1056, 11 Ann. Cas. 806.

67. Statutes have very generally given them the power to convey their own real estate, and to bar their right to dower in the real estate of their husbands by joining with them in conveyances. Certain formalities in the execution of the conveyance are required, and these must be strictly observed.

Neither a conveyance of land, nor a sale and transfer of personal property, without covenants or warranties, nor a gift, is a contract, for, while there is an agreement, the agreement transfers rights in rem only, without contemplating, or even for a moment creating, a right in personam.<sup>40</sup> Conveyances and transfers must, therefore, be dealt with separately from contracts, and not as contracts.

*At Common Law*

At common law a married woman could not, either by her own conveyance or by uniting with her husband in a conveyance, bar herself or her heirs of any estate of which she was seised in her own right, or of her right of dower in the real estate of her husband.<sup>41</sup> A conveyance of her land by a married woman was absolutely void as to her.<sup>42</sup> A conveyance by her jointly with her husband, whether of her own or of her husband's land, was considered as the act of the husband only, and the law restrained its operation to the husband's interest, just as if he alone had executed it.<sup>43</sup> "This disability is supposed to be founded on the principle that the separate legal existence of the wife is suspended during the marriage, and is strengthened by the consideration that, from the nature of the connection, there is danger that the influence of the husband may be improperly exerted for the purpose of forcing the wife to part with her rights in his favor."<sup>44</sup> The only mode in which a feme covert could convey her real estate at common law was by uniting with her husband in levying a fine, which was a solemn proceeding of record, in the face of the court, in which the judges were sup-

<sup>40</sup> Anson, Cont. p. 3; Clark, Cont. p. 12.

<sup>41</sup> *Martin v. Dwelly*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 245; *Hollingsworth v. McDonald*, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 230, 3 Am. Dec. 545.

<sup>42</sup> *Hoyt v. Swar*, 53 Ill. 134; *Fowler v. Shearer*, 7 Mass. 14; *Concord Bank v. Bellis*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 276; *Wing v. Deans*, 214 Mass. 546, 102 N. E. 313; *Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay*, 4 N. Y. 9.

<sup>43</sup> *Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay*, 4 N. Y. 9; *Martin v. Dwelly*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 245.

<sup>44</sup> Per Sutherland, J., in *Martin v. Dwelly*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 245.

posed to watch over and protect the rights of the wife, and to ascertain by a private examination that her joining in the act was voluntary.<sup>45</sup> Such was the doctrine of the common law.

At a very early date, and long before any statute on the subject, the custom arose in some states for married women to convey their real estate by deed in which the husband joined,<sup>46</sup> and the subsequent statutes as a rule really enacted what had long been recognized as the customary law.<sup>47</sup>

Since a wife's personal property in possession vested in her husband at common law, no question as to her power to transfer it could well arise.<sup>48</sup> So, too, she could not assign her choses in action so as to defeat his right to reduce them to his possession.<sup>49</sup>

### *In Equity*

A court of equity has no more power than a court of law to recognize a conveyance by a married woman as binding upon her, unless it conveys her equitable separate estate. In the latter case the conveyance may be upheld. The doctrine of the wife's equitable separate estate will be fully considered in a separate chapter. It is sufficient to say here that in most jurisdictions it is held that a married woman has, as an incident to her separate estate, the power to dispose of it by conveyance or otherwise, even though this power is not expressly conferred by the instrument creating the estate, provided it is not expressly excluded by the instrument. In some jurisdictions it is held that the power must be conferred in the creation of the estate. In none does the power exist if excluded in the creation of the estate.<sup>50</sup>

### *Under Modern Statutes*

In all of the states the common-law rules prohibiting conveyances by a married woman, and those giving her personal property to her husband, have been greatly modified by statute. In some states she now has almost as much power as a feme sole in respect to her real and personal property. In all states she has more or less power to dispose of it. The extent of this power will be shown in a subsequent chapter.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>45</sup> 2 Inst. 515; 1 Vent. 121a; *Martin v. Dwelly*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 245.

<sup>46</sup> *Shaw v. Russ*, 14 Me. 432; *Fowler v. Shearer*, 7 Mass. 14; *Gordon v. Haywood*, 2 N. H. 402; *Durant v. Ritchie*, 4 Mason, 45, Fed. Cas. No. 4,190.

<sup>47</sup> *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Althen v. Tarbox*, 48 Minn. 18, 50 N. W. 1018, 31 Am. St. Rep. 616.

<sup>48</sup> Ante, p. 128.      <sup>49</sup> Ante, p. 131.      <sup>50</sup> Post, p. 187.      <sup>51</sup> Post, p. 202.

*Mode of Conveyance Where the Power Exists*

Assuming that she has the power to make a conveyance, the question next arises as to the mode in which she must exercise it. In all of the states statutes have been enacted changing the common law in so far as it prevented a married woman from making a valid conveyance, and allowing her to convey her own real estate, or to bar her right of dower in her husband's real estate by uniting with him in a conveyance thereof.<sup>52</sup> These statutes, while they vary to some extent in the different states, very generally require the wife to acknowledge the conveyance with certain formalities, separate and apart from her husband. In this, as in all other respects, the directions of the statute must be strictly complied with, or the conveyance will be ineffectual as against the wife. A deed not acknowledged by the wife according to the directions of the statute is, as to her, absolutely void, and will not even be forced against her in equity as an agreement to convey.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Under Code 1906, c. 73, § 6, a duly acknowledged deed in which both husband and wife join conveys all right and title which she then has. *Wethered v. Conrad*, 73 W. Va. 551, 80 S. E. 953. Under Code Tenn. 1858, § 2076, authorizing a married woman to convey real estate by deed in which her husband joins, a deed by a married woman conveying to her husband lands which she holds in trust for him, is not void because he does not join therein. *Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. Waller*, 116 Tenn. 1, 95 S. W. 811, 115 Am. St. Rep. 763, 7 Ann. Cas. 1078. See, also, *Jordan v. Jackson*, 76 Neb. 15, 106 N. W. 999, rehearing denied 107 N. W. 1047; *Hensley v. Blankinship*, 174 N. C. 759, 94 S. E. 519; *Farmers' Bank of Hardinsburg v. Richardson*, 171 Ky. 340, 188 S. W. 406. Under Married Woman's Act, § 8304, wife, as to control and conveyance of her separate property, is *sui juris*, and as such is clothed with the right to sell her land and make a deed thereto independent of husband. *Riggs v. Price* (Mo.) 210 S. W. 420. Under Code W. Va. 1913, c. 66, § 3 (sec. 3671) and chapter 73, § 6 (sec. 3809), married woman in good faith living apart from her husband may, in the form prescribed by statute, make a valid disposition of her separate real and personal estate, without joining her husband whatever the cause of the separation. *Spangler v. Vermillion*, 80 W. Va. 75, 92 S. E. 449.

<sup>53</sup> *Martin v. Dwelly*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dec. 245; *Butler v. Buckingham*, 5 Day (Conn.) 492, 5 Am. Dec. 174; *Grove v. Todd*, 41 Md. 683, 20 Am. Rep. 76; *Hollingsworth v. McDonald*, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 230, 3 Am. Dec. 545; *Townslley v. Chapin*, 12 Allen (Mass.) 476; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Rust v. Goff*, 94 Mo. 511, 7 S. W. 418; *Laidley v. Central Land Co.*, 30 W. Va. 505, 4 S. E. 705; *Kimmey v. Abney* (Tex. Civ. App.) 107 S. W. 885; *Simpson v. Belcher*, 61 W. Va. 157, 56 S. E. 211; *Shumate v. Shumate*, 78 W. Va. 576, 90 S. E. 824; *Deese v. Deese*, 176 N. C. 527, 97 S. E. 475; *Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick*, 176 N. C. 182, 96 S. E. 988; *Tillery v. Land*, 136 N. C. 537, 48 S. E. 824. As to the effect of immaterial departures from statutory formalities, see *Homer v. Schonfeld*, 84 Ala. 313, 4 South. 105; *Hollingsworth v. McDonald*, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 230, 3 Am. Dec. 545. A con-

### CONTRACTS OF HUSBAND

68. A man's power to contract is not affected by his marriage, except that he cannot by his contract deprive the wife of rights which she acquires in his property by virtue of the marriage.

It is the legal existence of the woman only that is affected by marriage. The man's legal capacity remains virtually unimpaired. He has substantially the same power to enter into contracts as before marriage. The only restrictions on his power to contract which are imposed by marriage result, not from any incapacity in himself, but from the fact that by law the marriage confers upon the wife, as has been seen, certain rights in her husband's property. He cannot defeat these rights by any contract entered into by himself alone. Thus he cannot, by a sale of his land, defeat her right to dower therein if she survives him.

### CONTRACTS BY WIFE AS HUSBAND'S AGENT

69. IN GENERAL—The wife may, when expressly or impliedly authorized by the husband, act as his agent in the making of contracts for him; and she may become his agent by estoppel or by ratification, as in other cases of agency.
- (a) If they are living together, the fact of cohabitation raises a presumption of authority in fact; but this presumption may be rebutted.
  - (b) If they are living apart, the presumption is against her authority to bind him, and the burden is on the person dealing with her to show such authority.
70. AGENCY OF NECESSITY—As a rule, where a husband fails to provide for his wife, she becomes his agent of necessity to purchase necessities on his credit. But the rule is subject to qualification:

veyance by a married woman living apart from her husband for a valuable consideration, though void as a conveyance when the acknowledgment does not follow Code 1913, c. 73, § 6 (sec. 3809), is valid as a contract of sale, enforceable against her and her heirs. *Shumate v. Shumate*, 78 W. Va. 576, 90 S. E. 824.

- (a) He is liable, under such circumstances,
  - (1) Where he lives with his wife.
  - (2) Where they live apart, either through his fault or by agreement, and without fault on her part.
- (b) He is not liable
  - (1) Where she leaves him without cause, unless she offers to return, and he refuses to receive her.
  - (2) Where the credit is given to her, and not to him.
  - (3) Where she has a sufficient separate income.
  - (4) Where she has agreed to accept a certain amount from him, and he pays it.

The rule of the common law as to the power of the wife to contract is so far modified as to enable a wife to enter into a contract as the agent of her husband when he has given her express authority to bind him, or has impliedly held her out as having such authority.<sup>54</sup> Her agency is, like that of any other agent, a question of fact, and may be inferred from the ostensible authority with which the husband has clothed her.<sup>55</sup> Not only is the wife general agent for the husband with reference to those household matters that are usually under the wife's control,<sup>56</sup> but if the husband absents himself from home, keeping his whereabouts unknown and leaving his property in the care of his wife, she is his agent to do those things customarily delegated to wives having charge of property.<sup>57</sup> The most important class of cases in which the wife

<sup>54</sup> Add. Cont. 135; *Proctor v. Woodruff* (Sup.) 119 N. Y. Supp. 232; *James McCreery & Co. v. Martin*, 84 N. J. Law, 626, 87 Atl. 433, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 279. Where a husband authorized his wife to hire necessary board and lodging for herself and family, the husband is bound as if he personally made the contract. *Stevens v. Hush* (Sup.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 258. Where a husband authorized his wife as his agent to purchase household furniture on credit, and in doing so it was necessary that she contract with mortgagee to insure the property, the making of such agreement was within the scope of her authority. *Mosley v. Stratton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 203 S. W. 397.

<sup>55</sup> *McGeorge v. Egan*, 7 Scott, 112; *Mackinley v. McGregor*, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 369, 31 Am. Dec. 522; *BERGH v. WARNER*, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. W. 77, 28 Am. St. Rep. 362, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 85; *Cox v. Hoffman*, 20 N. C. 319; *Gray v. Otis*, 11 Vt. 628.

<sup>56</sup> *Freestone v. Butcher*, 9 Car. & P. 643; *Ruddock v. Marsh*, 1 Hurl. & N. 601.

<sup>57</sup> *Evans v. Crawford County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 130 Wis. 189, 109 N. W. 952, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485, 118 Am. St. Rep. 1009. In this case it was, however, held further that the authority of a wife as agent for her husband by implication of law does not, under any circumstances, extend to selling and conveying his realty.

may render her husband liable on the theory of agency in cases in which she purchases necessities, and pledges his credit therefor. In these cases the power of the wife and the liability of the husband will vary according to the circumstances. Where he supports her, she has no power to pledge his credit, even for necessities, unless there is authority in fact. If he fails to support her, she has the absolute right to pledge his credit for necessities, whether she has authority in fact or not.<sup>58</sup> The law, as applied to cases in which the wife is supported by the husband, will first be explained, and then cases in which he neglects to provide for her will be considered. Finally we shall ascertain what things are to be regarded as necessities.

#### *Agency by Estoppel*

Marriage and cohabitation do not, as a matter of law, regardless of the facts, imply authority in the wife to pledge her husband's credit.<sup>59</sup> The husband may, however, so act as to estop himself from denying his wife's agency. If she is generally allowed to deal with a tradesman, the husband will be considered to have held her out as his agent, and will be liable for her purchases. This doctrine is not limited to purchases of necessities by the wife. The extent of the estoppel will depend upon the extent of the dealings which the husband has thus authorized.<sup>60</sup> "If a tradesman has had dealings with the wife upon the credit of the husband, and the husband has paid him without demurrer in respect to such dealings, the tradesman has the right to assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that the authority of the wife which the husband has recognized continues. The husband's quiescence is in such cases tantamount to acquiescence, and forbids his denying an authority which his own conduct has invited the tradesman to assume."<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Duty to support wife and family, see ante, p. 80.

<sup>59</sup> *McNemar v. Cohn*, 115 Ill. App. 31.

<sup>60</sup> *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403; *Fenner v. Lewis*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 38; *Benjamin v. Benjamin*, 15 Conn. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 384; *Gates v. Brower*, 9 N. Y. 205, 59 Am. Dec. 530; *Keller v. Phillips*, 39 N. Y. 351; *Snell v. Stone*, 23 Or. 327, 31 Pac. 663. A husband is liable for household expenses incurred by the wife where he had clothed her with apparent authority by paying bills previously incurred. *Meier & Frank Co. v. Mitlenhner*, 75 Or. 331, 146 Pac. 796.

<sup>61</sup> *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403; *Bonwit, Teller & Co. v. Lovett* (Sup.) 102 N. Y. Supp. 800. If a husband, whose wife had pledged his credit to dressmakers, desired to repudiate her act as unauthorized, he was bound to act with reasonable promptness when he became aware of what had been done and that the dressmakers in good faith were acting

*Agency by Ratification*

The husband may, under the doctrine of agency by ratification, become liable on contracts made by his wife as his agent, by ratifying them. If, for instance, he ratifies a purchase made by his wife on his credit, he is just as liable as if he had previously authorized her to pledge his credit.<sup>62</sup> And this necessarily applies not only where the contract was for the purchase of necessities for the household, but extends to other contracts as well.<sup>63</sup> Knowledge that his wife has purchased goods, and failure to disapprove of the purchase, is a ratification.<sup>64</sup> He cannot repudiate a purchase by the wife, and at the same time retain the property purchased; but must return it if it is in existence.<sup>65</sup>

*Where the Wife is Supported by the Husband—Agency in Fact*

The husband's liability for goods furnished his wife, where he supports her, rests entirely upon the theory of agency in fact. If he supports her, she has no power to pledge his credit, even for necessities, unless there is authority in fact.<sup>66</sup> The principal ques-

on his wife's representations. *Auringer v. Cochrane*, 225 Mass. 273, 114 N. E. 355. The wife will be regarded as having authority to pledge her husband's credit for provisions where, for 12 years, he paid the accounts, notwithstanding he also advanced her large sums for household expenses. *Mettler v. Snow*, 90 Conn. 690, 98 Atl. 322, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 578.

<sup>62</sup> *Landgraf v. Tanner*, 152 Ala. 511, 44 South. 397. And see *Shuman v. Steinel*, 129 Wis. 422, 109 N. W. 74, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1048, 116 Am. St. Rep. 961, 9 Ann. Cas. 1064, holding that where a wife, assuming to act as her husband's agent, ordered certain books from plaintiff, and received them, and the husband subsequently, with knowledge of the facts, adopted her act by promising to pay for the property or by accepting the benefit of the transaction, he became individually liable for payment of the debt. But where a wife makes a contract in her own name for improvements on her husband's home, not as his agent, he is not bound as principal by ratification, because he paid for part of the work. *Thompson v. Brown*, 121 Ga. 814, 49 S. E. 740.

<sup>63</sup> *Conrad v. Abbott*, 132 Mass. 330; *Day v. Burnham*, 36 Vt. 37; *Hardenbrook v. Harrison*, 11 Colo. 9, 17 Pac. 72.

<sup>64</sup> *Seaton v. Benedict*, 5 Bing. 28; *Lane v. Ironmonger*, 13 Mess. & W. 368; *Cothran v. Lee*, 24 Ala. 380; *Woodward v. Barnes*, 43 Vt. 330; *Ogden v. Prentice*, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 160. Where a wife contracts, assuming to act for her husband, and the benefit comes to his hands, and he does not disavow within a reasonable time, he is bound thereby; but the rule does not apply to acts of the wife where the benefit comes to her. *Evans v. Crawford County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 130 Wis. 189, 109 N. W. 952, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485, 118 Am. St. Rep. 1009.

<sup>65</sup> *Gilman v. Andrus*, 28 Vt. 241, 67 Am. Dec. 713.

<sup>66</sup> *Jolly v. Rees*, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628; *Johnston v. Sumner*, 3 Hurl. & N. 261; *STEINFELD v. GIRRARD*, 103 Me. 151, 68 Atl. 630, *Cooley Cas. Per-*

tion in these cases is as to the presumption of authority. In other respects, the law is the same as in the case of any other contract entered into by the wife as agent of her husband.

*Same—Where They are Living Together*

Where the husband and wife are living together, a presumption arises, from the fact of cohabitation, that the husband has in fact given the wife authority to purchase goods on his credit.<sup>67</sup> The wife is general agent of the husband with reference to those matters which are usually under control of the wife, such as the purchase of clothes for herself, groceries and provisions for the family, and the engaging of household servants.<sup>68</sup> In other words, where a tradesman brings an action against the husband for articles furnished the wife on the husband's credit, he makes out a prima facie case by showing that the wife was living with her husband, and that the articles were in kind, quality, and quantity suitable to the hus-

sons and Domestic Relations, 89; *Weingreen v. Beckton* (Sup.) 102 N. Y. Supp. 520; *Wilson v. Thomass* (Sup.) 127 N. Y. Supp. 474; *Keller v. Phillips*, 89 N. Y. 351; *James McCreery & Co. v. Martin*, 84 N. J. Law, 626, 87 Atl. 433, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 279; *Benjamin v. Benjamin*, 15 Conn. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 384; *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403. A husband is liable for goods sold his wife upon his credit and by his authority or assent, express or implied. *Noel v. O'Neill*, 128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513.

<sup>67</sup> *Nathan v. Morgenthau* (Sup.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 796; *French v. Burlingame*, 155 Mo. App. 548, 134 S. W. 1100; *Valois v. Gardner*, 122 App. Div. 245, 106 N. Y. Supp. 808; *Howell v. Blesh*, 19 Okl. 260, 91 Pac. 893; *McCreery v. Scully*, 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 524. See, also, *Mettler v. Snow*, 90 Conn. 690, 98 Atl. 322, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 578. Where there has been no open separation the presumption arises that the husband and wife are living together. *BALL v. LOVETT* (Sup.) 98 N. Y. Supp. 815, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 85; *Stoutenborough v. Rammel*, 123 Ill. App. 487.

The husband will not be liable if the goods are sold on the credit of the wife alone. *Mattar v. Wathen*, 99 Ark. 329, 138 S. W. 455; *H. Leonard & Sons v. Stowe*, 166 Mich. 681, 132 N. W. 454; *Richburg v. Sherwood* (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 524; *Noel v. O'Neill*, 128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513; *Wickstrom v. Peck*, 179 App. Div. 855, 167 N. Y. Supp. 408. One who has sold clothing and other dry goods to a wife and charged to her account cannot collect therefor from the husband without proving that the husband had neglected to make adequate provision for the support of the wife, in view of Civ. Code, § 174. *Coulter Dry Goods Co. v. Munford*, 38 Cal. App. 231, 175 Pac. 900.

<sup>68</sup> *Freestone v. Butcher*, 9 Car. & P. 643; *Ruddock v. Marsh*, 1 Hurl. & N. 601; *Wagner v. Nagel*, 33 Minn. 348, 23 N. W. 308; *May v. Josias* (Sup.) 159 N. Y. Supp. 820. Duty to support wife and family, see ante, p. 80. The language of Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 45, § 5, that the husband is not liable "upon any contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility" does not apply to contracts made by a wife as agent, or on his credit for necessaries. *Noel v. O'Neill*, 128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513.

band's fortune and station in life.<sup>69</sup> This presumption, however, as already stated, is one of fact, and not of law. Cohabitation does not necessarily, but only *prima facie*, empower the wife to render her husband liable, even for necessities. He may rebut this presumption by showing that she was forbidden to pledge his credit.<sup>70</sup> And, since his liability, where he suitably maintains her, is based on the theory of an agency in fact, the tradesman's ignorance of the fact that the wife had been forbidden to pledge his credit is altogether immaterial, provided, of course, as heretofore explained, the husband has not so held out his wife as authorized to pledge his credit as to be estopped to deny her agency.<sup>71</sup> It is contended, it was said in a leading English case, "that there is a presumption that a wife living with her husband is authorized to pledge her husband's credit for necessities; that the goods supplied by the plaintiffs were, as it is admitted they were, necessities; and that, as a consequence, an implied authority is established. This contention is founded upon an erroneous view of what is meant by the term

<sup>69</sup> *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403; *Woodward v. Barnes*, 43 Vt. 330; *Keller v. Phillips*, 39 N. Y. 351; *Alley v. Winn*, 134 Mass. 77, 45 Am. Rep. 297; *FEINER v. BOYNTON*, 73 N. J. Law, 136, 62 Atl. 420, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 84; *Hays v. Cox* (Mo. App.) 185 S. W. 1164; *BALL v. LOVETT* (Sup.) 98 N. Y. Supp. 815, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 85; *B. Altman & Co. v. Durland*, 185 App. Div. 114, 173 N. Y. Supp. 62; *Edminston v. Smith*, 13 Idaho, 645, 92 Pac. 842, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 871, 121 Am. St. Rep. 294; *Stoutenborough v. Rammel*, 123 Ill. App. 487. The statute authorizing married women to contract does not abrogate the common-law liability of the husband for necessary comforts and supplies furnished the wife, suitable to their condition and degree in life. *Ponder v. D. W. Morris & Bro.*, 152 Ala. 531, 44 South. 651. To the same effect, see *Ruhl v. Heintze*, 97 App. Div. 442, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1031.

<sup>70</sup> *Jolly v. Rees*, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628; *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403; *Woodward v. Barnes*, 43 Vt. 330; *Keller v. Phillips*, 39 N. Y. 351; *Mattar v. Wathen*, 99 Ark. 329, 138 S. W. 455; *Meuschke v. Riley*, 159 Mo. App. 331, 140 S. W. 639; *Wickstrom v. Peck*, 155 App. Div. 523, 140 N. Y. Supp. 570. A shopkeeper, who has notice that husband claimed to be providing for his wife, and had forbidden credit, sells to the wife on the credit of the husband at the risk of being able to show that the husband failed to perform his duty, and that the goods furnished were actually necessary for the then present or immediate future use of the wife. *B. Altman & Co. v. Durland*, 185 App. Div. 114, 173 N. Y. Supp. 62.

<sup>71</sup> *Ante*, p. 170. As was pointed out in *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403, the statement in *Johnson v. Sumner*, 27 Law J. Exch. 341, that, "if a man and his wife live together, it matters not what private arrangement they make, the wife has all the usual authorities of wife," applied only to the case where an appearance of authority has been created by the husband's acts, or by his assent to the acts of his wife.

'presumption' in cases where it has been used with reference to a wife's authority to pledge her husband's credit for necessities. There is a presumption that she has such authority in the sense that a tradesman supplying her with necessities upon her husband's credit, and suing him, makes out a *prima facie* case against him upon proof of that fact and of the cohabitation. But this is a mere presumption of fact, founded upon the supposition that wives cohabiting with their husbands ordinarily have authority to manage in their own way certain departments of the household expenditure, and to pledge their husbands' credit in respect of matters coming within those departments. Such a presumption or *prima facie* case is rebuttable, and is rebutted when it is proved in the particular case, as here, that the wife has not that authority. If this were not so, the principles of agency, upon which, *ex hypothesi*, the liability of the husband is founded, would be practically of no effect."<sup>72</sup>

*Same—Where They are Living Apart*

Where a wife is living apart from her husband, there is no presumption that she has any authority in fact to pledge his credit even for necessities.<sup>73</sup> On the contrary, the presumption is that she has not. The person who sells to her under such circumstances either sells to her as a *feme sole*, or, if he knows that she is married, he is given reason to suspect, from the fact of her living apart from her husband, that her relations with him are such that she has not been authorized to pledge his credit.<sup>74</sup> Under these circumstances it is incumbent upon the tradesman, in order to hold the husband liable, to rebut the presumption by showing authority in fact, or else to bring the case within the rule to be presently explained, giving a wife absolute power to bind her husband where he neglects to provide for her.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Per Thesiger, L. J., in *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24, 5 Q. B. Div. 403.

<sup>73</sup> *Rea v. Durkee*, 25 Ill. 503; *Cany v. Patton*, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 140; *Hass v. Brady*, 49 Misc. Rep. 235, 96 N. Y. Supp. 449; *Malden Hospital v. Murdock*, 218 Mass. 73, 105 N. E. 457.

<sup>74</sup> *Quinlan v. Westervelt*, 65 Misc. Rep. 547, 120 N. Y. Supp. 879, holding that one who sells necessities to a married woman, whom he knows is living apart from her husband, cannot hold the husband therefor, on the theory that she was authorized to make the purchases on his credit, or that the provision made for her by him was inadequate.

<sup>75</sup> *Johnson v. Sumner*, 27 Law J. Exch. 341; *Walker v. Simpson*, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 83, 42 Am. Dec. 216; *Mitchell v. Treanor*, 11 Ga. 324, 56 Am. Dec.

*Where the Husband Neglects to Support the Wife—Agency of Necessity*

Where a husband neglects to provide for or support his wife, even if they are cohabiting, the wife has an absolute right to pledge his credit for necessities.<sup>76</sup> She has this right even though there is no agency in fact, for the agency is implied in law without regard to the fact.<sup>77</sup> The husband's liability is based on the theory of agency, but the agency is implied as a matter of law because of the husband's legal duty to support his wife. The husband will not be liable for necessities purchased by his wife if he shows that credit was given to the wife herself,<sup>78</sup> or that she had a sufficient separate income,<sup>79</sup> or that he made her a sufficient allowance.<sup>80</sup>

421; *Rea v. Durkee*, 25 Ill. 503; *Stevens v. Story*, 43 Vt. 327; *Sturtevant v. Starin*, 19 Wis. 268; *Benjamin v. Dockham*, 132 Mass. 181; *Inhabitants of Sturbridge v. Franklin*, 160 Mass. 149, 35 N. E. 669; *Hartmann v. Tegart*, 12 Kan. 177; *Vusler v. Cox*, 53 N. J. Law, 516, 22 Atl. 347. Where husband and wife are living separate and apart, it devolves upon a physician giving credit to the wife for medical services to show that the wife was not at fault, or that the husband authorized or assented to the performance of the services. *Steele v. Leyhan*, 210 Ill. App. 201.

<sup>76</sup> Duty to support wife and family, see ante, p. 80.

<sup>77</sup> *Eastland v. Burchell*, 3 Q. B. Div. 436; *Seybold v. Morgan*, 43 Ill. App. 39; *W. & J. Sloane v. Boyer* (Sup.) 95 N. Y. Supp. 531; *Pierpont v. Wilson*, 49 Conn. 450; *Dexter v. Booth*, 2 Allen (Mass.) 559; *Raynes v. Bennett*, 114 Mass. 424; *Benjamin v. Dockham*, 134 Mass. 418; *Watkins v. De Armond*, 89 Ind. 553; *Eller v. Crull*, 99 Ind. 375; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111; *Ferren v. Moore*, 59 N. H. 106; *Keller v. Phillips*, 39 N. Y. 351; *Cromwell v. Benjamin*, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 558; *Woodward v. Barnes*, 43 Vt. 330; *Barr v. Armstrong*, 56 Mo. 577; *Eames v. Sweetser*, 101 Mass. 78; *BERGH v. WARNEB*, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. W. 77, 28 Am. St. Rep. 362; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 85; *Dorrance v. Dorrance*, 257 Mo. 317, 165 S. W. 783; *Devendorf v. Emerson*, 66 Iowa, 698, 24 N. W. 515. The implied power of a wife to bind her husband for necessities, where it exists, is for her own benefit, and not for the benefit of those with whom she may deal. *Zent v. Sullivan*, 47 Wash. 315, 91 Pac. 1088, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 15 Ann. Cas. 19.

<sup>78</sup> *Jewsbury v. Newbold*, 26 Law J. Exch. 247; *Pearson v. Darrington*, 32 Ala. 227; *Stammers v. Macomb*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 454; *Moses v. Fogartie*, 2 Hill (S. C.) 335; *Carter v. Howard*, 39 Vt. 106; *Goodson v. Powell*, 9 Ga. App. 497, 71 S. E. 765; *Skinner v. Tirrell*, 150 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692, 21 L. R. A. 673, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447.

<sup>79</sup> *Freestone v. Butcher*, 9 Car. & P. 643; *Swett v. Penrice*, 24 Miss. 416; *Weisker v. Lowenthal*, 31 Md. 413.

<sup>80</sup> *Atkins v. Pearce*, 26 Law J. C. P. 252; *Oatman v. Watrous*, 120 App. Div. 66, 105 N. Y. Supp. 174; *Nathan v. Morgenthau* (Sup.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 796; *B. Altman & Co. v. Durland*, 185 App. Div. 114, 173 N. Y. Supp. 62; *Harshaw v. Merryman*, 18 Mo. 106. A husband is liable for necessities fur-

The rule applies all the more forcibly, if possible, where the husband unlawfully separates from his wife without making suitable provision for her, or if he, by his conduct, causes her to leave him.<sup>81</sup> A husband is bound to support his wife, and if he leaves her without the means of subsistence she becomes "an agent of necessity to supply her wants upon his credit."<sup>82</sup> This right arises where the husband has driven the wife away, or where she has left him in consequence of ill treatment and reasonable and well-grounded apprehension of further violence,<sup>83</sup> or because her husband has rendered his home an unfit place for her to live, as by introducing women of profligate habits,<sup>84</sup> or in consequence of the commission by him of such acts as would entitle her to a divorce from bed and board.<sup>85</sup> If the wife leaves her husband without justifiable cause, she forfeits the right to obtain her necessities at his expense.<sup>86</sup> In case she returns, and is received by her hus-

nished his wife on his credit, unless it appears by way of defense that the wife was amply supplied with similar articles, or that she had been furnished with ready money to pay therefor. *Frank v. Carter*, 219 N. Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549, L. R. A. 1917B, 1288, modifying judgment 164 App. Div. 913, 149 N. Y. Supp. 268.

<sup>81</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 146; *Bolton v. Prentice*, 2 Strange, 1214; *Mayhew v. Thayer*, 8 Gray (Mass.) 172; *Sultan v. Misrahi*, 47 Misc. Rep. 655, 94 N. Y. Supp. 519; *State v. Newman*, 91 Conn. 6, 98 Atl. 346, 3 A. L. R. 103; *Wolf v. Schulman*, 45 Misc. Rep. 418, 90 N. Y. Supp. 363; *CLOTHIER v. SIGLE*, 73 N. J. Law, 419, 63 Atl. 865, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 88; *Eller v. Crull*, 99 Ind. 375; *Snover v. Blair*, 25 N. J. Law, 94; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111. As to the effect of an offer to return, see note 86, *infra*.

<sup>82</sup> *Eastland v. Burchell*, 3 Q. B. Div. 436. And see *Sultan v. Misrahi*, 47 Misc. Rep. 655, 94 N. Y. Supp. 519; *Charles M. Decker & Bros. v. Moyer* (Sup.) 121 N. Y. Supp. 630; *In re Rudowsky's Estate*, 181 Ill. App. 318; *Harrigan v. Cahill*, 100 Misc. Rep. 48, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1005.

<sup>83</sup> *Houliston v. Smyth*, 2 Car. & P. 22; *Baker v. Oughton*, 130 Iowa, 35, 106 N. W. 272; *Beaudette v. Martin*, 113 Me. 310, 93 Atl. 758; *In re Newman's Case*, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359, L. R. A. 1916C, 1145; *Reynolds v. Sweetser*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 78.

<sup>84</sup> *Houliston v. Smyth*, 2 Car. & P. 22; *Descelles v. Kadmus*, 8 Iowa, 51; *Kemp v. Downham*, 5 Har. (Del.) 417.

<sup>85</sup> *Hancock v. Merrick*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 41; *Rea v. Durkee*, 25 Ill. 503; *Barker v. Dayton*, 28 Wis. 367, 383; *Thorpe v. Shapleigh*, 67 Me. 235.

<sup>86</sup> *Manby v. Scott*, 1 Mod. 124; *Etherington v. Parrott*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1006; *Kessler v. Kessler*, 2 Cal. App. 509, 83 Pac. 257; *Morgenroth v. Spencer*, 124 Wis. 564, 102 N. W. 1086; *Bevier v. Galloway*, 71 Ill. 517; *McCutchen v. McGahay*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 281, 6 Am. Dec. 373; *Harttmann v. Tegart*, 12 Kan. 177; *Collins v. Mitchell*, 5 Har. (Del.) 369; *Oinson v. Heritage*, 45 Ind. 73, 15 Am. Rep. 258; *Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester*, 60 Colo. 290, 152 Pac. 903, L. R. A. 1917A, 957; *Johnson v. Coleman*, 13 Ala. App. 520, 69 South. 318;

band, the right revives, but only as to future necessities.<sup>87</sup> This is true where she offers to return, and he refuses to receive her.<sup>88</sup> It follows from this doctrine that, where a wife elopes, and commits adultery, she loses the right to pledge her husband's credit for necessities;<sup>89</sup> and this has been held to be true even where the husband committed adultery first, and turned her away.<sup>90</sup> Where, however, he has connived at her adultery, it is no defense as against his liability.<sup>91</sup> One living in adultery with a wife who has left her husband, even for justifiable reasons, cannot make the husband liable for necessities furnished by him.<sup>92</sup>

*Sanger Bros. v. Trammell* (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 1175; *State v. Newman*, 91 Conn. 6, 98 Atl. 346, 3 A. L. R. 103; *Thorne v. Kathan*, 51 Vt. 520; *Belknap v. Stewart*, 38 Neb. 304, 56 N. W. 881, 41 Am. St. Rep. 729; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111; *STEINFELD v. GIRRARD*, 103 Me. 151, 68 Atl. 630, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 89; holding, also, that the tradesman's ignorance of the separation did not affect the rule. In *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111, it was said: "The husband who has causelessly deserted his wife may in good faith seek a reconciliation, and if the wife, under such circumstances, refuses to live with him again, without good cause, she becomes from that time the party in the wrong, and has no longer any authority to pledge his credit, even for necessities, more than she would have had if she had herself originally left him without cause. \* \* \* And it makes no difference that he desires her to change her residence, and to go to live with him at some other place, not unsuitable for her residence, since he has the right to choose his own residence, and it is the duty of the wife and children to conform to his wishes in this respect." See, also, *Rumney v. Keyes*, 7 N. H. 571; *Kimball v. Keyes*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 33. A husband was liable for necessary medical attention rendered to his wife during childbirth, and to his minor children, though, at time such services were rendered, the wife in the nervous state incident to pregnancy had temporarily left the husband and had gone to her mother; such temporary separation not constituting abandonment. *Bryant v. Lane* (Ala. App.) 81 South. 364.

<sup>87</sup> *Oinson v. Heritage*, 45 Ind. 73, 15 Am. Rep. 258; *Williams v. Prince*, 3 Strob. (S. C.) 490; *Reese v. Chilton*, 26 Mo. 598. There is authority to the effect that the husband will also be liable for debts contracted during separation. *Robison v. Gosnold*, 6 Mod. 171.

<sup>88</sup> *Manby v. Scott*, 1 Mod. 124, 131; *McGahay v. Williams*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 293; *McCutchen v. McGahay*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 281, 6 Am. Dec. 373; *Cunningham v. Irwin*, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 247, 10 Am. Dec. 458; *Henderson v. Stringer*, 2 Dana (Ky.) 291; *Clement v. Mattison*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 93.

<sup>89</sup> *Ham v. Toovey*, Selw. N. P. 271; *Morris v. Martin*, 1 Strange, 647; *Emmett v. Norton*, 8 Car. & P. 506; *Hardie v. Grant*, Id. 512; *Cooper v. Lloyd*, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 519.

<sup>90</sup> *Govier v. Hancock*, 6 Term R. 603. But see *Needham v. Bremner*, L. R. 1 C. P. 583.

<sup>91</sup> *Norton v. Fazan*, 1 Bos. & P. 226; *Wilson v. Glossop*, 19 Q. B. Div. 379; *Ferren v. Moore*, 59 N. H. 106.

<sup>92</sup> *Almy v. Wilcox*, 110 Mass. 443.

Where husband and wife live apart by mutual agreement, the husband's liability for necessities furnished her continues in the absence of any provision for her support.<sup>93</sup> It also continues where he has agreed to make her an allowance, if he does not pay it.<sup>94</sup> When, however, he furnishes her a sufficient allowance, she cannot bind him;<sup>95</sup> and the fact that the person who furnishes her with goods has no knowledge of the allowance is altogether immaterial, for in supplying her he acts at his peril.<sup>96</sup> The allowance must be sufficient for the wife's necessities, and whether it is so or not is a question of fact for the jury,<sup>97</sup> except where she agrees to accept a stipulated allowance, and not to apply to her husband for more. In that case the question of the sufficiency of the allowance is not for the jury, since it is excluded by the express terms of the settlement.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>93</sup> *Hodgkinson v. Fletcher*, 4 Camp. 70; *Ross v. Ross*, 69 Ill. 569; *Kimball v. Keyes*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 33; *Lockwood v. Thomas*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 248; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111; *Dixon v. Hurrell*, 8 Car. & P. 717; *Fredd v. Eves*, 4 Har. (Del.) 385; *McCarter v. McCarter*, 10 Ga. App. 754, 74 S. E. 308; *In re Newman's Case*, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359, L. R. A. 1916C, 1145; *Inhabitants of Alna v. Plummer*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 258. But see *McKee v. Cunningham*, 2 Cal. App. 684, 84 Pac. 260.

<sup>94</sup> *Beale v. Arabin*, 36 Law T. (N. S.) 249; *Nurse v. Craig*, 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 148. Husband, to defeat liability for necessities furnished wife for support of herself and children, on ground of agreement with wife, whereby such necessities were to be purchased with amount given wife weekly, is required to show that wife has been furnished with sufficient money to pay cash for all such necessities. *Best & Co. v. Cohen* (Sup.) 174 N. Y. Supp. 639.

<sup>95</sup> *Todd v. Stoakes*, 1 Salk. 116; *Dixon v. Hurrell*, 8 Car. & P. 717; *Mizen v. Pick*, 3 Mees. & W. 481; *Kemp v. Downham*, 5 Har. (Del.) 417; *Baker v. Barney*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 72, 5 Am. Dec. 326; *Kimball v. Keyes*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 33.

<sup>96</sup> *Mizen v. Pick*, 3 Mees. & W. 481; *Baker v. Barney*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 72, 5 Am. Dec. 326; *Kemp v. Downham*, 5 Har. (Del.) 417.

<sup>97</sup> *Hodgkinson v. Fletcher*, 4 Camp. 70; *Emmett v. Norton*, 8 Car. & P. 506; *Pearson v. Darrington*, 32 Ala. 227.

<sup>98</sup> *Eastland v. Burchell*, 3 Q. B. Div. 432. In this case it was said: "The authority of a wife to pledge the credit of her husband is a delegated, not an inherent, authority. If she binds him, she binds him only as his agent. This is a well-established doctrine. If she leaves him without cause and without consent, she carries no implied authority with her to maintain herself at his expense. But if he wrongfully compels her to leave his home, he is bound to maintain her elsewhere, and if he makes no adequate provision for this purpose she becomes an agent of necessity to supply her wants upon his credit. In such a case, inasmuch as she is entitled to a provision suitable to her husband's means and position, the sufficiency of any allowance which he makes under these circumstances is necessarily a

Where the husband and wife are living apart, the husband cannot, any more than when they are living together,<sup>90</sup> deprive his wife of the right to pledge his credit, where he neglects to make suitable provision for her, by giving notice that he will not be responsible for her necessities.<sup>1</sup> As has already been stated, a husband is not liable for necessities furnished his wife where credit was given to her, and not to him,<sup>2</sup> nor where she has a separate and sufficient income.<sup>3</sup>

*What are Necessaries for the Wife*

The necessities for which a wife may pledge her husband's credit under the rules which have just been explained are those things which are essential to her health and comfort, according to the rank and fortune of her husband. Necessaries, as applied to a wife, are not confined to those articles of food and clothing which are required to sustain life and preserve decency, but include such articles of utility as are suitable to maintain her according to the estate and degree of her husband.<sup>4</sup> Wearing apparel,<sup>5</sup> medical

question for the jury. Where, however, the parties separate by mutual consent, they may make their own terms; and so long as they continue the separation these terms are binding upon both. Where the terms are, as in this case, that the wife shall receive a specified income for her maintenance and shall not apply to the husband for anything more, how can any authority to claim more be implied? It is excluded by the express terms of the arrangement." And see *Johnson v. Sumner*, 27 Law J. Exch. 341; *Alley v. Winn*, 134 Mass. 77, 45 Am. Rep. 297.

<sup>90</sup> Ante, p. 172.

<sup>1</sup> *Harris v. Morris*, 4 Esp. 41; *Bolton v. Prentice*, 2 Strange, 1214; *W. & J. Sloane v. Boyer* (Sup.) 95 N. Y. Supp. 531; *Pierpont v. Wilson*, 49 Conn. 450; *Black v. Bryan*, 18 Tex. 453; *Watkins v. De Armond*, 89 Ind. 553.

<sup>2</sup> *Skinner v. Tirrell*, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692, 21 L. R. A. 673, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447; *Jewsbury v. Newbold*, 26 Law J. Exch. 247; *Pearson v. Darrington*, 32 Ala. 227; *Stammers v. Macomb*, 2 Wead. (N. Y.) 454; *Moses v. Fogartie*, 2 Hill (S. C.) 335; *Carter v. Howard*, 39 Vt. 106.

<sup>3</sup> *Freestone v. Butcher*, 9 Car. & P. 643; *Swett v. Penrice*, 24 Miss. 416; *Weisker v. Lowenthal*, 31 Md. 413.

<sup>4</sup> *Raynes v. Bennett*, 114 Mass. 424; *Gately Outfitting Co. v. Vinson* (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 133; *Wilder v. Brokaw*, 141 App. Div. 811, 126 N. Y. Supp. 932; *Wickstrom v. Peck*, 163 App. Div. 608, 148 N. Y. Supp. 596; *Brown v. Moudy*, 199 Ill. App. 85. See, also, *Ross v. Johnson*, 125 Ill. App. 65, holding that the test is not wholly whether the article is necessary and useful. A set of "Stoddard's Lectures," purchased by a wife, was not necessities for which the husband was liable by virtue of the marital relation. *Shuman v. Steinel*, 129 Wis. 422, 109 N. W. 74, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1048, 116 Am. St. Rep. 961, 9 Ann. Cas. 1064.

<sup>5</sup> *Hardenbrook v. Harrison*, 11 Colo. 9, 17 Pac. 72; *Fitzmaurice v. Buck*, 77 Conn. 390, 59 Atl. 415; *FEINER v. BOYNTON*, 73 N. J. Law, 136, 62 Atl.

attendance,<sup>6</sup> reasonable dentistry,<sup>7</sup> household supplies,<sup>8</sup> furniture,<sup>9</sup> a gold watch and certain jewelry,<sup>10</sup> have been held to be necessities. Legal expenses incident to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights,<sup>11</sup> or incident to a suit for divorce, where there is reasonable cause for instituting suit,<sup>12</sup> have also been held to be necessities. By the weight of authority in this country, however, legal expenses in suits for divorce are not necessities.<sup>13</sup> As was said by the Connecticut court: "The duty of providing necessities for the wife is strictly marital, and is imposed by the common law in reference only to a state of coverture, and not of divorce. By that law a valid contract of marriage was and is indissoluble, and therefore by it the husband could never have been placed under obligation to provide for the expenses of its dissolution."<sup>14</sup> Legal

420, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 84; *Ross v. Johnson*, 125 Ill. App. 65.

<sup>6</sup> *Harris v. Lee*, 1 P. Wms. 482; *Mayhew v. Thayer*, 8 Gray (Mass.) 172; *Cothran v. Lee*, 24 Ala. 380; *Johnson v. Coleman*, 13 Ala. App. 520, 69 South. 318; *Ketterer v. Nelson*, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S. W. 409, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754; *Thrall Hospital v. Caren*, 140 App. Div. 171, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1038; *Schneider v. Rosenbaum*, 52 Misc. Rep. 143, 101 N. Y. Supp. 529 (services of nurse). *Webber v. Spannhake*, 2 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 258.

<sup>7</sup> *Freeman v. Holmes*, 62 Ga. 556; *Gillman v. Andrus*, 28 Vt. 241, 67 Am. Dec. 713; *Clark v. Tenneson*, 146 Wis. 65, 130 N. W. 895, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 141.

<sup>8</sup> *Hall v. Weir*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 261; *Fischer v. Brady*, 47 Misc. Rep. 401, 94 N. Y. Supp. 25; *Perkins v. Morgan*, 36 Colo. 360, 85 Pac. 640.

<sup>9</sup> *Hunt v. De Blaquiere*, 5 Bing. 550. But see *Caldwell v. Blanchard*, 191 Mass. 489, 77 N. E. 1036, as to purchase by wife on her own credit.

<sup>10</sup> *Raynes v. Bennett*, 114 Mass. 424; *Cooper v. Haseltine*, 50 Ind. App. 400, 98 N. E. 437.

<sup>11</sup> *Wilson v. Ford*, L. R. 3 Exch. 63.

<sup>12</sup> *Brown v. Ackroyd*, 25 Law J. Q. B. 193; *Ottaway v. Hamilton*, 3 C. P. Div. 393; *Porter v. Briggs*, 38 Iowa, 166, 18 Am. Rep. 27. In the latter case it was held that it must be shown that the services were necessary for the protection of the wife's person, liberty, or reputation, distinguishing *Johnson v. Williams*, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 97, 54 Am. Dec. 491, where legal services in divorce proceedings were held not to be necessities.

<sup>13</sup> *Pearson v. Darrington*, 32 Ala. 227; *Zent v. Sullivan*, 47 Wash. 315, 91 Pac. 1088, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 15 Ann. Cas. 19; *Clarke v. Burke*, 65 Wis. 359, 27 N. W. 22, 56 Am. Rep. 631; *Morrison v. Holt*, 42 N. H. 478, 80 Am. Dec. 120; *Johnson v. Williams*, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 97, 54 Am. Dec. 491; *Wing v. Hurlburt*, 15 Vt. 607, 40 Am. Dec. 695; *Dorsey v. Goode-now*, *Wright* (Ohio) 120; *Williams v. Monroe*, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 514; *Dow v. Eyster*, 79 Ill. 254; *Shelton v. Pendleton*, 18 Conn. 423; *Meaher v. Mitchell*, 112 Me. 416, 92 Atl. 492, L. R. A. 1915C, 467, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 688; *Coffin v. Dunham*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 404, 54 Am. Dec. 769.

<sup>14</sup> *Shelton v. Pendleton*, 18 Conn. 423.

services rendered in successfully defending a married woman against a criminal prosecution are clearly necessities.<sup>15</sup>

Money is not to be regarded as necessities. "At law it is entirely clear that a married woman has no right to borrow money on her husband's credit, even for the purchase of necessities."<sup>16</sup> There are a number of cases which hold that where a person has lent money to a wife deserted by her husband for the purchase of necessities (even, it seems, where the loan is to the wife, and not on the husband's credit), and the money has been so used, he can recover it from the husband in equity.<sup>17</sup> This doctrine, however, is not clear on principle; and it has lately been expressly repudiated in Massachusetts, on the ground that there is no principle upon which it can be sustained.<sup>18</sup> As far as precedent is concerned, the rule is amply sustained, but the reasoning of the Massachusetts court in the case referred to renders it very doubtful.

<sup>15</sup> *Conant v. Burnham*, 133 Mass. 503, 43 Am. Rep. 532. And see dictum in *Porter v. Briggs*, 38 Iowa, 166, 18 Am. Rep. 27. Protection of a wife's character in a suit against her by employing counsel is as much a necessary as food, etc., within the rule requiring one to provide his wife with necessities suitable to their station in life. *Hamilton v. Salisbury*, 133 Mo. App. 718, 114 S. W. 563.

<sup>16</sup> *Skinner v. Tirrell*, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692, 21 L. R. A. 673, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447. A husband is not liable for money loaned to his wife with which to pay for a dress ordered by her; she not being abandoned, and he not having promised to repay the loan. *Reitman v. Scheyer* (Sup.) 165 N. Y. Supp. 452.

<sup>17</sup> *Harris v. Lee*, 1 P. Wms. 482; *Marlow v. Pitfield*, Id., 559; *Deare v. Soutten*, L. R. 9 Eq. 151; *Jenner v. Morris*, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 43; *Kenyon v. Farris*, 47 Conn. 510, 36 Am. Rep. 86; *Walker v. Simpson*, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 83, 42 Am. Dec. 216; *Leupple v. Osborn's Ex'rs*, 52 N. J. Eq. 637, 29 Atl. 433; *De Brauwere v. De Brauwere*, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, affirming 144 App. Div. 521, 129 N. Y. Supp. 587. Before plaintiff can recover from defendant for money advanced to defendant's wife, after notice that defendant would not be responsible for his wife's debts, he must show defendant's financial condition, his failure to provide for his wife, and that the money was advanced for necessities. *Klopper v. Mitten-thal* (Sup.) 117 N. Y. Supp. 93.

<sup>18</sup> *Skinner v. Tirrell*, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692, 21 L. R. A. 673, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447.

### HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S FUNERAL EXPENSES

71. It is the husband's duty to give his wife burial, and, where he neglects it, he will be liable for the necessary funeral expenses to any one who pays them.

Analogous to the husband's liability for necessities purchased by his wife on his credit, where he neglects to provide for her, is the liability imposed upon him by law to pay her necessary funeral expenses. The common law imposes upon the husband the duty of giving his wife a proper burial; and if he neglects to perform this duty, and some other person performs it, and pays the necessary funeral expenses, he may recover the money paid from the husband, by an action quasi ex contractu, as for money paid to the use of the husband; or if he furnishes the coffin and other things necessary for the burial, he may recover their value.<sup>19</sup> In the case of necessities purchased by the wife on the credit of her husband, the latter's liability is based on the theory of agency; but it is agency in law only, or quasi agency, for there is no agency in fact. In the case of funeral expenses of the wife, the husband's liability is not necessarily based on any theory of agency. In both cases the real ground of his liability is the same, resting, as it does on the duty of the husband which he has neglected, and which another has performed for him. In both cases the law imposes a liability quasi ex contractu.

Since the husband is liable for his wife's funeral expenses, it would seem to follow necessarily that when he pays them he pays his own debt, and, in the absence of any agreement, is not entitled to reimbursement out of the wife's separate estate; and it has been so held.<sup>20</sup> Some of the courts, however, have taken the contrary view.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Ambrose v. Kerrison, 20 Law J. C. P. 135; Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 344; Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 H. Bl. 90; Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538, 98 Am. Dec. 870; Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich. 590, 2 N. W. 917, 32 Am. Rep. 168; Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S. W. 409, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754; Stone v. Tyack, 164 Mich. 550, 129 N. W. 694; Gustin v. Bryden, 205 Ill. App. 204.

<sup>20</sup>Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89, 25 Am. Rep. 598; Staples' Appeal, 52 Conn. 425; In re Weringer's Estate, 100 Cal. 345, 34 Pac. 825.

<sup>21</sup>Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; In re McMyn, 33 Ch. Div. 575; McCue

The husband's liability is not affected by the fact that the wife left property by a will to another person, and that the latter assisted in the arrangements and direction of the funeral.<sup>22</sup> And the fact that the wife is living apart from her husband, through her own fault, though it would relieve him, as has been shown, from liability for her necessities, will not relieve him from liability for her funeral expenses.<sup>23</sup>

## HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S ANTENUPTIAL DEBTS

**72. The husband becomes liable on marriage for his wife's antenuptial debts. But his liability lasts only during the coverture, after which the liability of the wife revives. This liability has been very generally abolished by statute.**

The husband is liable during coverture for the debts contracted by his wife while sole.<sup>24</sup> His liability, however, continues only during coverture, and debts not put in judgment during that time cannot thereafter be enforced against him.<sup>25</sup> Although he may have received a large fortune in acquiring his wife's personal property by the marriage, yet he retains the same, on her death, free

<sup>1</sup> v. Garvey, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 562; McClellan v. Filson, 44 Ohio St. 184, 5 N. E. 861, 58 Am. Rep. 814 (in this case, however, the funeral expenses were paid out of the wife's estate by her executor, not the husband). In this connection see, also, Schneider v. Breler's Estate, 129 Wis. 446, 109 N. W. 99, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 917, where it was held that the statute (St. 1898, §§ 2341, 2342) exempting the separate estate of a married woman from liability for the husband's debts does not exempt her estate from liability for her funeral expenses, though the materials and labor were ordered by the husband and he would be liable at common law. St. 1898, § 3852, provides that funeral expenses shall be paid from the estate of the decedent, and does not except from the operation thereof the estate of a married woman decedent.

<sup>22</sup> Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich. 590, 2 N. W. 917, 32 Am. Rep. 168.

<sup>23</sup> Seybold v. Morgan, 43 Ill. App. 39.

<sup>24</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 443; 2 Kent, Comm. 143; Thomond v. Suffolk, 1 P. Wms. 462, 469; Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. Wms. 409; Barnes v. Underwood, 47 N. Y. 351; Cole v. Shurtleff, 41 Vt. 311, 98 Am. Dec. 587; Platner v. Patchin, 19 Wis. 333; Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384; Bryan v. Doolittle, 38 Ga. 255; Hetrick v. Hetrick, 13 Ind. 44; Morrow v. Whitesides' Ex'r, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411; Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25; Hawthorne v. Beckwith, 89 Va. 786, 17 S. E. 241.

<sup>25</sup> See the cases cited above.

from any liability to answer for her antenuptial debts.<sup>26</sup> And even a court of equity will not help creditors in subjecting what the husband has received to their claims.<sup>27</sup> The husband is equally liable for his wife's debts contracted *dum sola* where she brings him no fortune.<sup>28</sup> Her choses in action, not reduced to possession by the husband during coverture, however, may be reached by the wife's creditors after her death.<sup>29</sup> On the theory that the husband's liability for his wife's debts rests on the fact that marriage vests in the husband all his wife's chattels, and the right to reduce her choses in action to possession, whether the husband is an infant or not, it is held that an infant husband is liable for his wife's debts.<sup>30</sup> The husband's liability is limited to the obligations that were legally binding on his wife; and hence, if his wife was an infant, he is only liable for her necessities.<sup>31</sup> If the wife survives her husband, she again becomes liable for her debts contracted *dum sola*, although she may have brought her husband a fortune from which he has neglected to pay them.<sup>32</sup> In an action to enforce the husband's liability, the husband and wife must be sued jointly.<sup>33</sup> In most states by statute the common-law liability of the husband for his wife's antenuptial debts has been abolished.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Heard v. Stamford*, 3 P. Wms. 409; *Thomond v. Suffolk*, 1 P. Wms. 469; *Barnes v. Underwood*, 47 N. Y. 351; *Cureton v. Moore*, 55 N. C. 204.

<sup>27</sup> *Heard v. Stamford*, 3 P. Wms. 409; *Morrow v. Whitesides' Ex'r*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411; *Cureton v. Moore*, 55 N. C. 204.

<sup>28</sup> *Thomond v. Suffolk*, 1 P. Wms. 469.

<sup>29</sup> *Heard v. Stamford*, 3 P. Wms. 409; ante, p. 131.

<sup>30</sup> *Reeves*, Dom. Rel. 234; *Roach v. Quick*, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 238; *Butler v. Breck*, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 164, 39 Am. Dec. 768; *Cole v. Seeley*, 25 Vt. 220, 60 Am. Dec. 258.

<sup>31</sup> *Anderson v. Smith*, 33 Md. 465; *Bonney v. Reardin*, 6 Bush (Ky.) 34.

<sup>32</sup> *Woodman v. Chapman*, 1 Camp. 189; *Parker v. Steed*, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 206.

<sup>33</sup> *Mitchinson v. Hewson*, 7 Term R. 348; *Gage v. Reed*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 403; *Cole v. Shurtleff*, 41 Vt. 311, 98 Am. Dec. 587; *Platner v. Patchin*, 19 Wis. 333.

<sup>34</sup> See the statutes of the various states; *Smith v. Martin*, 124 Mich. 34, 82 N. W. 662; *Taylor v. Rountree*, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 725; *Baker v. Lukens*, 35 Pa. 146; *Johnson v. Griffiths & Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 683; *Zachary v. Cadenhead*, 40 Ala. 236. See, also, *Clark v. Miller*, 88 Ky. 108, 10 S. W. 277, holding that under the Kentucky statute the husband is not liable except to the amount he may have received from the wife. But see *Kies v. Young*, 64 Ark. 381, 42 S. W. 669, 62 Am. St. Rep. 198; *Ferguson v. Williams*, 65 Ark. 631, 44 S. W. 1126; *McMurtry v. Webster*, 48 Ill. 123; *Connor v. Berry*, 46 Ill. 370, 95 Am. Dec. 417; *Alexander v. Morgan*, 31 Ohio St. 546.

## CHAPTER V

### WIFE'S EQUITABLE AND STATUTORY SEPARATE ESTATE

- 73. Equitable Separate Estate.
- 74. Jus Disponendi.
- 75-77. Power to Charge by Contract.
- 78. Statutory Separate Estate.
- 79. Jus Disponendi.
- 80-82. Power to Charge by Contract.

The extent to which property rights are affected by coverture at common law, and the power of a married woman, at common law, to dispose of her property, and to enter into contracts, have been explained. Attention was also called to the fact that the common-law doctrine does not apply to the full extent in equity, nor under modern statutes. In this chapter the doctrine of courts of equity in relation to property settled to the separate use of the wife, called her "equitable separate estate," including her power to dispose of the same, and contract in relation to it, will be explained. The law governing the separate statutory estate of a married woman, and her powers in relation thereto, will then be considered.

### EQUITABLE SEPARATE ESTATE

73. In equity, a married woman may hold as a feme sole, and free from the control of her husband, property, real or personal, settled to her sole and separate use. To create an equitable separate estate in the wife, there must be an intention that the wife shall take, and that the husband shall not.

To mitigate the hardships arising from the rules of the common law giving to the husband rights in his wife's property, equity has recognized, or rather created, a doctrine by which a married woman may acquire and hold a separate estate, both real and personal, independently of her husband, and free from his control.<sup>1</sup> For this purpose equity treats married women, in relation to their separate

<sup>1</sup> A married woman's separate estate is a creation of equity, devised for her protection to evade the harsh and unjust dogmas of the law with respect to the rights of her husband over her property, which exist only during coverture, is suspended by discovery, and revives upon remarriage, unless

property, as if sole.<sup>2</sup> This doctrine is a creature of equity only, and was unknown to the common law. The doctrine applies only to property held to the wife's separate use by the terms of some agreement or conveyance, as under antenuptial or postnuptial agreements with her husband, gifts from her husband or strangers, or conveyances, devises, or bequests.<sup>3</sup> Trust estates, not limited to her separate use, are not equitable separate estates falling within this rule.<sup>4</sup>

It is well settled that to create an equitable separate estate the intention to create it must clearly appear. As has often been said in the cases, the words used in the grant or other instrument must clearly show that it is intended that the wife shall take, and the husband shall not. If this definitely appears, the form of the words is immaterial.<sup>5</sup> No trustee need be named for the wife. If no

defeated during the intermediate period. *Littleton v. Sain*, 126 Tenn. 461, 150 S. W. 423, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1118.

<sup>2</sup> *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Brown, Ch. 16, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 679, and authorities there cited; *Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 549, 8 Am. Dec. 447. And see authorities hereinafter referred to.

<sup>3</sup> 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1101; *Holliday v. Hively*, 199 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. 988; *Wallace v. Wallace*, 82 Ill. 530; *Musson v. Trigg*, 51 Miss. 172; *Harris v. McElroy*, 45 Pa. 216; *Lovewell v. Schoolfield*, 217 Fed. 689, 133 C. O. A. 449, certiorari denied *Hill v. Lovewell*, 239 U. S. 644, 36 Sup. Ct. 165, 60 L. Ed. 483; *Neville v. Cheshire*, 163 Ala. 300, 50 South. 1005; *Rutledge v. Rutledge*, 177 Mo. App. 469, 119 S. W. 489; *Stark v. Kirchgraber*, 186 Mo. 633, 85 S. W. 868, 105 Am. St. Rep. 629. While the quality of a wife's separate estate as such ceases when she becomes discover, yet, upon her remarriage, property which, during the lifetime of her first husband, belonged to her as part of her separate estate, again partakes of that equity. *Hughey v. Warner*, 124 Tenn. 725, 140 S. W. 1058, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 582. Where in 1859, a married woman received a gift of money, donor intending that it should be for her separate use, and after receiving it woman delivered money to her husband, who by investment in other property mingled it with his individual estate, such property became separate estate for use of wife; husband holding as implied trust. *Garner v. Lankford*, 147 Ga. 235, 93 S. E. 411.

<sup>4</sup> 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1098; *Taylor v. Meads*, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 597.

<sup>5</sup> *Buck v. Wroten*, 24 Grat. (Va.) 250; *Travis v. Sitz*, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075, L. R. A. 1917A, 671; *Rixey's Adm'r v. Detrick*, 85 Va. 42, 6 S. E. 617. The word "separate" has acquired a technical meaning, and where it is used in this connection, it is sufficient to create a separate estate. But the word "sole" has not necessarily this effect. *Massy v. Rowen*, L. R. 4 H. L. 288. The courts have held sufficient the words "for her sole and separate use." *Goodrum v. Goodrum*, 43 N. C. 313; *Parker v. Brooke*, 9 Ves. 583, 587; "as her separate estate," *Fox v. Hawkes*, 13 Ch. Div. 822; *Swain v. Duane*, 48 Cal. 358; "for her own use, independent of her husband," *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520; "for her own use and benefit, independent of any other person," *Margetts v. Barringer*, 7 Sim. 482;

one is named as trustee, equity will nevertheless treat the property as her separate estate, and hold the husband as trustee.<sup>6</sup>

The property settled to a wife's separate use, may be real or personal or any interest therein, as well as the rents and income therefrom,<sup>7</sup> and investments made from the savings of such rents or income<sup>8</sup> or from the proceeds of sales.<sup>9</sup> Personal property in possession, settled to the separate use of the wife, and not disposed of by her, passes to the husband on her death *jure mariti*, and not to her personal representatives, for a wife's separate estate lasts only during coverture.<sup>10</sup>

## POWER TO DISPOSE OF EQUITABLE SEPARATE ESTATE

74. In most jurisdictions a married woman has the power to dispose of her equitable separate estate, real or personal, though no power to do so is expressly conferred by the instrument creating it, provided the power is not expressly excluded. In some jurisdictions it is held that the power must be expressly conferred.

Whether or not a married woman has the power to dispose of her equitable separate estate is a question upon which the authorities are in direct conflict. It has been established by the court of chancery in England, and the doctrine is recognized in some of our

"that she shall receive and enjoy the issues and profits," *Tyrrell v. Hope*, 2 Atk. 561. The courts have passed on the sufficiency of innumerable phrases. For a collection of the cases, see the notes to 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1102, and Stew. Husb. & W. § 200. The principle is well settled that, as held in *Re Peacock's Trusts*, 10 Ch. Div. 490, an intention must appear that the wife shall take, and that the husband shall not; but there are many inconsistencies in the cases in applying this principle to particular words.

<sup>6</sup> *Story*, Eq. Jur. § 1380, 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1100; *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Newlands v. Paynter*, 4 Mylne & C. 408; *Jones v. Clifton*, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 908; *Porter v. Bank of Rutland*, 19 Vt. 410; *Firemen's Ins. Co. of Albany v. Bay*, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 407; *Varner's Appeal*, 80 Pa. 140. <sup>7</sup> 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1103; *Cheever v. Wilson*, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. Ed. 604; *Vizonneau v. Pegram*, 2 Leigh (Va.) 183.

<sup>8</sup> *Barrack v. McCulloch*, 3 Kay & J. 110; *Gore v. Knight*, 2 Vern. 535. But see, *contra*, *Ordway v. Bright*, 7 Helsk. (Tenn.) 681.

<sup>9</sup> *Justis v. English*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 565; *City Nat. Bank of Providence, R. I., v. Hamilton*, 34 N. J. Eq. 158.

<sup>10</sup> 2 Macq. Husb. & W. 288; *Molony v. Kennedy*, 10 Sim. 254; *Brown's Adm'rs v. Brown's Adm'rs*, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 127.

states, that, even though no power to dispose of her separate equitable estate is expressly conferred by the instrument creating it, she has such power, on the theory that the power is a necessary incident of the estate.<sup>11</sup> According to this doctrine, she may dispose of her equitable separate estate, whether it is real or personal, either by will, or by gifts, transfers, or conveyances, provided the instrument creating the estate does not expressly or by clear implication restrain her from doing so. And she may do so without the consent or concurrence of her husband or her trustee, in the absence of express restraint in the instrument.<sup>12</sup> In some states the courts have refused to recognize this doctrine, and have held that a wife has no power to dispose of her equitable separate estate, unless the power has been expressly conferred.<sup>13</sup>

Where the wife has the unrestricted power to dispose of her equitable separate estate, she may dispose of it in any way she may see fit, and she may therefore give or convey it to her husband as well as to any other person; but the disposition in such a case "must be free,—neither the result of flattery, nor of force, nor harsh and cruel treatment."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Fettiplace v. Gorges*, 1 Ves. Jr. 46; *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. 369; *Lechmere v. Brotheridge*, 32 Beav. 353; *Farington v. Parker*, L. R. 4 Eq. 116; *Radford v. Carwile*, 13 W. Va. 572; *Frery v. Booth*, 37 Vt. 78; *Imlay v. Huntington*, 20 Conn. 146; *Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 548, 8 Am. Dec. 447; *Leaycraft v. Hedden*, 4 N. J. Eq. 551; *Buchanan v. Turner*, 26 Md. 1; *Penn v. Whitehead*, 17 Grat. (Va.) 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478; *Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 202, 32 Am. Rep. 661; *Bain v. Buff's Adm'r*, 76 Va. 371; *Collins v. Wassell*, 34 Ark. 17; *Miller v. Voss*, 62 Ala. 122; *Dallas v. Heard*, 32 Ga. 604; *Smith v. Thompson*, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 291; *Miller v. Newton*, 23 Cal. 554; *Pond v. Carpenter*, 12 Minn. 430 (Gil. 315); *Burch v. Breckinridge*, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 482. 65 Am. Dec. 553; *Metropolitan Bank of St. Louis v. Taylor*, 53 Mo. 444. The *jus disponendi* extends to her lands in fee in England. *Taylor v. Meads*, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 597, 304. But in this country it has been held otherwise. *Radford v. Carwile*, 13 W. Va. 572; *Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 202, 32 Am. Rep. 661; *Armstrong v. Ross*, 20 N. J. Eq. 109.

<sup>12</sup> *Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 548, 8 Am. Dec. 447, and other cases cited above.

<sup>13</sup> *Ewing v. Smith*, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 417, 5 Am. Dec. 557; *Hardy v. Holly*, 84 N. C. 661; *Holliday v. Hively*, 198 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. 988; *Maurer's Appeal*, 86 Pa. 380; *Metcalf v. Cook*, 2 R. I. 355 (criticised in *Ives v. Harris*, 7 R. I. 413); *Doty v. Mitchell*, 9 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 435; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Hix v. Gosling*, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 560.

<sup>14</sup> *Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 549, 8 Am. Dec. 447.

**POWER TO CHARGE EQUITABLE SEPARATE ESTATE  
BY CONTRACT**

75. In England, and in most of our states, a married woman has the power, as an incident to her separate estate, to charge it by contract, unless the power is excluded in the creation of the estate. In some states the power must be expressly conferred.
76. In England, and in some of the states, this power is not limited to contracts for the benefit of the estate, or even for the benefit of the wife generally. In some states it is so limited. In others it is limited to contracts for the benefit of the estate itself.
77. In England, and in all of the states, the contract must be made upon the faith of the estate. In England, and in some states, whether it was so made is to be ascertained from all the surrounding circumstances. In other states it must expressly purport to charge the estate.

The Court in Chancery in England having established the doctrine of the wife's separate property, it was held to follow that a married woman could not claim the protection of equity in the enjoyment and disposition of her property without being subject to the burdens incident to ownership. While her contracts were void at law, equity introduced the innovation that, if she entered into an obligation which, if she were sole, would constitute a personal obligation against her, and purported to contract on the faith and credit of her separate estate, though she did not render herself personally liable, yet her separate estate was thereby charged; and it was considered to be immaterial whether the contract was for the benefit of the separate estate or not, or even whether it was for her benefit or not.<sup>15</sup> "The separate property of a married woman," it was said, "being a creature of equity, it follows that, if she has a power to deal with it, she has the other power incident to property in general, namely, the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it; and, inasmuch as her creditors have not the means at law of compelling payment of those debts, a court of equity takes upon itself

<sup>15</sup> *Matthewman's Case*, L. R. 3 Eq. 781, 787; *Johnson v. Gallagher*, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494, 509; *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Brown, Ch. 16, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 679, and authorities there collated.

to give effect to them, not as personal liabilities, but by laying hold of the separate property as the only means by which they can be satisfied."<sup>16</sup>

Some of the American courts have recognized and followed the doctrine of the English court, and hold that the power to charge the estate with debts is incident to the ownership of the estate; that it need not be expressly conferred by the instrument creating the estate; and, further than this, that the debt need not be for the benefit of the estate, or even for the benefit of the wife. Thus it has been held that separate property of a married woman, conferred upon her by marriage settlement (and the rule would apply to separate property conferred in any other way), which provides that she shall have the complete control of it as though the marriage had never taken place, and contains no restraint upon alienation, causes her to be regarded in a court of equity, with regard to such property, as a feme sole, and she may, by her agreement, freely entered into, charge it even for the payment of her husband's debts.<sup>17</sup>

In some states it is held that the contract must be for the benefit of the estate. In these states a married woman has no power to bind her separate estate at all, even by expressly charging it, unless the contract is for the benefit of the estate itself.<sup>18</sup> In other states it seems to be the rule that the contract must be either for the benefit of the separate estate or for the benefit of the wife generally.<sup>19</sup>

In some states, as has been seen, it is held that a married woman has no power to dispose of her separate estate, unless that power is expressly conferred by the instrument creating the estate. So, on the same reasoning, it is there held that she cannot charge her separate estate by contracts in relation thereto unless the power has been expressly conferred upon her in the creation of the estate.<sup>20</sup> In

<sup>16</sup> *Owens v. Dickenson*, Craig & P. 48.

<sup>17</sup> *Bradford v. Greenway*, 17 Ala. 797, 52 Am. Dec. 203. And see *Bain v. Buff's Adm'r*, 76 Va. 371.

<sup>18</sup> *Willard v. Eastham*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 328, 77 Am. Dec. 366; *Heburn v. Warner*, 112 Mass. 271, 17 Am. Rep. 86; *Musson v. Trigg*, 51 Miss. 172; *Owens v. Johnson*, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 265.

<sup>19</sup> *Yale v. Dederer*, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; *Kantrowitz v. Prather*, 31 Ind. 92, 99 Am. Dec. 587; *Wilson v. Jones*, 46 Md. 349; *Homeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall*, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; *Elliott v. Gower*, 12 R. I. 79, 34 Am. Rep. 600; *Dale v. Robinson*, 51 Vt. 20, 31 Am. Rep. 669; *Lillard v. Turner*, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 374.

<sup>20</sup> *Willard v. Eastham*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 328, 77 Am. Dec. 366; *Heburn v.*

no case can a married woman charge her separate estate by contract if she is restrained from doing so by the instrument creating it.

It must be borne in mind that under this doctrine a married woman has no more power in equity than she has at law to bind herself personally by her contracts, even where they are made in relation to, and for the benefit of, her equitable separate estate. Equity merely lays hold of the estate to satisfy the debt, and does not undertake to hold her personally liable. She binds the estate only, and not herself.

It is not every contract of a married woman that is binding upon her equitable separate estate, even if it is for the benefit of the estate. In all jurisdictions it is held that the contract must have been made on the faith of that estate.<sup>21</sup> If a man, for instance, should sell a married woman goods, not knowing she had a separate estate, but trusting her personally, he could not afterwards hold the estate liable.

As to the sufficiency of the circumstances to show that the contract sought to be enforced was made on the faith of the separate estate, so as to constitute a charge upon it, the courts are not agreed, and the rules are different in the different jurisdictions. According to the English doctrine the contract need not show by express terms that it was made on the credit of the estate; but it is sufficient if it appears from all the surrounding circumstances that it was made with intent to charge the estate.<sup>22</sup> And this rule has been substantially adopted by the courts of some of our states.<sup>23</sup> It was said in an English case: "In order to bind her separate estate by a general engagement, it should appear that the engagement was made with reference to, and upon the faith and credit of, that estate; and the question whether it was so or not is to be judged of by the court upon all the circumstances of the case."<sup>24</sup> In some of

Warner, 112 Mass. 271, 17 Am. Rep. 86; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 75; Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172; Owens v. Johnson, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 265.

<sup>21</sup> Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494; Jaques v. New York M. E. Church, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 548, 8 Am. Dec. 447; Johnson v. Cummins, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142.

<sup>22</sup> Lewin, Trusts, 767; Perry, Trusts, § 659; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494; Matthewman's Case, L. R. 3 Eq. 781; Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182.

<sup>23</sup> Sprague v. Tyson, 44 Ala. 338; De Baun v. Van Wagoner, 56 Mo. 347; Avery v. Vansickle, 35 Ohio St. 270; Harshberger's Adm'r v. Alger, 31 Grat. (Va.) 52; Radford v. Carwille, 13 W. Va. 572.

<sup>24</sup> Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494.

the states it is held that the contract must expressly purport to charge the separate estate.<sup>25</sup> And in still other states it is held that the contract must expressly purport to charge the estate if it is not for the benefit of the estate itself, but for the benefit of the wife generally.<sup>26</sup>

### STATUTORY SEPARATE ESTATE

78. The common law, in so far as it affects the property of the wife, has been greatly modified by modern statutes. The result of these statutes may be stated thus:

- (a) Perhaps in all the states the real estate owned by a woman at the time of her marriage remains her separate property after marriage.
- (b) In most states real estate acquired by her after marriage, by devise, descent, or purchase, becomes and remains her separate property.
- (c) In some states real estate acquired in any way becomes and remains her separate property.
- (d) In most states the personal property owned by a woman at the time of her marriage remains her separate property after marriage.
- (e) In most states personal property acquired by her after marriage, by bequest, descent, or purchase, becomes and remains her separate property.

It has been seen in another chapter that at common law the husband acquires certain rights in his wife's real estate, and acquires the absolute right to all her personalty in possession, and the right to reduce her choses in action to possession. As already stated, the legislatures have in modern times enacted laws changing the common law to a greater or less extent in the different states. In no state is the common law now in force to its full extent. The statutes vary so much in the different states that we can only refer to them in a general way.

<sup>25</sup> Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray (Mass.) 328, 77 Am. Dec. 366; Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271, 17 Am. Rep. 86; Wilson v. Jones, 46 Md. 349; Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172; Owens v. Johnson, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 265.

<sup>26</sup> Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; Wilson v. Jones, 46 Md. 349; Homeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; Elliott v. Gower, 12 R. I. 79, 34 Am. Rep. 600; Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20, 31 Am. Rep. 669; Lillard v. Turner, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 374.

Statutes have been passed in all the states of this country, perhaps, declaring that the real and personal property owned by a woman remains her separate property on her marriage, and that all property, real or personal, acquired by her after marriage, by devise or descent, purchase or gift, becomes her sole and separate property.<sup>27</sup>

In some states there are constitutional provisions intended to secure the property rights of married women,<sup>28</sup> and statutes passed in accordance therewith are not objectionable, in that they give greater protection to married women than the Constitution requires.<sup>29</sup>

The statutes are, as a rule, so clearly worded that there is no difficulty in determining their effect in so far as they give the wife certain property owned or acquired by her as her separate estate. The chief difficulty has been in determining the powers and liabilities of the wife in respect of such property.

<sup>27</sup> See the statutes of the various states. In some instances it is provided that the statute shall not apply to property acquired by gift from the husband. See Comp. St. Neb. 1905, c. 53, § 4290—1; P. S. Vt. § 3040. For English statute, see Married Women's Property Act (St. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 [1882]). Under the Vermont statute (P. S. §§ 3037, 3040) the instrument or decree by which a married woman attains the property must specify that it is to be her separate property. *Ainger v. White's Adm'x*, 85 Vt. 446, 82 Atl. 666; *Seaver v. Lang*, 92 Vt. 501, 104 Atl. 877.

A married woman has the same status as her husband as to the right to acquire property. *Farmers' State Bank of Ada v. Keen* (Okl.) 167 Pac. 207; *Caylor Lumber Co. v. Mays* (Okl.) 174 Pac. 521. Under the New Jersey act of March 25, 1852 (P. L. p. 407), a married woman took the legal title to property conveyed or devised to her, and not simply the equitable title. *De Baun's Ex'x v. De Baun*, 119 Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239. Under the Emancipation Act of 1913, a husband had no interest in a lot owned by the wife at time of her marriage, and the entire title thereto remained in the wife and might be levied upon and sold by her creditor as her property. *Henderson Grocery Co. v. Johnson*, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S. W. 723. Under the Constitution and laws of South Carolina, the real and personal property of a married woman, whether held by her at the time of her marriage or accruing to her thereafter by inheritance or otherwise, becomes her separate property, and she may dispose of it to the same extent as if she were unmarried; the husband having no marital rights such as existed at common law, but being under the same obligation as at common law to support and maintain the wife and family. *In re Carpenter* (D. C.) 179 Fed. 743.

<sup>28</sup> Const. Ark. 1874, art. 9, §§ 7, 8; Const. S. C. 1895, art. 17, § 9; Const. W. Va. art. 6, § 49.

<sup>29</sup> *Pelzer v. Campbell*, 15 S. C. 531, 40 Am. Rep. 705.

*Construction—Effect in General*

The general rule for the construction of these statutes is that they are to be so construed as to give full effect to their terms;<sup>80</sup> but, since they are in derogation of the common law, they are not to be extended further. They do not impliedly abrogate the common law beyond their terms.<sup>81</sup> Thus, where a statute provided that the wife should hold her separate estate to her sole and separate use, and that it should not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, it was held that the husband was nevertheless entitled to an estate by the curtesy, as the statute could have full effect without impairing his right thereto.<sup>82</sup> Nor will such an enactment deprive the husband of the right to administer on his wife's estate.<sup>83</sup>

The general effect of the statutes is to abrogate the husband's title to the wife's property, secured to him by the common law, and to vest in her both the legal and the equitable title,<sup>84</sup> and to secure to her the same control and power of management she would have if sole, except in so far as her right to charge the property for debts is restricted.<sup>85</sup>

*Statutory and Equitable Separate Estate Distinguished*

Statutes creating a statutory separate estate do not necessarily destroy the wife's right to a separate estate in equity; but an equitable separate estate may be created and may exist at the same time as the statutory separate estate.<sup>86</sup> The two estates are, how-

<sup>80</sup> *Kriz v. Peege*, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108.

<sup>81</sup> *Post*, p. 197.

<sup>82</sup> *Johnson v. Cummins*, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142; *Cole v. Van Riper*, 44 Ill. 58. *Contra*, *Billings v. Baker*, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 348. And see *King v. Davis* (C. C.) 137 Fed. 222.

<sup>83</sup> *Johnson v. Cummins*, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142; *Shumway v. Cooper*, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 556; *Vallance v. Bausch*, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 633; *Ransom v. Nichols*, 22 N. Y. 110.

<sup>84</sup> *Gunn v. Hardy*, 107 Ala. 609, 18 South. 284. So long as the wife keeps her property separate from that of her husband, it is her separate property. *In re Hill* (D. C.) 190 Fed. 390. The common-law rights of the husband are during the life of the wife abrogated. *McGuire v. Cook*, 98 Ark. 118, 135 S. W. 840, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 776. And the wife holds her lands as free from the common-law rights of the husband as if she were unmarried. *Deutsch v. Rohlfing*, 22 Colo. App. 543, 126 Pac. 1123. Since a married woman may hold real estate in her own right, if the real estate be a home place in which she resides, the presence of her husband does not detract from her full possession and ownership. *Graham v. Graham*, 202 Ala. 56, 79 South. 450.

<sup>85</sup> *Wood v. Wood*, 83 N. Y. 575. See *post*, p. 201.

<sup>86</sup> *Richardson v. Stodder*, 100 Mass. 528; *Musson v. Trigg*, 51 Miss. 172;

ever, essentially different. Under the statute a married woman takes the legal title to both real and personal property, wholly exempt from the marital rights of the husband, and free from his control or interference. The estate so derived is no longer a mere creature of equity, dependent on its power alone for protection and its principles for the rights of enjoyment; but, in all cases where by the nature of the conveyance, gift, devise, or bequest an absolute legal title would be vested in a feme sole, the same title will, by virtue of the statute, be vested in a feme covert, and the property will be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed by her the same as though she were unmarried. Her rights and the remedies incident thereto are legal, as distinguished from the equitable rights and remedies incident to the equitable separate estate.<sup>37</sup>

*Constitutionality of Statutes—Retrospective Construction*

In most states there are constitutional provisions prohibiting the Legislature from passing retrospective laws. "Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in relation to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective," and therefore in violation of

*Holliday v. Hively*, 198 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. 988. The Virginia statute (Code 1904, § 2294) provides specifically that separate equitable estates are not abolished. Acts 1913, c. 26, removing the disabilities of coverture in respect of married women, does not affect the creation or operation of equitable separate estates. *Travis v. Sitz*, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075, L. R. A. 1917A, 671. A husband executed a deed of land to the wife, who on the same day conveyed the land to a trustee for the husband's heirs. The husband died prior to the Married Woman's Act of February 28, 1887 (Acts 1886-87, p. 80). *Held*, that the wife acquired only the equitable title, and the legal title descended to the husband's heirs at his death, and the Married Woman's Act did not divest the heirs of such title, and a will subsequently made by the wife was ineffectual. *Neville v. Cheshire*, 163 Ala. 390, 50 South. 1005.

<sup>37</sup> *Cookson v. Toole*, 59 Ill. 515; *Williams v. Hugunin*, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; *Conway v. Smith*, 13 Wis. 140; *Musson v. Trigg*, 51 Miss. 172; *Frierson v. Williams*, 57 Miss. 451. Compare *Colvin v. Currier*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 371, and *Wood v. Wood*, 83 N. Y. 575. Whether a separate estate is an equitable separate estate or a statutory separate estate must be determined from the language and provisions of the instrument creating it. If the instrument grants powers or imposes restrictions not granted or imposed by the statute, but which are yet consistent with the rules and principles of equity, the estate will be construed to be an equitable, and not a statutory, separate estate. *Jones v. Jones' Ex'r*, 96 Va. 749, 32 S. E. 463. See, also, *Short v. Battle*, 52 Ala. 456, holding that if the intent is ambiguous, as when there is a mere conveyance, the statute steps in and makes the estate a statutory separate estate.

such constitutional provisions.<sup>38</sup> Under such a provision, or one having a similar prohibitory effect, the Legislature cannot take away or impair rights which have already vested in the husband by virtue of the marriage. If a husband has already acquired by virtue of the marriage and the existing law a vested right in property owned by his wife either at the time of the marriage or afterwards, whether it be real or personal, such right cannot constitutionally be taken from him by legislative enactment.<sup>39</sup> But there is nothing in such constitutional prohibitions to prevent the Legislature from defeating mere expectancies where no rights have vested in him. There is nothing unconstitutional in a statute giving married women the sole right to property that may afterwards be acquired by them, whether real or personal, or to the future income or profits of land owned by them at the time the statute is enacted. Such a statute neither defeats nor impairs any vested right either of the husband or of his creditors.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler*, 2 Gall. 105, Fed. Cas. No. 13,156; *Leete v. State Bank of St. Louis*, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W. 788.

<sup>39</sup> *Cranston v. Cranston*, 24 R. I. 297, 53 Atl. 44; *Vanata v. Johnson*, 170 Mo. 269, 70 S. W. 687; *Mayo v. Bank of Gleason*, 140 Tenn. 423, 205 S. W. 125; *Bennett v. Hutchens*, 133 Tenn. 65, 179 S. W. 629; *Tucker v. Tucker's Adm'r*, 165 Ky. 306, 176 S. W. 1173; *Farrell v. Patterson*, 43 Ill. 52; *Dubois v. Jackson*, 49 Ill. 49; *Almond v. Bonnell*, 76 Ill. 537; *McNeer v. McNeer*, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681, 19 L. R. A. 256; *Arnold v. Limeburger*, 122 Ga. 72, 49 S. E. 812; *Hetzel v. Lincoln*, 216 Pa. 60, 64 Atl. 866; *Coombs v. Read*, 16 Gray (Mass.) 271; *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336; *Carter v. Carter*, 14 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 59; *Eldridge v. Preble*, 34 Me. 148; *Erwin v. Puryear*, 50 Ark. 356, 7 S. W. 449; *Wythe v. Smith*, 4 Sawy. 17, Fed. Cas. No. 18,122. And see *Appeal of Freeman*, 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420, 37 L. R. A. 452, 57 Am. St. Rep. 112.

<sup>40</sup> See *Baker's Ex'rs v. Kilgore*, 145 U. S. 487, 12 Sup. Ct. 943, 36 L. Ed. 786; *Allen v. Hanks*, 136 U. S. 300, 10 Sup. Ct. 961, 34 L. Ed. 414; *Holliday v. McMillan*, 79 N. C. 315, 318; *Rutledge v. Rutledge*, 177 Mo. App. 469, 119 S. W. 489; *Rezabek v. Rezabek*, 196 Mo. App. 673, 192 S. W. 107; *Quigley v. Graham*, 18 Ohio St. 42; *McNeer v. McNeer*, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681, 19 L. R. A. 256; *Buchanan v. Lee*, 60 Ind. 117; *Sperry v. Haslam*, 57 Ga. 412; *Niles v. Hall*, 64 Vt. 453, 25 Atl. 479. It has been held that a husband's interest as tenant by the curtesy initiate, at common law, in land owned by his wife, is not a vested right, and may be interrupted by legislation before it becomes consummate by the death of the wife. *Alexander v. Alexander*, 85 Va. 353, 7 S. W. 335, 1 L. R. A. 125. See *Hill v. Chambers*, 30 Mich. 422. But the better opinion is to the contrary. See *McNeer v. McNeer*, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681, 19 L. R. A. 256; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 144 Ill. 274, 33 N. E. 51, 36 Am. St. Rep. 427; *Rose v. Sanderson*, 38 Ill. 247. See, as to the effect of the separate property acts on the husband's interest in his wife's lands. *Prall v. Smith*, 31 N. J. Law, 244; *Dayton v. Dusenbury*, 25 N. J. Eq. 110; *Eldridge*

Statutes taking from the husband rights which are given him at common law in his wife's property will not be construed as having a retroactive effect, even where retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution of the particular state, unless the intention of the Legislature that they shall have such effect is clearly expressed, and the language employed admits of no other construction. That intention is not to be assumed by the mere fact that the language of the statute is general, and might include past as well as future transactions.<sup>41</sup>

Constitutional prohibitions against laws impairing the obligation of contracts prevent the Legislatures from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts made by a husband concerning property of his wife, which he had a right to make by virtue of the marriage and under existing laws; but marriage is not a contract within the

*v. Preble*, 34 Me. 148; *Burson's Appeal*, 22 Pa. 164; *Bouknight v. Epting*, 11 S. C. 71. The Legislature, however, may clearly defeat, by a statute, any right to curtesy which he would otherwise have in land which may be acquired by the wife after the adoption of the statute. *Baker's Ex'rs v. Kilgore*, supra; *Allen v. Hanks*, supra. And it may defeat a husband's expectancy of a tenancy by the curtesy; that is, it may abolish curtesy, or modify the existing law, before the husband's interest becomes initiate. *Cooley*, Const. Lim. 440; *Wyatt v. Smith*, 25 W. Va. 813; *McNeer v. McNeer*, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681, 19 L. R. A. 256. See *Hill v. Chambers*, 30 Mich. 422. It cannot defeat a vested estate by the entirety. *Almond v. Bonnell*, 76 Ill. 536. It has also been held by some courts that a husband's right to reduce his wife's choses in action to possession is not a vested right, even as to existing choses in action not reduced, and that it may be interrupted by legislation. *Alexander v. Alexander*, 85 Va. 353, 7 S. E. 335, 1 L. R. A. 125; *Clarke v. McCreary*, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 347; *Percy v. Cockrill*, 53 Fed. 872, 881, 4 C. C. A. 73; *Goodyear v. Rumbaugh*, 13 Pa. 480; *Mellinger's Adm'r v. Bausman's Trustee*, 45 Pa. 522, 529; *Dille v. Henry's Ex'r*, 25 N. J. Law, 302. But the better opinion is to the contrary. *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336; *Westervelt v. Gregg*, 12 N. Y. 202, 62 Am. Dec. 160; *Norris v. Beyea*, 13 N. Y. 273, 288; *Ryder v. Hulse*, 24 N. Y. 372; *Leete v. State Bank*, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W. 788; *Sterns v. Weathers*, 30 Ala. 712; *Kidd v. Montague*, 19 Ala. 619; *Anderson v. Anderson*, 1 Ala. Sel. Cas. 612. Acts 34th Leg. c. 54, § 1 (*Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. Supp.* 1918, art. 4621a), providing that all property or moneys received as compensation for personal injuries sustained by wife shall be her separate property, does not affect actions filed prior to passage thereof. *Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Scheppelman* (Tex. Civ. App.) 203 S. W. 167.

<sup>41</sup> See *Stilphen v. Stilphen*, 65 N. H. 126, 23 Atl. 79; *Leete v. State Bank of St. Louis*, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W. 788, and authorities there cited. See, also, the cases cited in note 40, supra.

meaning of such provisions, and they cannot be set up to defeat legislation taking from a husband rights in his wife's property.<sup>42</sup>

#### *What Law Governs*

If the husband, by virtue of his marital right under the common law, becomes vested with title to his wife's personalty, the subsequent removal of the parties to a state in which the law declares that property owned or acquired by a married woman is her separate property will not divest him of his title.<sup>43</sup> Conversely, if a married woman acquires a separate property in personalty under the statute of the state of residence, the subsequent removal of the parties to a state where the common law prevails will not divest her of her title and vest it in the husband by virtue of his marital rights.<sup>44</sup>

#### *What Constitutes Wife's Separate Property*

As was stated above, the statutes generally provide that the property owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or thereafter acquired by her in any legal manner is her separate property.<sup>45</sup> Under these statutes it has been held that a married woman has a separate estate in property acquired by gift,<sup>46</sup> purchased on

<sup>42</sup> *MAYNARD v. HILL*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 1; ante, p. 3, and cases there cited.

<sup>43</sup> *Ellington v. Harris*, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134, 119 Am. St. Rep. 320; *Meyer v. McCabe*, 73 Mo. 236; *Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume*, 121 Ala. 168, 25 South. 806, 77 Am. St. Rep. 43.

<sup>44</sup> *Rice v. Shipley*, 159 Mo. 399, 60 S. W. 740.

<sup>45</sup> See ante, p. 193.

<sup>46</sup> *Salisbury v. Spofford*, 22 Idaho, 393, 126 Pac. 400; *Chorn v. Chorn's Adm'r*, 98 Ky. 627, 33 S. W. 1107; *Hess v. Brown*, 111 Pa. 124, 2 Atl. 416; *Cropper v. Bowles*, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 380; *Kinkaid v. Lee*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 622, 119 S. W. 342; *O'Brien v. McSherry*, 222 Mass. 147, 109 N. E. 904. Where a wife conveyed property received as a gift to a holding corporation formed by members of the family, the stock received in exchange therefor was acquired by gift, and was her separate property. *Smith v. Weed*, 75 Wash. 452, 134 Pac. 1070. A husband, who executed a note to his wife for money received by her as heir of her mother, thereby made the note the wife's separate property, and thereby deprived himself of any right to, or interest in, either the money or the note, though it did not in terms recite that it was for the wife's separate use. *Bennett v. Bennett's Adm'r*, 134 Ky. 444, 120 S. W. 372. In view of Rem. Code 1915, §§ 5919, 5925, 8766, 8771, where a husband procures a deed in wife's name, and so conducts himself with reference thereto, as to evidence no claim or interest therein, the property will constitute separate estate of wife. *Lanigan v. Miles*, 102 Wash. 82, 172 Pac. 894. Prior to the enactment of the Married Woman's Act (Acts 1866, p. 146), property given a wife during coverture vested in her husband, unless the gift used words indicating a wish for personal enjoyment by the wife. *Endsley v. Taylor*, 143 Ga. 607, 85 S. E. 852.

her own credit,<sup>47</sup> or with her own money,<sup>48</sup> or earnings,<sup>49</sup> and it does not affect her rights that her husband acted as her agent,<sup>50</sup> or took title in his own name,<sup>51</sup> or even that he paid a portion of the purchase money, if the intent was that the property should be her separate property.<sup>52</sup> Nor does the fact that the husband rendered

<sup>47</sup> *Merrell v. Purdy*, 129 Wis. 331, 109 N. W. 82; *Kriz v. Peege*, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108; *Citizens' Loan & Trust Co. v. Witte*, 116 Wis. 60, 92 N. W. 443; *Hibernian Sav. Inst. v. Luhn*, 34 S. O. 175, 13 S. E. 357; *United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee*, 58 Wash. 16, 107 Pac. 870; *Wilder v. Richie*, 117 Mass. 382; *SIDWAY v. NICHOL*, 62 Ark. 146, 34 S. W. 529; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 98; *Reeves v. McNeill*, 127 Ala. 175, 28 South. 623; *Conkling v. Levie*, 66 Neb. 132, 94 N. W. 988 (second case); *Hibbard v. Heckart*, 88 Mo. App. 544. And it does not affect her rights that she had no prior separate estate to form a basis of credit. *Trapnell v. Conklyn*, 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570, 38 Am. St. Rep. 30; *Messer v. Smyth*, 58 N. H. 298; *Kriz v. Peege*, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108. Property purchased by married woman on her individual credit, without applying on the price property or proceeds of property derived from her husband, is not liable for his debts. *Hoover v. Carver*, 135 Minn. 105, 160 N. W. 249. Creditors of a husband cannot reach property, which was purchased by the wife with money borrowed on her personal credit, and which was repaid out of her separate estate. *Morris v. Waring*, 22 N. M. 175, 159 Pac. 1002.

<sup>48</sup> *Gebhart v. Gebhart* (Tex. Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 964; *Oaks v. West* (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. 1033; *Fox v. Tyrone*, 104 Miss. 44, 61 South. 5; *Clark v. Baker*, 76 Wash. 110, 135 Pac. 1025; *Marshall Field & Co. v. McFarlane* (Iowa) 84 N. W. 1030. A wife acquired land as her separate estate if the consideration used in paying for the property was her separate estate. *Johnson v. Johnson* (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 202. Where property was paid for by husband's checks, it is nevertheless the wife's property, if the actual purchase money was funds of the wife previously given to him. *Conron v. Cauchols*, 242 Fed. 909, 155 C. O. A. 497.

<sup>49</sup> *Green v. Forney*, 134 Iowa, 318, 111 N. W. 976; *Rath v. Rankins*, 33 S. W. 832, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1120; *Dobbins v. Dexter Horton & Co.*, 62 Wash. 423, 113 Pac. 1088; *Larson v. Larson*, 15 Cal. App. 531, 115 Pac. 340; *Kinsey v. Feller*, 64 N. J. Eq. 367, 51 Atl. 485.

<sup>50</sup> *Reeves v. McNeill*, 127 Ala. 175, 28 South. 623.

<sup>51</sup> *Oaks v. West* (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. 1033; *Ligon v. Wharton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 S. W. 930. See, also, *Adoue v. Spencer*, 62 N. J. Eq. 782, 49 Atl. 10, 56 L. R. A. 817, 90 Am. St. Rep. 484, holding that the fact that the husband has taken possession of the wife's separate estate does not raise a presumption of a gift to him, and that he must account. Shares of stock purchased by husband with funds in his hands belonging to his wife remain wife's sole property, although shares were taken in the name of both husband and wife. *Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co.*, 176 N. C. 213, 97 S. E. 53. A husband, acquiring legal title to his wife's separate realty, is deemed to hold it in trust for her, without direct evidence that she intended a gift of it to him. *Farmers' State Bank of Ada v. Keen* (Okla.) 167 Pac. 207.

<sup>52</sup> *Gebhart v. Gebhart* (Tex. Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 964; *Corbett v. Sloan*, 52 Wash. 1, 99 Pac. 1025; *Patterson v. Patterson*, 197 Mass. 112, 83 N. E. 364. See, also, *Dyer v. Pierce* (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S. W. 441. Where a married

services in connection with the property render it less her separate property or give his creditors any claim thereon.<sup>53</sup> So, too, the increase of or income from her separate estate is her separate property.<sup>54</sup>

In many states her earnings in activities not connected with her household duties,<sup>55</sup> and in some damages for torts committed against her,<sup>56</sup> are her separate property.

woman's money is invested in land in her husband's name, she owns, in her separate right, a part of the land proportionate to the amount of her funds invested therein. *Kingman-Texas Implement Co. v. Herring Nat. Bank* (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 394.

<sup>53</sup> *Donovan v. Olson*, 47 Wash. 441, 92 Pac. 276; *Green v. Forney*, 134 Iowa, 316, 111 N. W. 976; *Smith's Ex'r v. Johns*, 154 Ky. 274, 157 S. W. 21; *Fink v. McCue*, 123 Mo. App. 313, 100 S. W. 549; *Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. Heckart*, 88 Mo. App. 544; *Trapnell v. Conklyn*, 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570, 38 Am. St. Rep. 30. See, also, *Carson v. Carson*, 204 Pa. 466, 54 Atl. 348. Improvements placed on the wife's separate real estate by the husband are her property. *Shaw v. Bernal*, 163 Cal. 262, 124 Pac. 1012; *Hood v. Hood*, 83 N. J. Eq. 695, 93 Atl. 797; *Kearney v. Vann*, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1189; *Holman v. Holman* (Mo.) 183 S. W. 623.

<sup>54</sup> *Thorn v. Anderson*, 7 Idaho, 421, 63 Pac. 592; *Henderson Grocery Co. v. Johnson*, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S. W. 723; *Maxwell v. Jurney*, 238 Fed. 566, 151 C. C. A. 502; *Carle v. Heller*, 18 Cal. App. 577, 123 Pac. 815; *Carson v. Carson*, 204 Pa. 466, 54 Atl. 348. Profits of wife's business, though derived through activities of husband, belong to her. *Bourgeois v. Edwards* (N. J. Ch.) 104 Atl. 447. Increase in the value of the wife's property by reason of the good management of the husband cannot be reached by his creditors. *Martin v. Banks*, 89 Ark. 77, 115 S. W. 928; *Green v. Forney*, 134 Iowa, 316, 111 N. W. 976; *Wasem v. Raben*, 45 Ind. App. 221, 90 N. E. 636. But see *Patton's Ex'r v. Smith*, 130 Ky. 819, 114 S. W. 315, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1124.

<sup>55</sup> *NUDING v. URICH*, 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl. 409, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 61; *Turner v. Davenport*, 63 N. J. Eq. 288, 49 Atl. 463; *Larkin v. Woosley*, 109 Ala. 258, 19 South. 520; *Vincent v. Ireland*, 2 Pennewill (Del.) 580, 49 Atl. 172; *Healey v. P. Ballantine & Sons*, 66 N. J. Law, 339, 49 Atl. 511; *Furth v. March*, 101 Mo. App. 329, 74 S. W. 147; *Roberts v. Haines*, 112 Ga. 842, 38 S. E. 109; *Hamilton v. Hamilton's Estate*, 26 Ind. App. 114, 59 N. E. 344; *Moore v. Crandall*, 205 Fed. 689, 124 C. C. A. 11; *Briggs v. Sanford*, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N. E. 436; *Dr. S. S. Still College & Infirmary of Osteopathy v. Morris*, 93 Neb. 328, 140 N. W. 272; *Booth v. Backus*, 182 Iowa, 1319, 166 N. W. 695; *Foy v. Pacific Power & Light Co.*, 105 Wash. 525, 178 Pac. 452; *Perry v. Blumenthal*, 119 App.

<sup>56</sup> *BLAECHINSKA v. HOWARD MISSION & HOME FOR LITTLE WANDERERS*, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755, 15 L. R. A. 215, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 57; *Healey v. P. Ballantine & Sons*, 66 N. J. Law, 339, 49 Atl. 511. See, also, *Harmon v. Old Colony B. Co.*, 165 Mass. 100, 42 N. E. 505, 30 L. R. A. 658, 52 Am. St. Rep. 499; *Harris v. Webster*, 58 N. H. 481; *Hey v. Prime*, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N. E. 141, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 570; *Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rowe*, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 98 S. W. 228.

When property is conveyed to husband and wife jointly, they take, as we have seen, as tenants by the entirety; that is, neither of them takes an undivided share separately from the other, but each has an interest in the whole, and on the death of either the property belongs to the other. Neither can defeat the rights of the other as survivor.<sup>57</sup> It has been held, therefore, that the wife has not such an interest in such property that it can be called her separate property within the meaning of the separate property acts.<sup>58</sup>

### *Management and Control of Wife's Separate Property*

Though in some states the statute provides that the management and control of the wife's separate property shall be vested in the husband,<sup>59</sup> in the absence of such a provision it is generally held

Div. 663, 104 N. Y. Supp. 127. Since the act of 1869 (Laws 1869, p. 255) the earnings of a wife realized from keeping boarders with the consent of her husband will be considered her own personal property, and, as a general rule, protected from subsequent creditors of her husband. *Arthur Lehman & Co. v. Slat*, 208 Ill. App. 39. But see *In re Shaw's Estate*, 201 Mich. 574, 167 N. W. 885, holding that, where wife living with husband furnishes board and room to an outsider, the wife has no personal right to recover therefor in absence of assignment by husband. Comp. Laws N. M. 1884, § 1087 (Comp. Laws 1897, § 1509), simply exempts earnings of wife from liability for debts of husband, and does not make them her separate property. *Albright v. Albright*, 21 N. M. 606, 157 Pac. 662, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 542.

<sup>57</sup> Ante, p. 146, "Estate by Entirety."

<sup>58</sup> *Speier v. Opfer*, 73 Mich. 35, 40 N. W. 909, 2 L. R. A. 345, 16 Am. St. Rep. 556; *Curtis v. Crowe*, 74 Mich. 99, 41 N. W. 876. But see *Dreutzer v. Lawrence*, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N. W. 423, and *FROST v. FROST*, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep. 689, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 74.

<sup>59</sup> *Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. Tex.* 1897, art. 2967; *Gen. St. Fla.* 1906, § 2589; *Rev. St. Idaho*, 1887, § 2498. But see Act March 9, 1903 (Sess. Laws 1903, p. 345). And see *McNeil v. Williams*, 64 Fla. 97, 59 South. 562; *Bates v. Capital State Bank*, 21 Idaho, 141, 121 Pac. 561; *Bledsoe v. Fitts*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 578, 105 S. W. 1142, certified questions answered *Atteberry v. Burnett*, 102 Tex. 118, 113 S. W. 526. But he cannot sell it. *Bledsoe v. Fitts*, supra; *Ligon v. Wharton* (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 S. W. 930; *Scruggs v. Gage* (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 696. Nor mortgage it. *Shomaker v. Waters*, 59 Fla. 414, 52 South. 586; *Walker v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Winters* (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 312. Under *Rev. St.* 1887, § 2499, if a wife has just cause to apprehend that her husband has mismanaged or will mismanage her separate property, she or some person in her behalf may apply for the appointment of a trustee to manage the same. *Sencerbox v. First Nat. Bank*, 14 Idaho, 95, 93 Pac. 369. Under *Const.* 1885, art. 11, § 1, declaring that all property of a wife owned before marriage or acquired by gift, devise, bequest, descent, or purchase shall be her property, she may, at her pleasure, terminate the control over her property conferred by *Gen. St.* 1906, § 2589, upon the husband. *Florida Citrus Exchange v. Grisham*, 65 Fla. 46, 61 South. 123.

that she can use, manage, and control her property as if she were unmarried,<sup>60</sup> subject, however, to certain restrictions on her power to mortgage or convey her property<sup>61</sup> and to charge the same for debts.<sup>62</sup>

### POWER TO DISPOSE OF STATUTORY SEPARATE ESTATE

79. A married woman has no power to dispose of her statutory separate estate unless the power is expressly or impliedly given her by the statute. Though some courts held otherwise in the case of personal property, the rule is that a statute merely giving the right to hold and enjoy, or the *jus tenendi*, does not include the *jus disponendi*.

A statute which merely gives a married woman the right to hold, own, possess, and enjoy as her separate property real and personal property owned before or acquired after marriage, or which gives her the right to hold such property to her sole and separate use, as if she were a single female, does not confer on her the power to dispose of real estate.<sup>63</sup> The *jus disponendi* will not be implied from a bare *jus tenendi*.<sup>64</sup> Under a statute providing that a married

<sup>60</sup> *Parent v. Callierand*, 64 Ill. 97; *Southard v. Plummer*, 36 Me. 64; *Agro v. Canner*, 167 Mass. 390, 45 N. E. 754; *Pomeroy v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.*, 40 Ill. 398; *Barton v. Barton*, 32 Md. 214; *Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin*, 246 Mo. 711, 152 S. W. 38; *Nelson v. Nelson*, 176 N. C. 191, 96 S. E. 986. Where a husband's possession of his wife's land accrued prior to the amendment of 1889 (Rev. St. 1889, § 6869) to the married woman's act, which deprived a husband of his former right to possession, such amendment did not change the husband's right. *Powell v. Powell*, 267 Mo. 117, 183 S. W. 625, judgment reversed on motion to modify 267 Mo. 117, 188 S. W. 795. A wife may sue her husband to recover or protect her separate estate. *In re Hoffman* (D. C.) 199 Fed. 448; *Masterman v. Masterman*, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537; *Ireland v. Ireland*, 244 Pa. 489, 90 Atl. 911; *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N. W. 598; *De Baun's Ex'r v. De Baun*, 119 Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239.

<sup>61</sup> See post, p. 209.

<sup>62</sup> See post, p. 208.

<sup>63</sup> *Cole v. Van Riper*, 44 Ill. 58; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287. In Louisiana, before the passage of the recent statute (Act No. 94, of 1916) a married woman had no capacity to alienate or encumber her separate property without the authorization of her husband or of a competent court. *Douglas v. Nicholson*, 140 La. 1098, 74 South. 566.

<sup>64</sup> *Miller v. Wetherby*, 12 Iowa, 415; *Cole v. Van Riper*, 44 Ill. 58; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287.

woman shall have the same rights over her separate property as if unmarried, it has, however, been held that she has the right to dispose of it.<sup>65</sup>

In respect to personalty, it has been held in many states that the *jus disponendi* is a necessary incident to the separate ownership of personal property.<sup>66</sup> Some courts have nevertheless refused to recognize the distinction.<sup>67</sup> In most of the states, however, the power of married women to dispose of their separate property has been definitely granted or denied in the statutes creating a separate estate.<sup>68</sup>

### POWER TO CHARGE STATUTORY SEPARATE ESTATE BY CONTRACT

80. In the absence of express enactment, statutes giving married women separate property do not impliedly authorize a married woman to contract generally; but she can contract so as to render her statutory separate property liable.

- (a) Where the contract would bind her equitable separate property.
- (b) Where the statute expressly authorizes her to contract with reference to her separate property.
- (c) Where the statute enacts that she may enjoy her separate property as if sole.

<sup>65</sup> *Real v. Warren*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 447; *HARRIS v. SPENCER*, 71 Conn. 233, 41 Atl. 773, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 102; *Wagner v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York*, 88 Conn. 536, 91 Atl. 1012; *Stewart v. Welser Lumber Co.*, 21 Idaho, 340, 121 Pac. 775; *Cropper v. Bowles*, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 380; *Marsh v. Marsh*, 92 Neb. 189, 137 N. W. 1122; *Belm-brink v. Fox*, 121 Md. 102, 88 Atl. 106. In some states the husband must join in the deed. *Council v. Pridgen*, 153 N. C. 443, 69 S. E. 404; *Phillips v. Hoskins*, 128 Ky. 371, 108 S. W. 283; *Schickhaus v. Sanford*, 83 N. J. Eq. 454, 91 Atl. 878; *Blondin v. Brooks*, 83 Vt. 472, 76 Atl. 184.

<sup>66</sup> *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287; *Harding v. Cobb*, 47 Miss. 599; *Beard v. Dedolph*, 29 Wis. 136. See, also, *Townsend v. Huntzinger*, 41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N. E. 619. There is no restriction upon the right of the wife to dispose of her personalty as fully and freely as if she had remained unmarried. *Deese v. Deese*, 176 N. C. 527, 97 S. E. 475.

<sup>67</sup> *Swift v. Luce*, 27 Me. 285; *Brown v. Fifield*, 4 Mich. 322; *Scott v. Scott*, 13 Ind. 225; *Moore v. Cornell*, 68 Pa. 320.

<sup>68</sup> See the statutes of the various states. In Indiana it is held that a statute restricting the right of a married woman to convey her realty does not affect her right to convey personalty. *Townsend v. Huntzinger*, 41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N. E. 619. A married woman has the same status as her

81. Statutes authorizing married women to acquire and hold property authorize the performance of all acts and the making of all contracts that are necessarily incident thereto, but do not abrogate the common law further than is necessary to give them full effect.

82. Equitable jurisdiction over equitable separate property has been extended in some states to statutory separate property, but not in all states. Contracts concerning such property are, therefore enforceable.

(a) In some states, in equity only.

(b) In other states, at law only.

(c) In other states, either at law or in equity.

Whatever power a married woman has to contract is given her by the statutes, and difficult questions sometimes arise in determining the extent to which the statutes giving the wife the right to hold and enjoy her separate property free from the control of her husband have removed the common-law disability of married women to contract, and there is considerable conflict in the cases on some points. It is clear that, while such statutes give a married woman certain rights in regard to her statutory separate property which she did not have at common law, they fall far short of placing her in the position of a feme sole. They are held to abridge the rights of the husband, and remove the disabilities of the wife, only so far as they expressly do so, and are held not to impliedly abrogate the common law beyond their terms.<sup>69</sup> Such statutes, therefore, in the absence of any enactment allowing married women to contract as if sole, do not enable her to make contracts not connected with her separate property.<sup>70</sup> Of course,

husband as to the right to convey property. *Farmers' State Bank of Ada v. Keen* (Okla.) 167 Pac. 207.

<sup>69</sup> *Speler v. Opfer*, 73 Mich. 35, 40 N. W. 909, 2 L. R. A. 345, 16 Am. St. Rep. 556; *Russel v. People's Sav. Bank*, 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. Rep. 444; and cases hereafter cited. Thus in Michigan, as in some other states, the statute has not given her the power to contract, except in regard to her separate property. It has therefore been held that as real property held by husband and wife jointly is held by them as tenants by the entirety, and cannot be regarded as the wife's separate property, she is not liable on a contract made jointly with her husband for improvements on such property. *Speler v. Opfer*, 73 Mich. 35, 40 N. W. 909, 2 L. R. A. 345, 16 Am. St. Rep. 556; *Curtis v. Crowe*, 74 Mich. 99, 41 N. W. 876. But see *Dreutzer v. Lawrence*, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N. W. 423.

<sup>70</sup> *Russel v. People's Sav. Bank*, 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. Rep. 444; *Speler v.*

when the statute completely removes the disabilities of coverture and gives her power to contract as if sole, a married woman may charge her separate estate by contract as freely as an unmarried woman.<sup>71</sup>

By the statutes of some states the wife is expressly given the power to make contracts "relating to," or "with reference to," or "in respect to," etc., her separate estate.<sup>72</sup> These expressions are generally held to include whatever is necessary to the full enjoyment and use of the property;<sup>73</sup> but a possible incidental benefit,

*Opfer*, 73 Mich. 35, 40 N. W. 909, 2 L. R. A. 845, 16 Am. St. Rep. 556; *Canal Bank v. Partee*, 99 U. S. 325, 25 L. Ed. 390; *Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin*, 12 Idaho, 202, 85 Pac. 497; *Id.*, 14 Idaho, 75, 93 Pac. 504, 17 L. B. A. (N. S.) 676; *State v. Robinson*, 143 N. C. 620, 56 S. E. 918; *Cary v. Dixon*, 51 Miss 593; *Jenne v. Marble*, 37 Mich. 319; *Hodges v. Price*, 18 Fla. 342; *O'Dally v. Morris*, 31 Ind. 111; *McKee v. Reynolds*, 26 Iowa, 578; *Pond v. Carpenter*, 12 Minn. 430 (Gil. 315); *Ritch v. Hyatt*, 3 MacArthur (D. C.) 536. See, also, *Thompson v. Minnich*, 227 Ill. 430, 81 N. E. 336.

<sup>71</sup> Such statutes have been enacted in many states. See *Crum v. Sawyer*, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E. 956; *Young v. McFadden*, 125 Ind. 254, 25 N. E. 284 (except contracts of suretyship); *McCorkle v. Goldsmith*, 60 Mo. App. 475 (except contracts with husband); *Colonial, etc., Mortgage Co. v. Bradley*, 4 S. D. 158, 55 N. W. 1108; *Bogie v. Nelson*, 151 Ky. 443, 152 S. W. 250; *Lyell v. Walbach*, 113 Md. 574, 77 Atl. 1111, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741; *Cooper v. Burel*, 129 Ark. 261, 195 S. W. 356; *McFarland v. Johnson*, 22 Idaho, 694, 127 Pac. 911. And see *Peter Adams Paper Co. v. Cassard*, 206 Pa. 179, 55 Atl. 949.

<sup>72</sup> See the statutes of the various states.

<sup>73</sup> *Marlow v. Barlew*, 53 Cal. 456; *Merrell v. Purdy*, 129 Wis. 331, 109 N. W. 82; *T. G. Northwall Co. v. Osgood*, 80 Neb. 764, 115 N. W. 308; *Blair v. Teel* (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 878; *Ball & Sheppard v. Paquin*, 140 N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307; *Sample v. Guyer*, 143 Ala. 613, 42 South. 106; *Gilbert v. Brown*, 123 Ky. 703, 97 S. W. 40, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1053; *Culberhouse v. Hawthorne*, 107 Ark. 462, 156 S. W. 421; *Bailey v. Fink*, 129 Wis. 373, 109 N. W. 86; *Micou v. McDonald*, 55 Fla. 776, 46 South. 291; *Parker v. Kane*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 346; *Basford v. Pearson*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 504; *Burr v. Swan*, 118 Mass. 588; *Albin v. Lord*, 39 N. H. 196, 202; *Batchelder v. Sargent*, 47 N. H. 262; *McCormick v. Holbrook*, 22 Iowa, 487, 92 Am. Dec. 400. A married woman's agreement to devise is one "concerning or relating" to her separate property within meaning of the statute. *Steinberger v. Young*, 175 Cal. 81, 165 Pac. 432. A married woman living in the home of her husband may bind her separate estate by a contract providing for the payment of a domestic, and, though she at the time owned no separate estate, such contract, upon the married woman's acquiring a separate estate, is upon principles of estoppel binding on such estate. *Bolthouse v. De Spelder*, 181 Mich. 153, 147 N. W. 539. Where, by a contract for the support of C., her married daughters were protected from liability under the statutes for furnishing her support in case she became unable to maintain herself, such contract operated to the benefit of the daughters' separate estates. *Payne v. Payne*, 129 Wis. 450, 109 N. W.

as when a woman indorses a note for the benefit of a corporation in which she is a stockholder, is too remote."<sup>74</sup> "Such a contract," said Judge Cooley, "is not within the words of the statute. Neither is it within the spirit of the statute, for that had in view the relieving of the wife of disabilities which operated unfairly and oppressively, and which hampered her in the control and disposition of her property for the benefit of herself and her family. It was not its purpose to give her a general power to render herself personally responsible upon engagements for any and every consideration which would support a promise at the common law. \* \* \* The test of competency is to be found in this: that it does or does not deal with the individual estate. Possible incidental benefits cannot support it."<sup>75</sup> A contract to sell her separate estate is "in respect to" her separate property;<sup>76</sup> and so, too, is a mortgage thereon.<sup>77</sup>

Notes and other obligations, given for the price of property, on its

105. Under Code N. M. 1915, § 2750, permitting a married woman to enter into any engagement respecting property which she might if unmarried, a note is an "engagement respecting property," which she may make, although enforceable only against her separate property. *First Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Flournoy*, 24 N. M. 256, 171 Pac. 793.

<sup>74</sup> *Russel v. People's Sav. Bank*, 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. Rep. 444.

<sup>75</sup> Where a married woman executed a note for her brother's benefit, the mere hope that by bettering her brother's financial condition by the proceeds of such note he might be able to repay other money due her, was not a "benefit" to her estate contemplated by the statute. *First Nat. Bank of Freehold v. Rutter*, 91 N. J. Law, 424, 104 Atl. 138, affirmed 92 N. J. Law, 621, 106 Atl. 371.

<sup>76</sup> *Dunn v. Stowers*, 104 Va. 290, 51 S. E. 366; *Basford v. Pearson*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 504; *Baker v. Hathaway*, 5 Allen (Mass.) 103; *Richmond v. Tibbles*, 26 Iowa, 474. See, also, *Dobbins v. Thomas*, 26 App. D. C. 157, holding that a contract made by a married woman for the exchange of real estate and for the purchase of personal property must, under Code, § 1156 (31 Stat. 1374, c. 854), be deemed to have been made with reference to her separate estate; there being no contrary intent expressed. Compare *Isphording v. Wolfe*, 36 Ind. App. 250, 75 N. E. 598, holding that a contract to pay for services rendered by a broker on the sale of the land of a married woman was valid.

<sup>77</sup> *Marlow v. Barlew*, 53 Cal. 456; *Messer v. Smyth*, 58 N. H. 298; *Collier v. Doe ex dem. Alexander*, 142 Ala. 422, 38 South. 244; *Mercantile Exch. Bank v. Taylor*, 51 Fla. 473, 41 South. 22. Power to borrow money, see *Feather v. Feather's Estate*, 116 Mich. 384, 74 N. W. 524; *June v. Labadie*, 138 Mich. 52, 100 N. W. 996; *Arnold v. McBride*, 78 Ark. 275, 93 S. W. 989; *SIDWAY v. NICHOL*, 62 Ark. 146, 34 S. W. 529, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 98; *Scott v. Collier*, 166 Ind. 644, 78 N. E. 184; *Blair v. Teel* (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 878; *Rood v. Wright*, 124 Ga. 849, 53 S. E. 390.

purchase by her, have been held to be contracts "in respect to" her separate property,<sup>78</sup> though there are cases holding the contrary.<sup>79</sup>

Many illustrations might be cited to show that the general rule is that a married woman has no powers now which she did not have at common law, except such as are given her by the statute and such as are necessarily implied as incidental thereto.<sup>80</sup> Thus, where a statute authorized a married woman "to contract, sell, transfer, mortgage, convey, devise, and bequeath" her separate statutory property "in the same manner and with like effect as if unmarried," a transfer of a note owned by a married woman, by indorsement, as collateral security for the debt of another, was held void, as the statute did not empower her to enter into a contract of suretyship.<sup>81</sup>

It has been shown in the preceding section that, under a statute providing that a married woman shall have the same rights over

<sup>78</sup> *Messer v. Smyth*, 58 N. H. 298; *Scott v. Collier*, 166 Ind. 644, 78 N. E. 184; *Nadel v. Weber Bros. Shoe Co.*, 70 Fla. 218, 70 South. 20, L. R. A. 1916D, 1230; *Rogers v. Eaton*, 181 Mich. 620, 148 N. W. 348; *Booth Mercantile Co. v. Murphy*, 14 Idaho, 212, 93 Pac. 777; *Merrell v. Purdy*, 129 Wis. 331, 109 N. W. 82; *Dailey v. Singer Manufacturing Co.*, 88 Mo. 301; *Tillman v. Shackleton*, 15 Mich. 447, 93 Am. Dec. 198; *Kriz v. Peege*, 119 Wis. 106, 95 N. W. 108. Under the New York married woman's act, a married woman may borrow money and purchase upon credit any property necessary or convenient for the purpose of commencing, as well as carrying on, a trade or business. *Frecking v. Rolland*, 53 N. Y. 422. A mortgage made by a married woman as part of the transaction by which she gains title to the land is valid, though it also secures a debt of her husband or some other person. *Conkling v. Levie*, 66 Neb. 132, 94 N. W. 987, 988. And, to the same effect, see *Bateman v. Cherokee Fertilizer Co.*, 21 Ga. App. 158, 93 S. E. 1021. Under G. L. Vt. 3521, a married woman may buy real estate and bind herself for its payment, and that she has no separate estate does not affect her personal liability. *Seaver v. Lang*, 92 Vt. 501, 104 Atl. 877. A married woman, buying a horse and using it in business, is liable for the price. *People's Trust Co. v. Merrill*, 78 N. H. 540, 102 Atl. 827.

<sup>79</sup> *Jones v. Crosthwaite*, 17 Iowa, 393; *Schneider v. Garland*, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 350; *Carpenter v. Mitchell*, 50 Ill. 470.

<sup>80</sup> *Bailey v. Fink*, 129 Wis. 373, 109 N. W. 86; *Citizens' State Bank of Wood River v. Smout*, 62 Neb. 223, 86 N. W. 1068; *Stack v. Padden*, 111 Wis. 42, 86 N. W. 568; *Burns v. Cooper*, 140 Fed. 273, 72 C. C. A. 25; *Smith v. Howe*, 31 Ind. 233; *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82; *Farmers' Bank v. Boyd*, 67 Neb. 497, 93 N. W. 676.

<sup>81</sup> *Russel v. People's Sav. Bank*, 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. Rep. 444. See, also, *Hall v. Hall*, 118 Ky. 656, 82 S. W. 269; *Garrigue v. Kellar*, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. 523, 69 L. R. A. 870, 108 Am. St. Rep. 324; *Field v. Campbell*, 164 Ind. 389, 72 N. E. 260, 108 Am. St. Rep. 301; *Sample v. Guyer*, 143 Ala. 613, 42 South. 106; *Gross v. Whiteley*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94.

her separate property as if unmarried, she has the right to dispose of it,<sup>82</sup> or to agree to dispose of it,<sup>83</sup> but that the *jus disponendi* will not be implied from a bare *jus tenendi*; <sup>84</sup> that, for instance, a statute giving the right to hold, own, possess, and enjoy,<sup>85</sup> or to hold to her sole and separate use as if she were a single female,<sup>86</sup> does not include the power to dispose of real estate. It has also been pointed out that in some states it has been held that the rule is different in the case of personalty, and that the *jus disponendi* is a necessary incident to the separate ownership of personal property,<sup>87</sup> but that this distinction is not recognized in all the states.<sup>88</sup> Where there is no express statutory authority to contract, but it is enacted, as in many states, that married women may hold, enjoy, and possess their separate property as if sole, they may make all such contracts as are necessarily incident to such enjoyment;<sup>89</sup> Under such a statute a married woman has been held to have the power to contract for labor and materials for the construction of a hotel on her separate real estate, on the ground that the intention of the statute could not be accomplished unless it also removed the common-law disability to the extent of empowering the wife to make all contracts necessary and convenient to the full enjoyment of her estate.<sup>90</sup> And generally it may be said that she has power to contract and charge her separate estate for improvements thereon <sup>91</sup> for work and labor in the cultivation of her farm <sup>92</sup> and for the

<sup>82</sup> *Beal v. Warren*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 447; ante, p. 202.

<sup>83</sup> *Dreutzer v. Lawrence*, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N. W. 423.

<sup>84</sup> *Miller v. Wetherby*, 12 Iowa, 415. And see *Cole v. Van Riper*, 44 Ill. 58; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287; ante, p. 202.

<sup>85</sup> *Cole v. Van Riper*, 44 Ill. 58; *Bressler v. Kent*, 61 Ill. 426; 14 Am. Rep. 67.

<sup>86</sup> *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287.

<sup>87</sup> *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. Law, 287; *Harding v. Cobb*, 47 Miss. 599; *Beard v. Dedolph*, 29 Wis. 136; ante, p. 203.

<sup>88</sup> *Swift v. Luce*, 27 Me. 285; *Brown v. Fifield*, 4 Mich. 322; *Scott v. Scott*, 13 Ind. 225; *Moore v. Cornell*, 68 Pa. 320.

<sup>89</sup> *Conway v. Smith*, 13 Wis. 140; *Cookson v. Toole*, 59 Ill. 519; *Williams v. Hugunin*, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; *Smith v. Howe*, 31 Ind. 233; *Lindley v. Cross*, Id. 106, 99 Am. Dec. 610; *Duren v. Getchell*, 55 Me. 241; *Mahon v. Gormley*, 24 Pa. 80; *Wright v. Blackwood*, 57 Tex. 644.

<sup>90</sup> *Conway v. Smith*, 13 Wis. 140.

<sup>91</sup> *Bankard v. Shaw*, 199 Pa. 623, 49 Atl. 230; *Popp v. Connery*, 138 Mich. 84, 101 N. W. 54, 110 Am. St. Rep. 304; *McAnally v. Hawkins Lumber Co.*,

<sup>92</sup> *Cookson v. Toole*, 59 Ill. 515.

purchase of the necessary tools and live stock for the farm.<sup>93</sup> So, too, in many states she may bind her estate for necessities and family expenses.<sup>94</sup>

While the courts have generally said that married women's separate property acts, being in derogation of common law, will be strictly construed, this does not mean that the court can refuse to give full effect to their terms. It was said in a leading case, under a statute making it lawful for a feme covert to acquire title to real estate by gift or grant, and to hold it as her separate estate, that the contract of a married woman to assume the payment of a mortgage as part of the purchase money for land conveyed to her was valid; that the law did not intend that she could acquire property without paying for it; and that the power to acquire and hold included the right to do all acts reasonably necessary in acquiring and holding.<sup>95</sup> As has been said by the Pennsylvania court: "Her power to purchase gives her a right to contract for the payment of the purchase money so far as to charge the property with such incumbrance as may be agreed upon to secure its payment."<sup>96</sup>

*Power to Charge Separate Property for Debts of Husband*

The statutes creating the separate estate of married women usually provide that the property shall be held by the wife free from the debts of her husband,<sup>97</sup> though it is recognized in many jurisdictions that her property may be held liable for her husband's debts if he is allowed to deal with it as his own with her consent

109 Ala. 397, 19 South. 417; Vail v. Meyer, 71 Ind. 159; Colvin v. Currier, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 371; Micou v. McDonald, 55 Fla. 776, 46 South. 291; Reid v. Miller, 205 Mass. 80, 91 N. E. 223; Lemons v. Biddy (Tex. Civ. App.) 149 S. W. 1065 (contract for digging well).

<sup>93</sup> Batchelder v. Sargent, 47 N. H. 262.

<sup>94</sup> See ante, p. 83.

<sup>95</sup> Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504. And see, to the same effect, Tiemeyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516, 39 Am. Rep. 674; Edwards v. Stacey, 113 Tenn. 257, 82 S. W. 470, 106 Am. St. Rep. 831; Crosby v. Waters, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 559; Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103, 31 Am. Rep. 437; Bower's Appeal, 68 Pa. 128.

<sup>96</sup> Bower's Appeal, 68 Pa. 128.

<sup>97</sup> See the statutes of the various states. And see Humbird Lumber Co. v. Doran, 24 Idaho, 507, 135 Pac. 66; Alsdurf v. Williams, 196 Ill. 244, 63 N. E. 686; Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N. Y. 293; Frost v. Knapp, 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 296; Smith v. Gott, 51 W. Va. 141, 41 S. E. 175; Elliott v. Atkinson, 45 Ind. App. 290, 90 N. E. 779; Burnham v. Stoutt, 35 Utah, 250, 99 Pac. 1070; In re Hill (D. C.) 190 Fed. 390; Farmers' State Bank v. Keen (Okla.) 167 Pac. 207. The provisions of the statute refer to such debts as were exclusively those of the

and knowledge.<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless, the question has often arisen whether the wife has power to charge her estate with such debts. Attention has already been called to the fact that in most states the wife is prohibited from entering into a contract of suretyship,<sup>99</sup> and that as a general rule, in the absence of a statute giving her unlimited power to contract, she can charge her separate estate only by contracts with reference thereto and for the benefit of herself or her estate.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with these rules it is generally held that a married woman cannot charge her separate estate by a contract of suretyship for the purpose of securing her husband's debt, or by an assumption of his debt.<sup>2</sup> So it has been held that she cannot sell her property to a creditor of the husband in extinguishment of his debt.<sup>3</sup> It is, however, generally conceded that she may borrow money and give it to her husband to be used in the payment

husband, and not debts which are primarily a charge against the wife's estate. *Schneider v. Breler's Estate*, 129 Wis. 446, 109 N. W. 99, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 917.

<sup>98</sup> *Wood v. Yant*, 27 Colo. App. 189, 149 Pac. 854; *O'Farrell v. Vickrage*, 163 Ill. App. 519; *Lamb v. Lamb*, 18 App. Div. 250, 46 N. Y. Supp. 219; *Early v. Wilson*, 31 Neb. 458, 48 N. W. 148; *Mertens v. Schlemme*, 68 N. J. Eq. 544, 59 Atl. 808.

<sup>99</sup> See ante, p. 160.

<sup>1</sup> See ante, p. 205.

<sup>2</sup> *Gross v. Whiteley*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94; *Grosman v. Union Trust Co.*, 228 Fed. 610, 143 C. C. A. 132, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 613, affirmed 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368 (construing Texas statute); *McLeod v. Poe*, 142 Ga. 254, 82 S. E. 663; *Johnson v. Holland* (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 494; *Underhill v. Mayer*, 174 Ky. 229, 192 S. W. 14; *Brady v. Equitable Trust Co., of Dover*, 178 Ky. 693, 199 S. W. 1082; *Red River Nat. Bank v. Ferguson* (Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 1088; *Simmons v. International Harvester Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 358, 96 S. E. 9; *Manor Nat. Bank v. Lowery*, 242 Pa. 559, 89 Atl. 678; *Hamilton v. Moore*, 136 La. 631, 67 South. 523; *Spencer v. Leland*, 178 Ala. 282, 59 South. 593; *Smith v. McDonald*, 49 Ind. App. 464, 97 N. E. 556; *Bauer v. Ambs*, 144 App. Div. 274, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (unless supported by independent consideration). But see *Royal v. Southerland*, 168 N. C. 405, 84 S. E. 708, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 623; *Willard v. Greenwood*, 228 Mass. 549, 117 N. E. 823. Notes signed by husband and wife, in consideration of payee's forbearance to sue on husband's account, were based on a good consideration as to the wife. *Markel v. De Francesco*, 93 Conn. 355, 105 Atl. 703. Extension of time of payment of husband's debt is good consideration as to the wife. *O. W. Schultz Lumber Co. v. Robinson* (S. D.) 169 N. W. 526. Under Laws Ark. 1915, p. 684, § 1, a married woman may be sued and judgment obtained on her note and open account, the consideration of which was a debt of her husband to plaintiff. *Holland v. Bond*, 125 Ark. 526, 189 S. W. 165.

<sup>3</sup> *Gross v. Whiteley*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94.

of his debts, or may so apply it directly,<sup>4</sup> or she may sell her property—the purchaser not being a creditor—and apply the proceeds to the payment of her husband's debts.<sup>5</sup>

In determining the validity of contracts the effect of which is to charge the separate estate, an important, and, indeed, controlling, element is whether there is manifest an intent to charge;<sup>6</sup> such intent being shown in the instrument itself.<sup>7</sup> Thus it has been held that a married woman may make a valid mortgage to secure her husband's debt, as the intent to charge her separate estate is thereby manifested.<sup>8</sup> The liability is, however, limited to the prop-

<sup>4</sup> *Gross v. Whiteley*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94; *Sample v. Guyer*, 143 Ala. 613, 42 South. 106; *Rood v. Wright*, 124 Ga. 849, 53 S. E. 390; *Allen v. National Bank of Tifton*, 14 Ga. App. 299, 80 S. E. 697. The creditor must act in good faith. *Ginsberg v. People's Bank of Savannah*, 145 Ga. 815, 89 S. E. 1086; *Warren v. Crow*, 198 Ala. 670, 73 South. 989. The statute providing that the separate property of the wife shall not be liable for the husband's debts was not designed to prevent a married woman from borrowing money or to deny her the right to discharge her husband's debts or to do with her money as she pleases, and a lender's rights are not prejudiced by the wife's disposition of the money borrowed upon her note, provided the transaction is not a subterfuge to evade the statute, or a scheme to procure the obligation of the wife as surety for her husband or another. *Third Nat. Bank v. Tierney*, 128 Ky. 836, 110 S. W. 293, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 418, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 81. Where defendant's husband applied for a loan which plaintiff refused to him, but granted the loan to defendant on her note, and she received no benefit, she is not liable thereon. *Oswald v. Jones*, 254 Pa. 32, 98 Atl. 784. Where the wife borrows money from her husband's creditor and hands it back in payment of her husband's debt, she becomes, though by indirection, a surety on her husband's debt, within the prohibition of Code 1907, § 4497. *Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Leftwich*, 197 Ala. 352, 72 South. 538.

<sup>5</sup> *Gross v. Whiteley*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94. See, also, *Kriz v. Peege*, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108.

<sup>6</sup> *Yale v. Dederer*, 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; *Williams v. Hugunin*, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82.

<sup>7</sup> *Yale v. Dederer*, 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82. See, also, *Ankeney v. Hannon*, 147 U. S. 118, 13 Sup. Ct. 206, 37 L. Ed. 105, where it was held that, even if the contract shows an intent to charge the wife's separate estate, it will not be extended to cover after-acquired property. To the same effect, see *Sticken v. Schmidt*, 64 Ohio St. 354, 60 N. E. 561.

<sup>8</sup> *Watts v. Gantt*, 42 Neb. 869, 61 N. W. 104; *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82; *Goodrum v. Merchants' & Planters' Bank*, 102 Ark. 326, 144 S. W. 198, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 511; *Colonial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin*, 85 N. J. Eq. 455, 96 Atl. 901; *Young v. Brown*, 136 Tenn. 184, 188 S. W. 1149; *Red River Nat. Bank v. Ferguson (Tex.)* 206 S. W. 923 affirming 192 S. W. 1088; *Brady v. Equitable Trust Co. of Dover*, 178 Ky. 693, 199 S. W. 1062; *Miller v. Sanders*, 98 Ky. 535, 33 S. W. 621.

erty in regard to which the intent is thus shown, and there can be no judgment for a deficiency against the wife.<sup>9</sup>

*Equitable or Legal Jurisdiction*

Contracts which, before the passage of these acts, were binding in equity on the wife's equitable separate estate, are under most statutes binding in equity on the wife's statutory separate estate. While the wife's separate estate is purely a legal one under the statute, it is held in most states that equity nevertheless has jurisdiction to charge the legal estate under such circumstances as would render it liable if the separate estate were a creation of equity.<sup>10</sup> "The jurisdiction of a court of equity," it has been said, "over the subject [separate property] does not rest upon the ground that the estate of the wife is an equitable estate merely, but upon the ground that it is her separate estate, which is equitably subject to contracts and engagements entered into by her which are not legally binding upon her personally, and which cannot be enforced by law."<sup>11</sup> In some states equitable jurisdiction over legal separate property is denied.<sup>12</sup>

She may pledge her personal property to secure the husband's debt. *Just v. State Savings Bank*, 132 Mich. 600, 94 N. W. 200; *Wingman v. Miller*, 98 Ky. 620, 33 S. W. 937; *Bartholomew v. Allentown Nat. Bank*, 260 Pa. 509, 103 Atl. 954. But see *Trotter Bros. v. Downs*, 200 Ala. 158, 75 South. 906, holding that under Code Ala. 1907, § 4497, wife cannot indirectly become surety for husband by mortgaging her property to secure money with which to pay his debt. And see *Washburn v. Gray*, 49 Ind. App. 271, 97 N. E. 190. A deed executed by a wife to secure a loan contemporaneously made to the husband is void. *Gross v. Whitely*, 128 Ga. 79, 57 S. E. 94.

<sup>9</sup> *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82; *Goll v. Fehr*, 131 Wis. 141, 111 N. W. 235; *Edwards v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.*, 173 N. C. 614, 92 S. E. 695.

<sup>10</sup> 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1099; *Yale v. Dederer*, 18 N. Y. 265, 272, 72 Am. Dec. 503; *Ballin v. Dillaye*, 37 N. Y. 35; *Perkins v. Elliott*, 23 N. J. Eq. 526; *Levi v. Earl*, 30 Ohio St. 147; *Phillips v. Graves*, 20 Ohio St. 371, 389, 5 Am. Rep. 675; *Cox's Adm'r v. Wood*, 20 Ind. 54; *Pond v. Carpenter*, 12 Minn. 430 (Gil. 315); *Hall v. Dotson*, 55 Tex. 520; *Wicks v. Mitchell*, 9 Kan. 80; *Todd v. Lee*, 15 Wis. 365; *Donovan's Appeal*, 41 Conn. 551; *Johnson v. Cummins*, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 105, 84 Am. Dec. 142.

<sup>11</sup> *Johnson v. Cummins*, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142. See, also, *Carpenter v. Mitchell*, 50 Ill. 470. A married woman is not bound in personam by her contract, but her separate property may be charged in equity and sold for its purchase money or for money or labor expended in improving it or upon her agreement in writing made for its benefit. *Kelliher v. Kennard*, 75 Fla. 665, 79 South. 28.

<sup>12</sup> *West v. Laraway*, 28 Mich. 464; *Cain v. Bunkley*, 35 Miss. 119, 145; *MacClay v. Love*, 25 Cal. 367, 85 Am. Dec. 133. Compare *Vall v. Meyer*, 71 Ind. 159.

Such contracts as can be made by a married woman under express statutory provision, as incident to her separate property, and such contracts as she can make, as necessary to the separate enjoyment of her property, can be enforced in some states by actions at law. The court says in *Conway v. Smith*<sup>13</sup> that it could not be assumed that the Legislature intended to rely on equitable aid to help out the objects of the statute, and that it necessarily follows that the contracts contemplated by the statute can be enforced by legal remedies. It was held in that case that an action at law would lie on a promissory note. And in *Cookson v. Toole*<sup>14</sup> an action at law for work and labor was sustained, the court holding that "the implication of capacity to contract in respect to her separate property, arising under the statute, is an implication of law, and, being an implication of law, and not of equity, the capacity to contract within the scope of the implication is necessarily a legal capacity and all contracts under it must be legal contracts, cognizable by courts of law." In the leading case of *Yale v. Dederer*,<sup>15</sup> however, under a similar statute, it was said that the statute does not remove the legal incapacity which prevents a married woman from contracting debts. When a married woman's contracts can be enforced at law, such remedy has been held in some states not to be exclusive, but cumulative, and that equity has concurrent jurisdiction.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 13 Wis. 125; *Krouskop v. Shontz*, 51 Wis. 204, 8 N. W. 241, 37 Am. Rep. 817. But see *Merrell v. Purdy*, 129 Wis. 331, 109 N. W. 82, holding that a married woman may, by proper instrument, charge her separate property for any obligation, even for her husband's debt, but the charge is only enforceable in equity.

<sup>14</sup> 59 Ill. 515. See, also, *Williams v. Hugunin*, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; *Todd v. Lee*, 15 Wis. 365.

<sup>15</sup> 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503.

<sup>16</sup> *Phillips v. Graves*, 20 Ohio St. 371, 5 Am. Rep. 675; *Mitchell v. Otey*, 23 Miss. 236; *Johnson v. Cummins*, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 80.

## CHAPTER VI

## ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS

- 83. Antenuptial Settlements.
- 84. Marriage as a Consideration.
- 85. Reasonableness of Provision for Wife.
- 86. Settlements Based on Antenuptial Agreements.
- 87. Statute of Frauds.
- 88-90. Postnuptial Settlements.
- 91-92. As against Creditors and Purchasers.

## ANTENUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS

83. An antenuptial settlement or marriage settlement is an agreement entered into before marriage, and in consideration thereof, between an intended husband and wife, or between them and third persons, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. A marriage settlement—
- (a) May determine the rights which the husband and wife shall have in his or her own, or in each other's, property.
  - (b) But, as a rule, it cannot otherwise vary the rights and obligations of husband and wife, arising from the marriage relation.

The term "settlement" is ordinarily applied to agreements entered into before marriage, and in contemplation and consideration thereof, by which the enjoyment and devolution of property is regulated.<sup>1</sup> In its broadest sense, however, the term applies also to settlements or agreements made after marriage. In the former case they are called "antenuptial settlements," and in the latter case they are called "postnuptial settlements." The term "marriage settlement" is often applied to agreements entered into after marriage—that is, to postnuptial settlements; but this use of the term is improper. A marriage settlement is essentially an agreement entered into before marriage, and in consideration thereof.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Corker v. Corker*, 87 Cal. 643, 25 Pac. 922.

<sup>2</sup> An assignment in consideration of a promise to marry is not an antenuptial contract within the Massachusetts statute (Rev. Laws, c. 153, §§ 26, 27). *Huntress v. Hanley*, 195 Mass. 230, 80 N. E. 946. An oral agreement, entered into and reduced to writing before marriage and signed after marriage, settling on intended wife a lot owned by intended husband and such

The term therefore includes antenuptial settlements only. Marriage settlements may have various objects in view. Ordinarily, the purpose is to alter the interests which the husband and wife would have in their own and in each other's property by the law of the marriage status, and to fix the same according to their own agreement; to preserve property intact in a particular family, or the issue of the contemplated union; or to prevent the dissipation of the property of either party by extravagance.<sup>2</sup> The purpose in most cases is to protect the wife and children against want from the possible loss or dissipation of property by the husband. "These marriage settlements are benignly intended to secure to the wife a certain support in any event, and to guard her against being overwhelmed by the misfortunes or unkindness or vices of her husband. They usually proceed from the prudence or foresight of friends, or the warm and anxious affection of parents; and, if fairly made, they ought to be supported according to the true intent and meaning of the instrument by which they are created. A court of equity will carry the intention of these settlements into effect, and not permit the intention to be defeated."<sup>4</sup>

The ordinary rules governing the construction of contracts apply to antenuptial settlements.<sup>5</sup> In so far as the contract is ambiguous the situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances may be considered.<sup>6</sup> The intention of the parties is controlling and must govern,<sup>7</sup> and in carrying this intention into effect antenuptial contracts should be liberally construed without regard to the strictly technical meaning of the words used,<sup>8</sup> and if

personal property as he might possess at his death, if she was then living as his wife and survived, in lieu of all rights, was in effect an antenuptial contract. *Haraldson v. Knutson*, 142 Minn. 109, 171 N. W. 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Crumlish v. Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co.*, 8 Del. Ch. 375, 68 Atl. 388.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 165; *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 399, 3 Am. Dec. 657; *McLeod v. Board*, 30 Tex. 238, 94 Am. Dec. 301; *Crosthwaite v. Hutchinson*, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 407, 5 Am. Dec. 619.

<sup>5</sup> *Landes v. Landes*, 268 Ill. 11, 108 N. E. 691. The law of the state where an antenuptial agreement was made and the marriage was celebrated will govern the rights of the parties. *New Jersey Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Parker*, 85 N. J. Eq. 557, 96 Atl. 574, affirming decree *New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Same*, 84 N. J. Eq. 351, 93 Atl. 196.

<sup>6</sup> *In re Hubinger's Estate*, 150 Iowa, 307, 130 N. W. 155.

<sup>7</sup> *Gordan v. Munn*, 88 Kan. 72, 127 Pac. 764, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 783, denying rehearing 87 Kan. 624, 125 Pac. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 783; *In re Deller's Estate*, 141 Wis. 225, 124 N. W. 278, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751.

<sup>8</sup> *Collins v. Bauman*, 125 Ky. 846, 102 S. W. 815.

the language used is ambiguous so as to admit of more than one construction, that most favorable to the wife should be adopted.<sup>9</sup>

There is no rule of law nor principle of public policy which prevents husband and wife from thus fixing, by an agreement before marriage, the rights which they shall have in each other's property.<sup>10</sup> Such agreements in so far as they provide for the control and disposition of the property of the parties during the marriage, and in the case of death of either, are generally recognized as valid by the courts, and especially by courts of equity.<sup>11</sup> By these agreements they may relinquish the rights in each other's property which they would otherwise acquire therein by virtue of the marriage.<sup>12</sup> Thus, they may relinquish their distributive shares in each other's estate<sup>13</sup> or the wife may bar her dower, or the husband

<sup>9</sup> *Mallow v. Eastes*, 179 Ind. 267, 100 N. E. 836; *In re Deller's Estate*, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N. W. 278, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751; *Oesau v. Oesau's Estate*, 157 Wis. 255, 147 N. W. 62.

<sup>10</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 163; *Campion v. Cotton*, 17 Ves. 264; *Appleby v. Appleby*, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 117 Am. St. Rep. 709, 10 Ann. Cas. 563; *Kroell v. Kroell*, 219 Ill. 105, 76 N. E. 63, 4 Ann. Cas. 801; *Rieger v. Schaible*, 81 Neb. 33, 115 N. W. 560, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 866, 16 Ann. Cas. 700; *Andrews v. Jones*, 10 Ala. 400; *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 398, 3 Am. Dec. 657; *Boardman's Appeal*, 40 Conn. 169; *Caulk v. Fox*, 13 Fla. 148; *Hanley v. Drumm*, 31 La. Ann. 106; *Peck v. Peck*, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; *McLeod v. Board*, 30 Tex. 239, 244, 94 Am. Dec. 301; *Woods v. Richardson*, 117 Mass. 276; *Baldwin v. Carter*, 17 Conn. 201, 42 Am. Dec. 735. See, also, *In re Hope-Johnstone*, 73 Law J. Ch. 321 [1904] 1 Ch. 470, 90 Law T. 253, 20 Times Law R. 282, when, however, a postnuptial settlement was involved.

<sup>11</sup> *Becker v. Becker*, 241 Ill. 423, 89 N. E. 737, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 858.

<sup>12</sup> See the cases cited in note 10. And see *Wetsel v. Firebaugh*, 258 Ill. 404, 101 N. E. 602; *Rankin v. Schiereck*, 166 Iowa, 10, 147 N. W. 180. The prospective spouses may relinquish their respective property rights aside from the homestead. *In re Adams' Estate*, 161 Iowa, 88, 140 N. W. 872. Compare *Wels v. Bach*, 146 Iowa, 320, 125 N. W. 211. And see *Swingle v. Swingle*, 36 N. D. 611, 162 N. W. 912, holding that an antenuptial agreement relating to homestead exemptions is void as contrary to public policy. In order that a marriage settlement may restrict a wife's power to control and dispose of her future acquired property, real and personal, the language of the instrument, especially since the Constitution of 1868, should be plain, and the intent to do so unequivocal. *Dunlap v. Hill*, 145 N. C. 312, 59 S. E. 112.

<sup>13</sup> *Glover v. Bates*, 1 Atk. 439; *Tarbell v. Tarbell*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 278; *Adams v. Dickson*, 23 Ga. 406; *McLeod v. Board*, 30 Tex. 238, 94 Am. Dec. 301; *Crostwaight v. Hutchinson*, 2 Bibb. (Ky.) 407, 5 Am. Dec. 619. An antenuptial contract, whereby the husband agreed to accept in relinquishment of his rights an income of \$10,000 annually on the death of his wife, the income to cease in the event of his marriage, cutting off the homestead rights of the husband and his statutory one-third interest in his wife's property,

his curtesy.<sup>14</sup> The husband may agree that his wife may retain all her own property to her sole and separate use, and he may settle his own property on her.<sup>15</sup> The agreement may relate to after-acquired property,<sup>16</sup> and the devolution of the property of either or both may be regulated.<sup>17</sup>

Marriage settlements being intended primarily to guard the property interests of the parties, and especially to protect the wife against changes in her husband's fortune, are confined in their subject-matter to rights in property,<sup>18</sup> and so far as property rights are concerned the law does not regard such agreements as contrary to public policy. As a rule, however, aside from the interest which the husband and wife shall take in each other's property, the rights and obligations arising from the marriage relation cannot be varied by agreement between husband and wife,<sup>19</sup> or between both or either of them and third persons. A husband, for instance, by merely agreeing to pay his wife a stipulated allowance, cannot always relieve himself of his common-law liability to pay for her necessities, if the allowance is insufficient.<sup>20</sup> Nor can an arrangement whereby a married woman lives apart from her husband, and has a separate maintenance secured to her, change the legal character of her relations to her husband, so as to enable her to

is not prohibited by law, and is valid. *Appleby v. Appleby*, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 117 Am. St. Rep. 709, 10 Ann. Cas. 563.

<sup>14</sup> *Charles v. Andrews*, 9 Mod. 151; *Simpson v. Gutteridge*, 1 Madd. 609; *Williams v. Chitty*, 3 Ves. 551; *Selleck v. Selleck*, 8 Conn. 85; *Stilley v. Folger*, 14 Ohio, 610; *Mines v. Phee*, 254 Ill. 60, 98 N. E. 260; *Tilton v. Tilton*, 130 Ky. 281, 113 S. W. 134, 132 Am. St. Rep. 359; *Collins v. Collins*, 212 Mass. 131, 98 N. E. 588; *Jacobs v. Jacobs*, 42 Iowa, 600; *Naill v. Maurer*, 25 Md. 532.

<sup>15</sup> *Baldwin v. Carter*, 17 Conn. 201, 42 Am. Dec. 735.

<sup>16</sup> *Dunlap v. Hill*, 145 N. C. 312, 59 S. E. 112; *Borland v. Welch*, 162 N. Y. 104, 56 N. E. 556; *Cole v. American Baptist Home Mission Soc.*, 64 N. H. 445, 14 Atl. 78; *In re Reis*, 73 Law J. K. B. 929, [1904] 2 K. B. 769, 91 Law T. 592, 53 Wkly. Rep. 122, 11 Manson, 229, 20 Times Law R. 547.

<sup>17</sup> *Davies v. Davies*, 1 Law J. Ch. (N. S.) 31; *Hunter v. Bryant*, 2 Wheat. 32, 4 L. Ed. 177; *Camp v. Smith*, 61 Ga. 449; *Jacobs v. Jacobs*, 42 Iowa, 600; *Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 202, 32 Am. Rep. 661.

<sup>18</sup> *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) § 171; *Isaacs v. Isaacs*, 71 Neb. 537, 99 N. W. 268.

<sup>19</sup> *Isaacs v. Isaacs*, 71 Neb. 537, 99 N. W. 268; *Clopton v. Clopton*, 162 Cal. 27, 121 Pac. 720; *Christian v. Hanks*, 22 Ga. 125; *Obermayer v. Greenleaf*, 42 Mo. 304.

<sup>20</sup> *Nurse v. Craig*, 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 148; *Clopton v. Clopton*, 162 Cal. 27, 121 Pac. 720; ante, p. 175.

contract and be sued as a feme sole.<sup>21</sup> Nor can a settlement whereby all a wife's property is conveyed in trust for her separate use,<sup>22</sup> nor an express agreement that the husband shall not be liable,<sup>23</sup> relieve him from his common-law liability for her antenuptial debts. And an antenuptial agreement by which a husband agreed not to change his domicile has been held void, as an attempt to abridge a legal right of the husband incident to the marriage status.<sup>24</sup>

### MARRIAGE AS A CONSIDERATION

84. Marriage is a sufficient consideration to support an antenuptial settlement.

(a) In favor of

- (1) The husband and wife and their issue, or the issue of a former marriage.
- (2) Collateral relatives, where it is clear that it was intended to provide for them.
- (3) But not in favor of mere strangers.

(b) As against

- (1) The settlor.
- (2) The settlor's creditors, in favor of an innocent beneficiary, though the settlor was insolvent, and intended to defraud his creditors.
- (3) But not as against creditors if the beneficiary participated in the fraudulent intent, or knew of it.

Nothing is better settled than that marriage is a sufficient consideration to support an antenuptial settlement as against the settlor.<sup>25</sup> It has been said by Mr. Justice Story to be a consideration

<sup>21</sup> *Marshall v. Rutton*, 8 Term R. 545; *Prentiss v. Paisley*, 25 Fla. 927, 7 South. 56, 7 L. R. A. 640.

<sup>22</sup> *Powell v. Manson*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 177, 193.

<sup>23</sup> *Harrison v. Traher*, 27 Ark. 288.

<sup>24</sup> *Hair v. Hair*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 163; *Isaacs v. Isaacs*, 71 Neb. 537, 90 N. W. 268; ante, p. 88. An agreement between parties about to be married that the wife shall live with her husband at the home of his parents is an antenuptial contract merged in the marriage contract and of no binding force. *Marshak v. Marshak*, 115 Ark. 51, 170 S. W. 567, L. R. A. 1915E, 161, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 206.

<sup>25</sup> *Valzey*, Set. Prop. 70; *Unger v. Mellinger*, 37 Ind. App. 639, 77 N. E. 814, 117 Am. St. Rep. 348; *Pierce v. Vansell*, 35 Ind. App. 525, 74 N. E. 554; *Colbert v. Rings*, 231 Ill. 404, 93 N. E. 274; *Hosmer v. Tiffany*, 115 App. Div. 303, 100 N. Y. Supp. 707; *Graves v. Von Below*, 160 Mich. 408, 125 N.

"of the highest value,"<sup>26</sup> and by Chancellor Kent to be "the highest consideration in law."<sup>27</sup> In a Massachusetts case it was said that an obligatory agreement to marry is an equally high consideration, not differing substantially from the consideration of marriage, and sufficient to support an antenuptial settlement, though the settlor's death prevented the marriage.<sup>28</sup> In order that a promise to marry, not followed by the marriage contemplated, may support a settlement, the settlement must have been made in consideration of the promise; and the settlement should show very clearly that such was the intention of the parties, to authorize a court to hold that the settlement was not conditional upon a marriage actually taking place. It has been held that, where the agreement to marry is rescinded by the parties, there is an entire failure of consideration.<sup>29</sup> The same should be true where the agreement is discharged by the death of one of the parties.

It is well settled that the marriage will support a settlement in favor of the husband and wife and their issue,<sup>30</sup> or the children of a former marriage.<sup>31</sup> It seems equally well settled that it will

W. 379; *Henry v. Butler*, 87 Kan. 122, 123 Pac. 742; *In re Adams' Estate*, 161 Iowa, 88, 140 N. W. 872; *Ex parte Marsh*, 1 Atk. 158; *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752; *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. 348, 8 L. Ed. 709; *Kroell v. Kroell*, 219 Ill. 105, 76 N. E. 63, 4 Ann. Cas. 801; *Broadrick v. Broadrick*, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 225; *Nesmith v. Platt*, 137 Iowa, 292, 114 N. W. 1053. And see *Appleby v. Appleby*, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 117 Am. St. Rep. 709, 10 Ann. Cas. 563, holding that, though the original engagement of marriage be absolute and entered into some months preceding the making and signing of an antenuptial contract, the agreement to marry remains a consideration for that contract, and sufficient to support it. An antenuptial contract executed by a prospective wife alone in consideration of marriage and a specified sum is not void merely because the money consideration was not paid at the time or within the lifetime of the husband. *Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen*, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

<sup>26</sup> *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. 348, 8 L. Ed. 709.

<sup>27</sup> *Sterry v. Arden*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 271.

<sup>28</sup> *Smith v. Allen*, 5 Allen (Mass.) 454, 81 Am. Dec. 758.

<sup>29</sup> *Essery v. Cowlard*, 26 Ch. Div. 191.

<sup>30</sup> 1 Valzey, Set. Prop. 141; *Schouler*, Husb. & W. § 349; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 1 P. Wms. 622; *Herring v. Wickham*, 29 Grat. (Va.) 628, 26 Am. Rep. 405; *Vason v. Bell*, 53 Ga. 416; *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 399, 3 Am. Dec. 657.

<sup>31</sup> *Gale v. Gale*, 6 Ch. Div. 144; *Michael v. Morey*, 26 Md. 239, 90 Am. Dec. 106; *Vason v. Bell*, 53 Ga. 416. In *Michael v. Morey*, supra, it was said: "The consideration of marriage is a valuable consideration, and not only sustains covenants in favor of the wife and the issue of the marriage, but also covenants for settlements in favor of children of a former marriage, as a moral consideration. The children are regarded as purchasers. They

not support a settlement in favor of entire strangers.<sup>33</sup> Whether it will support a settlement in favor of collateral relatives is a question upon which the authorities are conflicting. In England, by the weight of authority, the general rule is to exclude them.<sup>34</sup> But there are cases which recognize an exception to the general rule, and hold that a settlement will be supported even in favor of collateral relatives if there is something over and above the consideration flowing from the immediate parties to the settlement, from which it can be inferred that the collateral relatives were intended to be provided for, and that, if the provision in their behalf had not been agreed to, the superadded consideration would not have been given.<sup>35</sup> This exception, and even a broader one, it seems, has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Neves v. Scott*,<sup>36</sup> where it is said, after reviewing some of the English cases: "The result of all the cases, I think, will show that if, from the circumstances under which the marriage articles were entered into by the parties, or as collected from the face of the instrument itself, it appears to have been intended that the collateral relatives, in a given event, should take the estate, and a proper limitation to that effect is contained in them, a court of equity will enforce the trust for their benefit. They will not be regarded as volunteers outside of the deed, but as coming fairly within the influence of the considerations upon which it is founded. The consideration will extend through all the limitations for the benefit of the remotest persons provided for consistent with law."<sup>37</sup>

may enforce the obligations of the contracting parties, notwithstanding the nonperformance of mutual stipulations on the other side, unless they are conditional and dependent covenants. Although the defaulting party may not, in some instances, be allowed to enforce the articles specifically, the children, the innocent objects of parental solicitude and care, are entitled to all the benefit of the uses under the settlement, notwithstanding there has been a failure on one side. These reasons include as well the issue of a former as a subsequent marriage. There can be no equity in inflicting upon the only child of a former marriage, dependent on its mother for support, in whose behalf provision was made in anticipation of a second marriage, the penalty of forfeiture, because of the subsequent misconduct of her mother."

<sup>32</sup> *Sutton v. Chetwynd*, 3 Mer. 249; *Merritt v. Scott*, 6 Ga. 563, 50 Am. Dec. 365.

<sup>33</sup> 1 Valzey, Set. Prop. 76, 140.

<sup>34</sup> *Vernon v. Vernon*, 2 P. Wms. 594; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. Sr. 73; *Edwards v. Countess of Warwick*, 2 P. Wms. 171. See *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 196, 13 L. Ed. 102.

<sup>35</sup> 9 How. 196, 13 L. Ed. 102; 13 How. 268, 14 L. Ed. 140.

<sup>36</sup> And see *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 399, 3 Am. Dec. 657; *Hos-*

*As Against Creditors*

The statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, provides that all conveyances and dispositions of property, real or personal, made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, shall be void as against them; and the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 4, declares void all conveyances of real property made with the intent of defeating subsequent purchasers. These statutes are merely declaratory of the common law,<sup>37</sup> and have been thus accepted in some of our states, while in others they have been expressly adopted by statute, or re-enacted.<sup>38</sup> Both of these statutes contain provisos that nothing therein contained shall defeat any estate or interest made on good consideration, and bona fide to any person not having at the time notice of any fraudulent purpose.

Since marriage is a valuable consideration, antenuptial settlements are not fraudulent as against creditors and purchasers, under these statutes, where they are made in favor of innocent parties. A marriage settlement, even of all of the settlor's property, in favor of the husband or wife and their issue, will always be supported as against creditors of the settlor or purchasers, if the beneficiaries are innocent of any fraud; and it can make no difference that the settlor was insolvent, or his intent fraudulent, if the beneficiaries are innocent.<sup>39</sup> A settlement by a husband in favor of his wife has been upheld as against his creditors notwithstanding false recitals that the property was the wife's, because it did not appear that she knew that his circumstances were such as to make the settlement a fraud on any one.<sup>40</sup> As has been said by Mr. Justice Story: "Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and author-

ford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245, 42 N. W. 1018; Cole v. American Baptist Home Mission Soc., 64 N. H. 445, 14 Atl. 73.

<sup>37</sup> 4 Kent, Comm. 462, May, Fraud. Conv. 3; Rickards v. Attorney General, 12 Clark & F. 30, 42; Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch, 309, 2 L. Ed. 118.

<sup>38</sup> 4 Kent, Comm. 463; May, Fraud. Conv. 2.

<sup>39</sup> Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. 272; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 367, 8 L. Ed. 709; Herring v. Wickham, 29 Grat. (Va.) 628, 26 Am. Rep. 405; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 261; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen (Mass.) 454, 81 Am. Dec. 758; Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400; Jones' Appeal, 62 Pa. 324; Bunnell v. Witherow 29 Ind. 123; Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22, 26 L. Ed. 360; Bridge v. Eggleston, 14 Mass. 245, 7 Am. Dec. 209; Nance v. Nance, 84 Ala. 375, 4 South. 699, 5 Am. St. Rep. 378; Bumgardner v. Harris, 92 Va. 188, 23 S. E. 229; Boggess v. Richards' Adm'r, 39 W. Va. 567, 20 S. E. 599, 26 L. R. A. 537, 45 Am. St. Rep. 938; Hosmer v. Tiffany, 115 App. Div. 303, 100 N. Y. Supp. 797.

<sup>40</sup> Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. 272.

ity, than the doctrine that to make an antenuptial settlement void, as a fraud upon creditors, it is necessary that both parties should concur in, or have cognizance of, the intended fraud. If the settlor alone intend a fraud, and the other party have no notice of it, but is innocent of it, she is not, and cannot be, affected by it. Marriage, in contemplation of the law, is not only a valuable consideration to support such a settlement, but is a consideration of the highest value; and, from motives of the soundest policy, is upheld with a steady resolution. The husband and wife, parties to such a contract, are therefore deemed, in the highest sense, purchasers for a valuable consideration; and so that it is bona fide, and without notice of fraud brought home to both sides, it becomes unimpeachable by creditors."<sup>41</sup> It can make no difference, in so far as the validity of an antenuptial settlement by a husband on his wife and children is concerned, that, before the settlement and marriage, he lived with the woman in fornication.<sup>42</sup>

If in any case, on the other hand, there is an intent both on the part of the settlor and of the beneficiary to delay and defraud creditors, or if there is such an intent on the part of the settlor, and the beneficiary knows of it, the settlement will not be upheld.<sup>43</sup> "Fraud may be imputable to the parties either by direct co-operation in the original design at the time of its concoction, or by constructive co-operation from notice of it, and carrying the design, after such notice, into execution."<sup>44</sup> Of course an antenuptial agreement that the wife's property shall remain hers is not defeated by the fact that the object of the agreement is to defeat the husband's creditors.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. 348, 393, 8 L. Ed. 709. See, also, *McKnight v. Kingsley*, 48 Ind. App. 372, 92 N. E. 743; *J. P. Leininger Lumber Co. v. Dewey*, 86 Neb. 659, 126 N. W. 87, 21 Ann. Cas. 471.

<sup>42</sup> *Coutts v. Greenhow*, 2 Munf. (Va.) 363, 5 Am. Dec. 472, reversing *Greenhow v. Coutts*, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.) 485. And see *Herring v. Wickham*, 29 Grat. (Va.) 628, 26 Am. Rep. 405.

<sup>43</sup> *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. 348, 8 L. Ed. 709; *Davidson v. Graves*, Riley, Eq. (S. C.) 232; *Colombine v. Penhall*, 1 Smale & Giff. 228, 257; *Bulmer v. Hunter*, L. R. 8 Eq. 46.

<sup>44</sup> Per Story, J., in *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. at page 394, 8 L. Ed. 709.

<sup>45</sup> *Baldwin v. Carter*, 17 Conn. 201, 42 Am. Dec. 735.

## REASONABLENESS OF PROVISION FOR WIFE

85. An antenuptial agreement by which the wife releases her rights in the husband's property must be accompanied by the utmost good faith and free from fraud on the part of the husband, and the provision for the wife must be reasonably proportionate to the means of the husband.

As antenuptial settlements are intended primarily to protect the wife and children against want from the possible loss or dissipation of the property of the husband, it is essential that the agreement by which the wife releases her rights in the husband's property in consideration of a provision for her benefit should be characterized by the utmost good faith,<sup>46</sup> free from fraud on the part of the husband,<sup>47</sup> and the provision for the wife should be reasonably proportionate to the means of the husband.<sup>48</sup> The courts will

<sup>46</sup> *In re Kline's Estate*, 64 Pa. 122; *Achilles v. Achilles*, 137 Ill. 589, 28 N. E. 45; *Blerer's Appeal*, 92 Pa. 265.

<sup>47</sup> *Murdock v. Murdock*, 121 Ill. App. 429; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 198; *In re Deller's Estate*, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N. W. 278, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751; *Stansberry v. Stansberry*, 102 Neb. 489, 167 N. W. 563; *Tilton v. Tilton*, 130 Ky. 281, 113 S. W. 134, 132 Am. St. Rep. 359; *Maze's Ex'rs v. Maze*, 99 S. W. 336, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 679; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22.

<sup>48</sup> *Murdock v. Murdock*, 219 Ill. 123, 76 N. E. 57; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 198; *Tiernan v. Binns*, 92 Pa. 248; *Colbert v. Rings*, 231 Ill. 404, 83 N. E. 274; *Watson v. Watson*, 104 Kan. 578, 180 Pac. 242, 182 Pac. 643; *Stephens v. Stephens*, 181 Ky. 480, 205 S. W. 573; *Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r*, 163 Ky. 260, 173 S. W. 774; *Slingerland v. Slingerland*, 115 Minn. 270, 132 N. W. 326; *In re Haberman's Estate*, 239 Pa. 10, 86 Atl. 641. An antenuptial contract is not invalid merely because the wife does not receive thereunder as much as she would if there were no contract. *Landes v. Landes*, 268 Ill. 11, 108 N. E. 691. Disproportion to husband's means will not render contract invalid, where wife knew of the extent of the husband's property. *Yockey v. Marion*, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N. E. 34. To the same effect see *Gordon v. Munn*, 87 Kan. 624, 125 Pac. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 783, rehearing denied 88 Kan. 72, 127 Pac. 764, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 783. An antenuptial contract, whereby neither the husband nor the wife was to claim the property of the other at the other's death, is not so disproportionate and unreasonable as to raise the presumption of fraud. *Watson v. Watson*, 104 Kan. 578, 180 Pac. 242, 182 Pac. 643. In construing an antenuptial contract, the court should have regard to the interests of the children of the contracting parties living at the time it was entered into in determining whether the contract is reasonable and fair to the wife. *In re Hubinger's Estate*, 150 Iowa, 307, 130 N. W. 155.

There was too great disproportion where wife was to have only \$1,000

rigidly scrutinize an antenuptial contract, apparently unjust, which deprives the wife of any interest in her husband's estate without providing for her if she survives him,<sup>49</sup> and if any of the essentials of good faith are lacking, the settlement may be set aside in equity.<sup>50</sup>

The parties to an antenuptial contract do not deal at arm's length,<sup>51</sup> but they occupy a confidential relation to each other.<sup>52</sup> It is, therefore, essential that the contract be entered into with full knowledge of all that may materially affect it.<sup>53</sup> If the provision secured for the intended wife is disproportionate to the

out of an estate of \$30,000. *Stephens v. Stephens*, 181 Ky. 480, 205 S. W. 573. And where she would have only a small farm, the husband being worth \$200,000. *Shirey v. Shirey*, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369. And where wife would receive \$500 a year during husband's life and \$10,000 at his death, the husband being worth \$130,000. *Warner v. Warner*, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N. E. 630. But see *In re Deller's Estate*, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N. W. 278, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751, holding that where an antenuptial agreement made a provision of \$5,000 for the prospective wife out of the husband's estate at his death, and the estate amounted to \$85,000, the provision would not be so inadequate as to render the agreement unenforceable, because of the mere insufficiency of the provisions made for the intended wife.

<sup>49</sup> *In re Enyart's Estate*, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N. W. 120; *In re Deller's Estate*, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N. W. 278, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751; *Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen*, 159 Wis. 385, 150 N. W. 518.

<sup>50</sup> *Kline v. Kline*, 57 Pa. 120, 98 Am. Dec. 206; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22; *Peaslee v. Peaslee*, 147 Mass. 171, 17 N. E. 506; *Connor v. Stanley*, 72 Cal. 556, 14 Pac. 306, 1 Am. St. Rep. 84; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 198. In the absence of fraud, it is not ground to set aside a settlement that the wife was not fully informed as to her legal rights. *Robbins v. Robbins*, 225 Ill. 333, 80 N. E. 326, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953. A settlement will not be set aside on the ground of mistake because it contained no provision for revocation. *Crumlish v. Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co.*, 8 Del. Ch. 375, 68 Atl. 388.

<sup>51</sup> *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22; *Maze's Ex'rs v. Maze*, 99 S. W. 336, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 679; *Bierer's Appeal*, 92 Pa. 265.

<sup>52</sup> *Achilles v. Achilles*, 137 Ill. 589, 28 N. E. 45; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22; *Martin v. Collison*, 266 Ill. 172, 107 N. E. 257; *SPURLOCK v. BROWN*, 91 Tenn. 241, 18 S. W. 868, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 113; *Tiernan v. Binns*, 92 Pa. 248; *Nesmith v. Platt*, 137 Iowa, 292, 114 N. W. 1053, holding that the parties to an antenuptial agreement do not occupy any such relation of trust toward each other as to call for affirmative proof of the fairness of the agreement when contested by the wife after the death of the husband.

<sup>53</sup> *Warner v. Warner*, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N. E. 630; *Murdock v. Murdock*, 121 Ill. App. 429; *Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r*, 163 Ky. 260, 173 S. W. 774; *Stratton v. Wilson*, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S. W. 522, *Ann. Cas.* 1918B, 917; *In re Enyart's Estate*, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N. W. 120 (holding that the fact that the prospective wife knows in a general way that the husband is reputed wealthy is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement as to fair disclosure).

means of the intended husband, it raises a presumption of fraud or concealment, throwing upon those claiming in the husband's right the burden of disproving the same.<sup>54</sup>

In determining the fairness and reasonableness of the provision for the wife, the wealth of the husband, the existing means of the wife, and the age of the parties may be considered.<sup>55</sup>

### SETTLEMENTS BASED ON ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

86. The consideration of marriage supports a settlement made after marriage, if in pursuance of a valid antenuptial agreement in compliance with the statute of frauds.

A settlement, though not made until after marriage, is supported by the consideration of marriage as fully as if made before marriage, if it is made in pursuance of a valid antenuptial agreement.<sup>56</sup> Prior to the enactment of the statute of frauds, which, as will presently be seen, requires all agreements in consideration of marriage to be in writing,<sup>57</sup> it was held that a settlement made after marriage, in pursuance of an antenuptial agreement, was valid,

<sup>54</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, 144 Ill. 436, 33 N. E. 532; *Murdock v. Murdock*, 219 Ill. 123, 76 N. E. 57; *Achilles v. Achilles*, 151 Ill. 136, 37 N. E. 693; *Hessick v. Hessick*, 169 Ill. 486, 48 N. E. 712; *Mines v. Phee*, 254 Ill. 60, 98 N. E. 260; *Landes v. Landes*, 268 Ill. 11, 108 N. E. 691; *Rankin v. Schiereck*, 166 Iowa, 10, 147 N. W. 180; *Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen*, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516; *Bierer's Appeal*, 92 Pa. 265; *SPURLOCK v. BROWN*, 91 Tenn. 241, 18 S. W. 868, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 113; *McRae v. Battle*, 69 N. C. 98. But see *In re Whitmer's Estate*, 224 Pa. 413, 73 Atl. 551.

<sup>55</sup> *Brooks v. Brooks' Ex'rs* (Ky.) 58 S. W. 450, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 555; *Neely's Appeal*, 124 Pa. 406, 16 Atl. 883, 10 Am. St. Rep. 594; *Hosford v. Rowe*, 41 Minn. 245, 42 N. W. 1018; *Nesmith v. Platt*, 137 Iowa, 292, 114 N. W. 1053. An antenuptial contract is voidable on account of the incapacity of the wife by reason of infancy. *Shirey v. Shirey*, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369.

<sup>56</sup> 1 *Valzey*, Set. Prop. 72; *Tawney v. Crowther*, 3 Brown, Ch. 318; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; *Jason v. Jervis*, 1 Vern. 284, 286; *Reade v. Livingston*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520; *Sir Ralph Bovy's Case*, 1 Vent. 193; *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 399, 3 Am. Dec. 657; *Broadrick v. Broadrick*, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 225; *Pierce v. Vansell*, 35 Ind. App. 525, 74 N. E. 554. But a settlement based on an antenuptial agreement looking to a possible separation is not based on a good consideration. *Sawyer v. Churchill*, 77 Vt. 273, 59 Atl. 1014, 107 Am. St. Rep. 762.

<sup>57</sup> Post, p. 226.

though the agreement was not in writing.<sup>55</sup> Since the enactment of the statute, however, all agreements in consideration of marriage must be evidenced by writing before the court can recognize them as having any effect; and it follows that an antenuptial agreement must be in writing, in order that a settlement made in pursuance thereof after marriage may be upheld.<sup>56</sup>

### STATUTE OF FRAUDS

**87. Under the statute of frauds, an agreement in consideration of marriage must be evidenced by writing, or it cannot be proved or recognized by the courts.**

The statute of frauds and perjuries (St. 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 17) provides that "no action shall be brought whereby \* \* \* to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; \* \* \* unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." This statute has been substantially re-enacted in this country.

The statute applies to all agreements for which a marriage is the consideration, such as a promise to pay money, or to make a settlement of property if a marriage is consummated, and so includes marriage settlements or agreements therefor.<sup>57</sup> The stat-

<sup>55</sup> *Griffin v. Stanhope*, Cro. Jac. 454; *Sir Ralph Bovy's Case*, 1 Vent. 193.

<sup>56</sup> *Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 P. Wms. 618, 1 Strange, 236; *Dundas v. Dutens*, 1 Ves. Jr. 196; *Reade v. Livingston*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520; *Tawney v. Crowther*, 3 Brown, Ch. 263; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; *Lloyd v. Fulton*, 91 U. S. 479, 23 L. Ed. 363; *Bradley v. Saddler*, 54 Ga. 681; *Finch v. Finch*, 10 Ohio St. 501; *Henry v. Henry*, 27 Ohio St. 121; *Flenner v. Flenner*, 29 Ind. 569; *Izard v. Middleton*, Bailey, Eq. (S. C.) 228.

<sup>57</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 101, 102; *Tawney v. Crowther*, 3 Brown, Ch. 263; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; *Caton v. Caton*, 1 Ch. App. 137; *Ogden v. Ogden*, 1 Bland (Md.) 284; *Crane v. Gough*, 4 Md. 316; *Reade v. Livingston*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520; *Henry v. Henry*, 27 Ohio St. 121; *Finch v. Finch*, 10 Ohio St. 507; *Flenner v. Flenner*, 29 Ind. 564; *Caylor v. Roe*, 99 Ind. 1; *Lloyd v. Fulton*, 91 U. S. 479, 23 L. Ed. 363; *Deshon v. Wood*, 148 Mass. 132, 19 N. E. 1, 1 L. R. A. 518; *Hammond v. Hammond*, 135 Ga. 768, 70 S. E. 588; *McCartney v. Titsworth*, 142 App. Div. 292, 126 N. Y. Supp. 905; *Rowell v. Barber*, 142 Wis. 304, 125 N. W. 937, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140; *Watkins v. Watkins*, 82 N. J. Eq. 483, 89 Atl. 253, affirmed 85 N. J. Eq. 217, 95 Atl. 1079; *Chase v. Fitz*, 132 Mass. 359; *McAnnulty v. McAnnulty*, 120 Ill. 26, 11 N. E. 397, 60 Am. Rep. 552; *Mallory's Adm'r's v. Mallory's Adm'r*,

ute, therefore, applies to an agreement by a man and woman in contemplation of marriage that each shall retain the title to his or her own property, and dispose of it as if unmarried;<sup>61</sup> or that the survivor shall take no interest in the property of the other;<sup>62</sup> or that the survivor shall take certain property.<sup>63</sup>

The memorandum required by the statute of frauds does not go to the existence of the contract, but is evidence only. A parol agreement within the statute exists. It simply cannot be proved, and is unenforceable. For this reason, it is held that the note or memorandum in writing need not be made at the time the contract is made, but may be made at any time before it is sought to enforce it. This applies to other contracts within the statute of frauds;<sup>64</sup> and there is no ground upon which the courts are authorized to make an exception in the case of agreements in consideration of marriage. Nevertheless it seems to be the rule that a verbal agreement in consideration of marriage is not taken out of the operation of the statute by being reduced to writing after the marriage;<sup>65</sup> as has been shown, a settlement made after marriage, in pursuance of a valid antenuptial agreement, is supported by the consideration of marriage, but cannot be upheld unless there is written evidence of the antenuptial agreement, since the agreement cannot be proved by parol. Some of the courts have intimated, but

92 Ky. 316, 17 S. W. 737; *Hannon v. Hounihan*, 85 Va. 429, 12 S. E. 157; ante, p. 214. In *Larsen v. Johnson*, 78 Wis. 300, 47 N. W. 615, 23 Am. St. Rep. 404, it was held that the statute did not apply to an oral agreement between a man and woman, by which the man was to provide for the comfort and support of the woman during life, pay her debts, take care of, manage, and improve certain land, so as to make it productive, and to that end that the parties should marry and live together on the land, which should be conveyed by the woman to the man in fee simple. The court thought that the consideration for the conveyance of the land was the provision for the support and comfort of the woman and not the marriage. The statute does not apply to a promise to marry, the consideration for which is, not the marriage, but the promise of the other party. *Clark v. Pendleton*, 20 Conn. 495; *Clark*, Cont. 101.

<sup>61</sup> *Mallory's Adm'r's v. Mallory's Adm'r*, 92 Ky. 316, 17 S. W. 737.

<sup>62</sup> *Carpenter v. Cornings*, 51 Hun, 638, 4 N. Y. Supp. 947.

<sup>63</sup> *Hannon v. Hounihan*, 85 Va. 429, 12 S. E. 157. And see *White v. Bigelow*, 154 Mass. 593, 28 N. E. 904; *Adams v. Adams*, 17 Or. 247, 20 Pac. 633.

<sup>64</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 116, 128, and cases there cited.

<sup>65</sup> *Adams v. Swift*, 169 App. Div. 802, 155 N. Y. Supp. 873; *Rowell v. Barber*, 142 Wis. 304, 125 N. W. 937, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140; *McAnnulty v. McAnnulty*, 120 Ill. 28, 11 N. E. 397, 60 Am. Rep. 552; *Frazer v. Andrews*, 134 Iowa, 621, 112 N. W. 92, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 593, 13 Ann. Cas. 556; *London v. G. L. Anderson Brass Works*, 197 Ala. 16, 72 South. 359.

not decided, that it is not sufficient in these cases for the written evidence of the antenuptial agreement to be supplied by recitals in the instrument by which the settlement in pursuance thereof is made after marriage.<sup>66</sup> Under the principle stated above, however, such a recital may be sufficient.<sup>67</sup>

The note or memorandum in writing required by the statute need not be a formal written agreement. Any writing which shows all the terms of the agreement, the subject-matter, and the parties, and which is signed by the party to be charged, or his or her duly authorized agent, is sufficient, since written evidence of the agreement is all that is required. There is no difference in this respect between this kind of an agreement and any other agreement within the statute.<sup>68</sup> In a late case, a letter to a mother, proposing to marry her daughter, shown to the latter, and stating that the writer would convey certain land to the daughter when they should be married, was held a sufficient memorandum of the agreement to convey.<sup>69</sup> The memorandum may consist entirely of correspondence. It may consist of any number of separate papers, provided the papers refer to and identify each other. The most informal kind of a memorandum will suffice if it shows the agreement and its terms.<sup>70</sup>

The marriage of the parties is not such part performance as will, even in equity, take a parol antenuptial agreement out of the operation of the statute.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Dictum in *Randall v. Morgan*, 12 Ves. 67, and in *Reade v. Livingston*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520.

<sup>67</sup> Dictum in *Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 P. Wms. 618, 1 Strange, 236, and in *Dundas v. Dutens*, 1 Ves. Jr. 196.

<sup>68</sup> See *Clark*, Cont. 114-128, where the sufficiency of the memorandum required by the statute is discussed at length, and the cases on the subject are collected.

<sup>69</sup> *North Platte Milling & Elevator Co. v. Price*, 4 Wyo. 293, 33 Pac. 664.

<sup>70</sup> *Hammersley v. De Biel*, 12 Clark & F. 45; *Clark*, Cont. 114.

<sup>71</sup> *Hannon v. Hounihan*, 85 Va. 429, 12 S. E. 157; *Johnstone v. Mappin*, 60 Law J. Ch. 241; *Flenner v. Flenner*, 29 Ind. 564; *Hammond v. Hammond*, 135 Ga. 768, 70 S. E. 588; *Watkins v. Watkins*, 82 N. J. Eq. 483, 89 Atl. 253, affirmed 85 N. J. Eq. 217, 95 Atl. 1079; *Manning v. Riley*, 52 N. J. Eq. 39, 27 Atl. 810. The execution of a deed pursuant to an oral antenuptial agreement and deposit thereof to take effect on his death is such performance as will take the agreement out of the statute of frauds. *Rowell v. Barber*, 142 Wis. 304, 125 N. W. 937, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140.

## POSTNUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS

88. At common law, contracts, gifts, and conveyances, made between husband and wife directly and without the intervention of trustees or third persons, are void.
89. In equity, the common-law rule does not apply fully; but
- (a) Contracts between husband and wife will be supported, where they would be good at law if made with trustees for the wife.
  - (b) Gifts by the husband to the wife are good as between the parties, where there is an irrevocable gift to some person as trustee for the wife, or where the husband divests himself of the property, and agrees to hold as trustee for the wife.
  - (c) Conveyances by the husband directly to the wife are good as between the parties, when a just and reasonable provision for the wife.
90. Under modern statutes removing the disabilities of coverture, in many states contracts, gifts, and conveyances made between husband and wife, directly and without the intervention of trustees or third persons, are valid.

Postnuptial settlements include not only formal settlements made by husband or wife or third persons, but also all transfers of real or personal property made between husband and wife.

*At Common Law*

By reason of the common-law idea of the unity of husband and wife, they cannot, at common law, enter into any valid contract with each other.<sup>72</sup> Nor, apparently for the same reason, does the common law recognize as having any validity whatever, even as between the parties themselves, a gift of personal property,<sup>73</sup> or a conveyance of real property,<sup>74</sup> directly between husband and wife. Such a gift or conveyance is a mere nullity. "If any principle of

<sup>72</sup> *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375; *Lister v. Lister*, 86 N. J. Eq. 80, 97 Atl. 170. And see ante, p. 159.

<sup>73</sup> *Co. Litt.* 187b; *Kitchen v. Bedford*, 13 Wall. 413, 20 L. Ed. 637; *Manny v. Rixford*, 44 Ill. 129.

<sup>74</sup> *Co. Litt.* 187b, 3a, 112a; *Beard v. Beard*, 3 Atk. 72; *Phillips v. Barnet*, 1 Q. B. Div. 440; *Voorhees v. Presbyterian Church*, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 103; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 394; *Williams v. Betts* (Del. Ch.) 98 Atl. 371; *Edgerly v. Whalan*, 106 Mass. 307.

common law is settled and perfectly at rest, it seems 'to be this: that a husband cannot convey an estate by deed to his wife.'"<sup>75</sup> It is equally well settled that a wife cannot at common law make a conveyance directly to her husband, nor can they effect this purpose by joining in a deed to him.<sup>76</sup>

Of course, even at common law, a husband can make a valid contract with trustees, or a valid gift of personalty or conveyance of real property to trustees for the benefit of his wife, provided he does not commit a fraud upon his creditors. The device by which a husband usually conveyed land to his wife at common law was by conveying it to some third person, and having him convey to the wife. Such conveyances are valid.<sup>77</sup> By a similar circuitry, a wife could convey her land to her husband. While she could not convey to him directly, either by executing the conveyance alone or by joining with him in a conveyance, they could accomplish the purpose by joining in a conveyance to a third person, and having the grantee reconvey to the husband.<sup>78</sup> In such cases the wife must have acted freely, and not under coercion or undue influence by the husband.<sup>79</sup> There is no presumption of undue influence,<sup>80</sup> but the court will scrutinize the transaction closely, and, if any undue influence appears to have been exercised, set the conveyances aside.

### *In Equity*

The rule in equity does not follow the common law. In some cases a court of equity will recognize and enforce contracts and conveyances entered into directly between husband and wife, without the intervention of trustees. The general rule, as laid down by the Vermont court, is that, whenever a contract would be good at law if made with trustees for the wife, it will be sustained in equity, though made without the intervention of trustees.<sup>81</sup> So,

<sup>75</sup> *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 394.

<sup>76</sup> *White v. Wager*, 25 N. Y. 328; *Winans v. Peebles*, 32 N. Y. 423; *Sims v. Rickets*, 35 Ind. 181, 9 Am. Rep. 679; *Bailey v. Apperson*, 134 Tenn. 716, 185 S. W. 710; *Elder v. Elder*, 256 Pa. 139, 100 Atl. 581; *Scarborough v. Watkins*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540, 50 Am. Dec. 528.

<sup>77</sup> *Scarborough v. Watkins*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540, 50 Am. Dec. 528.

<sup>78</sup> *Scarborough v. Watkins*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540, 50 Am. Dec. 528; *Young v. Brown*, 136 Tenn. 184, 188 S. W. 1149.

<sup>79</sup> *Jackson v. Stevens*, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 110; *Shepperson v. Shepperson*, 2 Grat. (Va.) 501.

<sup>80</sup> *Scarborough v. Watkins*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540, 50 Am. Dec. 528.

<sup>81</sup> *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375. And see 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1372; 2

in equity, a gift or conveyance by the husband directly to the wife will be upheld, in certain cases, by holding the husband as trustee for the wife. Equity will uphold a clear, irrevocable gift by a husband to his wife, either with or without the intervention of trustees;<sup>82</sup> but the gift must be clear and complete. It is not sufficient to show an intention to give, but the intention must have been carried into effect.<sup>83</sup>

In the leading case of *Wallingsford v. Allen*,<sup>84</sup> a husband and wife having separated, and alimony having been decreed against him, he gave her, in discharge thereof, certain personal property. After her death he claimed the same. The court said, in rejecting his claim: "Every feature of the agreement is an appeal to have it tested by those principles of equity which have been applied to maintain a separate interest in women, acquired from their husbands during coverture, whether the same were made by the intervention of trustees or not, when the transfer was fairly made, upon a meritorious or valuable consideration. Agreements between hus-

Kent, Comm. 166; *Shepard v. Shepard*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57, 11 Am. Dec. 396; *Slanning v. Style*, 3 P. Wms. 334; *Arundell v. Phipps*, 10 Ves. 146; *Wallingsford v. Allen*, 10 Pet. 583, 9 L. Ed. 542; *In re Hill* (D. C.) 190 Fed. 390; *Sims v. Rickets*, 35 Ind. 181, 9 Am. Rep. 679; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 537; *Maraman's Adm'r v. Maraman*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 88; *Putnam v. Bicknell*, 18 Wis. 333; *Huber v. Huber's Adm'r*, 10 Ohio, 371; *Simmons v. McElwain*, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 419; *Wilder v. Brooks*, 10 Minn. 50 (Gil. 32), 88 Am. Dec. 49; *Stocket v. Holliday*, 9 Md. 480; *Bowie v. Stonestreet*, 6 Md. 418, 61 Am. Dec. 318. While law courts will not enforce a contract between husband and wife, equity will do so when the contract is fair or for the benefit of the wife. *McDonald v. Smith*, 95 Ark. 523, 130 S. W. 515; *Brown v. Clark*, 80 Conn. 419, 68 Atl. 1001; *Lister v. Lister*, 86 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170.

<sup>82</sup> *Lewin, Trusts*, 68; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1375; *Lucas v. Lucas*, 1 Atk. 270; *Hutchins v. Dixon*, 11 Md. 29; *Wallingsford v. Allen*, 10 Pet. 583, 9 L. Ed. 542; *McLean v. Longlands*, 5 Ves. 78; *Mews v. Mews*, 15 Beav. 529; *Deming v. Williams*, 26 Conn. 226, 68 Am. Dec. 386; *Dilts v. Stevenson*, 17 N. J. Eq. 407; *West v. Burke*, 165 App. Div. 667, 151 N. Y. Supp. 329, affirmed 219 N. Y. 7, 118 N. E. 561; *Grant v. Grant*, 34 Law J. Ch. 641.

<sup>83</sup> *Cotteen v. Missing*, 1 Madd. 176; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 188; *Jennings v. Davis*, 31 Conn. 134; *George v. Spencer*, 2 Md. Ch. 353. In *Grant v. Grant*, 34 Law J. Ch. 641, it was held that delivery is not necessary, for possession of the wife is that of her husband, and that present words of gift, without any further act, are sufficient in equity to constitute the husband trustee for the wife. But in *Re Breton's Estate*, 17 Ch. Div. 416, it was held that such a gift could not be supported; that this was an attempt to make a legal transfer, and therefore, under the rule of *Milroy v. Lord*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 809, it could not operate as a declaration of trust. See, also, *In re Pierce*, 7 Biss. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 11,139.

<sup>84</sup> 10 Pet. 583, 9 L. Ed. 542.

band and wife, during coverture, for the transfer from him of property directly to the latter, are undoubtedly void at law. Equity examines with great caution before it will confirm them. But it does sustain them when a clear and satisfactory case is made out that the property is to be applied to the separate use of the wife. Where the consideration for the transfer is a separate interest of the wife, yielded up by her for the husband's benefit, or of their family, or which has been appropriated by him to his uses; where the husband is in a situation to make a gift of property to the wife, and distinctly separates it from the mass of his property for her use,—either case equity will sustain, though no trustee has been interposed to hold for the wife's use."

Conveyances of real estate from the husband to the wife directly, without the intervention of a trustee, though void at law, are upheld in equity, as between the parties, where they are a just and suitable provision for the wife.<sup>85</sup> In an Indiana case it was said in regard to conveyances of real estate, as was said by the Supreme Court of the United States<sup>86</sup> in regard to gifts of personalty, that "a direct conveyance from a husband to his wife will be sustained and upheld in equity in either of the following cases, namely: (1) Where the consideration of the transfer is a separate interest of the wife, yielded up by her for the husband's benefit or that of her family, or which has been appropriated by him to his uses;

<sup>85</sup> *Sims v. Rickets*, 35 Ind. 151, 9 Am. Rep. 679; *Shepard v. Shepard*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57, 11 Am. Dec. 396; *Putnam v. Bicknell*, 18 Wis. 333; *Jones v. Clifton*, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 908; *Crooks v. Crooks*, 34 Ohio St. 610, 615; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375; *Waterman v. Higgins*, 28 Fla. 660, 10 South. 97; *In re Williams*, 4 Boyce (Del.) 401, 88 Atl. 716; *Thomas v. Hornbrook*, 259 Ill. 156, 102 N. E. 198; *Currier v. Teske*, 84 Neb. 60, 120 N. W. 1015, 133 Am. St. Rep. 602; *Williams v. Betts* (Del. Ch.) 98 Atl. 371; *Huber v. Huber's Adm'r*, 10 Ohio, 371; *Simmons v. McElwain*, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 419; *Wilder v. Brooks*, 10 Minn. 50 (Gil. 32), 88 Am. Dec. 49. Under the law of New Jersey, a transfer of property by a husband directly to his wife, in repayment of advances made to him by her, while not good at law, is enforceable in equity. *English v. Brown* (D. C.) 219 Fed. 248, judgment modified 229 Fed. 34, 143 C. C. A. 336. A deed direct from husband to wife, without the intervention of a trustee, made in good faith and not in fraud of creditors, is valid both in law and equity, and passes full title. *Currier v. Teske*, 84 Neb. 60, 120 N. W. 1015, 133 Am. St. Rep. 602, reversing on rehearing 82 Neb. 315, 117 N. W. 712. A direct deed from a husband to his wife executed before enactment of the married women's statute conveyed to her an equity which upon his death, under the statute of uses, merged legal title of husband in her equity. *Carson v. Berthold & Jennings Lumber Co.*, 270 Mo. 238, 192 S. W. 1018.

<sup>86</sup> *Wallingsford v. Allen*, 10 Pet. 583, 9 L. Ed. 542.

(2) where the husband is in a situation to make a gift to his wife, and distinctly separates the property given from the mass of his property, and sets it apart to the separate and exclusive use of his wife."<sup>87</sup> Of course, if the transfer of personalty, or conveyance of realty, directly from husband to wife, is supported by a valuable consideration, there is all the more reason for sustaining it in equity.<sup>88</sup>

It has been held in New York that a conveyance directly from a wife to her husband is not only void in law, but will not even be sustained in equity.<sup>89</sup>

#### *Under Modern Statutes*

In many states statutes removing the disabilities of married women entirely or to a limited extent have greatly modified the rules of the common law regarding contracts, gifts, and conveyances between husband and wife. Thus in many states a wife may now contract with her husband as freely as if unmarried, and in most states she may contract with him with reference to her separate property.<sup>90</sup> So, under statutes securing to married women their rights in their separate property, gifts from the husband to the wife<sup>91</sup> and from the wife to the husband<sup>92</sup> have been held valid, though in some states the statutes place restrictions on gifts between husband and wife.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>87</sup> *Sims v. Rickets*, 35 Ind. 181, 9 Am. Rep. 679.

<sup>88</sup> *Wallingsford v. Allen*, 10 Pet. 583, 9 L. Ed. 542.

<sup>89</sup> *White v. Wager*, 25 N. Y. 328; *Winans v. Peebles*, 32 N. Y. 423. But see *Sims v. Rickets*, 35 Ind. 181, 9 Am. Rep. 679. Equity scrutinizes a conveyance from wife to husband closely to ascertain whether it is free from fraud, but will not disturb a fair transaction. *McDonald v. Smith*, 95 Ark. 523, 130 S. W. 515.

<sup>90</sup> See ante, p. 150.

<sup>91</sup> *Balster v. Cadick*, 29 App. D. C. 405; *Corbett v. Sloan*, 52 Wash. 1, 99 Pac. 1025; *Sawyer v. Metters*, 133 Wis. 350, 113 N. W. 682; *Abbott v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 149 Mo. App. 511, 130 S. W. 1120; *Bruce v. Bruce*, 95 Ala. 563, 11 South. 197; *Le Blanc v. Sayers*, 202 Mich. 565, 168 N. W. 445.

<sup>92</sup> *Fritz v. Fernandez*, 45 Fla. 313, 34 South. 315; *Sample v. Guyer*, 143 Ala. 613, 42 South. 106; *Hamilton v. Douglas*, 46 N. Y. 218; *Spradling v. Spradling*, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848; *Third Nat. Bank v. Poe*, 5 Ga. App. 113, 62 S. E. 826; *Rea v. Rea*, 156 N. C. 529, 72 S. E. 573, 873. While under Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 3009, a wife cannot make contract of sale of her separate estate to her husband, without approval by judge of superior court of her domicile, yet she may make gift thereof to him. *Rich v. Rich*, 147 Ga. 488, 94 S. E. 568.

<sup>93</sup> See statutes of various states. And see *Brown v. Brown*, 174 Mass. 197, 54 N. E. 532, 75 Am. St. Rep. 292.

In many jurisdictions either under express provisions of the statute or under the construction given to statutes conferring on married women the power to contract and to control their property as if unmarried, conveyances from the husband to the wife directly and without the intervention of a trustee or third person are permitted.<sup>94</sup> In some jurisdictions conveyances from the wife to the husband have been recognized as valid,<sup>95</sup> but in others because of the requirement that the husband shall join in all conveyances by the wife, a conveyance by the wife directly to the husband is not valid.<sup>96</sup> In view of the statutes, transfers of personal property between husband and wife are generally held to be valid.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Baker v. Syfritt*, 147 Iowa, 49, 125 N. W. 998; *Koch v. Sallee*, 176 Ill. App. 379; *Mardt v. Scharmach*, 65 Misc. Rep. 124, 119 N. Y. Supp. 449; *Alferitz v. Arrivillaga*, 143 Cal. 646, 77 Pac. 657; *Fort v. Allen*, 110 N. C. 183, 14 S. E. 685; *Hoxie v. Price*, 31 Wis. 82; *Johnson v. Brauch*, 9 S. D. 116, 68 N. W. 173, 62 Am. St. Rep. 857; *Crowley v. Savings Union Bank & Trust Co.*, 30 Cal. App. 535, 159 Pac. 194; *Brecheisen v. Clark*, 103 Kan. 662, 176 Pac. 137; *Ramsey v. Yount* (Ind. App.) 120 N. E. 618. Such transfers are, however, forbidden in Minnesota. *Laird v. Vila*, 98 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656, 106 Am. St. Rep. 420. Where husband conveyed property to wife to secure family in a home, there being no understanding wife should hold for his benefit solely, title vested absolutely in her as between herself and husband. *English v. English*, 229 Mass. 11, 118 N. E. 178.

<sup>95</sup> *Osborn v. Cooper*, 131 Ala. 405, 21 South. 320, 59 Am. St. Rep. 117; *Brecheisen v. Clark*, 103 Kan. 662, 176 Pac. 137; *Haguewood v. Britain*, 273 Mo. 89, 199 S. W. 950; *Noel v. Fitzpatrick*, 124 Ky. 787, 100 S. W. 321; *Despain v. Wagner*, 163 Ill. 598, 45 N. E. 129; *Savage v. Savage*, 80 Me. 472, 15 Atl. 43; *Lawshe v. Trenton Banking Co.*, 87 N. J. Eq. 56, 99 Atl. 617; *Baker v. Syfritt*, 147 Iowa, 49, 125 N. W. 998; *Smelser v. Meier*, 271 Mo. 178, 196 S. W. 22; *Osburn v. Throckmorton*, 90 Va. 311, 18 S. E. 285. Under Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 3009, conveyance by wife to husband of her property without being first allowed by order of superior court of her domicile is void. *Sikes v. Bradley*, 20 Ga. App. 470, 93 S. E. 111.

<sup>96</sup> *Alexander v. Shalala*, 228 Pa. 297, 77 Atl. 554, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 844, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 20 Ann. Cas. 1330. Conveyance can be made only by intervention of third person. *McCord v. Bright*, 44 Ind. App. 275, 87 N. E. 654; *Brandau v. McCurley*, 124 Md. 243, 92 Atl. 540, L. R. A. 1915C, 767; *Kelley v. Dearman*, 65 W. Va. 49, 63 S. E. 603.

<sup>97</sup> *Crowley v. Savings Union Bank & Trust Co.*, 30 Cal. App. 535, 159 Pac. 194; *Buttler v. Farmers' Nat. Bank*, 173 Iowa, 659, 155 N. W. 999; *Pedrick v. Kuemmell* (N. J. Sup.) 65 Atl. 906 (construing Pennsylvania statute); *Seymour v. Fellows*, 77 N. Y. 178; *Rinn v. Rhodes*, 93 Ind. 389.

### SAME—AS AGAINST CREDITORS AND PURCHASERS

91. Postnuptial voluntary settlements, or gifts and conveyances between husband and wife, where the husband is indebted, are held, as against existing creditors, under the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, and similar statutes in this country, declaring conveyances of real estate and transfers of personal property void when made with intent to defraud creditors,
  - (a) Conclusively fraudulent and void in some states.
  - (b) Prima facie fraudulent and void in England and in most states.
92. Postnuptial and voluntary conveyances from husband to wife, where the husband is indebted, are held, as against subsequent purchasers, under the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 4, and similar statutes in this country, declaring void as against subsequent purchasers conveyances made with the intention of defeating them,
  - (a) Conclusively fraudulent and void in England.
  - (b) Prima facie fraudulent and void in this country.

While gifts and conveyances between husband and wife may be perfectly good in equity as between the parties themselves, they may be invalid as against creditors and purchasers. Postnuptial settlements, or gifts and conveyances between husband and wife, differ from antenuptial settlements in the matter of consideration. Antenuptial settlements are supported by the consideration of marriage, but postnuptial settlements are not, for the marriage is past.<sup>98</sup> The consideration of marriage supports an antenuptial settlement as against creditors and purchasers; but, as it is wanting in a postnuptial settlement, such a settlement, unless it is supported by some other valuable consideration, may be attacked as voluntary and fraudulent, under the statutes of 13 and 27 Eliz. and similar statutes enacted in this country.<sup>99</sup> As we have seen,<sup>1</sup> the stat-

<sup>98</sup> *Unger v. Mellinger*, 37 Ind. App. 639, 77 N. E. 814, 117 Am. St. Rep. 348; *Beverlin v. Casto*, 62 W. Va. 158, 57 S. E. 411; *Lloyd v. Fulton*, 91 U. S. 479, 23 L. Ed. 363; *CLOW v. BROWN*, 37 Ind. App. 172, 72 N. E. 534, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 119.

<sup>99</sup> *CLOW v. BROWN*, 37 Ind. App. 172, 72 N. E. 534, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 119. But an existing marriage relation is a valuable and sufficient consideration to support a conveyance or settlement by a hus-

<sup>1</sup> See note 1 on following page.

ute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, declares all conveyances and dispositions of property, real or personal, made with intent to defraud creditors, to be null and void as against them; and the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 4, declares void, as against subsequent purchasers of the same lands, tenements, or other hereditaments, all conveyances, etc., made with the intention of defeating them, or containing a power of revocation. Both of these statutes contain provisos that nothing therein contained shall defeat any estate or interest, made on good consideration and bona fide, to any person not having at the time notice of any fraudulent purpose. A voluntary settlement on his wife, after marriage, by one who is indebted, has been held in some of the states to be conclusively fraudulent as against existing creditors, regardless of the extent of the indebtedness or the amount of the settlement or the circumstances of the debtor.<sup>2</sup> This rule found support in the earlier English cases, where it was said that all voluntary conveyances were fraudulent, excepting "where the person making them is not indebted at the time."<sup>3</sup> In the later English cases, however, it is held that not every indebtedness will render a voluntary conveyance fraudulent;<sup>4</sup> that being indebted is only one circumstance from which evidence of the intention to defraud may be drawn;<sup>5</sup> that, if a person owing debts makes a settlement which subtracts from the property which is the proper fund for the payment of those debts an amount without which the debts cannot be paid, then the court may infer that the settlor intended to delay his creditors.<sup>6</sup> The prevailing doctrine in this country is in accord with the later English cases, namely, that a voluntary postnuptial settlement is only *prima facie* fraudulent as against existing creditors, and that this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the settlement was reasonable, and not disproportionate to the husband's means, taking into view his debts and situation, and that there was no intent,

band on his wife, if it does not affect the claims of creditors existing at the time of the said conveyance or settlement. *Indiana Match Co. v. Kirk*, 118 Ill. App. 102.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> *Reade v. Livingston*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520; *Annin v. Annin*, 24 N. J. Eq. 184, 191.

<sup>3</sup> *Russel v. Hammond*, 1 Atk. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Skarf v. Soulby*, 1 Macn. & G. 374.

<sup>5</sup> *Richardson v. Smallwood*, Jac. 552.

<sup>6</sup> *Freeman v. Pope*, 5 Ch. App. 538. See *May, Fraud. Conv.* 35, for a full discussion of English cases.

actual or constructive, to defraud creditors.<sup>7</sup> While, in England, a voluntary postnuptial settlement of real estate is held conclusively void as against a subsequent purchaser, even where he has notice of the prior deed,<sup>8</sup> in this country it has been held that the subsequent sale is only presumptive evidence of fraud.<sup>9</sup> Postnuptial settlements made for a valuable consideration, like antenuptial settlements which are supported by the consideration of marriage, fall within the provisos of the statutes of 13 and 27 Eliz., which except bona fide purchasers for value, and are therefore good as against both creditors and subsequent purchasers, in favor of a wife taking innocently.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Kehr v. Smith*, 20 Wall. 31, 35, 22 L. Ed. 313; *Leavitt v. Leavitt*, 47 N. H. 329; *Woolston's Appeal*, 51 Pa. 452; *Reynolds v. Lansford*, 16 Tex. 287; *Wilson v. Buchanan*, 7 Grat. (Va.) 334, 338.

<sup>8</sup> *Doe v. Manning*, 9 East, 59; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Brown, Ch. 148.

<sup>9</sup> 4 Kent, Comm. 464; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Pet. 280, 8 L. Ed. 120.

<sup>10</sup> Ante, pp. 221, 236; Macq. *Husb. & W.* 279; *Magniac v. Thompson*, 7 Pet. 348, 8 L. Ed. 709; *Simmons v. McElwain*, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 419; *Bullard v. Briggs*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 533, 19 Am. Dec. 292.

## CHAPTER VII

### SEPARATION AND DIVORCE

- 93-95. Agreements of Separation.
- 96. Divorce or Judicial Separation.
- 97, 98. Jurisdiction to Grant Divorce.
- 99-104. Grounds for Divorce.
  - 99. Adultery.
  - 100-102. Cruelty.
  - 103. Desertion.
  - 104. Miscellaneous Other Grounds.
- 105-109. Defenses in Suits for Divorce.
  - 105. Connivance.
  - 106. Collusion.
  - 107, 108. Condonation.
  - 109. Recrimination.
- 110. Extraterritorial Effect of Divorce.
- 111. Legislative Divorce.

### AGREEMENTS OF SEPARATION

- 93. Agreements of separation between husband and wife are valid if the separation has actually taken place at the time of the agreement, or immediately follows it; but it is otherwise if a future separation is contemplated.
- 94. The agreement to live separately will not be enforced, but only the provisions for maintenance, and other collateral engagements.
- 95. If the parties live together again, the agreement is rescinded, and the parties restored to their full marital rights.

At one time the courts refused to countenance any agreement between husband and wife to live separately, without regard to whether the agreement contemplated an immediate separation or a separation in the future, and without regard to the cause of the separation. All agreements for a separation were held void as against public policy, because in derogation of the marriage relation.

"This court," once said Lord Stowell, "considers a private separation as an illegal contract, implying a renunciation of stipulated duties; a dereliction of those mutual offices which the parties are not at liberty to desert; an assumption of a false character in both parties, contrary to the real status personæ, and to the obligations

which both of them have contracted in the sight of God and man, to live together 'till death do them part,' and on which the solemnities both of civil society and of religion have stamped a binding authority, from which the parties cannot release themselves by any private act of their own, or for causes which the law itself has not pronounced to be sufficient and sufficiently proved."<sup>1</sup>

There has, however, been a complete change in the law in this respect in England, and agreements to live separately are sustained by the English courts to-day even to the extent of enforcing specific performance of the agreement to live apart. This was caused by a change in judicial opinion as to the demands of public policy. As was said by Jessel, M. R.: "A change came over judicial opinion as to public policy. Other considerations arose, and people began to think that, after all, it might be better and more beneficial for married people to avoid in many cases the expense and scandal of suits of divorce by settling their differences quietly by the aid of friends out of court, although the consequences might be that they would live separately."<sup>2</sup> Since a married woman could, in a suit for divorce, sue or defend in her own name, it was held that she could compromise such suit, and that, since she could compromise a suit for divorce already instituted, she might compromise the difference with her husband before the commencement of litigation, by agreeing to live separately, on certain terms providing for her maintenance and the custody of her children.<sup>3</sup>

The courts in this country have taken the same view. It may be laid down as a general rule that the courts will enforce covenants or promises in agreements of separation relating to the maintenance of the wife and other collateral engagements, provided the separation has actually taken place at the time of the agreement, or immediately follows the agreement.<sup>4</sup> But an agreement having in view

<sup>1</sup> *Mortimer v. Mortimer*, 2 Hag. Const. 310.

<sup>2</sup> *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. Div. 605; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 233; *Marshall v. Marshall*, 27 Wkly. Rep. 399; *Hart v. Hart*, 18 Ch. Div. 670.

<sup>3</sup> *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. Div. 605; *McGregor v. McGregor*, 20 Q. B. Div. 529.

<sup>4</sup> *Archbell v. Archbell*, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 261; *Ellett v. Ellett*, 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861; 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1215; *In re Singer's Estate*, 233 Pa. 55, 81 Atl. 898, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1326; *Amspoker v. Amspoker*, 99 Neb. 122, 155 N. W. 602; *Pryor v. Pryor*, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S. W. 700, 129 Am. St. Rep. 102; *Sumner v. Sumner*, 121 Ga. 1, 48 S. E. 727; *HIETT v. HIETT*, 74 Neb. 96, 103 N. W. 1051;

a separation in the future is altogether void, as against public policy, and it is immaterial whether they are made before or after marriage, because they give inducements to the parties not to perform "duties in the fulfillment of which society has an interest." "The distinction," it has been said, "rests upon the following ground: An agreement for an immediate separation is made to meet a state of things which, however undesirable in itself, has in fact become inevitable. Still, that state of things is abnormal, and not to be contemplated beforehand. 'It is forbidden to provide for the possible dissolution of the marriage contract, which the policy of the law is to preserve intact and inviolate.' Or, in other words, to allow validity to provisions for a future separation would

Cooley, *Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 124; *Effray v. Effray*, 110 App. Div. 545, 97 N. Y. Supp. 286; *Branch v. Branch's Ex'r*, 98 S. W. 1004, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 417; *Carson v. Murray*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 483; *Champlin v. Champlin*, Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 55; *Calkins v. Long*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 97; *Pettit v. Pettit*, 107 N. Y. 677, 14 N. E. 500; *Clark v. Fosdick*, 118 N. Y. 7, 22 N. E. 1111, 6 L. R. A. 132, 16 Am. St. Rep. 733; *Hutton v. Hutton's Adm'r*, 3 Pa. 100; *Hitner's Appeal*, 54 Pa. 110; *Appeal of Agnew* (Pa.) 12 Atl. 160; *Com. v. Richards*, 131 Pa. 209, 18 Atl. 1007; *Dutton v. Dutton*, 30 Ind. 452; *Page v. Trufant*, 2 Mass. 159, 3 Am. Dec. 41; *Fox v. Davis*, 113 Mass. 255, 18 Am. Rep. 476; *Randall v. Randall*, 37 Mich. 563; *Barnes v. Barnes*, 104 N. C. 613, 10 S. E. 304; *Rains v. Wheeler*, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S. W. 324; *Carey v. Mackey*, 82 Me. 516, 20 Atl. 84, 9 L. R. A. 113, 17 Am. St. Rep. 500; *Garver v. Miller*, 16 Ohio St. 527; *Bettle v. Wilson*, 14 Ohio, 257; *Thomas v. Brown*, 10 Ohio St. 247; *Loud v. Loud*, 4 Bush. (Ky.) 453; *Gaines' Adm'r v. Poor*, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 503, 79 Am. Dec. 559; *Wells v. Stout*, 9 Cal. 479; *McCubbin v. Patterson*, 16 Md. 179; *Robertson v. Robertson*, 25 Iowa, 350; *Walker v. Walker's Ex'r*, 9 Wall. 743, 19 L. Ed. 814; *Switzer v. Switzer*, 26 Grat. (Va.) 574; *Harshberger's Adm'r v. Alger*, 31 Grat. (Va.) 52. Separation agreements will be enforced in equity only so far as it is just to enforce them. *Halstead v. Halstead*, 74 N. J. Eq. 596, 70 Atl. 928.

<sup>6</sup>*Hunt v. Hunt*, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 221. And see *Clark*, Cont. 444, and cases there cited; *Sumner v. Sumner*, 121 Ga. 1, 48 S. E. 727; *Hill v. Hill*, 74 N. H. 288, 67 Atl. 406, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848, 124 Am. St. Rep. 966; *Boyd v. Boyd*, 188 Ill. App. 136; *Terkelsen v. Petersen*, 216 Mass. 531, 104 N. E. 351; *Winter v. Winter*, 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 710; *Kaufman v. Kaufman*, 158 App. Div. 892, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1048; *Sayles v. Sayles*, 21 N. H. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 208; *Adams v. Adams*, 25 Minn. 72; *Stokes v. Anderson*, 118 Ind. 533, 21 N. E. 331, 4 L. R. A. 313; *People v. Mercein*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 47, 68; *Randall v. Randall*, 37 Mich. 563; *Gaines' Adm'r v. Poor*, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 503, 79 Am. Dec. 559; *Durant v. Titley*, 7 Price, 577; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 526; *Jee v. Thurlow*, 2 Barn. & C. 547. In the Philippine Islands it is held that an agreement between husband and wife providing for a separation and division of property is void unless a provision permitting such a contract is contained in the marriage contract. *Quintana v. Lerma*, 26 Phil. Rep. 285.

be to allow the parties, in effect, to make the contract of marriage determinable on conditions fixed beforehand by themselves." <sup>6</sup>

It must be noted that, where the law does enforce an agreement of separation, it does so only as to the provision as to maintenance and other collateral engagements. The courts of this country, at least, will not aid in carrying out such an agreement, in so far as it relates solely to the parties living apart. As was said in a Pennsylvania case: "When the parties have effected the separation, equity will control its incidents, and accomplish its lawful objects. It will compel the husband to pay what he stipulated to pay for the maintenance of the wife, \* \* \* but it will not decree a separation." <sup>7</sup>

An agreement of separation will be considered as rescinded if the parties afterwards cohabit or live together as husband and wife, by mutual consent, for ever so short a time.<sup>8</sup> And in such an event all the provisions of the agreement will cease to operate, and the parties will be restored to all their marital rights to the same extent as if no separation had ever taken place.<sup>9</sup>

## DIVORCE OR JUDICIAL SEPARATION

96. Divorce is the legal separation of husband and wife by the judgment of a court. There are two kinds:

- (a) It may dissolve the marriage, in which case it is called a divorce "*a vinculo matrimonii*."
- (b) It may suspend the effect of the marriage only in so far as cohabitation is concerned, in which case it is called a divorce "*a mensa et thoro*."

<sup>6</sup> Pol. Cont. 286.

<sup>7</sup> Smith v. Knowles, 2 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 413. And see Adams v. Adams, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 353; McKennan v. Phillips, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 571, 37 Am. Dec. 438; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; Collins v. Collins, 62 N. C. 153, 93 Am. Dec. 606; McCrocklin v. McCrocklin, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 370; Tournay v. Sinclair, 3 How. (Miss.) 324; Rogers v. Rogers, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 516, 27 Am. Dec. 34; Banner v. Banner, 184 Mo. App. 396, 171 S. W. 2; Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 49 N. J. Eq. 302, 24 Atl. 926.

<sup>8</sup> In re Matteote's Estate, 59 Colo. 566, 151 Pac. 448; Boyd v. Boyd, 188 Ill. App. 136; Haile v. Hale, 40 Okl. 101, 135 Pac. 1143; Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 261.

<sup>9</sup> See Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 483. But see Dennis v. Perkins, 88 Kan. 428, 129 Pac. 165, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219, holding that resumption of marital relations does not necessarily avoid the separation agreement in toto, but only so far as the facts and circumstances show an intent to avoid it.

In England the term "divorce" is now applied both to decrees of nullity of marriage and decrees of dissolution. But in this country the term is limited to decrees dissolving or suspending the effect of a valid marriage. Divorce means "the legal separation of man and wife, effected, for cause, by the judgment of a court, and either totally dissolving the marriage relation, or suspending its effects so far as concerns the cohabitation of the parties."<sup>10</sup> When the divorce is a total dissolution of the marriage relation, it is called a divorce "from the bond of marriage," or, in the Latin, "a vinculo matrimonii." Such a divorce dissolves the marriage tie, and releases the parties wholly from their matrimonial obligations.<sup>11</sup> When the divorce merely suspends the effect of the marriage as to cohabitation, it is called a divorce from bed and board, or, in the Latin, "a mensa et thoro." Such a divorce is partial or qualified. The parties are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together again, but the marriage itself is not affected.<sup>12</sup>

In South Carolina absolute divorce is unknown, and her courts have jurisdiction to grant only divorces a mensa et thoro.<sup>13</sup>

The marriage status is a matter of public interest,<sup>14</sup> and the Legislature may prescribe the grounds on which divorces may be granted and such conditions and limitations on the right to divorce as it deems public policy requires.<sup>15</sup> In view of this interest of the public, an action for divorce is not a mere controversy between private parties; but the state is interested as an adverse party so far as to oppose the granting of a divorce unless a case is made within the rules prescribed by the Legislature.<sup>16</sup> As the state favors the continuity of the marriage relation,<sup>17</sup> public policy requires that the marital relation shall not be severed without adequate

<sup>10</sup> Black, Law Dict. tit. "Divorce." For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, p. 2149.

<sup>11</sup> Connella v. Connella, 114 La. 950, 38 South. 690; Griswold v. Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 560.

<sup>12</sup> Freeman v. Beefer, 173 N. O. 581, 92 S. E. 486, L. R. A. 1917E, 886; Evans v. Evans, 43 Minn. 31, 44 N. W. 524, 7 L. R. A. 448.

<sup>13</sup> McCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178, 28 L. R. A. 655, 51 Am. St. Rep. 794.

<sup>14</sup> Barringer v. Dauernheim, 127 La. 679, 53 South. 923.

<sup>15</sup> Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, 106 Pac. 353, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 490, 20 Ann. Cas. 339.

<sup>16</sup> Reh fuss v. Reh fuss, 169 Cal. 86, 145 Pac. 1020; People v. Case, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N. E. 638, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 578; Grant v. Grant, 84 N. J. Eq. 81, 92 Atl. 791.

<sup>17</sup> Lyon v. Lyon, 39 Okl. 111, 134 Pac. 650.

cause.<sup>18</sup> Divorces may be granted only on legal grounds as prescribed by statute.<sup>19</sup>

## JURISDICTION TO GRANT DIVORCE

97. In this country jurisdiction to entertain a suit for divorce is entirely statutory; but, when once conferred, it is exercised as in the English ecclesiastical courts.

98. **ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION**—Jurisdiction of proceedings for a divorce is, in general, determined by the domicile of the parties.

In England the only courts which had any jurisdiction to entertain applications for divorce were the ecclesiastical courts, and they only granted divorces *a mensa et thoro*. Courts of common law and courts of chancery had no jurisdiction at all in this respect.<sup>20</sup> In this country there is no tribunal having the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. When the colonies and the states of the Union adopted the common law of England they did not adopt the ecclesiastical law pertaining to marriage and divorce.<sup>21</sup> Our courts have jurisdiction to grant divorces only when such jurisdiction has been expressly conferred on them by statute.<sup>22</sup>

An action for divorce, though a civil action, partakes of the character of neither an action *ex contractu* nor an action *ex delicto*.<sup>23</sup> It is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity in the ordinary sense.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, in exercising the jurisdiction conferred by statute, the courts are largely governed by the rules of

<sup>18</sup> *Devers v. Devers*, 115 Va. 517, 79 S. E. 1048; *TRENCHARD v. TRENCHARD*, 245 Ill. 313, 92 N. E. 243, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 131; *Rindlaub v. Rindlaub*, 19 N. D. 352, 125 N. W. 479.

<sup>19</sup> *Voss v. Voss*, 157 Wis. 430, 147 N. W. 634; *Main v. Main*, 168 Iowa, 353, 150 N. W. 590; *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192.

<sup>20</sup> Since the Judicature Act of 1873 divorce causes are heard in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice.

<sup>21</sup> *Cotter v. Cotter*, 225 Fed. 471, 139 C. C. A. 453; *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192.

<sup>22</sup> *Burtis v. Burtis*, *Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.)* 557, 14 Am. Dec. 563; *Anon.*, 24 N. J. Eq. 19; *Cizek v. Cizek*, 76 Neb. 797, 107 N. W. 1012; *Rumping v. Rumping*, 36 Mont. 39, 91 Pac. 1057, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1197, 12 Ann. Cas. 1090; *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192; *Judson v. Judson*, 171 Mich. 185, 137 N. W. 103; *Gilbert v. Hayward*, 37 R. I. 303, 92 Atl. 625; *Bodie v. Bates*, 99 Neb. 253, 156 N. W. 8.

<sup>23</sup> *Cohen v. Cohen*, 3 Royce (Del.) 361, 84 Atl. 122.

<sup>24</sup> *People ex rel. Levine v. Shea*, 201 N. Y. 471, 94 N. E. 1060.

the English ecclesiastical courts, except in so far as that law has been modified by statute;<sup>25</sup> and though a suit for divorce is not a suit in equity, and therefore not within the ordinary jurisdiction of a chancery court,<sup>26</sup> yet, except as the procedure may be governed by statute, the courts will apply the rules and principles of equity.<sup>27</sup>

In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, jurisdiction to grant divorce does not depend on the place where the marriage took place,<sup>28</sup> nor upon the place where the cause for divorce arose. In some states it has been held that the court will not take jurisdiction, if the offense does not constitute a ground for divorce in the state where it was committed, though it is a ground for divorce in the state where action is brought.<sup>29</sup>

### *Jurisdiction Dependent on Domicile*

It is a general rule that the jurisdiction of proceedings for a divorce depends on the domicile of the parties. To give the court jurisdiction at least one of the parties must be domiciled in the state or territory where the action is brought,<sup>30</sup> and if neither party

<sup>25</sup> *Crump v. Morgan*, 38 N. C. 91, 98, 40 Am. Dec. 447; *Le Barron v. Le Barron*, 35 Vt. 365; *Emerson v. Emerson*, 120 Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033; *Wuest v. Wuest*, 17 Nev. 217, 30 Pac. 886; *Williamson v. Williamson*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 488, 491; *Barrere v. Barrere*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 187, 196; *Wood v. Wood*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 108; *Devanbagh v. Devanbagh*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 554, 28 Am. Dec. 443; *Burr v. Burr*, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 20; *Griffin v. Griffin*, 47 N. Y. 137.

<sup>26</sup> *Emerson v. Emerson*, 120 Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033; *Martin v. Martin*, 173 Ala. 106, 55 South. 632; *Judson v. Judson*, 171 Mich. 185, 137 N. W. 103; *Bodle v. Bates*, 99 Neb. 253, 156 N. W. 8.

<sup>27</sup> *People ex rel. Levine v. Shea*, 201 N. Y. 471, 94 N. E. 1060; *Johannessen v. Johannessen*, 70 Misc. Rep. 361, 128 N. Y. Supp. 892; *Stone v. Duffy*, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595.

<sup>28</sup> *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87; *Blerstadt v. Blerstadt*, 29 App. Div. 210, 51 N. Y. Supp. 862; *Friedrich v. Friedrich*, 230 Mass. 59, 119 N. E. 449; *Barber v. Barber*, 89 Misc. Rep. 519, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1064; *Jones v. Jones*, 67 Miss. 195, 6 South. 712, 19 Am. St. Rep. 299; *Adams v. Adams*, 101 Md. 506, 61 Atl. 628; *Rose v. Rose*, 132 Minn. 340, 156 N. W. 664; *Duke v. Duke*, 70 N. J. Eq. 135, 62 Atl. 466; *Harteau v. Harteau*, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 181, 25 Am. Dec. 372; *Walker v. Walker*, 111 Me. 404, 89 Atl. 373. A complaint for divorce presupposes the existence of a marriage between the parties litigant. *Santos v. Sweeney*, 4 Phil. Rep. 79.

<sup>29</sup> *Pope v. Pope*, 161 Ky. 104, 170 S. W. 504; *Harteau v. Harteau*, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 181, 25 Am. Dec. 372. And see *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366. But see *Blakeslee v. Blakeslee*, 41 Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950.

<sup>30</sup> *Van Fossen v. State*, 37 Ohio St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507; *Watkins v. Watkins*, 125 Ind. 163, 25 N. E. 175, 21 Am. St. Rep. 217.

is domiciled in the state the court has in fact no jurisdiction.<sup>31</sup> Generally the statutes of the various states provide that the plaintiff must be domiciled in the state,<sup>32</sup> and the mere fact that the domicile was acquired for the purpose of obtaining a divorce does not affect the jurisdiction.<sup>33</sup> Of course, if both parties have their domicile in the state where action is brought, the jurisdiction of that state is complete as to both the subject-matter and the parties.<sup>34</sup>

As has been pointed out elsewhere, the domicile of the wife is generally the same as that of the husband;<sup>35</sup> consequently, if the wife is separated from the husband for her fault, her domicile is still the same as his, and the court, in an action for divorce brought by the husband in the state of his domicile, has jurisdiction of both parties.<sup>36</sup> But it is well settled that, for the purpose of divorce, an injured and innocent wife may acquire a domicile separate from

<sup>31</sup> *House v. House*, 25 Ga. 473; *Kell v. Kell*, 80 Neb. 496, 114 N. W. 570; *State v. Armington*, 25 Minn. 29; *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87. It has, however, been held in some cases that, if the parties voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction, they (but not third persons) are thereafter estopped to deny the court's jurisdiction. In *re Ellis' Estate*, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056, 23 L. R. A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514; *Kinnler v. Kinnler*, 45 N. Y. 535, 6 Am. Rep. 132; *Starbuck v. Starbuck*, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193, 93 Am. St. Rep. 631.

<sup>32</sup> See the statutes of the various states. And see *Carey v. Carey*, 5 Boyce (Del.) 53, 90 Atl. 405; *Howell v. Heriff*, 87 Kan. 389, 124 Pac. 168, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 429; *La Boute v. La Boute*, 210 Mass. 319, 96 N. E. 675; *Bradfield v. Bradfield*, 154 Mich. 115, 117 N. W. 588, 129 Am. St. Rep. 468; *Rumping v. Rumping*, 36 Mont. 39, 91 Pac. 1057, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1197, 12 Ann. Cas. 1090; *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192; *Walker v. Walker*, 32 R. I. 28, 78 Atl. 339; *Duxstad v. Duxstad*, 17 Wyo. 411, 100 Pac. 112, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1138. But see *Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick*, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S. W. 444. The word "residence," as used in statutes prescribing residence in the state for a certain period to give jurisdiction in divorce, is synonymous with "domicile." *Miller v. Miller*, 88 Vt. 134, 92 Atl. 9, L. R. A. 1915D, 852; *Connolly v. Connolly*, 33 S. D. 346, 146 N. W. 581.

<sup>33</sup> *Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve*, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 920. But mere physical presence in the state does not constitute such residence or domicile as will confer jurisdiction. *Presson v. Presson*, 38 Nev. 203, 147 Pac. 1061; *Halpine v. Halpine*, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 80.

<sup>34</sup> *McGill v. Deming*, 44 Ohio St. 645, 11 N. E. 118; *Cheely v. Clayton*, 110 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 328, 28 L. Ed. 298.

<sup>35</sup> Ante, p. 88.

<sup>36</sup> *Loker v. Gerald*, 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709, 16 L. R. A. 497, 34 Am. St. Rep. 252; *Burlen v. Shannon*, 115 Mass. 438; *Hood v. Hood*, 110 Mass. 463; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 72 N. Y. 217, 28 Am. Rep. 129; *Matter of Morrison* (In re Feyh's Estate) 52 Hun, 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90; *Post v. Post*, 55 Misc. Rep. 538, 105 N. Y. Supp. 910.

that of the husband;<sup>37</sup> and, on the other hand, the husband cannot by his own acts prevent the wife from adopting or maintaining the same domicile as his for the purposes of jurisdiction of divorce proceedings.<sup>38</sup> So, too, if the husband, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, removes to and acquires a domicile in another state, the domicile of the innocent wife will not necessarily follow his; but will remain in the state where she actually resides.<sup>39</sup>

This phase of the question of jurisdiction has been well illustrated by two cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In *Atherton v. Atherton*<sup>40</sup> the matrimonial domicile of the parties was in Kentucky. The wife abandoned the domicile, taking up her residence in New York; the husband remaining in Kentucky. He obtained a divorce there on the ground of abandonment; constructive service being made on the wife in the manner prescribed by the law of Kentucky. The court held that the domicile of the parties, for the purposes of the suit, was in Kentucky,<sup>41</sup> and that the Kentucky court had complete jurisdiction. In *Haddock v. Haddock*<sup>42</sup> the matrimonial domicile of the parties was in New York.

<sup>37</sup> *Arrington v. Arrington*, 102 N. C. 491, 9 S. E. 200; *Shaw v. Shaw*, 98 Mass. 158; *Smith v. Smith*, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 South. 248; *Cheever v. Wilson*, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604; *Sneed v. Sneed*, 14 Ariz. 17, 123 Pac. 312, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99; *Brown v. Brown*, 164 Ill. App. 589; *Ensign v. Ensign*, 54 Misc. Rep. 289, 105 N. Y. Supp. 917, affirmed 120 App. Div. 882, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1114; *Miller v. Miller*, 67 Or. 359, 136 Pac. 15; *Carty v. Carty*, 70 W. Va. 146, 73 S. E. 310, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 297; *Harding v. Alden*, 9 Me. (9 Greenl.) 140, 23 Am. Dec. 549; *Hanberry v. Hanberry*, 29 Ala. 719; *Hibbert v. Hibbert*, 72 N. J. Eq. 778, 65 Atl. 1028; *Ransom v. Ransom*, 54 Misc. Rep. 410, 104 N. Y. Supp. 198.

<sup>38</sup> *Ensign v. Ensign*, 54 Misc. Rep. 289, 105 N. Y. Supp. 917, affirmed in 120 App. Div. 882, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1114; *Hibbert v. Hibbert*, 72 N. J. Eq. 778, 65 Atl. 1028; *State ex rel. Aldrich v. Morse*, 31 Utah, 213, 87 Pac. 705, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127. Where the husband left the state to avoid a criminal charge the wife's domicile was not changed. *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192.

<sup>39</sup> *Vischer v. Vischer*, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 640; *Heath v. Heath*, 42 La. Ann. 437, 7 South. 540; *Woolworth v. Woolworth*, 115 App. Div. 405, 100 N. Y. Supp. 865.

<sup>40</sup> 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794, reversing 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291, 63 Am. St. Rep. 650.

<sup>41</sup> It is to be observed, however, that according to the views of Mr. Justice Peckham, who dissented from the decision of the court, the wife was justified in leaving the husband, so that she obtained a new domicile in New York; and this seems also to be the view taken by the New York court. *Atherton v. Atherton*, 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291, 63 Am. St. Rep. 650. In this connection see, also, *Post v. Post*, 55 Misc. Rep. 538, 105 N. Y. Supp. 910; *Matter of Morrison (In re Feyh's Estate)* 52 Hun, 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90.

<sup>42</sup> *HADDOCK v. HADDOCK*, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5

The husband abandoned the wife and subsequently acquired a domicile in Connecticut; the wife remaining in New York. The husband obtained a divorce in Connecticut; constructive service being made on the wife as prescribed by the law of Connecticut. The court held that the domicile of the wife did not in such case follow the husband,<sup>43</sup> and, following the New York rule, that the Connecticut court acquired no jurisdiction over her to grant a divorce.<sup>44</sup>

### GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE—ADULTERY

**99. Adultery is the voluntary intercourse of a married person with another than his or her wife or husband, and is almost universally made a ground of divorce.**

As has been seen, prior to 1858, in England, it was only the ecclesiastical courts which had jurisdiction to grant divorces. These courts granted divorces on the ground of adultery, but the divorce was only a *mensa et thoro*. The only way in which a divorce a *vinculo matrimonii* could be obtained was, in Catholic England, by dispensation from the Pope, and later, in Protestant England, by a bill in Parliament. So, in this country, the only way in which a divorce a *vinculo* could be obtained, even on the ground of adultery, was by recourse to the Legislature. There are now in England, and in most of our states, statutes making adultery a ground for an absolute divorce a *vinculo matrimonii*. Though to some extent it otherwise in England, the statutes in this country do not, as a rule, make any distinction in this respect between the rights of the husband and those of the wife. The same acts of adultery which, when committed by the wife, would entitle the husband to a divorce, will entitle the wife to a divorce if committed by the husband. The statutes are not the same in all the states. In some states a single act of adultery is ground for a divorce, while in

Ann. Cas. 1, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 144, affirming 178 N. Y. 557, 70 N. E. 1099.

<sup>43</sup> In this connection the case of *State ex rel. Aldrach v. Morse*, 31 Utah, 213, 87 Pac. 705, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127, is of interest. In this case, on an application for mandamus to compel the district court to proceed with the trial of a suit for divorce, it was held that the husband cannot, by abandoning the wife and going into another state to reside, change the matrimonial domicile, so that the court would not have jurisdiction of a suit for divorce brought by the wife in the state of the matrimonial domicile.

<sup>44</sup> Extraterritorial effect of divorce, see post, p. 287.

others there must be a "living in adultery,"<sup>46</sup> and in others the adultery must be accompanied by cruelty, desertion, or other aggravating circumstances.<sup>46</sup>

Adultery consists in the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with another than his or her wife or husband, whether the other party to the intercourse is married or single. Sexual intercourse under coercion, as in the case of rape<sup>47</sup> or during insanity,<sup>48</sup> is not adultery, because it is not voluntary. Mistake of fact may prevent an act of intercourse from being adultery; as where a woman has intercourse with a man under the belief that he is her husband, or where she has married the person with whom she has intercourse under the belief that her husband was dead.<sup>49</sup> Mistake of law, however, is no defense. Belief in the right to have more than one wife would not prevent the intercourse with the latter from being adulterous.<sup>50</sup> And intercourse after a second marriage, when a divorce from a prior marriage is illegal is adultery, and ground for a divorce from the prior marriage, though there was a bona fide belief in the validity of the divorce.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Prendergast v. Prendergast*, 146 N. C. 225, 59 S. E. 692, construing *Revisal 1905*, § 3350.

<sup>46</sup> *Stewart v. Stewart*, 105 Md. 297, 66 Atl. 16.

<sup>47</sup> *People v. Chapman*, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N. W. 896, 4 Am. St. Rep. 857. Since adultery is voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one not the husband or wife of such person, a wife may have a divorce for adultery if her husband commits a rape on another woman. *Johnson v. Johnson*, 78 N. J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119.

<sup>48</sup> *Nichols v. Nichols*, 31 Vt. 328, 73 Am. Dec. 352; *Broadstreet v. Broadstreet*, 7 Mass. 474; *Wray v. Wray*, 19 Ala. 522; *Id.*, 33 Ala. 187; *Mims v. Mims*, 33 Ala. 98. But see *Matchin v. Matchin*, 6 Pa. 332, 47 Am. Dec. 466.

<sup>49</sup> *Ayl. Par.* 226; *Valleau v. Valleau*, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 207. Of course, this does not apply if the intercourse under the second marriage is continued after knowledge that the first spouse is still living. *Mathewson v. Mathewson*, 18 R. I. 456, 28 Atl. 801, 49 Am. St. Rep. 782.

<sup>50</sup> See *Reynolds v. U. S.*, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244.

<sup>51</sup> *Simonds v. Simonds*, 103 Mass. 572, 4 Am. Rep. 576; *Leith v. Leith*, 39 N. H. 20; *Ackerman v. Ackerman*, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192; *McGiffert v. McGiffert*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 69. See *Palmer v. Palmer*, 1 Swab. & T. 551.

**SAME—CRUELTY**

100. Cruelty is made a ground of divorce in most states by statute. The statutes use various terms, as "extreme cruelty," "intolerable cruelty," "cruel and inhuman conduct," conduct rendering it "unsafe and improper" for the parties to cohabit, etc.
101. The general rule is that conduct to come within the statutes must consist in the infliction, or threatened infliction, of bodily harm. This may be
- (a) By personal violence, either actual or threatened and reasonably apprehended.
  - (b) By words or conduct, without personal violence, causing mental suffering, and thereby injuring, or threatening to injure, the health.
102. In some states falsely charging a wife with adultery is held to be cruelty, though unaccompanied by bodily harm; and in a few states it is held generally that bodily injury is not necessary.

In most states, by statute, cruelty is made a ground for divorce a vinculo matrimonii or a mensa et thoro. In some it is ground for divorce a mensa et thoro only. Various expressions are found in the statutes of the different states, but they are held to mean substantially the same thing. These expressions are, in most states, "extreme cruelty"; in some, "repeated cruelty"; in others "cruel or abusive treatment," "cruel and inhuman treatment, whether practiced by using personal violence or other means," "cruel treatment, outrages, or excesses, so as to render their living together insupportable," "cruel and inhuman treatment, or personal indignities, rendering life burdensome,"<sup>52</sup> "intolerable severity," "such conduct on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff as may render it unsafe and improper for the former to cohabit with the latter." In some states it is declared that "cruelty," within the meaning of the statute, must consist of personal violence. In others it is defined to be "the infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous

<sup>52</sup> *Simon v. Simon*, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, holding that the communication of a loathsome disease by a husband to a wife is such an indignity to her person, rendering "her condition intolerable and life burdensome," as will entitle her to a divorce.

mental suffering." In others it is declared that the treatment must be such as to injure health or endanger reason;<sup>53</sup> in others, so cruel as to endanger life.

It was originally the general rule, due perhaps to the peculiar wording of the statutes, that cruelty, to be a ground of divorce, must consist of physical cruelty, either direct or consequential, without personal violence, and this doctrine persists in some states.<sup>54</sup> But as will presently appear this rule has been greatly relaxed in most jurisdictions, and the infliction of mental suffering is recognized as a form of cruelty as well as physical violence.<sup>55</sup>

It is generally conceded that, in order to constitute cruelty, direct actual violence is not necessary.<sup>56</sup> Any conduct which is attended with bodily harm, and which renders it impossible or unsafe to discharge the duties of married life, may constitute cruelty as fully as direct violence.<sup>57</sup> The test is whether, under the circumstances

<sup>53</sup> See *Robinson v. Robinson*, 66 N. H. 600, 23 Atl. 362, 15 L. R. A. 121, 49 Am. St. Rep. 632; *RADER v. RADER*, 136 Iowa, 223, 113 N. W. 817, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 133.

<sup>54</sup> *Whitlock v. Whitlock*, 268 Ill. 218, 109 N. E. 6, reversing 187 Ill. App. 165; *Casey v. Casey*, 83 N. J. Eq. 603, 93 Atl. 720; *TRENCHARD v. TRENCHARD*, 245 Ill. 313, 92 N. E. 243, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 131.

<sup>55</sup> See post, p. 252.

<sup>56</sup> *RADER v. RADER*, 136 Iowa, 223, 113 N. W. 817, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 133; *Luettjohann v. Luettjohann*, 147 Iowa, 286, 126 N. W. 172; *Root v. Root*, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N. W. 194, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 740; *Carr v. Carr*, 171 Ala. 600, 55 South. 96; *Miller v. Miller*, 89 Neb. 239, 131 N. W. 203, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 360; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 32 N. D. 530, 156 N. W. 492; *Lyon v. Lyon*, 39 Okl. 111, 134 Pac. 650.

<sup>57</sup> *Brown v. Brown*, 129 Ga. 246, 58 S. E. 825; *Williams v. Williams*, 101 Minn. 400, 112 N. W. 528; *Carr v. Carr*, 171 Ala. 600, 55 South. 96; *Humber v. Humber*, 109 Miss. 216, 68 South. 161; *Knapp v. Knapp*, 23 Cal. App. 10, 136 Pac. 719. It is cruelty in a husband to refuse his wife the necessities of life when it is in his power to supply them. *Dysart v. Dysart*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 106, 111, 125; *Smedley v. Smedley*, 30 Ala. 714; *Whitacre v. Whitacre*, 64 Mich. 232, 31 N. W. 327; *Eastes v. Eastes*, 79 Ind. 363; *Butler v. Butler*, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 329. It is cruelty to subject unnecessarily the wife to conditions imposing great hardship and privation as by lack of proper support. *RADER v. RADER*, 136 Iowa, 223, 113 N. W. 817, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 133; *Dean v. Dean*, 181 Mich. 498, 148 N. W. 179. It is cruelty for a husband to have intercourse with his wife when he knows that he has a venereal disease, and infect her with it, and vice versa. *Collett v. Collett*, 1 Curt. Ecc. 678; *Anon.*, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 231; *Carbajal v. Fernandez*, 130 La. 812, 58 South. 581; *Rehart v. Rehart* (Or.) 25 Pac. 775. So where a husband compels his wife to submit to excessive sexual intercourse, with knowledge of injury to her health. *Mayhew v. Mayhew*, 61 Conn. 233, 23 Atl. 966, 29 Am. St. Rep. 195; *Shaw*

and conditions shown to exist, the complainant could with safety to person and health continue to live with defendant.<sup>58</sup> Threats of violence made in earnest, and which indicate an intention to do bodily harm, are sufficient. "The court is not to wait till the hurt is actually done."<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, mere threats not intended to be carried out, and not furnishing reasonable grounds for apprehension of bodily injury, are insufficient.<sup>60</sup> What must be the extent of the violence offered, or what will reasonably excite apprehension, will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The station in life and situation of the parties and all the attendant circumstances will be taken into consideration. A blow between parties in the lower conditions and in the highest stations of life has a very different aspect.<sup>61</sup> A single act of cruelty may be so severe as to

v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189; Youngs v. Youngs, 33 Ill. App. 223; Grant v. Grant, 53 Minn. 181, 54 N. W. 1059. The denial of intercourse is not cruelty on the part of either the husband or the wife. D'Aguiar v. D'Aguiar, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 773; Cousen v. Cousen, 4 Swab. & T. 164; Cowles v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 298; Lohmuller v. Lohmuller (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 751; Pinnebad v. Pinnebad, 134 Ga. 496, 68 S. E. 73; Magill v. Magill, 3 Pittsb. R. (Pa.) 25; Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 53. But see Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 147, 112 N. W. 481, 14 Detroit Leg. N. 284, 119 Am. St. Rep. 660. Where a husband had compelled his wife to submit to two abortions, and insisted that she should submit to a third and that she should bear no children, as a condition to the continuance of the marital relation, such conduct constituted extreme cruelty, entitling the wife to a divorce. Dunn v. Dunn, 150 Mich. 476, 114 N. W. 385, 14 Detroit Leg. N. 767. And see Sheldon v. Sheldon, 146 App. Div. 430, 131 N. Y. Supp. 201.

<sup>58</sup> Maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S. E. 571.

<sup>59</sup> Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Const. 35; Oliver v. Oliver, Id. 361, 364; Mytton v. Mytton, 11 Prob. Div. 141; Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373; Beebe v. Beebe, 10 Iowa, 133; Rhame v. Rhame, 1 McCord Eq. (S. C.) 197, 16 Am. Dec. 597; Whispell v. Whispell, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 217; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 60 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 151; Id., 73 N. Y. 369; Graecen v. Graecen, 2 N. J. Eq. 459; Hughes v. Hughes, 19 Ala. 307; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235; Harratt v. Harratt, 7 N. H. 196, 26 Am. Dec. 730; Griffith v. Griffith, 77 Neb. 180, 108 N. W. 981; Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 South. 923; Williams v. Williams, 101 Minn. 400, 112 N. W. 528. In this case it was also held that repeated charges made by the wife against the husband, not shown to have been based on reasonable cause, published by her for many years in private and public, rendering him a subject of discussion and ridicule, resulting in injury to his business and in the practical separation of the parties, constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, entitling the husband to a divorce.

<sup>60</sup> Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Const. 35; Eshbach v. Eshbach, 23 Pa. 343; Close v. Close, 24 N. J. Eq. 338; Shell v. Shell, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 716; Coursey v. Coursey, 60 Ill. 186; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 162 Ky. 741, 172 S. W. 1082; Uhlmann v. Uhlmann, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 236.

<sup>61</sup> Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Const. 35; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Hagg.

justify a divorce on the ground of cruelty,<sup>62</sup> but, as a rule, it is not sufficient.<sup>63</sup> A single act committed in a sudden passion might not constitute cruelty, when the same act committed as the result of a deliberate, fixed intention to abuse would suffice.<sup>64</sup>

There are some cases which apparently recognize as a ground of divorce, under the statutes, mere mental suffering caused by abusive or unkind treatment.<sup>65</sup> And in several states, where the courts do not recognize such a ground generally, they do recognize as cruelty a false accusation of adultery made by a husband against

Ecc. Supp. 1, p. 72; *Barrere v. Barrere*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 187; *Kline v. Kline*, 50 Mich. 438, 15 N. W. 541; *Zweig v. Zweig*, 46 Ind. App. 594, 93 N. E. 234; *Fleytas v. Pigneguy*, 9 La. 419; *Donald v. Donald*, 21 Fla. 571.

<sup>62</sup> *Reeves v. Reeves*, 3 Swab. & T. 139; *French v. French*, 4 Mass. 587; *Miller v. Miller*, 72 Tex. 250, 12 S. W. 167; *Russell v. Russell*, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 348; *MacDonald v. MacDonald*, 155 Cal. 665, 102 Pac. 927, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 45.

<sup>63</sup> *Holden v. Holden*, 1 Hagg. Const. 453; *Smallwood v. Smallwood*, 2 Swab. & T. 397; *Fleytas v. Pigneguy*, 9 La. 419; *Lauber v. Mast*, 15 La. Ann. 593; *Jenness v. Jenness*, 60 N. H. 211; *Richards v. Richards*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 389. In some states the statute requires "repeated cruelty." *Henderson v. Henderson*, 88 Ill. 248. Mere impulsive acts at long intervals of time do not constitute cruelty. *Rebstock v. Rebstock* (Sup.) 144 N. Y. Supp. 289.

<sup>64</sup> *Pillar v. Pillar*, 22 Wis. 658; *Cook v. Cook*, 11 N. J. Eq. 195; *Finley v. Finley*, 9 Dana (Ky.) 52, 83 Am. Dec. 528; *Moyler v. Moyler*, 11 Ala. 620. Isolated and infrequent acts of cruelty by a husband to his wife, culminating in physical violence of a dangerous character, accompanied by abusive words and a disavowal of any affection for her, are sufficient grounds of divorce from bed and board, especially where the wife is a weak and immature child of 16 years. *Boyle v. Boyle* (N. J. Ch.) 67 Atl. 690.

<sup>65</sup> *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 30 Kan. 744, 2 Pac. 122, 46 Am. Rep. 108; *Barnes v. Barnes*, 95 Cal. 171, 30 Pac. 399, 16 L. R. A. 660; *Fleming v. Fleming*, 95 Cal. 430, 30 Pac. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 124; *Outlaw v. Outlaw*, 118 Md. 498, 84 Atl. 383; *Emery v. Emery*, 181 Mich. 146, 147 N. W. 452; *Ather-ton v. Ather-ton*, 82 Hun, 179, 81 N. Y. Supp. 977; *Waltermire v. Waltermire*, 110 N. Y. 183, 17 N. E. 739. "It was formerly thought that to constitute extreme cruelty, such as would authorize the granting of a divorce, physical violence is necessary; but the modern and better considered cases have repudiated this doctrine, as taking too low and sensual a view of the marriage relation, and it is now very generally held that any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either the husband or wife which so grievously wounds the feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously impair the health, \* \* \* or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty, under the statute." *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, supra. As the cases cited in the following notes will show, the latter part of the above quotation is not, as it purports to be, in accord with the weight of opinion. It should be noted, in connection with the California cases cited above, that the California statute defines "extreme cruelty" to be the infliction of griev-

his wife.<sup>66</sup> But from a comparison of the decisions and a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances existing in the cases it would appear that mere mental suffering, caused by unkind, abusive, or insulting words, is not enough, but there must be such degree of mental disturbance as to threaten bodily harm or to render the continued existence of the marital relation dangerous to the mental or physical health.<sup>67</sup>

ous bodily injury "or grievous mental suffering." See *Barnes v. Barnes*, supra. Rev. Codes N. D. 1905, § 4051, contains the same provision. See *Mahnken v. Mahnken*, 9 N. D. 188, 82 N. W. 870, and *Mosher v. Mosher*, 16 N. D. 269, 113 N. W. 99, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820, 125 Am. St. Rep. 654. In the latter case it was said that the habitual use of profane language and telling obscene stories by the wife to the husband and to third parties in his presence and against his wishes furnishes a ground for divorce, where the characteristics of the husband are such that this course of conduct causes him humiliation and grievous mental suffering.

<sup>66</sup> *Smith v. Smith*, 8 Or. 100; *Eggerth v. Eggerth*, 15 Or. 626, 18 Pac. 650; *Wagner v. Wagner*, 36 Minn. 239, 30 N. W. 766; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 45 Mich. 150, 7 N. W. 760, 40 Am. Rep. 461; *Blurock v. Blurock*, 4 Wash. 495, 30 Pac. 637; *Jones v. Jones*, 60 Tex. 451; *Bahn v. Bahn*, 62 Tex. 518, 50 Am. Rep. 539; *Clinton v. Clinton*, 60 Mo. App. 296; *Waltermire v. Waltermire*, 110 N. Y. 183, 17 N. E. 739; *De Meli v. De Meli*, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996, 17 Am. St. Rep. 652; *Fowler v. Fowler*, 58 Hun. 601, 11 N. Y. Supp. 419. But see *Cheatham v. Cheatham*, 10 Mo. 296; *Wetherington v. Wetherington*, 57 Fla. 551, 49 South. 549; *Cooper v. Cooper*, 51 Ind. App. 374, 99 N. E. 782; *Hertz v. Hertz*, 126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 825; *Votaw v. Votaw*, 90 Neb. 699, 134 N. W. 410; *MacDonald v. MacDonald*, 155 Cal. 665, 102 Pac. 927, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 45; *Morris v. Morris*, 57 Wash. 465, 107 Pac. 186. But see, *Gordon v. Gordon*, 77 N. H. 597, 92 Atl. 546; *Stewart v. Stewart*, 175 Ind. 412, 94 N. E. 564.

<sup>67</sup> *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Hagg. Const. 35; *Harris v. Harris*, 2 Phillim. 111, 1 Eng. Ecc. R. 204; *Barlee v. Barlee*, 1 Addams, Ecc. 301; *Oliver v. Oliver*, 1 Hagg. Const. 361; *Kirkman v. Kirkman*, Id. 409; *Detrick's Appeal*, 117 Pa. 452, 11 Atl. 882; *Shaw v. Shaw*, 17 Conn. 189; *Boggess v. Boggess*, 4 Dana (Ky.) 307; *Daiger v. Daiger*, 2 Md. Ch. 335; *Close v. Close*, 24 N. J. Eq. 338; *Henderson v. Henderson*, 88 Ill. 248; *Moyler v. Moyler*, 11 Ala. 620; *Lucas v. Lucas*, 2 Tex. 112; *Kenley v. Kenley*, 2 How. (Miss.) 751; *Maben v. Maben*, 72 Iowa, 658, 34 N. W. 462; *Vanduzer v. Vanduzer*, 70 Iowa, 614, 31 N. W. 956; *Cheatham v. Cheatham*, 10 Mo. 296; *Disborough v. Disborough* (N. J. Ch.) 26 Atl. 852; *Brown v. Brown*, 129 Ga. 246, 58 S. E. 825; *De Cloedt v. De Cloedt*, 24 Idaho, 277, 133 Pac. 664; *Zweig v. Zweig*, 46 Ind. App. 594, 93 N. E. 234; *Rowe v. Rowe*, 84 Kan. 696, 115 Pac. 553; *Williams v. Williams*, 101 Minn. 400, 112 N. W. 528; *Mathewson v. Mathewson*, 81 Vt. 173, 69 Atl. 646, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 300; *Prall v. Prall*, 58 Fla. 496, 50 South. 867, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577; *Preuitt v. Preuitt*, 88 Neb. 124, 129 N. W. 175; *Kinsey v. Kinsey* (Sup.) 124 N. Y. Supp. 30; *Lyon v. Lyon*, 39 Okl. 111, 134 Pac. 650; *Cevene v. Cevene*, 143 Wis. 393, 127 N. W. 942. The use of abusive language may be shown in connection with acts or threats of physical violence, as characterizing them. *Dysart v. Dysart*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 106; *Gibbs v. Gibbs*, 18 Kan. 419; *Day v. Day*, 56 N. H. 316; *Farnham v. Farnham*, 73

In a leading case Lord Stowell said: "What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted, where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty. They are high moral offenses in the marriage state, undoubtedly, not innocent, surely, in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties—for it may exist on one side as well as on the other—the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and, if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. And if it be complained that, by this inactivity of the courts, much injustice may be suffered, and much misery produced, the answer is that courts of justice do not pretend to furnish cures for all the miseries of human life. They redress or punish gross violations of duty, but they go no further. They cannot make men virtuous; and, as the happiness of the world depends upon its virtue, there may be much unhappiness in it which human laws cannot undertake to remove."<sup>68</sup> "The law does not permit courts to sever the marriage bond, and to break up households, merely because parties, from unruly tempers or mutual wranglings, live unhappily together. It requires them to submit to the ordinary consequences of human infirmities and of unwise selections; and the misconduct which will form a good ground for a legal separation must be very serious, and such as amounts to extreme cruelty, entirely subverting the family relations, by rendering the association intolerable."<sup>69</sup> "Although the character of the ill treatment, whether it operates directly upon the body, or primarily upon the mind alone, and all the attending circumstances are to be considered for the purpose of estimating the degree of cruelty, yet the final test of the sufficiency, as a cause of divorce, must be its actual or reasonably apprehended injurious effect upon the body or

Ill. 497; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 73 N. Y. 369; *Johns v. Johns*, 57 Miss. 530; *Goodrich v. Goodrich*, 44 Ala. 670; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 20 N. J. Eq. 97; *Straus v. Straus*, 67 Hun, 491, 22 N. Y. Supp. 567.

<sup>68</sup> *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Hagg. Const. 35.

<sup>69</sup> *Cooper v. Cooper*, 17 Mich. 205, 97 Am. Dec. 182. See, also, *Olson v. Olson*, 130 Iowa, 353, 106 N. W. 758, holding that incompatibility of temper is no ground for divorce.

health of the complaining party. \* \* \* The practical view of the law is that a degree of cruelty which cannot be perceived to injure the body or the health of the body 'can be practically endured,' and must be endured if there is no other remedy than by divorce, because no 'scale' by which to gauge the purely mental susceptibilities and sufferings has yet been invented or discovered, except such as indicate the degrees thereof by their perceptible effects upon the physical organization of the body."<sup>10</sup>

When the mental suffering is so great that it preys upon the mind and undermines the health though the suffering is caused by words and conduct, unaccompanied by any act of physical violence, the result is bodily harm, and hence such conduct constitutes legal cruelty. The tendency of modern decisions, as the effect of mental suffering upon bodily health has come to be more fully understood, is towards much greater latitude than is found in the earlier cases, in granting divorces in cases of so-called "mental cruelty." Without repudiating the doctrine that the injury must be physical, the courts recognize that legal cruelty may exist in systematic abuse, humiliating insults and annoyances, causing mental suffering and consequent ill health, as fully as in acts of violence.<sup>11</sup> "A husband may, by a course of humiliating insults and annoyances, practiced in the various forms which ingenious malice could readily devise, eventually destroy the life or health of his wife, although such conduct may be unaccompanied by violence, positive or threatened. Would the wife have no remedy in such circumstances under our

<sup>10</sup> *Waldron v. Waldron*, 85 Cal. 251, 24 Pac. 649, 858, 9 L. R. A. 487. In a later case in California the court said that this quotation was too narrow under their statute declaring extreme cruelty to be the infliction of grievous bodily injury, "or grievous mental suffering." *Barnes v. Barnes*, 95 Cal. 171, 30 Pac. 299, 16 L. R. A. 660; *Fleming v. Fleming*, 95 Cal. 430, 30 Pac. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 124.

<sup>11</sup> *Butler v. Butler*, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 329; *Kelly v. Kelly*, 2 Prob. & Div. 31; *Walmesley v. Walmesley*, 1 Reports, 529, 69 Law T. (N. S.) 152; *Harding v. Harding*, 36 Colo. 106, 85 Pac. 423; *Brown v. Brown*, 129 Ga. 246, 58 S. E. 825; *Bush v. Bush* (Tex. Civ. App.) 103 S. W. 217; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 97 Mass. 373; *Kelly v. Kelly*, 18 Nev. 49, 1 Pac. 194, 51 Am. Rep. 732; *Fowler v. Fowler*, 58 Hun, 601, 11 N. Y. Supp. 419; *Cole v. Cole*, 23 Iowa, 433; *Day v. Day*, 84 Iowa, 221, 50 N. W. 979; *Williams v. Williams*, 23 Fla. 324, 2 South. 768; *Powelson v. Powelson*, 22 Cal. 358; *Wolff v. Wolff*, 102 Cal. 433, 36 Pac. 767, 1037; *Sylvia v. Sylvia*, 11 Colo. 319, 17 Pac. 912; *Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld*, 21 Colo. 16, 40 Pac. 49; *Latham v. Latham*, 30 Grat. (Va.) 307; *Freeman v. Freeman*, 31 Wis. 235, 249; *Glass v. Wynn*, 76 Ga. 319; *Leach v. Leach* (Me.) 8 Atl. 349; *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 30 Kan. 712, 2 Pac. 122, 46 Am. Rep. 108.

divorce laws, because actual or threatened personal violence formed no element in such cruelty? The answer to this question seems free from difficulty, when the subject is considered with reference to the principles on which the divorce for cruelty is predicated. The courts intervene to dissolve the marriage bond under this head, for the conservation of the life or health of the wife, endangered by the treatment of the husband. The cruelty is judged from its effects, not solely from the means by which those effects are produced. To hold absolutely that, if a husband avoids positive or threatened personal violence, the wife has no legal protection against any means short of these which he may resort to, and which may destroy her life or health, is to invite such a system of infliction by the indemnity given the wrongdoer. The more rational application of the doctrine of cruelty is to consider a course of marital unkindness with reference to the effect it must necessarily produce on the life or health of the wife, and, if it has been such as to affect or injure either, to regard it as true legal cruelty."<sup>72</sup>

A divorce on the ground of cruelty will not be granted if the ill treatment has been caused by the misconduct of the plaintiff. Cruelty, as a foundation for a divorce, must be unmerited and unprovoked. "If her conduct be totally incompatible with the duty of a wife, if it be violent and outrageous, if it justly provoke the indignation of the husband, and cause danger to his person, she must reform her own disposition and manner."<sup>73</sup> But although the plaintiff may have brought the ill treatment of which she complains upon herself, if it is wholly out of proportion to her offense, intemperate, and inexcusably severe, her misconduct will not bar her right to relief.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Butler v. Butler*, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 329.

<sup>73</sup> *Waring v. Waring*, 2 Phillim. 132; *Poor v. Poor*, 8 N. H. 307, 29 Am. Dec. 664; *Skinner v. Skinner*, 5 Wis. 449; *Von Glahn v. Von Glahn*, 46 Ill. 134; *Knight v. Knight*, 31 Iowa, 451; *Jones v. Jones*, 189 Ala. 286, 66 South. 4; *Pittis v. Pittis*, 82 N. J. Eq. 635, 89 Atl. 749; *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 34 S. D. 637, 150 N. W. 293; *Moulton v. Moulton*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 309; *Richards v. Richards*, 37 Pa. 225; *Daiger v. Daiger*, 2 Md. Ch. 335; *Childs v. Childs*, 49 Md. 509; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 14 Cal. 460; *Reed v. Reed*, 4 Nev. 395; *Harper v. Harper*, 29 Mo. 301. Violence committed in a quarrel in which both are at fault, and resulting in equal injury to both, is not ground for divorce. *Soper v. Soper*, 29 Mich. 305; *Castanedo v. Fortier*, 34 La. Ann. 135; *Maben v. Maben*, 72 Iowa, 658, 34 N. W. 462.

<sup>74</sup> *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Hagg. Const. 35; *Waring v. Waring*, 2 Phillim. 132; *Westmeath v. Westmeath*, 2 Hagg. Ecc. Supp. 1, 72; *Hawkins v. Hawkins*, 65 Md. 104, 3 Atl. 749; *King v. King*, 28 Ala. 315; *Segelbaum v. Segelbaum*, 39 Minn. 258, 39 N. W. 492; *Eidenmuller v. Eidenmuller*, 37 Cal. 364;

## SAME—DESERTION

103. In most states, by statute, desertion for a prescribed period is made ground for divorce. Desertion is withdrawal from cohabitation by one of the parties, with intent to abandon the other, without the other's consent, and without justification. In detail, to entitle an abandoned husband or wife to a divorce on the ground of desertion—

- (a) There must have been a cessation of cohabitation.
- (b) Cohabitation must have ceased for the entire statutory period.
- (c) There must have been an intent to abandon.
- (d) There must have been no consent on the part of the abandoned spouse.
- (e) There must have been no misconduct on the part of the abandoned spouse justifying the abandonment.

As was stated in treating of the effect of marriage upon the persons of the spouses, they are mutually entitled to cohabitation and intercourse. It is true that in this country no suit will lie for restitution of conjugal rights, and that, in the absence of a statute, there is no legal remedy by which an abandoned spouse can either compel the other to return, or be freed from the marriage tie. An abandoned wife has certain powers which she does not have while cohabiting with her husband, as the power to engage in business and contract as a feme sole, and the power to purchase necessities on her husband's credit, if she can obtain them; but most of her disabilities remain notwithstanding the abandonment, and the rights of her husband in her property continue.

This is the state of things at common law, but it has been changed to some extent in most states by statutes making desertion a ground for divorce. Desertion consists in the willful and unjustifiable abandonment of one of the spouses by the other, without the other's consent.<sup>75</sup> The length of time during which the deser-

Boeck v. Boeck, 16 Neb. 196, 20 N. W. 223; Marsh v. Marsh, 64 Iowa, 667, 21 N. W. 130; Machado v. Bonet, 39 La. Ann. 475, 2 South. 49.

<sup>75</sup> Bailey v. Bailey, 21 Grat. (Va.) 43; Williams v. Williams, 130 N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98, 14 L. R. A. 220, 27 Am. St. Rep. 517; Crounse v. Crounse, 108 Va. 108, 60 S. E. 627; Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737; Burk v. Burk, 21 W. Va. 445; Rose v. Rose, 50 Mich. 92, 14 N. W. 711; Bennett v. Bennett, 43 Conn. 313; Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 14 Cal. 654;

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tion must last varies under the statutes of the different states. In some it must last for three years, while in others it need last for one year only. To constitute such a desertion as will entitle the aggrieved spouse to a divorce, there must be (1) a cessation of cohabitation (2) for the time prescribed by the statute; (3) an intention to abandon; (4) want of consent on the part of the party abandoned; and (5) the abandonment must be unjustifiable. These are the elements of a "desertion," as the term is used in the divorce laws.<sup>76</sup>

#### *Abandonment and Cessation of Cohabitation*

To cohabit is to live together as husband and wife,<sup>77</sup> and the cessation of cohabitation, without intent to resume it, and without the consent of the other spouse, constitutes desertion.<sup>78</sup> Although a husband may continue to support his wife, there is a cessation of cohabitation if they cease to dwell together. "There is no more important right of the wife than that which secures to her, in the marriage relation, the companionship of her husband and the protection of his home. His willful denial of this right, with the intentional and permanent abandonment of all matrimonial intercourse, against her consent, is desertion, within the meaning of our statute; and such conduct is not relieved by the fact that he has from time to time contributed to her support and the support of her children."<sup>79</sup>

*Andrade v. Andrade*, 14 Ariz. 379, 128 Pac. 813; *Buckner v. Buckner*, 118 Md. 101, 84 Atl. 156, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 628; *Sergeant v. Sergeant*, 33 N. J. Eq. 204.

<sup>76</sup> *Barnett v. Barnett*, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737; *Plymate v. Plymate* (Mo. App.) 180 S. W. 29; *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099; *Maloney v. Maloney*, 83 Wash. 656, 145 Pac. 631; *Bacon v. Bacon*, 68 W. Va. 747, 70 S. E. 762.

<sup>77</sup> *Yardley's Estate*, 75 Pa. 207; *Pollock v. Pollock*, 71 N. Y. 137; ante, p. 75.

<sup>78</sup> *Middleton v. Middleton*, 187 Pa. 612, 41 Atl. 291; *Ogilvie v. Ogilvie*, 37 Or. 171, 61 Pac. 627; *Todd v. Todd*, 84 Conn. 591, 80 Atl. 717; *Hill v. Hill*, 62 Fla. 493, 56 South. 941, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 112 Md. 666, 77 Atl. 133.

<sup>79</sup> *Magrath v. Magrath*, 103 Mass. 577, 4 Am. Rep. 579; *Brokaw v. Brokaw*, 66 Misc. Rep. 307, 123 N. Y. Supp. 317, affirmed in 147 App. Div. 906, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1106; *Yeatman v. Yeatman*, 1 Prob. & Div. 489. Likewise, when a husband has been deserted by his wife, he may obtain a divorce on that ground, though he has continued to provide for her. *Macdonald v. Macdonald*, 4 Swab. & T. 242; *Stoffer v. Stoffer*, 50 Mich. 491, 15 N. W. 564; *Bauder's Appeal*, 115 Pa. 480, 10 Atl. 41; *Parker v. Parker*, 28 Ill. App. 22.

There may, however, be separation without desertion.<sup>80</sup> There must be a radical change in such marital relations as had existed between the parties. So, if the parties never lived together, but the wife lived with her parents from the time of marriage, receiving visits from her husband weekly, and occasionally visiting the home of the husband's parents, where he lived, such separation was not desertion.<sup>81</sup>

Whether refusal of marital intercourse is desertion is a question upon which the authorities are conflicting. Desertion was not a ground of divorce in the ecclesiastical courts. There the remedy was by suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Since the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in that action extended only to enforcing cohabitation, and not to compelling marital intercourse,<sup>82</sup> it has been held, in analogy to the suit for restitution of conjugal rights, or independently of such consideration, that such refusal does not constitute desertion.<sup>83</sup> Some of the courts have taken the contrary view, and hold that refusal of sexual intercourse for the period necessary to constitute desertion under the statute is desertion, within the meaning of the statute.<sup>84</sup>

There may be desertion without a going away.<sup>85</sup> When either spouse, after having deserted the other, offers in good faith to return, but is refused, such refusal, unless justified, will constitute

<sup>80</sup> *Hall v. Hall*, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 159.

<sup>81</sup> *Tipton v. Tipton*, 169 Iowa, 182, 151 N. W. 90, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 360.

<sup>82</sup> *Forster v. Forster*, 1 Hagg. Const. 154.

<sup>83</sup> *Segelbaum v. Segelbaum*, 39 Minn. 258, 39 N. W. 492; *Fritz v. Fritz*, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N. E. 1058, 14 L. R. A. 685, 32 Am. St. Rep. 156; *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 68 W. Va. 15, 69 S. E. 381, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 889; *Pfannebecker v. Pfannebecker*, 133 Iowa, 425, 110 N. W. 618, 119 Am. St. Rep. 608, 12 Ann. Cas. 543; *WATSON v. WATSON*, 52 N. J. Eq. 349, 28 Atl. 467, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 134; *Southwick v. Southwick*, 97 Mass. 327, 93 Am. Dec. 95; *Cowles v. Cowles*, 112 Mass. 298; *Prall v. Prall*, 58 Fla. 496, 50 South. 867, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577; *Lambert v. Lambert*, 165 Iowa, 367, 145 N. W. 920; *Steele v. Steele*, 1 MacArthur (D. C.) 505; *Reid v. Reid*, 21 N. J. Eq. 331; *Stewart v. Stewart*, 78 Me. 548, 7 Atl. 473, 57 Am. Rep. 822; *Morrison v. Morrison*, 20 Cal. 432; *Eshbach v. Eshbach*, 23 Pa. 343. See *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 87 Ill. 254. *Watson v. Watson* and *Reid v. Reid* have been disapproved in later New Jersey cases. See following note.

<sup>84</sup> *Graves v. Graves*, 88 Miss. 677, 41 South. 384; *Rector v. Rector*, 78 N. J. Eq. 386, 79 Atl. 295; *Raymond v. Raymond* (N. J. Ch.) 79 Atl. 430; *Evans v. Evans*, 93 Ky. 510, 20 S. W. 605. See *Heermance v. James*, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 120; *Fishl v. Fishl*, 2 Litt. (Ky.) 337; 1 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1676 et seq.

<sup>85</sup> *Rector v. Rector*, 78 N. J. Eq. 386, 79 Atl. 295.

desertion.<sup>86</sup> And a refusal to renew cohabitation after a separation by consent is, if the other elements are present, a desertion on the part of the one so refusing.<sup>87</sup> As has been seen in another place, the husband has a right to fix the family domicile, subject to some restrictions. If, therefore, the wife, without justifiable cause, refuses to follow him, she is guilty of desertion.<sup>88</sup>

But the right of the husband to determine the family domicile must be exercised in a reasonable manner and cannot be exercised arbitrarily, nor used as a means of dissolving the marriage relation.<sup>89</sup>

By the weight of authority, if a husband drives his wife away from him, or by his misconduct gives her justifiable cause for leaving him, his conduct amounts to desertion as fully as if he left her, and will support a suit by the wife for a divorce on that ground.<sup>90</sup> The Massachusetts court has held the contrary;<sup>91</sup> but reason, as

<sup>86</sup> *Grove's Appeal*, 37 Pa. 443; *Clement v. Mattison*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 93; *English v. English*, 6 Grant (U. C.) 580; *M'Gahay v. Williams*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 293; *Hague v. Hague*, 85 N. J. Eq. 537, 96 Atl. 579; *Fellows v. Fellows*, 31 Me. 342; *Creasey v. Creasey*, 168 Mo. App. 68, 151 S. W. 219; *Provost v. Provost*, 73 N. J. Eq. 418, 75 Atl. 1101; *Peretti v. Peretti*, 165 Cal. 717, 134 Pac. 322; *De Vry v. De Vry*, 46 Okl. 254, 148 Pac. 840; *McConnell v. McConnell*, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S. W. 931, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111; *Hannig v. Hannig* (Tex. Civ. App.) 24 S. W. 695. See cases cited in note 97, *infra*.

<sup>87</sup> *Butler v. Butler*, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 329; *Hankinson v. Hankinson*, 33 N. J. Eq. 66; *McAllister v. McAllister*, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 345; *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 5 Misc. Rep. 555, 26 N. Y. Supp. 30.

<sup>88</sup> *Winkler v. Powell*, 173 Ala. 46, 55 South. 536; *Coleman v. Coleman*, 164 Ky. 709, 176 S. W. 186; *Calichio v. Calichio*, 85 N. J. Eq. 213, 96 Atl. 658; *Sisemore v. Sisemore*, 17 Or. 542, 21 Pac. 820. That a wife refused to live at the home of her husband's parents though willing to live with him under any other reasonable condition was not desertion. *Marshak v. Marshak*, 115 Ark. 51, 170 S. W. 567, L. R. A. 1915E, 161, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 206. And see *Garrison v. Garrison* (Ky.) 104 S. W. 980.

<sup>89</sup> *Hall v. Hall*, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758. See, also, *Garrison v. Garrison* (Ky.) 104 S. W. 980.

<sup>90</sup> *Warner v. Warner*, 54 Mich. 492, 20 N. W. 557; *Barnett v. Barnett*, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737; *Davenport v. Davenport*, 106 Va. 736, 56 S. E. 562; *James v. James*, 58 N. H. 268; *Grove's Appeal*, 37 Pa. 443; *Morris v. Morris*, 20 Ala. 168; *Kinsey v. Kinsey*, 37 Ala. 393; *Jones v. Jones*, 95 Ala. 443, 11 South. 11, 18 L. R. A. 95; *Skean v. Skean*, 33 N. J. Eq. 148; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 22 N. J. Eq. 88; 91; *Levering v. Levering*, 16 Md. 213; *Harding v. Harding*, 22 Md. 337; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 125 Ill. 510, 16 N. E. 891; *Wood v. Wood*, 27 N. C. 674; *Welgand v. Welgand*, 42 N. J. Eq. 699, 11 Atl. 113; *Whitfield v. Whitfield*, 89 Ga. 471, 15 S. E. 543; *Stiles v. Stiles*, 52 N. J. Eq. 446, 29 Atl. 162.

<sup>91</sup> *Pidge v. Pidge*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 257.

well as authority, is against it. As was said by Putnam, J., dissenting, in a Massachusetts case: "Now, to all legal and reasonable intendment, the wife who is obliged to fly from her husband's violence and house into the street, for her preservation, is to be considered to be there, not of her own free will, but by reason of the force and violence of her husband. He has driven her from him; and I hold that it would be a perversion of terms to say that she, under those circumstances, deserted him. \* \* \* Having done the outrage, the husband leaves her to go into the world without house, home, or shelter, food or raiment, support, protection, or aid from him. \* \* \* I call this desertion."<sup>92</sup>

#### *Period of Abandonment*

To entitle an abandoned husband or wife to a divorce, the cessation of cohabitation must continue during the whole period prescribed by the statute.<sup>93</sup> If cohabitation is resumed even for the briefest period, and again ceases, the period of desertion must be calculated from the time of the last abandonment.<sup>94</sup> Where a wife who had abandoned her husband returned occasionally to look after her children, and perform domestic duties, it was held that this was not a renewal of cohabitation;<sup>95</sup> but where a wife returned and performed ordinary domestic duties for several years, living in the same house with her husband, he was denied a divorce for desertion.<sup>96</sup>

#### *Return or Offer to Return*

In case of desertion there is always a locus poenitentiae until the right to a divorce is complete. The deserting spouse may, until then, return, or offer to return, and the other must permit it. An offer to renew cohabitation made by the deserting spouse in good faith at any time before the separation has lasted for the period re-

<sup>92</sup> Per Putnam, J., in *Pidge v. Pidge*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 257.

<sup>93</sup> *Surber v. Surber*, 176 Ind. 399, 96 N. E. 126; *Vercade v. Vercade*, 147 Mich. 398, 110 N. W. 942; *Getz v. Getz*, 81 N. J. Eq. 465, 88 Atl. 376; *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099; *Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick*, 81 Neb. 627, 116 N. W. 490, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1071, 129 Am. St. Rep. 708.

<sup>94</sup> *Ex parte Aldridge*, 1 Swab. & T. 88; *La Flamme v. La Flamme*, 210 Mass. 156, 96 N. E. 62, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1133; *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099; *Burk v. Burk*, 21 W. Va. 445; *Crossman v. Crossman*, 33 Ala. 486; *Gaillard v. Gaillard*, 23 Miss. 152; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 87 Ill. 250.

<sup>95</sup> *Rie v. Rie*, 34 Ark. 37.

<sup>96</sup> *Holmes v. Holmes*, 44 Mich. 555, 7 N. W. 228. And see *Womble v. Womble* (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 473.

quired by the statute will bar a divorce, though refused by the deserted party.<sup>97</sup> Indeed, as has been seen, such a refusal constitutes desertion.<sup>98</sup> Such an offer, however, after the desertion has lasted for the statutory period, will be too late,<sup>99</sup> and it must be free from any improper qualifications and conditions.<sup>1</sup>

### *Intention to Abandon*

The mere cessation of cohabitation for the time prescribed in the statute is not desertion, unless there is also an intention to abandon. The cessation of cohabitation and intent to abandon must concur.<sup>2</sup> Separation, for instance, caused by necessary absence on business, or by sickness, or other necessity, is not desertion, within the meaning of the divorce law.<sup>3</sup> In a Connecticut case, it appeared that the wife had lived separate from her husband at his request, because of his inability to furnish a satisfactory support for her or their children. "This," said the court, "does not of itself constitute desertion on his part. For the purposes of this case, it is sufficient to say that the offense of desertion consists in the cessation of cohabitation, coupled with a determination in the mind of the offending party not to renew it. This intent is the decisive characteristic, and the question of intent is always a question of fact, and must be proved either by direct evidence, or as the necessary and certain consequence of other facts clearly proved. Mere

<sup>97</sup> *Brookes v. Brookes*, 1 Swab. & T. 326; *Loux v. Loux*, 57 N. J. Eq. 561, 41 Atl. 358; *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099; *Borden v. Borden*, 166 Cal. 469, 137 Pac. 27; *Walker v. Walker*, 14 Cal. App. 487, 112 Pac. 479; *Gaillard v. Gaillard*, 23 Miss. 152; *McClurg's Appeal*, 68 Pa. 366; *Prather v. Prather*, 26 Kan. 273; *Walker v. Loughton*, 31 N. H. 111; *Friend v. Friend*, *Wright* (Ohio) 639; *Fishli v. Fishli*, 2 Litt. (Ky.) 337. Compare *Garrison v. Garrison*, 104 S. W. 980, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1209. And see cases cited in note 86, supra.

<sup>98</sup> *Ante*, p. 259.

<sup>99</sup> *Cargill v. Cargill*, 1 Swab. & T. 235; *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099. See *Graeff v. Graeff* (N. J. Ch.) 25 Atl. 704.

<sup>1</sup> *Hunt v. Hunt*, 61 Fla. 630, 54 South. 390; *Arment v. Arment*, 154 Iowa, 573, 134 N. W. 616.

<sup>2</sup> *Williams v. Williams*, 130 N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98, 14 L. R. A. 220, 27 Am. St. Rep. 517; *Heyman v. Heyman*, 119 App. Div. 182, 104 N. Y. Supp. 227; *Kupka v. Kupka*, 132 Iowa, 191, 109 N. W. 610; *Hall v. Hall*, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758; *Stevens v. Stevens*, 123 Ky. 545, 96 S. W. 811; *Muller v. Muller*, 125 Md. 72, 93 Atl. 404; *Chatterton v. Chatterton*, 132 Ill. App. 31, affirmed 231 Ill. 449, 83 N. E. 161, 121 Am. St. Rep. 339; *Crounse v. Crounse*, 108 Va. 108, 60 S. E. 627.

<sup>3</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, 28 N. J. Eq. 207; *Howell v. Howell*, 64 N. J. Eq. 191, 48 Atl. 510; *Walton v. Walton*, 76 Miss. 662, 25 South. 166, 71 Am. St. Rep.

separation may result from necessity or accident, and much against the will of both parties."<sup>4</sup>

It is immaterial that the intention to abandon did not exist at the time of the separation, if it was afterwards formed and acted upon. The intention not to return, formed after separation has taken place, accompanied by continuation of the separation, is desertion; but the desertion in such a case begins when the intention is formed.<sup>5</sup>

That there was an intent to abandon need not be shown by direct evidence, but, like intent in other cases in which it is material in law, may be inferred from the circumstances. It may be presumed from long abandonment without apparent cause.<sup>6</sup> Such an intent, when once shown to have existed, will be presumed to have continued, until the contrary appears.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Consent of the Abandoned Spouse*

Not only must there be a cessation of cohabitation for the statutory period, and an intent to abandon, to constitute desertion, but the abandonment must be without the consent of the party abandoned. Nothing is better settled than that abandonment or separation by actual consent—whether such consent is expressed in the form of an agreement, or is inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances—cannot be relied upon as ground for divorce.<sup>8</sup> "Desertion can only be complained of when it is against

540. But see *Elzas v. Elzas*, 171 Ill. 632, 49 N. E. 717, where a contrary rule is laid down.

<sup>4</sup> *Bennett v. Bennett*, 43 Conn. 313. And see *Bailey v. Bailey*, 21 Grat. (Va.) 43; *Burk v. Burk*, 21 W. Va. 445; *Tipton v. Tipton*, 169 Iowa, 182, 151 N. W. 90, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 360; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 167 Cal. 732, 141 Pac. 367, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675; *Cook v. Cook*, 13 N. J. Eq. 263; *Jennings v. Jennings*, Id. 38; *McCoy v. McCoy*, 3 Ind. 555; *Williams v. Williams*, 3 Swab. & T. 547; *Ex parte Aldridge*, 1 Swab. & T. 88; *Bruner v. Bruner*, 70 Md. 103, 16 Atl. 385; *Keech v. Keech*, 1 Prob. & Div. 641; *Williams v. Williams*, 21 S. W. 529, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 744. The confinement of a wife in an insane asylum is not an abandonment of her husband. *Pile v. Pile*, 94 Ky. 308, 22 S. W. 215. To the same effect, see *Porter v. Porter*, 82 N. J. Eq. 400, 89 Atl. 251.

<sup>5</sup> *Pinkard v. Pinkard*, 14 Tex. 356, 65 Am. Dec. 129; *Foote v. Foote*, 71 N. J. Eq. 273, 65 Atl. 205; *Ahrenfeldt v. Ahrenfeldt*, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 47; *Fulton v. Fulton*, 36 Miss. 517; *Reed v. Reed*, Wright (Ohio) 224; *Gatehouse v. Gatehouse*, 1 Prob. & Div. 331. See *Conger v. Conger*, 13 N. J. Eq. 286.

<sup>6</sup> *Morrison v. Morrison*, 20 Cal. 431; *Hill v. Hill*, 87 Wash. 150, 151 Pac. 268.

<sup>7</sup> *Bailey v. Bailey*, 21 Grat. (Va.) 43; *Gray v. Gray*, 15 Ala. 779.

<sup>8</sup> *Johnson v. Johnson*, 107 Ark. 262, 154 S. W. 503; *Loftus v. Loftus*, 134

the will of the party who is deserted (in this case the husband), and constitutes a grievance which deprives him of the society of his wife without his consent or acquiescence. If there be a separation by consent, that consent shows that the parties deem it no grievance to be deprived of each other's society, and nothing but an unconditional and entire resumption of their early relations can restore them to such a position as would make a new separation by the departure of the wife, as in this case, a criminal desertion."<sup>9</sup>

The consent of the abandoned party, like consent in other cases where consent is material, need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from his or her conduct, or from the conduct of both parties. The consent must in some way be manifested. "The undisclosed emotions of the deserted party do not affect his rights."<sup>10</sup> But the fact of consent may be shown by his conduct.<sup>11</sup>

Consent to the separation may be inferred from a course of conduct inducing it,<sup>12</sup> or from a course of conduct promoting the continuance of a separation which has already taken place.<sup>13</sup> If, after a wife has separated from her husband, even without justification, she offers to return to him, and he refuses to receive her, her continuing away is not desertion.<sup>14</sup> And such refusal may be inferred

Ill. App. 360; *Albee v. Albee*, 38 Nev. 191, 147 Pac. 452; *Bacon v. Bacon*, 68 W. Va. 747, 70 S. E. 762; *Jones v. Read-Jones*, 84 N. J. Eq. 479, 98 Atl. 580; *Keesey v. Keesey*, 160 Cal. 727, 117 Pac. 1054; *Summers v. Summers*, 179 Ind. 8, 100 N. E. 71; *Walker v. Walker*, 125 Md. 649, 94 Atl. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 934; *Cox v. Cox*, 35 Mich. 461; *Rose v. Rose*, 50 Mich. 92, 14 N. W. 711; *Beller v. Beller*, 50 Mich. 51, 14 N. W. 696; *Ford v. Ford*, 143 Mass. 577, 10 N. E. 474; *Lea v. Lea*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 418; *Goldbeck v. Goldbeck*, 18 N. J. Eq. 42; *Benkert v. Benkert*, 32 Cal. 467; *Secor v. Secor*, 1 MacArthur (D. C.) 630; *Crow v. Crow*, 23 Ala. 583; *Stokes v. Stokes*, 1 Mo. 320; *Ingersoll v. Ingersoll*, 49 Pa. 249, 88 Am. Dec. 500; *Fulton v. Fulton*, 36 Miss. 517; *Adams v. Adams*, 66 Hun. 627, 20 N. Y. Supp. 765; *Townsend v. Townsend*, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 129; *Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald*, Id. 136; *Buckmaster v. Buckmaster*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 713; *Ward v. Ward*, 1 Swab. & T. 185.

<sup>9</sup> *Cooper v. Cooper*, 17 Mich. 205, 97 Am. Dec. 182.

<sup>10</sup> *Ford v. Ford*, 143 Mass. 577, 10 N. E. 474.

<sup>11</sup> *Ford v. Ford*, 143 Mass. 577, 10 N. E. 474; *Ward v. Ward*, 7 Pennewill (Del.) 364, 75 Atl. 611.

<sup>12</sup> *Meldowney v. Meldowney*, 27 N. J. Eq. 328; *Gray v. Gray*, 15 Ala. 779; *Gillinwaters v. Gillinwaters*, 28 Mo. 60; *Dwyer v. Dwyer*, 16 Mo. App. 422.

<sup>13</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, 28 N. J. Eq. 207; *Cornish v. Cornish*, 23 N. J. Eq. 208; *Bradley v. Bradley*, 160 Mass. 258, 35 N. E. 482; *Payne v. Payne* (N. J. Ch.) 28 Atl. 449; *Dwyer v. Dwyer*, 16 Mo. App. 422; *Schoen v. Schoen*, 48 Ill. App. 382.

<sup>14</sup> *Seeds v. Seeds*, 139 Iowa, 717, 117 N. W. 1069; *Conlin v. Conlin*, 163 Iowa, 420, 144 N. W. 1005; *Silverstein v. Silverstein*, 178 Ill. App. 145.

from his conduct towards her after the offer to return. Thus, where a wife who was living apart from her husband, each denying desertion, and alleging that the fault was on the part of the other, offered to live with him if he would treat her as a wife, and he saw her but once after the offer, and never asked her to come back, or made any effort to have her return and live with him, it was held that she was not guilty of desertion after the offer.<sup>15</sup>

Even where a wife who has deserted her husband without cause makes no offer to return to him, his conduct may show that he would not receive her back. If he does so act as to show affirmatively that he will not receive her back, he consents to the separation, and cannot rely upon its continuance as a ground for divorce. He is not bound to take any active steps to get her back, and therefore his mere silence will not amount to consent;<sup>16</sup> but it is a very different thing if he shows by an overt act that he is not willing to receive her. On this principle, it has been held that if a wife has deserted her husband, and, pending the separation, he brings suit against her for a divorce on the ground of adultery, this shows that he is not willing to receive her back, and that he cannot rely on the continuance of the separation pending the suit as desertion, entitling him to a divorce on that ground.<sup>17</sup> The Minnesota court has made a distinction on this point between cases in which the deserting spouse is guilty of the adultery and cases in which he or she is innocent, and has held that where, after a wife has deserted her husband, he brings a suit for divorce on the ground of her adultery after the desertion, the divorce suit may prevent her continuing to remain away from him from being desertion if she is innocent, but that it cannot have this effect if she is guilty.

<sup>15</sup> *Bradley v. Bradley*, 160 Mass. 258, 35 N. E. 482.

<sup>16</sup> *Redford v. Redford*, 162 Mo. App. 127, 144 S. W. 125; *Fielding v. Fielding*, 67 Fla. 143, 64 South. 546; *Seeds v. Seeds*, 139 Iowa, 717, 117 N. W. 1069; *Patterson v. Patterson*, 45 Wash. 296, 88 Pac. 196; *McKinney v. McKinney*, 77 W. Va. 58, 87 S. E. 928. But see *Rogers v. Rogers*, 81 N. J. Eq. 479, 86 Atl. 935, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 711; *Hague v. Hague*, 85 N. J. Eq. 537, 96 Atl. 579; *Dennison v. Dennison*, 52 Misc. Rep. 37, 102 N. Y. Supp. 621; *Deveos v. Deveos*, 115 Va. 517, 79 S. E. 1048.

<sup>17</sup> *Ford v. Ford*, 143 Mass. 577, 10 N. E. 474. That separation during the pendency of divorce proceedings is not desertion, see, also, *Clowes v. Clowes*, 9 Jur. 356; *Marsh v. Marsh*, 14 N. J. Eq. 315, 82 Am. Dec. 251; *Sykes v. Halstead*, 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 483; *Porritt v. Porritt*, 18 Mich. 420; *Doyle v. Doyle*, 26 Mo. 545; *Salorgne v. Salorgne*, 6 Mo. App. 603; *Edwards v. Green*, 9 La. Ann. 317; *Chipchase v. Chipchase*, 48 N. J. Eq. 549, 22 Atl. 588; *Graeff v. Graeff* (N. J. Ch.) 25 Atl. 704.

"If a defendant," it was said, "resisting an action founded upon her alleged desertion, relies upon such an intervening event as suspending or interrupting the effect of the desertion, and if it appear that her own wrongful conduct naturally caused the event relied upon in defense, such a defense cannot avail her. An unjustifiable desertion continues to be desertion, in legal contemplation and effect, none the less although it be attended by such wrongful conduct on the part of the deserting party as would naturally forbid his being received again, while unreformed, to matrimonial cohabitation."<sup>18</sup>

#### *Misconduct of the Abandoned Spouse*

The abandonment, to constitute desertion, even where there is no actual consent, must be unjustifiable. If either spouse is guilty of such misconduct as to justify the other in leaving, the latter's absence does not amount to desertion.<sup>19</sup> "It has accordingly been declared," says the Massachusetts court, "by the great weight of American authority, that ill treatment or misconduct of the husband of such a degree or under such circumstances as not to amount to cruelty for which the wife would be entitled to sue for a divorce against him might yet justify her in leaving his house, and prevent his obtaining a divorce for her desertion if she did so."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Wagner v. Wagner*, 39 Minn. 394, 40 N. W. 360.

<sup>19</sup> *Lyster v. Lyster*, 111 Mass. 327; *Crounse v. Crounse*, 108 Va. 108, 60 S. E. 627; *Warner v. Warner*, 54 Mich. 492, 20 N. W. 557; *Hardin v. Hardin*, 17 Ala. 250, 52 Am. Dec. 170; *Bishop v. Bishop*, 155 Ky. 679, 160 S. W. 176; *Gillinwaters v. Gillinwaters*, 28 Mo. 60; *Neff v. Neff*, 20 Mo. App. 182; *Welgand v. Welgand*, 42 N. J. Eq. 699, 11 Atl. 113; *Israel v. Israel*, 185 Ala. 39, 64 South. 67; *Farwell v. Farwell*, 47 Mont. 574, 133 Pac. 958, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 78; *Suydam v. Suydam*, 79 N. J. Eq. 144, 80 Atl. 1057. Desertion is not justified merely because the wife is slovenly, lazy, and neglectful of her own person, and fails to keep her children, her household, and her husband's clothing in proper order. *Hunter v. Hunter*, 121 Ill. App. 380. See, also, *McAndrews v. McAndrews*, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 252. Where the wife was compelled to leave her husband on account of his cruel treatment it was in law an abandonment by the husband. *Dowdy v. Dowdy*, 154 N. C. 556, 70 S. E. 917. And see *Davenport v. Davenport*, 106 Va. 736, 56 S. E. 562.

<sup>20</sup> *Lyster v. Lyster*, 111 Mass. 327.

**SAME—MISCELLANEOUS OTHER GROUNDS**

104. Various other grounds for divorce are prescribed by the statutes of some of the states. Among them may be mentioned:

- (a) Habitual drunkenness, in most states.
- (b) Conviction of crime and imprisonment under certain circumstances, in most states.
- (c) Incurable insanity, in some states.
- (d) Separation not amounting to desertion, in a few states.
- (e) Nonsupport, under certain circumstances, in some states.
- (f) Where the other party has obtained a divorce in another state, in some states.
- (g) Causes rendering marriage void or voidable, in some states; like impotence, relationship, prior marriage, mental incapacity, nonage, fraud, and duress.

Adultery, cruelty, and desertion are the most common grounds for a divorce; and they are the only grounds of which the size and scope of this work will permit of treatment at any length. It may be well, however, to call attention to the fact that the statutes in the various states have made numerous other acts or circumstances grounds for divorce, and to mention the substance of these statutes shortly, leaving the student to consult the local statutes to determine the grounds for divorce in his own state.

*Habitual Drunkenness, etc.*

In nearly all of the states a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, or a mensa et thoro, or either, at the option of the injured spouse, may be granted for "habitual drunkenness," "gross and confirmed habits of intoxication," such intoxication as renders "living together insupportable," etc. The language of the statutes differ, but they mean substantially the same thing.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps under none of the statutes will a divorce be granted unless it is shown that the habits of drunkenness are confirmed and continued. A man who drinks to excess may be an habitual drunkard, although he is not constantly drunk, but there are intervals when he refrains entirely from the use of intoxicating liquors. The excessive indulgence in intoxicating

<sup>21</sup> Stim. Am. St. Law, § 6206. "Continued drunkenness" and "habitual drunkenness" mean the same thing. *Gourlay v. Gourlay*, 16 R. I. 705, 19 Atl. 142.

drinks as a fixed habit is habitual drunkenness.<sup>22</sup> Neither occasional drunkenness,<sup>23</sup> nor the habitual, but moderate, use of intoxicants,<sup>24</sup> will constitute a ground for divorce.

A person who frequently drinks to excess, and becomes intoxicated whenever the temptation is presented and the opportunity is afforded him, is an habitual drunkard, within the meaning of the statutes.<sup>25</sup> The word "drunkenness," or the word "intoxication," is used in the statute in its ordinary sense, as referring to the effect of intoxicating liquors, and does not include the use of morphine or other drugs, though the effect of their use is similar.<sup>26</sup>

A wife cannot set up habitual drunkenness if, at the time of the marriage, she knew that the habit existed.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *Gourlay v. Gourlay*, 16 R. I. 705, 19 Atl. 142; *O'Kane v. O'Kane*, 103 Ark. 382, 147 S. W. 73, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 655; *Garrett v. Garrett*, 252 Ill. 318, 96 N. E. 882, reversing 160 Ill. App. 321; *Tarrant v. Tarrant*, 156 Mo. App. 725, 137 S. W. 56.

<sup>23</sup> *Rapp v. Rapp*, 149 Mich. 218, 112 N. W. 709; *Smith v. Smith*, 172 Mich. 175, 137 N. W. 644; *Donley v. Donley*, 150 Mo. App. 660, 131 S. W. 356; *Holm v. Holm*, 44 Utah, 242, 139 Pac. 937.

<sup>24</sup> *Bain v. Bain*, 79 Neb. 711, 113 N. W. 141; *Schaub v. Schaub*, 117 La. 727, 42 South. 249.

<sup>25</sup> *Walton v. Walton*, 34 Kan. 195, 8 Pac. 110; *McBee v. McBee*, 22 Or. 329, 29 Pac. 887, 29 Am. St. Rep. 613; *Ludwick v. Com.*, 18 Pa. 172; *State v. Pratt*, 34 Vt. 323; *Magahay v. Magahay*, 35 Mich. 210; *Blaney v. Blaney*, 126 Mass. 205; *Mack v. Handy*, 39 La. Ann. 491, 2 South. 181; *De Lesdernier v. De Lesdernier*, 45 La. Ann. 1364, 14 South. 191; *Williams v. Goss*, 43 La. Ann. 868, 9 South. 750; *Golding v. Golding*, 6 Mo. App. 602; *Brown v. Brown*, 38 Ark. 324; *Richards v. Richards*, 19 Ill. App. 465; *McGill v. McGill*, 19 Fla. 341; *Mahone v. Mahone*, 19 Cal. 627, 81 Am. Dec. 91. "The phrase 'habitual intemperance' scarcely requires an interpretation. It is easily understood. It means the custom or habit of getting drunk; the constant indulgence in such stimulants as wine, brandy, and whisky, whereby intoxication is produced; not the ordinary use, but the habitual use of them. The habit should be actual or confirmed. It may be intermittent. It need not be continuous or even of daily occurrence." *Mack v. Handy*, *supra*. Though the periods of a husband's intoxication occurred only three or four times a year, yet, where they lasted a week or ten days at a time, and he then became grossly intoxicated, and went or was sent to an inebriate asylum, and such periods had occurred for twelve or fifteen years, he was held to be an habitual drunkard. *Blaney v. Blaney*, *supra*.

<sup>26</sup> *Youngs v. Youngs*, 130 Ill. 230, 22 N. E. 806, 6 L. R. A. 548, 17 Am. St. Rep. 313, affirming 33 Ill. App. 223; *Rindlaub v. Rindlaub*, 19 N. D. 352, 125 N. W. 479. And see *Com. v. Whitney*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 477, where it was held that evidence of habitual intoxication from the use of chloroform would not sustain a criminal charge, under a statute, of being a common drunkard.

<sup>27</sup> *Porritt v. Porritt*, 16 Mich. 140; *Tilton v. Tilton*, 29 S. W. 290, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 538; *Blaney v. Blaney*, 126 Mass. 205.

*Conviction of Crime and Imprisonment*

In most states conviction of either party of a crime, and sentence to imprisonment in the state prison, is declared a ground of divorce.<sup>28</sup> In some states no time of sentence is prescribed, while in others the imprisonment must be for a certain number of years, varying in the different states, and in some it must be for life. In some states a divorce may be granted if either party has been indicted for an infamous offense, and is a fugitive from justice; in some he must have been a fugitive for a prescribed time. In some states conviction of a felony or infamous crime<sup>29</sup> is made a ground for divorce, without mentioning imprisonment or sentence. As a rule, no pardon can restore the guilty party to his marital rights.<sup>30</sup>

In some states the statutes extend to conviction and imprisonment in another state.<sup>31</sup> It has been held that, unless the statute expressly so provides, it cannot be so extended.<sup>32</sup> This, however, does not seem reasonable. The reasons why a divorce should be granted are as strong where the imprisonment and conviction are without the state as where they are within it.

A woman cannot knowingly marry a felon after his conviction, and afterwards set up such conviction, or a sentence to imprisonment based thereon, as ground for divorce. It has therefore been held that since a woman who marries a man who has been con-

<sup>28</sup> Imprisonment in a reformatory is not ground for divorce in Massachusetts. *Unsoeld v. Unsoeld*, 216 Mass. 594, 104 N. E. 462. Under the Oregon statute a conviction does not become ground for divorce, unless it has become final by affirmance on appeal or by failure to appeal. *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Or. 418, 96 Pac. 1099.

<sup>29</sup> In *Wheeler v. Wheeler*, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 567, it was held that assault with intent to rape was not an "infamous" crime, within the meaning of the statute. In most states, however, this would not be so; but all offenses are felonies and infamous that are or may be punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison. See *Clark*, Cr. Law, 34; *Ex parte Wilson*, 114 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct. 935, 29 L. Ed. 89; *Mackin v. U. S.*, 117 U. S. 348, 6 Sup. Ct. 777, 29 L. Ed. 909; *U. S. v. De Walt*, 128 U. S. 393, 9 Sup. Ct. 111, 32 L. Ed. 485. The Georgia statute (Civ. Code 1895, § 2426, par. 8) provides that conviction of an offense involving "moral turpitude" with sentence to imprisonment in the penitentiary is ground for divorce: *Holloway v. Holloway*, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S. E. 191, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, 115 Am. St. Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas. 1164.

<sup>30</sup> *Holloway v. Holloway*, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S. E. 191, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, 115 Am. St. Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas. 1164; *Wood v. Wood*, 135 Ga. 385, 69 S. E. 549.

<sup>31</sup> *Frantz v. Frantz*, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 467.

<sup>32</sup> *Leonard v. Leonard*, 151 Mass. 151, 23 N. E. 732, 6 L. R. A. 632, 21 Am. St. Rep. 437; *Martin v. Martin*, 47 N. H. 53.

victed of a crime, while his case is pending on exceptions in the supreme court, must know that sentence is likely to follow such conviction, a subsequent sentence can be no ground for divorce.<sup>33</sup>

In Wisconsin a statute provides that a sentence of imprisonment for life shall dissolve the marriage of the person sentenced, without any judgment of divorce or other legal process; and there are similar statutes in other states. This, however, is a case of legislative divorce.<sup>34</sup>

### *Insanity*

In the absence of a statute expressly allowing it, a divorce cannot be granted on the ground of the other party's insanity.<sup>35</sup> In some states, however, statutes have been enacted entitling a party to a divorce where the other party is incurably insane.<sup>36</sup>

### *Grounds Similar to Desertion—Nonsupport*

In a few states either party may obtain a divorce where they have voluntarily lived entirely separate for a certain length of time; and in some states a divorce may be granted when either party has separated from the other without his or her consent, and joined with a religious sect or society that professes to believe the marriage relation void or unlawful, and refused to cohabit with the other. In a few states a party is entitled to a divorce when the other party has obtained a divorce in another state;<sup>37</sup> and in some a divorce may be granted for disappearance of either party, and absence for a certain length of time, without being heard of. In a number of states, failure of the husband to support his wife, where he is able to do so, is made a ground for divorce.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Caswell v. Caswell, 64 Vt. 557, 24 Atl. 988, 33 Am. St. Rep. 943.

<sup>34</sup> Post, p. 291.

<sup>35</sup> Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308, 22 S. W. 215; Baughman v. Baughman, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 271.

<sup>36</sup> As to sufficiency of insanity, see Hanbury v. Hanbury, [1892] Prob. 222. That such a law is valid, see Hickman v. Hickman, 1 Wash. 257, 24 Pac. 445, 22 Am. St. Rep. 148.

<sup>37</sup> Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen, 86 Mich. 333, 49 N. W. 154.

<sup>38</sup> Lee v. Lee, 38 Okl. 388, 132 Pac. 1070; Gellatly v. Gellatly, 185 Mich. 382, 151 N. W. 1037; Svanda v. Svanda, 93 Neb. 404, 140 N. W. 777, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666; Lillie v. Lillie, 65 Vt. 109, 26 Atl. 525; Seigmund v. Seigmund, 46 Wash. 572, 90 Pac. 913; Caswell v. Caswell, 66 Vt. 242, 28 Atl. 988; Runkle v. Runkle, 96 Mich. 493, 56 N. W. 2. But see Arnold v. Arnold, 115 Ark. 32, 170 S. W. 486; Weller v. Weller, 154 Mo. App. 6, 133 S. W. 128. Under a statute providing that the wife may have a divorce when the husband, being of "pecuniary ability," without cause refuses to support her, and construing "pecuniary ability" to mean ability to provide for a wife,

*Divorce as a Substitute for Decree of Nullity*

Nullity suits—that is, suits to have a marriage judicially annulled for causes existing at the time it was entered into, and rendering it void or voidable—have been explained in treating of marriage, and properly so, for they are entirely different from a suit for divorce. In case of a decree of nullity the effect is not to dissolve an existing marriage, but to declare that a valid marriage has never existed. A suit for a divorce, on the other hand, is to dissolve a marriage that is valid. In many of the states a suit for divorce has been substituted by statute for the remedy, by suit for nullity, or else has been made a concurrent remedy. In a number of states, by statute, a divorce may be obtained for impotence or physical incapacity of either party existing at the time of the marriage;<sup>39</sup> or because the marriage is within the prohibited degrees of relationship;<sup>40</sup> or because either party was already married to another,<sup>41</sup> or was non compos mentis, or under the age of consent; or because the marriage was procured by fraud or duress.<sup>42</sup>

either from labor, income of property, or otherwise, it was held that a wife could not obtain a divorce because her husband, being able-bodied, would not work, and had therefore no means, and could not support her. *Jewett v. Jewett*, 61 Vt. 370, 17 Atl. 734. And see *Farnsworth v. Farnsworth*, 58 Vt. 555, 5 Atl. 401. A divorce was refused where the failure of the husband to support his wife was due to his committal to prison under sentence; the statute allowing a divorce for "neglect or refusal on the part of the husband, being of sufficient ability, to provide necessities for the subsistence of his wife." *Hammond v. Hammond*, 15 R. I. 40, 23 Atl. 143, 2 Am. St. Rep. 867.

<sup>39</sup> As to what constitutes impotence, see *Payne v. Payne*, 46 Minn. 467, 49 N. W. 230, 24 Am. St. Rep. 240. "Physically incapacitated," as used in the statute, has been held to mean "impotent." *Anon.*, 89 Ala. 291, 7 South. 100, 7 L. R. A. 425, 18 Am. St. Rep. 116. It has, however, been considered a broader term than "impotent." Thus, a woman who was afflicted with chronic syphilis was held physically incapacitated. *Ryder v. Ryder*, 66 Vt. 158, 28 Atl. 1029, 44 Am. St. Rep. 833. For other instances of physical incapacity, see *Mutter v. Mutter*, 123 Ky. 754, 97 S. W. 393, 124 Am. St. Rep. 381; *S— v. S—*, 192 Mass. 194, 77 N. E. 1025, 116 Am. St. Rep. 240. Impotence, to authorize a divorce, must be incurable, or, being curable, the party must refuse to submit to treatment. *Griffith v. Griffith*, 55 Ill. App. 474; *Kinkaid v. Kinkaid*, 256 Ill. 548, 100 N. E. 217; *Bunger v. Bunger*, 85 Kan. 564, 117 Pac. 1017, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 126. As to the effect of impotence on the validity of a marriage, and suits for nullity, see ante, pp. 29, 56.

<sup>40</sup> *McClain v. McClain*, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 248.

<sup>41</sup> See *Ralston v. Ralston*, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 241; *Dimpfel v. Wilson*, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180, 15 Ann. Cas. 753.

<sup>42</sup> *Wallace v. Wallace*, 137 Iowa, 37, 114 N. W. 527, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, 126 Am. St. Rep. 253, 15 Ann. Cas. 761; *Browning v. Browning*, 89 Kan.

*Other Grounds*

Other grounds for divorce prescribed by statute in some of the states are "gross misbehavior and wickedness of either party repugnant to and in violation of the marriage contract"; "any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty"; "any gross neglect of duty";<sup>43</sup> commission of buggery either before or after the marriage; when, unknown to the husband, the wife had been guilty of fornication before the marriage, or was pregnant by another man, or was a prostitute, or was matrimonially incapacitated.<sup>44</sup> So, on the other hand, the wife is entitled to a divorce in some states where the husband, unknown to the wife, was a notoriously licentious person at the time of the marriage.

In several states there is a general clause in the statute which allows the courts a very wide discretion in granting divorces. In Washington the statute allows a divorce "for any other cause deemed by the court sufficient, if satisfied that they [the parties] can no longer live together."<sup>45</sup> In Connecticut a divorce could formerly be granted "for any such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner, and defeats the purpose of the marriage relation"; but this clause has been repealed. In Wisconsin a divorce may be allowed "when, by reason of his conduct towards her being such as to render it improper for her to live with him, the court are of opinion that it will be discreet and proper to grant the divorce." In Arizona a divorce could formerly be granted "when the case is within the reason of the law, within the general mischief the law is intended to remedy, or within what

98, 130 Pac. 852, L. R. A. 1916C, 737, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1288. But see *Young v. Young* (Tex. Civ. App.) 127 S. W. 898. One who claims to have been fraudulently induced to marry by the representations of the woman that she was pregnant by illicit intercourse indulged in by them, but failed to show that he was deceived thereby, is not entitled to a divorce under a statute allowing a divorce "where the alleged marriage was procured by fraud, force, or coercion, and has not been subsequently confirmed by the acts of the parties." *Todd v. Todd*, 149 Pa. 60, 24 Atl. 128, 17 L. R. A. 320.

<sup>43</sup> Where the wife has refused for more than five years to cohabit with her husband as his wife, or to perform any of her household duties, her conduct is "gross neglect of duty," within the meaning of the statute. *Leach v. Leach*, 46 Kan. 724, 27 Pac. 131.

<sup>44</sup> Pregnancy at the time of the marriage, unknown to the husband, who had had no intercourse with her, is "matrimonial incapacity." *Caton v. Caton*, 6 Mackey (D. C.) 309.

<sup>45</sup> *Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.* § 5716, subd. 7. And see *Bickford v. Bickford*, 57 Wash. 639, 107 Pac. 837; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 68 Wash. 415, 123 Pac. 598.

it may be presumed the Legislature establishing the foregoing cause would have provided against had they foreseen the specific case"; but this provision seems to be no longer in operation. In Florida a divorce is allowed "for the habitual indulgence of a violent and ungovernable temper."<sup>46</sup>

### DEFENSES—CONNIVANCE

**105. Connivance is the corrupt consenting by one spouse to an offense by the other, and will bar a suit for divorce for such offense.**

It is the well-settled rule, and one which the courts are frequently called upon to apply, that, if either spouse consents to conduct on the part of the other which would ordinarily constitute a ground for divorce, he or she will be held to have connived at such conduct, and, on the principle, a volenti non fit injuria, will not be heard to complain of it as a ground for divorce.<sup>47</sup> This is expressly declared by the statute in many states. Where it is not so declared, it is nevertheless recognized as the law, for it was the law of the English ecclesiastical courts, and it is to be assumed that the Legislature intended to adopt the general principles by which those courts were governed, in so far as they are applicable and reasonable.<sup>48</sup>

On this principle a husband's connivance at his wife's adultery has frequently been held a complete bar to a divorce for the particular act of adultery connived at,<sup>49</sup> or for subsequent acts either with the same person or with another.<sup>50</sup> "If he has relaxed with one man, he cannot complain of another."<sup>51</sup> But this harsh

<sup>46</sup> *Hickson v. Hickson*, 54 Fla. 556, 45 South. 474.

<sup>47</sup> *Forster v. Forster*, 1 Hagg. Consist. 146; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 57; *Anichini v. Anichini*, 2 Curt. Ecc. 210; *Morrison v. Morrison*, 136 Mass. 310; *Id.*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688; *Myers v. Myers*, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 114; *Bourgeois v. Chauvin*, 39 La. Ann. 216, 1 South. 679.

<sup>48</sup> *Morrison v. Morrison*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688.

<sup>49</sup> *Delaney v. Delaney*, 71 N. J. Eq. 246, 65 Atl. 217, reversing 69 N. J. Eq. 602, 61 Atl. 266; *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 45 Misc. Rep. 260, 92 N. Y. Supp. 165; *Eames v. Eames*, 133 Ill. App. 665; *Riesen v. Riesen*, 148 Ill. App. 460; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 299, 15 Am. Dec. 210.

<sup>50</sup> *Gipps v. Gipps*, 3 Swab. & T. 116; *Lovering v. Lovering*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 85; *Hedden v. Hedden*, 21 N. J. Eq. 61; *Woodward v. Woodward*, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Atl. 424.

<sup>51</sup> *Lovering v. Lovering*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 85.

rule has been disapproved in some cases. Since "the iniquity which deprives a suitor of a right of justice in a court of equity is not general iniquitous conduct, unconnected with the matter in suit, but evil practice or wrongful conduct in the particular matter or transaction in respect to which judicial protection or redress is sought,"<sup>52</sup> it has been held that connivance by a husband at his wife's adultery is no bar to a suit for divorce on the ground that other acts of adultery committed by her without his connivance.<sup>53</sup> But it was said by the Massachusetts court that "the character of the connivance, under some circumstances, may be so open, gross, and revolting that the court may find that no injury has been done the husband, and that, therefore, there is nothing to redress; that the husband has entirely abandoned all right to claim that his wife should be chaste; and that he has thus consented to her prior adultery. He may come before the court with such impure hands that, upon the soundest considerations of public policy, his divorce should be refused."<sup>54</sup>

To constitute connivance, it is not necessary that there be any active procurement of the wrongful act. "I have no difficulty," said Lord Stowell, "in saying that passive conduct is as much a bar as active conspiracy."<sup>55</sup> Where the conduct of the husband "indicates an intention to have his wife transgress, or at least an intention to allow her to do so, undisturbed and unprevented," this amounts to connivance.<sup>56</sup>

Though passive and permissive conduct may be sufficient, there must be, at least, consent amounting to a corrupt intention to constitute connivance. "Passive acquiescence would be sufficient to bar the husband, providing it appeared to be done with the intention and in the expectation that she would be guilty of the crime; but, on the other hand, it has always been held that there

<sup>52</sup> *Woodward v. Woodward*, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Atl. 424, citing 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 399.

<sup>53</sup> *Woodward v. Woodward*, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Atl. 424; *Morrison v. Morrison*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688; *VIERTEL v. VIERTEL*, 99 Mo. App. 710, 75 S. W. 187, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 137.

<sup>54</sup> *Morrison v. Morrison*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688.

<sup>55</sup> *Moorsom v. Moorsom*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 87, 107. And see *Rogers v. Rogers*, Id. 57; *Rix v. Rix*, Id. 74; *Boulting v. Boulting*, 3 Swab. & T. 329; *Cairns v. Cairns*, 109 Mass. 408; *Morrison v. Morrison*, 136 Mass. 310; *Bourgeois v. Chauvin*, 39 La. Ann. 216, 1 South. 679.

<sup>56</sup> *Bourgeois v. Chauvin*, 39 La. Ann. 216, 1 South. 679; *Viertel v. Viertel*, 86 Mo. App. 494.

must be a consent. The injury must be volenti; it must be something more than mere negligence, than mere inattention, than overconfidence, than dullness of apprehension, than mere indifference. It must be intentional concurrence in order to amount to a bar."<sup>57</sup> If a husband who has reason to suspect his wife of adultery merely does nothing to prevent a recurrence of the act, and take steps to obtain proofs, there is no connivance,<sup>58</sup> and even where the husband, suspecting his wife of adultery, laid a trap for her and caught her in flagrante delicto, there was no connivance.<sup>59</sup> But the law does not allow temptation to be placed in a wife's way in order that advantage may be taken of the consequences.<sup>60</sup> "A husband is not barred by mere permission of opportunity for adultery, nor is it every degree of inattention which will deprive him of relief, but it is one thing to permit and another to invite."<sup>61</sup> A husband who endeavors to procure his wife to be lured into an act of adultery consents to it.<sup>62</sup> So, where detectives employed by the husband to procure evidence against the wife purposely induced her to commit adultery, there was connivance, barring a divorce, though the husband had not given any distinct orders to the detectives so to act.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>57</sup> *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 57; *Rix v. Rix*, Id. 74; *Boulting v. Boulting*, 3 Swab. & T. 329; *Marris v. Marris*, 2 Swab. & T. 530; *Glennie v. Glennie*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 1158; *Gipps v. Gipps*, 11 H. L. Cas. 1; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 144; *Cochran v. Cochran*, 35 Iowa, 477; *Welch v. Welch*, 50 Mo. App. 395. Mere passive permission to misconduct in order to test fidelity is not connivance. *Herriford v. Herriford*, 169 Mo. App. 641, 155 S. W. 855. And see *Lambert v. Lambert*, 165 Iowa, 367, 145 N. W. 920.

<sup>58</sup> *Timmings v. Timmings*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 76; *Relersen v. Relersen*, 32 App. Div. 62, 52 N. Y. Supp. 509; *Robbins v. Robbins*, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 54 Am. Rep. 488; *Engle v. Engle*, 153 Iowa, 285, 133 N. W. 654; *Lehman v. Lehman*, 78 N. J. Eq. 316, 79 Atl. 1060; *Pettee v. Pettee*, 77 Hun, 595, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1067; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 154 Mass. 194, 28 N. E. 167, 12 L. R. A. 524, 26 Am. St. Rep. 237.

<sup>59</sup> *Farwell v. Farwell*, 47 Mont. 574, 133 Pac. 958, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 78.

<sup>60</sup> *Viertel v. Viertel*, 86 Mo. App. 494; *Noyes v. Noyes*, 194 Mass. 20, 79 N. E. 814, 120 Am. St. Rep. 517, 10 Ann. Cas. 818.

<sup>61</sup> *Timmings v. Timmings*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 76; *Harris v. Harris*, 2 Hagg. Ecc. 376.

<sup>62</sup> *Woodward v. Woodward*, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Atl. 424; *Noyes v. Noyes*, 194 Mass. 20, 79 N. E. 814, 120 Am. St. Rep. 517, 10 Ann. Cas. 818.

<sup>63</sup> *Rademacher v. Rademacher*, 74 N. J. Eq. 570, 70 Atl. 687. And see *McAllister v. McAllister* (Sup.) 137 N. Y. Supp. 833.

### SAME—COLLUSION

106. Collusion is any agreement between the parties whereby they seek to obtain a divorce by an imposition on the court, and is ground for refusing relief.

In no case will a divorce be granted if it appears that there is collusion between the parties, even though it may appear that there is a valid cause for the divorce. Any agreement between husband and wife by which they are to endeavor to obtain a divorce by imposing upon the court is collusion, within the meaning of this rule.<sup>64</sup>

It is clearly collusion for the parties to agree that one of them shall institute a suit for divorce for a cause which does not exist, although they may have some other ground.<sup>65</sup> It is also collusion for them to agree to suppress facts which are pertinent and material;<sup>66</sup> or to institute a suit for divorce in pursuance of an understanding whereby one of them has committed some offense, such as adultery, for the purpose of affording ground for a divorce.<sup>67</sup> And, in general, it is collusion for the parties to act in concert in the conduct of the suit, even though there may be a valid ground for divorce.<sup>68</sup> But the husband may make the wife a reasonable allowance while the suit is pending, in order to save the expense of an application for alimony.<sup>69</sup> Collusion implies action in concert.

<sup>64</sup> *Griffiths v. Griffiths*, 69 N. J. Eq. 689, 60 Atl. 1090; *People v. Case*, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N. E. 638, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 578; *Branson v. Branson*, 76 Neb. 780, 107 N. W. 1011.

<sup>65</sup> *Butler v. Butler*, 15 Prob. Div. 13, 32, 66; *Jessop v. Jessop*, 2 Swab. & T. 301; *Stokes v. Anderson*, 118 Ind. 533, 21 N. E. 331, 4 L. R. A. 313.

<sup>66</sup> *Hunt v. Hunt*, 47 Law J. Prob. Div. & Adm. 22; *Barnes v. Barnes*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 505; *Jessop v. Jessop*, 2 Swab. & T. 301. It is collusion to suppress evidence of a valid defense. *Griffiths v. Griffiths*, 69 N. J. Eq. 689, 60 Atl. 1090.

<sup>67</sup> *Todd v. Todd*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 121; *Crewe v. Crewe*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 123.

<sup>68</sup> *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 1 Swab. & T. 567. But see *Harris v. Harris*, 4 Swab. & T. 232; *Frank v. Frank*, 178 Ill. App. 557; *Sheehan v. Sheehan*, 77 N. J. Eq. 411, 77 Atl. 1063, 140 Am. St. Rep. 566. Agreements intended merely to facilitate the divorce proceedings do not show collusion. *Dodge v. Dodge*, 98 App. Div. 85, 90 N. Y. Supp. 433.

<sup>69</sup> *Barnes v. Barnes*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 505; *In re Ellis' Estate*, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056, 23 L. R. A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514. An agreement pending suit for divorce respecting alimony, not accompanied by any understanding that the wife shall have a divorce or that the husband shall re-

There is no collusion, therefore, where one party takes advantage of a matrimonial offense by the other as a ground for divorce, though the offense was committed by the other in the desire, and with the hope and expectation, that such advantage would be taken of it. In other words, the fact that one party commits an offense, such as adultery or desertion, for the purpose of affording the other grounds for divorce, does not bar the other's right to a divorce, if the other did not act in concert to afford such ground.<sup>70</sup>

### SAME—CONDONATION.

107. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce, and bars the right to a divorce. But condonation is on the condition, implied by law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit that offense, and also that he shall thereafter treat the other with "conjugal kindness"; and a breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce.

108. Condonation may be by express words, if acted upon; or it may be inferred from conduct alone.

The forgiveness or remission by one of the spouses of a marital offense committed by the other is, in law, such a condonation of the offense as will bar a suit for divorce therefor.<sup>71</sup> This doctrine not only applies to adultery, but it also applies to cruelty, and to every other offense that constitutes a ground for divorce.<sup>72</sup>

fraud from contesting the suit is not collusion. *Rapp v. Rapp*, 162 Mo. App. 673, 145 S. W. 114.

<sup>70</sup> *Shaw v. Gould*, L. R. 3 H. L. 55; *Crewe v. Crewe*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 123; *Utterton v. Tewsh*, Ferg. Const. 23; *Kibblewhite v. Rowland*, Id. 226; *Wilmer v. Wilmer*, 21 N. D. 371, 130 N. W. 1015.

<sup>71</sup> *Durant v. Durant*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 733; *Westmeath v. Westmeath*, 2 Hagg. Ecc. Supp. 1; *Ferrers v. Ferrers*, 1 Hagg. Const. 130; *D'Agullar v. D'Agullar*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 773; *Sewall v. Sewall*, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am. Rep. 299; *Cumming v. Cumming*, 135 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep. 476; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637; *Taber v. Taber* (N. J. Ch.) 66 Atl. 1082; *Laycock v. Laycock*, 52 Or. 610, 98 Pac. 487; *Griffith v. Griffith*, 77 Neb. 180, 108 N. W. 981; *Quincy v. Quincy*, 10 N. H. 272; *Turnbull v. Turnbull*, 23 Ark. 615. Where a wife with full knowledge condones an offense and the husband is not guilty of further offense, she cannot in a subsequent suit against her for desertion set up the condoned act to prevent a divorce. *Davis v. Davis*, 134 Ga. 804, 68 S. E. 594; 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20.

<sup>72</sup> *Gardner v. Gardner*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 434; *Clague v. Clague*, 46 Minn. 461, 49 N. W. 198; *McGurk v. McGurk* (N. J. Ch.) 28 Atl. 510; *Sullivan v. Sulli-*

*Forgiveness Conditional*

Condonation is always conditional. When the condition is not expressed, the law implies a condition, not only that the particular offense shall not be repeated,<sup>73</sup> but also that the offender shall treat the other with "conjugal kindness."<sup>74</sup> A breach of this condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce, and it may be relied upon for this end just as fully as if it had never been condoned.<sup>75</sup> A condoned offense, whatever it may be, is therefore revived if the wrongdoer is subsequently guilty of adultery, cruelty, desertion, or any other breach of "conjugal kindness."<sup>76</sup> Acts of cruelty will revive a condoned offense, even though they may not themselves be sufficient as a ground for divorce; and the same must be true of desertion for less than the period required to make it a

van, 34 Ind. 368; Phillips v. Phillips, 27 Wis. 252; Bingham v. Bingham (Tex. Civ. App.) 149 S. W. 214; Murchison v. Murchison (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 790; Nogeess v. Nogeess, 7 Tex. 538, 58 Am. Dec. 78.

<sup>73</sup> Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 733; Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804, 68 S. E. 594, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20; Kostachek v. Kostachek, 40 Okl. 747, 140 Pac. 1021; Nogeess v. Nogeess, 7 Tex. 538, 58 Am. Dec. 78; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am. Rep. 299.

<sup>74</sup> "The plainer reason and good sense of the implied condition is 'that you shall not only abstain from adultery but shall in future treat me—in every respect treat me [to use the words of the law]—with conjugal kindness. On this condition I will overlook the past injuries you have done me.'" Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 743. And see Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Ecc. Supp. 1, 114; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637; Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497; Warner v. Warner, 31 N. J. Eq. 225; Atherton v. Atherton, 82 Hun, 179, 31 N. Y. Supp. 977; Shackleton v. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935, 27 Am. St. Rep. 478; Nogeess v. Nogeess, 7 Tex. 538, 58 Am. Dec. 78; Egidí v. Egidí, 37 R. I. 481, 93 Atl. 908, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 648; Robbins v. Robbins, 100 Mass. 150, 97 Am. Dec. 91.

<sup>75</sup> Cases cited *supra* and *infra*.

<sup>76</sup> Worsley v. Worsley, cited in 1 Hagg. Ecc. 734, 2 Lee, Ecc. 572; Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 733; D'Agullar v. D'Agullar, Id. 773; Bramwell v. Bramwell, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 618; Dent v. Dent, 4 Swab. & T. 105; Newsome v. Newsome, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 313; Warner v. Warner, 31 N. J. Eq. 225; Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497; Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637; Timerson v. Timerson, 2 How. Prac. N. S. (N. Y.) 526; Egidí v. Egidí, 37 R. I. 481, 93 Atl. 908, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 648; Viertel v. Viertel, 123 Mo. App. 63, 99 S. W. 759; Mosher v. Mosher, 16 N. D. 269, 113 N. W. 99, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820, 125 Am. St. Rep. 654; Cozard v. Cozard, 48 Wash. 124, 92 Pac. 935; Copsey v. Copsey, 74 Law. J. Prob. 40, [1905] Prob. 94, 91 Law T. 363, 20 Times Law R. 728; Wellman v. Wellman, 178 Mich. 107, 144 N. W. 493; Skinner v. Skinner, 47 Ind. App. 670, 95 N. E. 128; Page v. Page, 167 N. C. 346, 88 S. E. 625; Hartl v. Hartl, 155 Iowa, 329, 135 N. W. 1007; Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 131 N. W. 907, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1; McNamara v. McNamara, 93 Neb. 190, 139 N. W. 1045. But compare Brown v. Brown, 129 Ga. 246, 58 S. E. 825, holding that,

ground for divorce."<sup>77</sup> It was said in a Massachusetts case: "The law is settled in this commonwealth, in accordance with the doctrine declared by Lord Stowell and Sir John Nicholl in the English ecclesiastical courts, that any condonation by the wife of her husband's cruelty is on the implied, if not express, condition of his treating her in the future with conjugal kindness; that any breach of this condition will revive the right to maintain a libel for the original offense; and that such a breach may be shown by act, word, or conduct which would not of themselves prove a cause of divorce. Harshness and rudeness not sufficient to maintain a libel may receive a different interpretation and effect upon the question of condonation after proof that the husband has previously gone to the length of positive acts of cruelty."<sup>78</sup>

*What Amounts to Condonation*

Condonation may be by express words of forgiveness;<sup>79</sup> but an offer to forgive will not amount to condonation, unless it is accepted or acted upon by the other party.<sup>80</sup> Condonation may also be implied from the conduct of the parties, without proof of express forgiveness, and even, it seems from some of the cases, though it could be shown that there was no forgiveness in fact. Sexual intercourse, for instance, with knowledge of a prior offense, is such condonation.<sup>81</sup> Voluntary cohabitation, also, is generally held to be proof

where acts of cruelty have been condoned, such acts will not be revived as a ground of divorce except by fresh acts of cruelty.

<sup>77</sup> *Durant v. Durant*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 743; *D'Aguiilar v. D'Aguiilar*, Id. 773; *Bramwell v. Bramwell*, 3 Hagg. Const. 618; *Farnham v. Farnham*, 73 Ill. 497; *Warner v. Warner*, 31 N. J. Eq. 225; *Threewits v. Threewits*, 4 Desaus. (S. C.) 560; *Kostachek v. Kostachek*, 40 Okl. 747, 140 Pac. 1021; *Mathewson v. Mathewson*, 81 Vt. 173, 69 Atl. 646, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 300; *Marshall v. Marshall*, 65 Vt. 238, 26 Atl. 900; *Robbins v. Robbins*, 100 Mass. 150, 97 Am. Dec. 91.

<sup>78</sup> *Robbins v. Robbins*, 100 Mass. 150, 97 Am. Dec. 91.

<sup>79</sup> *Beeby v. Beeby*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789; *Quincy v. Quincy*, 10 N. H. 272.

<sup>80</sup> *Keats v. Keats*, 1 Swab. & T. 334; *Popkin v. Popkin*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 765, note; *Ferrers v. Ferrers*, Id. 781, note; *Quarles v. Quarles*, 19 Ala. 363; *Wolff v. Wolff*, 102 Cal. 433, 36 Pac. 767, 1037; *Anderson v. Anderson*, 89 Neb. 570, 131 N. W. 907, Ann. Cas. 1012C, 1. And see *Egbers v. Egbers*, 79 Wash. 72, 139 Pac. 767.

<sup>81</sup> *Snow v. Snow*, 2 Notes of Cas. Supp. 13; *Dillon v. Dillon*, 3 Curt. Ecc. 86; *Timmings v. Timmings*, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 76; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 67 N. J. Eq. 534, 58 Atl. 822; *Pitts v. Pitts*, 52 N. Y. 593; *Quincy v. Quincy*, 10 N. H. 272, 274; *Doe v. Doe*, 52 Hun. 405, 5 N. Y. Supp. 514; *Burns v. Burns*, 60 Ind. 259; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 123; *Farmer v. Farmer*, 86 Ala. 322, 5 South. 434; *Sparks v. Sparks*, 94 N. C. 527; *Eggerth v. Eggerth*, 15 Or. 626, 16 Pac. 650; *Auld v. Auld* (Super. N. Y.) 16 N. Y. Supp. 803; *Tilton v.*

of condonation;<sup>82</sup> but condonation will not necessarily be implied from the fact that the husband and wife continued to live together if there was no sexual intercourse.<sup>83</sup> Sexual intercourse will be presumed where the husband and wife are living together, but such presumption may be rebutted.<sup>84</sup>

Because of the dependent position of the wife, condonation will not be so readily inferred from conduct against her as it would be against the husband.<sup>85</sup>

#### *Same—Knowledge of Offense*

Condonation necessarily implies knowledge of the offense committed. Conduct, as, for instance, continued cohabitation and intercourse, cannot be construed as condonation if there was no knowl-

Tilton, 29 S. W. 290, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 538; Shivey v. Shivey, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369; Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N. J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119; Shackleton v. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935, 27 Am. St. Rep. 478. But see Bohnert v. Bohnert, 95 Cal. 444, 30 Pac. 590, where it was held that a single act of sexual intercourse after the commencement of a suit for a divorce for adultery was not alone sufficient to constitute condonation. See Hall v. Hall, 60 Law J. Prob., Div. & Adm. 73. The rule should not be enforced so rigorously against the wife as against the husband. Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N. J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119; Leech v. Leech, 82 N. J. Eq. 472, 89 Atl. 51.

<sup>82</sup> Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637; Anon., 6 Mass. 147; Eames v. Eames, 133 Ill. App. 665; McDuffee v. McDuffee, 169 Mich. 410, 135 N. W. 242; Bridge v. Bridge (N. J. Ch.) 93 Atl. 690; Rogers v. Rogers, 81 Wash. 502, 142 Pac. 1150; Phelps v. Phelps, 28 App. D. C. 577; Holschbach v. Holschbach, 134 Mo. App. 247, 114 S. W. 1035; Clague v. Clague, 46 Minn. 461, 49 N. W. 198; Nullmeyer v. Nullmeyer, 49 Ill. App. 573; Shivey v. Shivey, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369; In re Adams' Estate, 161 Iowa, 88, 140 N. W. 872; Johnsen v. Johnsen, 78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 189, 1200; Land v. Martin, 46 La. Ann. 1246, 15 South. 657; McGurk v. McGurk (N. J. Ch.) 28 Atl. 510. But the fact that a wife put up with mistreatment in the hope of cessation will not prevent her from showing such treatment in a baseless action for divorce brought by the husband. Bliss v. Bliss, 161 Mo. App. 70, 142 S. W. 1081. And a wife does not condone husband's adultery by continuing to live with him in the belief that his misconduct had ceased, when in fact it had not. Howard v. Howard, 188 Mo. App. 564, 176 S. W. 483.

<sup>83</sup> Dance v. Dance, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 794, note; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Ecc. Supp. 1; Guthrie v. Guthrie, 26 Mo. App. 566; Harnett v. Harnett, 59 Iowa, 401, 13 N. W. 408; Jacobs v. Tobelman, 36 La. Ann. 842; Denison v. Denison, 4 Wash. 705, 30 Pac. 1100; Lindsay v. Lindsay, 226 Ill. 309, 80 N. E. 876.

<sup>84</sup> Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789; Snow v. Snow, 2 Notes of Cas. Supp. 1, 13; Burns v. Burns, 60 Ind. 259; Phelps v. Phelps, 28 App. D. C. 577.

<sup>85</sup> D'Aguiar v. D'Aguiar, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 773; Beeby v. Beeby, Id. 789; Kirkwall v. Kirkwall, 2 Hagg. Const. 277; Gardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray (Mass.) 434; Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 108; Bowic v. Bowic, 3 Md. Ch.

edge of the offense claimed to have been condoned.<sup>86</sup> Mere suspicion is not knowledge. Cohabitation under circumstances which might excite suspicion merely, but without actual knowledge, is not condonation.<sup>87</sup> That a wife retains confidence in her husband, or a husband in his wife, notwithstanding rumors of his or her adultery, and circumstances tending to show that they may be true, ought not to be treasured up and relied upon as condonation.<sup>88</sup> Forgiveness of one act is not forgiveness of other unknown acts; but, when the terms of the forgiveness are general, it is not necessary that there should be actual knowledge of each distinct offense.<sup>89</sup>

### SAME—RECRIMINATION

**109. Recrimination is a countercharge in a suit for divorce that the complainant has been guilty of an offense constituting a ground for divorce. Adultery is universally, and any conduct which is ground for divorce is in most states, a complete bar to a divorce when set up in recrimination.**

In most states it is a good defense in a suit for divorce that the complainant has been guilty of any conduct which constitutes a ground for divorce. This is the doctrine of recrimination. In some states, as will presently be seen, the doctrine is more or less restricted by statute, or by judicial decision; and the extent to which acts of one spouse constituting a ground for divorce may be set up in bar of a suit for divorce brought by the other is not the same in all states.

The doctrine of recrimination has its foundation in the principle that one who asks relief must come into court with clean hands. In

51; *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 32 Miss. 279; *Horne v. Horne*, 72 N. C. 531; *Cochran v. Cochran*, 35 Iowa, 477; *Shackleton v. Shackleton*, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935, 27 Am. St. Rep. 478; *CLAGUE v. CLAGUE*, 46 Minn. 461, 49 N. W. 198, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 139.

<sup>86</sup> *Durant v. Durant*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 733; *Bramwell v. Bramwell*, 3 Hagg. Const. 629; *Anon.*, 6 Mass. 147; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 122 Mass. 423; *Delliber v. Delliber*, 9 Conn. 233; *Laycock v. Laycock*, 52 Or. 610, 98 Pac. 487; *Howard v. Howard*, 188 Mo. App. 564, 176 S. W. 483; *Odom v. Odom*, 36 Ga. 286.

<sup>87</sup> *Quincy v. Quincy*, 10 N. H. 272; *Polson v. Polson*, 140 Ind. 310, 39 N. E. 498; *Shackleton v. Shackleton*, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935, 27 Am. St. Rep. 478; *Welch v. Welch*, 50 Mo. App. 395.

<sup>88</sup> *Polson v. Polson*, 140 Ind. 310, 39 N. E. 498.

<sup>89</sup> *Rogers v. Rogers*, 122 Mass. 423; *Shackleton v. Shackleton*, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935, 27 Am. St. Rep. 478.

*Hoff v. Hoff*<sup>90</sup> the complainant asked a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. The defendant, with an answer denying cruelty filed a cross-bill charging the complainant with extreme cruelty. The court found both cases made out, and awarded a divorce on each bill. On appeal it was held that, when the court found that "each party had been guilty of such conduct as under the statute was cause for divorce, he should have dismissed both bills, and left the parties where their misbehavior had placed them." "A proper administration of justice," it was said, "does not require that courts shall occupy their time and the time of people who are so unfortunate as to be witnesses of the misdoings of others in giving equitable relief to parties who have no equities. And it is as true of divorce cases as of any others that a party must come into a court of equity with clean hands. Divorce laws are made to give relief to the innocent, not to the guilty."<sup>91</sup>

In most states the statutes have merely prescribed the grounds for divorce, and have made no provision at all respecting recrimination. Under these circumstances, the courts assume that the Legislature intended to adopt the general principles which had governed the ecclesiastical courts in England in granting divorces from bed and board, so far as these principles are applicable and are found to be reasonable.<sup>92</sup> In some states the subject of recrimination is covered by the statute, the Legislature having undertaken to specify what conduct may be set up by way of recrimination; and, of course, in these states the statute is controlling.<sup>93</sup>

#### *The Conduct Constituting Ground for Recrimination*

In the English ecclesiastical courts the only conduct on the part of the complainant that could be set up in recrimination to defeat

<sup>90</sup> 48 Mich. 281, 12 N. W. 160.

<sup>91</sup> See, also, *Beeby v. Beeby*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789; *Otway v. Otway*, 13 Prob. Div. 141; *Derby v. Derby*, 21 N. J. Eq. 36; *Hubbard v. Hubbard*, 74 Wis. 650, 43 N. W. 655, 6 L. R. A. 58; *Hall v. Hall*, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758; *Day v. Day*, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, 6 Ann. Cas. 169; *Stoneburner v. Stoneburner*, 11 Idaho, 603, 83 Pac. 938; *Benedicto v. Dela Rama*, 3 Phil. Rep. 35. Though the rule that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands would, where both parties show grounds for divorce, render neither entitled to a decree, such rule is, on grounds of public policy, or the peculiar exigencies of the case, often relaxed, and comparative rectitude is considered. *Weiss v. Weiss*, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587. And see *Johnsen v. Johnsen*, 78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 189, 1200.

<sup>92</sup> *Morrison v. Morrison*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688; *Robbins v. Robbins*, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 54 Am. Rep. 488.

<sup>93</sup> Post, p. 285.

his right to a divorce was adultery.<sup>94</sup> And in some states the offense set up in recrimination must be like in kind to that which is the ground on which divorce is claimed.<sup>95</sup> The rule, however, is different under the modern English statutes;<sup>96</sup> and it is not recognized in many states in this country, unless expressly declared by statute. The general rule in this country is, as stated by the Massachusetts court, that "a suitor for divorce cannot prevail if open to a valid charge, by way of recrimination, of any of the causes of divorce set out in the statute. Recrimination as a bar to divorce is not limited to a charge of the same nature as that alleged in the libel. It is sufficient if the recrimination charges any of the causes for divorce so declared in the statute. The general principle which governs in a case where one party recriminates is that recrimination must allege a cause which the law declares sufficient for a divorce."<sup>97</sup> According to this rule, in a suit for divorce, whatever may be the ground alleged and relied upon, the defendant may set up by way of recrimination any conduct on the part of the complainant which the statute declares a ground for divorce; as, for instance, cruelty or desertion or drunkenness in a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery, and vice versa, or cruelty in a suit for divorce on the ground of desertion, and vice versa.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Harris v. Harris*, 2 Hagg. Ecc. 376, 411; *Cocksedge v. Cocksedge*, 1 Rob. Ecc. 90.

<sup>95</sup> *Bast v. Bast*, 82 Ill. 584; *Huling v. Huling*, 38 Ill. App. 144; *Zimmerman v. Zimmerman*, 242 Ill. 552, 90 N. E. 192; *Hughes v. Hughes*, 133 Ill. App. 654; *Bancroft v. Bancroft*, 4 Boyce (Del.) 9, 85 Atl. 561; *Richardson v. Richardson*, 4 Port. (Ala.) 467, 30 Am. Dec. 538. Misconduct of the husband other than cruelty or infidelity cannot be set up as a bar to his suit for divorce for adultery. *Selbert v. Selbert* (N. J. Ch.) 83 Atl. 230.

<sup>96</sup> *Otway v. Otway*, 13 Prob. Div. 141.

<sup>97</sup> *Morrison v. Morrison*, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 60, 56 Am. Rep. 688; *CUSHMAN v. CUSHMAN*, 194 Mass. 38, 79 N. E. 809, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 143.

<sup>98</sup> *Hall v. Hall*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 39; *Clapp v. Clapp*, 97 Mass. 531; *Handy v. Hardy*, 124 Mass. 394; *Cumming v. Cumming*, 135 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep. 476; *Redington v. Redington*, 2 Colo. App. 8, 29 Pac. 811; *PEASE v. PEASE*, 72 Wis. 136, 39 N. W. 133, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 141; *Hubbard v. Hubbard*, 74 Wis. 650, 43 N. W. 655, 6 L. R. A. 58; *Church v. Church*, 16 R. I. 667, 19 Atl. 244, 7 L. R. A. 385; *Crim v. Crim*, 66 Or. 258, 134 Pac. 13; *Collett v. Collett*, 170 Mo. App. 590, 157 S. W. 90; *Egbers v. Egbers*, 79 Wash. 72, 139 Pac. 767; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 89 Neb. 749, 132 N. W. 401; *Green v. Green*, 125 Md. 141, 93 Atl. 400, L. R. A. 1915E, 972, *Ann. Cas.* 1917A, 175; *Nagel v. Nagel*, 12 Mo. 53; *Ryan v. Ryan*, 9 Mo. 539; *Shackett v. Shackett*, 49 Vt. 195; *Conant v. Conant*, 10 Cal. 249, 70 Am. Dec. 717; *Johns v. Johns*, 29 Ga. 718; *Ribet v. Ribet*, 39 Ala. 348; *Holmes v. Holmes*,

In *Pease v. Pease*,<sup>99</sup> a husband sued for divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, and the wife was permitted to defeat the suit by showing, in recrimination, that he had been guilty of cruelty that would have entitled her to a divorce. "We do not perceive," said the court, "upon what logical principle the court could grant redress to the husband for the adultery of the wife when he himself has been guilty of an offense which would give her a right to an absolute divorce were she was without fault. Both parties have violated the marriage contract, and can the court look with more favor upon the breach of one than the other? It is an unquestioned principle that, where one party is shown to have been guilty of adultery, such party cannot have a divorce for the adultery committed by the other.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*. In the forum of conscience, adultery of the wife may be regarded as a more heinous violation of social duty than cruelty by the husband. But the statute treats them as of the same nature and same grade of delinquency. It is true, the cruelty of the husband does not justify the adultery of the wife; neither would his own adultery; but still the latter has ever been held a bar. And where both adultery and cruelty are made equal offenses, attended with the same legal consequences, how can the court, in the mutual controversy, discriminate between the two, and give one the preference over the other? It seems to us that, as the law has given the same effect to the one offense as the other, the court should not attempt to distinguish between them, but treat them alike, and hold one a bar to the other."

It has been held that recrimination, to constitute a valid defense, must arise out of the fact that the acts or conduct for which the complainant seeks a divorce were induced by or in retaliation of complainant's conduct, relied upon in recrimination.<sup>2</sup> This, however, is contrary to the great weight of authority. To allow any

Walk. (Miss.) 474; *Adams v. Adams*, 17 N. J. Eq. 324; *Reid v. Reid*, 21 N. J. Eq. 331; *Harvey v. Harvey* (N. J. Ch.) 7 Atl. 871; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 40 Iowa, 230; *Stoneburner v. Stoneburner*, 11 Idaho, 603, 83 Pac. 938.

<sup>99</sup> *PEASE v. PEASE*, 72 Wis. 136, 39 N. W. 133, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 141.

<sup>1</sup> *Proctor v. Proctor*, 2 Hagg. Const. 292; *Brisco v. Brisco*, 2 Add. Ecc. 259; *Astley v. Astley*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 714; *Wood v. Wood*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 108; *Smith v. Smith*, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 432, 27 Am. Dec. 75; *Smith v. Smith*, 19 Wis. 522; *Mattox v. Mattox*, 2 Ohio, 233, 15 Am. Dec. 547; *Christianberry v. Christianberry*, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 202, 25 Am. Dec. 96; *Horne v. Horne*, 72 N. C. 530; *Haines v. Haines*, 62 Tex. 216; *Flavell v. Flavell*, 20 N. J. Eq. 211; *Adams v. Adams*, 17 N. J. Eq. 324; *Reid v. Reid*, 21 N. J. Eq. 331.

<sup>2</sup> *Trigg v. Trigg* (Tex.) 18 S. W. 313.

such doctrine would exclude the charge of adultery by way of recrimination in a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery.

*Same—Statutes Governing Recrimination*

In some of the states the subject of recrimination is entirely covered by the statutes, and no act can be set up by way of recrimination unless the case comes within the statute. In Minnesota it is provided that, "in any action brought for a divorce on the ground of adultery," the court may deny a divorce "when it is proved that the plaintiff has also been guilty of adultery." It has been held under this statute that the adultery of the plaintiff cannot be set up by way of recrimination, unless the adultery of the defendant is the ground of divorce relied upon.<sup>3</sup> In other words, under such a statute we have the absurd result that, while adultery by the husband will bar a suit by him for a divorce for the wife's adultery, it will not bar a suit by him for a divorce on the ground of some less heinous offense by the wife, such as desertion, cruelty, or drunkenness. It would have been better if the Legislature had left the question to the courts to be determined on principle. So, in Pennsylvania, where a statute provided that if the defendant in a divorce suit should allege and prove certain things, they should be a good defense and a perpetual bar, it was held that no other defense than those mentioned in the statute could be interposed.<sup>4</sup>

In a number of states it is expressly declared by statute, in accordance with the general rule obtaining both in England and in this country, even in the absence of statutory provision, that a divorce shall not be granted on the ground of adultery, when both parties are guilty of such an offense. In a few states it is provided that there shall be no divorce for any cause when the complainant was guilty of "like conduct." If such a statute is to be strictly construed, the only acts that can be set up by way of recrimination would be adultery when, and only when, a divorce is sought on the ground of adultery; desertion when a divorce is sought on the ground of desertion; cruelty when a divorce is sought on the ground of cruelty, etc.<sup>5</sup> It is doubtful, however, whether the statute should be so strictly construed, for the words "like conduct"

<sup>3</sup> *Buerfening v. Buerfening*, 23 Minn. 563.

<sup>4</sup> *Ristine v. Ristine*, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 460.

<sup>5</sup> There have been, and perhaps there are now, such statutes in Michigan, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Arizona. *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6217.

might well be taken to mean conduct constituting ground for divorce.<sup>6</sup>

*Same—Conduct Condoned*

As to whether an offense which has been condoned can be set up by way of recrimination, there has been some conflict in the authorities. Perhaps in no case has the offense of cruelty or desertion been allowed as a defense after condonation. The conflict has arisen in the case of adultery. In England, by statute, the courts are given a discretionary power to refuse a divorce on the ground of adultery, if the complainant has been guilty of adultery during the marriage; and some of the judges have, in the exercise of this discretion, refused a divorce on the ground of adultery, because of adultery by the complainant which the defendant had condoned.<sup>7</sup> Authorities in New York are to the same effect.<sup>8</sup> By the better opinion, however, both in England and in this country, and whether there is any statute on the subject or not, adultery by one spouse, if it has been condoned by the other, is no bar to a suit for a divorce for the subsequent adultery of the other.<sup>9</sup> An offense, when it is condoned, ceases to be a ground for a divorce, and for this reason, if for no other, it is not ground for recrimination. The question was fully considered by the Massachusetts court in *Cumming v. Cumming*;<sup>10</sup> and after a review of the authorities, and the reasons for

<sup>6</sup> See *Hoff v. Hoff*, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N. W. 160. In this case the divorce was asked on the ground of extreme cruelty, and extreme cruelty was the conduct set up by way of recrimination, so that it was strictly within the words of the statute. But the language of the court makes it clear that the broader view was taken of the statute. And see *Morrison v. Morrison*, 64 Mich. 53, 30 N. W. 903.

<sup>7</sup> *Seller v. Seller*, 1 Swab. & T. 482; *Goode v. Goode*, 2 Swab. & T. 253.

<sup>8</sup> *Wood v. Wood*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 108; *Morrell v. Morrell*, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 318.

<sup>9</sup> *Cumming v. Cumming*, 135 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep. 476; *Anichini v. Anichini*, 2 Curt. Ecc. 210; *Storms v. Storms*, 71 N. J. Eq. 549, 64 Atl. 700; *Talley v. Talley*, 215 Pa. 281, 64 Atl. 523; *Jones v. Jones*, 18 N. J. Eq. 33, 90 Am. Dec. 607; *Masten v. Masten*, 15 N. H. 159. See *Bleck v. Bleck*, 27 Hun (N. Y.) 298. In *Cumming v. Cumming*, supra, the rule was applied in the adultery by the wife, which had been condoned by the husband. "An act of adultery committed by the husband, and forgiven for years, should not be held to compel the husband to submit without redress to the faithlessness and unrestrained profligacy of his wife. The penalty is too severe for a forgiven offense. It is better to hold that, when the erring party is received back and forgiven, the marriage contract is renewed, and begins as res integra, and that it is for the party, and not for the courts, to forgive the new offense." *Jones v. Jones*, supra.

<sup>10</sup> 135 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep. 476.

the rule, it was held that the court should exercise no discretion in the matter, but should apply the rule in all cases. Even where a statute expressly provides, as it does in some states, that a divorce shall not be granted on the ground of adultery where both parties have been guilty, it does not seem that the statute should be construed as applying to adultery that has been condoned.<sup>11</sup>

### EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF DIVORCE

110. A decree of divorce, rendered in accordance with the law of the forum by a court of competent jurisdiction, is valid everywhere, and will be given full force and effect in all other states. This rule is, however, subject to the exception that the decree is subject to collateral attack for want of jurisdiction.

Under and by virtue of the "full faith and credit" clause of the federal Constitution,<sup>12</sup> decrees of divorce, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and valid when rendered, are conclusive in every other state. This provision, however, does not preclude an inquiry as to the jurisdiction, in so far as it rests on the domicile of the parties, of the court rendering the decree.<sup>13</sup> It follows that, as the court has jurisdiction when both parties are domiciled in the state where the divorce is sought,<sup>14</sup> the decree of divorce, if valid there, is valid everywhere;<sup>15</sup> and, on the other hand, as the

<sup>11</sup> See dictum in *Cumming v. Cumming*, 135 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep. 476, and in *Jones v. Jones*, 18 N. J. Eq. 33, 90 Am. Dec. 607.

<sup>12</sup> Const. U. S. art. 4, § 1, providing that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87.

<sup>13</sup> *HADDOCK v. HADDOCK*, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 144; *Hood v. State*, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 72 N. Y. 217, 28 Am. Rep. 129; *Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve*, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 920.

<sup>14</sup> Ante, p. 244.

<sup>15</sup> *Hall v. Hall*, 189 App. Div. 120, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1056, reversing 67 Misc. Rep. 267, 122 N. Y. Supp. 401; *Guggenheim v. Wahl*, 203 N. Y. 390, 96 N. E. 726, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 201; *Zentzls v. Zentzls*, 163 Wis. 342, 158 N. W. 284; *Hood v. Hood*, 11 Allen (Mass.) 196, 87 Am. Dec. 709; *Burlen v. Shannon*, 115 Mass. 438; *Cheely v. Clayton*, 110 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 328, 28 L. Ed. 298; *McGill v. Deming*, 44 Ohio St. 645, 11 N. E. 118. See, also, *Ather-ton v. Ather-ton*, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794, reversing 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291, 63 Am. St. Rep. 650. So, where the parties both

court has no jurisdiction if neither party is domiciled in the state where divorce is sought,<sup>16</sup> the decree, whether regarded as valid in that state or not, is of no force in other states.<sup>17</sup> In accordance with these principles it has been held that the dissolution of an Indian marriage contract according to the tribal laws and customs will be upheld, in the absence of a federal statute invalidating such laws and customs.<sup>18</sup> So, too, a divorce rendered in a foreign country, if valid according to the law of that country, will be recognized by our courts,<sup>19</sup> if it appears that the jurisdiction to grant a divorce according to the foreign law existed.<sup>20</sup>

It may be, however, that only one of the parties is domiciled in the state when divorce is sought. As to the effect of the decree in such cases, there is a great conflict of opinion. The general rule seems to be that, if the defendant does not reside in the state where suit is brought, the plaintiff must reside there or the court will have no jurisdiction.<sup>21</sup> The conflict in this class of cases grows out of the difference of opinion as to the nature of the proceeding for divorce, viz., whether it is a proceeding in rem or a proceeding

appear and submit to the jurisdiction of the court, the decree is valid. *Bledsoe v. Seaman*, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576.

<sup>16</sup> *Ante*, p. 245.

<sup>17</sup> *State v. Armington*, 25 Minn. 29; *Barber v. Root*, 10 Mass. 260; *People v. Dawell*, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260. A decree of divorce by a court in Nevada undertaking to dispose of the marriage status of spouses not residents there would be a nullity, as that state has no power either by legislative act or by decree of its court to fix the matrimonial status of one only transiently commorant therein. *Lister v. Lister*, 86 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170.

<sup>18</sup> *La Framboise v. Day*, 136 Minn. 239, 161 N. W. 529, L. R. A. 1917D, 571; *James v. Adams*, 56 Okl. 450, 155 Pac. 1121.

<sup>19</sup> Jewish divorces, granted by rabbis in Russia and Rumania, being valid there, are valid here. In *re Spondre's Estate*, 98 Misc. Rep. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 948; *Miller v. Miller*, 70 Misc. Rep. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787. The law of Turkey governing the marital status of a Christian man and woman domiciled there, that the act of the wife renouncing Christianity, and embracing the Mohammedan religion, and marrying a Mohammedan, nullifies the former marriage, will be given force in Massachusetts. *Kapigian v. Der Minassian*, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N. E. 264, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 535.

<sup>20</sup> See *Saperstone v. Saperstone*, 73 Misc. Rep. 631, 131 N. Y. Supp. 241, where a rabbinical divorce was refused recognition on the ground that the Russian rabbi did not have jurisdiction.

<sup>21</sup> *Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve*, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 920; *Dunham v. Dunham*, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N. E. 841, 35 L. R. A. 70; *Adams v. Adams*, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275; *People v. Dawell*, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260; *Hoffman v. Hoffman*, 46 N. Y. 30, 7 Am. Rep. 299; *Lister v. Lister*, 86 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170.

in personam.<sup>22</sup> Regarding the actual subject-matter of the litigation as the marriage status, the general doctrine is that the proceeding is in rem; the status being the res.<sup>23</sup> This doctrine has, however, been modified in some jurisdictions, where it has been recognized that the proceeding is not strictly in rem, but contains a personal element. In these jurisdictions the proceeding is regarded as quasi in rem.<sup>24</sup>

It is evident that, in cases where only one party is domiciled in the state where divorce is sought, there is only partial jurisdiction of the res. On the view the courts have taken of the nature of divorce proceedings as in rem or in personam depends the decision when the question of the extraterritorial effect of the decree has arisen. In some states the courts, regarding the proceeding as one in rem, have held that only such notice to the nonresident defendant is necessary as is required by the local law, and that the decree so rendered is binding in all courts.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> A proceeding in personam is one which seeks to fix a personal liability on the defendant, such as an action to recover a money judgment. A proceeding in rem, on the other hand is aimed only at defendant's property or something within the court's jurisdiction. A judgment in personam requires personal service on the defendant within the limits of the court's jurisdiction, while a judgment in rem does not require service within the jurisdiction, except on the thing itself; service on the defendant outside the jurisdiction by publication or otherwise being generally sufficient. See *Cross v. Armstrong*, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160.

<sup>23</sup> *McGill v. Deming*, 44 Ohio St. 645, 11 N. E. 118; *Ellison v. Martin*, 53 Mo. 575; *Dunham v. Dunham*, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N. E. 841, 35 L. R. A. 70; *Butler v. Washington*, 45 La. Ann. 279, 12 South. 356, 19 L. R. A. 814; *In re Ellis' Estate*, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056, 23 L. R. A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514.

<sup>24</sup> *Doughty v. Doughty*, 27 N. J. Eq. 315; *McFarlane v. McFarlane*, 43 Or. 477, 73 Pac. 203, 75 Pac. 139.

<sup>25</sup> *Ditson v. Ditson*, 4 R. I. 87, is the leading case. The doctrine has been followed and approved in *Kline v. Kline*, 57 Iowa, 386, 10 N. W. 825, 42 Am. Rep. 47; *Thurston v. Thurston*, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017; *Doerr v. Forsythe*, 50 Ohio St. 726, 35 N. E. 1055, 40 Am. St. Rep. 703; *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779; *McCormick v. McCormick*, 82 Kan. 31, 107 Pac. 546; *Howard v. Strobe*, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S. W. 792, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1057; *Searles v. Searles*, 140 Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 133; *Kenner v. Kenner*, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W. 779, L. R. A. 1918E, 587, rehearing denied 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S. W. 723, L. R. A. 1918E, 587; *Dunham v. Dunham*, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N. E. 841, 35 L. R. A. 70. In these cases it was, however, conceded that a decree for alimony, or for custody of the children, or affecting property rights, was not conclusive, as such decrees were in personam. But see *Hawkins v. Ragsdale*, 80 Ky. 353, 44 Am. Rep. 483, where the rule was under the statute extended even to a decree affecting dower. On the general doctrine,

In New Jersey and a few other states the courts have taken the position that a proceeding for divorce is quasi in rem, not requiring actual personal service within the jurisdiction of the court, and that the service is sufficient to render the decree binding extraterritorially if the best practicable service is made, such as service by mail or personal service outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.<sup>26</sup> The courts of New York and some other states have adopted the contrary rule, and, on the theory that the proceeding for divorce is in personam, have held that a divorce obtained in a state where the plaintiff alone is domiciled is of no extraterritorial effect, if the defendant were not personally served with notice within the jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce, or voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction,<sup>27</sup> unless the state of the

see, also, *Hilbish v. Hattle*, 145 Ind. 59, 44 N. E. 20, 33 L. R. A. 783, where, however, there seems to have been personal service on the defendant.

<sup>26</sup> *Felt v. Felt*, 59 N. J. Eq. 606, 45 Atl. 105, 49 Atl. 1071, 47 L. R. A. 546, 83 Am. St. Rep. 612; *Doughty v. Doughty*, 28 N. J. Eq. 581; *Magowan v. Magowan*, 57 N. J. Eq. 195, 39 Atl. 364. See, also, *Smith v. Smith*, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 South. 248, and *Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal*, 67 Iowa, 35, 24 N. W. 579, in which personal service was had outside the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree. The New Jersey rule has also been approved in *Massachusetts*. *Burien v. Shannon*, 115 Mass. 438; *Loker v. Gerald*, 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709, 16 L. R. A. 497, 34 Am. St. Rep. 252. Compare *State v. Armington*, 25 Minn. 29.

<sup>27</sup> *People v. Baker*, 76 N. Y. 78, 32 Am. Rep. 274, is the leading case. See also, *In re Kimball*, 155 N. Y. 62, 49 N. E. 331; *Williams v. Williams*, 130 N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98, 14 L. R. A. 220, 27 Am. St. Rep. 517; *Ransom v. Ransom*, 54 Misc. Rep. 410, 104 N. Y. Supp. 198; *Cross v. Cross*, 108 N. Y. 628, 15 N. E. 333; *Barber v. Barber*, 89 Misc. Rep. 519, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1064; *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, 123 Am. St. Rep. 585; *O'Dea v. O'Dea*, 101 N. Y. 23, 4 N. E. 110. In *Jones v. Jones*, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707, 2 Am. St. Rep. 447, the doctrine of *People v. Baker* was approved, but the decree was held valid, because the defendant had voluntarily appeared in the suit in the Texas court. See, also, *Strauss v. Strauss*, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N. Y. Supp. 842. The doctrine of the New York courts has also been approved in *Cook v. Cook*, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N. W. 33, 443, 43 Am. Rep. 706; *Harris v. Harris*, 115 N. C. 587, 20 S. E. 187, 44 Am. St. Rep. 471; *Perkins v. Perkins*, 225 Mass. 82, 133 N. E. 841, L. R. A. 1917B, 1028; *State v. Duncan*, 110 S. C. 253, 96 S. E. 294; *Jacobi v. Jacobi*, 45 App. D. C. 442; *Bruguiere v. Bruguiere*, 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 988, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 122; *Pettis v. Pettis*, 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13, 4 A. L. R. 852; *McCreery v. Davis*, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178, 28 L. R. A. 655, 51 Am. St. Rep. 794. And see *HADDOCK v. HADDOCK*, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 144; affirming 178 N. Y. 557, 70 N. E. 1099, where the decree of divorce was obtained by the husband, domiciled in Connecticut, with only constructive service on the wife, whose domicile was New York. Nevertheless the New York courts recognize the rule that the party obtaining the divorce

former was the matrimonial domicile of the parties,<sup>28</sup> in which case constructive service by publication is sufficient.<sup>29</sup> This also seems to be the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court.<sup>30</sup>

In accordance with principles already stated the injured party may for the purposes of divorce acquire a new domicile, and neither spouse can by unjustifiably abandoning the other acquire a new matrimonial domicile.<sup>31</sup>

### LEGISLATIVE DIVORCE

**111. In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislature of a state has the power to grant divorces by special act; and such an act is not within the constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts.**

The English ecclesiastical courts were limited to the granting of divorces from bed and board, and could not grant a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. This power, however, was exercised by Parlia-

may be estopped to set up the want of jurisdiction. *Starbuck v. Starbuck*, 173 N. Y. 508, 66 N. E. 193, 93 Am. St. Rep. 631; *Kaufman v. Kaufman*, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566, affirming (Sup.) 160 N. Y. Supp. 19. Where defendant is served in the state of the forum or appears, a judgment in any state of the Union, irrespective of the ground upon which it was granted, is within the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution. In *re Caltabellotta's Will*, 183 App. Div. 753, 171 N. Y. Supp. 82.

<sup>28</sup> The term "matrimonial domicile" means that place where one spouse is rightfully domiciled, and where the other spouse ought to be in order to fulfill the marital obligations. Decrees of divorce of other states recovered upon service by publication are not judgments in personam, and, if not rendered by the court of the last matrimonial domicile, are not within the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution, and are only recognized by other states by reason of comity, and will not prevail where in contravention of the public policy of the state. *Ball v. Cross*, 106 Misc. Rep. 184, 174 N. Y. Supp. 259. Where the husband and wife were married in New York, but the husband had always resided in Connecticut, a decree of New York divorcing the parties a mensa et thoro cannot claim recognition as a decree of the court of matrimonial domicile. *Pettis v. Pettis*, 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13, 4 A. L. R. 852.

<sup>29</sup> *Post v. Post*, 149 App. Div. 452, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1057, affirmed 210 N. Y. 607, 104 N. E. 1139; *Buckley v. Buckley*, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079, 126 Am. St. Rep. 900; *Montmorency v. Montmorency* (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1168; *People ex rel. Catlin v. Catlin*, 69 Misc. Rep. 191, 126 N. Y. Supp. 350.

<sup>30</sup> *Atherton v. Atherton*, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794; *HADDOCK v. HADDOCK*, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 144; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347.

<sup>31</sup> See ante, p. 245.

ment; and, when this country was settled, the legislative assemblies of the colonies followed the example of Parliament, and treated the subject as within their province. Since then divorces a vinculo have been granted by special act of the Legislature in very many of the states. In some states the power of the Legislature to grant divorces is restricted by constitutional provisions.<sup>32</sup> In the absence of such restrictions, however, it is well settled that the power exists. In a late case the question came before the Supreme Court of the United States; and it was held that a special act of a territorial Legislature dissolving the marriage relation between a husband resident in the territory and a wife who was a nonresident was a valid act of legislative power, and that it was not rendered invalid by the fact that there was no cause for divorce, and that the wife was not notified.<sup>33</sup> It was also held that such an act does not violate the clause of the federal Constitution prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of contracts, since marriage is not a contract, within the meaning of that provision.<sup>34</sup>

In some states the granting of divorces by the Legislature is regarded as an encroachment on the judicial powers.<sup>35</sup> And it has also been held that the passage of a special act granting a divorce contravenes the constitutional provision forbidding the enactment of special laws.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Sparhawk v. Sparhawk*, 116 Mass. 315; *State v. Fry*, 4 Mo. 120.

<sup>34</sup> *MAYNARD v. HILL*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 1; *Cronise v. Cronise*, 54 Pa. 255; *Crane v. Meginnis*, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 474, 19 Am. Dec. 237; *Starr v. Pease*, 8 Conn. 541; *Bingham v. Miller*, 17 Ohio, 445, 49 Am. Dec. 471; *State v. Duket*, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83, 31 L. R. A. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 928.

<sup>33</sup> *MAYNARD v. HILL*, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 1.

<sup>35</sup> *Bryson v. Campbell*, 12 Mo. 498; *Jones v. Jones*, 12 Pa. 351, 51 Am. Dec. 612; *In re Christiansen*, 17 Utah, 412, 53 Pac. 1003, 41 L. R. A. 504, 70 Am. St. Rep. 794.

<sup>36</sup> *Winkles v. Powell*, 173 Ala. 46, 55 South. 536.

## PART II

### PARENT AND CHILD

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#### CHAPTER VIII

##### LEGITIMACY, ILLEGITIMACY, AND ADOPTION

- 112-113. Legitimacy of Children.
- 114. Status of Illegitimate Children.
- 115. Adoption of Children.

Persons occupying the relation of parent and child have certain rights, and are subject to certain duties and obligations, which arise from the legal status established by that relation. Strictly speaking, the status exists only between the parent and his legitimate children and his children by adoption. But in some degree these rights, duties, and obligations may arise where one person has assumed to stand in loco parentis to another, without legal adoption. Before explaining these rights, duties, and obligations, it is necessary to show what constitutes legitimacy, how the relation of parent and child may arise through adoption, and how the relation in loco parentis may arise. In this chapter will also be considered the status of parent and illegitimate child, and the rights and duties which arise from that relation.

##### LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN

- 112. A child is legitimate at common law when it was born or begotten during the lawful wedlock of its parents, and very generally, by statute in this country, when its parents marry subsequent to its birth.
- 113. There is a strong presumption that the child of a married woman is legitimate; but this is a presumption of fact, and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that her husband is not its father.

##### *Legitimacy and Illegitimacy*

"A legitimate child," says Blackstone, "is he that is born in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time afterwards. 'Pater est quem

nuptiæ demonstrant,' is the rule of the civil law; and this holds with the civilians, whether the nuptials happen before or after the birth of the child. With us in England the rule is narrowed, for the nuptials must be precedent to the birth."<sup>1</sup> A child, to be legitimate, need not necessarily have been begotten during wedlock. It is sufficient if he was born after, though begotten before, marriage.<sup>2</sup> In *Rex v. Luffe*,<sup>3</sup> Lord Ellenborough said that, "with respect to the case where the parents have married so recently before the birth of the child that it could not have been begotten in wedlock, it stands upon its own peculiar ground. The marriage of the parties is the criterion adopted by the law, in cases of antenuptial generation, for ascertaining the actual parentage of the child. For this purpose it will not examine when the gestation began, looking only to the recognition of it by the husband in the subsequent act of marriage." "A bastard, by our English laws," says Blackstone, "is one that is not only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony. The civil and canon laws do not allow a child to remain a bastard if the parents afterwards intermarry; and herein they differ most materially from our law; which, though not so strict as to require that the child shall be begotten, yet makes it an indispensable condition, to make it legitimate, that it shall be born after lawful wedlock."<sup>4</sup> Of course, all children born so long after the death of the husband that, by the usual course of gestation, they could not possibly have been begotten by him, are illegitimate; and, generally, all children are illegitimate if it is clearly shown by the circumstances that the husband could not have been or is not their father.

At common law, if a marriage is void, the children of such a mar-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 446.

<sup>2</sup> *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 198; *Stegall v. Stegall*, 2 Brock. 256, Fed. Cas. No. 13,351; *Dennison v. Page*, 29 Pa. 420, 72 Am. Dec. 644; *Bowles v. Bingham*, 2 Munf. (Va.) 442, 5 Am. Dec. 497; *Id.*, 3 Munf. (Va.) 599; *State v. Wilson*, 32 N. C. 131; *State v. Herman*, 35 N. C. 502. And see *Grant v. Stimpson*, 79 Conn. 617, 66 Atl. 166.

<sup>3</sup> 8 East, 198.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 454. In countries governed by the civil law, three classes of children are recognized: Legitimate, natural, and bastards. Natural children are illegitimate children born of parents both of whom at the time of the child's birth had capacity to marry. Such children can be acknowledged or legitimated by the parents. Bastards are the illegitimate children of parents, one or both of whom were incapacitated to marry; i. e., children of adulterous connection. This class of children cannot be legitimated. See Civil Code Philippine Islands, art. 119 et seq. The rule in Louisiana is practically the same. *Briggs v. McLaughlin*, 134 La. 133, 63 South. 851.

riage are illegitimate, though the parties in marrying may have acted in the most perfect good faith.<sup>5</sup> So it is, also, where a marriage is voidable and avoided by disaffirmance, or by a decree of nullity in the lifetime of the parties, so as to render it void ab initio on such disaffirmance or the entry of such a decree.<sup>6</sup> These were harsh rules, and in most states they have been greatly modified by statute. In some states the statute is very broad. In Wisconsin, for instance, the statute declares that "the issue of all marriages declared null in law shall, nevertheless, be legitimate." Such a statute, said the Wisconsin court, means "that a child born within the wedlock of a regular marriage, which is null in law, shall, nevertheless, be the legitimate child and heir of each and both parents, so far as the question of legitimacy is concerned. In other words, all such children are legitimate to all intents and purposes. It is a very just and humane provision, and serves to mitigate somewhat the severity of the old law, which visited upon the children the sins of their parents." In the case from which we have quoted, therefore, it was held that a child born within the wedlock of a regular marriage, which is void in law because the woman is already married, is, nevertheless, the legitimate child and heir of both parents.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Presumption of Legitimacy—Evidence*

The child of a married woman is presumed to be legitimate, in the absence of evidence that the husband is not its father.<sup>8</sup> This

<sup>5</sup> Ante, pp. 82, 58.

<sup>6</sup> Ante, p. 58.

<sup>7</sup> *Watts v. Owens*, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N. W. 720. And see *Lincecum v. Lincecum*, 3 Mo. 441; *Dyer v. Brannock*, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; *Green v. Green*, 126 Mo. 17, 28 S. W. 752, 1008; *Evatt v. Miller*, 114 Ark. 84, 169 S. W. 317, L. R. A. 1916C, 759; *Nelson v. Jones*, 245 Mo. 579, 151 S. W. 80; *Glass v. Glass*, 114 Mass. 563; *Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce*, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; *Earle v. Dawes*, 3 Md. Ch. 230; *Hartwell v. Jackson*, 7 Tex. 576; *Graham v. Bennet*, 2 Cal. 508; *Heckert v. Hille's Adm'r*, 90 Va. 390, 18 S. E. 841. But see *Baylis v. Baylis*, 207 N. Y. 446, 101 N. E. 176, affirming 146 App. Div. 517, 131 N. Y. Supp. 671; *Green v. Kelly*, 228 Mass. 602, 118 N. E. 235.

<sup>8</sup> *Wallace v. Wallace*, 137 Iowa, 37, 114 N. W. 527, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, 126 Am. St. Rep. 253, 15 Ann. Cas. 761; *Ex parte Madalina*, 174 Cal. 693, 164 Pac. 348, 1 A. L. R. 1629; *Sims v. Birden*, 197 Ala. 690, 73 South. 379, 744; *Lewis v. Sizemore*, 78 S. W. 122, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1354; *Grant v. Stimpson*, 79 Conn. 617, 66 Atl. 166; *Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner*, 75 Ill. 315; *Rhyne v. Hoffman*, 59 N. C. 335; *Buckner's Adm'r v. Buckner*, 120 Ky. 596, 87 S. W. 776; *Vreeland v. Vreeland*, 78 N. J. Eq. 256, 73 Atl. 330, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940; *Powell v. State*, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N. E. 660, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255; *State v. Shaw*, 89 Vt. 121, 94 Atl. 434, L. R. A. 1915F, 1087; *Kennedy v. State*, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S. W. 842, L. R. A. 1916B, 1052, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1029; *In re Campbell's Estate*, 12 Cal. App. 707, 108 Pac. 669, 676;

presumption is very strong, and will not, as a rule,<sup>9</sup> be rebutted by anything less than clear and convincing proof that sexual intercourse did not take place between the father and mother at any time when, in the course of nature, the husband might have been the father of the child, or that the father and mother were not legally married.<sup>10</sup> This presumption is one of fact, and not of law, and may always be rebutted by showing that, in fact, the husband could not have been the father.<sup>11</sup> The presumption is clearly rebutted,

In *re Henry's Estate*, 167 Iowa, 557, 149 N. W. 605; *Wallace v. Wallace*, 73 N. J. Eq. 403, 67 Atl. 612; *Timmann v. Timmann* (Sup.) 142 N. Y. Supp. 298; *Ewell v. Ewell*, 163 N. C. 233, 79 S. E. 509, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 373; *Cave v. Cave*, 101 S. C. 40, 85 S. E. 244. Evidence that plaintiff's mother was legally married to a man, and that there was opportunity for procreation within the period of gestation, raises a conclusive presumption that plaintiff is his legitimate son. *Vanover v. Steele*, 173 Ky. 114, 819, 190 S. W. 667. While the presumption is not overcome by proof of an antenuptial conception it is weakened. *Jackson v. Thornton*, 133 Tenn. 36, 179 S. W. 384.

<sup>9</sup> See post, p. 298, as to rebuttal of presumption of legitimacy, even where intercourse by the husband is shown to have taken place.

<sup>10</sup> *Head v. Head*, 1 Sim. & S. 150; *Banbury Peerage Case*, Id. 153; *Pendrell v. Pendrell*, 2 Strange, 925; *Hargrave v. Hargrave*, 9 Beav. 552; *Bury v. Phillpot*, 2 Mylne & K. 349; *Plowes v. Bossey*, 31 Law J. Ch. 681; In *re Kelly's Estate*, 46 Misc. Rep. 541, 95 N. Y. Supp. 57; *Wallace v. Wallace*, 73 N. J. Eq. 403, 67 Atl. 612; *Orthwein v. Thomas*, 127 Ill. 554, 21 N. E. 430, 4 L. R. A. 434, 11 Am. St. Rep. 159; *Hemmenway v. Towner*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 209; *Phillips v. Allen*, 2 Allen (Mass.) 453; *Strode v. Magowan's Heirs*, 2 Bush (Ky.) 627; *Wright v. Hicks*, 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687; *Watts v. Owens*, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N. W. 720; *Egbert v. Greenwalt*, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 Am. Rep. 260; *Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner*, 75 Ill. 315; *Patterson v. Gaines*, 6 How. 550, 12 L. Ed. 553; *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778; *Mayer v. Davis*, 122 App. Div. 922, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1041; *Fox v. Burke*, 31 Minn. 319, 17 N. W. 861; *Kleinert v. Ehlers*, 38 Pa. 439; *SCANLON v. WALSHE*, 81 Md. 118, 31 Atl. 498, 48 Am. St. Rep. 488, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 157; In *re Pickens' Estate*, 163 Pa. 14, 29 Atl. 875, 25 L. R. A. 477. In *Strode v. Magowan's Heirs*, supra, it is said: "The law presumes that every child in a Christian country is prima facie the offspring of a lawful, rather than a meretricious union of the parents, and that, consequently, the mother, either by actual marriage, or by cohabitation and recognition, was the lawful wife of the father; and, in the absence of any negative evidence, no supplemental proof of legal marriage will be necessary to legitimate the offspring. Mere rumor is insufficient to bastardize issue, or require positive proof of actual marriage. If the presumption be false, repellant facts may be generally established; and, if no such facts can be clearly proved, the presumption from mere filiation should stand."

<sup>11</sup> *Bunel v. O'Day* (C. C.) 125 Fed. 303; In *re Biersack*, 96 Misc. Rep. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519; *Craig v. Shea*, 102 Neb. 575, 168 N. W. 135; *West v. Redmond*, 171 N. C. 742, 88 S. E. 341; *People v. Woodson*, 29 Cal. App. 531, 156 Pac. 378; *Harkrader v. Reed*, 5 Alaska, 668; *Flint v. Pierce* (Sup.) 136 N. Y. Supp. 1056; *State v. Shaw*, 89 Vt. 121, 94 Atl. 434, L. R. A. 1915F,

for instance, if it is shown that the husband was physically incapable of sexual intercourse, so that he could not have begotten the child;<sup>12</sup> or that he was beyond the seas, or, though not beyond the seas, that he was away from his wife, so that he could not have had intercourse with her during the time when, in the course of nature, the child must have been begotten.<sup>13</sup>

If access by the husband is shown, there is a very strong presumption of intercourse; and if there was intercourse at such a time that the child could, in the course of nature, have been begotten by him, the presumption is almost conclusive that he is the father.<sup>14</sup> "The modern rule, which is marked out by its good sense, is that, to bastardize the issue of a married woman, it must be shown beyond all reasonable doubt that there was no such access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. The rules of law, as laid down by the judges on the questions propounded to them by the house of lords, in the *Banbury Peerage Case*,<sup>15</sup> are substantially these: Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by satisfactory evidence to the contrary; and, where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken to be the

1067; *Kennedy v. State*, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S. W. 842, L. R. A. 1916B, 1052, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1029; *Wallace v. Wallace*, 73 N. J. Eq. 403, 67 Atl. 612; *Ewell v. Ewell*, 163 N. C. 233, 79 S. E. 509, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 373; *Powell v. State*, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N. E. 660, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255. But see *People v. Case*, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N. W. 55.

<sup>12</sup> *Banbury Peerage Case*, 1 Sim. & S. 153; *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 193, 207; *Hargrave v. Hargrave*, 9 Beav. 552; *Ewell v. Ewell*, 163 N. C. 233, 79 S. E. 509, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 373; *West v. Redmond*, 171 N. C. 742, 88 S. E. 341; *People v. Woodson*, 29 Cal. App. 531, 156 Pac. 378.

<sup>13</sup> *Banbury Peerage Case*, 1 Sim. & S. 153; *Head v. Head*, Id. 150; *Harkrader v. Reed*, 5 Alaska, 668; *Bosville v. Attorney General*, 12 Prob. Div. 177. In the last case it was in evidence that the usual period of gestation is 270 to 275 days, and that the child was born 276 or 277 days after the last opportunity for intercourse between the husband and wife. There was also evidence that it might have been the child of another. The jury found against legitimacy, and the court refused to set the verdict aside. This decision illustrates and sustains the proposition stated in the text, but clearly it goes too far, and allows too slight evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy; for it is a well-known fact that the period of gestation may extend far beyond 277 days. Perhaps the evidence that another man had intercourse with the wife may have had controlling weight.

<sup>14</sup> *Banbury Peerage Case*, 1 Sim. & S. 153; *Head v. Head*, Id. 150; *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 193; *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 174 Ky. 771, 193 S. W. 7; *In re Walker's Estate*, 176 Cal. 402, 168 Pac. 689.

<sup>15</sup> 1 Sim. & S. 153.

father of the child, unless there was a physical or natural impossibility that such intercourse should have produced such child."<sup>16</sup>

Mere proof of the wife's adultery is not sufficient to rebut the presumption, in the absence of any other evidence going to show that her husband could not have begotten the child. "Although actual adultery with other persons is established at or about the commencement of the usual period of gestation, yet if access by the husband has taken place, so that, by the laws of nature, he may be the father of the child, it must be presumed to be his, and not the child of the adulterer."<sup>17</sup>

By the early common law of England, the rule was that the husband must be conclusively presumed to be the father of his wife's children born during wedlock, if he was within the four seas at any time during the period of his wife's gestation, and was not physically incapable of procreation. To such an absurd length was the doctrine carried that it was decided that a child born in England was legitimate, although it clearly appeared that the husband resided in Ireland during the whole time of his wife's pregnancy, and for a long time previously, because Ireland was within the king's dominion.<sup>18</sup> This absurd doctrine was exploded by Lord Raymond in *Pendrell v. Pendrell*,<sup>19</sup> in 1732, where he held that the legal presumption of access by the husband might be controverted.<sup>20</sup> And the rule now is well settled, both in England and in this country, that the presumption is in all cases a presumption of fact, and not a presumption of law, and may always be rebutted; and, further than this, that it may be rebutted even where access by the husband is shown.<sup>21</sup> And the presumption may be rebutted, not only by showing physical incapacity, as stated above, but by any other legitimate evidence, including the conduct of the parties,

<sup>16</sup> *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778.

<sup>17</sup> *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778; *Town of Canaan v. Avery*, 72 N. H. 591, 58 Atl. 509; *Wright v. Hicks*, 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687; *Bury v. Phillpot*, 2 Mylne & K. 349; *Hemmenway v. Towner*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 209; *Footte v. State*, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 144 S. W. 275, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1184. And see *State v. Shaw*, 89 Vt. 121, 94 Atl. 434, L. R. A. 1915F, 1087.

<sup>18</sup> *Wright v. Hicks*, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451, where the ancient rule is shown by Lumpkin, J. And see Co. Litt. 244a; *Reg. v. Murray*, 1 Salk. 122.

<sup>19</sup> 2 Strange, 925.

<sup>20</sup> *Wright v. Hicks*, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451.

<sup>21</sup> *Pendrell v. Pendrell*, 2 Strange, 925; *Wright v. Hicks*, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451; *Id.*, 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687; *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778, and cases hereafter cited.

which clearly shows that there was no intercourse.<sup>22</sup> In *Cope v. Cope*,<sup>23</sup> where the husband and wife were living separate, and the wife in open adultery, the court said that, "although the husband and wife have an opportunity for access, it would be monstrous to suppose that under such circumstances he would avail himself of such opportunity. The legitimacy of a child, therefore, born under such circumstances, could not be established."<sup>24</sup> In *Wright v. Hicks*,<sup>25</sup> it is said by Lumpkin, J.: "The law now is universally understood to be clearly settled that, although the birth of a child during wedlock raises a presumption that such child is legitimate, yet this presumption may be rebutted both by direct and presumptive evidence. And, in arriving at a conclusion upon this subject, the jury may not only take into their consideration proofs tending to show the physical impossibility of the child born in wedlock being legitimate, but they may decide the question of paternity by attending to the relative situation of the parties, their habits of life, the evidence of conduct and of declarations connected with conduct, and to any induction which reason suggests, for determining upon the probabilities of the case. Where the husband and wife have had the opportunity of sexual intercourse, a very strong presumption arises that it must have taken place, and that the child in question is the fruit; but it is only a very strong presumption, and no more. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence, and it is the duty of the jury to weigh the evidence against the presumption, and to decide as, in the exercise of their judgment, either may appear to preponderate."

Even where there was intercourse by the husband, actually shown or presumed from access in the absence of evidence to the contrary the presumption of legitimacy may still be rebutted by circumstances showing that it was a natural impossibility that the husband could be the father of such a child; as, for instance, where the wife and husband are white persons, and an adulterous intercourse is shown to have existed between the wife and a negro at

<sup>22</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 211; *Hargrave v. Hargrave*, 9 Beav. 552; *Plowes v. Bossey*, 31 Law J. Ch. 681; *Head v. Head*, 1 Sim. & S. 150; *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 193, 207; *Morris v. Davis*, 5 Clark & F. 163; *Aylesford Peerage Case*, 11 App. Cas. 1; *Wright v. Hicks*, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451; *Id.*, 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687; *Van Aernam v. Van Aernam*, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 375; *Cannon v. Cannon*, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 410; *Cope v. Cope*, 1 Moody & R. 269.

<sup>23</sup> 1 Moody & R. 269.

<sup>24</sup> See *McLoud v. State*, 122 Ga. 393, 50 S. E. 145.

<sup>25</sup> 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451; 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687.

or about the time when the child must have been begotten, and the color and other physiological developments of the child demonstrate its African paternity.<sup>26</sup>

Though the presumption of legitimacy may be overthrown by proof of nonaccess, such proof must be clear and convincing.<sup>27</sup> The policy of the law does not allow either the husband or the wife to testify as to the fact of access or nonaccess, whether the testimony relates to access before or after marriage. "Nonaccess cannot be proved by either the husband or the wife, whether the action be civil or criminal, or whether the proceeding is one of settlement or bastardy, or to recover property claimed as heir at law."<sup>28</sup> In *Goodright v. Moss*,<sup>29</sup> where the question of legitimacy arose in an action of ejectment, Lord Mansfield said: "As to the time of the birth, the father and mother are the most proper witnesses to prove it. But it is a rule founded in decency, morality, and policy that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious."

#### *Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage or Acknowledgment*

It will be noticed from what has been said that, according to the civil law, children born before the marriage of their parents are rendered legitimate by the marriage. The rule of the common law to the contrary is still in force in England, and in some of our states;<sup>30</sup> but in many states statutes have been enacted providing,

<sup>26</sup> See *Whisterlo's Case*, cited in *Cross v. Cross*, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 778; *Wright v. Hicks*, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451; *Bullock v. Knox*, 96 Ala. 195, 11 South. 339.

<sup>27</sup> *Mayer v. Davis*, 122 App. Div. 393, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1041.

<sup>28</sup> *Dennison v. Page*, 29 Pa. 420, 72 Am. Dec. 644. And see *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 198; *Rex v. Rook*, 1 Wils. 340; *Goodright v. Moss*, 2 Cowp. 591; *Parker v. Way*, 15 N. H. 45; *People v. Overseers of Poor of Town of Ontario*, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 286; *Mink v. State*, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N. W. 445, 50 Am. Rep. 386; *People v. Case*, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N. W. 55; *Croom v. Whitehead*, 174 N. C. 305, 93 S. E. 854; *Watts v. Owens*, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N. W. 720; *Egbert v. Greenwalt*, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 Am. Rep. 260. And the rule also applies, so as to exclude declarations of husband or wife, unless they are admissible because connected with, and explanatory of, conduct. *Bowles v. Bingham*, 2 Munf. (Va.) 442, 5 Am. Dec. 497.

<sup>29</sup> 2 Cowp. 591.

<sup>30</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 526. It is held in England that a child born before marriage, though made legitimate according to the laws of the country of his birth, per subsequens matrimonium, cannot inherit land in England. *Birtwhistle v. Vardill*, 7 Clark & F. 895. This decision was based on the Statute of Merton (20 Hen. III, c. 9). And see *Smith v. Deer's Admrs*,

in accordance with the civil law, that the marriage of parents shall render legitimate, for all purposes, a child born before the marriage,<sup>31</sup> and in other states that such result will follow the marriage if the child is also acknowledged and taken into the family.<sup>32</sup> And such statutes are valid.<sup>33</sup> But it is held in some states that the marriage will not legitimate the offspring of an adulterous intercourse before the marriage.<sup>34</sup> In a number of states, also, by stat-

34 Pa. 126, 75 Am. Dec. 641, which arose under a statute of Pennsylvania similar to the Statute of Merton. The general rule in this country, however, is different. *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669.

<sup>31</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6631; *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, 122 Am. St. Rep. 585; *Summs v. Snare & Triest Co.*, 166 App. Div. 425, 152 N. Y. Supp. 29; *Harrison v. Harker*, 44 Utah, 541, 142 Pac. 716; *In re Adams' Estate*, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 591; *Clauer's Appeal*, 11 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 427; *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669. But a void marriage will not legitimate a child born prior thereto, though the children of such marriage are legitimate. *Adams v. Adams*, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275. And see *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, 123 Am. St. Rep. 585, affirmed in 218 U. S. 386, 30 Sup. Ct. 292, 54 L. Ed. 530, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1292. But it has been held in New York that under Domestic Relations Law, §§ 7, 24, and in view of section 6, and Code Civ. Proc. § 1745, an illegitimate child was legitimized by subsequent marriage of its parents, and its status was not affected because marriage was annulled on ground that father consented under duress. *Houle v. Houle*, 100 Misc. Rep. 28, 166 N. Y. Supp. 67. And it has been held in Pennsylvania that a subsequent marriage, to legitimate a child born before marriage, must be followed by cohabitation. *In re Sollinger's Estate*, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 3. These statutes are not confined in their operation to minor children. *Wolf v. Gall*, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346, 350. The civil-law rule is followed in the Philippine Islands. *Costo v. Antonio*, 10 Phil. Rep. 73.

<sup>32</sup> *Inhabitants of Monson v. Inhabitants of Palmer*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 551; *Town of Rockingham v. Town of Mount Holly*, 26 Vt. 653; *McBride v. Sullivan*, 155 Ala. 166, 45 South. 902; *Breidenstein v. Bertram*, 198 Mo. 328, 95 S. W. 828; *Stein's Adm'r v. Stein*, 106 S. W. 860, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 664; *Harrison v. Odum*, 148 Ga. 469, 96 S. E. 1038; *Kotzke v. Kotzke's Estate*, 205 Mich. 184, 171 N. W. 442; *Cain v. Gray*, 146 Ky. 402, 142 S. W. 715; *Haddon v. Crawford*, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811; *Landry v. American Creosote Works*, 119 La. 231, 43 South. 1016, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387; *Trayer v. Setzer*, 72 Neb. 845, 101 N. W. 989. See, also, *Rentle v. Rentle* (Okla.) 172 Pac. 1083. The recognition may be by conduct as well as by declarations. *Houghton v. Dickinson*, 196 Mass. 389, 82 N. E. 481.

<sup>33</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6631. See *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669; *Houghton v. Dickinson*, 196 Mass. 389, 82 N. E. 481.

<sup>34</sup> *Adams v. Adams*, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275; *Hall v. Hall*, 82 S. W. 300, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 610; *Sams v. Sams' Adm'r*, 85 Ky. 396, 3 S. W. 593. But see, contra, *Miller v. Pennington*, 218 Ill. 220, 75 N. E. 919, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 773; *Robinson v. Ruprecht*, 191 Ill. 424, 61 N. E. 631; *Bates v. Meade*, 174 Ky. 545, 192 S. W. 666; *Drake v. Milton Hospital Ass'n*, 266 Mo. 1, 178 S. W. 462; *Kotzke v. Kotzke's Estate*, 205 Mich. 184, 171

ute, the father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such into his family, and otherwise treating it as if legitimate, thereby renders it legitimate for all purposes.<sup>35</sup> And in Michigan, by statute, if the father, by writing executed, acknowledged and recorded like deeds of real estate, but with the judge of probate, acknowledged such child, it is legitimate for all purposes.<sup>36</sup> There are various other methods in different states by which illegitimate children may be rendered legitimate.<sup>37</sup> In a few states the putative father of a bastard has a process in court by which he may legitimate the child.<sup>38</sup> In some of the states illegitimate children who have been rendered legitimate under statutory provisions are called "legitimated" children. Statutes allowing illegitimate children to inherit, or otherwise clothing them with the status and rights of a legitimate child, are perfectly valid, for the Legislature has the right to change the common law in this respect.<sup>39</sup> Such statutes, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed; but the courts cannot refuse to give full effect to the clear intention of the Legislature, as evidenced by the language of the statute.<sup>40</sup>

The courts are not in agreement as to what constitutes a sufficient acknowledgment of the child to legitimate it. In a few instances it has been held that the acknowledgment must be by an instrument executed for the express purpose,<sup>41</sup> but the better rule seems to be that the writing need not be made for the express

N. W. 442; *Ives v. McNicoll*, 59 Ohio St. 402, 53 N. E. 60, 43 L. R. A. 772, 69 Am. St. Rep. 780.

<sup>35</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 6632. See *Blythe v. Ayres*, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40; *Id.*, 102 Cal. 254, 36 Pac. 522; *In re Gird's Estate*, 157 Cal. 534, 108 Pac. 499, 137 Am. St. Rep. 131; *Harrison v. Harker*, 44 Utah, 541, 142 Pac. 716.

<sup>36</sup> *How. Ann. St.* § 5775a.

<sup>37</sup> As by notarial act in Louisiana. *Davenport v. Davenport*, 116 La. 1009, 41 South. 240, 114 Am. St. Rep. 575; *Succession of Davis*, 126 La. 178, 52 South. 286. In some instances legitimation has been effected by special act of the Legislature. *Lee v. Shankle*, 51 N. C. 313. See, also, *Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District*, 41 Utah, 279, 125 Pac. 671, construing the Utah statute relating to the legitimation of children of Mormon polygamous marriages.

<sup>38</sup> Such statutes exist in Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee.

<sup>39</sup> *Cope v. Cope*, 137 U. S. 682, 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832; *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669.

<sup>40</sup> *Cope v. Cope*, 137 U. S. 682, 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832.

<sup>41</sup> *Hunt v. Hunt*, 37 Me. 333; *Childress v. Cutter*, 16 Mo. 24.

purpose of acknowledging the child, but that the acknowledgment is sufficient if made in any written instrument, collateral or otherwise.<sup>42</sup> It is, of course, necessary that paternity should be directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged.<sup>43</sup>

The writing must be complete in itself, so far as the acknowledgment is concerned, and must not require aid from extraneous evidence as to this fact.<sup>44</sup> If it appears with reasonable clearness and certainty from the written words that the paternity of the child is acknowledged, the instrument is sufficient, though it is informal,<sup>45</sup> and though the writing does not recite that the child is illegitimate.<sup>46</sup>

### *Conflict of Laws*

By the great weight of authority, the legitimacy of a child, not only for the purpose of determining whether he can inherit, but for all other purposes, is to be determined by the law of the place where he was born and the parents were domiciled.<sup>47</sup> A child, therefore, that is legitimate in the place of its birth is legitimate everywhere.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, a child that is illegitimate in the place of its birth is illegitimate everywhere, and is incapable of inheriting in another state, though, if he had been born in the latter state, he would have been capable of inheriting.<sup>49</sup>

Whether an illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent

<sup>42</sup> *Pederson v. Christofferson*, 97 Minn. 491, 106 N. W. 958 (when the instrument was a lease); *Succession of Serres*, 136 La. 531, 67 South. 356 (will); *In re Rohrer*, 22 Wash. 151, 60 Pac. 122, 50 L. R. A. 350 (where the father had certified before a notary that the plaintiff in an action for seduction was his daughter).

<sup>43</sup> *Moore v. Flack*, 77 Neb. 52, 108 N. W. 143; *Holloway v. McCormick*, 41 Okl. 1, 136 Pac. 1111, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536.

<sup>44</sup> *Holloway v. McCormick*, 41 Okl. 1, 136 Pac. 1111, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536.

<sup>45</sup> *In re Loyd's Estate*, 170 Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522; *Holloway v. McCormick*, 41 Okl. 1, 136 Pac. 1111, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536; *Richmond v. Taylor*, 151 Wis. 633, 139 N. W. 435.

<sup>46</sup> *In re Gregory*, 13 Misc. Rep. 363, 35 N. Y. Supp. 105; *In re Loyd*, 170 Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522; *Blythe v. Ayres*, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40. The person making the acknowledgment must be the real father of the child. *In re Reid's Estate*, 130 Minn. 256, 153 N. W. 324.

<sup>47</sup> *Story*, Conf. Law, § 87 et seq.; *Smith v. Kelly's Heirs*, 23 Miss. 167, 55 Am. Dec. 87; *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669; *Shedden v. Patrick*, 5 Paton, 194; *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; *Green v. Kelley*, 228 Mass. 602, 118 N. E. 235; *Holmes v. Adams*, 110 Me. 167, 85 Atl. 492.

<sup>48</sup> *Green v. Kelley*, 228 Mass. 602, 118 N. E. 235.

<sup>49</sup> *Smith v. Kelly's Heirs*, 23 Miss. 167, 55 Am. Dec. 87.

marriage of its parents, or by acknowledgment or otherwise, is determined by the law of the domicile of the father at the time of the attempted legitimation.<sup>50</sup> If an illegitimate child has, by the subsequent marriage of his parents, or otherwise, been rendered legitimate, he will be recognized as legitimate for all purposes in another state, in which there is no such statute.<sup>51</sup> Some of the cases are in conflict with this doctrine. Thus, it has been held in some jurisdictions that a person cannot inherit land in one state or country if he is illegitimate by the laws of that state or country, though he may be legitimate by the laws of the state or country in which he was born, and in which he and his parents are domiciled.<sup>52</sup> These cases seem to turn, however, on the Statute of Merton or statutes similar thereto in effect.

### STATUS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

114. The natural relation between a parent and his illegitimate children does not, at common law, give rise to those rights and duties which pertain to the legal status of parent and child. But to some extent the law recognizes bastards as children. Thus:

- (a) The mother is entitled to the custody and services of her illegitimate child, as against the father or strangers; but the welfare of the child may require the court to award its custody to another.
- (b) The child's domicile is determined by that of its mother.
- (c) The putative father is under no legal obligation to support his illegitimate child, but now, by statute, he may very generally be compelled to do so.
- (d) At common law, a bastard cannot inherit, and can have no heir except of his own body; but this rule has been to a great extent modified by statute.

<sup>50</sup> *Blythe v. Ayres*, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40; *Irving v. Ford*, 183 Mass. 448, 67 N. E. 366, 65 L. R. A. 177, 97 Am. St. Rep. 447; *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669; *In re Grove*, 40 Ch. Div. 216; *Adams v. Adams*, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275.

<sup>51</sup> *Miller v. Miller*, 91 N. Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669; *Finley v. Brown*, 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1285; *Scott v. Key*, 11 La. Ann. 232.

<sup>52</sup> *Burtwhistle v. Vardill*, 6 Bing. N. C. 385 (as to this case see *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321); *Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs*, 34 Pa. 126, 75 Am. Dec. 641; *Lingen v. Lingen*, 45 Ala. 410. See, also, *Hall v. Gabbert*, 213 Ill. 208, 72 N. E. 806.

The relation between a parent and his illegitimate offspring does not give rise to the rights and obligations arising from the relation of a parent and his legitimate child. At least, it is so at common law.<sup>53</sup> In the absence of statutory provision, the common law scarcely recognizes the father of a bastard, if, indeed, it recognizes him at all. The courts, however, for some purposes, do recognize the blood relationship between a bastard and its mother.<sup>54</sup> They recognize the mother's right to the custody and control of it, and will generally award her the custody as against strangers, and even as against the father.<sup>55</sup> The mother can also transfer her rights in this respect to another.<sup>56</sup> The rights of the mother, however, or of one to whom she has transferred the custody of the child, are not absolute and beyond control. As in the case of a legitimate child, so in the case of a bastard, the welfare of the child will be the controlling consideration, where a question arises as to its custody.<sup>57</sup> The rules applicable in the case of legitimate children<sup>58</sup> are equally applicable here. On the death of the mother of a bastard, it becomes an orphan in law, even though its father is living, and claims its custody.<sup>59</sup>

The domicile of a bastard is determined by that of its mother.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>53</sup> *Simmons v. Bull*, 21 Ala. 501, 56 Am. Dec. 257.

<sup>54</sup> *Eaton v. Eaton*, 88 Conn. 269, 91 Atl. 191; *Moore v. Saxton*, 90 Conn. 164, 96 Atl. 960, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 534; *Purinton v. Jamrock*, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926.

<sup>55</sup> *Reg. v. Nash*, 10 Q. B. Div. 454; *Rex v. New*, 20 Times Law R. 583; *Reg. v. Barnardo*, 24 Q. B. Div. 283; *Ex parte Knee*, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 148; *Marshall v. Reams*, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118; *Aycock v. Hampton*, 84 Miss. 204, 36 South. 245, 65 L. R. A. 689, 105 Am. St. Rep. 424; *Lipsey v. Battle*, 80 Ark. 287, 97 S. W. 49; *In re Moore*, 72 Misc. Rep. 644, 132 N. Y. Supp. 249; *Ex parte Bryon*, 83 Vt. 108, 74 Atl. 488; *Purinton v. Jamrock*, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926; *Friesner v. Symonds*, 46 N. J. Eq. 521, 20 Atl. 257; *Robalina v. Armstrong*, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 247; *Wright v. Wright*, 2 Mass. 109; *Carpenter v. Whitman*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 208; *Com. v. Fee*, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 255; *Town of Hudson v. Hills*, 8 N. H. 417; *Lawson v. Scott*, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 92; *Adams v. McKay*, 36 Ga. 440; *Pratt v. Nitz*, 48 Iowa, 33. But see *Hesselman v. Haas*, 71 N. J. Eq. 689, 64 Atl. 165, holding that as against any person except the putative father, the mother of a natural child has the natural right to its custody.

<sup>56</sup> *Marshall v. Reams*, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118.

<sup>57</sup> *Reg. v. Nash*, 10 Q. B. Div. 454; *Marshall v. Reams*, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118; *In re Lloyd*, 3 Man. & G. 547.

<sup>58</sup> *Post*, p. 343.

<sup>59</sup> *Friesner v. Symonds*, 46 N. J. Eq. 521, 20 Atl. 257.

<sup>60</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 214; *Dicey*, Dom. 5; *Blythe v. Ayres*, 96 Cal. 532, 31

In the absence of proof of her domicile, the child will be presumed to be settled in the place of its birth.<sup>61</sup>

At common law the father is under no legal obligation to maintain his illegitimate children, for as has been seen, in the eye of the common law, an illegitimate child has no father, but is regarded as nullius filius.<sup>62</sup> But the father is liable on an express promise to pay for support and maintenance to be furnished to his illegitimate children, and on an implied contract to pay therefor where he has adopted the child as his own, and acquiesced in any particular disposition of it.<sup>63</sup> It has been held that the mother, even in the absence of a statute, is bound to maintain her illegitimate child,<sup>64</sup> and she is in consequence thereof entitled to the child's services.<sup>65</sup>

In England, and in most of our states, statutes have been enact-

Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40; *Inhabitants of Monson v. Inhabitants of Palmer*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 551.

<sup>61</sup> *Guardians of Headington Union v. Guardians of Ipswich Union*, 25 Q. B. Div. 143.

<sup>62</sup> *Moncrief v. Ely*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 405; *Todd v. Weber*, 95 N. Y. 181, 47 Am. Rep. 20; *Bissell v. Myton*, 160 App. Div. 268, 145 N. Y. Supp. 591, affirmed 214 N. Y. 672, 108 N. E. 1089; *Simmons v. Bull*, 21 Ala. 501, 50 Am. Dec. 257; *Glidden v. Nelson*, 15 Ill. App. 297; *Nine v. Starr*, 8 Or. 49; *Wiggins v. Keizer*, 6 Ind. 252; *Duncan v. Pope*, 47 Ga. 445. But see *Best v. House* (Ky.) 113 S. W. 849; *Sanders v. Sanders*, 167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490; *State v. Rucker*, 86 S. C. 66, 68 S. E. 133, holding that there is a natural and moral duty on the father to support his illegitimate child.

<sup>63</sup> *Todd v. Weber*, 95 N. Y. 181, 47 Am. Rep. 20, and cases cited therein; *Knowlman v. Bluett*, L. R. 9 Exch. 307; *Hicks v. Gregory*, 19 Law J. C. P. 81; *Wiggins v. Keizer*, 6 Ind. 252; *Franklin v. Ford*, 13 Ga. App. 469, 79 S. E. 366; *Burton v. Belvin*, 142 N. C. 151, 55 S. E. 71; *Moncrief v. Ely*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 405; *Birdsall v. Edgerton*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 619; *Heaketh v. Gowing*, 5 Esp. 181. But not, it seems, where the woman was married to another at the time the child was begotten. *Vetten v. Wallace*, 39 Ill. App. 390. An agreement by a man to pay for the maintenance of children which may result from future illicit cohabitation is void, because of its immoral tendency. *Clark*, Cont. 439; *Crook v. Hill*, 3 Ch. Div. 773. But such an agreement as to children already born, or as to a child in ventre sa mere, is valid; the illicit intercourse in such case being past. *Clark*, Cont. 439; *Crook v. Hill*, 3 Ch. Div. 773. The moral obligation of a father to support his illegitimate children is a sufficient consideration for his bond so to do. *Trayer v. Setzer*, 72 Neb. 845, 101 N. W. 989.

<sup>64</sup> *Wright v. Wright*, 2 Mass. 109; *Friesner v. Symonds*, 46 N. J. Eq. 521, 20 Atl. 257, 259; *Nine v. Starr*, 8 Or. 49; *Carpenter v. Whitman*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 208; *People v. Landt*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 375; *Com. v. Fee*, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 255; *Town of Hudson v. Hills*, 8 N. H. 417. And see *People v. Chamberlain* (Sup.) 106 N. Y. Supp. 149 (under statute).

<sup>65</sup> *Illinois Central R. Co. v. Sanders*, 104 Miss. 257, 61 South. 309, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137.

ed making the father chargeable with the maintenance of his illegitimate children, for the purpose of relieving the parish or county of the expense. And in most states, by statute, the mother has a compulsory remedy, generally known as "bastardy proceedings," to compel the father to support the child.\*\*

*Inheritance by and from Bastards*

At common law the rights of an illegitimate child were much restricted. Blackstone says: "The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody, and sometimes called 'filius nullius,' sometimes 'filius populi.'"\*\* At common law he cannot inherit property from any one, for, while his blood relationship to his mother is recognized for certain purposes, he has no legal status as child and heir.\*\* Nor can he have heirs except of his own body.\*\* "A bastard," says Kent, "being, in the eye of the law, nullius filius, or, as the civil law, from the difficulty of ascertaining the father, equally concluded, patrem habere non intelliguntur, he has no inheritable blood, and is incapable of inheriting as heir, either to his putative father, or his mother, or to any one else; nor can he have heirs but of his own body. The rule of the common law, so far at least as it excludes him from inheriting as heir to his mother, is

\*\* St. 18 Eliz. c. 3; 4 & 5 Wm. IV, c. 76, § 72; *Mann v. People*, 35 Ill. 467; *Maloney v. People*, 38 Ill. 62; *State v. Evans*, 19 Ind. 92; *Scantland v. Com.*, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 585; *Bailey v. Chesley*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 284; *Wilbur v. Crane*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 284; *People v. Harty*, 49 Mich. 490, 13 N. W. 829; *State v. Nichols*, 29 Minn. 357, 13 N. W. 153; *State v. Mushied*, 12 Wis. 561; *Van Tassel v. State*, 59 Wis. 351, 18 N. W. 328. There is a valuable note on this subject covering, also, the procedure, evidence, etc., under the statutes, in 56 Am. Dec. 210-223.

\*\* 1 Bl. Comm. 459.

\*\* 1 Bl. Comm. 459; 2 Kent, Comm. 213; *Houghton v. Dickinson*, 196 Mass. 389, 82 N. E. 481; *State v. McDonald*, 59 Or. 520, 117 Pac. 281; *Hayworth v. Williams*, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S. W. 43, 132 Am. St. Rep. 879; *Jackson v. Hocke*, 171 Ind. 371, 84 N. E. 830; *Berry v. Powell*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 105 S. W. 345; *Hicks v. Smith*, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S. E. 153. The civil law was different as regards inheritance from the mother. *Pettus v. Dawson*, 82 Tex. 18, 17 S. W. 714.

\*\* 1 Bl. Comm. 459; 2 Kent, Comm. 213; *Cooley v. Dewey*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 93, 16 Am. Dec. 326; *Stover v. Boswell's Heir*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 233; *Barwick v. Miller*, 4 Desaus. (S. C.) 434; *Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain*, 30 Mo. 268; *State v. McDonald*, 59 Or. 520, 117 Pac. 281; *CROAN v. PHELPS' ADM'R*, 94 Ky. 213, 21 S. W. 874, 23 L. R. A. 753, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 164.

supposed to be founded partly in policy, to discourage illicit commerce between the sexes."<sup>70</sup>

The harsh rules of the common law, in so far as they rendered a bastard incapable of inheriting as heir, and of having heirs except of his own body, have been greatly modified by statute in this country.<sup>71</sup> In most states it is now provided by statute that bastards shall inherit from or through their mother share and share alike with her legitimate children.<sup>72</sup> "This relaxation in the laws of so many of the states, of the severity of the common law, rests upon the principle that the relation of parent and child, which exists in this unhappy case in all its native and binding force, ought to produce the ordinary legal consequences of that consanguinity."<sup>73</sup> So, also, in most states, by statute, bastards may not only have heirs of their own body, as at common law, but they may transmit to their mother and her kin, as if legitimate.<sup>74</sup> In some states, bas-

<sup>70</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 213.

<sup>71</sup> The right of inheritance of illegitimate children is purely statutory, and unless given by statute no such right exists. *Mansfield v. Neff*, 43 Utah, 258, 134 Pac. 1160. Illegitimate children are not favored in the law, and have only such property rights as are expressly granted by statute. *Bell v. Terry & Tench Co.*, 177 App. Div. 123, 163 N. Y. Supp. 733. The Legislature can remove the disabilities of illegitimate children as the right of inheritance is a creature of the law and can be changed by the Legislature at any time and to any extent. *Wolf v. Gull*, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346, 350.

<sup>72</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 3151. See *Alexander's Adm'r v. Alexander*, 31 Ala. 241; *Neil's Appeal*, 92 Pa. 193; *Stover v. Boswell's Heir*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 233; *Jackson v. Collins*, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 214; *McGuire v. Brown*, 41 Iowa, 650; *Lee v. Frater* (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 325; *Hahn v. Hammerstein*, 272 Mo. 248, 198 S. W. 833; *Moore v. Saxton*, 90 Conn. 164, 96 Atl. 960, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 534; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 88 Conn. 269, 91 Atl. 191; *Smith v. Garber*, 286 Ill. 67, 121 N. E. 173.

<sup>73</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 213.

<sup>74</sup> *Stim. Am. St. Law*, § 3154. See *Garland v. Harrison*, 8 Leigh (Va.) 368; *Neil's Appeal*, 92 Pa. 193; *Reese v. Starner*, 106 Md. 50, 66 Atl. 443; *Osborne v. McDonald* (C. C.) 159 Fed. 791, affirmed 167 Fed. 894, 93 C. C. A. 294; *Berry v. Powell*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 105 S. W. 345; *Dickinson's Appeal*, 42 Conn. 491, 19 Am. Rep. 553; *Ellis v. Hatfield*, 20 Ind. 101; *Nolasco v. Lurty*, 13 La. Ann. 100; *Remington v. Lewis*, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 606; *Blankenship v. Ross*, 95 Ky. 306, 25 S. W. 268. See, also, *Lewis v. Eutsler*, 4 Ohio St. 354. A statute providing that "bastards shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting an inheritance on the part of or to the mother" does not provide for the transmission of a bastard's estate through the mother and on to her collateral kindred. *CROAN v. PHELPS' ADM'R*, 94 Ky. 213, 21 S. W. 874, 23 L. R. A. 753, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 164; *McSurley v. Venters* (Ky.) 104 S. W. 365. See, also, *Blair v.*

tards may not only inherit from their mother, but they may represent her so as to inherit from her kin,<sup>75</sup> and in several states the illegitimate children of the same mother may inherit from each other through their mother.<sup>76</sup> In other states illegitimate children can inherit only from the mother.<sup>77</sup>

Of course, at common law an illegitimate child could not inherit from its father.<sup>78</sup> But such right is given by statute in many states, if there was proper acknowledgment of the child by the father.<sup>79</sup> In some states, on the failure of legitimate heirs, an illegitimate child may inherit from its father.<sup>80</sup>

Adams (C. C.) 59 Fed. 243; *University of North Carolina v. Markham*, 174 N. C. 338, 93 S. E. 845.

<sup>75</sup> See *Doe v. Bates*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 533; *Waggoner v. Miller*, 26 N. C. 480; *Berry v. Powell*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 105 S. W. 345; *Keech v. Enriquez*, 28 Fla. 597, 10 South. 91; *Barron v. Zimmerman*, 117 Md. 296, 83 Atl. 258, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 574; *Chambers v. Chambers*, 249 Ill. 126, 94 N. E. 108. See, also, *Tigert v. Wells*, 134 Tenn. 144, 183 S. W. 737. But it was held in *Thigpen v. Thigpen*, 136 Ga. 541, 71 S. E. 790, that an illegitimate is not, on the death of his mother, capable of inheriting from his maternal grandfather.

<sup>76</sup> *Curlew v. Jones*, 146 Ga. 367, 91 S. E. 115; *In re Lutz's Estate*, 43 Misc. Rep. 230, 88 N. Y. Supp. 556; *Berry v. Tullis* (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 348; *Yates v. Craddock* (Tex. Civ. App.) 184 S. W. 276; *McCline v. Ridley*, 134 Tenn. 164, 183 S. W. 736.

<sup>77</sup> *Jackson v. Jackson*, 78 Ky. 390, 39 Am. Rep. 246; *McSurley v. Venters*, 104 S. W. 365, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 963; *Overton v. Overton*, 123 Ky. 311, 96 S. W. 469; *Reynolds v. Hitchcock*, 72 N. H. 340, 56 Atl. 745; *Brown v. Kerby*, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 460. A statute making bastards capable of inheriting "on the part of their mother" does not enable a bastard to inherit from collateral kindred of his mother. *Williams v. Kimball*, 35 Fla. 49, 16 South. 783, 26 L. R. A. 746, 48 Am. St. Rep. 238; *Holmes v. Adams*, 110 Me. 167, 85 Atl. 492. But see *Berry v. Powell*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 105 S. W. 345.

<sup>78</sup> *Houghton v. Dickinson*, 196 Mass. 389, 82 N. E. 481; *Pair v. Pair*, 147 Ga. 754, 95 S. E. 295.

<sup>79</sup> See the statutes of the various states. See, also, *McKellar v. Harkins*, 183 Iowa, 1080, 166 N. W. 1061; *Wolf v. Gall*, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 350; *Rentle v. Rentle* (Okla.) 172 Pac. 1083; *Pederson v. Christofferson*, 97 Minn. 491, 106 N. W. 958; *Moore v. Flack*, 77 Neb. 52, 108 N. W. 143. Such statutes are remedial, and should be liberally construed. *Wilson v. Bass* (Ind. App.) 118 N. E. 379. The right of inheritance may be given by special act of the legislature. See *Davis v. Milford*, 85 S. C. 504, 67 S. E. 744.

<sup>80</sup> *Cox v. Rash*, 82 Ind. 519; *Haddon v. Crawford*, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811. Under *Burns' Ann. St. 1914*, §§ 870, 871, an adopted child is a "legitimate child," whose survivorship of his adopting father bars right of inheritance of illegitimate children of the father under *Burns' Ann. St. 1914*, § 3000. *Cooley v. Powers*, 63 Ind. App. 59, 113 N. E. 382.

### ADOPTION OF CHILDREN

115. By statute, in most jurisdictions, but not at common law, a person may adopt a child; and in such a case, unless there are statutory provisions to the contrary, the rights, duties, and obligations arising from the artificial relation will be substantially the same as those arising from the natural relation of parent and child.

Adoption is the act by which the relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature.<sup>81</sup> The legal adoption by one person of the offspring of another, giving him the status of a child by adoption, was unknown to the common law,<sup>82</sup> and in the sense in which the term is used in the United States is not recognized in England.<sup>83</sup> It was recognized, however, by the Roman law, and exists in many countries on the continent of Europe, which derive their jurisprudence from that law. It was long ago introduced, from the law of France or of Spain, into Louisiana and Texas, and more recently, at various times and by different statutes, into most of the other states.<sup>84</sup>

Since it was unknown to the common law, adoption exists in the United States only by virtue of statute.<sup>85</sup> Though the statutes au-

<sup>81</sup> *In re Sessions' Estate*, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 14 Am. St. Rep. 500. For other definitions, see 1 Words and Phrases, pp. 206, 207.

<sup>82</sup> *Albring v. Ward*, 137 Mich. 352, 100 N. W. 609; *Morrison v. Sessions' Estate*, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 14 Am. St. Rep. 500; *In re Huyck*, 49 Misc. Rep. 391, 99 N. Y. Supp. 502; *In re Jobson's Estate*, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062; *Ex parte Livingston*, 151 App. Div. 1, 135 N. Y. Supp. 328; *Hockaday v. Lynn*, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775.

<sup>83</sup> *Eversley, Law of Domestic Relations* (3d Ed. 1906) pt. 2, c. 2, p. 514. This authority says: "The law of England, strictly speaking, knows nothing of adoption, and does not recognize any rights, claims, or duties arising out of such a relation, except as arising out of an express or implied contract. But, in so far as the court of chancery will, in the interests of the children, enforce the waiver or abandonment of the control of the father (or mother), up to that point it might be said to countenance the claim of the adoptive parent, not on the ground of any right in the latter, but of the material well-being of the infant." Adoption is unknown in Scotland. See *Kerrigan v. Hall*, [1901] 4 Sess. Cas. 10.

<sup>84</sup> *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321. Adoption in Texas, however, gives the adopted person only the status of heir of the adopter, and does not create the relation of parent and child. *Eckford v. Knox*, 67 Tex. 205, 2 S. W. 372.

<sup>85</sup> *Morrison v. Sessions' Estate*, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 14 Am. St. Rep.

thorizing adoption of children are in derogation of the common law, and for this reason are, in some respects to be strictly construed,<sup>86</sup> so that, in order that there may be a legal adoption, there must be a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute,<sup>87</sup> yet the construction should not be narrowed so closely as to defeat the legislative intent.<sup>88</sup>

#### *Proceedings to Adopt*

The statutes relating to adoption vary so widely in the different states, that only the most general statement of the provisions governing adoption can be made. Whether the statute contains express provisions as to the age of the person adopting another or not it is contemplated that the adopter shall be of suitable age to assume the parental relation.<sup>89</sup> In some states, if the adopter is

500; *In re Thorne's Will*, 155 N. Y. 140, 49 N. E. 661; *In re Cozza*, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 214; *Rahn v. Hamilton*, 144 Ga. 644, 87 S. E. 1061; *Hillers v. Taylor*, 108 Md. 148, 69 Atl. 715; *In re Sharon's Estate*, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283. Of the states whose jurisprudence is based on the common law, Massachusetts seems to have been the first state to enact statutes relating to adoption. *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321.

<sup>86</sup> *Furgeson v. Jones*, 17 Or. 204, 20 Pac. 842, 3 A. L. R. 620, 11 Am. St. Rep. 806; *Bresser v. Saarman*, 112 Iowa, 720, 84 N. W. 920; *Appeal of Woodward*, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453; *Purinton v. Jamrock*, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926; *Long v. Dufer*, 58 Or. 162, 113 Pac. 59. The adoption statutes of Texas ingrafted on the law of the state the provisions of the civil law, as well as its construction of the law. *Harle v. Harle* (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 674.

<sup>87</sup> *Appeal of Woodward*, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453; *Long v. Dufur*, 58 Or. 162, 113 Pac. 59; *People v. Wethel*, 202 Ill. App. 77; *In re Sharron's Estate*, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283.

<sup>88</sup> *Ferguson v. Herr*, 64 Neb. 649, 90 N. W. 625, 94 N. W. 542; *In re Brown's Adoption*, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 259. While the Adoption Act is in derogation of the common law in so far as judgments under it deprive parents of their natural rights to the custody of their children, it is, on the other hand, highly remedial and charitable in that it provides a method whereby children who would otherwise be the objects of public charity are suitably provided for by persons who assume a legal duty to do so. *People v. Wethel*, 202 Ill. App. 77. The adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care, and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by persons who can properly rear and educate them. *In re Havsgord's Estate*, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378.

<sup>89</sup> *Krug v. Davis*, 87 Ind. 590. In Massachusetts the statute (Pub. St. 1882, c. 148, § 1) authorizes a person over 21 to adopt one younger than himself. See *Collamore v. Learned*, 171 Mass. 99, 50 N. E. 518. In North Dakota the statute authorizes any adult to adopt a minor, but the adopter must be at least 10 years older than the person adopted. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4441, 4442. It is jurisdictional that the person adopting a child must be 10 years older than the child. *In re Sharron's Estate*, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283.

married, both the husband and wife must join in the adoption.<sup>90</sup> In the absence of statute, either spouse may adopt a child without the other joining therein;<sup>91</sup> but in such case the adoption confers no rights and creates no duties as between the child and the spouse not joining.<sup>92</sup> In some states nonresidents may not adopt children residents of the state,<sup>93</sup> though other states have no such restriction.<sup>94</sup>

If the statute provides for the adoption of minors, necessarily the person adopted must be under 21 years of age.<sup>95</sup> There is some difference of opinion where the statute provides for the adoption of a "child." In some jurisdictions such statutes have been construed as referring to minor children only;<sup>96</sup> but the weight of authority is that under such statutes adults as well as minors may be adopted.<sup>97</sup>

It is generally required that the parents of the child to be adopted, or the survivor of them, must consent to the adoption, unless such parents have abandoned the child or otherwise forfeited the right to its custody.<sup>98</sup> If the parents are dead, or have abandoned

<sup>90</sup> In re Williams, 102 Cal. 70, 36 Pac. 407, 41 Am. St. Rep. 163; Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 86, 56 N. E. 303, 75 Am. St. Rep. 141; Jones v. Bean, 136 Ill. App. 545.

<sup>91</sup> Barnhizer v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335; Baskette v. Streight, 106 Tenn. 549, 62 S. W. 142; In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 123 Am. St. Rep. 673.

<sup>92</sup> Baskette v. Streight, 106 Tenn. 549, 62 S. W. 142; In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 123 Am. St. Rep. 673.

<sup>93</sup> Knight v. Gallaway, 42 Wash. 413, 85 Pac. 21; Appeal of Woodward, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453.

<sup>94</sup> Caldwell's Succession, 114 La. 195, 38 South. 140, 108 Am. St. Rep. 341.

<sup>95</sup> Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017; McCollister v. Yard, 90 Iowa, 621, 57 N. W. 447. See, also, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, § 4441.

<sup>96</sup> Anonymous, 1 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 576; Williams v. Knight, 18 R. I. 333, 27 Atl. 210.

<sup>97</sup> Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N. E. 1047, 17 L. R. A. 806; Collamore v. Learned, 171 Mass. 99, 50 N. E. 518; Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 South. 373, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884, 125 Am. St. Rep. 37, 15 Ann. Cas. 90; In re Moran, 151 Mo. 553, 52 S. W. 377; Succession of Caldwell, 114 La. 195, 38 South. 140, 108 Am. St. Rep. 341. But see Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 South. 498.

<sup>98</sup> In re Williams, 102 Cal. 70, 36 Pac. 407, 41 Am. St. Rep. 163; Baker v. Strahorn, 33 Ill. App. 59; Luppelle v. Winans, 37 N. J. Eq. 245; Ferguson v. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20 Pac. 842, 3 L. R. A. 620, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808; In re McCormick's Estate, 108 Wis. 234, 84 N. W. 148, 81 Am. St. Rep. 890; Willis v. Bell, 86 Ark. 473, 111 S. W. 808; In re McDevitt, 176 App. Div. 418, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1032; In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S. W. 1097; In re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816. The mere fact that the parents of the child have

the child, consent may be given by the person having the legal custody of the child.<sup>66</sup>

Though the statutes in several states provide for adoption by deed or declaration,<sup>1</sup> it is generally required that adoption shall be by judicial proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Residence, either permanent or temporary, is usually sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> The statutes usually require that the person seeking to adopt a child shall file a petition setting forth the necessary facts,<sup>3</sup> and that proper notice shall be given to the parents of the child to be adopted, or other persons interested.<sup>4</sup> If the

been divorced does not as a rule do away with the necessity of the consent of both parents. In *re Lease*, 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816; In *re Cozza*, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 214. Where a child had been adopted by its paternal grandparents, the child was subject to subsequent adoption by its maternal grandmother, without notice to or consent of the child's natural father. In *re McRae*, 189 N. Y. 142, 81 N. E. 956, 12 Ann. Cas. 505.

<sup>66</sup> *Burger v. Frakes*, 67 Iowa, 460, 23 N. W. 746, 25 N. W. 735; *Holmes v. Derrig*, 127 Iowa, 625, 103 N. W. 973; *Chubb v. Bradley*, 58 Mich. 208, 25 N. W. 186; *Egoff v. Board of Children's Guardians of Madison County*, 170 Ind. 238, 84 N. E. 151. Where a child was never legally rendered to or placed in custody of a children's aid society, it never had authority to legally act as its guardian and consent to its adoption. *Ex parte Martin*, 29 Idaho, 716, 161 Pac. 573. The mere failure of parents to support a child is not abandonment, but there must be a giving up of the child or total desertion. In *re Kelly*, 25 Cal. App. 651, 145 Pac. 156. And see In *re Wright*, 79 Neb. 10, 112 N. W. 311. In Iowa consent to adoption of an abandoned child may be given by the mayor of the city. *Anderson v. Blakeley*, 155 Iowa, 430, 136 N. W. 210.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, *Abney v. De Loach*, 84 Ala. 393, 4 South. 757; *Fosburgh v. Rogers*, 114 Mo. 122, 21 S. W. 82, 19 L. R. A. 201; *Hilpire v. Claude*, 109 Iowa, 159, 80 N. W. 332, 46 L. R. A. 171, 77 Am. St. Rep. 524; *Manuel v. Beck*, 70 Misc. Rep. 357, 127 N. Y. Supp. 266.

<sup>2</sup> *Rives v. Sneed*, 25 Ga. 612; *Glos v. Sankey*, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196; In *re Brown's Adoption*, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 259.

<sup>3</sup> *Watts v. Dull*, 184 Ill. 86, 56 N. E. 303, 75 Am. St. Rep. 141; In *re McCormick's Estate*, 108 Wis. 234, 84 N. W. 148, 81 Am. St. Rep. 890; In *re Edds*, 137 Mass. 346. Husband and wife must join in the petition. *Davis v. McGraw*, 206 Mass. 294, 92 N. E. 332, 138 Am. St. Rep. 398.

<sup>4</sup> In *re Humphrey*, 137 Mass. 84; *Glos v. Sankey*, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196; *Parsons v. Parsons*, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N. W. 147, 70 Am. St. Rep. 894; *Omaha Water Co. v. Schmal*, 147 Fed. 502, 78 C. C. A. 68 (construing Nebraska statute); *People v. Sullivan*, 126 Ill. App. 389. Under Thompson's Shannon's Code, §§ 5409-5411, relating to adoption, but not providing for notice to the natural parents of child to be adopted, some notice to and some appearance of such parents must be shown, though the notice need not necessarily be a formal notice. In *re Knott*, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S. W. 1097.

statutory requirements have been substantially complied with, and it appears that the best interests of the child will be promoted thereby the court will in the exercise of its discretion enter an order or decree of adoption.<sup>5</sup>

*Status of Adoptive Parent and Child*

Where the artificial relation of parent and child is created by adoption under the statutes, the relation will, by the express provisions of most of the statutes, and even independently of such express provisions, give rise to substantially the same rights, duties, and liabilities as arise out of the natural relation.<sup>6</sup> The law, cannot, and does not purport to, do the work of nature, and create one a child who by nature is a stranger.<sup>7</sup> But it can and does fix the status of the adoptive child to the adoptive parent as substantially the same as the status of a natural child.<sup>8</sup> By the act of adoption, the child becomes, in a legal sense, the child of the adoptive parent.<sup>9</sup> The general effect of adoption, therefore, is, with few exceptions, to place the parties in the legal relation of parent and child, with all the legal consequences.<sup>10</sup> The law declares the status, and from the status, as a necessary consequence, spring the or-

<sup>5</sup> In re Ward's Estate, 59 Misc. Rep. 328, 112 N. Y. Supp. 282; In re Wells, 60 Wash. 518, 111 Pac. 778. The welfare of the child is the controlling factor in the determination of adoption proceedings. Knight v. Galloway, 42 Wash. 413, 85 Pac. 21; In re Peterson's Estate, 212 Pa. 453, 61 Atl. 1005; In re Sharron's Estate, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may annul an adoption to promote the child's welfare. In re McDevitt, 176 App. Div. 418, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1032. Lawfully rendered decree of adoption adjudicates status of minor as to future parentage at law and extinguishes parental rights of natural parents, and the court has no continuing jurisdiction as in guardianship or divorce proceedings. In re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816. An adoption is ipso facto revoked by a second adoption of the child by other persons; the adoptive parent consenting thereto. Klapp v. Pulsipher, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381, L. R. A. 1918A, 818.

<sup>6</sup> As to the rights and duties arising out of the natural relation of parent and child, see post, pp. 321, 339.

<sup>7</sup> Adoption does not change the child's identity, nor make him a child in fact. In re Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 Atl. 601, 5 A. L. R. 1277.

<sup>8</sup> Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 296; Kroff v. Amhein, 94 Ohio St. 282, 114 N. E. 267; Scott v. Scott (D. C.) 247 Fed. 976; Franklin v. Fairbanks, 99 Kan. 271, 161 Pac. 617.

<sup>9</sup> Miller v. Miller, 123 Iowa, 165, 98 N. W. 631; Rives v. Sneed, 25 Ga. 612.

<sup>10</sup> In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S. W. 1097. On readoption the rights of the first adopter are ipso facto terminated. Klapp v. Pulsipher, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381, L. R. A. 1918A, 818.

dinary rights, duties, and liabilities which arise out of the same status created by nature.<sup>11</sup> In Texas, however, adoption does not constitute the adopted person a member of the family of the adopter, nor does it confer the privileges or impose the duties of parent and child. The person adopted is adopted merely as heir and not as child of the adopter.<sup>12</sup>

In accordance with the general principles set forth above, the adoptive parent is entitled to the custody,<sup>13</sup> services, and earnings of the adopted child,<sup>14</sup> and is bound to support and maintain such child.<sup>15</sup> The adopted child acquires the domicile of its parent by adoption,<sup>16</sup> and its domicile will change with the change of domicile of the adopting parent.<sup>17</sup> The property rights of an adopted child are substantially the same as those of a natural child,<sup>18</sup> and consequently the adopting parent is entitled to dispose of his property by will as he may see fit.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Humphries v. Davis*, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788; *Paul v. Davis*, 100 Ind. 422; *Lunay v. Vantyne*, 40 Vt. 503; *Sewall v. Roberts*, 115 Mass. 262; *Burrage v. Briggs*, 120 Mass. 103; *Rives v. Sneed*, 25 Ga. 612; *Moran v. Stewart*, 122 Mo. 295, 26 S. W. 962.

<sup>12</sup> *Harle v. Harle* (Tex.) 204 S. W. 317, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 674; *Eckford v. Knox*, 67 Tex. 205, 2 S. W. 372; *State ex rel. Walton v. Yturria* (Tex.) 204 S. W. 315, L. R. A. 1917F, 1079.

<sup>13</sup> *Tilley v. Harrison*, 91 Ala. 295, 8 South. 802; *In re Clements*, 78 Mo. 352. As to religious training of adopted child, see *Purinton v. Jamrock*, 196 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926.

<sup>14</sup> *Tilley v. Harrison*, 91 Ala. 295, 8 South. 802. And see *In re Carroll*, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 123 Am. St. Rep. 673. The adopting parent may maintain an action for damages for the wrongful death of the adopted child. *Ransom v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.*, 93 Ohio St. 223, 112 N. E. 586, L. R. A. 1916E, 704. And see *Carpenter v. Buffalo General Electric Co.*, 213 N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 754. But see *Mount v. Tremount Lumber Co.*, 121 La. 64, 46 South. 103, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 199, 126 Am. St. Rep. 312, 15 Ann. Cas. 148.

<sup>15</sup> *Ryan v. Foreman*, 181 Ill. App. 262, affirmed in 262 Ill. 175, 104 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 780; *Beach v. Bryan*, 155 Mo. App. 33, 133 S. W. 635; *Greenman v. Gillerman's Estate*, 188 Mich. 74, 154 N. W. 82. A natural parent cannot recover from the adoptive parent for the support of the child while it is in his own home and custody. *McNemar v. McNemar*, 137 Ill. App. 504.

<sup>16</sup> *Washburn v. White*, 140 Mass. 568, 5 N. E. 813.

<sup>17</sup> *Woodward v. Woodward*, 87 Tenn. 644, 11 S. W. 892.

<sup>18</sup> *Odenbreit v. Uthelm*, 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741, L. R. A. 1916D, 421.

<sup>19</sup> *Malaney v. Cameron*, 99 Kan. 70, 424, 161 Pac. 1180, affirming judgment on rehearing 98 Kan. 620, 159 Pac. 19, additional rehearing denied 99 Kan. 677, 162 Pac. 1172; *Horton v. Troll*, 183 Mo. App. 677, 167 S. W. 1081; *Masterson v. Harris*, 107 Tex. 73, 174 S. W. 570.

The natural parents are divested of all personal rights in respect to the child, and are relieved of all legal duties as its parents.<sup>20</sup> They lose, for instance, and the adoptive parent acquires, the right to the child's custody and control, and to its services and earnings;<sup>21</sup> and they are relieved from, and the adoptive parent assumes, the duties of maintenance, education, etc.

### *Rights of Inheritance*

The right of inheritance by and from adopted children is very generally regulated by statute, and the statutes, in this as in other respects, vary in the different states. The rights of inheritance by reason of an adoption are determined by the law in force at the time such rights accrue, and not by the law in force at the time of the adoption.<sup>22</sup> In most, if not all, states the adopted child becomes the heir of the adoptive parent in all respects as if he were a natural child,<sup>23</sup> except that in some states he cannot take, by representa-

<sup>20</sup> In re Masterson's Estate, 45 Wash. 48, 87 Pac. 1047, 122 Am. St. Rep. 886; Allison v. Bryan, 26 Okl. 520, 109 Pac. 934, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 146, 138 Am. St. Rep. 988; In re Macrae, 189 N. Y. 142, 81 N. E. 956, 12 Ann. Cas. 505; In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 214. And see State v. Kelley, 32 S. D. 526, 143 N. W. 953. See, also, Schlitz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 21 L. R. A. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873.

<sup>21</sup> Lunay v. Vantyne, 40 Vt. 508.

<sup>22</sup> Rosenkrans v. Rosenkrans, 163 App. Div. 730, 148 N. Y. Supp. 954, affirmed 220 N. Y. 628, 115 N. E. 1050; United States Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 135 N. Y. Supp. 849; In re Sorenson v. Rasmussen, 114 Minn. 324, 131 N. W. 325, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216.

<sup>23</sup> See Barnes v. Allen, 25 Ind. 222; Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 Atl. 520; Davis v. Krug, 95 Ind. 1; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788; Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; In re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381, L. R. A. 1918A, 818; Adams v. Merrill, 45 Ind. App. 315, 85 N. E. 114, 87 N. E. 36; Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa, 562; Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26; Glos v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196; Com. v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 389; Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304; Moran v. Stewart, 122 Mo. 295, 26 S. W. 962; Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 296; Ultz v. Upham, 177 Mich. 351, 143 N. W. 66; Horton v. Troll, 183 Mo. App. 677, 167 S. W. 1081; In re Cupples' Estate, 272 Mo. 465, 189 S. W. 556; In re Lepin's Estate, 53 Mont. 240, 163 Pac. 104; Nickerson v. Hoover (Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 588. If the husband only adopts the child, the wife not joining in the adoption, the child cannot inherit her estate. In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 123 Am. St. Rep. 673. On a second adoption the child loses all rights of inheritance under the first adoption, and is entitled only to inherit under the second adoption. Klapp v. Pulsipher, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381. In Mississippi adoption does not include heirship, unless specifically conferred in the decree. Beaver v. Crump, 76 Miss. 34, 23 South. 432; Adams v. Adams, 102 Miss. 256, 59 South. 84, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 235. Leonard v. H. Weston Lumber Co., 107 Miss. 729, 65 South. 459. See, also, Webb v. McIntosh, 178 Iowa,

tion, from the adoptive parent's kindred, either lineal or collateral.<sup>24</sup> If the adopted child die during the lifetime of the adoptive parent, leaving issue surviving, the surviving child inherits by representation from the adopting parent, who dies intestate.<sup>25</sup> In some states it is expressly provided that the adopted person can also inherit from his natural parents or kindred, though such a provision would not be necessary to so entitle him.<sup>26</sup>

In most states, either by express provision or necessary implication, the adoptive parent may inherit from the adopted person,<sup>27</sup>

156, 159 N. W. 637. When adopted person acquires property by descent from his adopter, it is not because he is a child of the adopter, but because Adoption Statute, §§ 1, 2, puts him in position of child with respect to inheritance. *State v. Yturria* (Tex.) 204 S. W. 315, L. R. A. 1918F, 1079, reversing judgment (Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 291.

<sup>24</sup> See *Keegan v. Geraghty*, 101 Ill. 26. And see, also, *Van Derlyn v. Mack*, 187 Mich. 146, 100 N. W. 278, 66 L. R. A. 437, 109 Am. St. Rep. 669, 4 Ann. Cas. 879; *Wallace v. Noland*, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N. E. 956, 138 Am. St. Rep. 247; *Ryan v. Foreman*, 181 Ill. App. 262, affirmed 262 Ill. 175, 104 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 780; *Hockaday v. Lynn*, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 565, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775; *In re Burnett's Estate*, 219 Pa. 599, 69 Atl. 74; *Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Humphrey*, 32 R. I. 318, 79 Atl. 829. Under the adoption statute (Pub. St. 1882, c. 164, §§ 6, 7; Gen. Laws 1909, c. 244, §§ 5, 6) no right of inheritance from a child of the adopting parent born to him in lawful wedlock is given to an adopted child. *Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller*, 39 R. I. 45, 97 Atl. 378, L. R. A. 1916E, 545.

<sup>25</sup> *Bernero v. Goodwin*, 267 Mo. 427, 184 S. W. 74; *Williams v. Rollins*, 271 Mo. 150, 195 S. W. 1009; *Kroff v. Amrhein*, 5 Ohio App. 37, judgment affirmed 114 N. E. 267; *Walworths' Estate*, 85 Vt. 322, 82 Atl. 7, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 849, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1223. Where one leaves a life estate to his sole heir, an adopted daughter, and the remainder to her issue, if any, on her death without issue, the remainder descends to those who claim through her, and not to the ancestor's collateral kindred. *Franklin v. Fairbanks*, 99 Kan. 271, 161 Pac. 617.

<sup>26</sup> *Wagner v. Varner*, 50 Iowa, 532; *Humphries v. Davis*, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788; *Clarkson v. Hatton*, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S. W. 761, 39 L. R. A. 748, 65 Am. St. Rep. 635; *In re Klapp's Estate*, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381, L. R. A. 1918A, 818; *Head v. Leak*, 61 Ind. App. 253, 111 N. E. 952; *McKellar v. Harkins*, 183 Iowa, 1030, 166 N. W. 1061. But see *In re Darling's Estate*, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606. Where the adoption of the minors followed the death of their father, it did not affect their status as his heirs. *In re Pillsbury's Estate*, 175 Cal. 454, 166 Pac. 11, 3 A. L. R. 1396. Under Domestic Relations Law, § 114, relating to rights of adopted person, the right of a half-sister of an intestate to share in his estate was not lost by her previous legal adoption by a stranger. *In re Landers' Estate*, 100 Misc. Rep. 635, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1036. A child adopted by her grandfather cannot take in the dual capacity of grandchild and adopted child, but can take only one share. *Billings v. Head*, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N. E. 177.

<sup>27</sup> See *Swick v. Coleman*, 218 Ill. 33, 75 N. E. 807, affirming *Coleman v.*

though generally the right is limited to property received from or through the adoptive parent.<sup>28</sup>

As to the right of inheritance by and from adopted persons, where the statute is silent on the subject, the authorities are not very clear. In Indiana, where the statute was silent on this question, it was held, after a thorough consideration, and a full review of the authorities, that where an adopted child acquires property by inheritance, not from his natural parents or kindred, but from his adoptive mother, such property, on the death of the child, will go to his adoptive father, to the exclusion of his natural parents or kindred.<sup>29</sup> The court was influenced by the consideration that this was only just, in view of the fact that the property had been acquired by the child from its adoptive parent, and not from its natural parent, and that equity has a potent influence in the construction of statutes. It was also considered, however, on principle and on authority, that this result followed necessarily from the legal status of adoptive parent and child. The status of an adopted child, it was said, for all legal purposes, and as to property inherited by it from an adoptive parent, is that of a natural child.

In the case just referred to, the court expressly limited its decision to the facts, and it was intimated, if not virtually conceded, that property inherited by a child from its natural parent would go back to its natural kindred, to the exclusion of its adoptive parent; and in some cases it has been expressly so held.<sup>30</sup>

In Missouri it was held that, though the legal relation of parent and child exists between adoptive parent and child, yet, as the statute vests the right of inheritance in the child only, the adoptive

Swick, 120 Ill. App. 381; *In re Jobson's Estate*, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062; *Calhoun v. Bryant*, 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266; *In re Darling's Estate*, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606. See, also, *MacMaster v. Fobes*, 226 Mass. 396, 115 N. E. 487. But see *Edwards v. Yearby*, 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19, L. R. A. 1815E, 462.

<sup>28</sup> *Dunn v. Means*, 48 Ind. App. 383, 95 N. E. 1015; *Warner v. King*, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N. E. 837; *Lanferman v. Vanzile*, 150 Ky. 751, 150 S. W. 1008, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 563. Since an adopted child under Rev. Laws, c. 154, becomes the child of both adopting parents, and inherits from them the same as other children, on such child's dying intestate her property descends to all of her next of kin by adoption, irrespective of whether it came from one adopting parent or the other. *MacMaster v. Fobes*, 226 Mass. 396, 115 N. E. 487.

<sup>29</sup> *Humphries v. Davis*, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788 (collecting and reviewing the cases). But see *Hole v. Robbins*, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617.

<sup>30</sup> *Hole v. Robbins*, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617. And see dictum in *Humphries v. Davis*, 110 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788.

parent cannot inherit from the adopted child; and that, even where the child has acquired property from an adoptive parent under the statute, the property, on the child's death intestate, goes to its natural parents or kinsmen.<sup>31</sup> But this decision has been very justly criticised.<sup>32</sup>

In Massachusetts the doctrine that the legal status of adoptive parent and child is the same in substance as that of natural parent and child was carried so far as to hold that an adopted child took as a child under a residuary clause of the adoptive mother's will, where the specific legacy had lapsed.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Agreement to Adopt—Invalid Adoption*

Mere agreements to adopt a child cannot, in the absence of a statute so providing, give rise to the relation of parent and child, such as results from a legal adoption.<sup>34</sup> But, where such agreements purport to make the child the heir of the adopting person, equity will enforce the agreement to protect the rights of the child.<sup>35</sup> And if the contract to adopt was valid in the state where it was made it will be given effect in another state, though it would not have been effective as an adoption in the latter state.<sup>36</sup> So, too, a defective adoption may be construed as a contract to adopt which will be enforced in equity.<sup>37</sup>

#### *Persons Standing in Loco Parentis*

When a person assumes a liability to maintain, rear, and educate a child, or receives a child into his family under such circumstances

<sup>31</sup> *Reinders v. Koppelman*, 68 Mo. 482, 30 Am. Rep. 802. But see *Laws Mo. 1917*, p. 193 (Act April 10, 1917).

<sup>32</sup> *Humphries v. Davis*, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788.

<sup>33</sup> *Burrage v. Briggs*, 120 Mass. 103.

<sup>34</sup> *Wall v. McEnnery's Estate*, 105 Wash. 445, 178 Pac. 631; *Malaney v. Cameron*, 98 Kan. 620, 159 Pac. 19, judgment affirmed on rehearing 99 Kan. 70, 424, 161 Pac. 1180, additional rehearing denied 99 Kan. 677, 162 Pac. 1172.

<sup>35</sup> *Odenbreit v. Utheim*, 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741, L. R. A. 1916D, 421; *Fiske v. Lawton*, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455; *Chehak v. Battle*, 133 Iowa, 107, 110 N. W. 330, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, 12 Ann. Cas. 140; *Buck v. Meyer*, 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997; *Signalgo v. Signalgo* (Mo.) 205 S. W. 23; *Barney v. Hutchinson*, 25 N. M. 82, 177 Pac. 890. And see *Malaney v. Cameron*, 99 Kan. 70, 424, 161 Pac. 1180, affirming judgment on rehearing 99 Kan. 620, 159 Pac. 19, additional rehearing denied 99 Kan. 677, 162 Pac. 1172.

<sup>36</sup> *In re Herrick's Estate*, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455.

<sup>37</sup> *Prince v. Prince*, 194 Ala. 455, 89 South. 906; *Anderson v. Blakesly*, 155 Iowa, 430, 136 N. W. 210.

as give rise to the presumption that he has assumed such liability, there being no legal adoption, such person is said to stand in loco parentis to the child.<sup>38</sup> One who assumes that relation is generally entitled to the rights and subject to the duties of an actual parent.<sup>39</sup>

### *What Law Governs*

Since status, independent of any rights that may flow from that status, is dependent on the law of the domicile of the person at the time the status is acquired,<sup>40</sup> the question whether a child has acquired the status of an adopted child is determined by the law of the state where the adoption took place,<sup>41</sup> and an adoption valid and effective in the state where made will be recognized as creating the status in every other state.<sup>42</sup> As to the rights of inheritance resulting from the adoption, they are determined by the law of the domicile of the decedent in the case of personal property, and *lex rei sitæ* in the case of real property, and not by the law of the place of adoption.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *In re Dull's Estate*, 1 Leg. Op. (Pa.) 125; *Brinkerhoff v. Mersells Ex'rs*, 24 N. J. Law, 680; *Schrumpf v. Settegast*, 36 Tex. 296. *Zent v. Fuchs*, 60 Hun, 582, 14 N. Y. Supp. 806; *Von der Horst v. Von der Horst*, 88 Md. 127, 41 Atl. 124.

<sup>39</sup> *Williams v. Hutchinson*, 3 N. Y. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 301. As to the rights and duties of a natural parent, see post, pp. 321, 339.

<sup>40</sup> *Matre v. Sankey*, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196; *Woodward v. Woodward*, 87 Tenn. 644, 11 S. W. 892.

<sup>41</sup> *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; *Anderson v. French*, 77 N. H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042, L. R. A. 1916A, 660, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 80; *Appeal of Woodward*, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453 (holding that an adoption once legally made is not terminated by a change of domicile).

<sup>42</sup> See cases cited in preceding note.

<sup>43</sup> *Keegan v. Geraghty*, 101 Ill. 26; *Calhoun v. Bryant*, 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266; *Van Matre v. Sankey*, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196; *Ross v. Ross*, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; *Anderson v. French*, 77 N. H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042, L. R. A. 1916A, 660, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 80; *Finley v. Brown*, 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1285. But see *Brown v. Finley*, 157 Ala. 424, 47 South. 577, 21 L. R. A. 679, 131 Am. St. Rep. 68, 16 Ann. Cas. 778. Apparently contrary to the above cases is *In re Sunderland*, 60 Iowa, 732, 13 N. W. 655. But this case involved an adoption by special act of the Legislature of Louisiana, and should therefore be distinguished from the cases cited above. In *Shick v. Howe*, 137 Iowa, 249, 114 N. W. 916, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 980, the law of the place of adoption (New York) and the law of Iowa (where intestate died) were the same. *Boaz v. Swinney*, 79 Kan. 332, 99 Pac. 621, is clearly contrary to the weight of authority.

## CHAPTER IX.

## DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PARENTS

- 116. Parent's Duty to Maintain Child.
- 117. Maintenance in Equity—Allowance Out of Child's Estate.
- 118. Contracts by Child as Parent's Agent.
- 119. Parent's Duty to Protect Child.
- 120. Parent's Duty to Educate Child.
- 121. Parent's Liability for Child's Torts.
- 122. Parent's Liability for Child's Crimes.

## PARENT'S DUTY TO MAINTAIN CHILD

116. Whether there is a legal duty on the part of the parent, at common law, to maintain his minor child, so as to render him liable for necessities furnished the child, is a question upon which the authorities are conflicting.
- (a) In England, and in some states, it is held that there is only a moral obligation, in the absence of a statute, and that there is no liability for necessities unless there is a promise in fact to pay for them, express or implied. But even in these jurisdictions it is usually provided by statute that the municipal authorities may compel the parent, if he is able to do so, to maintain his child. In most states it is a penal offense if the parent neglect to support his minor child.
  - (b) In other states it is held that the obligation is a legal one, and that there is a liability for necessities, in case of non-support by the parent, in the absence of any promise in fact, or else that, if the obligation is merely a moral one, it is nevertheless sufficient to create such a liability.

Morally, of course, a parent is bound to support his children, if they are unable to support themselves. In most jurisdictions this moral obligation is expressly made a legal obligation by statute. It is provided by the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 2, that the father and mother, grandfather and grandmother, of poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent persons, shall maintain them, if of sufficient ability, but that no person is bound to provide for his children unless they are impotent, or unable to work, through infancy, disease, or accident, and then that he is only obliged to furnish them with necessities. Stat-

utes more or less similar to this, and having the same object, have been enacted in many of our states.<sup>1</sup> Even where this is not the case, it would seem that the English statute is to be regarded as in force, for it is old enough to have become a part of our common law, and is applicable to our conditions. In most states, by statute, it is made a penal offense for a parent to abandon his minor children, or neglect to support them.<sup>2</sup> Irrespective of the statutes referred to, which are in the nature of poor laws, in many states statutes have been enacted imposing on the parents of infant children the legal duty of furnishing them with adequate support and education.<sup>3</sup>

Whether or not, at common law and independently of statutory provision, a parent is under a legal obligation to support and maintain his children, or whether it is merely a natural duty, binding in morals only, is a question upon which the authorities are conflicting. The later English cases hold that there is only a moral obligation. "Except under the operation of the poor law," said Cockburn, J., "there is no legal obligation on the part of the father to maintain his child, unless, indeed, the neglect to do so should bring the case within the criminal law. Civilly there is no such obligation."<sup>4</sup> It is accordingly held in England that a parent, even where he neglects to support his child, is not liable for necessities furnished to it, in the absence of an express promise to pay for them, or conduct from which a promise may be implied as a matter of fact. In other words, it is held that the law does not, as in the case of husband and wife, create any liability on the part of a parent for necessities furnished his child, in the absence of contract in fact, express or implied, on his part. "It is a clear principle of law," said Parke, B., "that a father is not under any legal obligation to pay his son's debts, except, indeed, by proceeding under St. 43 Eliz. c. 2, by which he may, under certain circumstances, be compelled to support his children according to his ability; but the mere moral obligation to do so cannot impose upon him any legal liability."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the statutes of the various states.

<sup>2</sup> See post, p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Civ. Code Cal. § 196, as distinguished from section 206. See, also, Rev. Laws Okl. 1910, § 4367; Comp. Laws, N. D. 1913, § 4423. And see the statutes of various states.

<sup>4</sup> Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B. 559.

<sup>5</sup> Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. 482. And see Shelton v. Springett, 11 C. B. 452, where it is said that "a father is not liable on a contract made

In this country the rule is the same in many states. In a number of states it has been expressly held, in accordance with the English cases referred to, that a parent is under no legal obligation to support his children;<sup>6</sup> and that he is not liable, therefore, for necessities furnished to them, in the absence of any express contract to pay for them, or a contract implied in fact.<sup>7</sup>

The result of these decisions is clearly opposed to every natural sense of justice. If they are sound, the result is that a father can desert a child which, because of its youth or of sickness or other cause, is absolutely helpless, and a stranger who, to save its life, feeds and clothes it, and procures necessary medical attendance, cannot recover his expenditures from the father. On the other hand, if a husband deserts his wife, though she may be fully able to work and to earn a living, the law allows her to bind her husband for necessities furnished her, even against his express command not to furnish them.<sup>8</sup> Again, it is well settled, both in England and in this country, that a parent who, being able, neglects to provide the necessities of life, including necessary medical attendance, for a child who is unable to provide for himself, and thereby causes the child's death, is guilty of manslaughter at least; and, if the neglect is willful and malicious, he is guilty of murder.<sup>9</sup> It is equally well settled, as a general principle of law, that to render a person guilty of manslaughter, because of a neglect of duty causing another's death, the duty must be a legal, as distinguished from a merely moral, duty.<sup>10</sup> It is inconsistent, therefore, to hold a parent

by his minor child, even for necessities furnished, unless an actual authority be proved or the circumstances be sufficient to imply one." And it is also said that the mere obligation to provide for the child's maintenance affords no legal inference for a promise. It is not altogether clear that these decisions are sustainable by authority. See *Rawlyns v. Vandyke*, 3 Esp. 252; *Stone v. Carr*, Id. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Kelley v. Davis*, 49 N. H. 187, 6 Am. Rep. 499 (but see *Hillsborough v. Deering*, 4 N. H. 86; *Pidgin v. Cram*, 8 N. H. 352); *Gordon v. Potter*, 17 Vt. 348; *Freeman v. Robinson*, 38 N. J. Law, 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399; *Raymond v. Loyl*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 483; *Chilcott v. Trimble*, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 502; *Hunt v. Thompson*, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 179, 36 Am. Dec. 538; *McMillen v. Lee*, 78 Ill. 443 (but see cases cited in note 11, *infra*); *Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg*, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; *Holt v. Baldwin*, 46 Mo. 265, 2 Am. Rep. 515; *White v. Mann*, 110 Ind. 74, 10 N. E. 629. And see *Sassaman v. Wells*, 178 Mich. 167, 144 N. W. 478.

<sup>7</sup> See the cases cited above.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 175.

<sup>9</sup> *Clark*, Cr. Law, 177, and cases there cited; *Reg. v. Morby*, *Clark*, Cr. Cas. 75.

<sup>10</sup> *Clark*, Cr. Law, 177, 178, and cases there cited.

criminally liable for neglect to support his child, and at the same time to say that he is under no legal obligation to support it. The law says that a parent is criminally liable for neglect causing his child's death; and it says that a stranger who sees a child starving on the common, or attacked by a dog, or drowning, is not criminally liable for not rescuing it, because the stranger is not legally, but only morally, bound to interfere. And yet the law also says that a parent is not under a legal, but only under a moral, obligation to feed his starving child.

These inconsistencies in the decisions show that some of them are wrong. The truth is that, in reason and on principle, a parent is legally, as well as morally, bound to support his children, if they are unable to care for themselves, and if he is able to do so; and if he neglects to do so, and another performs the duty for him, even against his wish or directions, he may recover therefor from the father, without regard to any idea of a contract in fact. There are a number of cases, and much dictum, in favor of this view.<sup>11</sup> Some of the cases cited in support of the above proposition seem to recognize, what is held in England, that there is only a moral obligation on the part of the parent to furnish support, but that this moral obligation is sufficient to impose legal liability for necessities upon the parent; but it is not proper to put the decision on this ground, for the general rule is that a moral obligation will not even sup-

<sup>11</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 190; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 283; Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 480, 7 Am. Dec. 395; Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 285; In re Ryder, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 188, 42 Am. Dec. 109; Furman v. Van Sise, 58 N. Y. 435, 15 Am. Dec. 441; Manning v. Wells, 8 Misc. Rep. 646, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1044; Guthrie County v. Conrad, 133 Iowa, 171, 110 N. W. 454; Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290; Allen v. Jacobi, 14 Ill. App. 277; Miller v. Davis, 45 Ill. App. 447 (but see Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam. [Ill.] 179, 36 Am. Dec. 538; McMillen v. Lee, 78 Ill. 443); Owen v. White, 5 Port. (Ala.) 435, 30 Am. Dec. 572; Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 471, 4 Am. St. Rep. 542; Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238, 154 N. W. 1097, L. R. A. 1916B, 1111; Snell v. Ham (Tex. Civ. App.) 151 S. W. 1077; Keaton v. Davis, 18 Ga. 457; Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 Gray (Mass.) 78; Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 347, 352, 48 Am. Dec. 671; Weeks v. Merrow, 40 Me. 151; Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 86; Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 352 (but see Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187, 6 Am. Rep. 499); Fidler v. Fidler, 33 Pa. 50; Holtzman v. Castleman, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 555; Maguinay v. Saudek, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 147; PORTER v. POWELL, 79 Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295, 7 L. R. A. 176, 18 Am. St. Rep. 353, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 168; Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day (Conn.) 37, 3 Am. Dec. 255 (approved in Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 421); Evans v. Pearce, 15 Grat. (Va.) 513, 78 Am. Dec. 635. See, also, Conn v. Conn, 57 Ind. 323; Courtright v. Courtright, 40 Mich. 633; Buckminster v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 252, 88 Am. Dec. 652;

port an express promise. To hold the parent liable, the courts, in effect, hold that the obligation is a legal one. This obligation to support is not based on the duty of the child to serve, but rather on the inability of the child to care for itself. Otherwise, those who are unable to render service because of extreme infancy, sickness, or accident—those who most of all, need support—would not be entitled to it. The duty is not merely to the child, but also to the public.<sup>12</sup>

The obligation thus imposed on the parent is not, however, enforceable at the suit of the child, even in equity, in the absence of a statute giving the right.<sup>13</sup> But it has been held in California that the duty imposed by the provisions of the statute relating to the support of poor persons<sup>14</sup> may be enforced in equity at the suit of the child.<sup>15</sup>

While the father is primarily liable for the support of his minor children,<sup>16</sup> the mother will generally become liable on the death of the father.<sup>17</sup> She will not be held liable if the child has an estate or income of its own.<sup>18</sup> The widow is not liable for the support of her stepchildren,<sup>19</sup> and where a widowed mother marries again the stepfather is under no obligation to support her children by her first husband.<sup>20</sup> But if he voluntarily assumes the obligation of

Wright v. Leupp, 70 N. J. Eq. 130, 62 Atl. 464; Cousins v. Boyer, 114 App. Div. 787, 100 N. Y. Supp. 290; Holt v. Holt, 42 Ark. 495.

<sup>12</sup> PORTER v. POWELL, 79 Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295, 7 L. R. A. 176, 18 Am. St. Rep. 353, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 168.

<sup>13</sup> Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308.

<sup>14</sup> Civil Code, § 206.

<sup>15</sup> Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 667, 89 Pac. 1083.

<sup>16</sup> PORTER v. POWELL, 79 Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295, 7 L. R. A. 176, 18 Am. St. Rep. 353, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 168; Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 Atl. 132, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 678, 14 Ann. Cas. 250; Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623, 1 Am. St. Rep. 307; Leibold v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N. E. 627. In some states by statute the mother must assist in the support of children if the father is unable to furnish adequate support. See Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, § 4423.

<sup>17</sup> Girls' Industrial Home v. Fritchey, 10 Mo. App. 344; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 559, 76 N. W. 169; Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411; Furman v. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435, 15 Am. Rep. 441; Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 100, and dissenting opinion, page 211.

<sup>18</sup> Englehardt v. Yung, 76 Ala. 534; Mowbry v. Mowbry, 64 Ill. 383; In re Lyons' Estate (Sur.) 137 N. Y. Supp. 171; Whipple v. Dow, 2 Mass. 415; Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97 (but see Inhabitants of Dedham v. Inhabitants of Natick, 16 Mass. 135); In re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385, 20 N. W. 366, 50 Am. Rep. 579.

<sup>19</sup> Popejoy v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 193 Mo. App. 612, 186 S. W. 1133.

<sup>20</sup> Tubb v. Harrison, 4 Term R. 118; Com. v. Hamilton, 6 Mass. 273; In

support, by receiving the children into his family and assuming to stand in loco parentis to the children, he is liable.<sup>21</sup> And generally a person who assumes to stand in loco parentis to a child is subject to the legal responsibilities flowing from the parental relation, and is therefore liable for the support of the child.<sup>22</sup>

The obligation on the part of the parent to maintain the child continues until the child is in a condition to provide for its own maintenance, and no further; and in no case does it extend further than to a necessary support.<sup>23</sup> The legal obligation ceases, except under some of the statutes, as soon as the child reaches the age of majority, however helpless he may be, and however wealthy the father may be.<sup>24</sup>

#### *Effect of Separation or Divorce*

Whether the liability of the father to support his children persists if the parents are separated by divorce or otherwise depends on the circumstances of the particular case. If the father deserts his family, the wife can recover from him for the support of the children.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, if the mother leaves her husband without cause, taking the children with her, the father is not liable.<sup>26</sup> The duty of the father to support the children is not relieved merely because the parents have separated by agreement and the mother has the custody of the children.<sup>27</sup> Though an agreement

re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385, 20 N. W. 366, 50 Am. Rep. 579; Bond v. Lockwood, 33 Ill. 212; McMahon v. McMahon, 113 Ill. 461. But see Ela v. Brand, 63 N. H. 14.

<sup>21</sup> State ex rel. Deckard v. Macom (Mo. App.) 186 S. W. 1157; Coakley v. Coakley, 216 Mass. 71, 102 N. E. 930, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 867; White v. McDowell, 74 Wash. 44, 132 Pac. 734. See, also, Huber v. Roth, 91 Kan. 134, 136 Pac. 794; Daniel v. Tolon, 53 Okl. 666, 157 Pac. 756, 4 A. L. R. 704.

<sup>22</sup> In re Harris, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825; Monk v. Hurlburt, 151 Wis. 41, 138 N. W. 59, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535; Howard v. Randolph, 134 Ga. 691, 68 S. E. 586, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 294, 20 Ann. Cas. 392.

<sup>23</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 190. When the child is emancipated, the father is not liable. Holland v. Hartley, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507.

<sup>24</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 191; Skidmore v. Skidmore, 160 App. Div. 594, 145 N. Y. Supp. 939; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. De Moss, 62 Ind. App. 635, 113 N. E. 417.

<sup>25</sup> De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508.

<sup>26</sup> Hyde v. Leisenring, 107 Mich. 490, 65 N. W. 536. But see Gilbert v. Gilbert, 149 Ky. 638, 149 S. W. 964; White v. White, 169 Mo. App. 40, 154 S. W. 872, where the parties were divorced for wife's fault.

<sup>27</sup> McGarvey's Guardian v. McGarvey's Adm'r, 163 Ky. 242, 173 S. W. 765; Ahrens v. Ahrens (Okla.) 169 Pac. 486; Edelson v. Edelson, 179 Ky. 300, 200

as to the custody and maintenance of children will be enforced as between the husband and the wife, it cannot affect the paramount liability of both imposed by statute.<sup>28</sup>

Though in several well-considered cases it has been held that when the care and custody of the children have been awarded to the mother by the decree of divorce, this carries with it the obligation to support,<sup>29</sup> the better rule, according to the weight of authority, is that the liability of either parent to support the children is not affected by the decree of divorce,<sup>30</sup> and the liability of the parent primarily liable for the support of the children continues, regardless of the divorce.<sup>31</sup> And even where the custody of the children has been given to the mother, her obligation to support the children is not exclusive of that of the father, and he remains liable to her for their maintenance.<sup>32</sup> The duty to support his children,

S. W. 625, 2 A. L. R. 689. But see *O'Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co.* (Colo.) 173 Pac. 544.

<sup>28</sup> *Brice v. Brice*, 50 Mont. 388, 147 Pac. 164 (construing Rev. Codes, §§ 3741, 3742).

<sup>29</sup> *Burritt v. Burritt*, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 124; *Brow v. Brightman*, 136 Mass. 187; *Brown v. Smith*, 19 R. I. 319, 33 Atl. 466, 30 L. R. A. 680; *Finch v. Finch*, 22 Conn. 411; *Stone v. Duffy*, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595; and see *Bondles v. Bondies*, 40 Okl. 164, 136 Pac. 1089.

<sup>30</sup> *In re Application for Support of Minor Children*, 164 Iowa, 208, 145 N. W. 467; *Gibbons v. Gibbons*, 75 Or. 500, 147 Pac. 530; *Hector v. Hector*, 51 Wash. 434, 99 Pac. 13.

<sup>31</sup> *Gilley v. Gilley*, 79 Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623, 1 Am. St. Rep. 307; *Rowell v. Rowell*, 97 Kan. 16, 154 Pac. 243, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 936; *Courtright v. Courtright*, 40 Mich. 633; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 268 Mo. 703, 186 S. W. 1032, modifying 168 Mo. App. 639, 154 S. W. 162; *Hector v. Hector*, 51 Wash. 434, 99 Pac. 13; *Schoennauer v. Schoennauer*, 77 Wash. 132, 137 Pac. 325; *Gibbons v. Gibbons*, 75 Or. 500, 147 Pac. 530; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 41 Wis. 229; *Conn v. Conn*, 57 Ind. 323.

<sup>32</sup> *Alvey v. Hartwig*, 106 Md. 254, 67 Atl. 132, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 678, 14 Ann. Cas. 250; *Spencer v. Spencer*, 97 Minn. 56, 105 N. W. 483, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851, 114 Am. St. Rep. 695, 7 Ann. Cas. 901; *Evans v. Evans*, 125 Tenn. 112, 140 S. W. 745, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 294; *Sanders v. Sanders*, 167 N. C. 319, 83 N. E. 490; *Stanton v. Willson*, 3 Day (Conn.) 37, 3 Am. Dec. 255 (but see *Finch v. Finch*, 22 Conn. 411); *Thomas v. Thomas*, 41 Wis. 229; *Conn v. Conn*, 57 Ind. 323; *Spade v. State*, 44 Ind. App. 529, 89 N. E. 604; *White v. White* (Mo. App.) 180 S. W. 1004; *Graham v. Graham*, 38 Colo. 453, 88 Pac. 852, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1270, 12 Ann. Cas. 137; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 93 Kan. 114, 143 Pac. 410, L. R. A. 1917A, 1137; *La Rue v. Kempf*, 186 Mo. App. 57, 121 S. W. 588; *Kinney v. Kinney*, 150 Iowa, 225, 129 N. W. 826; *White v. White*, 154 App. Div. 250, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1082; *Hall v. Hall*, 141 Ga. 361, 80 S. E. 992; *Riggs v. Riggs*, 91 Kan. 593, 138 Pac. 628, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 809; *Wills v. Wills*, 168 Ky. 35, 181 S. W. 619; *Hector v. Hector*, 51 Wash. 434, 99 Pac. 13. In *Ramsey v. Ramsey*, 121 Ind. 215, 23 N. E. 69,

said the Ohio court, "is not to be evaded by the husband so conducting himself as to render it necessary to dissolve the bonds of matrimony, and give to the mother the custody and care of the infant offspring. It is not the policy of the law to deprive children of their rights on account of the dissensions of their parents, to which they are not parties, or to enable the father to convert his own misconduct into a shield against parental liability. The divorce may deprive him of the custody and the services of his children, and of the rights of guardianship, against his will; but if, by the judgment of the court, and upon competent and sufficient evidence, he is found to be an unfit person to exercise parental control, while the mother is in all respects the proper person to be clothed with such authority, he cannot justly complain. The alimony allowed by the court below is not to be construed into an allowance for the support also of the child. 'Alimony,' in its proper significance, is not maintenance to the children, but to the wife; and the fact that there has been a judgment of divorce, with alimony and custody of minor children to the wife, will not of itself operate as a bar to a subsequent claim against the husband for the children's maintenance."<sup>33</sup> It has also been held that even the remarriage of the mother after the divorce does not release the father from his obligation.<sup>34</sup>

#### *Neglect to Support as an Offense*

In many states, by statute, it is made a penal offense for a parent to abandon his minor children, or neglect to support them.<sup>35</sup> Such

6 L. R. A. 682, it was held in a poorly reasoned opinion that where a child was born after the divorce the father was not liable for its support; the child being in the custody of the mother.

<sup>33</sup> *Pretzinger v. Pretzinger*, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 471, 4 Am. St. Rep. 542. And see *Holt v. Holt*, 42 Ark. 495.

<sup>34</sup> *Maxwell v. Boyd*, 123 Mo. App. 334, 100 S. W. 540; *Johnson v. Latty* (D. C.) 210 Fed. 961; *White v. McDowell*, 74 Wash. 44, 132 Pac. 734.

<sup>35</sup> *State v. Beers*, 77 Conn. 714, 58 Atl. 745; *Baldwin v. State*, 118 Ga. 328, 45 S. E. 399; *Mays v. State*, 123 Ga. 507, 51 S. E. 503; *Brown v. State*, 122 Ga. 568, 50 S. E. 378; *State v. Sanner*, 81 Ohio St. 393, 90 N. E. 1007, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1093; *State v. Gipson*, 92 Wash. 646, 159 Pac. 792; *Martin v. People*, 60 Colo. 575, 155 Pac. 318; *Moore v. State*, 1 Ga. App. 502, 57 S. E. 1016; *State v. Sparegrove*, 134 Iowa, 599, 112 N. W. 83; *State v. Block* (Mo. App.) 82 S. W. 1103; *State v. Peabody*, 25 R. I. 544, 56 Atl. 1028. And see *People v. Chamberlain* (Sup.) 106 N. Y. Supp. 149, holding that since, under Code Cr. Proc. § 839, the mother of a bastard child is liable for its support if able to support it, she may be prosecuted for abandonment if she wrongfully neglects to do so. Under the New York statute (Penal Law [Consol. Laws, c. 40] § 480), declaring it a felony for a

statutes are a proper exercise of the police power of the state.<sup>36</sup> Being highly penal in their nature, the statutes should be strictly construed.<sup>37</sup> So it has been held that to render the parent liable the child must be actually in need and he is not liable if the child is receiving necessary food, etc.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the parent is liable only when he withholds necessities which he is able to supply,<sup>39</sup> and a failure to furnish support will be excused if the parent is unable to furnish it and his inability is not due to his extravagance or misconduct.<sup>40</sup> Abandonment as a criminal offense under these statutes contains two essential ingredients, separation from child and neglect to provide for its needs. Mere absence from the child is not sufficient.<sup>41</sup>

### MAINTENANCE IN EQUITY—ALLOWANCE OUT OF CHILD'S ESTATE

117. When a parent is unable to support his child, and the child has property, equity will make allowances therefrom for his future or past maintenance. An allowance will not be granted if the parent is able to support his child, except where the child's fortune exceeds the parent's, when it may be maintained according to its fortune.

Where a father has not sufficient means to support his child, and the child has property of its own, it may be not only maintained,

parent to abandon his child, the father of an illegitimate, who never had custody of the child, is not liable. *People v. Fitzgerald*, 167 App. Div. 85, 152 N. Y. Supp. 641. Where one married the mother of an illegitimate child, his failure to support the child, though he had promised to do so, does not render him liable under the statute, unless he was the father of the child. *People v. Connell*, 151 App. Div. 943, 136 N. Y. Supp. 912. One who fails to comply with a divorce decree requiring him to support his child is liable under the statute for neglect to provide. *People v. Schlott*, 162 Cal. 347, 122 Pac. 846.

<sup>36</sup> *Ex parte Mitchell*, 19 Cal. App. 567, 126 Pac. 856.

<sup>37</sup> *Goetting v. Normoyle*, 191 N. Y. 368, 84 N. E. 287, affirming 119 App. Div. 143, 103 N. Y. Supp. 881.

<sup>38</sup> *State v. Thornton*, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S. W. 519, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 841. But see *State v. Langford*, 90 Or. 251, 176 Pac. 197, holding that proof of entire failure to support is not essential and that it is sufficient to show neglect to furnish adequate support.

<sup>39</sup> *Raborn v. State*, 71 Fla. 387, 72 South. 463. Failure to supply "necessary food," etc., construed. *State v. Shouse*, 268 Mo. 199, 186 S. W. 1064.

<sup>40</sup> *People v. Forester*, 29 Cal. App. 460, 155 Pac. 1022.

<sup>41</sup> *Phelps v. State*, 10 Ga. App. 41, 72 S. E. 524.

but educated, from the income of such property; and the court in the exercise of its equity powers will order such allowances as may be necessary.<sup>42</sup> In an urgent case the court may use the principal of a fund or other property belonging to a child to maintain and educate him.<sup>43</sup> As a general rule, however, if the father is amply able to support and educate his child, no allowance will be made out of the child's property,<sup>44</sup> unless the child's fortune is in excess of that of the parent.<sup>45</sup> It is only in exceptional cases that he is entitled to resort to the child's estate.<sup>46</sup>

It is obviously to the best interests of the child that he be maintained and educated in such a manner as to fit it to fill the position in life to which its future will entitle it. And it has therefore been held that, when the child's fortune warrants a scale of expenditure beyond what the parent's fortune will permit, a court of equity will make allowances therefrom, in accordance with the fortune, for his maintenance and education.<sup>47</sup> "What allowance, if any, shall be made to a father out of his children's property, for their maintenance, is a broad question of equity. The circumstances of each case, including the respective estates of father and child, are considered, and the decision is a just and reasonable conclusion of fact, with due regard for the general rule of parental duty."<sup>48</sup>

<sup>42</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 191; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1309, note 4; *Fuller v. Fuller*, 23 Fla. 236, 2 South. 426; *Commonwealth v. Lee*, 120 Ky. 433, 86 S. W. 990, judgment modified on rehearing 120 Ky. 433, 89 S. W. 731; *Beardsley v. Hotchkiss*, 96 N. Y. 201, 219; *Newport v. Cook*, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 332; *Cooley v. Stringfellow*, 164 Ala. 460, 51 South. 321; *Williams v. Williams*, 202 Ala. 539, 81 South. 41; *Evans v. Pearce*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 513, 78 Am. Dec. 635; *Funk's Guardian v. Funk*, 130 Ky. 354, 113 S. W. 419; *First Nat. Bank v. Greene* (Ky.) 114 S. W. 322; *Gaston v. Thompson*, 129 Ga. 754, 59 S. E. 799; *Peters v. Scoble*, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 541, affirmed 76 Ohio St. 564, 81 N. E. 1193.

<sup>43</sup> *Newport v. Cook*, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 332.

<sup>44</sup> *United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall* (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 892.

<sup>45</sup> *Butler v. Butler*, 3 Atk. 58; *Darley v. Darley*, Id. 399; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. 3, 28; *Cruger v. Heyward*, 2 Desaus. (S. C.) 94; *In re Kane*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 375; *Chapline v. Moore*, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 150; *Tanner v. Skinner*, 11 Bush (Ky.) 120; *In re Harland*, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 323; *Ela v. Brand*, 63 N. H. 14; *Hamilton's Adm'r v. Riney*, 140 Ky. 476, 131 S. W. 287; *In re Jeffrey's Estate* (Sur.) 137 N. Y. Supp. 168; *Buckley's Adm'r v. Howard*, 35 Tex. 566; *Kinsey v. State*, 98 Ind. 351; *Hines v. Mullins*, 25 Ga. 696; *Burke v. Turner*, 85 N. C. 500.

<sup>46</sup> *In re Harris*, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1175.

<sup>47</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 191; *Jervoise v. Silk*, Coop. t. Eld. 52; *Roach v. Garvan*.

<sup>48</sup> *Ela v. Brand*, 63 N. H. 14.

An allowance may also be made for past maintenance and education, when the extent of the respective estates of the parent and child, and the particulars of the expenditures, render an allowance equitable and just.<sup>49</sup> The mother is shown special favor in allowances for past maintenance and expenditures for education, and the courts will grant them in her case without so strict a showing as might be required of the father.<sup>50</sup>

### CONTRACTS BY CHILD AS PARENT'S AGENT

**118. A child, if expressly or impliedly authorized, may act as his parent's agent, and bind him by a purchase of goods, or by any other contract. If the parent holds the child out as having authority, he constitutes him his agent by estoppel.**

If a child is authorized, he may act as agent for his parent, and may bind him to pay for necessities purchased,<sup>51</sup> or by any other contract; and if the parent authorizes the child to purchase goods on his credit he is liable, though the seller did not know of the authorization, and though the goods purchased were necessities or not.<sup>52</sup> This depends, not upon any principle peculiar to the relation of parent and child, but on principles of the law of agency. The relation, however, will enable the court to infer authority from slight evidence,<sup>53</sup> and if from the circumstances surrounding the transaction the seller of goods is justified in assuming that author-

1 Ves. Sr. 157; *In re Burke*, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 617; *Trimble v. Dodd*, 2 Tenn. Ch. 500; *Ela v. Brand*, 63 N. H. 14; *Evans v. Pearce*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 513, 78 Am. Dec. 635. But see *McKnight's Ex'rs v. Walsh*, 23 N. J. Eq. 139.

<sup>49</sup> *Brown v. Smith*, 10 Ch. Div. 377; *In re Kane*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 375; *Smith v. Geortner*, 40 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 185; *Beardsley v. Hotchkiss*, 96 N. Y. 201; *Otte v. Becton*, 55 Mo. 99; *Myers v. Myers*, 2 McCord, Eq. (S. C.) 214, 16 Am. Dec. 648; *Trimble v. Dodd*, 2 Tenn. Ch. 500; *Alling v. Alling*, 52 N. J. Eq. 92, 27 Atl. 655.

<sup>50</sup> *In re Besondy*, 32 Minn. 385, 20 N. W. 366, 50 Am. Rep. 579; *Stewart v. Lewis*, 16 Ala. 734; *Englehardt v. Yung*, 76 Ala. 534; *Mowbry v. Mowbry*, 64 Ill. 383; *Gladding v. Follett*, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 58; *Whipple v. Dow*, 2 Mass. 415; *Pyatt v. Pyatt*, 46 N. J. Eq. 285, 18 Atl. 1048; *Alling v. Alling*, 52 N. J. Eq. 92, 27 Atl. 655.

<sup>51</sup> *Finn v. Adams*, 138 Mich. 258, 101 N. W. 533, 4 Ann. Cas. 1186.

<sup>52</sup> *Anderson v. Lunker*, 180 Iowa, 167, 162 N. W. 7.

<sup>53</sup> *Freeman v. Robinson*, 38 N. J. Law, 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399; *Jordan v. Wright*, 45 Ark. 237. See, as to sufficiency of evidence, *Cousins v. Boyer*, 114 App. Div. 787, 100 N. Y. Supp. 290.

ity was given, the parent may be held liable.<sup>54</sup> The authority of the child will be implied when the parent, with knowledge and without objection, allows the child to make purchases on credit,<sup>55</sup> and especially will the authority be implied if the parent has been in the habit of paying the child's bills without objection.<sup>56</sup> "Where the father permits his minor child to purchase goods on his account, whether for himself or for the father, and he pays for them without objection, it is a reasonable presumption that the minor had authority, and was the agent of the father, having full power to make such purchases. The proof of such authority is the same as the agency of the wife or a servant. The circumstances which authorize the inference of authority in the one case will be sufficient in either of the others; in each the question being whether there was authority to act as agent. When the agency is found to exist, the law then implies a promise, as in the case of any other agency."<sup>57</sup> The father who allows his child to purchase goods on his credit, and pays the bills without objection, cannot be heard to deny the child's agency. There is a clear case of agency by estoppel, for the father thus holds out the child as having authority to bind him.

If the parent refuses to furnish his child with necessities, he may nevertheless be charged therefor on the principles of agency;<sup>58</sup> and if a third person purchases necessities for the child, the parent

<sup>54</sup> *Auringer v. Cochrane*, 225 Mass. 273, 114 N. E. 355.

<sup>55</sup> *Martz v. Fullhart*, 142 Mo. App. 348, 126 S. W. 964. A mother living with the father is not liable for necessities in the absence of an express assumption of liability. *Leake v. J. R. King Dry Goods Co.*, 5 Ga. App. 102, 62 S. E. 729.

<sup>56</sup> *Thayer v. White*, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 343; *Fowlkes v. Baker*, 29 Tex. 135, 94 Am. Dec. 270; *Bryan v. Jackson*, 4 Conn. 288; *Murphy v. Ottenheimer*, 84 Ill. 39, 25 Am. Rep. 424; *Armstrong Clothing Co. v. Boggs*, 90 Neb. 499, 133 N. W. 1122, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 966; *Johnson v. Smallwood*, 88 Ill. 73; *Manning v. Wells*, 8 Misc. Rep. 646, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1044. The payment of one account without protest does not render the parent liable for subsequent purchases made by the child unless the purchases were necessities. *A. Alschuler & Sons v. Anderson*, 142 Ill. App. 323.

<sup>57</sup> *Murphy v. Ottenheimer*, 84 Ill. 39, 25 Am. Rep. 424; *McCRADY v. PRATT*, 138 Mich. 203, 101 N. W. 227, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 172.

<sup>58</sup> *Loucks v. Dutcher* (Co. Ct.) 112 N. Y. Supp. 269; *Snell v. Ham* (Tex. Civ. App.) 151 S. W. 1077; *PORTER v. POWELL*, 79 Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295, 7 L. R. A. 176, 18 Am. St. Rep. 353, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 168. But the father is not liable if there has been no neglect or refusal in the absence of authorization. *Smith v. Gilbert*, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S. W. 115, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1093.

is liable, but only to the extent of the sums actually paid out and reasonably necessary.<sup>59</sup> So, too, if the parent compels the child to leave home through fear of violence or other adequate cause, he will still be liable for necessities.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, the father cannot be held liable, even for necessities, on the theory of agency if he has emancipated the child;<sup>61</sup> and, of course, if the child leaves home on his own account, to seek his fortune or to avoid discipline, he does not carry with him the parent's credit.<sup>62</sup>

The necessities for the furnishing of which the parent may be held liable on the theory of agency, include food, clothing, residence, instruction, and medical services.<sup>63</sup>

In all cases of implied agency, if the credit is given to the child, and not to the parent, the latter does not become liable,<sup>64</sup> for his liability is based on the theory that the child has contracted, not for himself, but as agent for his parent; that he has pledged his parent's, and not his own, credit.

## PARENT'S DUTY TO PROTECT CHILD

### 119. The law recognizes the duty of a parent to protect his child, and will uphold him therein.

The duty of a parent to protect his child is fully recognized by the common law; but, as was said by Blackstone, it is "rather per-

<sup>59</sup> *Cheever v. Kelly*, 96 Kan. 269, 150 Pac. 529.

<sup>60</sup> *Brosius v. Barker*, 154 Mo. App. 657, 136 S. W. 18; *Hunycutt v. Thompson*, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 928; *Stanton v. Willson*, 3 Day (Conn.) 37, 3 Am. Dec. 255; *Owen v. White*, 5 Port. (Ala.) 435, 30 Am. Dec. 572 (dictum).

<sup>61</sup> *Holland v. Hartley*, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507.

<sup>62</sup> *Dyer v. Helson*, 117 Me. 203, 103 Atl. 161; *Brosius v. Parker*, 54 Mo. App. 657, 136 S. W. 18; *Hyde v. Leisenring*, 107 Mich. 490, 65 N. W. 536. But see *Bradley v. Keen*, 101 Ill. App. 519, where the child was only eight or nine years old. Where a minor was away attending school against the wishes of the father, he had no authority to pledge the father's credit even for medical services. *Sassaman v. Wells*, 178 Mich. 167, 144 N. W. 478.

<sup>63</sup> *Gately Outfitting Co. v. Vinson* (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 133; *Des Mond v. Kelly*, 163 Mo. App. 205, 146 S. W. 99; *Simoneau v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.*, 159 Cal. 494, 115 Pac. 320; *Howell v. Blesh*, 19 Okl. 260, 91 Pac. 893. Also funeral expenses. *P. J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson*, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 928; *Gobber v. Emptying*, 72 Misc. Rep. 10, 129 N. Y. Supp. 4. Proper articles of clothing to be worn at the funeral of the child's mother are also necessities. *Bisbee v. McManus*, 229 Mass. 124, 118 N. E. 192.

<sup>64</sup> *Varney v. Young*, 11 Vt. 258.

mitted than enjoined by any municipal law; nature in this respect working so strongly as to need rather a check than a spur."<sup>65</sup> A parent may justify an assault and battery, or even a homicide, in the necessary defense of the person of his child.<sup>66</sup> And he could maintain and uphold his children in their lawsuits without being guilty of the common-law offense of maintenance.<sup>67</sup>

### PARENT'S DUTY TO EDUCATE CHILD

#### 120. Parents are not under any legal duty to educate their children.

It is sometimes said by text-writers that it is the duty of a parent to give his children an education suitable to their station in life,<sup>68</sup> and there are dicta in many cases to the same effect.<sup>69</sup> This duty, however, is only a moral one. There is no legal duty on the part of a parent to educate his children, however wealthy he may be. At least, there seems to be no case in which such a duty has been enforced, either directly or indirectly. Education is not necessary to the subsistence of a child, and the reasons which should, and in some states do, render a parent legally bound to support his child do not apply.

### PARENT'S LIABILITY FOR CHILD'S TORTS

#### 121. A parent is not liable, because of the relation, for the torts of his child; but he may be liable for torts committed as his agent or servant, or with his knowledge and acquiescence.

Unlike the status of husband and wife, where the law makes the husband liable for his wife's torts,<sup>70</sup> the status of parent and child

<sup>65</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 450. A parent is bound by positive law to protect his child. *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 699, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 193.

<sup>66</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 450; 1 Hawk. P. C. 131.

<sup>67</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 450. But it is not the legal duty of a parent to engage counsel to defend his child. *Hill v. Childress*, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 514.

<sup>68</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 150; 2 Kent, Comm. 189.

<sup>69</sup> *Morse v. Welton*, 6 Conn. 547, 16 Am. Dec. 73; *Abbott v. Converse*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 533; *Lord v. Poor*, 23 Me. 569; *In re Putney*, 61 Misc. Rep. 1, 114 N. Y. Supp. 556; *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 699, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 193; *Johnson v. Terry*, 34 Conn. 259. See, also, *In re*

<sup>70</sup> Ante, p. 95.

imposes no liability on the parent for the torts of his child not committed with his knowledge, nor by his authority, express or implied.<sup>71</sup> There was such a liability under the civil law, but it never was recognized by the common law. If the parent authorizes the child to act as his servant or agent in any matter, he will be liable for any torts committed by the child in the course of this employment.<sup>72</sup> This liability does not depend upon the relationship of the parties as parent and child, but upon their relationship as principal and agent, and is governed by the rules governing other cases of agency. "A father is never liable for the wrongful acts of his minor son, unless the acts are committed with the father's consent, or in connection with the father's business."<sup>73</sup>

*Guertin's Child*, 5 Alaska, 1; *Brewer v. Cary*, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S. W. 685.

<sup>71</sup> *Moon v. Towers*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 611; *Palm v. Iverson*, 117 Ill. App. 535; *Maher v. Benedict*, 123 App. Div. 579, 108 N. Y. Supp. 228; *Chastain v. Johns*, 120 Ga. 977, 48 S. E. 343, 66 L. R. A. 958; *Miller v. Meche*, 111 La. 143, 35 South. 491; *Tift v. Tift*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 175; *Paulin v. Howser*, 63 Ill. 312; *Wilson v. Garrard*, 59 Ill. 51; *Schlossberg v. Lahr*, 60 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 450; *Brohl v. Lingeman*, 41 Mich. 711, 3 N. W. 199; *Baker v. Haldeman*, 24 Mo. 219, 69 Am. Dec. 430; *Paul v. Hummel*, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381; *Chandler v. Deaton*, 37 Tex. 406; *Edwards v. Crume*, 13 Kan. 348; *Smith v. Davenport*, 45 Kan. 423, 25 Pac. 851, 11 L. R. A. 429, 23 Am. St. Rep. 737; *McCauley v. Wood*, 2 N. J. Law, 86; *Scott v. Watson*, 46 Me. 362, 74 Am. Dec. 457; *Shockley v. Shepherd*, 9 Houst. (Del.) 270, 32 Atl. 173; *McCarthy v. Heiselman*, 140 App. Div. 240, 125 N. Y. Supp. 13; *Fanton v. Byrum*, 26 S. D. 366, 128 N. W. 325, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 501; *BRITTINGHAM v. STADIEM*, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S. E. 128, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 177; *LESSOFF v. GORDON*, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 124 S. W. 182, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 174; *Winn v. Holliday*, 109 Miss. 691, 69 South. 685; *Birch v. Abercrombie*, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59, modified on rehearing 135 Pac. 821; *Parker v. Wilson*, 179 Ala. 361, 60 South. 150, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87. A parent is not liable for the tort of his child committed while in play. *Schumer v. Register*, 12 Ga. App. 743, 78 S. E. 731.

<sup>72</sup> *Teagarden v. McLaughlin*, 86 Ind. 476, 44 Am. Rep. 332; *Strohl v. Levan*, 39 Pa. 177; *Lashbrook v. Patten*, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 317; *Beedy v. Reding*, 16 Me. 362; *Dunks v. Grey* (C. C.) 3 Fed. 862. In *Strohl v. Levan*, supra, a father was held liable in trespass for an injury inflicted by his son while driving the father's team, the father being present in the wagon at the time.

<sup>73</sup> *Smith v. Davenport*, 45 Kan. 423, 25 Pac. 851, 11 L. R. A. 429, 23 Am. St. Rep. 737. See, also, *Lemke v. Ady* (Iowa) 159 N. W. 1011. In *Tift v. Tift*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 175, an action was brought against a man for the killing of a hog by a dog, on the ground that the dog was set on by the defendant's minor daughter. In *Baker v. Haldeman*, 24 Mo. 219, 69 Am. Dec. 430, and other cases, supra, the father was sued for an assault committed by his child. In neither case was the tort committed with the father's consent,

In accordance with these principles, it has been held that the owner of an automobile is not liable for the negligent acts of his son while driving the car, unless the son was acting as the father's agent or in his service, express or implied.<sup>74</sup> He will not be liable where the son is using the car solely for his own purposes.<sup>75</sup> There is a difference of opinion on the question whether the liability of the father will attach if the son has been given permission to use the car. In some cases it has been held that the mere fact that the son, using the car for his own purposes, is doing so with the father's permission, does not make the father liable.<sup>76</sup> While in other cases the father has been held liable apparently on the ground that the son was using the car with his father's permission.<sup>77</sup> The theory in some cases seems to be that where the father has furnished an automobile as the customary conveyance of his family, the son, though driving for his own pleasure, is nevertheless engaged in the business of the father.<sup>78</sup> And it is generally held that, where

and he was held not liable. On the other hand, in *Teagarden v. McLaughlin*, 86 Ind. 476, 44 Am. Rep. 332, where a minor son had contracted with his father to clear a parcel of land, and in doing so negligently burned the property of a third person, the father was held liable, not because he was the parent of the wrongdoer, but because the wrongdoer was acting in his employment. In *LESSOFF v. GORDON*, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 124 S. W. 182, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 174, a child, in the absence of the father and in direct opposition to the wishes of the mother, attempted to pen up a cow. The cow ran into plaintiff, injuring him. It appeared that the boy had never had special care of the cow, though he had attended to feeding her occasionally. It was held that the boy's acts were not within the scope of any duty or service for the father, so as to render him liable.

<sup>74</sup> *Erlick v. Hels*, 193 Ala. 669, 69 South. 536; *Harris v. Jones*, 17 Ga. App. 215, 87 S. E. 713; *Sultzbach v. Smith*, 174 Iowa, 704, 156 N. W. 673, L. R. A. 1916F, 228; *King v. Smythe*, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918F, 293; *Warren v. Norguard*, 103 Wash. 284, 174 Pac. 7; *Watkins v. Clark*, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131.

<sup>75</sup> *Dougherty v. Woodward*, 21 Ga. App. 427, 94 S. E. 636; *Hays v. Hogan*, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918C, 715, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1127; *Lewis v. Steele*, 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575.

<sup>76</sup> *Maher v. Benedict*, 123 App. Div. 579, 108 N. Y. Supp. 228; *Lewis v. Steele*, 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575.

<sup>77</sup> *Dally v. Maxwell*, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351. Under the Nebraska statute (Rev. St. 1913, § 3048) the owner of an automobile who permits his son, under the age of 16, to operate the car, is guilty of negligence and is liable if other elements of actionable negligence are present. *Walker v. Klapp*, 99 Neb. 794, 157 N. W. 962, L. R. A. 1916E, 1292. To the same effect, see *Taylor v. Stewart*, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134.

<sup>78</sup> *Birch v. Abercromble*, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59, modified on rehearing 135 Pac. 821.

the car is used for a family purpose with the authority of the father, he is liable for the negligent acts of his son.<sup>79</sup>

The rule that the father is not liable by virtue of the relationship for the torts of his child applies, irrespective of the nature of the tort, and generally irrespective of the character of the child. A father, for instance, is not liable for an unauthorized assault by his son, though he may have known that the son was of a vicious character.<sup>80</sup> If a father knows that his minor child is committing a tort, and makes no effort to restrain him, he will be deemed to have consented and authorized its commission.<sup>81</sup> So, too, if the parent knows that the child is careless and incompetent to handle a dangerous instrumentality, such as firearms he will be liable for injuries committed by the child by the wrongful or negligent use thereof.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *Uphoff v. McCormick*, 139 Minn. 392, 166 N. W. 788; *Kayser v. Van Nest*, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 970; *Smith v. Jordan*, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761; *McNeal v. McKain*, 33 Okl. 449, 126 Pac. 742, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775.

<sup>80</sup> *Paul v. Hummel*, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381. Parents, whose son had been discharged from a hospital for the insane, are not liable for a homicide subsequently committed by him, in the absence of evidence that they could have reasonably anticipated the act of the son, because of a change in his condition after discharge. *Ballinger v. Rader*, 153 N. C. 488, 69 S. E. 497.

<sup>81</sup> In *Beedy v. Reding*, 16 Me. 362, a father was held liable in trover for wood taken at three different times by his minor sons, under circumstances which justified the jury in finding that it was taken with the father's knowledge. "The minor sons of the defendant," said the court, "being at the time members of his family, with the defendant's team, at three several times, hauled away the plaintiff's wood. This could hardly have been done without the defendant's knowledge, if it had not his approbation. It was his duty to have restrained them from trespassing on his neighbor's property." Where the father knew that his son had stretched a rope across the highway, so that a traveler was injured, he is liable. *Stewart v. Swartz*, 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N. E. 719. And see *Dunks v. Grey* (C. C.) 3 Fed. 862; *Schultz v. Morrison*, 91 Misc. Rep. 248, 154 N. Y. Supp. 257.

<sup>82</sup> *Sousa v. Irome*, 219 Mass. 273, 106 N. E. 998; *Charlton v. Jackson*, 183 Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670; *Johnson v. Glidden*, 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933, 74 Am. St. Rep. 795; *Hoverson v. Noker*, 60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382, 50 Am. Rep. 381; *Marshall v. Wymond* (Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 449. And see *Stephens v. Stephens*, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S. W. 1143, holding father liable where he permitted son 14 years old to have dynamite caps. Intrusting an automobile to a son known to be incompetent renders the parent liable, though the son was not acting as father's agent or servant. *Gardiner v. Solomon*, 200 Ala. 115, 75 South. 621, L. R. A. 1917F, 380. But an automobile is not a dangerous instrument, so as to render a parent negligent in permitting his son to use it. *Blair v. Broadwater*, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E. 632, L. R. A. 1918A, 1011.

The liability of a child for his own torts will be shown when we come to deal with the disability of infancy.<sup>83</sup>

### PARENT'S LIABILITY FOR CHILD'S CRIMES

122. The relation of parent and child does not render the parent liable for his child's crimes.

A parent may become criminally liable for the acts of his son if he counsels, aids, or abets him therein, just as he would become liable as an aider and abettor of any other criminal. But he does not incur any criminal liability for acts of his child to which he is in no way a party. The child's liability for his own crimes is hereafter shown.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Post, p. 523.

<sup>84</sup> Post, p. 529.

## CHAPTER X

## RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND OF CHILDREN

- 123. Rights of Parents in General.
- 124. Parent's Right to Correct Child.
- 125-126. Custody of Children.
- 127. Parent's Right to Child's Services and Earnings.
- 128-131. Emancipation of Children.
- 132-134. Action by Parent for Injuries to Child.
- 135-137. Action by Parent for Seduction or Debauching of Daughter.
- 138, 139. Action by Parent for Abducting, Enticing, or Harboring Child.
- 140. Parent's Rights in Child's Property.
- 141. Gifts, Conveyances, and Contracts between Parent and Child.
- 142-143. Advancements.
- 144. Duty of Child to Support Parents.
- 145. Domicile of Child.

## IN GENERAL

123. To enable them to perform their duties, parents have, subject to certain restrictions—
- (a) The right to correct their children.
  - (b) The right to their custody.
  - (c) The right to their services and earnings.

Parents possess certain powers over their children, and certain rights in relation to them. As will be seen in the following pages, they have the right to control and correct them within certain limits, the right to the custody of them, and the right to their services. Blackstone says that these rights are given to parents, partly to enable them to more effectively perform their duty, and partly as a recompense for their care and trouble in discharging it.<sup>1</sup> Kent says: "The rights of parents result from their duties. As they are bound to maintain and educate their children, the law has given them a right to such authority, and, in the support of that authority, a right to the exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred trust. This is the true foundation of parental power."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 452.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 203.

### PARENT'S RIGHT TO CORRECT CHILD

124. A parent, or one standing in loco parentis, may correct the child in a reasonable manner. If the correction is excessive or without cause, he will be amenable to the criminal law.

A parent has the right to correct and punish his minor child in a reasonable manner; and, so long as he keeps within the bounds of moderation, he cannot be made amenable to the criminal law therefor, as he would be if he undertook to punish another's child.<sup>3</sup> Persons standing in loco parentis have the same right.<sup>4</sup> A school-teacher is within the rule.<sup>5</sup> In the decided cases, the question has generally arisen in regard to the father; but there is no reason why the power of correction should not, like the power of control and the right to the child's services, pass to the mother on the father's death. Indeed, there seems no reason to doubt but that, even during the father's lifetime, except against his objection, the mother has a legal right to correct her children. As a child cannot maintain an action in tort against its parents,<sup>6</sup> a child cannot maintain a civil action against its parents, or one standing in loco parentis, for assault in administering corporal punishment.<sup>7</sup>

A parent cannot exercise the right of correction in a cruel manner, as by inflicting excessive punishment.<sup>8</sup> Nor can he inflict pun-

<sup>3</sup> 1 Hawk. P. C. 130; 1 Bl. Comm. 452; Clark, Cr. Law, 212; Winterburn v. Brooks, 2 Car. & K. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221; State v. Alford, 68 N. O. 322; Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 South. 288, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31; Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 South. 38. See, also, Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 South. 799, holding that, where a mother left her child with a person who was to support, educate, care for, and treat it as his own child, such person stood in loco parentis, and hence could not be sued by the child for a whipping inflicted on it, even though the mother stated, when she gave the child, that it was not to be whipped.

<sup>5</sup> Anderson v. State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 455, 75 Am. Dec. 774; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156; State v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 30 Am. Rep. 706; Danenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295, 35 Am. Rep. 216; Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273, 57 Am. Rep. 818.

<sup>6</sup> Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 68 L. R. A. 893, 107 Am. St. Rep. 805, 3 Ann. Cas. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa, 606, 91 N. W. 903, 94 Am. St. Rep. 318.

<sup>8</sup> Reg. v. Griffin, 11 Cox, Cr. Cas. 402; Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 283, 36 Am. Dec. 322; Com. v. Coffey, 121 Mass. 66; Com. v. Blaker, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 311; Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 281; State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa, 485; State v.

ishment wantonly and without cause.<sup>9</sup> If he transcends his authority in this respect, he will be amenable to the criminal law. He will be guilty of assault and battery,<sup>10</sup> or murder or manslaughter,<sup>11</sup> according to the circumstances. "The right of parents to chastise their refractory and disobedient children is so necessary to the government of families, and to the good order of society, that no moralist or lawgiver has ever thought of interfering with its existence, or of calling upon them to account for the manner of its exercise upon light or frivolous pretenses. But at the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be carried. In chastising a child, the parent must be careful that he does not exceed the bounds of moderation, and inflict cruel and merciless punishment. If he do, he is a trespasser, and liable to be punished by indictment. It is not, then, the infliction of punishment, but the excess, which constitutes the offense; and what this excess shall be is not a conclusion of law, but a question of fact, for the determination of the jury."<sup>12</sup>

Some of the authorities hold a parent, or one standing in loco parentis, criminally liable if, in correcting the child, he acts unreasonably—that is, if the correction is immoderate or excessive in fact—even though he may have acted honestly and without malice, and though no permanent injury may have been inflicted on the child; and they leave it to the jury exclusively to determine whether the correction was immoderate, without any further test than that of its

Jones, 95 N. C. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282; Com. v. Seed, 5 Clark (Pa.) 78; Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 South. 38.

<sup>9</sup> FLETCHER v. PEOPLE, 52 Ill. 395, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 181; Com. v. Coffey, 121 Mass. 66; Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221; State v. Jones, 95 N. C. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282; Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N. E. 777. It is held that, where the relation of parent and child exists, the child cannot maintain an action for damages against the parent for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted. "The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families, and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand." Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 South. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682.

<sup>10</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 212.

<sup>11</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 158, 172.

<sup>12</sup> Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 283, 36 Am. Dec. 322.

being reasonable.<sup>13</sup> According to the better opinion, however, the jury are not to be permitted to determine in all cases, without regard to any fixed rule or standard, whether the correction was, in their opinion, unreasonable, and therefore excessive. Parents must be allowed to exercise some discretion. A jury cannot exercise it for them. The court should therefore instruct the jury that they are not justified in finding that the parent is criminally liable because he exceeded his authority, unless they find that he inflicted permanent injury, or that he acted from malice.<sup>14</sup> As was said by the North Carolina court: "It would be a dangerous innovation, fruitful in mischief, if, in disregard of an established rule assigning limits to parental power, it were to be left to the jury to determine in each case whether a chastisement was excessive and cruel, and to convict when such was their opinion."<sup>15</sup> "The law has provided no means whereby a parent meditating chastisement, can first obtain a judicial opinion as to its necessity, the proper instruments, and its due extent. In reason, therefore, if he acts in good faith, prompted by true parental love, without passion, and inflicts no permanent injury on the child, he should not be punished merely because a jury, reviewing the case, do not deem that it was wise to proceed so far."<sup>16</sup> Malice on the part of the parent may, of course, be inferred from the circumstances, the fault for which the punishment was inflicted, the instrument used, etc.<sup>17</sup> Thus, malice may

<sup>13</sup> *Patterson v. Nutter*, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273, 57 Am. Rep. 818; *Johnson v. State*, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 283, 36 Am. Dec. 322; *Hinkle v. State*, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N. E. 777; *Neal v. State*, 54 Ga. 281.

<sup>14</sup> *State v. Jones*, 95 N. C. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282; *State v. Alford*, 68 N. C. 322; *State v. Pendergrass*, 19 N. C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416; *Com. v. Seed*, 5 Clark (Pa.) 78; *Boyd v. State*, 88 Ala. 169, 7 South. 268, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31; *Dean v. State*, 89 Ala. 46, 8 South. 38.

<sup>15</sup> *State v. Jones*, 95 N. C. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282.

<sup>16</sup> 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 882. "There are some well-considered authorities which hold teachers and parents alike liable, criminally, if, in the infliction of chastisement, they act clearly without the exercise of reasonable judgment and discretion. The test which seems to be fixed by these cases is the general judgment of reasonable men. *Patterson v. Nutter*, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273, 57 Am. Rep. 818. The more correct view, however, and the one better sustained by authority, seems to be that when, in the judgment of reasonable men, the punishment inflicted is immoderate and excessive, and a jury would be authorized, from the facts of the case, to infer that it was induced by legal malice, or wickedness of motive, the limit of lawful authority may be adjudged to be passed." *Boyd v. State*, 88 Ala. 169, 7 South. 268, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31.

<sup>17</sup> *Boyd v. State*, 88 Ala. 169, 7 South. 268, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31.

well be inferred where a father strikes his 10 year old daughter with a saw;<sup>18</sup> or leaves his 12 year old daughter in the house alone, tied to a piece of furniture;<sup>19</sup> or keeps his blind son shut up for several days in winter, in a cold, damp cellar;<sup>20</sup> or strikes his son several times in the face with his fist, and with the butt end of a stick, and uses language showing passion.<sup>21</sup>

In all cases the legal presumption is that the correction was proper, and the burden of proof is on him who contends that it was otherwise.<sup>22</sup>

### CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

125. At common law, in England, the father, and on his death the mother, was entitled, as a matter of course, to the custody and control of their minor children except in case of their gross unfitness. Equity, however, would not allow the right to control as against the well-being of the child. The common-law doctrine has also been modified by statute in England.

126. In this country the courts recognize the parental right of custody in the different jurisdictions, but the prevailing doctrine is that, in awarding the custody of a child, the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration. The courts consider, not only the fitness of the persons contending for the custody, but the condition and future prospects of the child, and the wishes of the child where it is old enough to decide intelligently.

At common law the father is entitled to the custody of his minor child. Some cases recognize this as an absolute right, except in the case of the most flagrant unfitness, and have awarded the father the custody of his child without taking the interests of the child into consideration at all.<sup>23</sup> The right has been upheld even to the extent

<sup>18</sup> *Neal v. State*, 54 Ga. 281.

<sup>19</sup> *Hinkle v. State*, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N. E. 777.

<sup>20</sup> *FLETCHER v. PEOPLE*, 52 Ill. 395, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 181.

<sup>21</sup> *Boyd v. State*, 88 Ala. 169, 7 South. 268, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31.

<sup>22</sup> See *Anderson v. State*, 3 Head (Tenn.) 455, 75 Am. Dec. 774.

<sup>23</sup> *Ex parte Hopkins*, 3 P. Wms. 152; *Rex v. De Manneville*, 5 East, 221; *Rex v. Greenhill*, 4 Adol. & E. 624; *Ex parte Skinner*, 9 Moore, 278; *In re Andrews*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153; *People v. Olmstead*, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 9.

of allowing the father to take an infant from its mother's breast.<sup>24</sup> After the death of the father, the right to the custody of the children passes to the mother.<sup>25</sup>

The common-law rule of the husband's paramount right to the custody of his children was modified in England by an act passed in 1839, known as "Talfourd's Act," conferring authority on the Court of Chancery to award to the mother the custody of children under the age of 7,<sup>26</sup> and again by the "Infant's Custody Act," of 1873, conferring such authority as to children under 16.<sup>27</sup> Long prior to these acts, the Court of Chancery in England had departed from the strict rule of the common law, and had refused to recognize any right in the father to demand the custody of his child, regardless of the child's interests, and had interfered to protect the welfare of the child;<sup>28</sup> and the rule there is now well settled that a court exercising chancery jurisdiction will primarily consider the welfare of the child.<sup>29</sup>

In this country the courts, both of law and of equity, while recognizing the common-law rule that the right to the custody of the child is primarily in the father,<sup>30</sup> and after his death in the mother,<sup>31</sup> have modified the rule to a greater or less extent, and regarding the father's paramount right at common law as a mere *prima facie* right,<sup>32</sup> which is not inalienable,<sup>33</sup> have adopted the equitable principle that this right must yield to considerations affecting the well-being of the child.<sup>34</sup> While there is some conflict in the cases, the great weight of authority establishes the following propositions:

<sup>24</sup> *Rex v. De Manneville*, 5 East, 221.

<sup>25</sup> *Villareal v. Mellish*, 2 Swanst. 536; *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; *Brackett v. Brackett*, 77 N. H. 68, 87 Atl. 252; *Cook v. Bybee*, 24 Tex. 278.

<sup>26</sup> St. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54.

<sup>27</sup> St. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12.

<sup>28</sup> 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1341; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. 1; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh. (N. S.) 141.

<sup>29</sup> *Reg. v. Gyngall*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 232.

<sup>30</sup> *Brackett v. Brackett*, 77 N. H. 68, 87 Atl. 252.

<sup>31</sup> *Brackett v. Brackett*, 77 N. H. 68, 87 Atl. 252; *In re Lindner's Estate*, 13 Cal. App. 208, 109 Pac. 101. Where the mother had been awarded the custody of the child and subsequently died (the father) was entitled to the custody of the child, if a proper person. *In re Smith's Guardianship* (Iowa) 158 N. W. 578.

<sup>32</sup> *Jensen v. Jensen*, 168 Wis. 502, 170 N. W. 735.

<sup>33</sup> *State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher*, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 696.

<sup>34</sup> *Dumain v. Gwynne*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 270; *Wadleigh v. Newhall* (C. C.)

(1) Though the courts have a discretion in contentions over the custody of children, and will take into consideration the welfare of the child, the right of the father is generally held to be paramount, if he is a fit person.<sup>55</sup> The courts cannot act arbitrarily, and disregard the rights of the father, merely because the prospects and surroundings of the child will be brighter if he is awarded to some other and more wealthy person. The parent cannot be deprived of the custody of his children because he is poor, and occupies a humble station in life, and a more wealthy and refined person is willing to take them, and give them better advantages.<sup>56</sup> As

186 Fed. 941; *WARD v. WARD*, 84 Tex. Civ. App. 104, 77 S. W. 829, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 189; *In re Smith*, 13 Ill. 138; *Cowls v. Cowls*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708; *State v. Baird*, 21 N. J. Eq. 384; *State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher*, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028, *Ann. Cas.* 1915D, 696; *Jensen v. Jensen*, 168 Wis. 502, 170 N. W. 735; *Peese v. Gellerman*, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 110 S. W. 196; *State v. Flint*, 63 Minn. 187, 65 N. W. 272; *Schroeder v. State*, 41 Neb. 745, 60 N. W. 89; *Slater v. Slater*, 90 Va. 845, 20 S. E. 780; *Corrie v. Corrie*, 42 Mich. 509, 4 N. W. 218; *Rowe v. Rowe*, 28 Mich. 353; *In re Heather Children*, 50 Mich. 261, 15 N. W. 487; *Saunders v. Saunders*, 166 Ala. 351, 52 South. 310; *Steele v. Hohenadel*, 141 Ill. App. 201, affirmed *Hohenadel v. Steele*, 237 Ill. 229, 86 N. E. 717; *Waters v. Gray* (Mo. App.) 193 S. W. 33; *Knapp v. Tolan*, 26 N. D. 23, 142 N. W. 915, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83; *Brackett v. Brackett*, 77 N. H. 68, 87 Atl. 252.

<sup>55</sup> *Verser v. Ford*, 37 Ark. 27; *Terry v. Johnson*, 73 Neb. 653, 103 N. W. 319; *GILMORE v. KITSON*, 165 Ind. 402, 74 N. E. 1083, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 182; *Parker v. Wiggins* (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 788; *Hernandez v. Thomas*, 50 Fla. 522, 39 South. 641, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 111 Am. St. Rep. 137, 7 Ann. Cas. 446; *State v. Richardson*, 40 N. H. 272; *People v. Sinclair*, 47 Misc. Rep. 230, 95 N. Y. Supp. 861; *Rust v. Vanvacter*, 9 W. Va. 600; *Henson v. Walts*, 40 Ind. 170; *Draper v. Draper*, 68 Ill. 17; *State v. Barney*, 14 R. I. 62; *Johnson v. Terry*, 34 Conn. 259; *People v. Olmstead*, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; *Lovell v. House of Good Shepherd*, 9 Wash. 419, 37 Pac. 660, 43 Am. St. Rep. 839; *Brinster v. Compton*, 68 Ala. 299; *Slater v. Slater*, 90 Va. 845, 20 S. E. 780; *Latham v. Ellis*, 116 N. C. 30, 20 S. E. 1012; *People ex rel. Snell v. Snell*, 77 Misc. Rep. 538, 137 N. Y. Supp. 193; *Brackett v. Brackett*, 77 N. H. 68, 87 Atl. 252; *Buchanan v. Buchanan*, 93 Kan. 613, 144 Pac. 840; *Kirkland v. Matthews* (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 830. The father is entitled to the custody, even against a guardian appointed without his consent. *In re Schwartz*, 171 Cal. 633, 154 Pac. 304. In Idaho the father has no absolute right to deprive the mother of the custody of an infant child merely because he is the father. *State v. Beslin*, 19 Idaho, 185, 112 Pac. 1053.

<sup>56</sup> *Swarens v. Swarens*, 78 Kan. 682, 97 Pac. 968; *People ex rel. Beaudoin v. Beaudoin*, 126 App. Div. 505, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1092, affirmed 193 N. Y. 611, 86 N. E. 1129; *Wohlford v. Burckhardt*, 141 Ill. App. 321; *Hernandez v. Thomas*, 50 Fla. 522, 39 South. 641, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 111 Am. St. Rep. 137, 7 Ann. Cas. 446; *Cormack v. Marshall*, 122 Ill. App. 208; *Dunkin v. Seifert*, 123 Iowa, 64, 98 N. W. 558.

was said by the Arkansas court: "It is one of the cardinal principles of nature and of law that as against strangers, the father, however poor and humble, if able to support the child in his own style of life, and of good moral character, cannot, without the most shocking injustice, be deprived of the privilege by any one whatever, however brilliant the advantage he may offer. It is not enough to consider the interests of the child alone."<sup>37</sup> While the welfare of the child is always to be considered, due weight must always be given to the legal rights of the father. "The discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one, but, in the absence of any positive disqualification of the father for the proper discharge of his parental duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount right to the custody of his infant child, which no court is at liberty to disregard. And, while we are bound to also regard the permanent interests and welfare of the child, it is to be presumed that its interests and welfare will be best promoted by continuing that guardianship which the law has provided, until it is made plainly to appear that the father is no longer worthy of the trust."<sup>38</sup>

(2) The best interests of the child are always to be considered, having due regard to the parental rights of the father.<sup>39</sup> Few cases can be found in which a child has been taken from a father, who was able and willing to support it, and who had been guilty of no breach of duty towards it, and given to a stranger or to a more distant relative. An examination of the cases will show that where the supposed interests of the child have been allowed to control as against the right of the father, the father has been guilty of some breach of his duty to the child. If a father, or one standing in loco parentis, is a drunkard, or a criminal, or cruel,<sup>40</sup> or shiftless, or otherwise unfit,<sup>41</sup> the interests of the child should outweigh his paren-

<sup>37</sup> *Verser v. Ford*, 37 Ark. 27.

<sup>38</sup> *State v. Richardson*, 40 N. H. 272; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 103 Va. 750, 50 S. E. 273. It has been held, however, that where husband and wife are separated the question which one of them is entitled to the custody of their child is within the sound discretion of the court. *Lozano v. Martinez*, 36 Phil. Rep. 976.

<sup>39</sup> *Commonwealth v. Strickland*, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 309; *Parker v. Wiggins* (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 788; *Mason v. Williams*, 165 Ky. 331, 176 S. W. 1171; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 103 Va. 750, 50 S. E. 273; *Wadleigh v. Newhall* (C. C.) 136 Fed. 941.

<sup>40</sup> *Marshall v. Reams*, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118; *In re Gustow*, 220 N. Y. 373, 115 N. E. 995.

<sup>41</sup> *Chapsky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321; *In re Brown*, 117 Ill.

tal right of custody. So, if a father deserts his wife and child when the child is helpless, and leaves her or others to perform his duties for him, the welfare of the child may outweigh his parental right when he subsequently seeks the aid of the court to regain the custody which he has thus relinquished.<sup>42</sup> And even where he relinquishes the custody of his child to another at the latter's request, and for what he supposes to be the interests of the child, he may be regarded, in a sense, as having neglected his duty as a father; and his right to the child's custody when he seeks to regain it, particularly after the lapse of years, will have to yield to the child's interests.<sup>43</sup>

Almost all the cases in which the father's right to the custody of his child has been denied are cases in which he was unfit to have the care of the child, or else cases in which he had relinquished his right for a time, and sought the aid of the court to regain custody. Manifestly, in these cases, he has no right to complain if the court regards the child's welfare as the controlling consideration, even where he is able, ready, and willing to perform his duty in the future.<sup>44</sup>

App. 332; *Plahn v. Dribred*, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 600, 83 S. W. 867; *Cowls v. Cowls*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708.

<sup>42</sup> *McShan v. McShan*, 56 Miss. 413. And see *Schroeder v. State*, 41 Neb. 745, 60 N. W. 89; *Hewitt v. Long*, 76 Ill. 399.

<sup>43</sup> *Chapsky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321; *Washaw v. Gimble*, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S. W. 389; *Wood v. Wood*, 77 N. J. Eq. 593, 77 Atl. 91; *People v. Porter*, 23 Ill. App. 196. The child's interests, of course, may require it to be restored to the father in such a case. See *Armstrong v. Stone*, 9 Grat. (Va.) 102.

<sup>44</sup> *U. S. v. Green*, 3 Mason, 482, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256; *Mercein v. People*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 64, 35 Am. Dec. 653; *Waldron's Case*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; *Corrie v. Corrie*, 42 Mich. 509, 4 N. W. 213; *Ex parte Schumpert*, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 344; *Bonnett v. Bonnett*, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N. W. 91, 47 Am. Rep. 810; *State v. Stigall*, 22 N. J. Law, 286; *Bryan v. Lyon*, 104 Ind. 227, 3 N. E. 880, 54 Am. Rep. 309; *In re Smith*, 13 Ill. 138; *Gishwiller v. Dodez*, 4 Ohio St. 615; *McShan v. McShan*, 56 Miss. 413; *Washaw v. Gimble*, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S. W. 389; *Gibbs v. Brown*, 68 Ga. 803; *Ex parte Murphy*, 75 Ala. 409; *Brinster v. Compton*, 68 Ala. 299; *Sturtevant v. State*, 15 Neb. 459, 19 N. W. 617, 48 Am. Rep. 349. In *Wood v. Wood*, 77 N. J. Eq. 593, 77 Atl. 91, a girl six years old had been placed by her father, the mother consenting, in the care of her aunts, to be brought up and educated by them. She had a good home, loving care and was brought up under much better conditions than it was within the power of the parents to afford. The conduct of the parents showed their confidence in the aunts and their belief that it was for the child's welfare to remain with them. The father died, leaving his family in poor circumstances. The mother, while finding no fault with the aunts' method of bringing up the child, attempted to regain custody, apparently to

"As to the question of the right of the father to have the custody of his infant child, in a general sense it is true. But this is not on account of any absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the infant; the law presuming it to be for its interest to be under the nurture and care of his natural protector, both for maintenance and education. When, therefore, the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into the custody of the father, and to withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all the circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent interest of the infant; and, if the infant be of sufficient discretion, it will also consult its personal wishes. It will free it from all undue restraint, and endeavor, as far as possible, to administer a conscientious, parental duty with reference to its welfare. It is an entire mistake to suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or that the latter has an absolute vested right in the custody."<sup>45</sup> "When an infant child or minor is out of the possession and custody of the father, and habeas corpus is resorted to by the latter to obtain such custody, it does not follow as necessary matter of right that the prayer of the petition will be granted. The court is clothed with a sound discretion to grant or refuse relief, always to be exercised for the benefit of the infant primarily, but not arbitrarily in disregard of the father's natural right to be preferred. If the father be reasonably suitable, and able to maintain and rear his child, his prayer should ordinarily be granted."<sup>46</sup>

There may be cases in which the court, from a consideration of the child's welfare, would not award its custody to the father, even though no fault or neglect of duty could be imputed to him. A child of very tender years needs the care and attention of a mother, and even were she to desert the father, without any fault on his part, the child would not be taken from her, at least until it has reached an age when the father can properly care for it.<sup>47</sup> It can

make use of the child and to have her "rough it" at home with the younger children. It was held that the child should remain in the custody of the aunts.

<sup>45</sup> Per Story, J., in *U. S. v. Green*, 3 Mason, 482, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256.

<sup>46</sup> *Brinster v. Compton*, 68 Ala. 299.

<sup>47</sup> In *re Bort*, 25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255; *McKim v. McKim*, 12 R. I. 462, 34 Am. Rep. 694; *Ex parte Schumpert*, 6 Rich. (S. O.) 344; *Com. v. Addicks*, 5 Bln. (Pa.) 520; *Patterson v. Patterson*, 86 Ark. 64, 109 S. W. 1168; *Turner v. Turner*, 93 Miss. 167, 46 South. 413; *People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair*, 91 App. Div. 322, 86 N. Y. Supp. 539 (but see *Id.*, 47 Misc. Rep. 230, 95 N. Y. Supp. 861); *State v. Paine*, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 523; *State v.*

only be in such cases as this, where the child, from its extreme youth or sickness, needs a mother's care, that the court can deprive the father of the right to the child's custody, where the father can properly care for the child, and is in every way a fit person to have the charge of it, and has not in any way neglected the child or relinquished his rights. This is true in contentions between father and mother after they have separated, as well as in contentions between the father and strangers.<sup>48</sup>

(3) In arriving at a determination as to what is best for the welfare and happiness of the child, the court will consider the ties of nature and of association;<sup>49</sup> the character and feelings of the parties contending for the custody;<sup>50</sup> the age,<sup>51</sup> health,<sup>52</sup> and sex of the child; the moral or immoral surroundings of its life; the benefits of education and development; and the pecuniary prospects.<sup>53</sup> All these considerations enter into the judicial determination.<sup>54</sup>

King, Ga. Dec. 98, pt. 1; *Miner v. Miner*, 11 Ill. 43; *Anon.*, 55 Ala. 428; *Com. v. Demott*, 64 Pa. 805, note; *Chandler v. Chandler*, 24 Mich. 176; *Scoggins v. Scoggins* 80 N. C. 318. But see *Hewitt's Case*, 11 Rich. (S. C.) 326; *Carr v. Carr*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 168.

<sup>48</sup> See *McKim v. McKim*, 12 R. I. 462, 34 Am. Rep. 694; *Com. v. Addicks*, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 174; *Com. v. Briggs*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 208; *Bennett v. Bennett*, 43 Conn. 313; *Scoggins v. Scoggins*, 80 N. C. 318; *Welch v. Welch*, 33 Wis. 534; *Carr v. Carr*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 168. Where a husband and wife have separated because unable to agree, and there is no evidence that they are not equally fit custodians of their son five years old, the father, by reason of his paramount right in law, will be awarded such custody. *People v. Sinclair*, 47 Misc. Rep. 230, 95 N. Y. Supp. 861.

<sup>49</sup> Thus, where the father has allowed his child to be cared for and raised by others until it has become attached to them, this fact will influence the court in determining whether it will, after the lapse of years, give the custody to the father. "It is an obvious fact that ties of blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of the child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on the ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel." *Chapasky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321. And see *Washaw v. Gimble*, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S. W. 389; note 73, *infra*.

<sup>50</sup> *Richards v. Collins*, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726; *Sheers v. Stein*, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. 728, 5 L. R. A. 781; *Holmes' Case*, 19 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 329.

<sup>51</sup> *Haskell v. Haskell*, 152 Mass. 16, 24 N. E. 859; *McKim v. McKim*, 12 R. I. 462, 34 Am. Rep. 694; notes 47, *supra*, and 64, *infra*.

<sup>52</sup> *Richards v. Collins*, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726; *McKim v. McKim*, 12 R. I. 462, 34 Am. Rep. 694; *HUSSEY v. WHITING*, 145 Ind. 580, 44 N. E. 639, 57 Am. St. Rep. 220, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 186; *Gardenhire v. Hinds*, 1 Head (Tenn.) 402.

<sup>53</sup> *Armstrong v. Stone*, 9 Grat. (Va.) 102; *Lyons v. Blenkin*, Jac. 245; *Gar-*

<sup>54</sup> *Marshall v. Reams*, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118. See *Slater v. Slater*, 90 Va. 845, 20 S. E. 780.

Where the child has reached the age of discretion, it will often be allowed to make its own choice, and its wishes will always be taken into consideration.<sup>55</sup> But the choice of the child is not a controlling consideration. Welfare controls choice, and the court will not permit the choice of the child to lead it into an improper custody.<sup>56</sup> In this connection the rights of parents and guardians should also be respected, and such rights will not be disregarded by the court to gratify the mere wishes of a child, when the parent or guardian is a proper person to be intrusted with its custody.<sup>57</sup> There is no fixed age when the discretion of a child begins, but mental capacity is the test.<sup>58</sup>

### *In Cases of Divorce*

Though the court, in case of divorce, is inclined so to award the custody of the children to the innocent party,<sup>59</sup> it does not follow as a matter of course that the complainant in the divorce suit is entitled to the custody of the infant children.<sup>60</sup> The question of the custody of the children is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court,<sup>61</sup> and there is no absolute rule by which it can be determined which of the two contesting parties is entitled to the custody.<sup>62</sup> As in other cases, the general rule is that the best interests of the child will determine its custody.<sup>63</sup> If, for instance, the

denhire v. Hinds, 1 Head (Tenn.) 402. But pecuniary benefit is not controlling. Dunkin v. Seifert, 123 Iowa, 64, 98 N. W. 558.

<sup>55</sup> Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274; U. S. v. Green, 3 Mason, 482, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256; State v. Bratton, 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 359; Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593; Brinster v. Compton, 68 Ala. 299; Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433, 3 Am. St. Rep. 115; State v. Paine, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 523; Shaw v. Nachtwey, 43 Iowa, 653; Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726; Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. 399.

<sup>56</sup> Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118.

<sup>57</sup> Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118.

<sup>58</sup> Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 South. 95, 37 Am. St. Rep. 118; Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726.

<sup>59</sup> Caldwell v. Caldwell, 141 Iowa, 192, 119 N. W. 599.

<sup>60</sup> See Hazelton v. Hazelton, 162 Mich. 192, 127 N. W. 297; Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah, 242, 139 Pac. 937.

<sup>61</sup> Seeley v. Seeley, 30 App. D. C. 191, 12 Ann. Cas. 1058, certiorari denied 209 U. S. 544, 28 Sup. Ct. 570, 52 L. Ed. 919; Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa, 419, 116 N. W. 608; Royal v. Royal, 167 Ala. 510, 52 South. 735.

<sup>62</sup> Kjellander v. Kjellander, 92 Kan. 42, 139 Pac. 1013.

<sup>63</sup> Adams v. Adams, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 167; Giles v. Giles, 30 Neb. 624, 46 N. W. 916; Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mass. 16, 24 N. E. 859; In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255; Lusk v. Lusk, 28 Mo. 91; Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534; Irwin v. Irwin, 96 Ky. 318, 28 S. W. 664, and 30 S. W. 417; Luck v.

child is of such tender years, or in such delicate health, that it needs a mother's care, particularly if it is a girl, its custody will ordinarily be awarded to the mother, at least temporarily, even where the husband is without fault.<sup>64</sup> And if one of the parties is an unfit person to have the custody of the children, and the other is a fit person, their custody will be awarded to the latter.<sup>65</sup>

The decree in a divorce suit does not permanently settle the right to custody of children in awarding the custody to one of the parties. A change of circumstances may authorize the court to order a change of custody.<sup>66</sup> For instance, should the mother, to whom the custody of a child is awarded on divorce, afterwards become an unfit person to be intrusted with the child, the father, if a fit person, might obtain the custody.<sup>67</sup> So, where the spouse to whom the cus-

*Luck*, 92 Cal. 653, 28 Pac. 787; *Beyerle v. Beyerle*, 155 Cal. 266, 100 Pac. 702; *Keesling v. Keesling*, 42 Ind. App. 361, 85 N. E. 837; *Wandersee v. Wandersee*, 132 Minn. 321, 156 N. W. 348; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 52 Wash. 679, 101 Pac. 358; *Kentzler v. Kentzler*, 8 Wash. 166, 28 Pac. 370, 28 Am. St. Rep. 21; *Umlauf v. Umlauf*, 128 Ill. 378, 21 N. E. 600; *In re Krauthoff*, 191 Mo. App. 149, 177 S. W. 1112; *Cowls v. Cowls*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708. When necessary to promote the welfare of the children, the court may take them away from both parents and award the custody to a third person. *Collins v. Collins*, 76 Kan. 93, 90 Pac. 809.

<sup>64</sup> See the cases above cited. And see *Messenger v. Messenger*, 56 Mo. 329; *Lusk v. Lusk*, 28 Mo. 91; *Chandler v. Chandler*, 24 Mich. 176; *Klein v. Klein*, 47 Mich. 518, 11 N. W. 367; *Wann v. Wann*, 85 Ark. 471, 108 S. W. 1052; *Wills v. Wills*, 168 Ky. 35, 181 S. W. 619; *Boxa v. Boxa*, 92 Neb. 78, 137 N. W. 986; *Draper v. Draper*, 68 Ill. 17. But see *Carr v. Carr*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 168; *Welch v. Welch*, 83 Wis. 534. In *Weiss v. Weiss*, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587, the court held that, even though the children were very young and the mother a fit person, the custody should be awarded according to the best interests of the children. The wishes of the parents is of secondary consideration, and even comparative fitness or unfitness is not controlling.

<sup>65</sup> *Irwin v. Irwin*, 96 Ky. 318, 30 S. W. 417; *Thiesing v. Thiesing*, 26 S. W. 718, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 115; *Flory v. Ostrom*, 92 Mich. 622, 52 N. W. 1038; *Schichtl v. Schichtl*, 88 Iowa, 210, 55 N. W. 309; *Blid v. Blid*, 82 Neb. 294, 117 N. W. 700; *Penn v. Penn*, 37 Okl. 650, 133 Pac. 207; *Miner v. Miner*, 11 Ill. 43; *Cowls v. Cowls*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708; *Umlauf v. Umlauf*, 128 Ill. 378, 21 N. E. 600.

<sup>66</sup> *Draper v. Draper*, 68 Ill. 17; *Oliver v. Oliver*, 151 Mass. 349, 24 N. E. 51. Compare *Wilkinson v. Deming*, 80 Ill. 342, 22 Am. Rep. 192; *Hayes v. Hayes*, 192 Ala. 280, 68 South. 351; *Meffert v. Meffert*, 118 Ark. 582, 177 S. W. 1; *McKay v. McKay*, 77 Or. 14, 149 Pac. 1032; *Beyerle v. Beyerle*, 155 Cal. 266, 100 Pac. 702; *Morrill v. Morrill*, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. 1; *State ex rel. Bush v. Trahan*, 125 La. 312, 51 South. 216. To justify a change of the custody, there should be a material change in the circumstances, making it equitable that different terms be imposed. *Kinney v. Kinney*, 150 Iowa, 225, 129 N. W. 826; *Julian v. Julian*, 60 Ind. App. 520, 111 N. E. 196.

<sup>67</sup> *Morin v. Morin*, 66 Wash. 312, 119 Pac. 745, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 585, where the mother became insane.

today is awarded, even though it may have been so awarded because of the unfitness of the other, afterwards dies, the other may obtain the custody, by showing that he has become fit for it, and that it will be for the child's interest.<sup>68</sup>

### *Agreement as to Custody of Child*

The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the position that an agreement entered into by a father, for the relinquishment of his right to the custody of his child, is void as against public policy, and will not even bind him.<sup>69</sup> "The care and custody of minor children is a personal trust in the father, and he has no general power to dispose of them to another."<sup>70</sup> Such an agreement, however, is not to be entirely ignored. "It is to be considered, not for the purpose of fixing the rights of the parties, but for the purpose of shedding light upon their actual relations and feelings for the infant, and assisting the exercise of a wise discretion by the court as to what disposition should be made of it for the promotion of its own welfare."<sup>71</sup> In other words, although the law does not countenance

<sup>68</sup> *Bryan v. Lyon*, 104 Ind. 227, 3 N. E. 880, 54 Am. Rep. 309. And see *Schammel v. Schammel*, 105 Cal. 258, 38 Pac. 729; *Purdy v. Ernst*, 93 Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429.

<sup>69</sup> *Queen v. Smith*, 22 Law J. Q. B. 116; *In re Edwards*, 42 Law J. Q. B. 99; *Hernandez v. Thomas*, 50 Fla. 522, 39 South. 641, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 111 Am. St. Rep. 137, 7 Ann. Cas. 446; *Cormack v. Marshall*, 122 Ill. App. 208; *In re Galleher*, 2 Cal. App. 364, 84 Pac. 352; *Carey v. Hertel*, 37 Wash. 27, 79 Pac. 432; *Wood v. Shaw*, 92 Kan. 70, 139 Pac. 1165; *Marks v. Wooster* (Mo. App.) 199 S. W. 446; *State v. Baldwin*, 5 N. J. Eq. 454, 45 Am. Dec. 397; *Chapsky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321; *Cook v. Bybee*, 24 Tex. 278; *Brooke v. Logan*, 112 Ind. 183, 13 N. E. 669, 2 Am. St. Rep. 177; *Stapleton v. Poynter*, 111 Ky. 264, 62 S. W. 730, 53 L. R. A. 784, 98 Am. St. Rep. 411; *Washaw v. Gimble*, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S. W. 389; *State v. Libbey*, 44 N. H. 321, 82 Am. Dec. 223. This principle prevents a father from making an irrevocable agreement with his wife, on separation, by which he relinquishes to her the custody of their children. *People v. Mercen*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 410, 38 Am. Dec. 644; *Johnson v. Terry*, 34 Conn. 259. Where the father and mother are separated, the mother cannot by written agreement vest the custody of the child in the maternal grandmother as against the father. *Mason v. Williams*, 165 Ky. 331, 176 S. W. 1171. And, to the same effect, see *Long v. Smith* (Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 25; *Bailey v. Gaston*, 8 Ala. App. 476, 62 South. 1017. In many states by statute the father cannot by agreement transfer the custody to a third person as against the mother. See *Zink v. Milner*, 39 Okl. 347, 135 Pac. 1, applying Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, § 4899. See, also, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, § 4424. An agreement for custody, being revocable, is revoked on the death of the parent making it, if the other parent survives. *Smith v. Young*, 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628.

<sup>70</sup> *State v. Baldwin*, 5 N. J. Eq. 454, 45 Am. Dec. 397.

<sup>71</sup> *Weir v. Marley*, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S. W. 798, 6 L. R. A. 672,

agreements whereby a father seeks to transfer to another the custody of his child, such agreements, when carried out by the parties, may have the indirect effect of preventing the father from reasserting his right, the interests of the child in such cases being the controlling consideration.<sup>72</sup>

It has frequently been held that the custody of a child will not be restored to a parent who has transferred its custody to another, where the child, by being thus separated from him for years, has transferred its interests and affections to its adopted home, and become estranged from its parent, on the ground that it would be a serious injury to the child to sever the ties that bind it to its adopted home and its adopted parents, and compel it to return.<sup>73</sup> "After the affections of both child and adopted parent become engaged, and a state of things has arisen which cannot be altered without risking the happiness of the child, and the father wants to reclaim it, the better opinion is that he is not in a position to have the interference of the court in his favor. His parental right must yield to the feelings, interests, and rights of others acquired with his consent."<sup>74</sup>

Some of the courts, contrary to the view above stated, have held that a parent can, by agreement, surrender the custody of his infant child so as to make the custody of him to whom he surrenders it legal as against him.<sup>75</sup> Even in these jurisdictions, however, a parent

<sup>72</sup> *Fletcher v. Hickman*, 50 W. Va. 244, 40 S. E. 371, 55 L. R. A. 896, 88 Am. St. Rep. 862.

<sup>73</sup> *Weir v. Marley*, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S. W. 798, 6 L. R. A. 672; *Chapsky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321; *Washaw v. Gimble*, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S. W. 389; *Richards v. Collins*, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726; *Bently v. Terry*, 59 Ga. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 399; *Merritt v. Swimley*, 82 Va. 433, 3 Am. St. Rep. 115; *Bonnett v. Bonnett*, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N. W. 91, 47 Am. Rep. 810; *Sheers v. Stein*, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. 728, 5 L. R. A. 781; *Hoxsie v. Potter*, 16 R. I. 374, 17 Atl. 129; *In re Murphy*, 12 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 513; *Clark v. Bayer*, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593; *Parker v. Wiggins* (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 788.

<sup>74</sup> *Clark v. Bayer*, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593.

<sup>75</sup> *Bonnett v. Bonnett*, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N. W. 91, 47 Am. Rep. 810; *Miller v. Miller*, 123 Iowa, 165, 98 N. W. 631. And see *Plahn v. Dribred*, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 600, 83 S. W. 867; *Bently v. Terry*, 59 Ga. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 399; *Eaves v. Fears*, 131 Ga. 820, 64 S. E. 269; *Wilkinson v. Lee*, 138 Ga. 360, 75 S. E. 477, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1013; *State v. Smith*, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 463, 20 Am. Dec. 324; *McDowle's Case*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 328; *State v. Barrett*, 45 N. H. 15; *Curtis v. Curtis*, 5 Gray (Mass.) 535; *Dumain v. Gwynne*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 270; *Com. v. Barney*, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 409; *In re Goodenough*, 19 Wis. 274.

cannot, by surrendering the custody of his child to another, prevent the courts from changing the custody where the welfare of the child demands it.<sup>76</sup>

As has been shown in a previous chapter, statutes have been enacted in most states by which parents may consent to the adoption of their children by another. Here, of course, the legal adoption is binding.<sup>77</sup> So, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, parents may bind out their children as apprentices.<sup>78</sup>

### PARENT'S RIGHT TO CHILD'S SERVICES AND EARNINGS

127. The father, and, by the weight of authority, the mother on his death, is entitled to a minor child's services and earnings, while the child lives with and is supported by them, and has not been emancipated. When he has been emancipated, however, this right ceases, and with it, of course, all rights which are dependent upon it.

So long as a minor child lives with or is supported by its parents, and has not been emancipated,<sup>79</sup> the father is entitled to its services and earnings.<sup>80</sup> The right to a child's services is generally said to

<sup>76</sup> *Bonnett v. Bonnett*, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N. W. 91, 47 Am. Rep. 810; *Chap-sky v. Wood*, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321.

<sup>77</sup> *Ante*, p. 310.

<sup>78</sup> *Post*, p. 571.

<sup>79</sup> As to the emancipation of children, see *post*, p. 353.

<sup>80</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 453; *Benson v. Remington*, 2 Mass. 113; *Plummer v. Webb*, 4 Mason, 380, Fed. Cas. No. 11,233; *Gale v. Parrott*, 1 N. H. 28; *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204; *Lord v. Poor*, 23 Me. 569; *Magee v. Magee*, 65 Ill. 255; *Galligan v. Woonsocket St. Ry. Co.*, 27 R. I. 363, 62 Atl. 376; *Allen v. Allen*, 60 Mich. 635, 27 N. W. 702; *Sweet v. Crane*, 39 Okl. 248, 134 Pac. 1112 (applying Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, §§ 4899, 4911, 4912); *Royal v. Grant*, 5 Ga. App. 643, 63 S. E. 708; *Kenure v. Brainerd & Armstrong Co.*, 88 Conn. 265, 91 Atl. 185; *Fuller v. Blair*, 104 Me. 469, 72 Atl. 182; *Freeman v. Shaw*, 173 Mich. 262, 139 N. W. 66; *Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Retzloff*, 229 Ill. 194, 82 N. E. 214; *Southern Ry. Co. v. King Bros. & Co.*, 136 Ga. 173, 70 S. E. 1109; *Gilman v. G. W. Dart Hardware Co.*, 42 Mont. 96, 111 Pac. 550. In an action by a minor for personal injuries, he cannot recover for loss of wages during minority, unless it appears that the parent has lost the right to his child's earnings. *Orr v. Wahlfeld Mfg. Co.*, 179 Ill. App. 235. If a minor, with his parent's consent, enlists in the army or navy, the parent's right of control is suspended, and all pay, bounties, and prize moneys belong to the minor, and not to the parent. *Halliday v. Miller*, 29 W. Va. 424, 1 S. E. 821, 6 Am. St. Rep. 653; *Gapen v. Gapen*, 41 W. Va.

be based on the parent's duty to support the child.<sup>81</sup> Thus it has been said that the parent's right to the services and earnings of his child is contingent on his actually providing support for the child and retaining parental control over him, and if he ceases to provide support, or voluntarily or by operation of law releases his parental authority, his right to the child's services and earnings ceases.<sup>82</sup> But the right is recognized even in those jurisdictions where it is denied that there is any legal duty to support. Whatever may be the foundation of this right of the parent, its existence is well settled. There is some authority to the effect that the right to a child's services and earnings does not vest in the mother, even when the father has deserted her and the child, or is dead; that the mother, even under such circumstances as these, is entitled only to reverence and respect, and has no authority over the child, or right to its services.<sup>83</sup> This, however, is a mistake, due perhaps, to some extent, to following, without reason or other authority, the dictum of Blackstone and other old writers and judges to that effect, and to a failure to recognize the fact that there is no longer any such principle or doctrine as the old feudal doctrine, "which, requiring, as it did, the abject subjection and servitude of the wife, was unable to recognize the supremacy of the mother."<sup>84</sup> By the overwhelming weight of modern authority, a widowed mother is entitled to the services and earnings of a minor child to the same

422, 23 S. E. 579; *Taylor v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank*, 97 Mass. 345; *Banks v. Conant*, 14 Allen (Mass.) 497; *Magee v. Magee*, 65 Ill. 255; *Cadwell v. Sherman*, 45 Ill. 348; *Baker v. Baker*, 41 Vt. 53; *Mears v. Bickford*, 55 Me. 528. Contra, *Bundy v. Dodson*, 28 Ind. 295; *Ginn v. Ginn*, 38 Ind. 526.

<sup>81</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 193, *Jenness v. Emerson*, 15 N. H. 488; *Wheeler v. State*, 51 Ind. App. 622, 100 N. E. 25; *Doyle v. Carney*, 190 N. Y. 386, 83 N. E. 37; *Franklin v. Butcher*, 144 Mo. App. 660, 129 S. W. 428; *BIGGS v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO.*, 91 Ark. 122, 120 S. W. 970, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 190.

<sup>82</sup> *Chaloux v. International Paper Co.*, 75 N. H. 281, 73 Atl. 301, 139 Am. St. Rep. 690. In *Canovar v. Cooper*, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 117, it was said by Strong, P. J.: "The reason why parents are entitled to the services of their minor children, usually given, is that which I have already mentioned—the liability to support them. But, in my opinion, a much stronger reason, and one more consonant with the feelings and obligations of parent and child, is that it gives the parent the control over the actions of his children, when they are incapable of judging for themselves, and thus has a tendency to save them from the effects of idleness or imprudence."

<sup>83</sup> *Pray v. Gorham*, 31 Me. 240; *Com. v. Murray*, 4 Bin. (Pa.) 487, 5 Am. Dec. 412; *Fairmount & A. St. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Stutler*, 54 Pa. 375, 93 Am. Dec. 714.

<sup>84</sup> *Hammond v. Corbett*, 50 N. H. 501, 9 Am. Rep. 288.

extent as the father would be if living.<sup>85</sup> The same rule applies where a wife is deserted by her husband, or he is imprisoned, and she is left to maintain her children, for the same reasons for the rule apply in both cases.<sup>86</sup> And generally a person who has definitely assumed to stand in loco parentis to a child is entitled to his services.<sup>87</sup>

Since a parent is thus entitled to the earnings of his minor child, it follows that where he has not expressly or impliedly emancipated the child, or consented to its receiving and enjoying its own earnings, as hereafter explained,<sup>88</sup> he may maintain an action for the child's wages against one who has employed the child, and the action is properly brought in the parent's name alone.<sup>89</sup> It has been held that the right to the child's services is personal to the parent, like the right of custody, and cannot be assigned to another, as by binding the child out at service.<sup>90</sup> But there are other decisions in favor of allowing a parent to assign his child's services for a consideration to inure to himself.<sup>91</sup>

In the absence of emancipation, express or implied, a child cannot make any contract with another to serve him which will be binding

<sup>85</sup> *Hammond v. Corbett*, 50 N. H. 501, 9 Am. Rep. 288; *Osborn v. Allen*, 26 N. J. Law, 388; *Matthewson v. Perry*, 37 Conn. 435, 9 Am. Rep. 339; *Scamell v. St. Louis Transit Co.*, 103 Mo. App. 504, 77 S. W. 1021; *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101; *Horgan v. Pacific Mills*, 158 Mass. 402, 33 N. E. 581, 35 Am. St. Rep. 504; *Kennedy v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 186; *Gray v. Durland*, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 100; *Ballard v. St. Albans Advertiser Co.*, 52 Vt. 325; *Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg*, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; *State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 24 Md. 84, 87 Am. Dec. 600; *Cain v. Devitt*, 8 Iowa, 116; *Duffield v. Cross*, 12 Ill. 397; *Snediker v. Everingham*, 27 N. J. Law, 143; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 11 N. J. Eq. 272; *Franklin v. Butcher*, 144 Mo. App. 660, 129 S. W. 428; *Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Conner* (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1022.

<sup>86</sup> See *Wodell v. Coggeshall*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 391; *Chilson v. Phillips*, 1 Vt. 41; *Winslow v. State*, 92 Ala. 78, 9 South. 728; *Newton v. Cooper*, 13 Ga. App. 458, 79 S. E. 356; *Briscoe v. Price*, 275 Ill. 63, 113 N. E. 881; *Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Conner* (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1022; *Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Smith*, 93 Ga. 742, 21 S. E. 157.

<sup>87</sup> *Stone v. Pulsipher*, 16 Vt. 428; *Schrimpf v. Settegast*, 36 Tex. 296.

<sup>88</sup> Post, p. 358.

<sup>89</sup> *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204; *Duffield v. Cross*, 12 Ill. 397; *Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg*, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; *Monaghan v. School Dist.*, 38 Wis. 100.

<sup>90</sup> *Musgrove v. Kornegay*, 52 N. C. 71 (collecting cases); *U. S. v. Balnbridge*, 1 Mason, 71, Fed. Cas. No. 14,497.

<sup>91</sup> *Day v. Everett*, 7 Mass. 145; *State v. Barrett*, 45 N. H. 15; *Johnson v. Bicknell*, 23 Me. 154; *Ford v. McVay*, 55 Ill. 119.

on the father; nor can he give a valid discharge for his wages. One who, under such circumstances, pays a minor for services, or for injuries resulting in loss of service, does so at his peril; and, if the father has not relinquished his right to such services, the payment will be no defense in an action by the father.<sup>92</sup> But where the father allows his minor son to work for another and receive his wages, the payment to the son is a good payment until the agreement is rescinded.<sup>93</sup> The same principle applies where an apprentice is employed without his master's consent.<sup>94</sup> The father, where his child is employed without his consent, may ratify the contract made with the child, and recover under it; or he may repudiate it, and recover the value of the services.<sup>95</sup>

Since the earnings of a minor unemancipated child belong to the father, they may be reached by the father's creditors, and subjected to the payment of their claims, just like any other property.<sup>96</sup> And the same is true of property purchased with the child's earnings. It was held in a late Texas case, for instance, that land bought by a mother with the wages given her by her son, who was not emancipated, was subject to the claims of the father's creditors.<sup>97</sup>

When a child is emancipated—that is, when he is released from parental control, either by the consent of the parent or by operation of law, including cases in which he is deserted—the parent's right to the child's services and earnings ceases, and with it, of course, all rights, duties, and liabilities which are dependent upon its existence also cease.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>92</sup> *White v. Henry*, 24 Me. 531; *Weeks v. Holmes*, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 215; *Horgan v. Pacific Mills*, 158 Mass. 402, 33 N. E. 581, 35 Am. St. Rep. 504; *Sherlock v. Kimmell*, 75 Mo. 77; *Dunn v. Altman*, 50 Mo. App. 231.

<sup>93</sup> *Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*, 171 N. C. 23, 86 S. E. 174. And see *Ping Min. & Mill. Co. v. Grant*, 68 Kan. 732, 75 Pac. 1044, construing the Kansas statute (Gen. St. 1901, § 4185). Under Domestic Relations Law (Consol. Laws, N. Y. c. 14) § 72, in the absence of notice from the parent, a payment of wages to the minor is a good payment. *Langer v. Kaufman*, 94 Misc. Rep. 216, 157 N. Y. Supp. 825. And see *Comp. Laws N. D. 1913*, § 4437.

<sup>94</sup> *James v. Leroy*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 274; *Bowes v. Tibbets*, 7 Me. (Greenl.) 457; *Munsey v. Goodwin*, 3 N. H. 272.

<sup>95</sup> *Sherlock v. Kimmell*, 75 Mo. 77.

<sup>96</sup> *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; *Harper v. Utsey* (Tex. Civ. App.) 97 S. W. 508; *Beaver v. Bare*, 104 Pa. 58, 49 Am. Rep. 567; *Dick v. Grissom*, *Freem. Ch. (Miss.)* 428; *Doe v. Reid*, 53 N. C. 377; *Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co.*, 79 Tex. 179, 15 S. W. 259, 23 Am. St. Rep. 327.

<sup>97</sup> *Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co.*, 79 Tex. 179, 15 S. W. 259, 23 Am. St. Rep. 327.

<sup>98</sup> *Post*, p. 398. *Winslow v. State*, 92 Ala. 78, 9 South. 728; *Southern Ry. Co. v. Flemister*, 120 Ga. 524, 48 S. E. 160.

### EMANCIPATION OF CHILDREN

128. A child may be released from parental control, and become entitled to his earnings, in which event he is said to be emancipated.
129. Emancipation may be effected
- (a) By the consent of the parent, evidenced by written or oral agreement, or gathered from the circumstances.
  - (b) By operation of law—
    - (1) Where the parent abandons or fails to support the child.
    - (2) Where the child contracts a valid marriage, either with or without the parent's consent.
    - (3) Where the child attains his majority, which is at 21 years, or, in some jurisdictions, in the case of females, 18 years.
  - (c) A parent who, by his conduct, leads an employer of a child to believe that the child has a right to his earnings, and to pay the child, is concluded by the payment, on the equitable principle of estoppel.
130. The emancipation, if without consideration, may be revoked before it is acted upon by the child, but not afterwards. If supported by a valuable consideration, or, at common law, if it is under seal, it cannot be revoked.
131. Emancipation, as regards future services and earnings, is valid as against creditors of the parent.

A child may be released from parental control, and become entitled to his earnings, or, in other words, he may become emancipated, either by the consent of his parent, or by operation of law without such consent.\*\* The effect of emancipation is to deprive the parent of all power of control over the child, so long as the eman-

\*\* Emancipation, used in a technical sense, means the freeing of the child from all care, custody, and control, and from all claim of services. *Wabash R. Co. v. McDoniels*, 183 Ind. 104, 107 N. E. 291. Emancipation of the child is the relinquishment by the parent of all control and authority over the child, conferring on the child the right to his earnings, and extinguishing the parent's legal duty to maintain and support the child. *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 193. A parent who has emancipated his child is not liable to a third person for board of the child. *Holland v. Hartley*, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507.

cipation continues. The child becomes entitled to his time and his earnings, and to property purchased with his earnings, free from any claims of his parent, or of his parent's creditors,<sup>1</sup> and, on his death, his earnings pass to his administrator.<sup>2</sup>

Not only may a parent emancipate his child, so as to entitle it to receive its earnings from third persons, but "emancipation may be implied even when the minor resides at home and works for his father, from a promise on the part of the father to pay him for his services during his minority, so that the minor may maintain an action against the father even for such services."<sup>3</sup> Because of the relation, the presumption is against any such contract, and the child must show affirmatively that there was an understanding that compensation should be paid.

*How Emancipation may be Effected—By Consent of Parent*

Emancipation may be effected by the consent of the parent, or it may be effected by operation of law without his consent. The clearest case of emancipation by consent is where the child can show an express written or oral agreement with the parent.<sup>4</sup> Here

<sup>1</sup> *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204; *Burlingame v. Burlingame*, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 92; *Kain v. Larkin*, 131 N. Y. 300, 30 N. E. 105; *Woodward v. Donnell*, 146 Mo. App. 119, 123 S. W. 1004; *Revel v. Pruitt*, 42 Okl. 696, 142 Pac. 1019; *Kenure v. Brainard & Armstrong Co.*, 88 Conn. 265, 91 Atl. 185; *Torrens v. Campbell*, 74 Pa. 470; *Beaver v. Bare*, 104 Pa. 58, 49 Am. Rep. 567; *Partridge v. Arnold*, 73 Ill. 600; *Snediker v. Everingham*, 27 N. J. Law, 143; *Trapnell v. Conklyn*, 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570, 38 Am. St. Rep. 30; *Gale v. Parrot*, 1 N. H. 28; *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293; *Jenney v. Alden*, 12 Mass. 375; *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101; *Whiting v. Earle*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 201, 15 Am. Dec. 207; *Morse v. Welton*, 6 Conn. 547, 16 Am. Dec. 73; *Chase v. Elkins*, 2 Vt. 290; *Varney v. Young*, 11 Vt. 258; *Tillotson v. McCrillis*, Id. 477; *Wilson v. McMillan*, 62 Ga. 16, 35 Am. Rep. 115; *Wambold v. Vick*, 50 Wis. 456, 7 N. W. 438.

<sup>2</sup> *Smith v. Knowlton*, 11 N. H. 191; *Dierker v. Hess*, 54 Mo. 246.

<sup>3</sup> *Wood, Mast. & Serv.* § 25; *Wilson v. McMillan*, 62 Ga. 16, 35 Am. Rep. 115; *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293; *Beaver v. Bare*, 104 Pa. 58, 49 Am. Rep. 567; *McCloskey v. Cyphert*, 27 Pa. 220; *Steel v. Steel*, 12 Pa. 64; *Dierker v. Hess*, 54 Mo. 246; *Donegan v. Davis*, 66 Ala. 362; *Sword v. Keith*, 31 Mich. 247; *Sammon v. Wood*, 107 Mich. 506, 65 N. W. 529.

<sup>4</sup> *Bristol v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 128 Iowa, 479, 104 N. W. 487; *Broslus v. Barker*, 154 Mo. App. 657, 136 S. W. 18; *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 193; *Abbott v. Converse*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530; *Fox v. Schumann*, 191 Mich. 331, 158 N. W. 168; *Holland v. Hartley*, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507. Emancipation is express, if with the consent of the parent disabilities are removed by the court, under *Kirby's Dig. Ark.* § 1309, or by contract for valuable consideration. In *re Riff* (D. C.) 205 Fed. 406. On

there can be no difficulty. Emancipation by consent may also, like any other agreement, be implied as a matter of fact from the conduct of the parties.<sup>6</sup> No particular act or ceremony is necessary to constitute emancipation. It may be established by direct evidence, or implied from circumstances; and it may, as has already been seen,<sup>6</sup> be implied as well when the child continues to reside at home as when he lives elsewhere. Like any other fact, its existence or nonexistence is to be determined by all the circumstances of the particular case.<sup>7</sup>

*Same—By Operation of Law*

Emancipation may also be effected by operation of law, and even against the will of the parent. It is so effected by the valid marriage of the child.<sup>8</sup> So, where a child reaches his majority, the par-

the death of the father, the mother may emancipate the child. *Campbell v. Campbell*, 11 N. J. Eq. 268. An oral agreement may, of course, be unenforceable, because within the statute of frauds. *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204.

<sup>6</sup> *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293; *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; *Chase v. Smith*, 5 Vt. 556; *Kain v. Larkin*, 131 N. Y. 300, 30 N. E. 105; *Abbott v. Converse*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530; *George Adams & Burke Co. v. Cook*, 82 Neb. 684, 118 N. W. 662; *Fox v. Schumann*, 191 Mich. 331, 158 N. W. 168; *Merithew v. Ellis*, 116 Me. 468, 102 Atl. 301, 2 A. L. R. 1429; *Longhofer v. Herbel*, 83 Kan. 278, 111 Pac. 483; *Brosius v. Barker*, 154 Mo. App. 657, 136 S. W. 18; *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 193; *Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Retzlaff*, 229 Ill. 194, 82 N. E. 214; *Weese v. Yokum*, 62 W. Va. 550, 59 S. E. 514.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*, note, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Canovar v. Cooper*, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 115; *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204; *Whiting v. Earle*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 201, 15 Am. Dec. 207; *Inhabitants of Dennyville v. Inhabitants of Trescott*, 30 Me. 470; *Inhabitants of West Gardiner v. Inhabitants of Manchester*, 72 Me. 509; *Penn v. Whitehead*, 17 Grat. (Va.) 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478; *Lewis v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.*, 82 Kan. 351, 108 Pac. 95; *Johnson v. Silsbee*, 49 N. H. 543; *Beaver v. Bare*, 104 Pa. 58, 49 Am. Rep. 567; *Donegan v. Davis*, 66 Ala. 362; *Haugh Ketcham & Co. Iron Works v. Duncan*, 2 Ind. App. 264, 28 N. E. 334; *Everett v. Sherfey*, 1 Iowa, 357; *Schoenberg v. Voigt*, 36 Mich. 310.

<sup>8</sup> *Aldrich v. Bennett*, 63 N. H. 415, 56 Am. Rep. 529; *Vanatta v. Carr*, 229 Ill. 47, 82 N. E. 267; *Dick v. Grissom*, *Freem. Ch. (Miss.)* 428; *Town of Northfield v. Town of Brookfield*, 50 Vt. 62; *Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Plymouth*, 15 Mass. 203; *Com. v. Graham*, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255; *STATE EX REL SCOTT v. LOWELL*, 78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877, 46 L. R. A. 440, 79 Am. St. Rep. 358; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 22; *Town of Craftsbury v. Town of Greensboro*, 66 Vt. 585, 29 Atl. 1024. The fact that the marriage is against the parent's will can make no difference, if the marriage is valid. *Aldrich v. Bennett*, *supra*; *Com. v. Graham*, *supra*; *Cochran v. Cochran*, 196 N. Y. 86, 89 N. E. 470, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 160, 17 Ann. Cas. 782. But see

ent's rights over him, and to his services and earnings, cease, and the child is emancipated by operation of law.<sup>9</sup> At common law, the age of majority is 21 years for both sexes, but, by statute, in some jurisdictions a female reaches her majority at 18.

It is said that emancipation will be inferred from the wrongful conduct of a parent indicating a renunciation of the parental relation, as when he abandons or forces his child to leave him, or neglects to support him, so that it is necessary for the child to support himself. It is better, however, to class emancipation thus effected as emancipation by operation of law; for willingness of the parent, under such circumstances, is altogether immaterial. The law emancipates the child. A parent is only entitled to the services and earnings of his child while the child is supported by him. "Although the general principle is clear and unquestioned that the father is entitled to the services of his minor child, and to all that such child earns by his labor, yet it seems to be equally clear that, as the right of the father to the services of the child is founded upon his duty to support and maintain his child, if he should fail, neglect, or refuse to observe and perform this duty, his right to the services of his child should cease to exist; and such we hold to be the law."<sup>10</sup> It has therefore been held that, where a widow marries again, she cannot recover the wages due her daughter by her first husband, who does not live with her, and is not supported by her.<sup>11</sup> And the rule is well settled "that if the father abandons the child, and leaves him to provide for himself, the child becomes entitled to his earnings as a means of support, and the father has no claim upon them."<sup>12</sup> "As the father may forfeit his right to the custody

*White v. Henry*, 24 Me. 531; *Austin v. Austin*, 167 Mich. 164, 182 N. W. 495, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 545.

<sup>9</sup> *Town of Poultney v. Town of Glover*, 23 Vt. 328; *Brown v. Ramsay*, 29 N. J. Law, 117; *Mercer v. Jackson*, 54 Ill. 397.

<sup>10</sup> *Farrell v. Farrell*, 3 Houst. (Del.) 633. And see *Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg*, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; *Inhabitants of Wells v. Inhabitants of Kennebunk*, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 200; *In re Riff* (D. C.) 205 Fed. 406; *P. J. Huny-cutt & Co. v. Thompson*, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 928; *Smith v. Gilbert*, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S. W. 115, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1098; *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 193; *Chaloux v. International Paper Co.*, 75 N. H. 281, 73 Atl. 301, 139 Am. St. Rep. 690.

<sup>11</sup> *Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg*, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687. And see *Inhabitants of St. George v. Inhabitants of Deer Isle*, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 390.

<sup>12</sup> *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386. See, also, *Smith v. Gilbert*, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S. W. 115, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1098; *Swift & Co. v.*

and control of his child's person by abusing his power so, by neglecting to fulfill the obligations of a father, he may forfeit his right to the fruit of his child's labor. If he provides no home for his protection, if he neither feeds nor clothes him, nor ministers to his wants in sickness or health, it would be a most harsh and unnatural law which authorized the father to appropriate to himself all the child's earnings. It would be recognizing in fathers something like that preeminent and sovereign authority which has never been admitted by the jurisprudence of any civilized people, except that of ancient Rome, whose law held children to be the property of the father, and placed them, in relation to him, in the category of things instead of that of persons."<sup>13</sup>

*Same—Estoppel of Parent*

If a parent, by his conduct, leads others to reasonably believe that he has emancipated his child, and such others act upon this belief, the parent will be estopped to deny emancipation to their prejudice, though there has been no emancipation either in fact or in law. If, for instance, a child makes a contract, on his own account, to serve another, and the father knows of it, and makes no objection, the other party to the contract may safely pay the child his earnings, and the payment will bar a claim to such earnings by the father.<sup>14</sup>

Johnson, 138 Fed. 867, 71 C. C. A. 619, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161; Wodell v. Coggeshall, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 391; Chilson v. Phillips, 1 Vt. 41; Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 104, 53 Am. Dec. 778; Gulf Cooperation Co. v. Abernathy, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 137, 116 S. W. 869; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 275, 8 Am. Dec. 101; Ream v. Watkins, 27 Mo. 516, 72 Am. Dec. 283; Canovar v. Cooper, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 115; The Etna, 1 Ware, 474, Fed. Cas. No. 4,542; Stansbury v. Bertron, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 362; McCARTHY v. RAILROAD CORP., 148 Mass. 550, 20 N. E. 182, 2 L. R. A. 608, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 200; Liberty v. Palermo, 79 Me. 473, 10 Atl. 455; Brown v. Ramsay, 29 N. J. Law, 117; Loy v. Loy, 128 Ind. 150, 27 N. E. 351; Clay v. Shirley, 65 N. H. 644, 23 Atl. 521.

<sup>13</sup> The Etna, 1 Ware, 474, Fed. Cas. No. 4,542.

<sup>14</sup> Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 201, 15 Am. Dec. 207; Vance v. Calhoun, 77 Ark. 35, 90 S. W. 619, 113 Am. St. Rep. 111; Culberson v. Alabama Const. Co., 127 Ga. 599, 56 S. E. 765, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 411, 9 Ann. Cas. 507; Merrill v. Hussey, 101 Me. 439, 64 Atl. 819; McMorrow v. Dowell, 116 Mo. App. 289, 90 S. W. 728; Atkins v. Sherbino, 58 Vt. 248, 4 Atl. 703; Nixon v. Spencer, 16 Iowa, 214; Armstrong v. McDonald, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 300; Smith v. Smith, 30 Conn. 111; Schoonover v. Sparrow, 38 Minn. 393, 37 N. W. 949; In re Riff (D. C.) 205 Fed. 406; Ingram v. Southern Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 762, 67 S. E. 926; Lowrie v. Oxendine, 153 N. C. 267, 69 S. E. 131; Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 171 N. C. 23, 86 S. E. 174; Giovagnoli v. Ft. Orange Const. Co., 148 App. Div. 489, 133 N. Y. Supp. 92. See also, Ping Min. & Mill. Co. v. Grant, 68 Kan. 732, 75 Pac. 1044, applying Gen. St. Kan.

There is no necessity to ask whether there has been an emancipation in fact.<sup>15</sup> It is sufficient to apply the equitable principle that "where one voluntarily, by his words or conduct, causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position for the worse, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time."<sup>16</sup> Such conduct does not necessarily conclude the parent as against the child, nor would it prevent him, in the absence of an emancipation in fact, from claiming the wages before payment, and thereby rendering the employer liable to him.<sup>17</sup> While the fact that the child received his wages for his own use does not conclusively show emancipation,<sup>18</sup> acquiescence by the father in the child's contracting on his own account, and receiving and using his wages, would be evidence from which the jury might infer emancipation in fact.<sup>19</sup>

*Consideration—Revocation*

The relinquishment by a parent of his right to the services and earnings of his child is valid as a gift, and, as between the parties, it requires no consideration. When a child performs labor for his parent, under an agreement that he shall be compensated therefor by the parent, or performs labor for another under an agreement with the parent that he (the child) shall own what he receives, the parent will be bound by the agreement, though there is no consideration for the relinquishment of his rights.<sup>20</sup> "The cases referred to establish the doctrine that it (the right to the child's services) may be transferred to the minor. It is to be regarded as being in the nature of property, and, as a minor may hold other property independently of his father, there seems to be no valid

1901, § 4185; *Langer v. Kaufman*, 94 Misc. Rep. 216, 157 N. Y. Supp. 825, applying Domestic Relations Law (Consol. Laws N. Y. c. 14) § 72. See Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, § 4437.

<sup>15</sup> *Atkins v. Sherbino*, 58 Vt. 248, 4 Atl. 703.

<sup>16</sup> *Fetter*, Eq. 45.

<sup>17</sup> *Atkins v. Sherbino*, 58 Vt. 248, 4 Atl. 703.

<sup>18</sup> *Wallace v. Cox*, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S. W. 611, L. R. A. 1917B. 690.

<sup>19</sup> *Lackman v. Wood*, 25 Cal. 147; *Scott v. White*, 71 Ill. 287.

<sup>20</sup> *Fort v. Gooding*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 371; *Stanley v. National Union Bank*, 115 N. Y. 122, 22 N. E. 29; *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; *Chase v. Smith*, 5 Vt. 556; *Abbott v. Converse*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530; *Shute v. Dorr*, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204; *ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL*, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 193; *Gale v. Parrot*, 1 N. H. 28; *Morse v. Welton*, 6 Conn. 547, 16 Am. Dec. 73; *Snediker v. Everingham*, 27 N. J. Law, 143.

reason why he may not thus hold the right to his own time and earnings. \* \* \* As it may be held by gift or license, there is no reason why the gift, when accepted, should be any more revocable, without the consent of the donee, than other gifts."<sup>21</sup>

If the emancipation is without consideration, however, it may be revoked at any time before it is acted upon, and from the time of revocation the parent is restored to his original rights.<sup>22</sup> It is a mere gift or license, and, like any other gift or license, it may be revoked at any time before it is accepted, and acceptance is acting upon it. "A gift is not binding on the donor until accepted; and the acceptance of a gift of this character must be by acting upon it. Until it is acted upon, it must, from the nature of the case, be revocable."<sup>23</sup>

If the relinquishment of his rights by the parent is supported by a valuable consideration, or at common law at least, if his agreement is under seal, he cannot revoke. "As he [the minor] may hold it [his time and right to earnings] by a contract with his father under seal, or for a valuable consideration, there is no more reason for holding that the father may revoke this contract at his pleasure than any other contract. On principle, he should be as fully bound by it as by a conveyance of land or other property to his child."<sup>24</sup>

#### *Rights of Parent's Creditors*

The emancipation of a child, and relinquishment by the parent of his right to the future services and earnings of the child, is perfectly valid as against the parent's creditors, even though the parent may be insolvent, and even though the intention is to prevent the creditors from enforcing their claims against such earnings, or property purchased with them.<sup>25</sup> And this is true though the child re-

<sup>21</sup> Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530.

<sup>22</sup> Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530; Dickinson v. Talmage, 133 Mass. 249; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa. 356; Soldanels v. Missouri Pac. Railway Co., 23 Mo. App. 516; Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend (N. Y.) 459, 20 Am. Dec. 639; Chase v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290; Stovall v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 19; Hood & Johnson v. Pelham, Siltz & Co., 5 Ala. App. 471, 59 South. 767; In re Riff (D. C.) 205 Fed. 406; BIGGS v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO., 91 Ark. 122, 120 S. W. 970, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 190; but see ROUND BROS. v. McDANIEL, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 134 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 193, where it was held that the father lost his right to revoke by delay.

<sup>23</sup> Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530.

<sup>24</sup> Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530.

<sup>25</sup> Wilson v. McMillan, 62 Ga. 16, 35 Am. Rep. 115; Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; Manchester v. Smith, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 113;

mains at home, and is hired by the parent.<sup>26</sup> As was said by the North Carolina court: "A creditor cannot make his debtor work in order to pay the debt, nor can he force him to make his children work, or sell under execution the valuable interest which a father has in the services of the child."<sup>27</sup> And, as was said by the Pennsylvania court, a father "is not bound to work his son or daughter as he would work a horse or slave for the benefit of his creditors."<sup>28</sup> If, however, such an arrangement is merely colorable, and the parent is in fact still to have the benefit of the wages, the transaction is fraudulent and void as against creditors.<sup>29</sup> And, where the wages are already earned, the gift of them would be subject to the general rules governing voluntary conveyances.<sup>30</sup>

### ACTION BY PARENT FOR INJURIES TO CHILD

132. When a child is injured by the wrongful act or omission of a person, the father, or any other person standing in loco parentis, may maintain an action against the wrongdoer to recover for the resulting loss of service and incidental expenditures.

133. The rules as to the necessity of showing the relationship of master and servant between the parent and child to entitle the parent to sue may be thus stated:

- (a) To recover for loss of service, the right to the child's services, and therefore the relationship of master and servant, actual or constructive, must be shown. The relationship exists constructively if there is a right to service. Therefore—

*Wambold v. Vick*, 50 Wis. 456, 7 N. W. 438; *Lord v. Poor*, 23 Me. 569; *Trapnell v. Conklyn*, 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570, 38 Am. St. Rep. 30; *McCloskey v. Cyphert*, 27 Pa. 220; *Partridge v. Arnold*, 73 Ill. 600; *Winchester v. Reid*, 53 N. C. 379; *Johnson v. Silsbee*, 49 N. H. 543; *Chase v. Elkins*, 2 Vt. 290; *Bray v. Wheeler*, 29 Vt. 514; *Lackman v. Wood*, 25 Cal. 147; *Dierker v. Hess*, 54 Mo. 250; *Furth v. McKnight*, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 583, 26 S. W. 95.

<sup>26</sup> *Wilson v. McMillan*, 62 Ga. 16, 35 Am. Rep. 115; *Dierker v. Hess*, 54 Mo. 250; *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293.

<sup>27</sup> *Winchester v. Reid*, 53 N. C. 379.

<sup>28</sup> *McCloskey v. Cyphert*, 27 Pa. 220.

<sup>29</sup> *Atwood v. Holcomb*, 39 Conn. 270, 12 Am. Rep. 386; *Wilson v. McMillan*, 62 Ga. 16, 35 Am. Rep. 115.

<sup>30</sup> *Beaver v. Bare*, 104 Pa. 58, 49 Am. Rep. 567; *Winchester v. Reid*, 53 N. C. 379; *Dick v. Grissom*, *Freem. Ch. (Miss.)* 428.

- (1) If the child is a minor, living at home, service is presumed.
  - (2) Temporary absence of the child from home will not prevent a recovery, if the parent has a right to its services.
  - (3) By the weight of authority in this country, but not in England, the parent may recover if he has not relinquished his right to reclaim the child's services at any time, though the child, at the time of the injury, may be in the actual service of another, even with the parent's consent, and even though the child does not intend to return.
  - (4) If the parent has relinquished his right to the child's services, he cannot recover on the theory of loss of service.
- (b) On the theory that loss of service at the time of action is the gist of the action by a parent for an injury to his child, it is held in England that there can be no recovery at all where there has been no loss of service, as where the child is too young to render any service. But, by the weight of authority in this country, there may be a recovery for incidental expenses in caring for the child, and there may be a recovery for prospective loss of services, however young the child may be.
134. At common law, an action would not lie for an injury resulting in the immediate death of the child; but a right of action in such a cause is very generally given by statute.

Where a child is injured by the wrongful conduct of another, and the injury results in direct and proximate damage to the parent, the tort gives rise to two causes of action—one in the parent, and one in the child.<sup>81</sup> The two causes of action are separate and distinct. The child cannot sue for the damage to the parent, nor can the parent sue for the damage to the child. Each must sue for his own damage, and neither action is a bar to the other.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> *Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyons*, 156 Ky. 222, 160 S. W. 942.

<sup>82</sup> *Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad Co.*, 125 Mass. 130; *Karr v. Parks*, 44 Cal. 46; *Forsythe v. Central Mfg. Co.*, 103 Tenn. 497, 53 S. W. 731; *Slaughter v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.*, 90 S. W. 243, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 665, rehearing denied 91 S. W. 713.

Where the wrong results in damage to the child only, no action can be maintained by the parent. A father cannot maintain an action for the wrongful exclusion of his child from school, for the child alone is damaged.<sup>33</sup> Where a child is injured by an assault and battery, the child alone can sue for the personal injury, including the physical and mental suffering, and the expense, if any, incurred by him; for this damage is to him, and not to the parent.<sup>34</sup> As will be seen in a subsequent section, the same is true where a daughter is seduced or debauched. Her father cannot maintain an action therefor at common law, unless he is specially damaged. For the mere seduction, the action, if it can be maintained at all, must be brought by the daughter.<sup>35</sup> And so it is in other cases; a parent cannot in any case maintain an action for an injury to his child alone, unless he brings the action in the name of the child.<sup>36</sup> If, however, a wrong results in a direct injury to the parent, as distinguished from the injury to the child, the parent has a right of action.

#### *Loss of Services of Child*

Since a parent having the care and custody of his child has a right to his services and earnings, any wrongful act or omission of a person, the direct result of which is to cause him to lose such services temporarily or permanently, is an injury to him, as distinguished from the injury to the child; and the authorities are therefore agreed that, if he has sustained such a loss, he may maintain an action therefor. And in such an action he may recover, not only for the loss up to the time the action is brought, but also, since he can recover but once for the wrong, for any loss of service during the

<sup>33</sup> *Boyd v. Blaisdell*, 15 Ind. 73; *Sorrels v. Matthews*, 129 Ga. 319, 58 S. E. 819, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, 12 Ann. Cas. 404; *Donahoe v. Richards*, 38 Me. 378.

<sup>34</sup> *Cowden v. Wright*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 429, 35 Am. Dec. 633; *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; *Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad Co.*, 125 Mass. 130; *Western Union Tel. Co. v. Erwin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 607.

<sup>35</sup> *Post*, p. 378.

<sup>36</sup> *SORRELS v. MATTHEWS*, 129 Ga. 319, 58 S. E. 819, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, 12 Ann. Cas. 404, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 200; *Kirk v. Middlebrook*, 201 Mo. 245, 100 S. W. 450; *Pattison v. Gulf Bag Co.*, 116 La. 963, 41 South. 224, 114 Am. St. Rep. 570; *Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co. v. Doak*, 115 Tenn. 720, 92 S. W. 853. But see *Nyman v. Lynde*, 93 Minn. 257, 101 N. W. 163, following *Gardner v. Kellogg*, 23 Minn. 463, and holding that under Rev. Laws 1905, § 4060, the father may maintain an action for injuries to his minor child; the action being for the benefit of, and a bar to an independent action by, the child.

child's minority which, in the judgment of the jury, and according to the evidence, will be sustained in the future.<sup>37</sup> This is true of any injury to a child resulting directly in loss of services to the parent. It is true of an assault and battery,<sup>38</sup> of negligence resulting in personal injuries,<sup>39</sup> of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment,<sup>40</sup> and of injuries inflicted by vicious animals negligently permitted to run at large.<sup>41</sup> As will be seen more at length in subsequent sections, it is also true of the seduction or debauching of a daughter,<sup>42</sup> and of the abduction, enticing away, or harboring of a child.<sup>43</sup>

The right of the parent to recover for the loss of services of the child depends, in the case of personal injuries, on the right of the child to recover for the injury.<sup>44</sup> So, too, where the parent by giving consent to employment in a dangerous occupation thereby assumed the risks of the employment, he cannot recover for an injury due thereto.<sup>45</sup> But the consent of the parent to the employment

<sup>37</sup> *Russell v. Corne*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1032; *Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co.*, 125 Mass. 130; *Cowden v. Wright*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 429, 35 Am. Dec. 633; *Dolard v. Roberts*, 130 N. Y. 269, 29 N. E. 104, 14 L. R. A. 238; *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; *Dufield v. Cross*, 12 Ill. 397; *Kerr v. Forgue*, 54 Ill. 482, 5 Am. Rep. 146; *Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Motesenbocker*, 41 Okl. 454, 138 Pac. 790; *Kenner v. Kenner*, 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S. W. 723, L. R. A. 1918E, 587, denying rehearing 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W. 779, L. R. A. 1918E, 587; *Magee v. Holland*, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341; *Shields v. Yonge*, 15 Ga. 349, 60 Am. Dec. 698; *Kennard v. Burton*, 25 Me. 39, 43 Am. Dec. 249; *Klingman v. Holmes*, 54 Mo. 304; *Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Miller*, 49 Tex. 322; *Braswell v. Garfield Cotton Oil Mill Co.*, 7 Ga. App. 167, 66 S. E. 539; *Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley*, 151 Ky. 109, 151 S. W. 363; *Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Hunt*, 32 Okl. 368, 122 Pac. 673; *Wennell v. Dowson*, 88 Conn. 710, 92 Atl. 663.

<sup>38</sup> *Cowden v. Wright*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 429, 35 Am. Dec. 633; *Klingman v. Holmes*, 54 Mo. 304; *Hoover v. Helm*, 7 Watts (Pa.) 62; *Trimble v. Spiller*, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 394, 18 Am. Dec. 189.

<sup>39</sup> *Kennard v. Burton*, 25 Me. 39, 43 Am. Dec. 249; *Shields v. Yonge*, 15 Ga. 349, 60 Am. Dec. 698; *Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co.*, 125 Mass. 130; *Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Miller*, 49 Tex. 322.

<sup>40</sup> *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483.

<sup>41</sup> *Durden v. Barnett*, 7 Ala. 169; *Karr v. Parks*, 44 Cal. 46.

<sup>42</sup> Post, p. 378.

<sup>43</sup> Post, p. 384.

<sup>44</sup> *Thompson v. United Laboratories Co.*, 221 Mass. 276, 108 N. E. 1042; *Regan v. Supert Theatre*, 220 Mass. 259, 107 N. E. 984. If the child's right of action is barred by reason of contributory negligence, the parent's right of action is also barred. *Raden v. Georgia R. Co.*, 78 Ga. 47.

<sup>45</sup> *Weaver v. Isell*, 161 Pa. 386, 29 Atl. 49; *King v. Floding*, 18 Ga. App. 280, 89 S. E. 451; *Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co.*, 89 N. J. Law, 205, 98

will not prevent a recovery for injuries due, not to the ordinary risks, but the negligence of the employer.<sup>46</sup>

*Expenses Incurred by Reason of the Wrong*

If a parent is put to extra expense in the support and maintenance of his children, by reason of the tortious conduct of another, constituting an interference with his legal rights as parent, he should be allowed to recover for such expense from the wrongdoer. Thus, in case of an assault and battery committed upon his child, or any other tortious conduct towards the child, resulting in personal injuries, the parent should recover for the medical or other expenses incurred in curing and caring for him. His right to recover such damages is conceded by all the authorities where the relation of master and servant exists, actually or constructively, and the injury also results in a loss of the child's services.<sup>47</sup> This rule not only applies to expenses in curing personal injuries, but, as will be seen, it also applies to medical and other expenses in caring for a daughter who has been seduced or debauched,<sup>48</sup> and to expenses in regaining the custody of an abducted child.<sup>49</sup>

Whether or not a parent can recover for expenses in caring for and curing an injured child, independently of any loss of services, is a question upon which the authorities are conflicting.<sup>50</sup>

*Necessity to Show Loss of Service*

It is clear, of course, that there can be no recovery as for loss of services, unless a loss of service can be shown. Therefore, where the damages sought to be recovered in any particular case are for the loss of services of the child, it must appear that the relationship

Atl. 308 (applying P. L. 1904, p. 152). See, also, *New v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 116 Ga. 147, 42 S. E. 391, 59 L. R. A. 115.

<sup>46</sup> *Woodward Iron Co. v. Cook*, 124 Ala. 349, 27 South. 455.

<sup>47</sup> *Russell v. Corne*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1032; *Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co.*, 125 Mass. 130; *Rogers v. Smith*, 17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; *Magee v. Holland*, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341; *Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Motesenbocker*, 41 Okl. 454, 138 Pac. 790; *Travers v. Hartmann*, 5 Boyce (Del.) 302, 92 Atl. 855; *Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. De Atley*, 151 Ky. 109, 151 S. W. 363; *Klingman v. Holmes*, 54 Mo. 304; *Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co.*, 109 N. Y. 95, 16 N. E. 65. See, also, *Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co. v. Doak*, 115 Tenn. 720, 92 S. W. 853. But see *Fagan v. Interurban St. Ry. Co.* (Sup.) 85 N. Y. Supp. 340, holding that, in an action for personal injuries to plaintiff's son, there could be no recovery for expenses alleged to have been incurred for the board, lodging, and nursing of the son, where such expenses were not paid by plaintiff, nor their reasonable value shown.

<sup>48</sup> Post, p. 378.

<sup>49</sup> Post, p. 384.

<sup>50</sup> Post, p. 372.

of master and servant, actual or constructive, exists between the plaintiff and the child.<sup>51</sup> If the child has been wholly emancipated by the parent, so that he is not entitled to his services, there can be no recovery on the theory of a loss of service.<sup>52</sup> Nor, it seems clear, can there be any recovery on such a theory by a parent who, by desertion and nonsupport, has forfeited all right to his child's services, or impliedly emancipated him.<sup>53</sup>

If a minor child has not been emancipated, and the parent, by his conduct, has not lost the right to his services, the relationship of master and servant will be presumed, and no proof of acts of service is necessary. It is the right to the child's service, and not actual performance of services, that determines the right to recover.<sup>54</sup> The mere temporary absence of a child from home, therefore, at the time of his injury, will not defeat a recovery by the parent, if the parent has a right to his services.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 288. And see *Eickhoff v. Sedalla*, W. & S. W. Ry. Co., 106 Mo. App. 541, 80 S. W. 966, upholding the right of a stepfather to sue. See, also, *Palmer v. Baum*, 123 Ill. App. 584, where it was held that a father may recover for loss of services of an adult daughter who though married was separated from her husband and a member of such father's family.

<sup>52</sup> *McCARTHY v. BOSTON & L. R. CORP.*, 148 Mass. 550, 20 N. E. 182, 2 L. R. A. 608, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 200; *Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley*, 151 Ky. 109, 151 S. W. 363; *Memphis Steel Const. Co. v. Lister*, 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S. W. 902, L. R. A. 1918B, 406; *Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Blasengame*, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 93 S. W. 187. Emancipation of a minor child is a question of fact. If the parent continues to exercise authority, and the child to submit to it, the relation of master and servant continues. *Sutton v. Huffman*, 32 N. J. Law, 58; *Hudkins v. Haskins*, 22 W. Va. 645.

<sup>53</sup> *Southern Ry. Co. v. Flemister*, 120 Ga. 524, 48 S. E. 160; *Wodell v. Coggeshall*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 391. As to what constitutes emancipation, express and implied, see ante, p. 280.

<sup>54</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 452; *Evans v. Walton*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 615; *Maunder v. Venn*, *Moody & M.* 323; *Manvell v. Thomson*, 2 Car. & P. 303; *Terry v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 599; *Herring v. Jester*, 2 Houst. (Del.) 66; *Parker v. Meek*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 29; *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233; *Mercer v. Walmsley*, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486; *Kennedy v. Shea*, 110 Mass. 147, 14 Am. Rep. 584; *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 288; *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 39, 53 Am. Dec. 338; *Boyd v. Byrd*, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 113, 44 Am. Dec. 740; *Mulvehall v. Millward*, 11 N. Y. 343; *Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley*, 151 Ky. 109, 151 S. W. 363; *Rice v. Norfolk Southern R. Co.*, 167 N. C. 1, 82 S. E. 1034. And see *Amos v. Atlanta Ry. Co.*, 104 Ga. 809, 31 S. E. 42, where the child at the time of the injury was working in the county chain gang under sentence.

<sup>55</sup> *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 288; *Boyd v. Byrd*, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 113, 44 Am. Dec. 740.

In England it is held that there is no right of action in the parent, on the theory of loss of service, where the child has left home and is in the service of another, at the time of the injury; and that it can make no difference that the parent has not bound the child out, and can reclaim his services at any time, or even that the child's departure is against the parent's will.<sup>56</sup> In this country the rule is different in most states, if not in all. It is held that, if the parent has not emancipated the child or otherwise forfeited the right to his services, he may at any time compel the child to return and serve him; and the child, therefore, is still constructively in the parent's service.<sup>57</sup> The American doctrine necessarily results from the principle that it is the right to a minor child's services, and not present acts of service, at the time of the injury, that determines the right to recover.<sup>58</sup> The fact that the child has no intention to return cannot make any difference, for that cannot terminate the relationship of master and servant between the parent and the child. As was said by the New York court, the child's volition cannot affect the parent's rights.<sup>59</sup> This question has generally arisen in actions for the seduction or debauching of a daughter; but the doctrine is general, and must apply just as well where some other injury to a child is complained of. If the child, at the time of the injury, is bound out to service to another, the rule is different, for the parent then has no right to the child's services.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>56</sup> *Dean v. Peel*, 5 East, 45; *Davies v. Williams*, 10 Q. B. 725; *Hedges v. Tagg*, L. R. 7 Exch. 283; *Blaymire v. Haley*, 6 Mees. & W. 55; *Thompson v. Ross*, 5 Hurl. & N. 16.

<sup>57</sup> *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 238; *Mulvehall v. Millward*, 11 N. Y. 343; *Clark v. Fitch*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459, 20 Am. Dec. 639; *Kennedy v. Shea*, 110 Mass. 147, 14 Am. Rep. 584; *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233; *Ellington v. Ellington*, 47 Miss. 329; *White v. Murtland*, 71 Ill. 250, 22 Am. Rep. 100; *Hornketh v. Barr*, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 36, 11 Am. Dec. 568; *Logan v. Murray*, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 175, 9 Am. Dec. 422; *Mohry v. Hoffman*, 86 Pa. 358; *Boyd v. Byrd*, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 113, 44 Am. Dec. 740; *Bolton v. Miller*, 6 Ind. 266; *Mercer v. Walmsley*, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486; *Greenwood v. Greenwood*, 28 Md. 369, 382; *Hudkins v. Haskins*, 22 W. Va. 645.

<sup>58</sup> *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 238; *Clark v. Fitch*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459, 20 Am. Dec. 639; *Mulvehall v. Millward*, 11 N. Y. 343.

<sup>59</sup> *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 389, 6 Am. Dec. 238.

<sup>60</sup> *Dain v. Wycoff*, 7 N. Y. 191; *Kennedy v. Shea*, 110 Mass. 150, 14 Am. Rep. 584; *Ellington v. Ellington*, 47 Miss. 329; *Bolton v. Miller*, 6 Ind. 262. Even in England however, it was held that where a man fraudulently procured a girl to enter his service, for the purpose of seducing her, and carried out his purpose, the parent might sue as if no hiring had taken place. *Speight v. Oliviera*, 2 Starkie, 493.

If the service has terminated, however, and the child has returned home, or is on his way home, he is constructively in his parent's service, and, if injured before or after reaching home, the parent may recover.<sup>61</sup>

If the child is so young at the time of the injury that it is incapable of performing any act of service, and it is cured before it reaches an age at which it can perform services, it is clear that there can be no recovery as for mere loss of service, for there has been and can be no loss of service, as the result of the injury. In *Hall v. Hollander*<sup>62</sup> the child was less than three years old when injured, and was cured within six months. The declaration sought to recover, among other damages, for loss of the child's services during that time. It was very properly held that there could be no recovery as for loss of services. In England the cases go further than this, and hold that, where the parent sues "per quod servitium amisit," he must show a loss of service at the time of the action, and cannot maintain an action solely for prospective loss of service. And it is therefore held that there can be no recovery for loss of services where the child, at the time of the action, is too young to perform any act of service, though the injury may be permanent, and it may be clear that there will be a loss of services in the future. There are decisions and dicta in this country to the same effect.<sup>63</sup> But, in most states where the question has arisen, the doctrine of the English courts is repudiated, and it is held that there may be a recovery for prospective loss of services, however young or incapable of service the child may be at the time the action is brought.<sup>64</sup>

Whether or not a parent can recover for expenses incurred in caring for his child independently of any loss of service is a question

<sup>61</sup> *Terry v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 599 (a case of seduction of a daughter). And see *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233.

<sup>62</sup> 7 Dowl. & R. 133.

<sup>63</sup> See *Whitaker v. Warren*, 60 N. H. 20, 49 Am. Rep. 302; *Shields v. Younge*, 15 Ga. 349, 356, 60 Am. Dec. 698; *Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.*, 26 Mo. App. 75; *Dunn v. Cass Ave. & F. G. Ry. Co.*, 21 Mo. App. 188.

<sup>64</sup> *Finley v. Richmond & D. R. Co.* (C. C.) 59 Fed. 419; *Clark v. Bayer*, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593; *Frick v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co.*, 75 Mo. 542; *Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co.*, 109 N. Y. 95, 16 N. E. 65; *Rice v. Norfolk Southern R. Co.*, 167 N. C. 1, 82 S. E. 1034; *NETHERLAND-AMERICAN STEAM NAV. CO. v. HOLLANDER*, 59 Fed. 417, 8 C. C. A. 169, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 198.

upon which the authorities are conflicting. In *Hall v. Hollander*,<sup>65</sup> which has already been referred to, a father brought an action for personal injury to his son by driving against him. The declaration alleged that, by means thereof, the son was sick during the space of six months, "during all which time the plaintiff lost and was deprived of the service of his said son and servant, and was also thereby forced and obliged to pay, lay out, and expend a large sum of money, in and about endeavoring to procure his said son and servant to be cured," etc. At the trial it appeared that the son was only 2½ years old, and there was no evidence that he was capable of performing any service for his father. It was therefore held that the action as brought could not be maintained. This case has often been cited as authority for the proposition that there can be no recovery for expenses incurred by a parent in caring for the injured child in the absence of the actual or constructive relation of master and servant, and loss of services. But the case does not go so far. The declaration expressly based the right to recover on the existence of the relationship of master and servant, and the evidence showed that the child was too young to perform any act of service. It was for this reason that the action failed. Bayley, J., said that he certainly was not prepared to say "that a declaration might not be framed, in which the father being averred to be under an obligation to maintain the child, and having no means of obtaining medical assistance, he necessarily incurred expense in and about his cure, so as to entitle him to recover." The later English cases, however, hold that there can be no recovery for such expenses unless there is an actual or constructive relationship of master and servant, and, therefore, that there can be no recovery even for medical and other expenses where the child is too young to render services.<sup>66</sup> There are cases in this country which recognize the same doctrine.<sup>67</sup>

These cases which deny to the parent any remedy for medical or other expenses incurred in consequence of the injury to the child, except as incident to the loss of service, ignore the parental relation and obligation as an independent ground of recovery, although it is clear that the parent has sustained a pecuniary loss as the proxi-

<sup>65</sup> 7 Dowl. & R. 133.

<sup>66</sup> *Grinnell v. Wells*, 8 Scott, N. R. 741.

<sup>67</sup> *Whitaker v. Warren*, 60 N. H. 20, 49 Am. Rep. 302; *Shields v. Yonge*, 15 Ga. 349, 356, 60 Am. Dec. 698; *Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.*, 28 Mo. App. 75; *Dunn v. Cass Ave. & T. G. Ry. Co.*, 21 Mo. App. 188.

mate result of the wrong. In this country the prevailing doctrine is the other way, and in favor of allowing the parent to recover independently of any question as to loss of service. "The authorities in this country approve a more liberal and a more reasonable doctrine, and, basing the right of action upon the parental relation, instead of master and servant, allow the father to recover his consequential loss irrespective of the age of the minor."<sup>68</sup> In *Dennis v. Clark*,<sup>69</sup> which is a leading case holding this doctrine, it was decided after careful consideration, and a review of the authorities, that, when an infant residing with his father receives such an injury as would give the child a right of action, the father, who is put to necessary expense in the care and cure of the child, may maintain an action for indemnity, though the child may be too young to render any service. This doctrine casts upon the wrongdoer responsibility for a pecuniary loss flowing approximately from his wrongful act, if actually sustained by the parent in the discharge of his parental obligation to care for and maintain his infant children, without regard to any consideration of loss of service.

It has been held in a late case in New York that the parent cannot recover for medical and surgical expenses, which, according to the testimony of experts, may become necessary in the future, though the child might be allowed to recover therefor.<sup>70</sup>

#### *Other Elements of Damage*

As will presently be seen, the courts have made a distinction as regards the measure of damages, between actions by a parent for the seduction or debauching of his daughter and actions for other wrongs. In the former they not only allow the parent to recover for loss of his daughter's services, and for medical and other expenses incurred in caring for her, but they recognize, as the real gravamen of the action, the wounded feelings and mortification of the parent, the disgrace brought upon his family by the wrong, and the corrupting example to the other children, and allow the jury

<sup>68</sup> *Finley v. Richmond & D. R. Co.* (C. C.) 59 Fed. 419; *Dennis v. Clark*, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 347, 48 Am. Dec. 671; *Sykes v. Lawlor*, 49 Cal. 236; *Durden v. Barnett*, 7 Ala. 169; *Clark v. Bayer*, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593; *Trow v. Thomas*, 70 Vt. 580, 41 Atl. 652; *Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co.*, 109 N. Y. 95, 16 N. E. 65; *NETHERLAND-AMERICAN STEAM NAV. CO. v. HOLLANDER*, 59 Fed. 417, 8 C. C. A. 169, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 198.

<sup>69</sup> 2 Cush. (Mass.) 347, 48 Am. Dec. 671.

<sup>70</sup> *Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co.*, 109 N. Y. 95, 16 N. E. 65.

to take these matters into consideration in awarding the damages.<sup>71</sup> There are some cases in which this principle has been applied in an action for loss of service from other injuries than seduction. It has been held, for instance, that in an action per quod servitium amisit, brought by a parent for an assault and battery on his daughter, the jury, in assessing the damages, had a right to consider the injury to the parent's feelings, and to the character of the family.<sup>72</sup> In most states the rule is otherwise,<sup>73</sup> the recovery of such damages being limited to actions for the seduction or debauching of a daughter.

#### *Remote and Proximate Cause*

The loss of service or expenses incurred by the parent must be the proximate result of the wrongful conduct of the defendant, or he cannot recover therefor. Thus, as will be seen in dealing with seduction, if the daughter loses her health, not as the direct result of the seduction, but because of mental suffering caused by her abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or other similar causes, and her loss of health results in the loss of her services to her father, or in expenses to him, the seduction is not the proximate cause of the loss, and the father cannot maintain an action therefor.<sup>74</sup> The same principle applies in the case of other injuries.

#### *Adult Children*

A parent may maintain an action for the loss of the services of an adult child if the relationship of master and servant exists between them. In such a case the relationship will not be implied, as in the case of a minor child, for there is no right to the services of an adult child from which to imply service. It must be shown that the relationship actually exists. The question has generally arisen in cases of seduction of an adult daughter, but the rule applies to other injuries also.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Post, p. 382.

<sup>72</sup> Trimble v. Spiller, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 394, 18 Am. Dec. 189. And see Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo. 304; Magee v. Holland, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341.

<sup>73</sup> Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 429, 35 Am. Dec. 633; Whitney v. Hitchcock, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 461.

<sup>74</sup> Post, p. 382.

<sup>75</sup> Mercer v. Jackson, 54 Ill. 397; Palmer v. Baum, 123 Ill. App. 594. As to seduction of daughter, see post, p. 383.

*Who may Sue*

The action for loss of services caused by injury to a child is not necessarily always in the father. It is in the person entitled to the services of the child. If the father is entitled, then the action must be brought by him, and not by the mother or any other person.<sup>76</sup> If the mother is entitled to the child's services, either because of the father's death, or because of his desertion, leaving the child for her to support, she may sue.<sup>77</sup> And the action may be maintained by any person who stands in loco parentis.<sup>78</sup>

*Action for Death of Child*

In treating of husband and wife, attention was called to the rule, "*Actio personalis moritur cum persona*," and it was shown that, by the weight of authority, it was applied at common law so as to prevent an action by one spouse for a wrongful act or neglect causing the death of the other.<sup>79</sup> It was seen that if, by the tortious conduct of another, a wife was killed, her husband could not, at common law, recover for the loss of her society or services. It was also

<sup>76</sup> *Vossell v. Cole*, 10 Mo. 634, 47 Am. Dec. 136; *Furman v. Van Sise*, 56 N. Y. 435, 15 Am. Rep. 441; *Sargent v. —*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 106; *Ryan v. Fralick*, 50 Mich. 483, 15 N. W. 561; *Jag. Torts*, 453.

<sup>77</sup> *Bedford v. McKowl*, 3 Esp. 119; *Natchez, J. & C. R. Co. v. Cook*, 63 Miss. 38; *Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Smith*, 93 Ga. 742, 21 S. E. 157; *Harford County Com'rs v. Hamilton*, 60 Md. 340, 45 Am. Rep. 739; *Kennedy v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 187; *Horgan v. Pacific Mills*, 158 Mass. 402, 33 N. E. 581, 35 Am. St. Rep. 504; *Franklin v. Butcher*, 144 Mo. App. 660, 129 S. W. 428; *McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills*, 24 R. I. 447, 53 Atl. 320, 60 L. R. A. 122, 96 Am. St. Rep. 749; *Abrahams v. Kidney*, 104 Mass. 222, 6 Am. Rep. 220; *Ellington v. Ellington*, 47 Miss. 329; *Davidson v. Abbott*, 52 Vt. 570, 36 Am. Rep. 767; *Gray v. Durland*, 51 N. Y. 424; *Keller v. Donnelly*, 5 Md. 211. But see *South v. Deniston*, 2 Watts (Pa.) 474. A widow, who has remarried and who is not contributing to the support of the child, cannot recover for injury not resulting in death, under the Pennsylvania statute. *American Steel & Wire Co. v. Tynon*, 183 Fed. 949, 106 C. C. A. 289.

<sup>78</sup> *Whitaker v. Warren*, 60 N. H. 20, 49 Am. Rep. 302; *Clark v. Bayer*, 32 Ohio St. 299, 30 Am. Rep. 593; *Fernsler v. Moyer*, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 416, 39 Am. Dec. 33; *Irwin v. Dearman*, 11 East, 23; *Blanchard v. Ilsley*, 120 Mass. 487, 21 Am. Rep. 535; *Saunders v. Alvido & Laserre*, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 356, 113 S. W. 902; *City of Albany v. Lindsey*, 11 Ga. App. 573, 75 S. E. 911; *Ingersoll v. Jones*, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 661; *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338; *Moritz v. Garnhart*, 7 Watts (Pa.) 302, 32 Am. Dec. 762; *Manvell v. Thomson*, 2 Car. & P. 303; *Davidson v. Goodall*, 18 N. H. 423; *Keller v. Donnelly*, 5 Md. 211; *Ball v. Bruce*, 21 Ill. 161; *Maguinay v. Saudek*, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 146; *Jag. Torts*, 454, and cases there collected. See post, p. 384.

<sup>79</sup> Ante, p. 121; *Tiff. Death Wrongf. Act*, §§ 1-18.

seen that this rule has been very generally changed by statute. The same is true in the case of parent and child, where the child is killed by the wrongful act or omission of another. Though there were some cases to the contrary,<sup>80</sup> by the weight of authority, at common law the parent could not recover for the loss of the child's services, nor for his expenses resulting from the wrong, where his death was immediate.<sup>81</sup> Under Lord Campbell's act,<sup>82</sup> however, and the similar statutes which have been enacted in this country, the rule is different; and, wherever a child's death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, his parent, or his executor or administrator, for the parent's benefit, may recover damages for past and prospective loss of the child's services. And it is well settled in this country that, when suit is brought under the statute, there may be a recovery for future loss of services, although the child was of such tender years as to be incapable of rendering services.<sup>83</sup> Even under the statutes, the damages are for loss of service, and their measure is the value of the services, past and prospective, less the probable cost of support and maintenance.<sup>84</sup> Beyond what the law will imply as between parent and child, no proof of service in fact is necessary in suing under the statute.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>80</sup> *Ford v. Monroe*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 210 (since overruled); *Plummer v. Webb*, 1 Ware, 69, Fed. Cas. No. 11,234; *James v. Christy*, 18 Mo. 162; *Shields v. Yonge*, 15 Ga. 349, 60 Am. Dec. 698.

<sup>81</sup> *Osborn v. Gillett*, L. R. 8 Exch. 88 (Bramwell, B., dissenting); *Skinner v. Housatonic R. Corp.*, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 475, 48 Am. Dec. 616; *Nickerson v. Harriman*, 38 Me. 277; *Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Packer*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 455, 15 Am. Rep. 725; *Edgar v. Castello*, 14 S. O. 20, 37 Am. Rep. 714; *Natchez, J. & C. R. Co. v. Cook*, 63 Miss. 38; *Sherman v. Johnson*, 58 Vt. 40, 2 Atl. 707; *Jackson v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.*, 140 Ind. 241, 39 N. E. 663, 49 Am. St. Rep. 192; *Tiff. Death Wrongf. Act*, § 11, and cases there cited.

<sup>82</sup> St. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.

<sup>83</sup> *Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. Ferry R. Co.*, 47 N. Y. 317, 7 Am. Rep. 450; *Oldfield v. New York & H. R. Co.*, 14 N. Y. 310; *Fopplano v. Baker*, 3 Mo. App. 560. Both parents may join in an action for death of a child resulting from breach of contract to properly care for him. *Bailey v. College of Sacred Heart*, 52 Colo. 116, 119 Pac. 1067.

<sup>84</sup> *Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney*, 82 Ill. 198, 25 Am. Rep. 306; *Rajnowski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co.*, 74 Mich. 20, 41 N. W. 847; *Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly*, 73 Ind. 252; *Brunswick v. White*, 70 Tex. 504, 8 S. W. 85.

<sup>85</sup> *Duckworth v. Johnson*, 4 Hurl. & N. 653; *Condon v. Railway Co.*, 16 Ir. C. L. 415; *Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. Ferry R. Co.*, 47 N. Y. 317, 7 Am. Rep. 450; *Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Barker*, 39 Ark. 491; *City of Chicago v. Major*, 18 Ill. 349, 68 Am. Dec. 553.

*Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor to Child*

Perhaps, even at common law, a parent could maintain an action against a person for selling or furnishing his minor child with intoxicating liquors, whereby the parent sustains damage. At any rate, in many states such a right of action is given by statute, so that "where liquor is sold to a minor, whereby he becomes intoxicated, and he thereafter becomes sick in consequence thereof, and the father is deprived of his services and is compelled to expend money for medical attendance upon him, the father may maintain an action, under the civil damage law, to recover the damages occasioned thereby."<sup>86</sup>

**ACTION BY PARENT FOR SEDUCTION OR DEBAUCHING OF DAUGHTER**

135. On the seduction or debauching of his daughter, resulting actually or constructively in loss of service, the father, or any one standing in loco parentis, has a right of action against the wrongdoer for the loss of service and incidental expenses.
136. In such a case damages may also be given for all that the parent may suffer from the ruin of his daughter, the disgrace to his family, and the corrupting example to his other children.
137. The same rules apply here as in the case of other injuries, as to the necessity to show that the daughter was in the actual or constructive service of the plaintiff at the time of the injury. The necessity for loss of service has been dispensed with by statute in some states.

A parent's right to the services of his child gives him a right of action for damages arising from the seduction or debauching of his daughter.<sup>87</sup> At common law the daughter's consent to the inter-

<sup>86</sup> Black, Intox. Liq. § 285. See Id. §§ 277-337.

<sup>87</sup> Bennett v. Allcott, 2 Term R. 167; Woodward v. Walton, 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 476; Blagge v. Hsley, 127 Mass. 191, 34 Am. Rep. 361; Hubbell v. Wheeler, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 359; Parker v. Meek, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 29; Logan v. Murray, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 175, 9 Am. Dec. 422; Ellington v. Ellington, 47 Miss. 329; Mercer v. Walmsley, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486; Sargent v. —, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 109; Scarlett v. Norwood, 115 N. C. 284, 20 S. E. 459. If a marriage is fraudulently induced by a man who already has a wife living, the fraud vitiates the parent's consent, and an action may be

course prevented her from maintaining an action for her seduction;<sup>88</sup> but her consent cannot affect her parent's rights, and is therefore no bar to his action for the loss of her services and other damages to him.<sup>89</sup>

From the earliest period the courts have based the parent's right of action, not upon the seduction or debauching, but upon the loss of his daughter's services. The action cannot be maintained for the mere act of intercourse, though it is a far greater injury to the father than any mere pecuniary loss he may sustain. In *Eager v. Grimwood*<sup>90</sup> it appeared that the defendant had debauched the plaintiff's daughter, but that another, and not he, was the cause of her pregnancy; and it was therefore held that the plaintiff could not recover.

In its origin the action was very technical. If the wrongdoer came upon the father's premises and debauched the daughter there, the parent could maintain an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, and lay the loss of service and other damage sustained by reason of the intercourse as consequential upon and in aggravation of the trespass; or he could, at his election, bring an action on the case, ignoring the trespass. But for merely debauching a man's daughter, unaccompanied by an unauthorized entry upon his premises, the action had to be in case. And such is still the rule at common law.<sup>91</sup>

When the action is for the loss of service, there can, of course, be no recovery, unless the relationship of master and servant actually or constructively exists.<sup>92</sup> And the cases go even further, and hold

maintained by him. *Lawyer v. Fritcher*, 130 N. Y. 239, 29 N. E. 267, 14 L. R. A. 700, 27 Am. St. Rep. 521.

<sup>88</sup> *Paul v. Frazier*, 3 Mass. 71, 3 Am. Dec. 95; *Woodward v. Anderson*, 9 Bush (Ky.) 624; *Jordan v. Hovey*, 72 Mo. 574, 37 Am. Rep. 447; *Weaver v. Bachert*, 2 Pa. 80, 44 Am. Dec. 159; *Oberlin v. Upson*, 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N. E. 511, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1061. But this has been changed by statute in some states. See *Colly v. Thomas*, 99 Misc. Rep. 158, 163 N. Y. Supp. 432.

<sup>89</sup> *Koenke v. Bauer*, 162 Mo. App. 718, 145 S. W. 506; *Reutkemeler v. Nolte*, 179 Iowa, 342, 161 N. W. 290, L. R. A. 1917D, 273.

<sup>90</sup> 1 Exch. 61.

<sup>91</sup> *Mercer v. Walmsley*, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486, and cases cited in note 87, *supra*.

<sup>92</sup> See *Dain v. Wycoff*, 7 N. Y. 191, where the child was bound out as an apprentice. But see, also, *Bolton v. Miller*, 6 Ind. 262, holding that mere agreement that child should serve another, which is not of such character as to prevent father from claiming the services of the child at any time, is not sufficient to bar his right of action. And see, generally, ante, p. 370.

that no action at all can be maintained, even for medical and other expenses incurred in caring for the daughter, unless the relationship of master and servant exists either in fact or in contemplation of law.<sup>93</sup> As has been seen, however, in this country, where a minor child is injured by the wrongful conduct of another, and the parent incurs expense in caring for and curing the child, many courts base the parent's right of action for indemnity upon the parental relation and obligation to maintain the child, instead of on the relation of master and servant, and allow a recovery irrespective of the loss of service.<sup>94</sup> There is no good reason why the doctrine of these cases should not be applied to cases in which the wrong is the debauching of a daughter.

It is not necessary in this action, any more than in an action for other injuries to a child to show the actual performance of services by a minor child.<sup>95</sup> It is sufficient to show that the parent has a right to the daughter's services, if she is a minor, and service will be implied.<sup>96</sup> So the mere temporary absence of the daughter from her parents' home does not bar the right to maintain the action.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>93</sup> *Grieanell v. Wells*, 7 Man. & G. 1033; *Harris v. Butler*, 2 Mees. & W. 539; *Abrahams v. Kildney*, 104 Mass. 222, 6 Am. Rep. 220; *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338; *Coon v. Moffet*, 3 N. J. Law, 583, 4 Am. Dec. 392; *White v. Murtland*, 71 Ill. 252, 22 Am. Rep. 100; *Vossel v. Cole*, 10 Mo. 634, 47 Am. Dec. 136; *Whitbourne v. Williams*, 70 Law J. K. B. 933, [1901] 2 K. B. 722, 85 Law T. 271.

<sup>94</sup> *Ante*, p. 372.

<sup>95</sup> *Snider v. Newell*, 132 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 354.

<sup>96</sup> *Maunder v. Venn*, *Moody & M.* 323; *Manvell v. Thomson*, 2 Car. & P. 303; *Herring v. Jester*, 2 Houst. (Del.) 66; *Parker v. Meek*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 29; *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233; *Bolton v. Miller*, 6 Ind. 262; *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 288; *Mercer v. Walmsley*, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486; *Kennedy v. Shea*, 110 Mass. 147, 14 Am. Rep. 584; *White v. Murtland*, 71 Ill. 250, 22 Am. Rep. 100; *Reutkemeler v. Nolte*, 179 Iowa, 342, 161 N. W. 290, L. R. A. 1917D, 273; *Ingwaldson v. Skrivseth*, 7 N. D. 388, 75 N. W. 772. But see *Taylor v. Daniel*, 98 S. W. 986, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 377.

<sup>97</sup> *Clark v. Fitch*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459, 20 Am. Dec. 639; *Elder v. Warner* (Sup.) 129 N. Y. Supp. 816; *Ingwaldson v. Skrivseth*, 7 N. D. 388, 75 N. W. 772; *Blagge v. Isley*, 127 Mass. 191, 34 Am. Rep. 361; *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233. In *Martin v. Payne*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387, 6 Am. Dec. 288, the plaintiff's daughter, who was under age, went, with the consent of her father, to live with her uncle, for whom she worked when she pleased, and he agreed to pay her for her work; but there was no agreement that she should continue to live in his house for any fixed time. While in her uncle's house she was seduced and got with child. Immediately afterwards she returned to her father's house, where she was maintained, and the expense of her lying in was paid by him. It was held that the

It has already been shown in a preceding section when the relationship of master and servant is deemed to exist between parent and child, and the rules there stated are applicable in cases of seduction.<sup>98</sup>

The courts have made a distinction, as regards the measure of damages, between actions by a parent for the seduction or debauching of his daughter and actions for other wrongs. The fiction of loss of service is generally upheld even in cases of seduction; but the courts recognize as the real gravamen of the action the wounded feelings and mortification of the parent, the disgrace brought upon his family by the wrong, and the corrupting example to the other children, and allow the jury to take these matters into consideration in awarding damages.<sup>99</sup> As was said by Lord Eldon: "In point of form, the action only purports to give a recompense for loss of service; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that this is an action brought by a parent for an injury to her child. In such case I am of opinion that the jury may take into their consideration all that she can feel from the nature of the loss. They may look upon her as a parent losing the comfort, as well as the service, of her daughter, in whose virtue she can feel no consolation, and as the

father could maintain an action against the seducer. In *Clark v. Fitch*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459, 20 Am. Dec. 639, it was proved upon the trial of a similar action that the plaintiff told his daughter that she might remain at home or go out to service, as she pleased, but, if she left his house, she must take care of herself, and he relinquished all claim to her wages and services. It was contended that there was a distinction between this case and that of *Martin v. Payne*, supra, on the ground that he had given her her time absolutely; but the court held that the personal rights of the father were not relinquished, and that he could recover. And in *Mulvehall v. Millward*, 11 N. Y. 343, it appeared that the plaintiff's minor daughter, who had left his house to work for the defendant, was seduced by the latter while in his employ, and became pregnant. She thereafter worked at other places, and did not return to her father's house; nor did it appear that she had any intention to return there until after her confinement and the birth of her child. It was not shown that her father took any care of her, or expended any money on her account, during her pregnancy or sickness. It was held that, as the father had not surrendered his right to her services, he could maintain an action for her seduction.

<sup>98</sup> Ante, p. 369, where the cases on seduction as well as on other injuries are collected, and the conflicts shown.

<sup>99</sup> *Blagge v. Ilsley*, 127 Mass. 191, 34 Am. Rep. 361; *Bedford v. McKowl*, 3 Esp. 119; *Irwin v. Dearman*, 11 East, 23; *Barbour v. Stephenson* (C. C.) 32 Fed. 66; *Clem v. Holmes*, 33 Grat. (Va.) 722, 36 Am. Rep. 793; *Rollins v. Chalmers*, 51 Vt. 592; *Garretson v. Becker*, 52 Ill. App. 255; *Russell v. Chambers*, 31 Minn. 54, 16 N. W. 458; *Elder v. Warner* (Sup.) 129 N. Y. Supp. 816; *Dwire v. Stearns* (N. D.) 172 N. W. 69; *Tillotson v. Currin*, 176 N. C.

parent of other children, whose morals may be corrupted by her example."<sup>1</sup>

Some states, in recognition of the principle that the real gravamen of the action is not the loss of service, but the wounded feelings, mortification, and disgrace of the parent, have abolished, by statute, the fiction of loss of service, and allow the parent to recover without proof of such loss.<sup>2</sup> In an interesting case the Supreme Court of Kansas has held that, in view of the provisions of the Code abolishing forms of action and feigned issues, the action would lie by virtue of the parental relation alone, and this irrespective of the fact that the daughter had attained her majority.<sup>3</sup>

As stated in treating generally of a parent's right of action for injuries to his child, the loss of services or expenses must be the proximate result of the defendant's wrong, or the parent cannot recover. The principle applies to action by a parent for the seduction or debauching of his daughter. If the daughter, for instance, loses her health, not as the direct result of the seduction, but because of mental suffering caused by her abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or other similar causes, and her ill health results in the loss of her services to her father, or in medical or other expenses, the loss to the father is too remote a consequence of the seduction, and he cannot maintain an action.<sup>4</sup> If, however, mental distress or disease is the proximate result of the intercourse, as where it is accomplished under circumstances of violence or fraud, and impairment of health, and consequent expense or loss of serv-

479, 97 S. E. 395; *Haelssig v. Decker*, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N. W. 1085; *Felkner v. Scarlet*, 29 Ind. 154; *Phelin v. Kenderdine*, 20 Pa. 354; *Hudkins v. Haskins*, 22 W. Va. 645; *Klopfer v. Bromme*, 26 Wis. 372; *Dain v. Wyckoff*, 18 N. Y. 45, 72 Am. Dec. 493; *Hatch v. Fuller*, 131 Mass. 574; *Parker v. Monteith*, 7 Or. 277; *Emery v. Gowen*, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 33, 16 Am. Dec. 233; *Cook v. Bartlett*, 179 Mass. 576, 61 N. E. 266; *Mighell v. Stone*, 175 Ill. 261, 51 N. E. 906, affirming 74 Ill. App. 129; *Middleton v. Nichols*, 62 N. J. Law, 636, 43 Atl. 575, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 204.

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford v. McKowl*, 3 Esp. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Hein v. Holdridge*, 78 Minn. 468, 81 N. W. 522 (applying Gen. St. 1894, § 5163) *Schmit v. Mitchell*, 59 Minn. 251, 61 N. W. 140 (applying Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 33); *Stoudt v. Shepherd*, 73 Mich. 588, 41 N. W. 696 (applying How. Ann. St. 1882, § 7779); *Anderson v. Aupperle*, 51 Or. 556, 95 Pac. 330 (applying B. & C. Comp. § 35). And see *Fry v. Leslie*, 87 Va. 269, 12 S. E. 671.

<sup>3</sup> *Anthony v. Norton*, 60 Kan. 341, 56 Pac. 529, 44 L. R. A. 757, 72 Am. St. Rep. 360 (applying Code Civ. Proc. §§ 6, 7, 116). But see *Kaufman v. Clark*, 141 La. 316, 75 South. 65, L. R. A. 1917E, 756.

<sup>4</sup> *Boyle v. Brandon*, 13 Mees. & W. 738; *Knight v. Wilcox*, 14 N. Y. 413.

ice to the father follow, the father may maintain an action. It is not necessary that the intercourse shall have resulted in pregnancy or sexual disease.<sup>5</sup> Loss sustained in consequence of a venereal disease caused by the intercourse is not too remote.<sup>6</sup>

A parent may maintain an action for loss of the services of an adult child, if the relationship of master and servant exists between them. Under such circumstances an action will lie for seducing or debauching an adult daughter, and thereby causing a loss of services; and the recovery may, as in the case of a minor daughter, include damages for wounded feelings, mortification, etc.<sup>7</sup> In the case of an adult child, however, the relationship of master and servant will not be implied, as in the case of a minor child, but it must be shown that the relation actually existed.<sup>8</sup> Proof of any actual service, however slight, has been held sufficient.<sup>9</sup> And it has been held that service may be presumed where an adult daughter continues to live with her father.<sup>10</sup>

Though the right to maintain an action for the seduction or debauching of a child is primarily in the father,<sup>11</sup> it is not necessarily limited to him. On his death or desertion, the action may be main-

<sup>5</sup> *Abrahams v. Kidney*, 104 Mass. 222, 6 Am. Rep. 220; *Van Horn v. Freeman*, 6 N. J. Law, 322, *Manvell v. Thomson*, 2 Car. & P. 303; *Blagge v. Isley*, 127 Mass. 191, 34 Am. Rep. 361; *Briggs v. Evans*, 27 N. C. 16.

<sup>6</sup> *White v. Nellis*, 31 N. Y. 405, 88 Am. Dec. 282.

<sup>7</sup> *Bennett v. Allcott*, 2 Term R. 166; *Davidson v. Abbott*, 52 Vt. 570, 36 Am. Rep. 767; *Herring v. Jester*, 2 Houst. (Del.) 66; *Sutton v. Huffman*, 32 N. J. Law, 58; *Bayles v. Burgard*, 48 Ill. App. 371; *Mercer v. Walmsley*, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27, 9 Am. Dec. 486; *Lee v. Hodges*, 13 Grat. (Va.) 726; *Vossel v. Cole*, 10 Mo. 634, 47 Am. Dec. 136; *Nickleson v. Stryker*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 115, 6 Am. Dec. 318; *Thompson v. Millar*, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 447; *Patterson v. Thompson*, 24 Ark. 55; *Briggs v. Evans*, 27 N. C. 21; *Hartman v. McCrary*, 59 Mo. App. 571.

<sup>8</sup> *Harper v. Luffkin*, 7 Barn. & C. 387; *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338; *Parker v. Meek*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 29; *Nickleson v. Stryker*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 115, 6 Am. Dec. 318; and cases cited in note 75, *supra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Beaudette v. Goyne*, 87 Me. 534, 33 Atl. 23. And see *Wallace v. Clark*, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 93, 5 Am. Dec. 654. See, also, cases cited above.

<sup>10</sup> See *Sutton v. Huffman*, 32 N. J. Law, 58; *Brown v. Ramsay*, 29 N. J. Law, 118; *Briggs v. Evans*, 27 N. C. 21; *Wilhoit v. Hancock*, 5 Bush (Ky.) 567. See *Hartman v. McCrary*, 59 Mo. App. 571. In *Palmer v. Baum*, 123 Ill. App. 584, it was held that a father may recover for loss of services of an adult daughter, who, though married, was separated from her husband and was a member of the father's family.

<sup>11</sup> *Mulvehall v. Millward*, 11 N. Y. 243; *Scarlett v. Norwood*, 115 N. C. 284, 20 S. E. 459.

tained by the mother.<sup>12</sup> And, generally, an action will lie by any person who stands in loco parentis, and is therefore entitled to the child's services.<sup>13</sup>

### ACTION BY PARENT FOR ABDUCTING, ENTICING, OR HARBORING CHILD.

138. A parent, or any one standing in loco parentis, has a right of action for loss of services and incidental expenses against one who abducts or wrongfully entices or harbors his child.
139. The same rules apply here as in the case of other injuries, as to the necessity to show the actual or constructive relationship of master and servant.

The right of a parent to the custody and services of his minor children gives him a right of action against any one who abducts or designedly entices his child away from him, or who harbors the

<sup>12</sup> Ante, p. 355; *Bedford v. McKowl*, 3 Esp. 119; *Furman v. Van Sise*, 56 N. Y. 435, 15 Am. Rep. 441; *Heaps v. Dunham*, 95 Ill. 583; *Abrahams v. Kidney*, 104 Mass. 222, 6 Am. Rep. 220; *Ellington v. Ellington*, 47 Miss. 329; *Davidson v. Abbott*, 52 Vt. 570, 36 Am. Rep. 767; *Anthony v. Norton*, 60 Kan. 341, 56 Pac. 529, 44 L. R. A. 757, 72 Am. St. Rep. 360; *Gray v. Durland*, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 100; *Id.*, 51 N. Y. 424; *Keller v. Donnelly*, 5 Md. 211; *Coon v. Moffet*, 3 N. J. Law, 583, 4 Am. Dec. 392; *Hammond v. Corbett*, 50 N. H. 501, 9 Am. Rep. 288; *Matthewson v. Perry*, 37 Conn. 435, 9 Am. Rep. 339. But see *South v. Denniston*, 2 Watts (Pa.) 474. A wife may sue as next friend of her insane husband for seduction of their daughter. *Abbott v. Hancock*, 123 N. C. 99, 31 S. E. 268. In *Coon v. Moffet*, 3 N. J. Law, 583, 4 Am. Dec. 392, it was held that an action might be maintained by the mother for the seduction of her daughter during the father's lifetime, and while the daughter was in the constructive service of her father, where the mother after the father's death, supported and cared for the daughter, paid her lying-in expenses, and became entitled to and lost her services; the loss of services being considered the gist of the action. And see *Parker v. Meek*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 29. But see, contra, *Logan v. Murray*, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 175, 9 Am. Dec. 422; *Vossell v. Cole*, 10 Mo. 634, 47 Am. Dec. 136.

<sup>13</sup> Ante, p. 356; *Irwin v. Dearman*, 11 East, 23; *Manvell v. Thomson*, 2 Car. & P. 303; *Davidson v. Goodall*, 18 N. H. 423; *Keller v. Donnelly*, 5 Md. 211; *Ball v. Bruce*, 21 Ill. 161; *Tittlebaum v. Boehmcke*, 81 N. J. Law, 697, 80 Atl. 323, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 298; *Maguinay v. Saudek*, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 146; *Bracy v. Kibbe*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 273; *Ingersoll v. Jones*, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 661. But see *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338. The provisions of the Oregon statute (B. & C. Comp. § 35) giving the father and mother the right to sue for seduction of daughter, irrespective of right to services, does not affect the common-law right of a grandfather, in whose household the female lives, to sue for her seduction. *Anderson v. Aupperle*, 51 Or. 556, 95 Pac. 330.

child, knowing that it has wrongfully left its home.<sup>14</sup> The parent may sue either in assumpsit or in tort.<sup>15</sup> The action in assumpsit is on the theory that the defendant has impliedly undertaken to pay for the services of the child.<sup>16</sup> The action in tort is the ordinary action of trespass on the case for the wrong and the consequent loss of the child's services.<sup>17</sup> It has also been held that an action will lie in trespass *vi et armis*, for the loss of the child's society, without any allegation of loss of service.<sup>18</sup> The intent of a person harboring a child who has run away from home is material. The employment, in good faith, of a runaway child, without knowledge that he has left his home wrongfully, is not a wrong.<sup>19</sup>

In an action for abducting, enticing, or harboring, the recovery may include the expense to which the plaintiff has been put in regaining the custody of the child.<sup>20</sup> In such an action as this, the gist of the action is the loss of the child's services, and the relation

<sup>14</sup> *Evans v. Walton*, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; *Everett v. Sherfey*, 1 Iowa, 356; *Butterfield v. Ashley*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249; *Stowe v. Heywood*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 118; *Caughey v. Smith*, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 351; *Moritz v. Garnhart*, 7 Watts (Pa.) 302, 32 Am. Dec. 762; *Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Showers*, 71 Ind. 451; *Thompson v. Howard*, 31 Mich. 309; *Selman v. Barnett*, 4 Ga. App. 375, 61 S. E. 505; *Vaughan v. Rhodes*, 2 McCord (S. C.) 227, 13 Am. Dec. 713; *Magee v. Holland*, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341; *Plummer v. Webb*, 4 Mason, 380, Fed. Cas. No. 11,233; *Sargent v. Mathewson*, 38 N. H. 54. See *Loomis v. Deets* (Md.) 30 Atl. 612. The action cannot be maintained by the mother, if the father is alive and resides with her. *Soper v. Igo*, Walker Co., 121 Ky. 550, 89 S. W. 538, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 362, 123 Am. St. Rep. 212, 11 Ann. Cas. 1171.

<sup>15</sup> *Thompson v. Howard*, 31 Mich. 309.

<sup>16</sup> *Thompson v. Howard*, 31 Mich. 309.

<sup>17</sup> *Evans v. Walton*, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; *Jones v. Tevis*, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 25, 14 Am. Dec. 98; *Sargent v. Mathewson*, 38 N. H. 54; *Noice v. Brown*, 39 N. J. Law, 569.

<sup>18</sup> *Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart*, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 276; *Vaughan v. Rhodes*, 2 McCord (S. C.) 227, 13 Am. Dec. 713; *Magnuson v. O'Dea*, 75 Wash. 574, 135 Pac. 640, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1230. And see 3 Bl. Comm. 140. But see *Jones v. Tevis*, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 25, 14 Am. Dec. 98. In *Washburn v. Abrams*, 122 Ky. 53, 90 S. W. 997, it was held that a parent may maintain an action for abduction and detention of a child, based on the principle of the parent's right to the child's services, though the child renders no services, in which recovery may be had for injury to feelings and for loss of companionship of the child, as well as loss of services. But no action will lie for loss of love and affection. *Miles v. Cuthbert* (Sup.) 122 N. Y. Supp. 703.

<sup>19</sup> *Butterfield v. Ashley*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249; *Caughey v. Smith*, 47 N. Y. 244; *Kenney v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 101 Md. 490, 61 Atl. 581, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205. *Sargent v. Mathewson*, 38 N. H. 54.

<sup>20</sup> *Magee v. Holland*, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341.

of master and servant, actual or constructive, between the plaintiff and the child, must be shown.<sup>21</sup> A father, for instance, cannot maintain an action for enticing away his son, whom he has suffered to remain under the custody of his mother, from whom he (the father) is separated, and to be supported and employed by her.<sup>22</sup> The rules as to constructive service are the same in these as in other cases.<sup>23</sup>

### PARENT'S RIGHTS IN CHILD'S PROPERTY

#### 140. Apart from his child's earnings a parent, as such, has no rights in property acquired by his child.

Whatever property a child may acquire in any manner, except as compensation for services rendered by him, belongs to him absolutely, and the parent, as such, has no claim to it.<sup>24</sup> "He has no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift, or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever, therefore, an infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his father cannot interpose any claim to it, either as against the child, or as against third persons who claim title or possession from or under the infant."<sup>25</sup> It follows from this that one who pays money belonging to a child to his parent does so at his own risk, and will not be protected by the parent's discharge.<sup>26</sup> A parent has no implied authority to compromise or settle a cause of action of his infant child,<sup>27</sup> nor can he, by

<sup>21</sup> *Magee v. Holland*, 27 N. J. Law, 86, 72 Am. Dec. 341; *Butterfield v. Ashley*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249; *Wodell v. Coggeshall*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 391.

<sup>22</sup> *Wodell v. Coggeshall*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 391.

<sup>23</sup> *Ante*, p. 367.

<sup>24</sup> *Banks v. Conant*, 14 Allen (Mass.) 497; *Keeler v. Fassett*, 21 Vt. 539, 52 Am. Dec. 71; *Jackson v. Combs*, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 38; *Hopkins v. Lee*, 162 Iowa, 185, 143 N. W. 1002; *Rhoades v. McNulty*, 52 Mo. App. 301.

<sup>25</sup> *Banks v. Conant*, 14 Allen (Mass.) 497.

<sup>26</sup> *Dagley v. Tolferry*, 1 P. Wms. 285; *Perry v. Carmichael*, 95 Ill. 519; *Clark v. Smith*, 13 S. C. 585; *Linton v. Walker*, 8 Fla. 144, 71 Am. Dec. 105; *Brown v. State*, 42 Ala. 540.

<sup>27</sup> *Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lasca*, 79 Kan. 311, 99 Pac. 616, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 338, 17 Ann. Cas. 605; *Kirk v. Middlebrook*, 201 Mo. 245, 100 S. W.

reason of the relationship alone, accept payment of, and satisfy, a judgment in favor of the child.<sup>28</sup>

Where a child has not been emancipated, but is supported by his parent, his services, as we have seen, belong to the parent. His earnings from services rendered for another, without a gift of them to him by the parent, stand on the same footing, and belong to the parent. And so it is with property purchased with his earnings.<sup>29</sup> What is given to a child by his parent in the way of support and maintenance, and for purposes of education, as clothing, school books, etc., belongs to the parent, and he may reclaim it, or recover damages for its injury.<sup>30</sup> But what is given, not in the way of support and maintenance, but with the intention that it shall become the property of the child, will become his.<sup>31</sup> And this is true of a gift of his earnings.<sup>32</sup>

### GIFTS, CONVEYANCES, AND CONTRACTS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD

141. Gifts, conveyances, and contracts between parent and child are as valid as if between strangers. But—

- (a) A gift or conveyance from child to parent, or a contract beneficial to the parent, is presumed to have been made under parental influence, and to be voidable by the child, if made before or shortly after attaining his majority; and the parent must show that there was no undue influence.
- (b) Gifts, conveyances, and contracts by a minor child are voidable at his option, on the ground of infancy.

A gift from a parent to his child, accompanied by delivery, is as valid as a gift between strangers.<sup>33</sup> Delivery of a gift from a father

450; *Leslie v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.*, 102 Kan. 159, 169 Pac. 193, L. R. A. 1918C, 55.

<sup>28</sup> *Paskewie v. East, St. L. & S. Ry. Co.* 281 Ill. 385, 117 N. E. 1035, L. R. A. 1918C, 52, reversing 206 Ill. App. 131.

<sup>29</sup> *Ante*, p. 354.

<sup>30</sup> *Dickinson v. Winchester*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 114, 50 Am. Dec. 760; *Parmelee v. Smith*, 21 Ill. 620; *Prentice v. Decker*, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 21.

<sup>31</sup> *Wheeler v. St. Joseph & W. Ry. Co.*, 31 Kan. 640, 3 Pac. 297; *Grangiac v. Arden*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 293; *Dickinson v. Winchester*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 114, 50 Am. Dec. 760.

<sup>32</sup> *Morse v. Welton*, 6 Conn. 547, 16 Am. Dec. 73; *ante*, p. 363. As to gift of earnings as against creditors, see *ante*, p. 357.

<sup>33</sup> *May v. May*, 33 Beav. 81, 87; *Sanborn v. Goodhue*, 28 N. H. 48, 59 Am.

to his child, when the property remains in the family, is often difficult to prove; but, when the gift is in fact shown to have been fully executed by delivery,<sup>84</sup> it will be upheld. A child may likewise make a valid gift to its parent, if the gift is not tainted with undue parental influence.<sup>85</sup> The same is true of conveyances between parent and child.<sup>86</sup> And it is also true of contracts between them. The relationship of parent and child imposes no disability upon the parties to contract with each other. Their contracts, in the absence of undue influence by the parent, are just as valid as contracts between strangers.<sup>87</sup>

As will be seen in a subsequent chapter, an infant is not bound by his contracts, gifts, or conveyances if he chooses to avoid them on attaining his majority; but the other party, being an adult, is bound if the infant elects to hold him.<sup>88</sup> The principles governing contracts and conveyances by infants must apply to contracts and conveyances between a parent and his minor child.

Because of the parental relation and the opportunity it affords for the exercise of undue influence by the parent over the child, a contract between parent and child, beneficial to the parent, or a gift or conveyance by a child to his parent, made before or shortly after the child has attained his majority, will be presumed to have been the result of undue influence by the parent, and may be avoided by the child, unless the parent shows that no undue in-

Dec. 398; *Kellogg v. Adams*, 51 Wis. 138, 8 N. W. 115, 37 Am. Rep. 815; *In re Acken's Estate*, 144 Iowa, 519, 123 N. W. 187, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1166; *Hawthorne v. Jenkins*, 182 Ala. 255, 62 South. 505, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 707; *Dodd v. McCraw*, 8 Ark. 84, 46 Am. Dec. 301; *Danley v. Rector*, 10 Ark. 211, 50 Am. Dec. 242; *Martrick v. Linfield*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 325, 32 Am. Dec. 265; *Kerrigan v. Rautigan*, 43 Conn. 17; *Pierson v. Halsey*, 19 Iowa, 114; *Hillebrant v. Brewer*, 6 Tex. 45, 55 Am. Dec. 757; *Sims v. Sims Adm'r*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 449, 33 Am. Dec. 293. Where there is a donation from a parent to the child, there is no presumption of undue influence. *Neal v. Neal*, 155 Ala. 604, 47 South. 66; *Sanders v. Gurley*, 153 Ala. 459, 44 South. 1022.

<sup>84</sup> See cases above cited. It requires less positive evidence to establish a delivery of a gift from a father to his children than it does between persons who are not related. *Jenning v. Rohde*, 99 Minn. 335, 109 N. W. 597.

<sup>85</sup> Note, 39, *infra*.

<sup>86</sup> *Taylor v. Staples*, 8 R. I. 170, 5 Am. Rep. 556; *Kennedy v. McCann*, 101 Md. 643, 61 Atl. 625; *Powers v. Powers*, 46 Or. 479, 80 Pac. 1058; *Jenning v. Rohde*, 99 Minn. 335, 109 N. W. 597; *Becker v. Schwerdtle*, 6 Cal. App. 462, 92 Pac. 398. A deed by a father to his bastard son is valid. *Hall v. Hall*, 82 S. W. 300, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 610.

<sup>87</sup> *Abbott v. Converse*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530; *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293; *Steel v. Steel*, 12 Pa. 64.

<sup>88</sup> Post, p. 495.

fluence was exercised, and that the child acted freely and with a full knowledge of all material facts.<sup>39</sup> The presumption of undue influence from parental relations does not cease as soon as the child becomes of age. It continues until there is such a complete emancipation that the judgment of the child is under no control. In *Bergen v. Udall*,<sup>40</sup> a daughter, soon after reaching her majority, made a voluntary conveyance for the benefit of her father. "A transaction like the present," said the court, "will be examined by the court with the most jealous scrutiny and suspicion. The person relying upon it must show affirmatively, not only that the person who made it understood its nature and effect, and executed it voluntarily, but that such will and intention was not in any degree the result of misrepresentation or mistake, and was not induced by the exertion, for selfish purposes, and for his own exclusive benefit, of the influence and control which he possessed as a father over his daughter."<sup>41</sup>

It has already been seen that a parent may relinquish his right to the services of his minor child, and that he may bind himself by an agreement to compensate the child for his services.<sup>42</sup> Because of the relationship, however, there is a presumption that no compensation was intended; and the child must show affirmatively that there was an agreement for compensation.<sup>43</sup> The same is true

<sup>39</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 367, and cases there cited; *Wright v. Vanderplank*, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 133; *Archer v. Hudson*, 7 Beav. 551; *Hoghton v. Hoghton*, 15 Beav. 278; *Savery v. King*, 5 H. L. Cas. 627; *Miller v. Simonds*, 72 Mo. 689; *Bergen v. Udall*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 8 How. 183, 12 L. Ed. 1040; *Betz v. Lovell*, 197 Ala. 239, 72 South. 500; *Cooley v. Stringfellow*, 164 Ala. 460, 51 South. 321; *Pevehouse v. Adams*, 52 Okl. 495, 153 Pac. 65; *Berkmeyer v. Kellerman*, 82 Ohio St. 239, 30 Am. Rep. 577; *Ripple v. Kuehne*, 100 Md. 672, 60 Atl. 464; *EIGHMY v. BROOK*, 126 Iowa, 535, 102 N. W. 444, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 206. But the rule will not be applied to defeat a gift or contract, merely because of the relation. *Giers v. Hudson*, 102 Ark. 232, 143 S. W. 916; *Turner v. Turner*, 31 Okl. 272, 121 Pac. 616.

<sup>40</sup> 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 9.

<sup>41</sup> See, also, *Williams v. Canary*, 249 Fed. 344, 161 C. C. A. 352, where it was said that, while equity will closely scan a contract between parent and child, entered into shortly after the child attained his majority, yet such contract is not prima facie void, and if not unconscionable, and if made with complete understanding on the part of the child, it will not be declared void.

<sup>42</sup> Ante, p. 358, and cases there cited. And see *Officer v. Swindlehurst*, 41 Mont. 126, 108 Pac. 583.

<sup>43</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 28, and cases there cited; *Bantz v. Bantz*, 52 Md. 693; *Hefron v. Brown*, 155 Ill. 322, 40 N. E. 583; *Faloon v. McIntyre*, 118 Ill. 292, 8 N. E. 315; *Miller v. Miller*, 16 Ill. 296.

where a child who has attained his majority continues to live with his parents, and to render services as during his minority. The presumption is that the services were intended to be gratuitous, and the burden is on the child to show that both parties intended that compensation should be made.<sup>44</sup> A like rule applies where a parent seeks to recover as on a contract with a child for support or maintenance.<sup>45</sup>

### ADVANCEMENTS

142. Gifts of real or personal property from parent to child, in anticipation of the child's share of the parent's estate under statutes of distribution, are known as "advancements."

143. The expenses of maintenance and education, and inconsiderable gifts, are not advancements; but it is *prima facie* otherwise with gifts made to start a child in business or a profession, or to make a provision for him, and other substantial gifts.

When a parent makes a gift to any of his children, either out of his real or his personal estate, in anticipation of the child's share of his estate, the gift is known as an advancement, and will be taken into consideration in the distribution of the estate in case of intestacy.<sup>46</sup> The doctrine of advancement applies in the case of the distribution of intestate estates, under the statute of distribution in England (St. 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 10),<sup>47</sup> and under similar statutes in the various states of this country.<sup>48</sup>

Not every gift from parent to child will be considered as an advancement. Payments made for the ordinary expenses of maintenance and education are not advancements, nor are gifts of money

<sup>44</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 28; *Dye v. Kerr*, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 444; *Pellage v. Pellage*, 32 Wis. 136; *Mosteller's Appeal*, 30 Pa. 473; *Fitch v. Peckham*, 16 Vt. 150; *Young v. Herman*, 97 N. C. 280, 1 S. E. 792; *Freeman v. Freeman*, 65 Ill. 106; *Hall v. Hall*, 44 N. H. 293.

<sup>45</sup> See *Clark*, Cont. 28.

<sup>46</sup> *Abb. Desc. Wills & Adm.* 10, 138; 4 Kent, Comm. 417, 418; *Grattan v. Grattan*, 18 Ill. 167, 65 Am. Dec. 726; *Wallace v. Reddick*, 119 Ill. 151, 8 N. E. 801; *Brunson v. Henry*, 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256; *Murphy v. Murphy*, 95 Iowa, 271, 63 N. W. 697.

<sup>47</sup> *Edwards v. Freeman*, 2 P. Wms. 435; *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 318.

<sup>48</sup> *Marshall v. Rensch*, 3 Del. Ch. 239; *Huggins v. Huggins*, 71 Ga. 66; *Beebe v. Estabrook*, 79 N. Y. 246; *Grattan v. Grattan*, 18 Ill. 167, 65 Am. Dec. 726.

for current expenses, or inconsiderable presents.<sup>49</sup> But payments made to enable a child to enter a profession, or to start him in business, are prima facie deemed advancements, such as the admission fee to one of the inns of court, the cost of a commission in the army, or the purchase of the good will and stock in trade of a business.<sup>50</sup> And in all other cases, when substantial payments of money have been made to a child, or he has received real or personal property of considerable value, the presumption is that they have been given him by way of advancements. "If, in the absence of evidence, you find a father giving a large sum in one payment, there is a presumption that that is intended to start him in life, or make a provision for him."<sup>51</sup>

The presumption that a voluntary conveyance from a parent to a child is intended as an advancement is based on the supposition that he intends to treat his children equally; and if anything shows a purpose to discriminate between children, the presumption that the conveyance is an advancement is overthrown.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, L. R. 20 Eq. 155; *Cooner v. May*, 3 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 185; *In re Riddle's Estate*, 19 Pa. 431; *Bradsher v. Cannady*, 76 N. C. 445; *Bowles v. Winchester*, 13 Bush (Ky.) 1; *Elliot v. Collier*, 1 Ves. Sr. 16; *Sanford v. Sanford*, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 293; *Mitchell's Distributees v. Mitchell's Adm'r*, 8 Ala. 414; *In re King's Estate*, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 370; *Meadows v. Meadows*, 33 N. C. 148.

<sup>50</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, L. R. 20 Eq. 155; *Boyd v. Boyd*, L. R. 4 Eq. 305; *Bruce v. Griscom*, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 280; *Ison v. Ison*, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 15; *McCaw v. Blewit*, 2 McCord, Eq. (S. C.) 90; *Shiver v. Brock*, 55 N. C. 137.

<sup>51</sup> *Taylor v. Taylor*, L. R. 20 Eq. 155. And see *Sanford v. Sanford*, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 293; *Graves v. Spedden*, 46 Md. 527; *Gordon v. Barkelaw*, 6 N. J. Eq. 94; *Hatch v. Straight*, 3 Conn. 31, 8 Am. Dec. 152; *Hodgson v. Macy*, 8 Ind. 121; *Aylor v. Aylor* (Mo.) 186 S. W. 1068; *Cowden v. Cowden*, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 71; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 4 Gilman (Ill.) 303; *Maxwell v. Maxwell*, 109 Ill. 588; *Sampson v. Sampson*, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 329; *Watkins v. Young*, 31 Grat. (Va.) 84; *Murphy v. Murphy*, 95 Iowa, 271, 63 N. W. 697; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 90 Iowa, 541, 58 N. W. 879; *Roberts v. Coleman*, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S. E. 482; *Culp v. Wilson*, 133 Ind. 294, 32 N. E. 928; *New v. New*, 127 Ind. 576, 27 N. E. 154; *Reynolds' Adm'r v. Reynolds*, 92 Ky. 556, 18 S. W. 517; *McClanahan v. McClanahan*, 36 W. Va. 34, 14 S. E. 419; *Kemp v. Cossart*, 47 Ark. 62, 14 S. W. 465. Insurance by a father on his life in the name of a son was held an advancement in *Cazassa v. Cazassa*, 92 Tenn. 573, 22 S. W. 560, 20 L. R. A. 178, 36 Am. St. Rep. 112. Of course, the presumption may always be rebutted by showing that a gift or payment for services was intended, or that other consideration was given by the child. See *Hattersley v. Bissett*, 51 N. J. Eq. 597, 29 Atl. 187, 40 Am. St. Rep. 532; *Beakhust v. Crumby*, 18 R. I. 689, 30 Atl. 453, 31 Atl. 753; *Hall v. Hall*, 107 Mo. 101, 17 S. W. 811; *Groom v. Thomson* (Ky.) 16 S. W. 369, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 223; *Comer v. Comer*, 119 Ill. 170, 8 N. E. 796.

<sup>52</sup> *Plowman v. Nicholson*, 81 Kan. 210, 106 Pac. 279.

### DUTY OF CHILD TO SUPPORT PARENTS

144. A child is under no legal obligation to support his parents, unless the duty is imposed by statute.

A child is under no legal obligation at common law to support his parents, even though they are destitute and infirm. There is a strong moral obligation, but no such duty is recognized by the law, unless, as is the case in some jurisdictions, the duty is expressly imposed by statute.<sup>53</sup> While they are entitled to the child's wages during its minority, the relation which the child bears to them imposes no legal duty of maintenance, and no promise on the part of the child to pay even for necessities furnished them will be implied.<sup>54</sup> If the children live with their parents, the earnings of all going into a common fund for the support of the household, and the father has not promised to repay the son for any contribution made to the father's support, no implied promise arises.<sup>55</sup>

### DOMICILE OF CHILD

145. The child's domicile of origin is determined by the domicile of the father if the child is legitimate, and by the domicile of the mother if illegitimate. The child's domicile changes with the father's, or with the mother's, if a widow, unless she remarries.

<sup>53</sup> *Duffy v. Yordl*, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159, 117 Am. St. Rep. 125, 9 Ann. Cas. 1017; *Tobin v. Bruce*, 39 S. D. 64, 162 N. W. 933, certiorari denied *Bruce v. Tobin*, 245 U. S. 18, 38 Sup. Ct. 7, 62 L. Ed. 123. Generally, a mode of enforcing such liability is prescribed by the statute. If no mode is provided, one who maintains a person within the terms of the statute, whose son, though able, neglected and refused to maintain him, may recover therefor from the son. *McCook County v. Kammos*, 7 S. D. 558, 64 N. W. 1123, 31 L. R. A. 461, 58 Am. St. Rep. 854; *Howe v. Hyde*, 88 Mich. 91, 50 N. W. 102. Under the Illinois statute (*Hurd's Rev. St.* 1908, c. 107, § 1), requiring children to support their infirm and indigent parents, a right of action does not accrue to the parent himself to enforce the act. *Schwerdt v. Schwerdt*, 141 Ill. App. 386, affirmed 235 Ill. 386, 85 N. E. 613.

<sup>54</sup> *Rex v. Munden*, 1 Strange. 190; *Lebanon v. Griffin*, 45 N. H. 558; *Edwards v. Davis*, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 281; *Becker v. Gibson*, 70 Ind. 239; *Stone v. Stone*, 32 Conn. 142.

<sup>55</sup> *Cotter v. Cotter*, 82 Conn. 331, 73 Atl. 903. See, also, *Millis v. Thayer*, 139 Wis. 480, 121 N. W. 124.

The domicile of a legitimate child is originally that of its father, and, where the parent changes his domicile, the child's domicile changes with it.<sup>56</sup> The mother's domicile acquired after her husband's death determines that of the child,<sup>57</sup> but the child's domicile will not follow the mother's in case of her remarriage, but continues to be the same as it was on the death of the father.<sup>58</sup> An infant, not being *sui juris*, cannot acquire a domicile of his own,<sup>59</sup> though, for the purpose of obtaining a settlement, a pauper, after emancipation, has been held capable of acquiring an independent domicile.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>56</sup> *Somerville v. Somerville*, 5 Ves. 750; *Sharpe v. Crispin*, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 611; *Taylor v. Jeter*, 33 Ga. 195, 81 Am. Dec. 302; *Daniel v. Hill*, 52 Ala. 430. As to domicile of an illegitimate child, see ante, p. 305. A person standing in loco parentis to a child may change its domicile. In re *Vance*, 92 Cal. 195, 28 Pac. 229; *Cox v. Boyce*, 152 Mo. 576, 54 S. W. 467, 75 Am. St. Rep. 483.

<sup>57</sup> *Pottinger v. Wightman*, 3 Mer. 67; *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark. & F. 42; *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 470, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230; *Ryall v. Kennedy*, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 347; *Carlisle v. Tuttle*, 30 Ala. 613.

<sup>58</sup> *Cumner Parish v. Milton Parish*, 3 Salk. 259; *Pottinger v. Wightman*, 3 Mer. 67; *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230; *Brown v. Lynch*, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 214; *Johnson v. Copeland's Adm'r*, 35 Ala. 521; *Inhabitants of Freetown v. Inhabitants of Taunton*, 16 Mass. 52.

<sup>59</sup> *Somerville v. Somerville*, 5 Ves. 750; *Brown v. Lynch*, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 214; *Lacy v. Williams*, 27 Mo. 280; *Taylor v. Jeter*, 33 Ga. 195, 81 Am. Dec. 302.

<sup>60</sup> *Inhabitants of Charlestown v. Inhabitants of Boston*, 13 Mass. 469; *Overseers of Washington Tp. v. Overseers of Beaver Tp.*, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 548; *Inhabitants of Dennysville v. Inhabitants of Trescott*, 30 Me. 470.

## PART III

### GUARDIAN AND WARD

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#### CHAPTER XI

##### GUARDIANS DEFINED—SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT

- 146-147. In General.
- 148. Natural Guardians.
- 149. Guardians in Socage.
- 150. Testamentary Guardians.
- 151. Chancery Guardians.
- 152. Statute Guardians.
- 153. Quasi Guardians, or Guardians by Estoppel.
- 154. Guardians of Persons Non Compotes Mentis.
- 155. Guardians Ad Litem.
- 156-158. Selection and Appointment of Guardians by Court.
- 159. Jurisdiction to Appoint Guardian.

##### IN GENERAL

146. A guardian is one to whom the law intrusts the persons or estates, or both, of those who, by reason of their infancy or of mental infirmities, are not sui juris. Persons under guardianship are called "wards."
147. The various kinds of guardians are
- (a) Natural guardians.
  - (b) Guardians in socage.
  - (c) Testamentary guardians.
  - (d) Chancery guardians.
  - (e) Statute guardians.
  - (f) Quasi guardians or guardians by estoppel.
  - (g) Guardians of persons non compotes mentis or spendthrifts.
  - (h) Guardians ad litem.

Guardianship is a trust which is dual in its nature, involving two distinct and separate functions—the control of the person of the ward, and the management of his estate.<sup>1</sup> Guardians are there-

<sup>1</sup> United States v. Hall (D. C.) 171 Fed. 214.

fore divided into two classes—guardians of the person, called in the civil law “tutors,” and guardians of the estate, called in the civil law “curators.” These civil-law terms are in use in Louisiana.<sup>2</sup> A guardian of the person is one who is lawfully invested with the care of the person of the ward. A guardian of the estate is one who has been lawfully invested with the power of taking care of and managing the estate of an infant. Guardians may also be divided as stated in the black-letter text. Some of them have charge of the person of the ward only, while others have charge of his estate only, and others have charge both of the person and estate. A guardian ad litem is a guardian merely for the purpose of a suit.

### NATURAL GUARDIANS

**148. The father, or, if he is dead, the mother, or, if both are dead, the next of kin is the natural guardian of a child. A natural guardian is a guardian of the ward's person only.**

At common law there was what was known as a “guardian by nature.” This guardianship related only to the person of the heir apparent, and vested first in the father, and then in the mother. It is now obsolete.<sup>3</sup> There was also a guardianship for nurture, which related to the person, but applied only to the younger children.<sup>4</sup> These two forms of guardianship are now replaced by the natural guardianship of the parent, or next of kin, if the parents are dead. The father is entitled to the custody of his own children during their infancy, not only as guardian by nurture, but by nature.<sup>5</sup> On the death of the father, guardianship by nature passes to the mother, and, on her death, to the grandfather or grandmother or any other person who is next of kin.<sup>6</sup> *Prima facie*, the natural

<sup>2</sup> The term “curator” is also used in some other states. The term signifies one who has charge only of the property or estate of the ward, as distinguished from “guardian,” who has charge only of the person, or both the person and estate. *Burger v. Frakes*, 67 Iowa, 460, 23 N. W. 746, 25 N. W. 735.

<sup>3</sup> *Macph. Inf.* 57; 2 *Kent, Comm.* 221.

<sup>4</sup> *Macph. Inf.* 60; 2 *Kent, Comm.* 221.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Hopkins*, 3 P. Wms. 152; *In re Galleher*, 2 Cal. App. 364, 84 Pac. 352; *Ringstad v. Hanson*, 150 Iowa, 324, 130 N. W. 145; *In re Knott*, 162 Mich. 10, 126 N. W. 1040; *In re Wright*, 79 Neb. 10, 112 N. W. 311.

<sup>6</sup> *Harg. Co. Litt.* 88b, note 12; *Lamar v. Micou*, 114 U. S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. 857, 29 L. Ed. 94; *Holmes v. Derrig*, 127 Iowa, 625, 103 N. W. 973; *In re Benton*, 92 Iowa, 202, 60 N. W. 614, 54 Am. St. Rep. 546; *Smith v. Young*, 136

guardian is entitled to the custody of the child; but there are exceptions to the rule, resulting from the doctrine that the child's welfare must be considered in awarding his custody. This question has been fully explained in treating of the relation of parent and child.<sup>7</sup> The natural guardian of a child has control of his person only. He has no authority or responsibility, as such, in regard to the child's property.<sup>8</sup>

### GUARDIANS IN SOCAGE

149. Guardianship in socage was where an infant acquired by descent land held in socage. The next of kin who could not possibly inherit became guardian and had authority over the person of the infant as well as the land, and over personal property connected with it, but not over other personalty. On reaching the age of 14, the infant could elect his own guardian, and terminate the guardianship. This kind of guardianship is obsolete at common law, but there is a similar guardianship by statute in some jurisdictions.

"At the common law, if lands held in socage came to an infant by descent, his nearest relative who could not by any possibility inherit the lands was his guardian in socage until the age of fourteen, and until the infant selected a guardian for himself. Such guardian might lawfully receive the rents and profits of the land during the continuance of the guardianship. If the lands descended from the father or other paternal relatives, the mother, or next of kin on the part of the mother, was the guardian; and, if the lands descended on the part of the mother, the father, or next of

Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628; *Darden v. Wyatt*, 15 Ga. 414. In the Philippine Islands the wife is natural guardian of her children on death of husband, but this terminates upon her remarriage. *Palet v. Aldecoa Co.*, 15 Phil. Rep. 232.

<sup>7</sup> Ante, p. 343.

<sup>8</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 220; *Williams v. Cleaveland*, 76 Conn. 426, 56 Atl. 850; *Hyde v. Stone*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 354, 22 Am. Dec. 532; *Kline v. Beebe*, 6 Conn. 494; *Perry v. Carmichael*, 95 Ill. 519; *Kendall v. Miller*, 9 Cal. 591; *Otto v. Schlapkahl*, 57 Iowa, 226, 10 N. W. 651; *Ringstad v. Hanson*, 156 Iowa, 324, 130 N. W. 145; *Vineyard v. Heard* (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 22; *Alston v. Alston*, 34 Ala. 15; *Linton v. Walker*, 8 Fla. 144, 71 Am. Dec. 105; *May v. Calder*, 2 Mass. 55; *Miles v. Boyden*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 213; *Johnson's Adm'r v. Johnson's Ex'r*, 2 Hill, Eq. (S. C.) 280, 29 Am. Dec. 72; ante, p. 336; *Palet v. Aldecoa Co.*, 15 Phil. Rep. 232. But in Louisiana the natural tutrix

kin on the paternal side, was entitled to the guardianship."<sup>9</sup> It has been held that there could be no guardianship in socage where the infant acquired the lands by purchase, and not by descent.<sup>10</sup> To insure the safety of the ward, the guardianship was given by the law to the next of kin who could not possibly inherit the lands, for the guardianship extended over the person of the ward as well as the land.<sup>11</sup> On reaching the age of 14 the infant could terminate the guardianship, and elect his own guardian.<sup>12</sup> Guardianship in socage, as stated above, extended over the person of the ward, as well as over the real estate;<sup>13</sup> and it extended over personalty connected with the real estate, but not over choses in action and other personal property.<sup>14</sup>

Guardianship in socage was an incident of the feudal system existing in England under the common law of real property. It has fallen into disuse there, and it was never common in this country. In New York, and perhaps in other states, there is a somewhat similar guardianship known as "guardianship in socage." The Revised Statutes of New York provide: "Where an estate in lands shall become vested in an infant, the guardianship of such infant, with the rights, duties, and powers of a guardian in socage, shall belong (1) to the father of the infant; (2) if there be no father, to the mother; (3) if there be no father or mother, to the nearest and eldest relative of full age, not being under any legal incapacity, and, as between relatives of the same degree of consanguinity, male shall be preferred."<sup>15</sup> The guardianship thus created is like the guardianship in socage at common law, except that it continues until the infant reaches the age of 21; and relatives who can inherit from the infant are not excluded, and it makes no difference, how the land was acquired.<sup>16</sup>

may take possession of property and convert it for the ward's benefit. *Hoggatt v. Morancy*, 10 La. Ann. 169.

<sup>9</sup> *Combs v. Jackson*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 153, 19 Am. Dec. 568. See 1 Bl. Comm. 461; 2 Kent, Comm. 221.

<sup>10</sup> *Combs v. Jackson*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 153, 19 Am. Dec. 568; *Quadrang v. Downs*, 2 Mod. 176.

<sup>11</sup> Co. Litt. § 123; 2 Kent, Comm. 222; *Fonda v. Van Horne*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 631, 30 Am. Dec. 77.

<sup>12</sup> Co. Litt. § 123.

<sup>13</sup> Co. Litt. § 123; Com. Dig. "Guardian," B; 2 Kent, Comm. 221.

<sup>14</sup> *Foley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 138 N. Y. 333, 34 N. E. 211, 20 L. R. A. 620, 34 Am. St. Rep. 456.

<sup>15</sup> 4 Rev. St. N. Y. (8th Ed.) pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 1, art. 1, § 5.

<sup>16</sup> *Foley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 138 N. Y. 333, 34 N. E. 211, 20 L. R. A.

### TESTAMENTARY GUARDIANS

150. By statute, a father, and in some states a mother, on his death, may, generally by will, and in some states by deed, appoint a guardian for a minor child. Such a guardianship extends to the person, and to the real and personal property, of the ward, and continues until the ward's majority.

Testamentary guardianship was created by the statute of 12 Car. II. c. 24, the provisions of which have been substantially enacted in many of the states in this country. It was provided by that statute that the father of minor children could "by deed executed in his lifetime, or by his last will and testament in writing," dispose of their custody and tuition. Under this statute, the father alone could appoint,<sup>17</sup> and he could do so though himself a minor. In this country the statutes of the different states contain various, but not uniform, changes.<sup>18</sup> In some states the appointment can only be made by will, and in some the mother, after the death of the father, succeeds to his power, if she is unmarried.<sup>19</sup> It is sufficient for the appointment of a testamentary guardian that the intention to appoint is clear, although there is no express designation as such in the will, provided that the powers essential to the office are conferred.<sup>20</sup> The authority is derived from the appointment, and requires no confirmation by the court,<sup>21</sup> nor even by the probate of

620, 34 Am. St. Rep. 456; *Fonda v. Van Horne*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 631, 30 Am. Dec. 77. See, also, *In re Wagner*, 75 Misc. Rep. 419, 135 N. Y. Supp. 678.

<sup>17</sup> See, also, the Florida statute (Rev. St. 1892, § 2086); *Hernandez v. Thomas*, 50 Fla. 522, 39 South. 641, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 111 Am. St. Rep. 137, 7 Ann. Cas. 446.

<sup>18</sup> *In re Kellogg*, 110 App. Div. 472, 96 N. Y. Supp. 965; *Blacksher v. Northrup*, 176 Ala. 190, 57 South. 743, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454; *In re Allen's Estate*, 162 Cal. 625, 124 Pac. 237; *Ingalls v. Campbell*, 18 Or. 461, 24 Pac. 904. Testamentary guardianship is not authorized in Iowa. *In re O'Connell's Guardianship*, 102 Iowa, 355, 71 N. W. 211.

<sup>19</sup> *In re Kellogg*, 110 App. Div. 472, 96 N. Y. Supp. 965; *In re Waring's Will*, 46 Misc. Rep. 222, 94 N. Y. Supp. 82. Father cannot appoint guardian by will if mother is living. *Campbell v. Mansfield*, 104 Miss. 533, 61 South. 593, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446. Necessity of mother's consent. *In re Snowball's Estate*, 156 Cal. 240, 104 Pac. 444.

<sup>20</sup> *Bridges v. Hales*, Mos. 108; *Miller v. Harris*, 14 Sim. 540; *Corrigan v. Kiernan*, 1 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 208; *Southern Marble Co. v. Stegall*, 90 Ga. 236, 15 S. E. 806; *In re Hawley*, 104 N. Y. 250, 10 N. E. 352; *Balch v. Smith*, 12 N. H. 437.

<sup>21</sup> *Norris v. Harris*, 15 Cal. 226; *Southern Marble Co. v. Stegall*, 90 Ga. 236, 15 S. E. 806.

the will;<sup>22</sup> and, when such power has been exercised by the testator, the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a different guardian.<sup>23</sup> By statute, such appointment is sometimes made subject to the probate of the will, and also the approval of the court and the giving of a bond. The office is one of personal trust, and is not assignable.<sup>24</sup> Testamentary guardianship extends to the person, and to the real and personal estate, of the child, and it continues until the ward arrives at full age.<sup>25</sup> The statute of Charles II. does not confer upon the father power to appoint a guardian for his illegitimate child, nor can he delegate any such power to a third person.<sup>26</sup> It is the practice of the courts to adopt the nomination of a guardian by a putative father of a natural child, in cases where he has left an estate, and the person nominated is in all respects proper; but this is simply in deference to the wishes of the deceased, and not as a matter of right which the court is bound to respect.<sup>27</sup>

In Texas, it has been held that the statutes of that state providing for the continuance in office of a guardian, and for the appointment of his successor, exclude the idea of another being appointed to succeed him before his removal; and, therefore, that a person appointed, by the will of a father (or, as in this case, a mother), guardian of the estate of a minor child, is not entitled to letters of guardianship while another guardian, appointed at the father's request in his lifetime, is qualified to act.<sup>28</sup>

### CHANCERY GUARDIANS

151. Courts of chancery, in the absence of statutory limitations, have jurisdiction to appoint guardians of the persons and estates of infants.

<sup>22</sup> *Gilliat v. Gilliat*, 3 Phillim. Ecc. 222.

<sup>23</sup> *Copp v. Copp*, 20 N. H. 284; *Robinson v. Zollinger*, 9 Watts (Pa.) 169.

<sup>24</sup> *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Wms. 102; *In re Moore*, 11 Ir. Com. Law, 1; *Balch v. Smith*, 12 N. H. 437.

<sup>25</sup> *In re Sheetz's Estate*, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 367. See, also, *In re Grimes' Estate*, 79 Mo. App. 274; *In re Kellogg*, 110 App. Div. 472, 96 N. Y. Supp. 965. But see *Churchill v. Jackson*, 132 Ga. 666, 64 S. E. 691, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 875, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1203, where appointment was limited to care of estate.

<sup>26</sup> *Ramsay v. Thompson*, 71 Md. 315, 18 Atl. 592, 6 L. R. A. 705, and cases there cited.

<sup>27</sup> *Ramsay v. Thompson*, 71 Md. 315, 18 Atl. 592, 6 L. R. A. 705.

<sup>28</sup> *Potts v. Terry*, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 394, 28 S. W. 122.

Chancery guardians are appointed by the court of chancery, and in England constitute the most important class of guardians. The jurisdiction of chancery over infants is of very ancient date. Its origin is traced to the delegation by the crown of its duty to protect the helpless, as *parens patriæ*.<sup>29</sup> The court of chancery will not exercise its jurisdiction unless the infant has property,<sup>30</sup> but this is often obviated by the settlement of a small amount on the child.<sup>31</sup> The appointment may be made when the child has no other guardian, when a suit is pending in which it is interested, or upon petition without suit.<sup>32</sup> In this country, courts of equity often retain a general jurisdiction over the persons and estates of infants,<sup>33</sup> though, as a rule, the matter of guardianship is exclusively delegated by statute to the probate court or other similar tribunal.<sup>34</sup>

### STATUTE GUARDIANS

152. Guardians of the persons and estates of infants are generally appointed in this country by courts of special statutory jurisdiction. They are known as "statute guardians."

The probate, surrogate's, orphans', ordinary's, or other similar court generally has, in the various states of this country, full statutory jurisdiction over the persons and estates of minors, and over their guardianship. Guardians appointed by these courts are now generally designated as "statute guardians," and form, in this country, to-day by far the most important class. Their selection and appointment, and their powers, duties, and obligations, are determined in detail to a greater or less degree by statute.<sup>35</sup> In the absence

<sup>29</sup> 2 Fonbl. Eq. (5th Ed.) 228, note; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1333; *Butler v. Freeman*, Amb. 301.

<sup>30</sup> *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. 1, 20.

<sup>31</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 655.

<sup>32</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 655.

<sup>33</sup> Pom. Eq. Jur. § 78; *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; *Board of Children's Guardians of Marion County v. Shutter*, 139 Ind. 268, 34 N. E. 665, 31 L. R. A. 740; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 250 Ill. 354, 95 N. E. 345, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1158, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 344, reversing 155 Ill. App. 619.

<sup>34</sup> *Brack v. Morris*, 90 Kan. 64, 132 Pac. 1185; *State ex rel. Baker v. Bird*, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S. W. 119, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 353; *Parker v. Lewis*, 45 Okl. 807, 147 Pac. 310.

<sup>35</sup> Guardians and curators are creatures of the law and statutory officers of the court. They have no inherent powers, but only such as are prescribed by statute. *Scott v. Royston*, 223 Mo. 568, 123 S. W. 454.

of statutory regulations, the ordinary principles of law governing the relations of guardian and ward apply. When an infant is sole executor, or is the next of kin to whom letters of administration ought to be granted, the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice in England will appoint a probate guardian to act *durante minore ætate*, for the purpose of administering the estate.<sup>36</sup> In this country the courts generally have statutory powers to select an administrator to act in the infant's place during his minority.

### QUASI GUARDIANS, OR GUARDIANS BY ESTOPPEL

153. Where one who has no right to do so assumes to act as guardian, he may be made to account as guardian.

When one who has not been regularly appointed a guardian assumes to act as such, or, by intermeddling, has taken possession of an infant's estate, he may, at the election of the infant, be treated as a wrongdoer or as a guardian.<sup>37</sup> "A mere stranger or wrongdoer, who takes possession of the property of an infant, and receives the rents and profits thereof, may, in equity, be considered as the guardian of the infant, and may be compelled to account as such."<sup>38</sup> And, also, when a regular guardian continues to manage the ward's property after the latter's majority, and in effect continues the guardianship, he may be made to account according to the rules pertaining as between a regular guardian and his ward.<sup>39</sup> Ordinarily, however, on the termination of the guardianship, the relation changes from that of guardian and ward to that of debtor and creditor.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Eversley, Dom. Rel. 653; 1 Williams, Ex'rs, 480.

<sup>37</sup> Revett v. Harvey, 1 Sim. & S. 502; Wall v. Stanwick, 34 Ch. Div. 763; Blomfield v. Eyre, 8 Beav. 250; Zeideman v. Molasky, 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754; Van Epps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 64, 25 Am. Dec. 516; Sherman v. Baljou, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 304; Pennington v. L'Houmedieu, 7 N. J. Eq. 343; Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15; In re Harris' Guardianship, 17 Ariz. 405, 153 Pac. 422; Smith's Appeal, 158 Mich. 174, 122 N. W. 564; Crooks v. Turpen, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 183; Lehmann v. Rothbarth, 111 Ill. 185; Martin's Adm'r v. Fielder, 82 Va. 455, 4 S. E. 602. There is no such thing as a guardian de facto. Bell v. Love, 72 Ga. 125.

<sup>38</sup> Van Epps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 64, 25 Am. Dec. 516; Anderson's Adm'r v. Smith, 102 Va. 697, 48 S. E. 29.

<sup>39</sup> Mellish v. Mellish, 1 Sim. & S. 138.

<sup>40</sup> Crowell's Appeal, 2 Watts (Pa.) 295; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 4 Grat. (Va.) 43.

### GUARDIANS OF PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS

154. Generally, by statute, the probate or some similar court is given the power to appoint a guardian of the person and estate of persons who are non compotes mentis. In some states the power is extended to include spendthrifts.

The crown, as *parens patriæ*, had authority over the care and custody of infants; but this authority did not originally extend to insane persons and other persons non compotes mentis. It was, however, conferred on the crown by Parliament, and intrusted under the sovereign's sign manual to the Lord Chancellor. In this country the guardianship of persons who are non compotes mentis is wholly regulated by statute in the different states, jurisdiction being generally conferred upon the probate or other similar court. Guardianship over spendthrifts was unknown at common law, but is not uncommon under statutes in this country.<sup>41</sup> Guardianship of persons non compotes mentis is governed by substantially the same principles and rules of law as the guardianship of infants.

### GUARDIANS AD LITEM

155. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed by a court of justice to prosecute or defend for an infant in a suit to which he is a party.

Every court in which suit is brought against an infant has the power to appoint a person to defend for him, when he has no guardian; for, as an infant cannot appoint an attorney, he would otherwise be without assistance. A person so appointed is called a "guardian ad litem." His power and duties, as the term implies, are limited to the defense of the suit.<sup>42</sup> A guardian ad litem may also be appointed to sue for an infant, but this is not usual, as an infant generally sues by next friend.<sup>43</sup> The appointment of a guardian ad litem will be considered when we come to treat of infants, and of actions by and against them.

<sup>41</sup> Post, p. 535.

<sup>42</sup> Co. Litt. 88b; Bouv. Law Dict. "Guardian"; post, p. 468.

<sup>43</sup> Post, p. 468.

## SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS BY COURT

156. The selection of a guardian by the court is discretionary. The father, or, in this country, the mother if he is dead, or, if both are dead, one of the next of kin, will be appointed, unless he is unfit, or the interests of the child demand the appointment of some one else.
157. A child over 14 could select his own guardian for nurture or in socage, at common law, and may select his statute guardian in this country, if the person selected is suitable.
158. But the court will not appoint as guardian,
- (a) In England, a married woman, though in this country the marriage of a woman is generally not regarded as a disqualification.
  - (b) Nonresidents, as a rule, though it has the power to do so.
  - (c) Persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the ward.

In the selection of a guardian, the court has a liberal,<sup>44</sup> but not arbitrary,<sup>45</sup> discretion. It will generally respect the natural claim of the father to act as guardian of his child.<sup>46</sup> An appointment, though too informal to be good as a testamentary appointment, has great weight with the court in the selection of a guardian.<sup>47</sup> And, generally, the wishes of a deceased parent will prevail, in the ab-

<sup>44</sup> *In re Kaye*, 1 Ch. App. 387; *Ohrns v. Woodward*, 134 Mich. 596, 96 N. W. 950; *Nelson v. Green*, 22 Ark. 367; *State v. Houston*, 32 La. Ann. 1305; *Battle v. Vick*, 15 N. C. 294; *In re Johnson*, 87 Iowa, 130, 54 N. W. 69; *Crawford v. Crawford*, 91 Iowa, 744, 60 N. W. 501.

<sup>45</sup> *White v. Pomeroy*, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 640.

<sup>46</sup> *In re Forrester*, 162 Cal. 493, 123 Pac. 283; *Andrino v. Yates*, 12 Idaho, 618, 87 Pac. 787; *In re Alexander*, 127 La. 853, 54 South. 125; *In re TULLY*, 54 Misc. Rep. 184, 105 N. Y. Supp. 858, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 210; *In re Galleher*, 2 Cal. App. 364, 84 Pac. 352. Under Domestic Relations Law (Laws 1896, p. 223, c. 272) § 51, vesting in the mother a right to the custody of a child equally with the father, a guardian cannot be appointed for a minor on the father's petition without notice to the mother. *In re Drowne's Estate*, 56 Misc. Rep. 417, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1029.

<sup>47</sup> *Hall v. Stork*, 5 Law J. Exch. 97; *In re Kaye*, 1 Ch. App. 387; *In re De Marcellin*, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 207; *State ex rel. Young v. Cook*, 193 Mo. App. 276, 183 S. W. 365. And see *Knott v. Cottee*, 2 Phil. Ch. 192, where a recommendation in a will as to the custody of a child was followed. But the attempted designation by will does not give the person so named any right of priority. *In re Allen's Estate*, 162 Cal. 625, 124 Pac. 287.

sence of good reasons to the contrary.<sup>48</sup> The best interests of the infant will prevail, however, against even the claim of a father, when he is not a suitable person.<sup>49</sup> In this country, particularly, the benefit of the ward is the paramount consideration with the court; and some third person is often appointed, not only when the father is unfit, but solely out of consideration for the general welfare of the child.<sup>50</sup> If the father is not living, the mother, in this country, will generally be appointed, unless there is some good reason why she should not.<sup>51</sup> If the child is an orphan, the preference will be given to the next of kin as against strangers.<sup>52</sup> At common law an infant over 14 years of age could select his guardian by nurture or in socage;<sup>53</sup> and, by statutory enactment, an infant of 14 may generally nominate his own guardian, and such person must be appointed by the court, if suitable.<sup>54</sup> It is even

<sup>48</sup> *Bennett v. Byrne*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 216; *In re Tank's Guardianship*, 129 Wis. 629, 109 N. W. 565; *Cozine v. Horn*, 1 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 143; *In re Turner*, 19 N. J. Eq. 433; *Badenhoof v. Johnson*, 11 Nev. 87; *Watson v. Warnock*, 31 Ga. 716. But see *In re Tank's Guardian*, 129 Wis. 629, 109 N. W. 565; *Parker v. Lewis*, 45 Okl. 807, 147 Pac. 310.

<sup>49</sup> *In re TULLY*, 54 Misc. Rep. 184, 105 N. Y. Supp. 858, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 210; *In re Lamb's Estate* (Sur.) 139 N. Y. Supp. 685; *Hamerick v. People*, 126 Ill. App. 491; *Russner v. McMillan*, 37 Wash. 416, 79 Pac. 988; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 15 Ves. 445; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. 1; *Thomas v. Roberts*, 3 De Gex & S. 758.

<sup>50</sup> *Heinemann's Appeal*, 96 Pa. 112, 42 Am. Rep. 532; *Jones v. Bowman*, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439, 67 L. R. A. 860; *Page v. Hodgdon*, 63 N. H. 53; *Griffin v. Sarsfield*, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 4; *In re Cross*, 92 Misc. Rep. 89, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1020; *In re Tank's Guardianship*, 129 Wis. 629, 109 N. W. 565; *Hule v. Nixon*, 6 Port. (Ala.) 77; *Badenhoof v. Johnson*, 11 Nev. 87; *Lupple v. Winans*, 37 N. J. Eq. 245; *Bennett v. Byrne*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 216; *In re McGrath*, [1893] 1 Ch. 143.

<sup>51</sup> *Albert v. Perry*, 14 N. J. Eq. 540; *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; *In re Snowball's Estate*, 156 Cal. 240, 104 Pac. 444; *Davis' Adm'r v. Davis*, 162 Ky. 316, 172 S. W. 665; *In re Tank's Guardianship*, 129 Wis. 629, 109 N. W. 565; *Ramsay v. Ramsay*, 20 Wis. 507. Where a child has been adopted with consent of natural parents, the mother is not entitled to appointment as guardian on the death of the father. *In re Masterson's Estate*, 45 Wash. 48, 87 Pac. 1047, 122 Am. St. Rep. 886.

<sup>52</sup> *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & F. 42; *Sullivan's Case*, 1 Moll. 225; *Albert v. Perry*, 14 N. J. Eq. 540; *State ex rel. Young v. Cook*, 193 Mo. App. 276, 183 S. W. 365; *Morehouse v. Cooke*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 226. There are frequently statutory enactments to the same effect. *In re Dellow's Estate*, 1 Cal. App. 529, 82 Pac. 558. An uncle has no legal right to appointment as guardian, merely because he is competent and the father dying intestate desired such appointment. *Hutchins v. Brown*, 77 N. H. 105, 88 Atl. 706.

<sup>53</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 462; *Ex parte Edwards*, 3 Atk. 519; *Mauvo v. Ritchie*, 3 Cranch, C. C. 147, Fed. Cas. No. 9,312; *Inferior Court v. Cherry*, 14 Ga. 594.

<sup>54</sup> *Adams' Appeal*, 38 Conn. 304; *Dickerson v. Bowen*, 128 Ga. 122, 57 S.

held that the infant may nominate a guardian to supersede one already appointed by the court,<sup>55</sup> but there is also authority to the contrary.<sup>56</sup>

The appointment of a married woman as guardian is held improper in England,<sup>57</sup> but a female guardian who marries may be reappointed after a reference to ascertain whether her reappointment is for the benefit of the child.<sup>58</sup> In this country it has been said to be against the policy of the law to appoint a married woman as guardian,<sup>59</sup> but by the weight of authority, she is competent to act in that capacity.<sup>60</sup> When her husband is unsuitable, the appointment has been refused on the ground that the wife would be under his influence.<sup>61</sup> A nonresident will ordinarily not be appointed, since he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the court;<sup>62</sup> but such appointments are within the power of the court,<sup>63</sup> unless contrary to statutory provisions.<sup>64</sup>

E. 326; *Wirsig v. Scott*, 79 Neb. 822, 112 N. W. 655; *State ex rel. Pinger v. Reynolds*, 121 Mo. App. 699, 97 S. W. 650; *Lunt v. Aubens*, 39 Me. 392; *Montgomery v. Smith*, 8 Dana (Ky.) 599; *Arthurs' Appeal*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 55; *Sessions v. Kell*, 30 Miss. 458; *Burns v. Parker* (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 673; *Kelly v. Smith*, 15 Ala. 687. But see *In re TULLY*, 54 Misc. Rep. 184, 105 N. Y. Supp. 858, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 210, following *Ledwith v. Ledwith*, 1 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 154, and holding that the court may exercise its own discretion, though the person is a suitable one. And see *In re Wyckoff*, 67 Misc. Rep. 1, 124 N. Y. Supp. 625.

<sup>55</sup> *Sessions v. Kell*, 30 Miss. 458; *Bryce v. Wynn*, 50 Ga. 332; *Kelly v. Smith*, 15 Ala. 687; *In re Kirckman's Estate*, 168 Cal. 688, 144 Pac. 745; *Dickerson v. Bowen*, 128 Ga. 122, 57 S. E. 326; *Montgomery v. Smith*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 599. But, when the ward has had one choice, he cannot supersede such guardian by another, unless the first is removed for cause. *Central Trust Co. v. McCarroll*, 141 Ky. 278, 132 S. W. 541, *Ann. Cas.* 1912C, 475.

<sup>56</sup> *Gray's Appeal*, 96 Pa. 243; *Ham v. Ham*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 74; *Mauro v. Ritchie*, 3 Cranch, C. C. 147, *Fed. Cas. No.* 9,312.

<sup>57</sup> *In re Kaye*, 1 Ch. App. 387.

<sup>58</sup> *In re Gornall*, 1 Beav. 347; *Jones v. Powell*, 9 Beav. 345.

<sup>59</sup> *Holley v. Chamberlain*, 1 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 333, overruled by *In re Hermance*, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 1; married women having been made competent by statute in New York.

<sup>60</sup> *Beard v. Dean*, 64 Ga. 258; *Farrer v. Clark*, 29 Miss. 195; *Jarrett v. State*, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 27; *Palmer v. Oakley*, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 433, 47 Am. Dec. 41; *Goss v. Stone*, 63 Mich. 319, 29 N. W. 735; *Ex parte Maxwell*, 19 Ind. 88; *Succession of Gaines*, 42 La. Ann. 699, 7 South. 788. A married woman is not incapacitated from acting as guardian of her children by a former marriage. *Wright v. Wright* (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 1015.

<sup>61</sup> *Kettletas v. Gardner*, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 488; *Ex parte Maxwell*, 19 Ind. 88.

<sup>62</sup> *Logan v. Fairlee*, Jac. 193; *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & F. 42, 86; *In re Taylor*, 3 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 259.

<sup>63</sup> *Daniel v. Newton*, 8 Beav. 485; *Succession of Oliver*, 113 La. 877, 37 South. 862; *Berry v. Johnson*, 53 Me. 401.

<sup>64</sup> *Finney v. State*, 9 Mo. 227.

An executor or administrator of an estate in which an infant has an interest has been held not to be a proper person, on the ground that his interests may be adverse to those of the child.<sup>65</sup> But the trustee of an infant is a proper person,<sup>66</sup> unless it appears that he has acted or may act to the infant's prejudice.<sup>67</sup> The rule is general that the court will not appoint a person whose interests are or may be adverse to those of the infant.<sup>68</sup> The court may appoint a corporation as guardian where it is authorized by statute to act in that capacity.<sup>69</sup> But the appointment of a firm designated in a will has been refused.<sup>70</sup>

### JURISDICTION TO APPOINT GUARDIAN

**159. A guardian can only be appointed by a court within whose jurisdiction the minor has his residence, or has property.**

The place of residence of an infant determines the court which has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian;<sup>71</sup> but, when a nonresident infant has property within the jurisdiction, a guardian may usually be appointed by the court of the county where the property is sit-

<sup>65</sup> *Griffin v. Sarsfield*, 2 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 4; *Ex parte Crutchfield*, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 336; *Isaacs v. Taylor*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 600.

<sup>66</sup> *Bennett v. Byrne*, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 216.

<sup>67</sup> As where he has subordinated the interest of the child to those of another cestui que trust. *Barnsback v. Dewey*, 13 Ill. App. 581.

<sup>68</sup> *In re Van Beuren's Estate* (Sur.) 13 N. Y. Supp. 261; *Corwin's Appeal*, 126 Pa. 326, 19 Atl. 38; *In re Brien's Estate*, 58 Hun, 604, 11 N. Y. Supp. 522; *In re Edmonson's Estate*, 78 Neb. 279, 110 N. W. 540. But see *In re Bedford's Estate*, 158 Cal. 145, 110 Pac. 302.

<sup>69</sup> *Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe*, 40 Minn. 7, 41 N. W. 232, 2 L. R. A. 418; *In re Cordova*, 4 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 66; *Ledwith v. Ledwith*, 1 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 154; *Glaser v. Priest*, 29 Mo. App. 1; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 88 Ky. 275, 11 S. W. 5; *In re Brien's Estate*, 58 Hun, 604, 11 N. Y. Supp. 522.

<sup>70</sup> *De Mazar v. Pybus*, 4 Ves. 644.

<sup>71</sup> *Brown v. Lynch*, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 214; *Connell v. Moore*, 70 Kan. 88, 78 Pac. 164, 109 Am. St. Rep. 408; *Ware v. Coleman*, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 198; *Maxson's Lessee v. Sawyer*, 12 Ohio, 195; *Dorman v. Ogbourne*, 16 Ala. 759; *Darden v. Wyatt*, 15 Ga. 414; *Lewis v. Castello*, 17 Mo. App. 593; *Smith v. Young*, 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628; *In re Conner*, 93 Neb. 118, 139 N. W. 834; *Herring v. Goodson*, 43 Miss. 392; *Harding v. Weld*, 128 Mass. 587; *In re BRADY*, 10 Idaho, 366, 79 Pac. 75, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 212; *Sears v. Terry*, 26 Conn. 273. Letters of guardianship issued to a person entitled to custody in the domicile of the minor will prevail over letters to a parent in a different domicile. *Smidt v. Benenga*, 140 Iowa, 399, 119 N. W. 439.

uated.<sup>72</sup> Although the legal domicile be elsewhere, residence in fact has been held sufficient to confer jurisdiction.<sup>73</sup> An appointment made when the infant has neither a residence nor property is void, and may be attacked collaterally;<sup>74</sup> but, when the court has jurisdiction, an appointment can only be set aside by direct proceedings in the same court,<sup>75</sup> and, although there was no personal service on the ward, the appointment cannot be attacked collaterally.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Logan v. Farlee*, Jac. 196; *Stephens v. James*, 1 Mylne & K. 627; *Seaverns v. Gerke*, 3 Sawy. 353, Fed. Cas. No. 12,595; *Nunn v. Robertson*, 80 Ark. 350, 97 S. W. 293, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1197; *Clarke v. Cordis*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 466; *In re Hubbard*, 82 N. Y. 90; *Rice's Case*, 42 Mich. 528, 4 N. W. 284; *Davis v. Hudson*, 29 Minn. 27, 11 N. W. 136; *Grier v. McLendon*, 7 Ga. 362; *Barnsback v. Dewey*, 13 Ill. App. 581; *Neal v. Bartleson*, 65 Tex. 478. A nonresident minor, whose only property within the state was the statutory right of action for the wrongful death of a parent, had an "estate" within the state. *Williams v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 169 Mo. App. 468, 155 S. W. 64.

<sup>73</sup> *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & F. 42; *In re Hubbard*, 82 N. Y. 90; *Ross v. Southwestern R. Co.*, 53 Ga. 514. But see *Sudler v. Sudler*, 121 Md. 46, 88 Atl. 26, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1191, holding that domicile and not place of abode is the minor's "residence" within meaning of the Maryland statute.

<sup>74</sup> Cases cited in preceding notes.

<sup>75</sup> *Grier v. McLendon*, 7 Ga. 362; *Sears v. Terry*, 26 Conn. 273; *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; *Speight v. Knight*, 11 Ala. 461; *Pannill's Adm'r v. Calloway's Committee*, 78 Va. 387; *Brack v. Morris*, 90 Kan. 64, 132 Pac. 1185; *Paslick v. Shay*, 148 Ky. 642, 147 S. W. 369; *Williams v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 169 Mo. App. 468, 155 S. W. 64; *Wirsig v. Scott*, 79 Neb. 322, 112 N. W. 655; *Baker v. Cureton*, 49 Okl. 15, 150 Pac. 1090.

<sup>76</sup> *Board of Children's Guardians of Marion County v. Shutter*, 139 Ind. 268, 34 N. E. 665, 31 L. R. A. 740; *Kurtz v. St. Paul & D. R. Co.*, 48 Minn. 339, 51 N. W. 221, 31 Am. St. Rep. 657; *Kurtz v. West Duluth Land Co.*, 52 Minn. 140, 53 N. W. 1132; *Appeal of Gibson*, 154 Mass. 378, 28 N. E. 296.

## CHAPTER XII

## RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF GUARDIANS

- 160. Guardian's Right to Custody of Ward.
- 161. Guardian's Right to Ward's Services.
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## GUARDIAN'S RIGHT TO CUSTODY OF WARD

160. The guardian is ordinarily entitled to the custody of his ward, except, in this country, as against the parents. In all cases the courts have a discretion, and will award the custody as may be best for the interests of the child.

The rule of the English courts is that a guardian is entitled to the custody of the person of his ward, not only as against strangers, but even as against the child's parents.<sup>1</sup> In this country the custody of the ward will ordinarily be given to its guardian, both as against strangers and as against relations,<sup>2</sup> with the exception of its parents. The rights of the parent are generally conceded by

<sup>1</sup> *Wright v. Naylor*, 5 Madd. 77; *In re Andrews*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Wms. 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Coltman v. Hall*, 31 Me. 196; *Bounell v. Berryhill*, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 613; *Johns v. Emmert*, 62 Ind. 533; *Ex parte Ralston*, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 119.

the courts to be superior to those of the guardian.<sup>6</sup> The right to the ward's custody is often regulated by statute. In the award of the custody of the child's person, even as between parent and guardian, the courts will exercise a reasonable discretion, and when the question arises as to the right to its custody, as between its parent and another,<sup>4</sup> will be largely influenced by the child's best interests.<sup>5</sup> If the child is of sufficient discretion, the court will take its wishes into consideration.<sup>6</sup>

### GUARDIAN'S RIGHT TO WARD'S SERVICES

**161. A guardian, as such, is not entitled, like a parent, to his ward's services and earnings.**

A guardian, as such, has no right to his ward's services, corresponding to the parent's right to the services of his minor child.<sup>7</sup> When an infant is living with and supported by his guardian as a member of his family, and renders ordinary household services, it has been held that he may set off the value of such services against the guardian's claim for maintenance.<sup>8</sup> There are cases, however, which hold the contrary.<sup>9</sup> The guardian, not being entitled to the services of his ward, cannot, as such, bring an action for

<sup>6</sup> *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 598, 28 Am. Dec. 451; *Ramsay v. Ramsay*, 20 Wis. 507; *In re Ross' Guardianship*, 6 Cal. App. 597, 92 Pac. 871; *Lord v. Hough*, 37 Cal. 657. But see *Mason v. Williams*, 165 Ky. 831, 176 S. W. 1171, holding that the right of a statutory guardian is not superior to that of a parent. The guardian is entitled to his ward's custody in the absence of an award to another, and is not answerable for false imprisonment in asserting his right thereto. *Townsend v. Kendall*, 4 Minn. 412 (Gil. 315), 77 Am. Dec. 534.

<sup>4</sup> Ante, p. 843.

<sup>5</sup> *Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Ves. Sr. 157; *Garner v. Gordon*, 41 Ind. 92; *Ward v. Roper*, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 111; *In re Heather Children*, 50 Mich. 281, 15 N. W. 487; *Stone v. Duffy*, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595; *Smith v. Haas*, 132 Iowa, 493, 109 N. W. 1075.

<sup>6</sup> *Anon.*, 2 Ves. Sr. 374; *People v. Wilcox*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178.

<sup>7</sup> *Haskell v. Jewell*, 59 Vt. 91, 7 Atl. 545; *Zeideman v. Molasky*, 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754; *Bass v. Cook*, 4 Port. (Ala.) 390; *In re Clark*, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 301; *Denison v. Cornwell*, 17 Serg. & B. (Pa.) 377; *Hayden v. Stone*, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 400; *Blanchard v. Hsley*, 120 Mass. 487, 21 Am. Rep. 535.

<sup>8</sup> *Phillips v. Davis*, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 520, 62 Am. Dec. 472; *Calhoun v. Calhoun*, 41 Ala. 369; *Crosby v. Crosby*, 1 S. C. 337. As to the right to charge for ward's support, see post, p. 413.

<sup>9</sup> *Moyer v. Fletcher*, 56 Mich. 508, 23 N. W. 198; *Armstrong's Heirs v. Walkup*, 12 Grat. (Va.) 608.

loss of services caused by a tortious injury, as for the seduction of a female ward.<sup>10</sup> If, however, the guardian stands in loco parentis, so that he has the same rights as a parent would have, including the right to control the child's services, he may maintain such an action.<sup>11</sup>

### MAINTENANCE OF WARD—CONTRACTS

162. A guardian is bound to maintain his ward from the income of the estate, but he is not bound to furnish support personally, and no promise on his part will be implied, without his consent, to pay even for necessities furnished the ward.
163. A guardian cannot, by contract, bind either the ward or his estate. He is primarily personally liable on contracts, though made by him as guardian, and on behalf of the ward, but in proper cases he is entitled to reimbursement.
164. By the weight of authority, when the ward lives with the guardian as a member of his family, receiving support, and rendering the ordinary services of a child, the guardian is not entitled to an allowance for such support, in the absence of an agreement, the relation in such case being quasi parental.

It is the duty of the guardian to maintain and educate his ward in a manner suitable to his means, from the income of the ward's estate.<sup>12</sup> Although the ward's father is living, the guardian should provide for his maintenance out of his estate, provided the father is unable to do so, and a court of equity will order an allowance for such maintenance.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Blanchard v. Hsley*, 120 Mass. 487, 21 Am. Rep. 535.

<sup>11</sup> *Fernsler v. Moyer*, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 416, 39 Am. Dec. 33. See *Bartley v. Richtmyer*, 4 N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338; ante, p. 376.

<sup>12</sup> *Reading v. Wilson*, 38 N. J. Eq. 446; *Preble v. Longfellow*, 48 Me. 279, 77 Am. Dec. 227; *Roscoe v. McDonald*, 101 Mich. 313, 59 N. W. 603, and cases hereafter cited. As a rule, the entire cost of well-to-do infants shall not exceed the interest on the capital of their estate. In *re Brown*, 80 Misc. Rep. 4, 141 N. Y. Supp. 193.

<sup>13</sup> *Errat v. Barlow*, 14 Ves. 202; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 15 Ves. 449; *Clark v. Montgomery*, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 464; *Beasley v. Watson*, 41 Ala. 234; *Waldrom v. Waldrom*, 76 Ala. 285; In *re Alexander*, 79 N. J. Eq. 226, 81 Atl. 732; In *re Boyes' Estate*, 151 Cal. 153, 90 Pac. 454; *State v. Martin*, 18 Mo. App. 468; *Newport v. Cook*, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 332.

A guardian is under no personal obligation to support his ward, and therefore no promise on his part will be implied, as a matter of law, to pay even for his ward's necessities. "A guardian is not responsible, either personally or in his fiduciary character, for necessities furnished his ward without his consent, express or implied."<sup>14</sup> If a guardian should willfully withhold from his ward necessities suited to his fortune and condition in life, equity, or the probate or other court having jurisdiction of the guardianship, would compel him to supply them and if a stranger, ad interim, should furnish them, he would be reimbursed out of the ward's fortune; but no one could furnish even necessities without the guardian's consent, and maintain an action against the guardian therefor. Where, therefore, a guardian refuses or neglects to furnish his ward a support, "the remedy is by application to the court, which will dismiss the guardian for neglect of duty, or the infant may himself purchase necessities; or, if of such a tender age that he cannot contract himself, a third person may supply his wants. But then the guardian is not liable, but the infant. In that case suit must be brought against the infant, who can appear by guardian, and not against the guardian himself; and the judgment, when rendered, is against the infant, and execution can only be had of the estate of the infant."<sup>15</sup>

Clearly, no consent on the part of the guardian can be implied where necessities are furnished without his knowledge, nor can his consent be implied, even where he has such knowledge, if the circumstances are such that he cannot be held to know that the party furnishing them believes he consents. If his knowledge and acquiescence are as consistent with want of consent as with consent, his consent will not be implied.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Barnum v. Frost's Adm'r*, 17 Grat. (Va.) 398; *Pinnell v. Hinkle*, 54 W. Va. 119, 46 S. E. 171; *Overton v. Beavers*, 19 Ark. 623, 70 Am. Dec. 610; *Edmunds v. Davis*, 1 Hill (S. C.) 279; *Tucker v. McKee*, 1 Bailey (S. C.) 344; *Call v. Ward*, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 118, 39 Am. Dec. 64; *Bredin v. Dwen*, 2 Watts (Pa.) 95; *Penfield v. Savage*, 2 Conn. 387; *McDaniel v. Mann*, 25 Tex. 101; *Gwaltney v. Cannon*, 31 Ind. 227; *State v. Cook*, 34 N. C. 67; *Spring v. Woodworth*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 326. A guardian has the same right as a parent to decide what are necessities, and any one supplying the child does so at his peril. *Nicholson v. Spencer*, 11 Ga. 607; *Kraker v. Byrum*, 13 Rich. (S. C.) 163; *McKanna v. Merry*, 61 Ill. 177.

<sup>15</sup> *Call v. Ward*, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 118, 39 Am. Dec. 64.

<sup>16</sup> *Call v. Ward*, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 118, 39 Am. Dec. 64; *Edmunds v. Davis*, 1 Hill (S. C.) 279; *Overton v. Beavers*, 19 Ark. 623, 70 Am. Dec. 610. Where, on a father's refusal to support his child, a relative furnished support, it was

The guardian's authority is limited to supplying the needs of the ward out of the income of the estate. He cannot, by contract, render the ward personally liable even for necessities, nor can he bind the ward's estate.<sup>17</sup> On contracts made by him, the guardian renders himself personally liable, though he may expressly contract as guardian;<sup>18</sup> but in proper cases he is entitled to reimbursement out of the ward's estate.<sup>19</sup> In a Massachusetts case a guardian gave a promissory note, as guardian, to effect the release of his ward from an execution against the person, and it was held that he was personally liable thereon. In answer to an objection that the defendant guardian was not personally liable, as he contracted only as guardian, the court said: "As an administrator cannot, by his promise, bind the estate of his intestate, so neither can the guardian, by his contract, bind the person or estate of his ward. Unless, therefore, the defendant is liable to pay this note, the plaintiff has no remedy. But we are satisfied that the defendant is liable. It is his promise, made on a sufficient consideration; and although, in the note, he states that he promises as guardian, yet he is personally bound—his trust being inserted only to entitle himself to indemnity from his ward, with which the plaintiff has no concern."<sup>20</sup> When a guardian incurs liability in excess of the estate, and fails to limit his liability, he is personally liable for the excess.<sup>21</sup>

held that the child's guardian, who had no knowledge of the father's refusal, was not liable to the relative for such support, though he had sufficient funds belonging to the ward. *Turner v. Flagg*, 6 Ind. App. 563, 33 N. E. 1104.

<sup>17</sup> *Jones v. Brewer*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 314; *Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. M. Rich & Bros.*, 122 Ga. 506, 50 S. E. 338; *Forster v. Fuller*, 6 Mass. 58, 4 Am. Dec. 87; *Massachusetts General Hospital v. Fairbanks*, 132 Mass. 414; *Reading v. Wilson*, 38 N. J. Eq. 446; *Aborn v. Janis*, 62 Misc. Rep. 95, 113 N. Y. Supp. 309; *Tenney v. Evans*, 14 N. H. 343, 40 Am. Dec. 194; *Sperry v. Fanning*, 80 Ill. 371; *State v. Clark*, 16 Ind. 97; *Brown v. Grant*, 29 W. Va. 117, 11 S. E. 900; *Lusk v. Patterson*, 2 Colo. App. 306, 30 Pac. 253.

<sup>18</sup> *Forster v. Fuller*, 6 Mass. 58, 4 Am. Dec. 87; *Thacher v. Dinsmore*, 5 Mass. 299, 4 Am. Dec. 61; *Rollins v. Marsh*, 128 Mass. 116; *Simms v. Norris*, 5 Ala. 42; *Sperry v. Fanning*, 80 Ill. 371; *Hunt v. Maldonado*, 89 Cal. 636, 27 Pac. 56; *Reynolds v. Garber-Buick Co.*, 183 Mich. 157, 149 N. W. 985, L. R. A. 1915C, 362; *Bell v. Dingwell*, 91 Neb. 699, 136 N. W. 1128; *McNabb v. Clipp*, 5 Ind. App. 204, 31 N. E. 858; *Lewis v. Edwards*, 44 Ind. 333. His promise is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing. *Roche v. Chaplin*, 1 Bailey (S. C.) 419; *McNabb v. Clipp*, 5 Ind. App. 204, 31 N. E. 858.

<sup>19</sup> Post, p. 414.

<sup>20</sup> *Forster v. Fuller*, 6 Mass. 58, 4 Am. Dec. 87.

<sup>21</sup> *Hutchinson v. Hutchinson*, 19 Vt. 437; *Broadus v. Rosson*, 3 Leigh (Va.) 12,

A guardian cannot exceed the income of the estate in the maintenance of his ward, without leave of court.<sup>22</sup> "When a guardian finds that the income of the ward's estate is not sufficient for his maintenance, it is his duty to submit the whole matter to the consideration of the court, and to act under its directions. If he proceeds otherwise, he acts upon his own responsibility."<sup>23</sup> It has been held that a guardian has no authority to make advances from his own means for the maintenance of his ward, and that where he does so he cannot recover the amount advanced, from the ward, after the latter attains his majority.<sup>24</sup> This, however, cannot prevent a guardian from advancing the means necessary to support the ward, and claiming to be reimbursed out of the estate of his ward which subsequently comes into his hands. Reimbursement will be allowed in a proper case.<sup>25</sup>

By the weight of authority, when a ward is living with his guardian as a member of his family receiving support on the one hand and rendering household services on the other it will be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that they are living in the relation of parent and child; and the guardian cannot under such circumstances charge the ward's estate for maintenance. Nor of course under such circumstances could the ward recover for his services. "Where the family relation exists whether natural or assumed, there is, in the absence of an express agreement, or circumstances from which an agreement may be fairly inferred, no implied obligation to pay for board, on the one hand, or for work, on the other."<sup>26</sup> There are many cases, however,

<sup>22</sup> *Hudson v. Newton*, 83 Ark. 223, 103 S. W. 170; *Stewart v. Crump*, 131 La. 463, 59 South. 903; *Campbell v. O'Neill*, 69 W. Va. 459, 72 S. E. 732; *Fidelity Trust Co. v. Butler*, 91 S. W. 676, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1268.

<sup>23</sup> *Patton v. Thompson*, 55 N. C. 411, 67 Am. Dec. 222. And see post, pp. 414-416, and cases there cited.

<sup>24</sup> *Preble v. Longfellow*, 48 Me. 279, 77 Am. Dec. 227; *In re Boyes' Estate*, 151 Cal. 143, 90 Pac. 454.

<sup>25</sup> *Patton v. Thompson*, 55 N. C. 411, 67 Am. Dec. 222; *Johnston v. Coleman*, 56 N. C. 293; *Withers v. Hickman*, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 292; *Gott v. Culp*, 45 Mich. 265, 7 N. W. 767; *In re Boyes' Estate*, 151 Cal. 143, 90 Pac. 454; *Speer v. Tinsley*, 55 Ga. 89; *In re Ward*, 49 Misc. Rep. 181, 98 N. Y. Supp. 923; *Gaspard v. Coco*, 116 La. 1096, 41 South. 326; *DUFFY v. WILLIAMS*, 133 N. C. 195, 45 S. E. 548, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 215. But see *Logan v. Gay* (Tex. Civ. App.) 87 S. W. 852, holding that failure to procure an order of court precedent to expenditure cannot be remedied by an order nunc pro tunc.

<sup>26</sup> *Doan v. Dow*, 8 Ind. App. 324, 35 N. E. 709. And see *Webster v. Wadsworth*, 44 Ind. 283; *ABRAMS v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARAN-*

which do not support this view, but which hold that a guardian who takes his ward into his family to live is entitled to reasonable compensation for board and clothing furnished, though no express agreement to charge and to pay therefor is shown, and though the ward assists in the performance of household duties.<sup>27</sup>

### SAME—USE OF PRINCIPAL OF ESTATE

165. The guardian is restricted to the use of the income of the estate in the maintenance and education of the ward, unless he has obtained leave of the court to use the principal.
166. Such leave will be granted in a case of necessity, or where the advantage to the ward clearly demands it. And the court may approve such use by the guardian, without previous application for leave, where the court would have authorized it if application had been made.

TY CO., 127 Wis. 579, 106 N. W. 1091, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1055, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 222; Mulhern v. McDavitt, 16 Gray (Mass.) 404; Folger v. Heidel, 60 Mo. 285; Douglas' Appeal, 82 Pa. 169; Horton's Appeal, 94 Pa. 62. In Otis v. Hall, 117 N. Y. 131, 22 N. E. 563, on an accounting by a guardian, it appeared that having no children of his own, he had told the stepfather of his ward that he would take the child into his family, and bring him up as his own; that he would collect certain pension money due the ward, and pay it over to him, with interest, when he became of age; that, upon this understanding, he was appointed guardian of the child, took him into his family, and always spoke of him as his child, saying that he had adopted him. The ward lived with him, and did the usual work of the farm. It was held that the guardian stood in loco parentis, and was not entitled to any allowance for maintenance of the ward. "It is well settled," said the court, "that where parties sustain the relation of parent and child, either by nature or adoption, the former, in the absence of an express promise, cannot be required to pay for services rendered by the child, nor the latter be obliged to pay for maintenance."

<sup>27</sup> Moyer v. Fletcher, 56 Mich. 508, 23 N. W. 198. And see Armstrong's Heirs v. Walkup, 12 Grat. (Va.) 608; Pratt's Adm'r v. Baker, 56 Vt. 70; Rawson v. Corbett, 43 Ill. App. 127; Pyatt v. Pyatt, 46 N. J. Eq. 285, 18 Atl. 1048; Mumford v. Rood, 36 S. D. 80, 153 N. W. 921; Jacobia v. Terry, 92 Mich. 275, 52 N. W. 629. In some of the cases cited, there were peculiar circumstances which may be regarded as distinguishing them from Doan v. Dow, and other cases cited in note 26, supra, so that they are not against the proposition to which those cases are cited. Thus, in Pyatt v. Pyatt, 46 N. J. Eq. 285, 18 Atl. 1048, the guardian used the ward's money to support the ward. This shows an intention to charge the ward. And compare In re Livernols' Estate, 78 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 279, with Moyer v. Fletcher, 56 Mich. 508, 23 N. W. 198.

In the maintenance of the ward the guardian is ordinarily authorized to use only the income of the estate.<sup>28</sup> He cannot break in upon the principal without the sanction of the court. If necessary, the court will authorize such an expenditure,<sup>29</sup> but the guardian must apply to the court, and, if he assumes to judge of the necessity himself, he does so at his own risk, and on his own responsibility.<sup>30</sup> Such a rule as this is necessary to protect the property of the ward, and this is its object. "A guardian," said the Illinois court, "will not be permitted to expend upon the maintenance and education of his ward more than the income of the estate, without the sanction of the court. The court itself, on an application, proper as to time, would proceed with the utmost degree of caution, and would withhold its sanction, except in a case of strong necessity or advantage to the ward, very clearly made out. In a case where the ward had considerable expectancies, or his estate had not yet been reduced to possession, or he was likely to suffer for the common necessities of life, or, exhibiting fine talents, it was desirable to expend his small estate in his education, with a view to his future advancement in life; in these and similar instances of necessity or advantage to the ward, the court would authorize the expenditure of the capital of his estate."<sup>31</sup> The ward's real property cannot be sold to provide for maintenance without leave of court first obtained.<sup>32</sup> Nor can the proceeds of real estate sold for reinvestment be so used.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Ante, p. 412.

<sup>29</sup> Villard v. Robert, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 40, 49 Am. Dec. 654; Hudson v. Newton, 83 Ark. 223, 103 S. W. 170; Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 21; In re Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 100; Roseborough v. Roseborough, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 314; Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 332; Withers v. Hickman, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 292. See, also, Com. v. Lee, 120 Ky. 433, 86 S. W. 990, 89 S. W. 731.

<sup>30</sup> Villard v. Robert, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 40, 49 Am. Dec. 654; Walker v. Wetherell, 6 Ves. 473; Lee v. Brown, 4 Ves. 362, 369; In re Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 100; Davis v. Harkness, 1 Gilman (Ill.) 173, 41 Am. Dec. 184; Beeler v. Dunn, 3 Head (Tenn.) 87, 75 Am. Dec. 761; Owens v. Pearce, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 45; Phillips v. Davis, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 520, 62 Am. Dec. 472; State v. Clark, 16 Ind. 97; Dowling v. Feeley, 72 Ga. 557; McDowell v. Caldwell, 2 McCord, Eq. (S. C.) 43, 16 Am. Dec. 635; Campbell v. O'Neill, 69 W. Va. 459, 72 S. E. 732; Myers v. Wade, 6 Rand. (Va.) 444; Rinker v. Streitt, 33 Grat. (Va.) 663; Johnston v. Coleman, 56 N. C. 290; Gilbert v. McEachen, 38 Miss. 469.

<sup>31</sup> Villard v. Robert, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 40, 49 Am. Dec. 654; Com. v. Lee, 120 Ky. 433, 86 S. W. 990, 89 S. W. 731.

<sup>32</sup> Fidelity Trust Co. v. Butler, 91 S. W. 676, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1268. See, also, post, p. 436.

<sup>33</sup> Strong v. Moe, 8 Allen (Mass.) 125; Rinker v. Streitt, 33 Grat. (Va.) 663.

Though a guardian always intrinches upon the principal of his ward's estate at his own peril, the fact that he does so does not necessarily bar him from an allowance therefor. The rule, on the contrary, is well established that the court will approve such a use of the principal by the guardian, without a previous application for leave of the court, where it is clear that the court would have authorized it if application had been made.<sup>84</sup>

### CHANGE OF WARD'S DOMICILE BY GUARDIAN

167. A natural guardian can change his ward's domicile. Other guardians can change the municipal domicile, but, by the weight of authority, they cannot change the state or national domicile.

There is considerable conflict in the authorities as to the power of a guardian to change the domicile of his ward. In England it is held that, where the guardian is also a parent, the domicile, according to the rule as between parent and child, follows that of the parent, although the child's rights of succession to property may be thereby altered to his prejudice.<sup>85</sup> It has been doubted whether a guardian who is not a parent can change the ward's domicile, but the question does not seem to have been passed upon by the English courts.<sup>86</sup> In this country the rule is uniform, as in England, that a natural guardian may in good faith change his ward's domicile from one state or county to another.<sup>87</sup> In a late Iowa case it was held that the paternal grandfather of an orphan child,

<sup>84</sup> *Lee v. Brown*, 4 Ves. 362; *Prince v. Hine*, 26 Beav. 634; *In re Boyes' Estate*, 151 Cal. 143, 90 Pac. 454; *Browne v. Bedford*, 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 304; *In re Putney*, 61 Misc. Rep. 1, 114 N. Y. Supp. 556; *Jarret v. Andrews*, 7 Bush (Ky.) 312; *Barton v. Bowen*, 27 Grat. (Va.) 849; *Weathersbee v. Blanton*, 31 S. C. 604, 9 S. E. 817; *Calhoun v. Calhoun*, 41 Ala. 369; *Roseborough v. Roseborough*, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 314; *Long v. Norcom*, 37 N. O. 354; *Bellamy v. Thornton*, 103 Ala. 404, 15 South. 831; *Maupin's Ex'r v. Dulany's Devisees*, 5 Dana (Ky.) 589, 30 Am. Dec. 699.

<sup>85</sup> *Pottinger v. Wightman*, 3 Mer. 67; *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & F. 42.

<sup>86</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 692; *Dicey*, Dom. 100; *Jac. Dom.* § 254.

<sup>87</sup> *Jac. Dom.* § 260; *Holyoke v. Haskins*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 20, 16 Am. Dec. 372; *Pedan v. Robb's Adm'r*, 8 Ohio, 227; *In re Kiernan*, 38 Misc. Rep. 394, 77 N. Y. Supp. 924; *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230; *In re Benton*, 92 Iowa, 202, 60 N. W. 614, 54 Am. St. Rep. 546; ante, p. 392.

being the child's natural guardian, could change his domicile to another state.<sup>38</sup>

It seems also to be the uniform rule in this country that guardians, other than natural guardians, may change the municipal domicile of the ward; that is, that they may change it from one place to another in the same state. It was said in a New York case: "In the present instance the residence of the infant has been changed from one county to another, but still has been retained under the sovereignty of the same laws. This, I have no doubt, is completely within the scope of the guardian's authority. No rights are impaired or affected by the act, the jurisdiction of the state is preserved, and no other consequence flows from the change of residence than the substitution of one officer in the place of another—a result entirely conformable to those purposes of convenience contemplated by the statute in regulating the appointment of a guardian by the surrogate of the county where the infant resides."<sup>39</sup> Whether or not a guardian, who is not a natural guardian, has the power to change his ward's domicile from one state or county to another, without the court's consent is a question on which the decisions conflict.<sup>40</sup>

In all cases, in the absence of statutory restrictions on its power, a court of chancery has the power to restrain the removal of a child, where its interests will be injuriously affected. The court, as the protector of infants, has this power, even as against a natural guardian, though it must be a very extreme or special case

<sup>38</sup> In *re Benton*, 92 Iowa, 202, 60 N. W. 614, 54 Am. St. Rep. 546. But see *Marheineke v. Grothaus*, 72 Mo. 204.

<sup>39</sup> *Ex parte Bartlett*, 4 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 221. And see *Jac. Dom.* § 257; *Kirkland v. Whately*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 462; *LAMAR v. MICO*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230; *Anderson v. Anderson's Estate*, 42 Vt. 350, 1 Am. Rep. 334. But the domicile of the guardian is not necessarily that of the ward. *School Directors v. James*, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 568, 37 Am. Dec. 525.

<sup>40</sup> *Daniel v. Hill*, 52 Ala. 430; *Mears v. Sinclair*, 1 W. Va. 185; *Ex parte Bartlett*, 4 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 221; *Seiter v. Straub*, 1 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 264; *School Directors v. James*, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 568, 37 Am. Dec. 525; *Wilkins' Guardian*, 146 Pa. 585, 23 Atl. 325; *LAMAR v. MICO*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230. But see *Pedan v. Robb's Adm'r*, 8 Ohio, 227; *Townsend v. Kendall*, 4 Minn. 412 (Gil. 315), 77 Am. Dec. 534; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 596, 28 Am. Dec. 451; *Smidt v. Benenga*, 140 Iowa, 399, 118 N. W. 439; *White v. Howard*, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 294; *Wheeler v. Hollis*, 19 Tex. 522, 70 Am. Dec. 363; *In re Afflick's Estate*, 3 MacArthur (D. C.) 95.

to induce it to interfere.<sup>41</sup> In the case of testamentary, chancery, or statute guardians, it will not hesitate to interfere where its interference is necessary for the child's protection.<sup>42</sup>

### MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE—GUARDIANSHIP AS A TRUST

168. A guardian is a trustee, and therefore—

- (a) He cannot reap any benefit from the use of his ward's property.
- (b) He cannot purchase at a sale of his ward's property.
- (c) He cannot sell his own property to his ward.

169. The ward has all the rights, as against the guardian, that a cestui que trust has against the trustee. And therefore—

- (a) He may ratify the wrongful use of his property by the guardian, and claim all profits arising therefrom, or repudiate the transaction and hold the guardian to account.
- (b) He may repudiate purchases of his real estate by his guardian, and claim a resulting trust.
- (c) He may trace and reclaim personal property converted by his guardian, when it can be identified.

The relation of guardian and ward is that of trustee and cestui que trust.<sup>43</sup> Whenever the guardian makes use of the ward's property with the object of reaping a personal advantage, or does any act which would amount to a breach of trust, either in fact or in law, the ward, on attaining his majority, may either ratify the transaction, and take any profit arising from it, or repudiate it, and require the guardian to account.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Crenze v. Hunter*, 2 Cox, Ch. 242; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 52; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 1 Dow. & C. 152; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 596, 28 Am. Dec. 451.

<sup>42</sup> *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 596, 28 Am. Dec. 451.

<sup>43</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 317; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 961; *Mathew v. Brise*, 14 Beav. 341; *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Wms. 703; *Gilbert v. Schwenck*, 14 Mees. & W. 488; *Wall v. Stanwick*, 34 Ch. Div. 763; *Smith v. Smith* (D. C.) 210 Fed. 947, affirmed 224 Fed. 1, 139 C. O. A. 465; *In re Toman's Estate*, 110 Ill. App. 135; *White v. Parker*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; *Pepper v. Stone*, 10 Vt. 427; *Isaacs v. Taylor*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 600.

<sup>44</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 229; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 Mylne & K. 655; *Seguin's Appeal*, 103 Pa. 139; *White v. Parker*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; *Kyle v. Barnett*, 17 Ala. 306; *Kennaird v. Adams*, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 102; *Sparhawk v. Allen*, 21 N. H. 9; *Heard v. Daniel*, 26 Miss. 451; *Chorpenning's Appeal*, 32 Pa. 315, 72 Am. Dec.

Equity requires the utmost good faith in all transactions between guardian and ward.<sup>45</sup> The guardian must protect the ward's estate, and is not allowed to make any profit on it outside that which is lawfully allowed him for conducting the trust.<sup>46</sup> He may not trade with himself on account of the ward, or use or deal with the ward's property for his own benefit.<sup>47</sup>

A purchase by a guardian at a sale of the ward's property will be set aside, as against him, not only when he has taken an undue advantage,<sup>48</sup> but, by the weight of authority, even when the sale was fairly made, and for an adequate price, on the ground that a trustee will not be allowed to place himself in a position where his interests may be inconsistent with his duty.<sup>49</sup> "An inclination has been manifested by some of the English judges, and perhaps by some of the courts in this country, to look into the transaction, when a trustee has purchased the trust property, and to make its

789. Where a duly recorded mortgage was assigned to a guardian, who thereafter, as agent of a third party, negotiated a loan to the mortgagors for a payment on the mortgage, receiving as security another mortgage on the same land, he had no authority to postpone his security as guardian to the second mortgage. *Covey v. Leslie*, 144 Mich. 165, 107 N. W. 900.

<sup>45</sup> *Pevehouse v. Adams*, 52 Okl. 495, 153 Pac. 65.

<sup>46</sup> *Brandau v. Greer*, 95 Miss. 100, 48 South. 519, 21 Ann. Cas. 1118.

<sup>47</sup> *Charles v. Witt*, 88 Kan. 484, 129 Pac. 140.

<sup>48</sup> *LeFevre v. Laraway*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 167; *Hayward v. Ellis*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 272; *Mann v. McDonald*, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 275.

<sup>49</sup> 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 481; *Cary v. Cary*, 2 Sch. & L. 173; *Ex parte James*, 8 Ves. 348; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252; *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 503, 11 L. Ed. 1076; *Scott v. Freeland*, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 409, 45 Am. Dec. 310; *Sunter v. Sunter*, 190 Mass. 449, 77 N. E. 497; *In re TANNER'S ESTATE*, 218 Pa. 361, 67 Atl. 646, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 219; *Chorpenning's Appeal*, 32 Pa. 315, 72 Am. Dec. 789; *Morgan v. Johnson*, 68 Ill. 190; *LeFevre v. Laraway*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 167; *Beal v. Harmon*, 38 Mo. 435; *Taylor v. Calvert*, 138 Ind. 67, 37 N. E. 531. In *Haynes v. Montgomery*, 96 Ark. 573, 132 S. W. 651, a purchase by the guardian of the ward's land at mortgage foreclosure sale was held invalid. In *Waldstein v. Barnett*, 112 Ark. 141, 165 S. W. 459, it was held that a guardian, purchasing his ward's property, was chargeable with notice that the ward had a special homestead interest in the property and was bound to inform the ward of that fact before purchasing, and cannot excuse a failure to do so by claiming that he was ignorant thereof. A guardian's wife cannot lawfully acquire property of his wards, which the law forbids him to acquire. *Brandau v. Greer*, 95 Miss. 100, 48 South. 519, 21 Ann. Cas. 1118. To bring a case within the operation of this rule, "the relation," said the Pennsylvania court in *Chorpenning's Appeal*, *supra*, "must be one in which knowledge, by reason of the confidence reposed, might be acquired, or power exists to affect injuriously the interests of cestuis que trustent, or advance that of the trustee. The reason of the law is its life, and, unless some advantage might be gained by reason of the rela-

validity rest upon its fairness.<sup>50</sup> The decided weight of authority, however, is the other way. The sale may be set aside at the option of the cestui que trust, as a matter of course. \* \* \* This is the safest rule. It removes temptation from the trustee. If he is permitted, under any circumstances, to become a purchaser of the trust estate, the deepest frauds may be cloaked under the guise of fairness, and exclude the possibility of proof."<sup>51</sup> As against a subsequent purchaser from the guardian, a different question is presented. Such sale is not void, but voidable only, and an innocent purchaser for value from the guardian would acquire a good title.<sup>52</sup> If a guardian sells his own property to the ward, the rule is the same. The transaction is voidable, at the option of the ward, on attaining his majority, or before.<sup>53</sup>

A purchase of a ward's property by the guardian, or a sale by the guardian of his own property to the ward, is, as stated above, merely voidable at the option of the ward. He may ratify it after attaining his majority, in which case, if he has full knowledge of his rights, and is not unduly influenced by the guardian, he cannot afterwards avoid it. And his ratification may be implied from his conduct. Thus it may be implied from an unreasonable delay in taking steps to have the transaction set aside after attaining his majority, provided he had full knowledge of his rights.<sup>54</sup> So, also, the receipt by the ward, on becoming of age, of the value of his property purchased by the guardian, or the use of property sold to him by his guardian, is an affirmance of the transaction, and renders it binding.<sup>55</sup>

tion, the principle does not apply." It was therefore held in that case that a guardian may purchase the interest of his ward when the sale is made by a public officer, and is inevitable. In this case, land in which minors had an interest as heirs was sold by the sheriff under an execution against the personal representative of their ancestor, and their guardian, who had no funds of the wards, purchased at the sale. The purchase was sustained. See, also, *Prevost v. Gratz*, Fed. Cas. No. 11,406; *Fisk v. Sarber*, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 18.

<sup>50</sup> *Elrod v. Lancaster*, 2 Head (Tenn.) 571, 75 Am. Dec. 749.

<sup>51</sup> *Scott v. Freeland*, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 409, 45 Am. Dec. 310.

<sup>52</sup> *Wyman v. Hooper*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 141; *Morrison v. Kinstra*, 55 Miss. 71; *Taylor v. Brown*, 55 Mich. 482, 21 N. W. 901.

<sup>53</sup> *Hendee v. Cleaveland*, 54 Vt. 142.

<sup>54</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 238; *Scott v. Freeland*, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 409, 45 Am. Dec. 310; *Hoyt v. Sprague*, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585; *Telpel v. Vanderweir*, 36 Minn. 443, 31 N. W. 934; *Cassedy v. Casey*, 58 Iowa, 326, 12 N. W. 286; *Sherry v. Sansberry*, 3 Ind. 320; *In re Wood*, 71 Mo. 623; *Trader v. Lowe*, 45 Md. 1.

<sup>55</sup> *Scott v. Freeland*, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 409, 45 Am. Dec. 310; *Caplinger v. Stokes*, Meigs (Tenn.) 175.

A guardian should not mingle the ward's funds with his own, but should deposit moneys in bank in a separate account.<sup>56</sup> All the authorities agree that if the guardian deposits his ward's moneys, not only in his own name, but together with funds of his own, he is liable if they are lost by a failure of the bank; and, by the weight of authority, he is so liable if he merely makes the deposit in his own name, without disclosing the true character of the fund, though there is no mingling of it with his own moneys; for he thus obtains personal credit on the appearance of owning the deposit, which is an advantage to himself from the management of the ward's moneys.<sup>57</sup> In a Maryland case, a guardian, before the failure of a bank, had deposited his ward's money in his own name, and taken certificates of deposit therefor, but he did not give notice of his fiduciary relation to the deposit. It was held that he must bear the loss of the deposit from a failure of the bank, though there was no mingling of the money with his own funds, and though he made on the certificates an indorsement that they were the property of his ward. The court said: "At the same time that this court feels itself bound to shield a trustee from harm in the honest and faithful discharge of his duties in his fiduciary character, it is bound studiously to exercise a vigilant care in protecting the interests of those who, from their tender years, are incapable of protecting themselves. No principle seems to be better settled than that, in such a case as this, any loss arising from a misplaced confidence in the solidity of a banking institution, or other depositories of trust property, must be borne by the trustee, and not by his cestui que trust. By making the deposit in his own name, he gained a credit with the bank, and reaped all the advantages which could be derived from the apparent ownership of the sum deposited, assuming his authority so to make such a deposit; and, having received the benefit, the law declares, and justice seems to require, that he should bear the loss. Nor is there any peculiar hardship in

<sup>56</sup> In re Allard's Guardianship, 49 Mont. 219, 141 Pac. 661.

<sup>57</sup> 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1067; Wren v. Kirton, 11 Ves. 377; Fletcher v. Walker, 3 Madd. 73; Macdonnell v. Harding, 7 Sim. 178; Jenkins v. Walter, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 218, 29 Am. Dec. 539; McAllister v. Com., 30 Pa. 536; Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300, 12 N. W. 465, 13 N. W. 274, 42 Am. Rep. 708; BOOTH v. WILKINSON, 78 Wis. 652, 47 N. W. 1128, 23 Am. St. Rep. 443, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 217; Valden v. Stubblefield's Ex'r, 28 Grat. (Va.) 153. But see Davis v. Harman, 21 Grat. (Va.) 194; Parsley's Adm'r v. Martin, 77 Va. 376, 46 Am. Rep. 733.

the establishment of such a principle, which would deter a prudent trustee from assuming upon himself the responsibilities of such a fiduciary relation as it is at all times in his power to avoid any risk or responsibility by clothing the transaction in its true colors, and making the deposit, not in his own name, but in the name of him who is the real owner, and for whom he is trusted."<sup>58</sup> And, by the weight of authority, the liability of the guardian is the same in any other case where he invests his ward's funds in his own name.<sup>59</sup>

Some of the courts have adopted a less stringent doctrine, and require some want of good faith on the part of the guardian to render him liable for a loss happening without his fault. The Virginia court has held, for instance, that the mere fact that the guardian deposits the ward's funds in his own name is not, alone, sufficient to render him liable on failure of the bank, where there is no mingling of the funds with his own, and he acts in perfect good faith, and not for his personal advantage.<sup>60</sup> In this case two of the five judges dissented, and the great weight of authority is against the decision.<sup>61</sup>

#### *Right of Ward to Follow Trust Property*

The right of a cestui que trust to follow the trust estate, when wrongfully disposed of by the trustee, is thus clearly stated in Mr. Fetter's work on Equity: "Where trust property has been wrongfully disposed of by the trustee, the cestui que trust may assert his right to the specific property in two ways: (a) He may follow it into the hands of the person to whom it has been wrongfully conveyed by the trustee, unless such person is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the trust. (b) He may attach and follow the property that has been substituted for the trust estate so long as the substituted property can be traced."<sup>62</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Jenkins v. Walter*, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 218, 29 Am. Dec. 539.

<sup>59</sup> *Knowlton v. Bradley*, 17 N. H. 458, 43 Am. Dec. 609; *In re Wood's Estate and Guardianship*, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252; *White v. Parker*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48. In *Knowlton v. Bradley*, supra, it was held that a guardian taking a note payable to himself individually, without a designation of his official capacity, cannot show, on the failure of the debtor, that it was taken for the funds of his ward. But see *Barney v. Parsons' Guardian*, 54 Vt. 623, 41 Am. Rep. 858.

<sup>60</sup> *Parsley's Adm'r v. Martin*, 77 Va. 376, 46 Am. Rep. 733.

<sup>61</sup> See the cases in notes 57-59, supra, in many of which the facts were similar to those in *Jenkins v. Walter*, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 218, 29 Am. Dec. 539. See, particularly, *Williams v. Williams*, 55 Wis. 300, 12 N. W. 465, 13 N. W. 274, 42 Am. Rep. 708.

<sup>62</sup> *Fetter*, Eq. 207,

This doctrine applies to guardianship. Aside from the ward's right of action on the guardian's bond for misappropriation of trust funds, he may follow and recover the trust property, when it can be traced and identified, into whosoever hands it may come, other than purchasers for value without notice, and in whatsoever form it may take. If, for instance, a guardian invests trust funds, in his own name, in a negotiable note or other security, the ward may claim the note or other security, not only in the hands of the guardian, but also in the hands of his transferees, provided they are not purchasers for value, without notice of the character of the security, as trust property.<sup>63</sup> So if the guardian unlawfully purchases property, real or personal, with the funds of his ward, there is a resulting trust for the ward, "so that he may either claim a beneficial right to the property, or, at his election, claim a lien upon the property, for the security of the money invested in it; and, if the trustee sell, the purchaser from him with notice of the trust, stands in the shoes of the trustee."<sup>64</sup> Guardianships are trusts, and "trusts are not only enforced against those persons who are rightfully possessed of the trust property as trustees, but against all persons who come into possession of the property bound by the trust, with notice of such trust."<sup>65</sup>

So long as the ward's property can be identified in the hands of the guardian in whatever form it may take the ward is entitled to recover it as against the guardian's creditors in case of his insolvency or bankruptcy. Thus where a guardian invested his ward's funds in a promissory note payable to his own order and died insolvent, it was held that the ward was entitled to recover the full amount of the note from the estate.<sup>66</sup> But, if the property of the ward is mingled with that of the guardian in such a way that its

<sup>63</sup> *Carpenter v. McBride*, 3 Fla. 292, 52 Am. Dec. 379. And see *Brown v. Dunham*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 42; *Burdeau v. Davey*, 43 La. Ann. 585, 9 South. 752.

<sup>64</sup> *Turner v. Street*, 2 Rand. (Va.) 404, 14 Am. Dec. 792; *Durling v. Hammar*, 20 N. J. Eq. 220; *Boisseau v. Boisseau*, 79 Va. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 616; *Sterling v. Arnold*, 54 Ga. 690; *Armitage v. Snowden*, 41 Md. 119; *Morrison v. Kinstra*, 55 Miss. 71; *Beazley v. Harris*, 1 Bush (Ky.) 533; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 22 Iowa, 427; *Patterson v. Booth*, 103 Mo. 402, 15 S. W. 543. But where a guardian purchases property on his own credit, and subsequently appropriates his ward's funds to the payment of his debt therefor, no trust arises in the ward's favor. *French v. Sheplor*, 83 Ind. 266, 43 Am. Rep. 67; *Richardson v. Day*, 20 S. C. 412.

<sup>65</sup> *Adair v. Shaw*, 1 Sch. & L. 262.

<sup>66</sup> *Brown v. Dunham*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 42.

identity is lost, the ward has no rights superior to those of general creditors.<sup>67</sup>

The ward cannot follow the trust property into the hands of purchasers for value, and without notice, but his remedy in such a case is against the guardian and his sureties.<sup>68</sup> A guardian has the right to sell the personal property of his ward, if the interests of the ward require him to do so. A purchaser from the guardian has a right to presume that the guardian is acting for the benefit of the ward, and he is not obliged to see to the application of the money paid. A bona fide purchaser, therefore, of the personal property of a ward from his guardian, will be protected from claims of the ward because of the guardian's breach of trust.<sup>69</sup>

Where the ward has once repudiated an unauthorized investment or disposition of the trust property, and elected to hold the guardian and his sureties responsible, he cannot afterwards enforce a trust against the property.<sup>70</sup>

### SAME—ACTS IN EXCESS OF AUTHORITY

170. If a guardian exceeds his authority, though in good faith, he is liable for any resulting loss. If there is benefit instead of loss, the ward may claim the benefit.

<sup>67</sup> *Covey v. Neff*, 63 Ind. 391; *Vason v. Bell*, 53 Ga. 416.

<sup>68</sup> *Field v. Schieffelin*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 151, 11 Am. Dec. 441.

<sup>69</sup> A person dealing with a guardian, and acquiring property belonging to the wards from him, is not to be regarded as an innocent purchaser of the property, if the transaction was on the face of it a breach of the trust; and it can make no difference in such case that such person was not guilty of any fraudulent intent. Thus, where a guardian unlawfully (post, p. —) used the funds of the ward to purchase a real estate for the ward, without leave of court, it was held that, as the breach of trust was apparent on the face of the transaction, the vendor of the land, though he may have been innocent of any actual fraudulent intent, was to be regarded as a participant in the breach, and that he was liable for the amount received by him, with interest. *Bolsseau v. Bolsseau*, 79 Va. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 616. So, where a person receives from a guardian, in payment of the personal debt of the guardian, money which he knows to belong to the ward, the ward may hold him liable. It will not do for him to say that he acted in good faith, for "the law stamps the transaction as fraudulent, however innocent the intention of the parties; not actual fraud in this case, but fraud in law, arising from a misapplication of trust funds." *Asberry's Adm'r v. Asberry's Adm'r*, 33 Grat. (Va.) 470.

<sup>70</sup> *Rowley v. Towsley*, 53 Mich. 329, 19 N. W. 20; *Beam v. Froneberger*, 75 N. O. 540; *Edmonds v. Morrison*, 5 Dana (Ky.) 223; *Clayton v. McKinnon*, 54 Tex. 206.

If the guardian acts beyond the scope of his authority, although in good faith and with the best intentions, and such unauthorized transaction is detrimental to the ward, the guardian will be personally liable; but if it is beneficial to the ward the guardian will be protected, and the ward take the benefit.<sup>71</sup> "In equity, the dealing of guardians with the estates of their wards is watched over with a vigilant jealousy by the chancellor. And while the chancellor will often uphold and ratify contracts and arrangements made by the guardian which are for the interest of his ward, although there may be no authority or express sanction of law for the special course he may have pursued, yet, if such contract or arrangement be detrimental to the estate of the ward, it is the province and the duty of courts of equity to vacate and set it aside. It is upon a similar principle of natural justice that the infant or minor, when he attains his majority, is permitted to make his election to adopt and confirm the contracts of his guardian without authority of law in and about his estate, when they are to his advantage, and to repudiate them if he deem them injurious. If the guardian sell the land of his ward without being authorized by law, the ward has his election to accept the price, or reclaim the land, when he comes of age, no matter who has become the purchaser."<sup>72</sup>

### SAME—DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED

**171. A guardian is bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence, and no more, in the management of his ward's estate.**

In the management of the ward's estate, the guardian must exercise ordinary prudence and care, and such prudence and care only. If he acts as a prudent man of business would do under sim-

<sup>71</sup> *Millner v. Harewood*, 18 Ves. 259; *May v. Duke*, 61 Ala. 53; *In re Mells*, 64 Iowa, 391, 20 N. W. 486; *Jackson v. Sears*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 435; *Capehart v. Huey*, 1 Hill, Eq. (S. C.) 405; *Eichelberger's Appeal*, 4 Watts (Pa.) 84; *Smith v. Dibrell*, 31 Tex. 239, 98 Am. Dec. 526. "It is a well-settled principle of equity that wherever a trustee, or one standing in a fiduciary character, deals with the trust estate for his own personal profit, he shall account to the cestui que trust for all the gain which he has made. If he uses the trust money in speculations, dangerous, though profitable, the risk will be his own, but the profit will inure to the cestui que trust. Such a rule, though rigid, is necessary to prevent malversation." *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 543, 14 L. Ed. 1047.

<sup>72</sup> *Smith v. Dibrell*, 31 Tex. 239, 98 Am. Dec. 526.

ilar circumstances in the management of his own affairs, and a loss results, he will not be held responsible, if he acted within the scope of his authority and in good faith.<sup>73</sup> So where a guardian, in the use of due care, deposits the ward's funds in a bank regarded as solvent, to remain for such time as may be reasonably necessary for the same to be invested under order of court, he is not liable for a loss resulting from the failure of the bank.<sup>74</sup> But for losses caused by his negligence or inexcusable mismanagement he will be held to account;<sup>75</sup> and if he deposits money in bank for a fixed period under an unauthorized agreement, whereby his right to withdraw the money is suspended for such period, he is liable for a loss occurring through the failure of the bank.<sup>76</sup>

So where a guardian received a note, as part of the property of his ward, executed by a person who had property sufficient to pay it, and failed either to obtain security for its payment, or to obtain judgment on it, though he had sufficient time and opportunity to

<sup>73</sup> *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 218; *Spelght v. Gaunt*, 9 App. Cas. 1; *LAMAR v. MICO*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230; *Taylor v. Kellogg*, 103 Mo. App. 258, 77 S. W. 130; *Scoville v. Brock*, 79 Vt. 449, 65 Atl. 577, 118 Am. St. Rep. 975; *Walker v. Thompson*, 145 Ky. 597, 140 S. W. 1045; *In re Wood's Estate and Guardianship*, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252; *Layne v. Clark*, 152 Ky. 310, 153 S. W. 437; *Holeman v. Blue*, 10 Ill. App. 130; *State v. Morrison*, 68 N. C. 162; *Walker v. Walker*, 42 Ga. 135; *Barney v. Parsons' Guardian*, 54 Vt. 623, 41 Am. Rep. 858; *Glover v. Glover*, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 153; *Taylor v. Hite*, 61 Mo. 142. It is the policy of the courts to sustain if possible, irregular acts of a guardian, when done in good faith and without detriment to the estate. *Duffy v. McHale*, 35 R. I. 16, 85 Atl. 36.

<sup>74</sup> *Murph v. McCullough*, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 90 S. W. 69; *In re Law*, 144 Pa. 499, 22 Atl. 831, 14 L. R. A. 103; *Corcoran v. Kostrometinoff*, 164 Fed. 685, 91 C. C. A. 619, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 399; *In re Wood's Estate and Guardianship*, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252.

<sup>75</sup> *Kimball v. Perkins*, 130 Mass. 141; *Covey v. Leslie*, 144 Mich. 165, 107 N. W. 900; *Shurtleff v. Rile*, 140 Mass. 213, 4 N. E. 407; *Pierce v. Prescott*, 128 Mass. 140; *Royer's Appeal*, 11 Pa. 36; *Balthaser's Appeal*, 133 Pa. 338, 19 Atl. 403; *Potter v. Hiscox*, 30 Conn. 508; *Boaz's Adm'r v. Milliken*, 83 Ky. 634; *Harris v. Harrison*, 78 N. C. 202.

<sup>76</sup> *Murph v. McCullough*, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 90 S. W. 69. See, also, *Evans' Estate*, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 142, when the guardian left the larger part of his ward's money in bank uninvested for four years and was held liable for loss by failure of the bank, though there was no bad faith. And in *Collins v. Gooch*, 97 N. C. 186, 1 S. E. 653, 2 Am. St. Rep. 284, it was held that it did not show prudence on the part of the guardian to deposit his ward's money in bank in another state. A guardian is personally liable for a loss of funds, deposited with a bank for a fixed period on a certificate of deposit, without security. *Corcoran v. Kostrometinoff*, 164 Fed. 685, 91 C. C. A. 619, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 399.

do so, and allowed all the property of the maker, which he had assigned for the benefit of creditors, to be distributed to other creditors, it was held that he was guilty of negligence, and was liable to the ward for the amount of the note and interest thereon. "While a court," it was said, "is always loth to surcharge a trustee with money that never came into his hands, and exacts from him only reasonable and ordinary care in such matters, it will not do for a guardian to utterly neglect his duties in the care and management of his ward's estate. Ordinary prudence in this instance would have saved his ward's money, and we are not measuring his responsibility by any higher standard. It is not too much to say that, had this been his own money, in all probability it would not have been lost; and he ought not to have been less vigilant in his ward's interest than he would have been in his own."<sup>77</sup> In another case it was said in reference to a guardian's liability for negligence: "A fiduciary relation requires vigilance as well as honesty. A dead and sluggish calm—a supine negligence—is full of peril to the minor. It is often as fatal as positive dishonesty."<sup>78</sup>

### **SAME—COLLECTION AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY —ACTIONS**

172. It is the guardian's duty to collect and protect his ward's property of every description. To this end,

- (a) He may bring suit—
  - (1) In his ward's name generally.
  - (2) In his own name on contracts made by him as guardian.
- (b) He may accept property in settlement of claims.
- (c) He may compromise claims.
- (d) He may submit to arbitration.

In this country a guardian has the general management of the ward's estate, and acts largely according to his own discretion, and at his own risk, subject, of course, to the supervision of the court in the settlement of his accounts. His duties and powers are, in the main, those of all trustees. On his qualification as a guardian, it is his right and duty to take possession of the ward's property, of

<sup>77</sup> Balthaser's Appeal, 133 Pa. 338, 19 Atl. 403.

<sup>78</sup> Royer's Appeal, 11 Pa. 36.

every description,<sup>79</sup> and wherever situated.<sup>80</sup> It is his duty to make every reasonable effort to reduce choses in action to possession, and to enforce any claim which the ward may have either to real or to personal property.<sup>81</sup> And, of course, when it is necessary, he may maintain suits for this purpose.<sup>82</sup> A guardian will be charged with loss resulting from negligence in failing to perform these duties.<sup>83</sup> This is true where a guardian neglects to take steps

<sup>79</sup> *Pierce v. Prescott*, 128 Mass. 140. Damages recovered in an action for personal injuries should be paid to the guardian, and not to the ward's next friend. *City of Austin v. Colgate* (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 896.

<sup>80</sup> *Potter v. Hiscor*, 30 Conn. 508.

<sup>81</sup> *United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State*, 40 Ind. App. 136, 81 N. E. 226; *Ware v. Ware*, 28 Grat. (Va.) 670; *Longino v. Delta Bank*, 75 Miss. 407, 23 South. 178. He may delegate the power to perform any ministerial act, such as the receiving of money due the ward. *Forbes v. Reynard*, 113 App. Div. 306, 98 N. Y. Supp. 710.

<sup>82</sup> *Smith v. Bean*, 8 N. H. 15; *Shepherd v. Evans*, 9 Ind. 260; *Bryson v. Collmer*, 33 Ind. App. 494, 71 N. E. 229; *Rousk v. Griffith*, 65 W. Va. 752, 65 S. E. 168; *Wright v. Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Ass'n*, 154 Ill. App. 201; *Taylor v. Bemiss*, 110 U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441, 28 L. Ed. 64. The guardian has the same control over his action as any other suitor has. *South Bend Land Co. v. Denio*, 7 Wash. 303, 35 Pac. 64. In *Boruff v. Stipp*, 126 Ind. 32, 25 N. E. 865, it was contended that a guardian could not maintain replevin to recover possession of his ward's property; that an action for this purpose should be brought by the infant's next friend, under the statute allowing him to sue by next friend. In overruling this contention, the court said: "The right of action for the possession is not necessarily in the infant, when he has a legally appointed guardian, claiming the possession and custody of the personal property. No doubt, an infant may, by his next friend, in some instances, prosecute an action for the possession of personal property; but the guardian, having the custody of the infant and the management of his estate, may also prosecute an action for the possession of personal property owned by his ward. Having the right to the control and management of the property, he must, as a necessary incident, have the right to recover possession of such property from one unlawfully retaining the possession of the same."

<sup>83</sup> *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 488; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Madd. 290; *Balthaser's Appeal*, 133 Pa. 338, 19 Atl. 403 (ante, p. 426); *Caney v. Bond*, 6 Beav. 486; *Pierce v. Prescott*, 128 Mass. 140; *White v. Parker*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; *Bond v. Lockwood*, 33 Ill. 212; *Covington v. Leak*, 65 N. C. 594; *Carrillo v. McPhillips*, 55 Cal. 130; *Culp v. Lee*, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74; *Dodson v. McKelvey*, 93 Mich. 263, 53 N. W. 517; *Boaz's Adm'r v. Milliken*, 83 Ky. 634. See *ABRAMS v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO.*, 127 Wis. 579, 106 N. W. 1091, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1055, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 222, holding that where a guardian has intrusted a claim to an attorney for collection for the benefit of the wards, and has received the amounts collected in bank drafts or checks which she indorsed and returned to the attorney for investment, she is liable for loss of funds through the default of the attorney. The existence of a good debt or demand due the ward at the time of the guardian's appointment, and its subsequent

to enforce payment of a note due his ward,<sup>84</sup> or where he fails to recover possession of real estate belonging to his ward, or to enforce any other property right of his ward. "In obtaining possession of the ward's estate, as well as in its preservation and disposition, a guardian is held to the same degree of responsibility as is imposed upon executors, administrators, and trustees. It is his duty to recover all the property of his ward which comes to his knowledge, whether in possession or in action. He must use due diligence to discover its existence. He is bound to use that care and prudence which competent and faithful men employ in their own business. If he has knowledge of all the facts upon which the title of his ward depends, then it is a breach of duty on his part not to assert and enforce that title. It is an obligation assumed by accepting the guardianship, for the neglect of which the guardian cannot excuse himself by pleading ignorance of the law on which the rights of his ward depend. If the estate suffers loss by such ignorance, the guardian is chargeable with it, on the ground of constructive negligence."<sup>85</sup> Of course, if the guardian exercises ordinary prudence in his management of the estate, and is guilty of no negligence, he cannot be held liable for losses. If he exercises ordinary prudence, therefore, he will not be held liable because a claim becomes worthless though it might have been collected when he was appointed.<sup>86</sup>

Suits brought on behalf of the estate should ordinarily be in the ward's name,<sup>87</sup> but the prevailing rule is that, on a contract made

loss, raise a presumption that the loss resulted from his negligence. *ROUSH v. GRIFFITH*, 65 W. Va. 752, 65 S. E. 168, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 226.

<sup>84</sup> *Monget v. Walker*, 4 La. Ann. 214; *Coggins v. Flythe*, 113 N. C. 102, 18 S. E. 96. But when a guardian acted in good faith in the purchase of a note, exercising reasonable and proper care, he is not liable because of failure to realize on the note the amount expected at the time of the purchase. *Henderson v. Lightner*, 92 S. W. 945, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 301.

<sup>85</sup> *Pierce v. Prescott*, 128 Mass. 140.

<sup>86</sup> *Stem's Appeal*, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 472, 34 Am. Dec. 569; *Waring v. Darnall*, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 127; *Love v. Logan*, 69 N. C. 70; ante, p. 425.

<sup>87</sup> *Hutchins v. Dresser*, 26 Me. 76; *Vincent v. Starks*, 45 Wis. 458; *Sillings v. Bumgardner*, 9 Grat. (Va.) 273; *Bradley v. Amidon*, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 235; *Riggs v. Zaleski*, 44 Conn. 120; *Perine v. Grand Lodge*, 48 Minn. 82, 50 N. W. 1022; *McMullen v. Blecker*, 64 W. Va. 88, 60 S. E. 1093, 131 Am. St. Rep. 894; *Taylor v. Superior Court*, 30 R. I. 200, 74 Atl. 482; *Dennison v. Willcutt*, 3 Idaho, 793, 35 Pac. 698; *Longstreet v. Tilton*, 1 N. J. Law, 38. See, also, *Campbell v. Fichter*, 168 Ind. 645, 81 N. E. 661, 11 Ann. Cas. 1089, holding that a guardian is not a trustee of an express trust within *Burns' Ann.*, St. 1901, § 252, providing that a trustee of an express trust may sue without joining with

by the guardian in the course of the management of the estate, he should sue in his own name.<sup>88</sup> In the exercise of a proper discretion he may accept real or personal property in settlement of a claim,<sup>89</sup> but he cannot ordinarily accept payment for less than the full amount of an enforceable debt.<sup>90</sup> It would be otherwise if in the exercise of good faith, and to save expense.<sup>91</sup> A guardian may also compromise claims against the ward's estate, and a submission to arbitration by him is authorized, and will be binding.<sup>92</sup>

Where suit is reasonably brought by a guardian to recover or protect his ward's property, his expenses for attorney's fees and costs will be allowed out of the ward's estate.<sup>93</sup> Allowance will also be made for reasonable counsel fees paid for advice in the management of the trust, and for legal services rendered in any litigation concerning the ward's estate.<sup>94</sup> But the guardian cannot

him the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. An action for personal injuries to the ward must be brought in the name of the ward. *Pleper v. Shahid*, 101 S. C. 364, 85 S. E. 905. And see *Patterson v. Melchior*, 102 Minn. 363, 113 N. W. 902.

<sup>88</sup> *Pond v. Curtiss*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 45; *Thomas v. Bennett*, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 197; *McKinney v. Jones*, 55 Wis. 39, 11 N. W. 606, 12 N. W. 381; *Hightower v. Maull*, 50 Ala. 495; *Sainsevain v. Luce*, 4 Cal. Unrep. 496, 35 Pac. 1033.

<sup>89</sup> *Mason v. Buchanan*, 62 Ala. 110.

<sup>90</sup> *Darby v. Stribling*, 22 S. C. 243; *Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Indemnity Co. v. Crayton*, 110 Ill. App. 648, affirmed in 209 Ill. 550, 70 N. E. 1066.

<sup>91</sup> *Blue v. Marshall*, 3 P. Wms. 381; *Torry v. Black*, 58 N. Y. 185; *Ordinary v. Dean*, 44 N. J. Law, 64.

<sup>92</sup> *Weston v. Stuart*, 11 Me. 326; *Hutchins v. Johnson*, 12 Conn. 376, 30 Am. Dec. 622; *Weed v. Ellis*, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 254; *Goleman v. Turner*, 14 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 118; *Strong v. Beroujon*, 18 Ala. 168; *Nashville Lumber Co. v. Barefield*, 93 Ark. 353, 124 S. W. 758, 20 Ann. Cas. 968; *Grievance Committee v. Ennis*, 84 Conn. 594, 80 Atl. 767; *Dwyer v. Corrugated Paper Products Co.*, 80 Misc. Rep. 412, 141 N. Y. Supp. 240; *Kelley v. Adams*, 120 Ind. 340, 22 N. E. 317; *Jones v. Bond*, 76 Ga. 517. But not where the interests of the guardian and ward are antagonistic. *Fortune v. Killebrew*, 86 Tex. 172, 23 S. W. 976. A guardian may not confess judgment against his ward. *Boudreaux v. Lower Terrehonne Refining & Mfg. Co.*, 127 La. 98, 53 South. 456. A parent has no implied authority to compromise or settle a cause of action of his infant child. *Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lasca*, 79 Kan. 311, 99 Pac. 616, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 338, 17 Ann. Cas. 605.

<sup>93</sup> *In re Flinn*, 31 N. J. Eq. 640; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 5 Ala. 517; *Bickerstaff v. Marlin*, 60 Miss. 509, 45 Am. Rep. 418; *Sears v. Collie*, 148 Ky. 444, 146 S. W. 1117; *Succession of Hanna*, 135 La. 1043, 66 South. 355; *Taylor v. Bemiss*, 110 U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441, 28 L. Ed. 64. And so, also, for defending suits. *Mathes v. Bennett*, 21 N. H. 204; *Wilhelm v. Hendrick*, 167 Ky. 219, 180 S. W. 516. But an improvident contract will not be upheld. *Wheeler v. James & James* (Ky.) 120 S. W. 350.

<sup>94</sup> *Voessing v. Voessing*, 4 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 360; *State v. Foy*, 65 N. C. 265; *Moore v. Shields*, 69 N. C. 50; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 8 Ala. 796;

charge his ward with attorney's fees made necessary by his own negligence.<sup>95</sup>

### SAME—INVESTMENTS

173. A guardian must invest his ward's funds within a reasonable time; and if he fails to do so he will be charged interest, or, in case of gross delinquency, compound interest.
174. He cannot invest money on the credit of individuals or firms, nor, in some states, in stock in corporations, nor can he convert personalty into real estate, without leave of court, but generally he is only called upon to use the care of a prudent man of business.

It is the duty of the guardian, as soon as it can reasonably be done to advantage, to invest his ward's funds in productive securities.<sup>96</sup> He is usually allowed a reasonable period, varying from six months to a year for this purpose, and where he unreasonably delays he will be charged interest.<sup>97</sup> Where the guardian uses the ward's money in his business, or otherwise converts it to his own use, or is guilty of gross delinquency in his failure to invest, he will be charged with compound interest.<sup>98</sup>

*Caldwell v. Young*, 21 Tex. 800. Also for clerk hire. *McWhorter v. Benson*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 28; *Van Derheyden v. Van Derheyden*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 287, 21 Am. Dec. 86.

<sup>95</sup> *Rawson v. Corbett*, 43 Ill. App. 127.

<sup>96</sup> The surety on a guardian's bond may, through the proper court, compel the guardian to make a proper and lawful investment of the ward's money. *American Surety Co. v. Sperry*, 171 Ill. App. 56.

<sup>97</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 231; *Goff's Guardian v. Goff*, 123 Ky. 73, 93 S. W. 625, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 501; *Murph v. McCullough*, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 90 S. W. 69; *Corcoran v. Renehan*, 24 App. D. C. 411; *Merritt v. Wallace*, 76 Ark. 217, 88 S. W. 876; *Boynton v. Dyer*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 1; *Worrell's Appeal*, 23 Pa. 44; *Karr's Adm'r v. Karr*, 6 Dana (Ky.) 3; *White v. Parker*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; *Dunscomb v. Dunscomb*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 508, 7 Am. Dec. 504; *Owen v. Peebles*, 42 Ala. 338; *Pettus v. Sutton*, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 356; *Crosby v. Merriam*, 31 Minn. 342, 17 N. W. 950; *Armstrong's Heirs v. Walkup*, 12 Grat. (Va.) 608; *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047; *Rawson v. Corbett*, 43 Ill. App. 127. No interest will be charged on what is kept on hand for ordinary current expenses. *Knowlton v. Bradley*, 17 N. H. 458, 43 Am. Dec. 609, *Baker's Appeal*, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 12. A guardian is not liable for interest during the first year after his appointment unless there is interest earned. *Griffin v. Collins*, 125 Ga. 159, 53 S. E. 1004.

<sup>98</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 231; *Glassell v. Glassell*, 147 Cal. 510, 82 Pac. 42; *Farwell v. Steen*, 46 Vt. 678; *Swindall v. Swindall*, 43 N. C. 285; *Stark v. Gamble*, 43 N. H. 465; *Clay v. Clay*, 8 Metc. (Ky.) 548; *Snavelly v. Harkrader*,

The authorities as to the character of the investments which a guardian or other trustee is authorized to make are not in accord. Investments are allowed in some states which are not allowed in others. "The general rule is everywhere recognized, that a guardian or trustee, when investing property in his hands, is bound to act honestly and faithfully, and to exercise a sound discretion, such as men of ordinary prudence and intelligence use in their own affairs."<sup>99</sup> In some jurisdictions no attempt has been made to establish a more definite rule.<sup>1</sup> In others the discretion has been confined by the Legislature or the courts within strict limits.

Prior to the Declaration of Independence the Court of Chancery in England allowed considerable latitude to guardians and other trustees in the investment of trust funds. They could invest, not only in public funds and real estate securities, but also in stock in private corporations.<sup>2</sup> They could not, however, by the weight of authority, invest in a mere personal obligation, like a promissory note, without other than private security.<sup>3</sup> Later the court limited trust investments to the public funds, and excluded investments in bank stock, or other corporate stock, or in mortgages of real estate. In this state of the law, Parliament passed acts, and orders in chancery were made pursuant thereto, authorizing trustees to invest in

29 Grat. (Va.) 112; *Boynton v. Dyer*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 1; *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047; *Hughes v. People*, 111 Ill. 457; *In re Eschrich*, 85 Cal. 98, 24 Pac. 634. But see *Goff's Guardian v. Goff*, 93 S. W. 625, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 501, holding that if a guardian uses the ward's estate in his own business, or mingles the ward's money with his own, so that it becomes undistinguishable, he must account for at least legal interest; and, if he made a greater profit, he must account for that also.

<sup>99</sup> *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230. A guardian, complying with an order as to investment of funds is protected against loss, if otherwise free from negligence. *Mumford v. Rood*, 36 S. D. 80, 153 S. W. 921.

<sup>1</sup> *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 230 (collecting authorities); *Boggs v. Adger*, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 408, 411; *Brown v. Wright*, 39 Ga. 96; *Foscue v. Lyon*, 55 Ala. 440; *Brown v. Campbell*, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 233; *Harvard College v. Amory*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446, 461; *Lovell v. Minot*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 116, 119, 32 Am. Dec. 206; *Brown v. French*, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. 254; *Bowker v. Pierce*, 130 Mass. 262.

<sup>2</sup> *Jackson v. Jackson*, 1 Atk. 513, 514.

<sup>3</sup> *Ryder v. Bickerton*, 3 Swanst. 80, note; *Adye v. Feuilletau*, 1 Cox, Ch. 24; *Holmes v. Dring*, 2 Cox, Ch. 1; *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 839. But see *Knight v. Plimouth*, 3 Atk. 480; *Harden v. Parsons*, 1 Eden, 145.

stock of the Bank of England or of Ireland, or upon real estate securities as well as in the public funds.<sup>4</sup>

In this country the courts are not entirely agreed as to what are to be deemed proper investments by a guardian or other trustee. In some states the question is regulated by statute. Perhaps in all the states he is authorized to invest in public or real securities, like government bonds and real estate mortgages.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps in most states he may invest in stock in corporations, like railroad and bank stock.<sup>6</sup> In some states such an investment is not authorized.<sup>7</sup> By the great weight of authority, guardians and the sureties on their bonds are responsible for losses occurring through unsecured, or insufficiently secured, loans or investments made on the credit of individuals or firms, however solvent the individual or firm may be when the loan or investment is made—mere personal security

<sup>4</sup> *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 230.

<sup>5</sup> *Gray v. Fox*, 1 N. J. Eq. 259, 22 Am. Dec. 508; *Stevens v. Meserve*, 73 N. H. 293, 61 Atl. 420, 111 Am. St. Rep. 612; *In re Wisner's Estate*, 145 Iowa, 151, 123 N. W. 978; *Worrell's Appeal*, 9 Pa. 508; *Nance v. Nance*, 1 S. C. 209; *Smith v. Smith*, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 238. But see *In re Wood's Estate*, 247 Pa. 478, 93 Atl. 634.

<sup>6</sup> *Lovell v. Minot*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. 206; *Harvard College v. Amory*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446, 461; *Brown v. French*, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. 254; *Bowker v. Pierce*, 130 Mass. 262; *Smyth v. Burns' Adm'rs*, 25 Miss. 422; *Hammond v. Hammond*, 2 Bland (Md.) 306; *Gray v. Lynch*, 8 Gill (Md.) 403; *Murray v. Feinour*, 2 Md. Ch. 418; *Boggs v. Adger*, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 408; *Haddock v. Bank*, 66 Ga. 496; *Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Glover*, 90 Ky. 355, 14 S. W. 343; *Durett v. Com.*, 90 Ky. 312, 14 S. W. 189. Where corporate stock is held a good investment, a guardian may invest in a note secured by such stock. *Lovell v. Minot*, supra.

<sup>7</sup> In many states the rule is against such an investment. In a New York case it was said: "It is not denied that the employment of the fund, as a capital in trade, would be a clear departure from the duty of trustees. If it cannot be so employed under the management of a copartnership, I see no reason for saying that the incorporation of the partners tends, in any degree, to justify it. The moment the fund is invested in bank or insurance or railroad stock, it has left the control of the trustees. Its safety and the hazard or risk of loss is no longer dependent upon their skill, care, or discretion in its custody or management; and the terms of the investment do not contemplate that it ever will be returned to the trustees." *King v. Talbot*, 40 N. Y. 76. And see *Worrell's Appeal*, 9 Pa. 508; *Allen v. Gaillard*, 1 S. C. 279; *French v. Currier*, 47 N. H. 88; *Gray v. Fox*, 1 N. J. Eq. 259, 268, 22 Am. Dec. 508; *Halsted v. Meeker's Ex'rs*, 18 N. J. Eq. 136; *Lathrop v. Smalley's Ex'rs*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192; *Ihmsen's Appeal*, 43 Pa. 431; *Smith v. Smith*, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 238. An unauthorized investment of a ward's funds is not void, but voidable only, as against one who takes the ward's property with knowledge that the guardian has no authority to transfer it. *McCutchen v. Roush*, 139 Iowa, 351, 115 N. W. 903. A guardian cannot, without au-

not being deemed sufficient.<sup>8</sup> And it is well settled that a guardian has no authority to subject his ward's estate to the hazards of trade, and that if he does so, and a loss instead of a profit, results, he and his sureties will be responsible.<sup>9</sup>

A guardian cannot, without leave of court first obtained, change the form of the investment<sup>10</sup> or convert personalty into real estate, as by investing his ward's funds in the purchase of land.<sup>11</sup> Nor can he erect buildings on land of the ward, or make permanent additions to buildings already thereon.<sup>12</sup> But he may pay taxes and

thority from the probate court, accept shares in a corporation to be organized for the ward's interest in the estate. *Davidson v. I. M. Davidson Real Estate & Investment Co.*, 228 Mo. 1, 125 S. W. 1143, 136 Am. St. Rep. 615.

<sup>8</sup> *Clark v. Garfield*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 427; *Smith v. Smith*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 281; *Gray v. Fox*, 1 N. J. Eq. 259, 22 Am. Dec. 508; *In re Moore*, 112 Me. 119, 90 Atl. 1088, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 645; *Clay v. Olaj*, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 548; *Covington v. Leak*, 65 N. C. 594; *Boyett v. Hurst*, 54 N. C. 168. But see *Konigsmacher v. Kimmel*, 1 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 207, 21 Am. Dec. 374. In North Carolina it seems that an investment in a note with sureties is good. *Covington v. Leak*, 65 N. C. 594. And in some states investments in the unsecured personal obligation of an individual or firm have been sustained. See *Foscue v. Lyon*, 55 Ala. 440, 452. Money placed temporarily in bank at interest, though it can only be withdrawn on two weeks' notice, is not an investment; and, if the bank is in good repute, the guardian will not be liable if it subsequently fails. *Law's Estate*, 144 Pa. 499, 22 Atl. 831, 14 L. R. A. 103. It is otherwise where money is invested in a certificate of deposit of a bank in another state. Such an investment is at the guardian's risk. *Collins v. Gooch*, 97 N. C. 186, 1 S. E. 653, 2 Am. St. Rep. 284.

<sup>9</sup> *Martin v. Davis*, 80 Wis. 376, 50 N. W. 171; *Michael v. Locke*, 80 Mo. 548; *Corcoran v. Allen*, 11 R. I. 567. See *Hoyt v. Sprague*, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585. Where a guardian purchased railroad stocks and bonds, and sold the bonds for a sum equal to the amount invested, and afterwards sold the stocks for an amount which was clear profit, he was liable for the proceeds of the stocks. *Martinez v. Meyers*, 181 Ala. 293, 61 South. 810. The retention of money in his own hands, giving a note therefor, is not an "investment." *Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud*, 115 Md. 29, 80 Atl. 603.

<sup>10</sup> *Moyers v. Kinnick*, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 65; *Los Angeles County v. Winans*, 13 Cal. App. 234, 109 Pac. 640; *McCutchen v. Roush*, 139 Iowa, 351, 115 N. W. 903.

<sup>11</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 230; *Perry, Trusts*, §§ 605, 606; *Witter v. Witter*, 3 P. Wms. 99; *Ware v. Polhill*, 11 Ves. 257; *Royer's Appeal*, 11 Pa. 36; *Woods v. Boots*, 60 Mo. 546; *Boisseau v. Boisseau*, 79 Va. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 616; *Skelton v. Ordinary*, 32 Ga. 266. A guardian may not purchase real estate, where the purchase price exceeds the funds available, thus creating a debt against the estate. *Harris v. Preston*, 153 Ky. 810, 156 S. W. 902. The court may by general order authorize a guardian to invest the ward's money in real estate. *In re Wisner's Estate*, 145 Iowa, 151, 123 N. W. 978.

<sup>12</sup> *Murphy v. Walker*, 131 Mass. 341; *Burke & Williams v. Mackenzie*, 124 Ga. 248, 52 S. E. 653; *In re Miller's Estate*, 1 Pa. 326; *Snodgrass' Appeal*,

incumbrances from the income of the estate, when necessary for the preservation of the property, and he will be reimbursed therefor, though he has acted without the previous sanction of the court.<sup>13</sup>

When the matter is not regulated by statute, or settled by judicial precedent in the particular jurisdiction, a guardian will generally be protected where he uses such care as would be exercised by a prudent man of business in selecting a security for an investment, and not for speculation.<sup>14</sup> "If a trustee acts with good faith, and a sound discretion, in the investment of trust funds, he is not to be held responsible for any loss which may happen."<sup>15</sup> "All that can be required of a trustee to invest is that he shall conduct himself faithfully, and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety, of the capital to be invested."<sup>16</sup> When a guardian is appointed in a state which is not his ward's domicile, he should not, in accounting for his investments, be held to a narrower range of securities than is allowed by the law of the domicile.<sup>17</sup>

37 Pa. 377; *Hassard v. Rowe*, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 22; *Copley v. O'Neill*, 39 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 41; *Green v. Winter*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 26, 7 Am. Dec. 475; *Cheney v. Roodhouse*, 135 Ill. 257, 25 N. E. 1019; *Payne v. Stone*, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 367. But see *May v. May*, 109 Mass. 257, where the cost of a building erected for use, and not for an investment, was allowed the guardian of an insane ward, the court saying: "It could not be said to be an unreasonable expenditure for a man of like fortune and circumstances, not under guardianship; and we think the fact of guardianship furnishes no sufficient ground, in the present case, for its disallowance."

<sup>13</sup> *Wright v. Comley*, 14 Ill. App. 551; *March v. Bennett*, 1 Vern. 428; *Waters v. Ebrall*, 2 Vern. 606.

<sup>14</sup> *Clark v. Garfield*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 427; *Harvard College v. Amory*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446; *Lovell v. Minot*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. 206; *Konigsmacher v. Kimmel*, 1 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 207, 21 Am. Dec. 374; *King v. Talbot*, 40 N. Y. 76; *Nance v. Nance*, 1 S. C. 209; *Jack's Appeal*, 94 Pa. 367; *Gary v. Cannon*, 38 N. C. 64.

<sup>15</sup> *Clark v. Garfield*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 427; *Henderson v. Lightner*, 92 S. W. 945, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 301; *Stevens v. Meserve*, 73 N. H. 293, 61 Atl. 420, 111 Am. St. Rep. 612.

<sup>16</sup> *Harvard College v. Amory*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446.

<sup>17</sup> *LAMAR v. MICOU*, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751, *Cooley*

### SAME—CARE OF REAL ESTATE

175. A guardian must lease his ward's lands, keep the buildings in repair, and collect the rents. But he has no authority to allow any use of the lands which would amount to waste.

The guardian may lease his ward's lands, and it is his duty to do so,<sup>18</sup> and to collect the rents therefrom.<sup>19</sup> His authority to lease extends only for the term of the ward's minority, and a lease for a longer time may be avoided by the ward on becoming of age.<sup>20</sup> The guardian's control over the ward's land extends only to the use of the same. It has been held that he may cut growing timber, when such use does not amount to waste.<sup>21</sup> But, since he cannot dispose of his ward's real estate without an order of court, his lease of mineral lands for development, being a grant of part of the corpus of the land, would be without authority.<sup>22</sup> If the guardian occupies the ward's land himself, he will be liable for rent,<sup>23</sup> as well as for any depreciation caused by improper cultivation.<sup>24</sup> He must keep all buildings in repair, if the income of the estate is suffi-

Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 230; *Id.*, 114 U. S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. 857, 29 L. Ed. 94.

<sup>18</sup> *Rex v. Oakley*, 10 East, 494; *Emerson v. Spicer*, 46 N. Y. 594; *Richardson v. Richardson*, 49 Mo. 29; *Hughes' Minors' Appeal*, 53 Pa. 500; *Willis' Appeal*, 22 Pa. 329; *Palmer v. Cheseboro*, 55 Conn. 114, 10 Atl. 508; *Walker v. Thompson*, 145 Ky. 597, 140 S. W. 1045; *Rogers v. Harris* (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 809; *Clark v. Burnside*, 15 Ill. 62. By statute, in some states, he must first obtain leave of court. See *Alexander v. Buffington*, 66 Iowa, 360, 23 N. W. 754; *Gaines v. Gaines*, 116 Ark. 508, 173 S. W. 410, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1254; *Charles v. Witt*, 88 Kan. 484, 129 Pac. 140.

<sup>19</sup> *Willis' Appeal*, 22 Pa. 329; *Taylor v. Kellogg*, 103 Mo. App. 258, 77 S. W. 130; *Bond v. Lockwood*, 33 Ill. 212; *Griffin v. Collins*, 125 Ga. 159, 53 S. E. 1004.

<sup>20</sup> *Emerson v. Spicer*, 46 N. Y. 594; *Rogers v. Harris* (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 809; *Jackson v. O'Rourke*, 71 Neb. 418, 98 N. W. 1068. Under the Kentucky statute (Ky. St. 1903, § 2031) a guardian may lease the ward's land until the latter shall arrive at full age, provided the lease is not for a longer term than seven years. *Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Howard*, 100 S. W. 270, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1179.

<sup>21</sup> *Thompson v. Boardman*, 1 Vt. 367, 18 Am. Dec. 684; *Bond v. Lockwood*, 33 Ill. 212; *Torry v. Black*, 58 N. Y. 185. But see *Bursirk v. Sanders*, 70 W. Va. 363, 73 S. E. 937; *Bettes v. Brower* (D. C.) 184 Fed. 342.

<sup>22</sup> *Stoughton's Appeal*, 88 Pa. 198; *Haskell v. Sutton*, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533. And see *Williams' Case*, 3 Bland (Md.) 186.

<sup>23</sup> *In re Otis*, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 542; *Royston v. Royston*, 29 Ga. 82; *Willis v. Fox*, 25 Wis. 646; *In re Tyler*, 40 Mo. App. 378.

<sup>24</sup> *Willis v. Fox*, 25 Wis. 646.

cient, and for loss of rent occurring from neglect so to do,<sup>25</sup> as well as for injury thereby resulting to the property,<sup>26</sup> he will be liable.

### SAME—SALE OF REAL ESTATE

176. By statute, guardians, on obtaining license from the court, are generally empowered to sell their wards' lands to pay debts, or for future maintenance and expenses, where there is not sufficient personal property, and in some states for the purpose of making more advantageous investments.
177. Sales without license from the court are void, and the same is true where the court granting the license had no jurisdiction. Sales made in pursuance of a license from a court having jurisdiction, though irregular, cannot be collaterally attacked.

Some of the courts have held that a court of chancery, as the general guardian of infants within its jurisdiction, has an inherent power to decree a sale of their real estate whenever it is for their advantage to do so,<sup>27</sup> but the weight of authority is to the contrary.<sup>28</sup> In most states, by statute, such power has been expressly conferred, subject to certain restrictions, either upon the court of chancery, or upon the probate or other similar court. In some states power is given to mortgage the estate, under certain circumstances.<sup>29</sup> The statutes usually authorize sales where the personal property is insufficient to pay the debts of the ward's estate, and to pro-

<sup>25</sup> *Smith v. Gummere*, 39 N. J. Eq. 27.

<sup>26</sup> *Willis v. Fox*, 25 Wis. 646.

<sup>27</sup> *In re Salisbury*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 347; *Huger v. Huger*, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 18; *Stapleton v. Langstaff*, Id. 22; *Williams v. Harrington*, 33 N. C. 616, 53 Am. Dec. 421; *Ex parte Jewett*, 16 Ala. 409; *Goodman v. Winter*, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13.

<sup>28</sup> *Taylor v. Phillips*, 2 Ves. Sr. 23; *Calvert v. Godfrey*, 6 Beav. 97; *Field v. Moore*, 25 Law J. Ch. 66; *Rogers v. Dill*, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 415; *Baker v. Lorillard*, 4 N. Y. 257; *Williams' Case*, 3 Bland (Md.) 186 (but see *Roche v. Waters*, 72 Md. 264, 19 Atl. 535, 7 L. R. A. 533); *Pierce's Adm'r v. Trigg's Heirs*, 10 Leigh (Va.) 406; *Faulkner v. Davis*, 18 Grat. (Va.) 651, 98 Am. Dec. 698.

<sup>29</sup> *U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Sperry*, 138 U. S. 313, 11 Sup. Ct. 321, 34 L. Ed. 969. On order of court. *Bell v. Dingwell*, 91 Neb. 699, 136 N. W. 1128. The Missouri statute (Rev. St. 1890, § 3504 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 2000]) authorizes the guardian to mortgage the ward's realty to obtain money for the education and maintenance of the ward. It was held, in *Capen v. Garrison*, 193 Mo. 335, 92 S. W. 368, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838, that authority to raise by mortgage money to discharge a pre-existing incumbrance could not be implied. But see *Stokes v. Payne*, 58 Miss. 614, 38 Am. Rep. 340, and *Davidson*

vide for his future support and education and for the expenses of caring for his property,<sup>30</sup> and sometimes sales are authorized in order to make more advantageous investments.

The contract of a guardian to sell his ward's real estate, or a sale and conveyance thereof by him, without an order of court, is an absolute nullity, for a guardian has no authority to dispose of the real estate of his ward, unless by order of court.<sup>31</sup> "An instrument conveying land of minors, signed by one representing himself to be their guardian, is wholly inoperative without the production of the precedent orders of a court of competent jurisdiction in the premises, and therefore inadmissible as evidence against them. Courts will not presume the existence of authority to act, in such cases, in the absence of all proof of the existence of the power, and its loss or destruction, even after the lapse of thirty years."<sup>32</sup> An order of the court being necessary to authorize a guardian to sell and convey his ward's real estate, it follows that the sale and conveyance must be in strict compliance with the order; otherwise it is just as much without authority as if there were no order of court at all.<sup>33</sup> Unless it is otherwise provided by statute, the court cannot authorize a natural guardian, as such, to dispose of his ward's real estate. The guardian must be a duly appointed guardian of the ward's estate, and he must have qualified as such.<sup>34</sup> And, a fortiori, the court cannot authorize a sale by some third person.<sup>35</sup>

v. Wampler, 29 Mont. 61, 74 Pac. 82, to the effect that the power to sell does not include the power to mortgage.

<sup>30</sup> *Faulkner v. Davis*, 18 Grat. (Va.) 651, 98 Am. Dec. 698.

<sup>31</sup> *Worth v. Curtis*, 15 Me. 228; *Le Roy v. Jacobosky*, 136 N. C. 443, 48 S. E. 796, 87 L. R. A. 977; *Gault Lumber Co. v. Pyles*, 19 Okl. 445, 92 Pac. 175; *Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Witherspoon's Adm'r*, 100 S. W. 259, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1067; *Nichols v. Bryden*, 86 Kan. 941, 122 Pac. 1119; *Touchy v. Gulf Land Co.*, 120 La. 545, 45 South. 434, 124 Am. St. Rep. 440; *Houlihan v. Fogarty*, 162 Mich. 492, 127 N. W. 793; *Palmer v. Abrahams*, 55 Wash. 352, 104 Pac. 648; *Thacker v. Henderson*, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 271; *Morrison v. Kinstra*, 55 Miss. 71; *Gaylord v. Stebbins*, 4 Kan. 42; *Downing v. Peabody*, 56 Ga. 40; *Ex parte Kirkman*, 3 Head (Tenn.) 517; *Mason v. Wait*, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 127; *Wells v. Chaffin*, 60 Ga. 677; *House v. Brent*, 69 Tex. 27, 7 S. W. 65; *Shamleffer v. Mill Co.*, 18 Kan. 24; *Washabaugh v. Hall*, 4 S. D. 168, 56 N. W. 82.

<sup>32</sup> *House v. Brent*, 69 Tex. 27, 7 S. W. 65.

<sup>33</sup> *Cox v. Manvel*, 56 Minn. 358, 57 N. W. 1062. As to purchase by guardian at sale of ward's property, see ante, p. 419.

<sup>34</sup> *Shanks v. Seamonds*, 24 Iowa, 131, 92 Am. Dec. 465; *Myers v. McGavock*, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N. W. 522, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627.

<sup>35</sup> *Paty v. Smith*, 50 Cal. 153; *McKee v. Thomas*, 9 Kan. 343.

A sale made under the order of a court having no jurisdiction in the premises is an absolute nullity, and may be attacked in any way and at any time.<sup>36</sup> But when the court has jurisdiction a sale made in pursuance of its license cannot be attacked collaterally for irregularities.<sup>37</sup> The courts do not agree as to what requirements of the statutes are jurisdictional.<sup>38</sup> The provision of the statutes in the various states are generally uniform in requiring the guardian to execute a special bond binding him to make the sale honestly, and to account for the application of the proceeds in accordance with the objects for which the license was granted. In most states failure to give the bond is held to be jurisdictional, and to render the sale absolutely void,<sup>39</sup> but in some states it is held that such a failure will not render the sale open to attack in a collateral proceeding.<sup>40</sup> The same variance exists in the decisions of the different states as to the necessity of giving notice to the ward. By the weight of authority, such notice is held not to be jurisdictional, on the theory that the proceeding is purely in rem.<sup>41</sup> The court of

<sup>36</sup> *Wells v. Steckleberg*, 52 Neb. 597, 70 N. W. 865, 66 Am. St. Rep. 529; *Harris v. Hopkins*, 166 Ky. 147, 179 S. W. 14.

<sup>37</sup> *Beachy v. Shomber*, 73 Kan. 62, 84 Pac. 547; *Fuller v. Hager*, 47 Or. 242, 83 Pac. 782, 114 Am. St. Rep. 916; *Field v. Peeples*, 180 Ill. 376, 54 N. E. 304; *Davidson v. Hutchins*, 112 Ind. 322, 13 N. E. 106; *Sockey v. Winstock*, 43 Okl. 758, 144 Pac. 372; *Hubermann v. Evans*, 46 Neb. 784, 65 N. W. 1045.

<sup>38</sup> Compare *Fuller v. Hager*, 47 Or. 242, 83 Pac. 782, 114 Am. St. Rep. 916, and *Bachelor v. Korb*, 58 Neb. 122, 78 N. W. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 70, as to the necessity of oath by the guardian. And see *Fender v. Powers*, 67 Mich. 433, 35 N. W. 80.

<sup>39</sup> *Williams v. Morton*, 38 Me. 47, 61 Am. Dec. 229; *Tracy v. Roberts*, 88 Me. 310, 34 Atl. 63, 51 Am. St. Rep. 394; *Blauser v. Diehl*, 90 Pa. 350; *Stewart v. Bailey*, 28 Mich. 251; *McKeever v. Ball*, 71 Ind. 398; *Phillips v. Spalding's Guardian*, 102 S. W. 1193, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 579; *Barnett v. Bull*, 81 Ky. 127; *Vanderburg v. Williamson*, 52 Miss. 233.

<sup>40</sup> *Arrowsmith v. Harmoning*, 42 Ohio St. 254; *Howbert v. Heyle*, 47 Kan. 58, 22 Pac. 116; *Watts v. Cook*, 24 Kan. 278; *McKinney v. Jones*, 55 Wis. 39, 11 N. W. 606, and 12 N. W. 381; *Bunce v. Bunce*, 59 Iowa, 533, 13 N. W. 705. But see *Weld v. Johnson Mfg. Co.*, 84 Wis. 537, 54 N. W. 335, 998.

<sup>41</sup> *Mohr v. Manierre*, 101 U. S. 417, 25 L. Ed. 1052; *Thaw v. Ritchie*, 136 U. S. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. 1037, 34 L. Ed. 531; *Furr v. Burns*, 124 Ga. 742, 53 S. E. 201; *Dexter v. Cranston*, 41 Mich. 448, 2 N. W. 674; *Williams v. Williams*, 18 Ind. 345; *Doe v. Jackson*, 51 Ala. 514; *Myers v. McGavock*, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N. W. 522, 528, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627; *Mohr v. Porter*, 51 Wis. 487, 8 N. W. 364; *Mason v. Wait*, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 127; *Mulford v. Beveridge*, 78 Ill. 455; *Spring v. Kane*, 86 Ill. 580. But see *Musgrave v. Conover*, 85 Ill. 374. *Contra*, *Beachy v. Shomber*, 73 Kan. 62, 84 Pac. 547; *Rule v. Broach*, 58 Miss.

a county where a ward has real estate may license a foreign guardian to sell, when he has complied with the state laws regarding foreign guardians, though the ward is a nonresident.<sup>43</sup>

### SAME—SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

178. A guardian may sell his ward's personal property without leave of court.

It is within the scope of the guardian's authority to sell his ward's personal property without first obtaining leave of court,<sup>43</sup> except when he is restricted by some statutory provision.<sup>44</sup> A guardian ought not to sell his ward's personal property unless the proceeds are needed for the due execution of the trust, or unless he can, by the sale, produce some advantage to the estate. Even where he sells it improperly, however, the purchaser will acquire a good title, if there is innocence and good faith on his part. "Having the power [to sell] without obtaining any special license or authority, a title under him, acquired bona fide by the purchaser, will be good; for the purchaser cannot know whether the power has been executed with discretion or not, and the estate is always supposed to be secure by the bond given by the guardian for the faithful execution of his trust, and discreet management of the property."<sup>45</sup>

552; *Rankin v. Miller*, 43 Iowa, 11; *Mohr v. Tulip*, 40 Wis. 66 (overruled by *Mohr v. Porter*, supra); *Tracy v. Roberts*, 88 Me. 310, 34 Atl. 68, 51 Am. St. Rep. 394.

<sup>42</sup> *Menage v. Jones*, 40 Minn. 254, 41 N. W. 972; *West Duluth Land Co. v. Kurtz*, 45 Minn. 380, 47 N. W. 1134; *Myers v. McGavock*, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N. W. 522, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627; *Bouldin v. Miller* (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W. 133.

<sup>43</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 228; *Field v. Schieffelin*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 150, 11 Am. Dec. 441; *Nashville Lumber Co. v. Barefield*, 93 Ark. 253, 124 S. W. 758, 20 Ann. Cas. 968; *Cabble v. Cabble*, 111 App. Div. 426, 97 N. Y. Supp. 773; *Ellis v. Proprietors*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 243; *Hunter v. Lawrence's Adm'r*, 11 Grat. (Va.) 111, 62 Am. Dec. 640; *Humphrey v. Buisson*, 19 Minn. 221 (Gil. 182); *Wallace v. Holmes*, 9 Blatchf. 67, Fed. Cas. No. 17,100. The rule is otherwise in some states as to real estate mortgages. *McDuffie v. McIntyre*, 11 S. C. 551, 32 Am. Rep. 500.

<sup>44</sup> *Hendrix v. Richards*, 57 Neb. 794, 78 N. W. 378. And see *Gentry v. Bearss*, 82 Neb. 787, 118 N. W. 1077, construing the Oklahoma statute.

<sup>45</sup> *Ellis v. Proprietors*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 243. And see the other cases above cited.

### SAME—POWER TO EXECUTE INSTRUMENTS

179. Guardians can execute all instruments which are necessary in the scope of their trust, but cannot bind the ward or his estate by covenants.

Guardians have authority to execute all instruments which are necessary, within the scope of the trust. Thus, when a guardian has been authorized by court to sell real estate, he may execute a conveyance of the same.<sup>46</sup> His authority is limited, however, to the transfer of the title. He cannot bind his ward by covenants, but will be personally bound by any covenants therein contained.<sup>47</sup> A guardian, on receiving payment of a mortgage, has authority to discharge it of record.<sup>48</sup> He can make a binding contract for the extension of the mortgage,<sup>49</sup> or assign it,<sup>50</sup> and, on breach of condition, may foreclose.<sup>51</sup>

### FOREIGN GUARDIANS

180. A guardian's authority is strictly territorial, but foreign guardians are recognized, in most states, as a matter of comity, on compliance with certain statutory regulations.

The authority of a guardian is confined to the county or state of his appointment. His rights are strictly territorial, and unless his appointment is recognized, as a matter of comity, by a sister state or foreign country, he has no extraterritorial rights in re-

<sup>46</sup> *Whiting v. Dewey*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 428; *State v. Clark*, 28 Ind. 138; *Byrd v. Turpin*, 62 Ga. 591; *Young v. Lorain*, 11 Ill. 625, 52 Am. Dec. 463.

<sup>47</sup> *Whiting v. Dewey*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 428; *Young v. Lorain*, 11 Ill. 625, 52 Am. Dec. 463; *Holyoke v. Clark*, 54 N. H. 578. But no implied covenants arise in a lease by a guardian. *Webster v. Conley*, 46 Ill. 13, 92 Am. Dec. 234.

<sup>48</sup> *Chapman v. Tibbits*, 33 N. Y. 289; *Riddell v. Vizard*, 35 La. Ann. 310; *Perkins v. Dyer*, 6 Ga. 401. Contra, *Freiberg v. De Lamar*, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 27 S. W. 151. But a mortgage given by a guardian to his ward cannot be satisfied by the guardian without authority of court, and payment of the debt. *Jennings v. Jennings*, 104 Cal. 150, 37 Pac. 794.

<sup>49</sup> *Willick v. Taggart*, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 511.

<sup>50</sup> *Field v. Schleffelin*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 150, 11 Am. Dec. 441; *Humphrey v. Bulsson*, 19 Minn. 221 (Gil. 182). Contra, *Mack v. Brammer*, 28 Ohio St. 508.

<sup>51</sup> *Taylor v. Hite*, 61 Mo. 142. A guardian has authority to redeem from a foreclosure. *Marvin v. Schilling*, 12 Mich. 356.

gard to the person or property of his ward.<sup>52</sup> Thus he cannot as such maintain an action in a state other than the one in which he was appointed, unless authorized so to do by the laws of the state in which the suit is brought.<sup>53</sup> The authority of a foreign guardian is sometimes recognized as a matter of comity,<sup>54</sup> and if a new appointment is required the claims of the foreign guardian to the office will generally be respected.<sup>55</sup> In many states there are statutory regulations authorizing a foreign guardian to act on complying with certain regulations,<sup>56</sup> such as filing a certified copy of his appointment,<sup>57</sup> or the giving of a bond, and in some states he must first take out ancillary letters of guardianship.<sup>58</sup> An ancillary guardian is not bound to account in the foreign state for funds received there, but should render his account to the court of his original appointment.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Story, *Conf. Laws*, §§ 492-529; Whart. *Conf. Laws*, §§ 209-268; *Ex parte Watkins*, 2 Ves. Sr. 470; *Hoyt v. Sprague*, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585; *Rice's Case*, 42 Mich. 528, 4 N. W. 284; *Weller v. Suggett*, 3 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 249; *McLoskey v. Reid*, 4 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 334; *Rogers v. McLean*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 304 (but see *Freund v. Washburn*, 17 Hun [N. Y.] 543); *Kraft v. Wickey*, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 332, 23 Am. Dec. 569; *Leonard v. Putnam*, 51 N. H. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 106; *Grist v. Forehand*, 36 Miss. 69; *Burnet v. Burnet*, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 323; *Hoffman v. Watkins*, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 130 S. W. 625; *In re Nickals*, 21 Nev. 462, 34 Pac. 250. A settlement by a foreign guardian of a claim for wrongful death of the father of his ward is no bar to a suit in Illinois, as the authority of the guardian is local. *Devine v. American Posting Service*, 174 Ill. App. 403.

<sup>53</sup> *Pulver v. Leonard* (C. C.) 176 Fed. 586; *In re Kingsley* (D. C.) 160 Fed. 275.

<sup>54</sup> *Savini v. Lousada*, 22 Law T. (N. S.) 61; *Nugent v. Vetzera*, L. R. 2 Eq. 704; *Stuart v. Bute*, 9 H. L. Cas. 440; *In re Crosswell's Petition*, 23 R. I. 137, 66 Atl. 55, 13 Ann. Cas. 874; *Curtis v. Union Homestead Ass'n*, 126 La. 959, 53 South. 63; *Woodworth v. Spring*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 321; *Earl v. Dresser*, 30 Ind. 11, 95 Am. Dec. 660; *Marts v. Brown*, 56 Ind. 386; *Wells v. Andrews*, 60 Miss. 373; *Sims v. Renwick*, 25 Ga. 58.

<sup>55</sup> *In re Crosby*, 42 Wash. 366, 85 Pac. 1; *Grimmett v. Witherington*, 16 Ark. 377, 63 Am. Dec. 66; *Earl v. Dresser*, 30 Ind. 11, 95 Am. Dec. 660.

<sup>56</sup> *Rice's Case*, 42 Mich. 528, 4 N. W. 284; *Hoyt v. Sprague*, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585; *Watt v. Allgood*, 62 Miss. 38.

<sup>57</sup> *Pulver v. Leonard* (C. C.) 176 Fed. 586.

<sup>58</sup> *Ex parte Huffman* (C. C.) 167 Fed. 422.

<sup>59</sup> *Smoot v. Bell*, 3 Cranch C. C. 343, Fed. Cas. No. 13132.

## INVENTORY AND ACCOUNTS

181. Guardians must file an inventory of the estate, and account from time to time, and, at the expiration of the guardianship, must render a final account.
182. A final account, when settled and allowed by the court, can only be questioned in a direct proceeding on the ground of fraud or mistake.
183. When the same person is executor or administrator and guardian, he is liable primarily, as executor or administrator, for funds in his hands due his ward as legatee or distributee, but becomes liable as guardian on charging himself in that capacity.

It is the duty of the guardian to file an inventory of the estate and to render accounts from time to time, usually annually.<sup>60</sup> And even one who, though not legally appointed as guardian, has acted as such, may be required to account, as guardian de facto, by a court of equity.<sup>61</sup> Neither the inventory<sup>62</sup> nor such accounts<sup>63</sup> are conclusive as to the facts therein set forth, but are prima facie correct, as against the guardian and his sureties,<sup>64</sup> or against any one else who disputes their correctness.<sup>65</sup> At the expiration of his term of office the guardian must, in accordance with his general duty, as well, usually, as by the express provisions of his bond, render a final account, and he may be brought into

<sup>60</sup> *Alcon v. Koons*, 42 Ind. App. 537, 82 N. E. 92; *Beem v. Mays*, 79 Or. 247, 152 Pac. 103; *Yeager's Appeal*, 34 Pa. 173. See the statutes of the various states. The duty to account is a continuing one and on the death of the guardian devolves on his administrator. *Nelson v. Cowling*, 89 Ark. 334, 116 S. W. 890. But see *Miller v. Ash*, 156 Cal. 544, 105 Pac. 600.

<sup>61</sup> *Campbell v. O'Neill*, 69 W. Va. 459, 72 S. E. 732.

<sup>62</sup> *Bourne v. Maybin*, 3 Woods, 724, Fed. Cas. No. 1,700; *State v. Stewart*, 36 Miss. 652; *Green v. Johnson*, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 389.

<sup>63</sup> *Douglas' Appeal*, 82 Pa. 169; *Prindle v. Holcomb*, 45 Conn. 111; *Guardianship of Cardwell*, 55 Cal. 137; *Diaper v. Anderson*, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 168; *France v. Shockey*, 92 Ark. 41, 121 S. W. 1036; *Walker v. Thompson*, 145 Ky. 597, 140 S. W. 1045.

<sup>64</sup> *Davis v. Combs*, 38 N. J. Eq. 473; *State v. Jones*, 89 Mo. 470, 1 S. W. 355; *Bond v. Lockwood*, 33 Ill. 212; *State v. Stewart*, 36 Miss. 652; *Sanders v. Forgasson*, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 249; *In re Heath's Estate*, 58 Iowa, 36, 11 N. W. 723; and cases cited in notes 62 and 63, supra.

<sup>65</sup> *Coggins v. Flythe*, 113 N. C. 102, 18 S. E. 96.

court for that purpose.<sup>66</sup> This account, when settled and allowed by the court, is, by the weight of authority, conclusive, as against all parties,<sup>67</sup> when attacked collaterally, and can only be questioned in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose, on the ground of fraud or mistake.<sup>68</sup>

When a person is both executor or administrator and guardian, and receives funds to which his ward is entitled as legatee or distributee, he is not liable in both capacities at once.<sup>69</sup> He must primarily account for such funds as executor or administrator, and remains liable as such until a settlement in such capacity, in which he is credited with the funds as executor or administrator, and charged as guardian.<sup>70</sup> But after the expiration of a reasonable

<sup>66</sup> *Gilbert v. Guptill*, 34 Ill. 112; *Succession of Gullebert*, 117 La. 372, 41 South. 854; *Miller v. Ash*, 156 Cal. 544, 105 Pac. 600; *National Surety Co. v. State*, 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 105; *In re Moore*, 112 Me. 119, 90 Atl. 1088, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 645; *Dunn v. Clinghan*, 93 Miss. 310, 47 South. 503; *Whitfield v. Burrell*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 567, 118 S. W. 153; *Sroufe v. Sroufe*, 74 Wash. 639, 134 Pac. 471; *Walls' Appeal*, 104 Pa. 14; *Say's Ex'rs v. Barnes*, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 112, 8 Am. Dec. 679; *Wade v. Lobdell*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 510; *Stark v. Gamble*, 43 N. H. 465. Where the ward dies before settlement, the accounting must be with the ward's representative. *Livermore v. Ratti*, 150 Cal. 458, 89 Pac. 327. For the purposes of a settlement a guardianship is deemed to continue after it has in law ceased. *Mitchell v. Penny*, 66 W. Va. 660, 66 S. E. 1003, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788, 135 Am. St. Rep. 1046.

<sup>67</sup> *Allman v. Owen*, 31 Ala. 167; *McCleary v. Menke*, 109 Ill. 294; *Candy v. Hanmore*, 76 Ind. 125; *American Bonding Co. v. People*, 46 Colo. 394, 104 Pac. 81; *Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Slinker*, 35 Okl. 123, 123 Pac. 696; *Id.*, 35 Okl. 153, 123 Pac. 698; *In re Pleasonton's Estate*, 232 Pa. 381, 81 Atl. 420; *Whitfield v. Burrell*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 567, 118 S. W. 153; *State v. Leslie*, 83 Mo. 60; *King v. King*, 40 Iowa, 120; *Brodrick v. Brodrick*, 56 Cal. 563. *Contra*, *Henley v. Robb*, 86 Tenn. 474, 7 S. W. 190; *Campbell v. Williams*, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 122; *Bourne v. Maybin*, 3 Woods, 724, Fed. Cas. No. 1,700; *State v. Miller*, 44 Mo. App. 118.

<sup>68</sup> *Cummings v. Cummings*, 128 Mass. 532; *State v. Leslie*, 83 Mo. 60; *American Bonding Co. v. People*, 46 Colo. 394, 104 Pac. 81; *Charles v. Witt*, 88 Kan. 484, 129 Pac. 140; *Ackermann v. Haumueller*, 148 Mo. App. 400, 128 S. W. 51; *Id.*, 148 Mo. App. 427, 128 S. W. 56; *Reed v. Ryburn*, 23 Ark. 47; *McDow v. Brown*, 2 S. C. 95; *Yeager's Appeal*, 34 Pa. 173.

<sup>69</sup> *Wren v. Gayden*, 1 How. (Miss.) 365. But, in case of his failure to duly collect such funds as guardian, the sureties on his bond as guardian may also become liable therefor. *Harris v. Harrison*, 78 N. C. 202.

<sup>70</sup> *Conkey v. Dickinson*, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 51; *Burton v. Tunnell*, 4 Har. (Del.) 424; *Alston v. Munford*, 1 Brock. 266, Fed. Cas. No. 267; *Weaver v. Thornton*, 63 Ga. 655. His liability as guardian has been held to arise from the time he charged himself as such, without obtaining any order of court, or making a formal settlement. *In re Scott's Account*, 36 Vt. 297. And see *In re Brown*, 72 Hun, 160, 25 N. Y. Supp. 694; *State v. Branch*, 112 Mo. 661, 20 S. W. 693. Where a legacy is payable at a future date, the executor can-

time, sometimes determined by the time limited by law for the settlement of estates, it will be presumed that he has transferred the funds, and holds them in his capacity as guardian.<sup>71</sup> Such presumption may be rebutted where the question arises as to liability on his executor's or administrator's bond.<sup>72</sup> The intention to charge himself as guardian may be inferred from his acts in regard to the property in his hands.<sup>73</sup>

### COMPENSATION OF GUARDIAN

**184. When a guardian has faithfully executed his trust, but not otherwise, he will be allowed compensation for his services, in the settlement of his accounts.**

In England guardians receive no compensation for their services, but in this country the rule is otherwise. The rules are different in the various states, but ordinarily guardians receive a certain percentage or commission on receipts and disbursements, the rate being established either by statute or by the court. In some states no regular percentage is established, but the court allows what is reasonable.<sup>74</sup> For any specific services rendered by the guardian, apart from the general management of the estate, a reasonable allowance in addition to his percentage will ordinarily be made, to be determined by the importance and difficulty of the services.<sup>75</sup>

not render the sureties on his bond as guardian liable by prematurely charging himself as guardian. *Swope v. Chambers*, 2 Grat. (Va.) 319.

<sup>71</sup> *Watkins' Adm'rs v. State*, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 220; *Karr's Adm'r v. Karr*, 6 Dana (Ky.) 3; *Townsend v. Tallant*, 33 Cal. 45, 91 Am. Dec. 617; *In re Wood*, 71 Mo. 623; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 2 Hill, Eq. (S. C.) 277, 29 Am. Dec. 72; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 17 Ohio St. 150, 91 Am. Dec. 125.

<sup>72</sup> *Wilson v. Wilson*, 17 Ohio St. 150, 91 Am. Dec. 125.

<sup>73</sup> *Drane v. Bayliss*, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 174; *Adams v. Gleaves*, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 367; *Swope v. Chambers*, 2 Grat. (Va.) 319; *Tittman v. Green*, 108 Mo. 22, 18 S. W. 885.

<sup>74</sup> *May v. May*, 109 Mass. 252; *McElhenny's Appeal*, 46 Pa. 347; *In re Roberts*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 43; *State v. Foy*, 65 N. C. 265; *Hughes v. Smith*, 2 Dana (Ky.) 251; *France v. Shockey*, 92 Ark. 41, 121 S. W. 1056; *Bell v. Bell's Guardian*, 167 Ky. 430, 180 S. W. 803; *Holcombe v. Holcombe's Ex'rs*, 13 N. J. Eq. 415; *Knowlton v. Bradley*, 17 N. H. 458, 43 Am. Dec. 609. And see *Trustee of Elizabeth Speers' Memorial Hospital v. Makibben's Guardian*, 126 Ky. 17, 102 S. W. 820. Commissions will be granted in accordance with the law in force at the time of the accounting. *In re Chenery's Estate*, 89 Misc. Rep. 680, 152 N. Y. Supp. 312.

<sup>75</sup> *May v. May*, 109 Mass. 252; *McElhenny's Appeal*, 46 Pa. 347; *Spath's*

But compensation in the nature of a commission on reinvestments of money and repairs has been refused on the ground that it is in conflict with the true nature and purpose of the trust that the guardian should be a gainer by increasing the amount of expenditures through frequent changes of investments, or by repairs.<sup>76</sup> Commissions are allowed a guardian as compensation for the performance of his duty, and when he has failed in such performance the court will not allow him any compensation at all.<sup>77</sup>

### SETTLEMENTS OUT OF COURT—GIFTS FROM WARD

185. The final settlement of a guardian's account, made with the ward out of court, whereby the guardian gains any advantage, will be set aside, unless it appears that the ward has given his deliberate, intelligent, voluntary acquiescence, or is guilty of laches in asserting his rights.
186. Gifts from a ward to his guardian, made during the guardianship, or shortly after its termination, are presumed to have been made under undue influence; and, to uphold them, it must be shown that they were made voluntarily and understandingly.

Any arrangement entered into between a guardian and his ward, whereby the guardian gains an advantage, is looked upon with great suspicion by the court; and, if such an arrangement is to stand, it is incumbent on the guardian to show that he has dealt with his ward exactly as a stranger would have done who was without the knowledge of the ward's affairs possessed by him, and that he has not exercised any influence which he may have acquired over the mind of his ward, to his own advantage, and that he has

*Estates*, 144 Pa. 383, 22 Atl. 749; *Anderson v. Silcox*, 82 S. C. 100, 63 S. E. 128; *Emerson*, Appellant, 32 Me. 159; *Evarts v. Nason*, 11 Vt. 122.

<sup>76</sup> *May v. May*, 109 Mass. 252.

<sup>77</sup> *State v. Richardson*, 29 Mo. App. 595; *In re Ward*, 49 Misc. Rep. 181, 98 N. Y. Supp. 923; *Hescht v. Calvert*, 32 W. Va. 215, 9 S. E. 87; *Topping v. Windley*, 99 N. C. 4, 5 S. E. 14; *In re Wolfe's Estate* (Sur.) 2 N. Y. Supp. 494; *Donlon v. Maley*, 60 Ind. App. 25, 110 N. E. 92; *In re Moore*, 112 Me. 119, 90 Atl. 1088, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 645; *In re Allard's Guardianship*, 49 Mont. 219, 141 Pac. 661; *Pyatt v. Pyatt*, 44 N. J. Eq. 491, 15 Atl. 421; *Appeal of Fish* (Pa.) 7 Atl. 222; *State v. Gilmore*, 50 Mo. App. 353. Mere mistakes in keeping the accounts of the estate, where no fraud is shown will not forfeit the right to compensation. *Rogers v. Lindsay*, 89 Kan. 417, 131 Pac. 150.

brought everything to his ward's knowledge which he himself knew.<sup>78</sup> The final settlement of the guardian's account, made out of court, or his purchase of the ward's property shortly after the termination of the guardianship, or the release by the ward of any claims against the guardian, will be scrutinized with the greatest care by the courts.<sup>79</sup> "In a court of law, the moment of emancipation from legal pupilage is the moment of absolute power and unlimited capacity. This court extends its watchfulness further, and requires that a discharge to the guardian shall not be precipitated; that ample time shall be allowed for consultation and inquiry; that there shall be a full exhibition of the estate, and of its administration. And it requires that a guardian who settles his account in secret shall be prepared to prove that he has fully complied with these requisitions, unless he can shelter himself under a positive ratification—a deliberate, intelligent, voluntary acquiescence—or such a flow of time as will induce the court to refuse its interposition."<sup>80</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Hall v. Turner's Estate*, 78 Vt. 62, 61 Atl. 763; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 21 N. M. 372, 155 Pac. 356, L. R. A. 1916E, 854; *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 Mylne & K. 113, 135; *Revett v. Harvey*, 1 Sim. & S. 502; *Hylton v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. Sr. 547; *Allfrey v. Allfrey*, 11 Jur. 981. The burden is on the guardian, though he is the parent of the ward and the settlement is made a few days after the ward arrived at full age. *Baum v. Hartmann*, 226 Ill. 160, 80 N. E. 711, 117 Am. St. Rep. 246, reversing 122 Ill. App. 444.

<sup>79</sup> *Griffin v. Collins*, 122 Ga. 102, 49 S. E. 827, holding that a receipt by a ward acquitting the guardian in full of all claims against him is not valid if signed before the termination of guardianship. See, also, *Fidelity Trust Co. v. Butler*, 91 S. W. 676, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1268; *Wilson v. Fidelity Trust Co. (Ky.)* 97 S. W. 753; *National Surety Co. v. State*, 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 105.

<sup>80</sup> *Fish v. Miller*, Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 267. And see *Voltz v. Voltz*, 75 Ala. 566; *Eberts v. Eberts*, 55 Pa. 110; *Hall v. Cone*, 5 Day (Conn.) 543; *Stark v. Gamble*, 43 N. H. 465; *Williams v. Powell*, 36 N. C. 460; *Harris v. Carstarphen*, 69 N. C. 416; *Carter v. Tice*, 120 Ill. 277, 11 N. E. 529; *Richardson v. Linney*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 571; *Powell v. Powell*, 52 Mich. 432, 18 N. W. 203; *Line v. Lawder*, 122 Ind. 548, 23 N. E. 758; *McConkey v. Cockey*, 69 Md. 286, 14 Atl. 465. And see *Wilson v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 97 S. W. 753, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 263. The ward cannot set aside a conveyance made by him after attaining his majority, without restoring the consideration received from his guardian. *Wickiser v. Cook*, 85 Ill. 68. But the tender of the amount received by him is not a condition precedent. *Rist v. Hartner*, 44 La. Ann. 430, 10 South. 759. The ward must act promptly in avoiding a gift or conveyance to his guardian, or he may be barred by his laches. *Fleider v. Harbison*, 93 Ky. 482, 20 S. W. 508; *Roth's Estate*, 150 Pa. 261, 24 Atl. 685; *In re Alexander's Estate*, 156 Pa. 368, 27 Atl. 18; *Lataillade v. Orena*, 91 Cal. 565, 27 Pac. 924, 25 Am. St. Rep. 219; *Ela v. Ela*, 84 Me. 423, 24 Atl. 893.

Equity will not permit transactions between guardian and ward to stand, though they occur after majority, if the intervening period is short, unless the fullest deliberation by the ward and the utmost good faith by the guardian is shown, and a guardian cannot procure an acknowledgment of settlement from his ward shortly after his majority without a full disclosure of every fact necessary to inform the ward of the true condition of the accounts.<sup>81</sup>

While every reasonable intendment will be made, in a settlement, in favor of the ward, particularly if he has made allowances in the guardian's favor, yet, if the influence of the guardian has entirely ceased, such settlement and the release of the guardian will be sustained, when made voluntarily on the part of the ward, and without concealment or misrepresentation by the guardian.<sup>82</sup> A settlement of a guardian's final account in a probate court, or other similar court of statutory jurisdiction, may likewise be set aside in equity on proof of actual or constructive fraud.<sup>83</sup>

Gifts from a ward to his guardian, made during the continuance of the guardianship, are presumed to have been induced by undue influence, and will be set aside unless they are shown to have been entirely voluntary, and to have been clearly understood by the ward.<sup>84</sup> In a leading Vermont case<sup>85</sup> it was held that mere lapse of time is not sufficient to prove a ratification of the gift, unless it appears also that the ward knew that the gift was invalid and could be set aside, and knowing these facts, had consented for an unreasonable time that the gift might stand unquestioned, and that such consent was the result of his free and intelligent choice, and not the result of the pressure and influence arising out of the confidential relations existing between the parties. On the same principle, a gift or conveyance to a guardian made by the ward shortly after

<sup>81</sup> *Willis v. Rice*, 157 Ala. 252, 48 South. 397, 131 Am. St. Rep. 55.

<sup>82</sup> *Kirby v. Taylor*, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 242; *Hawkins' Appeal*, 32 Pa. 263; *Smith v. Davis*, 49 Md. 470; *Davenport v. Olmstead*, 43 Conn. 67; *Douglass v. Ferris*, 138 N. Y. 192, 33 N. E. 1041, 34 Am. St. Rep. 435; *Condon v. Churchman*, 32 Ill. App. 317; *Davis v. Hagler*, 40 Kan. 187, 19 Pac. 628. 'But a ward will not be bound by a ratification of his guardian's accounts made in ignorance of material facts. *Long v. Long*, 142 N. Y. 545, 37 N. E. 486.

<sup>83</sup> *Carter v. Tice*, 120 Ill. 277, 11 N. E. 529; *Douglass v. Low*, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 497; *Monnin v. Beroujon*, 51 Ala. 196.

<sup>84</sup> *Bisp. Eq. § 234*; *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 120, 127; *Wade v. Pulsifer*, 54 Vt. 45; *Waller v. Armistead's Adm'rs*, 2 Leigh (Va.) 11, 21 Am. Dec. 594; *Farmer's Ex'r v. Farmer*, 39 N. J. Eq. 211.

<sup>85</sup> *Wade v. Pulsifer*, 54 Vt. 45.

the termination of the guardianship is prima facie presumed to have been made under undue influence, and will be set aside unless shown to have been entirely voluntary, and made by the ward with a full understanding of his position and rights in regard to his property.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 113; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Butler, 91 S. W. 676, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1268; Berkmeier v. Kellerman, 32 Ohio St. 239, 30 Am. Rep. 577; Garvin's Adm'r v. Williams, 50 Mo. 206; Ashton v. Thompson, 32 Minn. 25, 18 N. W. 918; Tucke v. Buchholz, 43 Iowa, 415.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP—ENFORCING GUARDIAN'S LIABILITY

- 187. Termination of Guardianship.
- 188. Enforcement of Guardian's Liability,
- 189-191. Guardians' Bonds.

### TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP

187. Guardianship is terminated in the following ways:

- (a) By the ward's reaching his majority.
- (b) By the death of the ward.
- (c) By the death of the guardian.
- (d) By the marriage of a female ward.
- (e) Under the statutes of some states, by the marriage of a female guardian.
- (f) By the resignation of the guardian, if he is permitted to resign.
- (g) By removal of the guardian by the court, when he fails to perform his duty, or when he is unfit for the position.

Testamentary guardianship, unless an earlier time is named in the appointment,<sup>1</sup> and chancery<sup>2</sup> and statute<sup>3</sup> guardianship, all terminate at majority. If, however, as has been seen, a guardian continues to manage the ward's estate after his majority, without making a final settlement, this will constitute, in effect, a continuation of the guardianship. It will constitute him a quasi guardian, and he must account for all transactions on the same principles which govern his acts during the ward's minority.<sup>4</sup> On the death of the ward, the guardianship necessarily terminates, and the

<sup>1</sup> Selby v. Selby, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 488; Arthurs' Appeal, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 55; Buckley v. Herder (Tex. Civ. App.) 133 S. W. 703.

<sup>2</sup> Eversley, Dom. Rel. 680.

<sup>3</sup> Bourne v. Maybin, 3 Wood, 724, Fed. Cas. No. 1,700; Probate Judge v. Stevenson, 55 Mich. 320, 21 N. W. 348; Rullman v. Rullman, 81 Kan. 521, 106 Pac. 52; Stroup v. State, 70 Ind. 495; People v. Brooks, 22 Ill. App. 594; Overton v. Beavers, 19 Ark. 623, 70 Am. Dec. 610. By express statutory provision in some states it terminates earlier.

<sup>4</sup> Ante, p. 401; Mellish v. Mellish, 1 Sim. & S. 138; Stinson v. Leary, 69 Wis. 269, 34 N. W. 63.

guardian has no right to act further as guardian, or to administer on the estate, but must adjust his accounts with the ward's legal representatives.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, on the guardian's death, his executor or administrator has no authority to act as guardian, but must settle the accounts of the guardianship, and pay the balance to the succeeding guardian.<sup>6</sup> Where there are joint statute<sup>7</sup> or testamentary<sup>8</sup> guardians, and one dies, the survivor continues the trust. The reason is that the trust is coupled with an interest. "Letters of guardianship create a trust, coupled with an interest. When two are appointed, and one of them dies, the trust survives. It is so when administration is granted to two. The law is the same as to joint guardians and joint administrators."<sup>9</sup> The guardianship of a female ward is terminated by her marriage,<sup>10</sup> but the marriage of a male ward does not end the guardianship.<sup>11</sup> At common law the marriage of a female guardian in socage had the effect of terminating her guardianship, and transferring it to her husband;<sup>12</sup> but the marriage of a female testamentary guardian did not have this ef-

<sup>5</sup> *Bean v. Bumpus*, 22 Me. 549; *State Fair Ass'n v. Terry*, 74 Ark. 149, 85 S. W. 87; *Norton v. Strong*, 1 Conn. 65; *Whittemore v. Coleman*, 239 Ill. 450, 88 N. E. 228; *Martin v. Caldwell*, 49 Ind. App. 1, 96 N. E. 660; *Ordway v. Phelps*, 45 Iowa, 279; *In re Colvin's Estate*, 3 Md. Ch. 278; *Barrett v. Provincher*, 39 Neb. 773, 58 N. W. 292. See, also, *Livermore v. Ratti*, 150 Cal. 458, 89 Pac. 327, holding that, where the ward dies before settlement, the settlement must be with the ward's legal representative.

<sup>6</sup> *Connelly v. Weatherly*, 33 Ark. 653; *Armstrong's Heirs v. Walkup*, 12 Grat. (Va.) 608; *Peel v. McCarthy*, 38 Minn. 451, 38 N. W. 205, 8 Am. St. Rep. 681; *Waterman v. Wright*, 36 Vt. 164; *Woodbury v. Hammond*, 54 Me. 332; *Gregg v. Gregg*, 15 N. H. 190.

<sup>7</sup> *Pepper v. Stone*, 10 Vt. 427. And in this country the same rule applies to chancery guardians. *People v. Byron*, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 53. But in England it is otherwise. *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, 1 Russ. 528.

<sup>8</sup> *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Wms. 103. And, when one declines to act, the other may carry on the trust. *Kevan v. Waller*, 11 Leigh (Va.) 414, 36 Am. Dec. 391; *In re Reynolds*, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 41.

<sup>9</sup> *Pepper v. Stone*, 10 Vt. 427.

<sup>10</sup> *Bac. Abr. "Guardian," E*; *Mendes v. Mendes*, 1 Ves. Sr. 89; *Bartlett v. Cowles*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 445; *In re Whitaker*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 378; *In re Brick's Estate*, 15 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 12; *Porch v. Fries*, 18 N. J. Eq. 204; *Jones v. Ward*, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 160; *Garnet v. Com.*, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 389; *Nicholson v. Willborn*, 13 Ga. 467; *Mouser v. Nunn*, 142 Ky. 656, 134 S. W. 1148; *Carpenter v. Solomon* (Tex. App.) 14 S. W. 1074; *Shutt v. Carlloss*, 36 N. C. 232; *Armstrong's Heirs v. Walkup*, 12 Grat. (Va.) 608; *Siman v. Lens*, 37 Phil. Rep. 969.

<sup>11</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 226; *Mendes v. Mendes*, 1 Ves. Sr. 89; *In re Brick's Estate*, 15 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 12.

<sup>12</sup> *Bac. Abr. "Guardian and Ward," E*.

fect.<sup>13</sup> It has been held that the marriage of a female statute guardian does not terminate the guardianship,<sup>14</sup> but, by statute in some states, it is otherwise.<sup>15</sup> In some jurisdictions her husband becomes a joint guardian with her.<sup>16</sup>

One appointed a socage guardian could not refuse the office,<sup>17</sup> nor resign.<sup>18</sup> And it has been held that a testamentary guardian has no right to resign.<sup>19</sup> When he refuses to act, however, the court may appoint a successor.<sup>20</sup> Guardians appointed by the court of chancery cannot resign without valid grounds, and must obtain the sanction of the court.<sup>21</sup> Statute guardians are, by express provision, often allowed to resign their office; and, when there is no express enactment to that effect, their tender of resignation is sufficient ground for their removal, where the court has the power of removal for cause.<sup>22</sup> But a resignation, if accepted, does not take effect until there has been an accounting and a discharge by the court on proper notice.<sup>23</sup>

#### *Removal of Guardians*

As incident to its general jurisdiction in guardianship, the Court of Chancery, in England, has the power to remove guardians whom it has appointed;<sup>24</sup> and, while testamentary guardians cannot be

<sup>13</sup> Com. Dig. "Guardian," 384; *Dillon v. Lady Mount Oashell*, 4 Brown, Parl. Cas. 306; ante, p. 398.

<sup>14</sup> *Leavel v. Bettis*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 74; *Cotton's Guardian v. Wolf*, 14 Bush (Ky.) 238; *Birmingham Coal & Iron Co. v. Doe ex dem. Arnett*, 181 Ala. 621, 62 South. 26; *In re Elgin's Guardianship*, 1 Tuck. (N. Y.) 97. But see *Swartwout v. Swartwout*, 2 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 52.

<sup>15</sup> *Carr v. Spannagel*, 4 Mo. App. 285; *Field v. Torrey*, 7 Vt. 372; *Swartwout v. Swartwout*, 2 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 52.

<sup>16</sup> *Wood v. Stafford*, 50 Miss. 370; *Martin v. Foster's Ex'r*, 38 Ala. 688.

<sup>17</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 683; *Bedell v. Constable*, Vaughan, 177.

<sup>18</sup> *St. Marlbridge*, 52 Hen. III, c. 17.

<sup>19</sup> *Spencer v. Earl of Chesterfield*, 1 Amb. 146; *Young v. Lorain*, 11 Ill. 625, 52 Am. Dec. 463.

<sup>20</sup> *Spencer v. Earl of Chesterfield*, 1 Amb. 146; *O'Keefe v. Casey*, 1 Schoales & L. 106; *McAlister v. Olmstead*, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 210; *Ex parte Crumb*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 439.

<sup>21</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 684.

<sup>22</sup> *Young v. Lorain*, 11 Ill. 624, 52 Am. Dec. 463; *Brown v. Huntsman*, 32 Minn. 486, 21 N. W. 555. The court may appoint a successor. *Simpson v. Gonzalez*, 15 Fla. 9; *Lefever v. Lefever*, 6 Md. 472. A mother, who, after accepting the tutorship of her children, remarries, and is retained in the tutorship with her husband, cannot resign. *In re Minors Long*, 118 La. 689, 43 South. 279.

<sup>23</sup> *Wackerle v. People*, 168 Ill. 250, 48 N. E. 123; *Manning v. Manning*, 61 Ga. 137.

<sup>24</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 684.

removed, they may be superseded and restrained from interfering with the infant's person or estate.<sup>25</sup> Courts of chancery in the United States, possessing a general jurisdiction in equity, have sometimes exercised such jurisdiction in matters pertaining to guardianship. It has been held that such courts may remove, not only guardians appointed by themselves, but also statutory and testamentary guardians.<sup>26</sup> Probate, surrogates', and similar courts, invested by statute with jurisdiction in matters pertaining to guardianships, generally have their power to remove testamentary guardians<sup>27</sup> and guardians of their own appointing.<sup>28</sup> Though it has been held that probate courts have no general power to remove guardians, but only for causes specified in the statute,<sup>29</sup> the better rule seems to be that the court is not confined to the grounds mentioned in the statute, but may exercise discretion in the removal or retention of guardians.<sup>30</sup>

A breach of official duty by a guardian, such as the use of the ward's property for his own advantage,<sup>31</sup> the failure to apply the income of the ward's property to his support,<sup>32</sup> the waste of the estate,<sup>33</sup> or failure to file an inventory when ordered,<sup>34</sup> has been

<sup>25</sup> *Foster v. Denny*, 2 Ch. Cas. 237; *Ingham v. Bickerdike*, 6 Madd. 275.

<sup>26</sup> *Cowls v. Cowls*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708; *Ex parte Crumb*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 439; *Disbrow v. Henshaw*, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 349; 2 Kent, Comm. 227.

<sup>27</sup> *McPhillips v. McPhillips*, 9 R. I. 536; *Damarell v. Walker*, 2 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 198; *Copp v. Copp*, 20 N. H. 284.

<sup>28</sup> *Simpson v. Gonzalez*, 15 Fla. 9; *Clement's Appeal*, 25 N. J. Eq. 508; *Skidmore v. Davies*, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 316. A guardian appointed by the circuit court cannot be removed by the county court. *State v. Kelley*, 32 S. D. 526, 143 N. W. 953.

<sup>29</sup> *State ex rel. Baker v. Bird*, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S. W. 119, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 353.

<sup>30</sup> *People v. Buck*, 149 Ill. App. 283; *Rummels v. Clark*, 164 Iowa, 659, 146 N. W. 462.

<sup>31</sup> *Snively v. Harkrader*, 29 Grat. (Va.) 112; *In re O'Neill's Guardian*, 1 Tuck. (N. Y.) 34; *Wood v. Black*, 84 Ind. 279; *In re Cooper*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 34. But see *Sweet v. Sweet*, Speers, Eq. (S. C.) 309.

<sup>32</sup> *In re Swift*, 47 Cal. 629; *Ruohs v. Backer*, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 395, 19 Am. Rep. 598.

<sup>33</sup> *Dickerson v. Dickerson*, 31 N. J. Eq. 652; *In re Guardianship of Chambers*, 46 Okl. 139, 148 Pac. 148.

<sup>34</sup> *Windsor v. McAtee*, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 430; *People v. Buck*, 149 Ill. App. 283. But see *Succession of Burrell*, 118 La. 1076, 43 South. 882. The provision of the statute requiring a guardian to file an inventory and account within a prescribed time is merely directory, and noncompliance, if not attended by fraud, is not ground for removal. *Heath v. Maddock*, 81 N. J. Eq. 469, 86 Atl. 945, affirmed 82 N. J. 366, 91 Atl. 1069.

held sufficient ground for removal.<sup>35</sup> Removal will also be made in case the guardian is unfit for the position—as when his interests are hostile to the ward's;<sup>36</sup> when his influence on account of confirmed habits of intoxication<sup>37</sup> or immoral life,<sup>38</sup> is bad; where, through ignorance, he is incompetent to manage the estate,<sup>39</sup> or has been convicted of a crime.<sup>40</sup> Insolvency will not necessarily disqualify,<sup>41</sup> though it has been held sufficient ground for removal.<sup>42</sup> Removal from the state has been held a ground for revoking the appointment,<sup>43</sup> and is sometimes expressly made so by statute.<sup>44</sup> When a guardian has obtained his appointment through false representations, he may be removed.<sup>45</sup> A guardian cannot be removed by the court without due notice to him;<sup>46</sup> and the ap-

<sup>35</sup> For other grounds of removal, see *In re Dixon*, 156 N. C. 26, 72 S. E. 71 (failure to account for rents and profits of ward's lands); *In re Allurd*, 49 Mont. 219, 141 Pac. 661 (mingling guardianship funds with his own, or profiting by use of ward's funds); *Davis' Adm'r v. Davis*, 162 Ky. 316, 172 S. W. 665 (lack of interest in ward). But removal for irregularities is in discretion of court. *In re Nelson*, 148 Iowa, 118, 126 N. W. 973, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 974.

<sup>36</sup> *In re Mansfield's Estate*, 206 Pa. 64, 55 Atl. 784; *In re Edmonson's Estate*, 78 Neb. 279, 110 N. W. 540. Conduct tending to alienate the child's affections from its mother has been held sufficient ground for removal. *Perkins v. Finnegan*, 105 Mass. 501.

<sup>37</sup> *Kettletas v. Gardner*, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 488.

<sup>38</sup> *Ruohs v. Backer*, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 395, 19 Am. Rep. 598.

<sup>39</sup> *Nicholson's Appeal*, 20 Pa. 50; *Wood v. Black*, 84 Ind. 279.

<sup>40</sup> *In re Soley's Estate*, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 402; *Clark v. Smith*, 110 Miss. 728, 174 South. 897.

<sup>41</sup> *In re Chew's Estate*, 4 Md. Ch. 60.

<sup>42</sup> *In re Cooper*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 34. And see *Baldrige v. State*, 69 Ind. 166.

<sup>43</sup> *Cooke v. Beale*, 33 N. C. 36. See *Succession of Cass*, 42 La. Ann. 381, 7 South. 617. Though removal from the state does not ipso facto revoke guardianship, the court should remove on its own motion. *Watts v. Hicks*, 119 Ark. 621, 178 S. W. 924. Removal of an undertutor from one parish to another does not vacate his office. *Beene v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co.*, 134 La. 467, 64 South. 330.

<sup>44</sup> *State v. Engelke*, 6 Mo. App. 356; *Speight v. Knight*, 11 Ala. 461. Under *Kirby's Dig. Ark. § 3778*, letters of guardianship are not ipso facto revoked by the guardian's removal from the state. *Watts v. Hicks*, 119 Ark. 621, 178 S. W. 924.

<sup>45</sup> *Clement's Appeal*, 25 N. J. Eq. 508; *Pease v. Roberts*, 16 Ill. App. 634.

<sup>46</sup> *Gwin v. Vanzant*, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 143; *Copp v. Copp*, 20 N. H. 284; *Montgomery v. Smith*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 599; *Speight v. Knight*, 11 Ala. 461; *State v. Engelke*, 6 Mo. App. 356; *Smith v. Haas*, 132 Iowa, 493, 109 N. W. 1075; *Hart v. Gray*, 3 Sumn. 339, Fed. Cas. No. 6,152. Contra, where he leaves the state. *Cooke v. Beale*, 33 N. C. 36.

pointment of a new guardian will not have that effect, the guardianship continuing until a judicial decree of removal is made.<sup>47</sup>

### ENFORCEMENT OF GUARDIAN'S LIABILITY

188. A suit does not lie by the ward against the guardian during the guardianship, but courts of chancery have a general jurisdiction to control guardians of their own appointment in the management of the estate. The liability of statute guardians is usually enforced by means of their bonds.

Where a guardian misappropriates his ward's funds, an action at law will not lie at the suit of the ward, in *indebitatus assumpsit*.<sup>48</sup> Nor can a bill in equity be brought, although a guardian has assets of the ward in his hands, to charge him for nonpayment of the ward's debts, since there is an adequate remedy at law on the guardian's bond.<sup>49</sup> The relation being that of trustee and *cestui que trust*, and not that of debtor and creditor, the guardian is subject to all the liabilities, and entitled to all the benefits, incidental to his position, one of which is the right to an opportunity to render his account, and to have the same adjusted by the court.<sup>50</sup> It has also been held that a ward cannot recover damages during the guardianship, in a suit against his guardian for an assault and battery, though it might be ground for his removal or for redress in the criminal courts.<sup>51</sup>

A court of chancery, as it has a general jurisdiction over guardians appointed by it, can make such orders during the continuance of the guardianship as are necessary to protect the ward's estate, and, by a bill in equity brought by the ward through his next friend, the guardian may be compelled to account.<sup>52</sup> In matters of ac-

<sup>47</sup> *Fay v. Hurd*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 528; *Copp v. Copp*, 20 N. H. 284; *Bledsoe v. Britt*, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 458, 463; *Estridge v. Estridge*, 76 S. W. 1101, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1076; *Robinson v. Zollinger*, 9 Watts (Pa.) 160; *Thomas v. Burrus*, 23 Miss. 550, 57 Am. Dec. 154. See, also, *Dickerson v. Bowen*, 128 Ga. 122, 57 S. E. 326.

<sup>48</sup> *Brooks v. Brooks*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 18; *Thorndike v. Hinckley*, 155 Mass. 263, 29 N. E. 579; *Linton v. Walker*, 8 Fla. 144, 71 Am. Dec. 105.

<sup>49</sup> *Conant v. Kendall*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 36.

<sup>50</sup> *Brooks v. Brooks*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 18; *Bonner v. Evans*, 89 Ga. 656, 15 S. E. 906; *Minter v. Clark*, 92 Tenn. 459, 22 S. W. 73.

<sup>51</sup> *Mason v. Mason*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 506. But see *Brattain v. Cannady*, 96 Ind. 266.

<sup>52</sup> *Blake v. Blake*, 2 Schoales & L. 26; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 Johns. Ch.

counting, courts of probate and other similar courts are often held to possess powers which are co-extensive with those of a court of chancery, and they adopt the same forms and mode of procedure.<sup>53</sup> Courts having a general jurisdiction over the estates of wards have also been held to have the power to order the payment of claims.<sup>54</sup> When a guardian retains his ward's property after the termination of the guardianship, the action of account will lie at law, at the suit of the ward.<sup>55</sup> Statute guardians are generally held to accountability by enforcing their liability under their bonds, as explained in the following section.

### GUARDIANS' BONDS

189. All guardians, with the exception of testamentary guardians in some jurisdictions, must give bonds before entering on their duties; and they and their sureties are liable thereunder for all losses occurring through the guardians' delinquencies.
190. The liability under a guardian's bond continues until barred by the statute of limitations. By the weight of authority, it cannot be enforced until determined by the settlement of the final account.
191. The sureties on the special sale bond, and not those on the general bond, are, by the weight of authority, liable for the proceeds of a sale of real estate under order of the court.

Guardians of the person and estate appointed by the Court of Chancery in England,<sup>56</sup> and statute guardians in this country,<sup>57</sup> are required to give bonds, with sureties satisfactory to the court, for the faithful discharge of their duties, and to duly account. They

(N. Y.) 283, 9 Am. Dec. 298; *Swan v. Dent*, 2 Md. Ch. 111; *Linton v. Walker*, 8 Fla. 144, 71 Am. Dec. 105; *Lemon v. Hansbarger*, 6 Grat. (Va.) 301; *Manning v. Manning*, 81 Ga. 137; *Peck v. Braman*, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 141.

<sup>53</sup> *In re Steele*, 65 Ill. 322; *Cheney v. Roodhouse*, 135 Ill. 257, 25 N. E. 1019; *Tudhope v. Potts*, 91 Mich. 490, 51 N. W. 1110; *Seaman v. Duryea*, 11 N. Y. 324.

<sup>54</sup> *Yeakle v. Winters*, 60 Ind. 554; *Turner v. Flag*, 6 Ind. App. 563, 33 N. E. 1104.

<sup>55</sup> *Feld v. Torrey*, 7 Vt. 372; *Harris v. Harris*, 44 Vt. 820; *Green v. Johnson*, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 389.

<sup>56</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 657.

<sup>57</sup> By statute, testamentary guardians are often required to give bond, and render account. *Murphy v. Superior Court*, 84 Cal. 592, 24 Pac. 310.

have no authority to act before the giving of the bond.<sup>55</sup> The guardian and his sureties are responsible for all property, of every nature and description, which comes, or which, if the guardian performs his duty, should come, into his hands as guardian,<sup>56</sup> as well as for losses occurring through his failure to perform his duty.<sup>60</sup> For property of his ward which may come into his hands otherwise than in his capacity as guardian, his sureties are not responsible.<sup>61</sup> Nor are they liable for property received, or for acts performed, after his final discharge.<sup>62</sup> But the termination of the guardianship does not relieve the sureties from liability for property received and acts performed during its continuation,<sup>63</sup> and their liability continues, unless limited by special statute, until the statute of limitations has run.<sup>64</sup> On the death of the surety, his estate is

<sup>55</sup> *Wuesthoff v. Germania Life Ins. Co.*, 107 N. Y. 580, 14 N. E. 811; *Poe v. Schley*, 16 Ga. 364; *Westbrook v. Comstock*, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 314; *People v. Seelye*, 146 Ill. 189, 32 N. E. 458.

<sup>56</sup> *Mattoon v. Cowing*, 13 Gray (Mass.) 387; *Brooks v. Tobin*, 135 Mass. 69; *Pierce v. Prescott*, 128 Mass. 140; *Bond v. Lockwood*, 33 Ill. 212; *McClendon v. Harlan*, 2 Helsk. (Tenn.) 337; *Hunt v. State*, 53 Ind. 321; *Neill v. Neill*, 31 Miss. 36; *Newberry v. Wilkinson*, 199 Fed. 673, 118 C. C. A. 111 affirming *Newberry v. Wilkinson* (C. C.) 190 Fed. 62; *State v. Brown*, 73 N. C. 81; *Butler v. Legro*, 62 N. H. 350, 13 Am. St. Rep. 573; *Culp v. Stanford*, 112 N. C. 664, 16 S. E. 761. But see *Rudy v. Rudy*, 145 Ky. 245, 140 S. W. 192.

<sup>60</sup> *Richardson v. Boynton*, 12 Allen (Mass.) 138, 90 Am. Dec. 141; *Taylor v. Hemingray*, 81 Ky. 158; *Jennings v. Copeland*, 90 N. C. 572; *Elchelberger v. Gross*, 42 Ohio St. 549; *Yost v. State*, 80 Ind. 350.

<sup>61</sup> *Livermore v. Bemis*, 2 Allen (Mass.) 394; *Hinckley v. Harriman*, 45 Mich. 343, 7 N. W. 907; *Allen v. Crosland*, 2 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 68; *Hindman v. State*, 61 Md. 471; *Parker v. Wilson*, 98 Ark. 553, 136 S. W. 981; *Id.*, 99 Ark. 344, 137 S. W. 926, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 84. And see *Rudy v. Rudy*, 145 Ky. 245, 140 S. W. 192.

<sup>62</sup> *Merrells v. Phelps*, 34 Conn. 109. The sureties on a guardian's bond are liable only for the money, or property that actually was in, or that came into, his hands during the term covered by the bond. *American Bonding Co. v. People*, 46 Colo. 394, 104 Pac. 81.

<sup>63</sup> *Naugle v. State*, 101 Ind. 284; *In re Walling*, 35 N. J. Eq. 105; *Jennings v. Copeland*, 90 N. C. 572. And see *Baum v. Hartmann*, 226 Ill. 160, 80 N. E. 711, 117 Am. St. Rep. 246.

<sup>64</sup> *Bonham v. People*, 102 Ill. 434; *Ragland v. Justices of Inferior Court*, 10 Ga. 65. To the same effect, see *Wescott v. Upham*, 127 Wis. 590, 107 N. W. 2; *Murphy v. Cady*, 145 Mich. 33, 108 N. W. 493. The statute runs from the time the guardian accounts, *Bell v. Rudolph*, 70 Miss. 234, 12 South. 153; or from the time when he denies or repudiates the trust, *Reuter v. Lawe*, 86 Wis. 106, 56 N. W. 472. In the case of fraud, the statute runs from the date of its discovery, *Lataillade v. Orena*, 91 Cal. 565, 27 Pac. 924, 25 Am. St. Rep. 219; but not before the ward's majority, *Minter v. Clark*, 92 Tenn. 459, 22 S. W. 73.

liable.<sup>65</sup> Even the discharge of a surety will relieve him only from the acts of the guardian occurring subsequent to the giving of a new bond.<sup>66</sup> For previous acts the sureties on the old and new bonds are in some jurisdictions jointly liable,<sup>67</sup> but in others the second bond has been held not to be retrospective.<sup>68</sup> By the weight of authority, an action on a guardian's bond will not lie until the guardian's liability is determined by the settlement of his final account.<sup>69</sup>

When a special bond is required, as on the sale of real estate by a guardian under a license by the court, the conduct of such sale, and the application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the license, are generally held a separate trust, and not one of the general duties of the guardianship; and therefore, in case of a breach, the sureties on the special bond are liable, and not those on the general bond.<sup>70</sup> In some states, however, the sureties on the spe-

<sup>65</sup> *Anderson v. Thomas*, 54 Ala. 104; *Hutchcraft v. Shrout's Heirs*, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 208, 15 Am. Dec. 100; *Brooks v. Rayner*, 127 Mass. 268; *Cotton v. State*, 64 Ind. 573.

<sup>66</sup> *Elchelberger v. Gross*, 42 Ohio St. 549; *In re Conover*, 35 N. J. Eq. 108; *Bellune v. Wallace*, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 80; *Yost v. State*, 80 Ind. 350; *Kaspar v. People*, 230 Ill. 342, 82 N. E. 816. See, also, *United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hansen*, 36 Okl. 459, 129 Pac. 60, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 402; *Id.*, 36 Okl. 449, 129 Pac. 67.

<sup>67</sup> *Loring v. Bacon*, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 465; *Miller v. Kelsey*, 100 Me. 103, 60 Atl. 717; *Hutchcraft v. Shrout's Heirs*, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 208, 15 Am. Dec. 100; *Bell's Adm'r v. Jasper*, 37 N. C. 597; *Ammons v. People*, 11 Ill. 6; *Steele v. Reese*, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 263. See, also, *Kaspar v. People*, 230 Ill. 342, 82 N. E. 816 affirming 132 Ill. App. 1.

<sup>68</sup> *Lowry v. State*, 64 Ind. 421; *State v. Jones*, 89 Mo. 470, 1 S. W. 355; *State v. Shackelford*, 56 Miss. 648; *Ætna Indemnity Co. v. State*, 101 Miss. 703, 57 South. 980, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 961; *Sebastian v. Bryan*, 21 Ark. 447.

<sup>69</sup> *Murray v. Wood*, 144 Mass. 195, 10 N. E. 822; *Wallace v. Swepston*, 74 Ark. 520, 86 S. W. 398, 109 Am. St. Rep. 94; *Bailey v. Rogers*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 186; *Stilwell v. Mills*, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 304; *BISBEE v. GLEASON*, 21 Neb. 534, 32 N. W. 578, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 240; *Allen v. Tiffany*, 53 Cal. 16; *Vermilya v. Bunce*, 61 Iowa, 606, 16 N. W. 735; *Ordinary v. Helshon*, 42 N. J. Law, 15. *Contra*, *State v. Slevin*, 93 Mo. 253, 6 S. W. 68, 3 Am. St. Rep. 526; *Wolfe v. State*, 59 Miss. 338; *Call v. Ruffin*, 1 Call (Va.) 333; *Bonham v. People*, 102 Ill. 434; *Farrington v. Secor*, 91 Iowa, 606, 60 N. W. 193. There need be no accounting when the liability is otherwise definitely determined. *Long v. Long*, 142 N. Y. 545, 37 N. E. 486.

<sup>70</sup> *Lyman v. Conkey*, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 317; *Swartwout v. Oaks*, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 622; *Yost v. State*, 80 Ind. 350; *Williams v. Morton*, 38 Me. 47, 61 Am. Dec. 229; *Judge of Probate v. Toothaker*, 83 Me. 195, 22 Atl. 119; *Blauser v. Diehl*, 90 Pa. 350; *Smith v. Gummere*, 39 N. J. Eq. 27; *Madison County v. Johnston*, 51 Iowa, 152, 50 N. W. 492. *Contra*, *Hart v. Stribling*, 21 Fla.

cial and on the general bonds are jointly liable,<sup>71</sup> while in others the sureties on the special bond are primarily liable.<sup>72</sup>

136; *State v. Cox*, 62 Miss. 786. Where a guardian sold for reinvestment, and neglected to reinvest, he was held liable, under his special sale bond, for the principal, and on his general bond, for interest thereon. *Mattoon v. Cowing*, 13 Gray (Mass.) 387. But see *Smith v. Gummere*, *supra*. The liability under a special sale bond has been held limited to a proper compliance with the prerequisites to the sale, a faithful discharge of the duties in conducting it, and to investing the proceeds as directed by the order, and as not extending to the subsequent management of such proceeds, or their final payment at the expiration of the guardianship. *Fay v. Taylor*, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 529.

<sup>71</sup> *Barker v. Boyd*, 71 S. W. 528, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1389; *Swisher v. McWhinney*, 64 Ohio St. 343, 60 N. E. 565.

<sup>72</sup> *Findley v. Findley*, 42 W. Va. 372, 26 S. E. 433.

## **PART IV**

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### **INFANTS, PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS, AND ALIENS**

#### **CHAPTER XIV.**

##### **INFANTS**

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- 223-224. Responsibility of Infants for Crime.

##### **INFANCY DEFINED**

192. At common law all persons under 21 years of age are infants.  
But, by statute, in some states, females attain their majority at 18, and in some states, by statute, all minors attain their majority on marriage.

The term "infancy" is used in law to designate the status of persons under the age of majority, which is fixed at common law at 21 for both sexes. Since the law disregards fractions of a day in computing time, an infant becomes of age at the first moment of the

day preceding the twenty-first anniversary of his birth.<sup>1</sup> By statute, in some states females become of age at 18; in others, on marriage; and in a few states both sexes attain their majority on marriage.<sup>2</sup>

### CUSTODY AND PROTECTION

193. The state has power to control and regulate the custody of children and to establish and enforce regulations for their protection.

The right of parents<sup>3</sup> and the duly appointed guardian<sup>4</sup> to the custody of the child has been discussed elsewhere. While the general right of parents and guardians is recognized, it is well settled that they possess no absolute right to the custody of the child, but that the state, as *parens patriæ*, as the welfare of the child may demand, may control and determine its proper custody,<sup>5</sup> and leg-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 463; 2 Kent, Comm. 283; Anon., 1 Ld. Raym. 480; Fitz-Hugh v. Dennington, 6 Mod. 259; Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 597; STATE v. CLARKE, 8 Har. (Del.) 557, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 245; United States v. Wright, 197 Fed. 297, 116 C. C. A. 659; Ex parte Wood, 5 Cal. App. 471, 90 Pac. 961; Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447; Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 419. If one be born the 1st of February at 11 at night, and on the last of January in the twenty-first year of his age, at 1 of the clock in the morning, he makes his will of lands, and dies, it is a good will, for he was then of age. Anonymous, 1 Salk. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Stim. Am. St. Law, § 6801. The Legislature has power to change the age at which a minor is privileged to exercise legal rights which shall be binding on him. Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 91 N. J. Law, 289, 102 Atl. 395. A statute extending the period of minority in males and females to 21 years, did not change status of one who had already reached age of majority under former law. Smith v. Smith, 104 Kan. 629, 180 Pac. 231. The status of a person as to his infancy or majority is determined by the law of his domicile. Harding v. Schapiro, 120 Md. 541, 87 Atl. 951.

<sup>3</sup> Ante, p. 343.

<sup>4</sup> Ante, p. 408.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 205; Lally v. Sullivan, 85 Iowa, 49, 51 N. W. 1155, 16 L. R. A. 681; In re Knowack, 158 N. Y. 482, 53 N. E. 676, 44 L. R. A. 699; In re Hope, 19 R. I. 486, 34 Atl. 994; State v. Klasen, 123 Minn. 382, 143 N. W. 984, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597; In re Stittgen, 110 Wis. 625, 86 N. W. 563; Hunt v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 142 Mich. 93, 105 N. W. 531, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564, 7 Ann. Cas. 821; Hesselman v. Haas, 71 N. J. Eq. 689, 64 Atl. 165; Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 Atl. 679, 38 L. R. A. 471. In some jurisdictions it is held that the court of chancery, as representing the government, has power independent of statute to control the custody of children and to protect them. Hayes v. Hayes, 192 Ala. 280, 68 South. 351; Witter v. Cook County Com'rs, 256 Ill. 616, 100 N. E. 148; In re Williams, 77 N. J. Eq. 478, 77 Atl. 350, 79 Atl. 686. Right to commit children to the custody of societies

islate for its protection.\* Thus, it is within the power of the Legislature to enact statutes to prevent the presence of infants in billiard and pool rooms, saloons, and the like,<sup>7</sup> or the exhibition to an infant of stories of crime or bloodshed, or obscene books or pictures;<sup>8</sup> to prescribe regulations as to the employment of children;<sup>9</sup> and to prevent and punish cruelty to children;<sup>10</sup> or neglect endangering the life or injuring the health of children.<sup>11</sup>

organized to care for neglected children. *McFall v. Simmons*, 12 S. D. 562, 81 N. W. 898; *In re Kol*, 10 N. D. 493, 88 N. W. 273; *State v. Isenbuth*, 34 S. D. 218, 148 N. W. 9; *Kennedy v. Meara*, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S. E. 243, 9 Ann. Cas. 396.

\* *People v. Pierson*, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243, 63 L. R. A. 187, 98 Am. St. Rep. 666; *People v. Ewer*, 141 N. Y. 129, 36 N. E. 4, 25 L. R. A. 794, 38 Am. St. Rep. 788; *Commonwealth v. Wormser*, 260 Pa. 44, 103 Atl. 500 affirming 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 444; *In re Michels*, 170 Cal. 339, 149 Pac. 587; *Glenn v. State*, 10 Ga. App. 128, 72 S. E. 927; *Travis v. State*, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 492. The various so-called "Mothers' Pension" acts are a valid exercise of the legislative power to protect the dependent children of widowed and indigent mothers. See *State Board of Control v. Buckstegge*, 18 Ariz. 277, 158 Pac. 837; *State v. Klasen*, 123 Minn. 382, 143 N. W. 984, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597; *Cass County v. Nixon*, 35 N. D. 601, 161 N. W. 204, L. R. A. 1917C, 897; *Finley v. Marion County*, 81 Or. 294, 159 Pac. 557; *In re Ramsey*, 102 Neb. 302, 167 N. W. 66; *Commonwealth v. Powell*, 256 Pa. 470, 100 Atl. 964, L. R. A. 1917E, 1150.

<sup>7</sup> *Powell v. State*, 62 Ind. 531; *State v. Johnson*, 108 Iowa, 245, 79 N. W. 62; *Ex parte Meyers*, 7 Cal. App. 528, 94 Pac. 870; *Commonwealth v. Wills*, 82 S. W. 236, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 515; *State v. Schnables*, 109 Ark. 429, 160 S. W. 388; *Lang v. State*, 162 Ala. 85, 50 South. 353; *Commonwealth v. Nance*, 158 Ky. 444, 165 S. W. 423; *State v. Rosenfield*, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N. W. 1068, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331, 187 Am. St. Rep. 557; *State v. Anderson*, 61 Wash. 674, 112 Pac. 931; *Rhodes v. State*, 118 Tenn. 761, 102 S. W. 899.

<sup>8</sup> *Strohm v. People*, 160 Ill. 582, 43 N. E. 622, affirming 60 Ill. App. 128.

<sup>9</sup> *City of New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills*, 43 Misc. Rep. 266, 88 N. Y. Supp. 1085; *Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co.*, 250 Ill. 303, 95 N. E. 204, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 275, affirmed *Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp*, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60, 58 L. Ed. 245, L. R. A. 1915A, 1196; *State v. Rose*, 125 La. 462, 51 South. 496, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 821; *Hanahan v. Pittston Coal Min. Co.*, 218 Pa. 311, 67 Atl. 642, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 120 Am. St. Rep. 885; *Green v. Appleton Woolen Mills*, 162 Wis. 145, 155 N. W. 958; *People v. Taylor*, 192 N. Y. 398, 85 N. E. 759, reversing 124 App. Div. 434, 108 N. Y. Supp. 796; *Pettit v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*, 156 N. C. 119, 72 S. E. 195; *Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People*, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924, 105 Am. St. Rep. 74; *State v. Shorey*, 48 Or. 396, 86 Pac. 881; *State v. Deck*, 108 Mo. App. 292, 83 S. W. 314.

<sup>10</sup> *Gary v. State*, 118 Ga. 17, 44 S. E. 817; *People v. Loomis*, 161 Mich. 651, 126 N. W. 985; *Stone v. State*, 1 Ga. App. 292, 57 S. E. 992.

<sup>11</sup> *Lynam v. People*, 65 Ill. App. 687; *Cowley v. People*, 83 N. Y. 464, 38 Am. Rep. 464; *People v. Pierson*, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243, 63 L. R. A. 187, 98 Am. St. Rep. 666; *People v. Trank*, 88 App. Div. 294, 85 N. Y. Supp. 55.

*Juvenile Dependents and Delinquents*

Perhaps the most noteworthy instances of legislation looking to the care and protection of children are to be found in statutes passed in most, if not all, states, in comparatively recent years, providing for the care of delinquent, dependent, and neglected children and establishing juvenile courts to administer the law. These laws have been generally held to be constitutional,<sup>12</sup> and a valid exercise of the police power of the state.<sup>13</sup> Such statutes are in conformity to a sound public policy,<sup>14</sup> and are a proper exercise of the right of the state as *parens patriæ* to promote the well-being of children unable to care for themselves or liable to become a burden to the state, either through neglect or a tendency to become criminal.<sup>15</sup> They are not objectionable as depriving parents of their right to the custody of their children.<sup>16</sup>

These statutes provide generally for the commitment of dependent and neglected children to persons, societies, or institutions where they will receive proper care,<sup>17</sup> and for the commitment of delinquent children to proper industrial or reform schools.<sup>18</sup> The

<sup>12</sup> *Pugh v. Bowden*, 54 Fla. 302, 45 South. 499, 14 Ann. Cas. 816; *Rooks v. Tindall*, 138 Ga. 863, 76 S. E. 378; *Ex parte Sharp*, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 Pac. 503, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886; *In re Turner*, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1022; *Childress v. State*, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S. W. 643; *Mill v. Brown*, 31 Utah, 473, 88 Pac. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935; *Leonard v. Licker*, 3 Ohio App. 377.

<sup>13</sup> *Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Savage*, 63 Fla. 337, 58 South. 835; *Egoff v. Board of Children's Guardians of Madison County*, 170 Ind. 238, 84 N. E. 151; *State v. Isenhuth*, 34 S. D. 218, 148 N. W. 9.

<sup>14</sup> *State v. Bryant*, 94 Neb. 754, 144 N. W. 804.

<sup>15</sup> *State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher*, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 696; *State v. Dunn*, 53 Or. 304, 99 Pac. 278, 100 Pac. 258; *In re Turner*, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1022. These laws rest on the fundamental doctrine that a child from its birth owes allegiance to the government of the country of its birth and is entitled to the protection of that government. *Ex parte Powell*, 6 Okl. Cr. 495, 120 Pac. 1022.

<sup>16</sup> *United States v. Behrendsohn* (D. C.) 197 Fed. 953; *State v. Cagle*, 111 S. C. 548, 96 S. E. 291. The state's power to detain minor children is not arbitrary or unlimited, but depends on their lack of parental care and the existence of improper environment. *Ex parte Watson*, 157 N. C. 340, 75 S. E. 1049.

<sup>17</sup> *Rogers v. State*, 4 Ga. App. 392, 61 S. E. 496; *Lindsay v. Lindsay*, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 908, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1222; *Henn v. Children's Agency*, 204 Fed. 766, 123 C. O. A. 216; *Braua v. Braua*, 139 La. 305, 71 South. 519; *Moch v. Superior Court* (Cal. App.) 179 Pac. 440.

<sup>18</sup> *Van Walters v. Board of Children's Guardians of Marlon County*, 132 Ind. 567, 32 N. E. 568, 18 L. R. A. 431; *In re Gassaway*, 70 Kan. 695, 79 Pac. 113; *Mill v. Brown*, 31 Utah, 473, 88 Pac. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935; *Ex*

statutes apply, of course, only to minors, and often only to minors under 18 years of age.<sup>19</sup> They are not criminal in character, but rather benevolent, paternal, and reformatory.<sup>20</sup> Their object is not punishment, but the removal of the delinquent from temptation and improper environment.<sup>21</sup> The statutes are remedial in their nature and should be liberally construed.<sup>22</sup>

parte Pruitt, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 394, 200 S. W. 392; *Ex parte Gilder*, 98 Wash. 514, 167 Pac. 1093; *White v. Board of Managers of State Industrial School*, 79 Misc. Rep. 494, 141 N. Y. Supp. 173; *People ex rel. New York Juvenile Asylum v. Board of Sup'rs of Nassau County*, 168 App. Div. 863, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1076. Delinquency, as applied in these statutes, was unknown to the common law. *State v. Dunn*, 53 Or. 304, 99 Pac. 278, 100 Pac. 258. The acts or omissions of a child, which in an adult would be a crime, constitute juvenile delinquency, except where the child knew the wrongfulness thereof. *Ex parte Powell*, 6 Okl. Cr. 495, 120 Pac. 1022. Refusal to attend school is delinquency, under the Wisconsin Statute. *State v. Freudenberg*, 166 Wis. 35, 163 N. W. 184.

<sup>19</sup> *Ex parte Lewis*, 3 Cal. App. 738, 86 Pac. 996; *De Kay v. Oliver*, 161 Iowa, 550, 143 N. W. 508; *State v. Howard*, 127 La. 435, 53 South. 677. The operation of the law governing juvenile delinquents is not suspended merely because the delinquent enters into the marriage relation. *Stoker v. Gowans*, 45 Utah, 556, 147 Pac. 911, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1025. See, also, *McPherson v. Day*, 162 Iowa, 251, 144 N. W. 4. Though a woman has reached 18 years of age and is married, nevertheless, under Juvenile Court Act, St. 1909, p. 213, and as amended by St. 1915, p. 1225, juvenile court may control her as a delinquent person until she reaches the age of 21. *Ex parte Willis*, 30 Cal. App. 188, 157 Pac. 819. But compare *Ex parte Lewis*, 3 Cal. App. 738, 86 Pac. 996. In Kentucky it is held that the age of the child to be determined as of the time of the commission of the offense and not as of the time of the indictment or trial. *Mattingly v. Commonwealth*, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S. W. 370. But compare *State v. Ebarbo*, 143 La. 591, 78 South. 973.

<sup>20</sup> *Ex parte Sharp*, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 Pac. 563, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886; *Childress v. State*, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S. W. 643; *Mill v. Brown*, 31 Utah, 473, 88 Pac. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935; *Mills v. State*, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 129, 177 S. W. 492. The general purpose of the juvenile act is to provide for the welfare of neglected and delinquent children, by placing the state, as far as possible, in loco parentis, with a view to their information. *State v. Eisen*, 53 Or. 297, 99 Pac. 282, 100 Pac. 257. Proceedings before a juvenile court in delinquency are in the nature of special civil actions. *Ogden v. State*, 162 Wis. 500, 156 N. W. 476. But see *Miller v. State*, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 495, 200 S. W. 389.

<sup>21</sup> *In re Turner*, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 371, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1022; *Weber v. Doust*, 84 Wash. 330, 146 Pac. 623, reversing on rehearing 81 Wash. 668, 143 Pac. 148; *Ex parte Powell*, 6 Okl. Cr. 495, 120 Pac. 1022; *Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State*, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S. W. 771, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 752.

<sup>22</sup> *State v. Dunn*, 53 Or. 304, 99 Pac. 278, 100 Pac. 258; *State v. Eisen*, 53 Or. 297, 99 Pac. 282, 100 Pac. 257; *People v. Turja*, 157 Mich. 532, 122 N. W. 177; *In re Lundy*, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1007. In so far as they restrain the liberty of the child, the statutes should be strictly

### PRIVILEGES AND DISABILITIES

194. Infants are favorites of the law, which, for their protection, has conferred upon them certain privileges and has imposed upon them certain disabilities.
195. **CAPACITY TO HOLD OFFICE.** An infant can hold an office which is purely ministerial, but not one requiring the exercise of discretion, or involving financial responsibility.
196. **CAPACITY TO MAKE WILL.** At common law the will of a male at 14, and of a female at 12, years of age, was valid as to personalty, but an infant could not make a valid will of real estate.
197. **CAPACITY TO SUE AND DEFEND.** An infant cannot sue in person or by an attorney, but only by guardian or next friend; and, when sued, he cannot appear in person, by attorney or next friend, but only by a general guardian or by guardian ad litem. In most states the appointment of the next friend or guardian ad litem is regulated by statute. Where an infant is sued, and has appeared by guardian ad litem, he is bound by a judgment at law and decree in equity as fully as an adult.
198. **INFANTS AS WITNESSES.** An infant is competent to testify as a witness if he understands the nature of an oath, but not otherwise.

To protect infants from the injuries which because of their inexperience and immature mental capacity, might arise from their own acts, or the acts of designing adults, the law has thrown its protection around them in the form of various privileges and disabilities. The principal of these is, of course, the privilege of avoiding their contracts and the disability to bind themselves by their agreements under certain circumstances—a branch of the subject to be treated at length hereafter.<sup>28</sup> Infants' rights are not superior to those of adults, and superior equities of an adult will not be defeated merely because the adversary party is an infant;

construed. In *re Lundy*, *supra*. Statutes concerning infants are entitled to favorable and liberal construction, and it is not a valid objection to them that within reasonable limits they may deprive children of their liberty or their parents of their custody. *State v. Cagle*, 111 S. C. 548, 96 S. E. 291.

<sup>28</sup> Post, p. 471.

the principal difference between the two classes being that the rights of an infant will always be protected by the court, while adults must protect their own rights.<sup>24</sup> So, too, an infant is bound by all constitutional and valid laws, just as all other persons are.<sup>25</sup> There are, however, certain privileges and disabilities of a general nature, almost universally regarded as necessarily incident to the status of infancy.<sup>26</sup> Thus, in the absence of any positive provisions to the contrary, an infant will not be prejudiced by lapse of time<sup>27</sup> or laches.<sup>28</sup> So, too, it has been generally held that the doctrine of estoppel has no application to infants,<sup>29</sup> unless the conduct of the infant was intentionally fraudulent.<sup>30</sup> And, inasmuch as the

<sup>24</sup> *In re Shreve*, 87 N. J. Eq. 7, 710, 103 Atl. 683.

<sup>25</sup> *Johnson v. Kennecott, Copper Corporation*, 5 Alaska, 571.

<sup>26</sup> Capacity to marry, see ante, p. 21.

<sup>27</sup> *Grimsby v. Hudnell*, 78 Ga. 378, 2 Am. St. Rep. 46; *Calhoon v. Baird*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 168; *Rector v. Rector*, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 105; *Parker v. Bicks*, 114 La. 942, 38 South. 687; *Taylor v. Leonard*, 94 Ark. 122, 126 S. W. 387; *Brown v. Hooks*, 133 Ga. 345, 65 S. E. 780; *Coe v. Sloan*, 16 Idaho, 49, 100 Pac. 354; *Cobb v. Klosterman*, 58 Or. 211, 114 Pac. 96; *Cameron v. Hicks*, 141 N. C. 21, 53 S. E. 728, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407; *Bess Mar Realty Co. v. Capell* (Sup.) 164 N. Y. Supp. 803; *Hays v. Hinkle* (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 153; *Meurin v. Kopplin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S. W. 984. But, if the statute of limitations has commenced to run in favor of title by adverse possession, the running of such statute is not tolled upon the death of the person in possession because of the minority of the party claiming under him. *Wood v. Bapp* (S. D.) 169 N. W. 518; *Armstrong v. Wilcox*, 57 Fla. 30, 49 South. 41, 131 Am. St. Rep. 1080; *Mullen v. Manhattan Ry. Co.*, 124 App. Div. 295, 108 N. Y. Supp. 852, affirmed 195 N. Y. 539, 88 N. E. 1126; *Dunlap v. Robinson*, 87 S. C. 577, 70 S. E. 313; *Sandmeyer v. Dolljst* (Tex. Civ. App.) 208 S. W. 113; *Babcock Lumber & Land Co. v. Ferguson* (D. C.) 243 Fed. 623.

<sup>28</sup> *Smith v. Sackett*, 5 Gilman (Ill.) 534; *Northern v. Scruggs*, 118 Miss. 353, 79 South. 227.

<sup>29</sup> *Lackman v. Wood*, 25 Cal. 147; *Sims v. Everhardt*, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; *Harmon v. Smith* (C. C.) 38 Fed. 482; *Gillespie v. Nabors*, 59 Ala. 441, 81 Am. Rep. 20; *Merriam v. Cunningham*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40; *New York Building Loan & Banking Co. v. Fisher*, 23 App. Div. 363, 48 N. Y. Supp. 152; *Underwood v. Deckard*, 34 Ind. App. 198, 70 N. E. 383; *Headley v. Hoopengartner*, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744; *Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood Co.*, 39 Wash. 415, 81 Pac. 869; *Raymond v. General Motorcycle Sales Co.*, 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359; *Gappmayer v. Wilkinson* (Utah) 177 Pac. 763; *Gibney v. Allen*, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. 811; *Tobin v. Spann*, 85 Ark. 556, 109 S. W. 534, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672; *Harper v. Utsey* (Tex. Civ. App.) 97 S. W. 508. In the absence of bad faith, neither the doctrine of estoppel nor that of waiver applies to minors. *Cowie v. Strohmeier*, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956, 137 N. W. 778.

<sup>30</sup> *Headley v. Hoopengartner*, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744; *Harper v. Utsey* (Tex. Civ. App.) 97 S. W. 508; *Ostrander v. Quin*, 84 Miss. 230, 36 South. 257, 105 Am. St. Rep. 426; *Lake v. Perry*, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569; *Fowler v. Alabama Iron & Steel Co.*, 164 Ala. 414, 51 South. 393; *Turner v. Stewart*,

infant is not bound by an estoppel, it has also been held that he cannot urge it against an adult.<sup>31</sup> An infant may act as agent,<sup>32</sup> but in some jurisdictions he cannot appoint an agent or attorney in fact.<sup>33</sup> It has been held in some jurisdictions that an infant may act as trustee,<sup>34</sup> though there are English authorities to the contrary.<sup>35</sup>

### *Capacity to Hold Office*

An infant may hold an office which is purely ministerial, but when an office requires the exercise of discretion, or the safe discharge of its duties involves the assumption of liabilities which would not be binding on an infant, he cannot, as a rule, be appointed.<sup>36</sup> He cannot hold a public office requiring the receipt and disbursement of moneys,<sup>37</sup> nor can he act as administrator.<sup>38</sup>

### *Capacity to Make Will*

At common law, males at 14 years of age, and females at 12, could dispose of personal property by will,<sup>39</sup> but neither could make a valid devise of real estate until attaining majority.<sup>40</sup> By statute,<sup>41</sup> in England, no will made by any person under 21 is valid; and the age at which a will can be made in this country is now

149 Ky. 15, 147 S. W. 772; *GRAUMAN MARX & CLINE CO. v. KRIENITZ*, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 251. But see *Beauchamp v. Bertig*, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659.

<sup>31</sup> *Montgomery v. Gordon*, 51 Ala. 377.

<sup>32</sup> *Talbot v. Bowen*, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 436, 10 Am. Dec. 747; *Sims v. Gunter*, 201 Ala. 286, 78 South. 62. Compare *United States Inv. Corp. v. Ulrickson*, 84 Minn. 14, 86 N. W. 613, 87 Am. St. Rep. 326.

<sup>33</sup> See post, p. 473. And see post, p. 474.

<sup>34</sup> As an infant may be a trustee, equity will enforce a trust as to property held by an infant as trustee. *Clary v. Spain*, 119 Va. 58, 89 S. E. 130. And see *Sims v. Gunter*, 201 Ala. 286, 78 South. 62.

<sup>35</sup> *In re Porter*, 25 L. J. Ch. 482; *In re Sheldermine*, 33 Law J. Ch. 474. And see *Lewin, Trusts*, 37, 38.

<sup>36</sup> *Crosbie v. Hurley*, Alc. & N. 431; *Moore v. Graves*, 3 N. H. 408 (collecting cases). One otherwise qualified may act as appraiser of land to be sold on execution, though he be under 21 years of age. *White v. Laurel Land Co.*, 82 S. W. 571, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 775. Rehearing denied 83 S. W. 628, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1235.

<sup>37</sup> *Claridge v. Evelyn*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 81.

<sup>38</sup> 1 *Williams, Ex'rs*, 479; *Ex parte Sergison*, 4 Ves. 147; *In re Goods of Duchess of Orleans*, 1 Swab. & T. 253; *Rea v. Englesing*, 56 Miss. 463; *Briscoe v. Tarkington*, 5 La. Ann. 692.

<sup>39</sup> 1 *Williams, Ex'rs*, 15; *Davis v. Baugh*, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 477. The question is not free from doubt. *Co. Litt.* 89b.

<sup>40</sup> *Jarm. Wills*, 32; 4 *Kent, Comm.* 505.

<sup>41</sup> *St. 1 Vict. c. 26*, § 7.

generally fixed by statutes, some of which are similar to the English statute. Some of the statutes make a distinction between males and females, and some make a distinction between real and personal property.

### *Capacity to Sue and Defend*

While the rights of infants may be enforced in courts of law, they cannot sue in person, nor are they competent to appoint attorneys to appear in court for them.<sup>42</sup> At common law they could only sue by guardian. By the statute of Westm. II, c. 15, infants were authorized to sue by *prochein ami*, or next friend, and, by well-settled practice, may generally sue either by guardian or by next friend,<sup>43</sup> though in many jurisdictions the whole matter is regulated by statute. The next friend or guardian is an officer of the court, rather than a party to the action,<sup>44</sup> and, in theory, is appointed by the court; but in practice, except when required by statute, the obtaining of an order of appointment has fallen into disuse, as it may subsequently be obtained if the authority to appear is questioned.<sup>45</sup> His authority begins with the commencement of the

<sup>42</sup> 1 Co. Litt. 135b; *Bartholomew v. Dighton*, Cro. Eliz. 424; *Gilbert v. Mazerat*, 121 La. 35, 43 South. 47; *Thurston v. Tubbs*, 250 Ill. 540, 95 N. E. 479, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 375; *Miles v. Boyden*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 213; *Wainwright v. Wilkinson*, 62 Md. 146; *Clark v. Turner*, 1 Root (Conn.) 200; *Bennett v. Davis*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 393; *Mockey v. Grey*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 192. It has been held that a minor who has been emancipated does not need a guardian *ad litem* to bring an action.

<sup>43</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 464; *Deford v. State*, 30 Md. 179; *Barwick v. Rackley*, 45 Ala. 215; *Brown v. Hull*, 16 Vt. 673; *Judson v. Blanchard*, 3 Conn. 579; *Hurt v. Railroad Co.*, 40 Miss. 391; *Heath v. Maddock*, 81 N. J. Eq. 469, 86 Atl. 945, affirmed 82 N. J. Eq. 366, 91 Atl. 1069; *Scott v. Royston*, 223 Mo. 568, 123 S. W. 454; *Turman Cooperage Co. v. Shelton*, 136 Ark. 570, 207 S. W. 42; *Simpson v. Alexander*, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 619. If, pending the action, the minor arrives at his majority, he may at his election assume control of the prosecution or defense in his individual capacity. *BERNARD v. PITTSBURG COAL CO.*, 137 Mich. 279, 100 N. W. 396, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 246; *Webb v. Harris*, 32 Okl. 491, 121 Pac. 1082, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 602; *Slafter v. Savage*, 89 Vt. 352, 95 Atl. 790; *Mahoney v. Park Steel Co.*, 217 Pa. 20, 66 Atl. 90; *Ohio Valley Tie Co. v. Hayes*, 180 Ky. 469, 203 S. W. 193. And see *Johnson v. Alexander* (Okl.) 167 Pac. 989.

<sup>44</sup> *Davies v. Lockett*, 4 Taunt. 765; *Klaus v. State*, 54 Miss. 644; *Bartlett v. Batts*, 14 Ga. 539; *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick*, 36 Md. 619. And therefore he may be removed by the court at any time for cause. *Barwick v. Rackley*, 45 Ala. 215; *Deford v. State*, 30 Md. 179; *Simpson v. Alexander*, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 619.

<sup>45</sup> *Guild v. Cranston*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 506; *Judson v. Blanchard*, 3 Conn. 579; *Williams v. Cleaveland*, 76 Conn. 426, 56 Atl. 850; *Barwick v. Rackley*, 45 Ala. 215; *Deford v. State*, 30 Md. 179; *Klaus v. State*, 54 Miss. 644; *Rima*

action, and he cannot sue when a demand is necessary before suit.<sup>46</sup> In the appointment of the next friend, the courts will generally respect the claim of a father, as the natural guardian of his child, to represent the infant,<sup>47</sup> unless his interest is adverse,<sup>48</sup> but relationship is not a requisite in a next friend.<sup>49</sup>

When an infant is sued he cannot appear in person or by attorney,<sup>50</sup> or by next friend,<sup>51</sup> but only by guardian.<sup>52</sup> If the infant already has a general guardian, it is his duty to appear for the infant,<sup>53</sup> unless his interest is adverse;<sup>54</sup> but, if no general guardian has been appointed, a special guardian, known as a "guardian ad litem," must be appointed by the court to represent the infant in the action.<sup>55</sup> The appointment and duties of a guardian ad litem are regulated by statute in most of the states. The failure to

v. Iron Works, 120 N. Y. 433, 24 N. E. 940; Bartlett v. Batts, 14 Ga. 539. By statute, a formal order of appointment is often required. But the absence of a formal order is not fatal to the appointment, if the fact appears by recitals or reference in the record. Crane v. Stafford, 217 Ill. 21, 75 N. E. 424.

<sup>46</sup> Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 213.

<sup>47</sup> Woolf v. Pemberton, 6 Ch. Div. 19; Rue v. Meirs, 43 N. J. Eq. 377, 12 Atl. 369; Donald v. City of Ballard, 34 Wash. 576, 76 Pac. 80. But see Gilbert v. Mazerat, 121 La. 35, 46 South. 47.

<sup>48</sup> Patterson v. Pullman, 104 Ill. 80.

<sup>49</sup> Guild v. Cranston, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 506; Burns v. Wilson, 1 Mo. App. 179; Bartlett v. Batts, 14 Ga. 539.

<sup>50</sup> Co. Litt. 88b, note; Frescobaldi v. Kinaston, 2 Strange, 783; Bullard v. Spoor, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 430; Knapp v. Crosby, 1 Mass. 479; Bedell's Heirs v. Lewis' Heirs, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 562; Starbird v. Moore, 21 Vt. 529; Marshall v. Wing, 50 Me. 62; Wright v. McNatt, 49 Tex. 425.

<sup>51</sup> Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 27 H; Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344; Brown v. Hull, 16 Vt. 673. The only difference between the functions of the "next friend" and the "guardian ad litem" is that the former prosecutes, and the latter defends, for the minor. Watts v. Hicks, 119 Ark. 621, 178 S. W. 924.

<sup>52</sup> Mitchell v. Spaulding, 206 Pa. 220, 55 Atl. 968.

<sup>53</sup> Mansur v. Pratt, 101 Mass. 60; Cowan v. Anderson, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 284; Colt v. Colt (O. C.) 19 Blatchf. 399, 48 Fed. 385; Hughes v. Sellers, 34 Ind. 337; Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484; Nunn v. Robertson, 80 Ark. 350, 97 S. W. 293, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1197.

<sup>54</sup> Owens v. Gunther, 75 Ark. 37, 86 S. W. 851, 5 Ann. Cas. 130; Adams v. De Dominques, 129 Ky. 599, 112 S. W. 663.

<sup>55</sup> Bac. Abr. "Guardian," B 4; Roberts' Widow v. Stanton, 2 Munf. (Va.) 129, 5 Am. Dec. 463; Stinson v. Pickering, 70 Me. 273; Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296; Simmons v. Arnim (Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 184; Stewart v. Parr, 74 W. Va. 327, 82 S. E. 259; GRAUMAN, MARX & CLINE CO. v. KRIENITZ, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 251. Wherever the personal or property rights of an infant are involved in a legal proceeding, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem for the protection of such rights. Mechling v. Meyers, 284 Ill. 484, 120 N. E. 542.

appoint a guardian ad litem is, apart from statutory regulations, an error which may be cured within a limited time after appearance:<sup>56</sup> but, when no guardian ad litem has been appointed, a judgment rendered under such circumstances is voidable,<sup>57</sup> though valid until set aside.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, a decree in equity rendered against an infant, after due service of process and appearance by guardian ad litem, is binding on him until reversed, and is only reversible for fraud, collusion, or error.<sup>59</sup>

### *Infants as Witnesses*

At common law there is no age under which an infant is incompetent to testify as a witness. The only rule is that he must be of sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of an oath, and the solemn responsibility which rests upon him to tell the truth. Above the age of 14 years an infant is presumed to be competent, though, of course, the presumption may be rebutted by showing that he does not understand the nature of an oath. If he is under 14 years of age he is presumed to be incompetent, and his competency must be established to the satisfaction of the court before he can be allowed to testify.<sup>60</sup> A child of 6 years has been allowed to testify. Though there is some authority to the contrary,<sup>61</sup> by the weight of opinion, when a child, on being examined as to his

<sup>56</sup> *Nicholson v. Wilborn*, 13 Ga. 467.

<sup>57</sup> *O'Hara v. McConnell*, 93 U. S. 150, 23 L. Ed. 840; *Austin v. Trustees*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 196, 41 Am. Dec. 497; *Walkenhorst v. Lewis*, 24 Kan. 420; *Moore v. McEwen*, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 373; *Barber v. Graves*, 18 Vt. 290; *Hanlin v. Burk Bros. Meat & Provision Co.*, 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S. W. 547; *Conway v. Clark*, 177 Ala. 99, 58 South. 441; *Dudley v. Dudley*, 126 Ark. 182, 189 S. W. 838; *Manning v. Boylinson*, 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 512; *Weiss v. Coudrey*, 102 Mo. App. 65, 76 S. W. 730; *WEAVER v. GLENN*, 104 Va. 443, 51 S. E. 835; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 247. See, also, *McMurtry v. Fairley*, 194 Mo. 502, 91 S. W. 902, holding that, where an infant defendant in partition was not properly served with process, the court was without authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for him, and the judgment as to him was void.

<sup>58</sup> *Colt v. Colt*, 111 U. S. 566, 4 Sup. Ct. 553, 28 L. Ed. 520; *Austin v. Trustees*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 196, 41 Am. Dec. 497; *England v. Garner*, 90 N. C. 197; *Bernecker v. Miller*, 44 Mo. 102; *Walkenhorst v. Lewis*, 24 Kan. 420.

<sup>59</sup> 1 *Daniell*, Ch. Prac. 205; *Gregory v. Molesworth*, 3 Atk. 626; *Ralston v. Lahee*, 8 Iowa, 17, 74 Am. Dec. 291; *Rivers v. Durr*, 46 Ala. 418.

<sup>60</sup> 1 *Greenl. Ev.* § 367; *Rosc. Cr. Ev.* 94; *Reg. v. Hill*, 5 Cox, Cr. Cas. 259; *State v. Richie*, 28 La. Ann. 327, 26 Am. Rep. 100; *Kendall v. May*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 64; *Carter v. State*, 63 Ala. 52, 35 Am. Rep. 4; *McGuire v. People*, 44 Mich. 286, 6 N. W. 669, 38 Am. Rep. 265.

<sup>61</sup> *Rex v. Williams*, 7 Car. & P. 320; *Reg. v. Nicholas*, 2 Car. & K. 246.

competency, does not appear to understand the nature of an oath, and is of sufficient intelligence to understand if properly instructed, the trial or proceeding may, in the discretion of the judge, be postponed to allow such instruction.<sup>62</sup> As a rule, the question of an infant's competency as a witness is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be interfered with, or cause a reversal of the judgment based on the infant's testimony, except in a clear case.<sup>63</sup> But the ruling is reviewable, and will be ground for a reversal if it appears that the child was manifestly ignorant of all religious sanction.<sup>64</sup>

### CONTRACTS OF INFANTS

199. The contracts of an infant are either void, voidable, or valid.  
Thus—

- (a) It was formerly held that all contracts of an infant which are manifestly to his prejudice are absolutely void; and in some states, still, powers of attorney, appointments of an agent, contracts of suretyship, and bonds with a penalty are held void. The tendency now is to hold no contract void.
- (b) Where a contract is not void, nor valid, as hereafter explained, it is simply voidable at the infant's option. Most contracts are within this class.
- (c) The following contracts are valid, and bind the infant as well as the adult:
  - (1) Contracts created by law or quasi contracts.
  - (2) Contracts for necessities. By the better opinion, these are contracts created by law.
  - (3) Contracts entered into under direction or authority of a statute.
  - (4) Contracts made in order to do what he was legally bound to do, and could have been compelled to do.
  - (5) Contracts entered into by him in a representative capacity.

<sup>62</sup> *Com. v. Lynes*, 142 Mass. 577, 8 N. E. 408, 56 Am. Rep. 709.

<sup>63</sup> *McGuire v. People*, 44 Mich. 286, 6 N. W. 669, 38 Am. Rep. 265.

<sup>64</sup> *Rader v. Adamson*, 37 W. Va. 585, 16 S. E. 808; *Beason v. State*, 72 Ala. 191.

- (6) In some jurisdictions an executed contract is binding upon the infant where he has received a substantial benefit under it, and cannot place the other party in statu quo. As to this, however, there is much doubt, and the weight of authority is the other way.

Of the various privileges conferred and disabilities imposed on infants, the most important is the privilege of avoiding their contracts or the disability to bind themselves by their contracts, under certain circumstances.<sup>65</sup> The contracts of infants are either void, voidable, or valid—"void" being used in the sense of void for all purposes, and incapable of ratification; "voidable," in the sense of voidable at the option of the infant; and "valid," in the sense of binding on the infant.

#### *Void and Voidable Contracts*

There is much confusion among the decisions in regard to infants' contracts, arising from the failure to use the words "void" and "voidable" in a uniform sense; "void" being used in many cases to mean simply not enforceable, and in others to mean not capable of ratification. But, aside from this, there is great inconsistency among the cases as to what contracts are void, and what are voidable; a gradual change having taken place in most jurisdictions in favor of holding infants' contracts voidable rather than void. Many contracts which would formerly have been held void are now held merely voidable. The object of the law being to protect the infant from dangers peculiar to infancy, it is considered that this object is fully attained by leaving it for him to decide whether or not he will be bound on reaching his majority.<sup>66</sup>

Keane v. Boycott<sup>67</sup> is a leading case representing the old rule.

<sup>65</sup> Generally speaking, and subject to certain exceptions to be discussed hereafter, infants are not bound by their contracts, being incapable of contracting. *Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.*, 195 Mo. App. 40, 189 S. W. 1195; *Daughterty v. Reveal*, 54 Ind. App. 71, 102 N. E. 381. The fact that he has no parent or guardian does not clothe him with power to contract. *Wickham v. Torley*, 136 Ga. 594, 71 S. E. 881, 56 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57. And in respect of the power to contract the law makes no distinction between an infant of tender years and one who has almost attained his majority, except in so far as the rules may be modified by statute. *Ex parte McFerren*, 184 Ala. 223, 63 South. 159, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 672, reversing *Edge-wood Highland Land Co. v. McFerren*, 9 Ala. App. 275, 63 South. 157.

<sup>66</sup> *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229.

<sup>67</sup> 2 H. Bl. 511.

In that case the doctrine was stated to be (1) that where the court could pronounce the contract for the benefit of the infant, as for necessities, it was good; (2) that, where the court could pronounce it to his prejudice, it was void; (3) that, in those cases where the benefit or prejudice was uncertain, the contract was voidable only. And the same doctrine has been laid down in this country.<sup>68</sup> According to this classification, and on the theory of manifest prejudice to the infant, some courts hold that a power or appointment of attorney by an infant is absolutely void, and a nullity.<sup>69</sup> Some courts extend the rule to all appointments of agents.<sup>70</sup> And the same has been held as to contracts of suretyship and obligations with a penalty by infants.<sup>71</sup> In some states, by statute, contracts relating to real property are void, if the infant is under 18 years of age.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 234; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 65, 9 L. Ed. 345; *Robinson v. Weeks*, 56 Me. 102; *Dunton v. Brown*, 31 Mich. 182; *Green v. Wilding*, 59 Iowa, 679, 13 N. W. 761, 44 Am. Rep. 696. In *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572, it was said: "Whether a contract by an infant be void or voidable or binding is frequently a question of very difficult solution. If it be clearly prejudicial to him, it is void. If it may be for his benefit, or to his damage, it is voidable at his election, and he may avoid it during his minority, or when he becomes of full age. If the contract be clearly beneficial to him, he is bound." An infant's contracts cannot be enforced against him during infancy, if not beneficial to the infant, and can be enforced only to the extent that they are beneficial. *Covault v. Nevitt*, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959.

<sup>69</sup> *Saunderson v. Marr*, 1 H. Bl. 75; *Lawrence's Lessee v. McArter*, 10 Ohio, 37; *Wainwright v. Wilkinson*, 62 Md. 146; *Knox v. Flack*, 22 Pa. 337; *Waples v. Hastings*, 3 Har. (Del.) 403 (holding that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment is void); *Pyle v. Cravens*, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 17; *Bennett v. Davis*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 393. The same court refused to follow the rule in the case of a power coupled with an interest. *Duvall v. Graves*, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 461.

<sup>70</sup> *Trueblood v. Trueblood*, 8 Ind. 195, 65 Am. Dec. 756; *Poston v. Williams*, 99 Mo. App. 513, 73 S. W. 1099; *Armitage v. Widoe*, 36 Mich. 124; *Flexner v. Dickerson*, 72 Ala. 318; *Glass v. Glass*, 76 Ala. 368; *Smoot v. Ryan*, 187 Ala. 396, 65 South. 828; *Weidenhammer v. McAdams*, 52 Ind. App. 98, 98 N. E. 883; *McDonald v. City of Spring Valley*, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 2 A. L. R. 1359, reversing 209 Ill. App. 7. But see post, p. 474.

<sup>71</sup> *Suretyship*, *Maples v. Wightman*, 4 Conn. 376, 10 Am. Dec. 149. Obligations with a penalty, *Fisher v. Mowbray*, 8 East, 330; *Baylis v. Dineley*, 3 Maule & S. 477.

<sup>72</sup> *Comp. Laws N. D.* 1913, § 4338; *Civ. Code Cal.* § 33. See *Lee v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc.*, 177 Cal. 656, 171 Pac. 677; *Gruba v. Chapman*, 36 S. D. 119, 153 N. W. 929; *Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons*, 166 Cal. 557, 137 Pac. 911; *Jefferson v. Gallagher*, 56 Okl. 405, 150 Pac. 1071. *Laws Okl.* 1909, c. 13, limiting right of married minor to convey real estate to that acquired after

In many cases, on the other hand, the courts have rejected this doctrine, and the tendency to-day is to leave it for the infant to pass on the question of benefit or prejudice on reaching his majority. Under these decisions, all, or nearly all, contracts of infants, are merely voidable,<sup>73</sup> without regard to their appearing to be prejudicial to the infant or otherwise, excepting certain contracts which are binding on him.<sup>74</sup> Thus, in *Williams v. Moor*,<sup>75</sup> Baron Parke said: "The promise is not void in any case unless the infant chooses to plead his infancy." And in a recent case<sup>76</sup> it was said: "The true doctrine now seems to be that the contract of an infant is in no case absolutely void. An infant may, as a general rule, disaffirm any contract into which he has entered; but, until he does so, the contract may be said to subsist, capable of being made absolute by affirmance, or void by disaffirmance, on his arriving at age. In other words, infancy confers a privilege, rather than imposes a disability." According to this doctrine, some of the courts, contrary to the cases heretofore referred to, regard powers of appointments of attorneys, and all appointments of agents, mere-

marriage, does not apply to land owned by married minor woman before its enactment. *Crump v. Guyer*, 60 Okl. 222, 157 Pac. 321, 2 A. L. R. 331.

<sup>73</sup> *Morton v. Steward*, 5 Ill. App. 533; *Reed v. Lane*, 61 Vt. 481, 17 Atl. 796; *In re Huntenberg* (D. C.) 153 Fed. 768; *Luce v. Jestrab*, 12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848; *Helland v. Colton State Bank*, 20 S. D. 325, 106 N. W. 60; *COURSOLLE v. WEYERHAUSER*, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. 697, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 249; *Jones v. Valentines' School of Telegraphy*, 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043; *Henderson v. Clark*, 163 Ky. 192, 173 S. W. 367; *In re Farley*, 213 N. Y. 15, 106 N. E. 756, L. R. A. 1916D, 816, *Ann. Cas.* 1916C, 494, reversing 161 App. Div. 63, 146 N. Y. Supp. 291; *Grievance Committee v. Ennis*, 84 Conn. 594, 80 Atl. 767; *Clemmer v. Price*, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 125 S. W. 604; *Casement v. Callaghan*, 35 N. D. 27, 159 N. W. 77; *Drummond v. Drummond* (Sur.) 171 N. Y. Supp. 477; *La Rosa v. Nichols*, 92 N. J. Law, 375, 105 Atl. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412, reversing judgment (Sup.) *La Rose v. Same*, 91 N. J. Law, 355, 103 Atl. 390; *Sims v. Gunter*, 201 Ala. 286, 78 South. 62. And see *Harner v. Dipple*, 31 Ohio St. 72, 27 Am. Rep. 496; *Fetrow v. Wiseman*, 40 Ind. 148; *Henry v. Root*, 33 N. Y. 526; *Holmes v. Rice*, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. W. 772; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Cole v. Pennoyer*, 14 Ill. 158; *Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner*, 75 Ill. 315; *Bozeman v. Browning*, 31 Ark. 364; *Weaver v. Jones*, 24 Ala. 420; *Kendrick v. Neisz*, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245; *Pars. Cont.* 295; *Pollock, Cont.* 52. The modern rule has been followed in regard to all classes of contracts. For collection of authorities in regard to particular contracts, see 22 Cyc. pp. 527-538, 580-600.

<sup>74</sup> Post, p. 477.

<sup>75</sup> 11 Mees. & W. 256.

<sup>76</sup> *Lammon v. Beeman*, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. 476.

ly voidable by the infant at his option.<sup>77</sup> And the same is true of contracts of suretyship and obligations with a penalty.<sup>78</sup> Except in states where the rule has been changed by statute,<sup>79</sup> the cases generally hold that an infant's conveyances or mortgages of real estate, his purchases of real estate, and his sales mortgages, and purchases of personal property, merely voidable.<sup>80</sup> The same may be said of most other contracts—partnership agreements,<sup>81</sup> agree-

<sup>77</sup> *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229; *Benson v. Tucker*, 212 Mass. 60, 98 N. E. 589, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219; *Hardy v. Waters*, 38 Me. 450; *Towle v. Dresser*, 73 Me. 252; *Alsworth v. Cordtz*, 31 Miss. 32. See also, *Ferguson v. Railway Co.*, 73 Tex. 344, 11 S. W. 347; *Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 184 Mass. 348, 68 N. E. 673, 63 L. R. A. 741, 100 Am. St. Rep. 560.

<sup>78</sup> *Suretyship*, *Owen v. Long*, 112 Mass. 403; *Reed v. Lane*, 61 Vt. 481, 17 Atl. 796; *Fetrow v. Wiseman*, 40 Ind. 148; *Williams v. Harrison*, 11 S. C. 412; *Helland v. Colton State Bank*, 20 S. D. 325, 106 N. W. 60; *Harner v. Dipple*, 31 Ohio St. 72, 27 Am. Rep. 496. Bonds with a penalty, *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Weaver v. Jones*, 24 Ala. 420.

<sup>79</sup> See ante, p. 473, note 72.

<sup>80</sup> *Cole v. Pennoyer*, 14 Ill. 158; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800; *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burrows, 1794; *Bigelow v. Kinney*, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; *Logan v. Gardner*, 136 Pa. 588, 20 Atl. 625, 20 Am. St. Rep. 939; *Henry v. Root*, 33 N. Y. 526; *Callis v. Day*, 38 Wis. 643; *Manning v. Johnson*, 26 Ala. 446, 62 Am. Dec. 732; *French v. McAndrew*, 61 Miss. 187; *Tillery v. Land*, 136 N. C. 537, 48 S. E. 824; *White v. Sikes*, 129 Ga. 508, 59 S. E. 228, 121 Am. St. Rep. 228; *Tomczek v. Wieser*, 58 Misc. Rep. 46, 108 N. Y. Supp. 784; *Lawder v. Larkin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. 171; *Eldridge v. Hoefer*, 52 Or. 241, 93 Pac. 246; *Robinson v. Allison*, 192 Mo. 366, 91 S. W. 115; *Shaffer v. Dettie*, 191 Mo. 377, 90 S. W. 131; *Hiles v. Hiles*, 82 S. W. 580, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 824, rehearing denied 83 S. W. 615, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1264; *Smith v. Smith's Ex'r*, 107 Va. 112, 57 S. E. 577, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1184, 122 Am. St. Rep. 831, 12 Ann. Cas. 857; *Hatton v. Bodan Lumber Co.*, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 123 S. W. 163; *Strain v. Hinds*, 277 Ill. 598, 115 N. E. 563; *Parrish v. Treadway*, 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580; *Merida v. Cummings* (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S. W. 613; *Hogan v. Utter*, 175 N. C. 332, 95 S. E. 565; *Appell v. Appell*, 235 Ill. 37, 85 N. E. 205; *Forsee's Adm'r v. Forsee*, 144 Ky. 169, 137 S. W. 836.

<sup>81</sup> *Dunton v. Brown*, 31 Mich. 182; *Kuipers v. Thorne*, 182 Ill. App. 28; *Latrobe v. Dietrich*, 114 Md. 8, 78 Atl. 983; *Gordon v. Miller*, 111 Mo. App. 342, 85 S. W. 943. A minor who has entered into a partnership may disaffirm the partnership agreement, and withdraw, and he may plead his infancy as a defense against personal liability for the firm debts. *Shirk v. Shultz*, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N. E. 12; *Dunton v. Brown*, 31 Mich. 182; *Bush v. Linthicum*, 59 Md. 344; *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; *Yates v. Lyon*, 61 N. Y. 344; *Whittemore v. Elliott*, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 518. But he cannot withdraw what he has invested in the business from the claims of firm creditors. *Shirk v. Shultz*, supra; *Adams v. Beall*, supra; *Kitchen v. Lee*, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 107, 42 Am. Dec. 101; *Page v. Morse*, 128 Mass. 99;

ments to render services,<sup>82</sup> promissory notes,<sup>83</sup> indorsements of a bill or note,<sup>84</sup> lease by or to infant,<sup>85</sup> submission to arbitration,<sup>86</sup> settlement of disputed boundary,<sup>87</sup> compromise of action or claim,<sup>88</sup> release of damages,<sup>89</sup> promise to marry,<sup>90</sup> or subscription to corporate stock.<sup>91</sup>

*Skinner v. Maxwell*, 66 N. C. 45; *Furlong v. Bartlett*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 401. In *Moley v. Brine*, 120 Mass. 324, it was held that, when the assets of the firm are not sufficient to pay the partners the amount invested by each in full, the infant partner cannot insist on payment in full, but is only entitled to share in the assets in proportion to the amount which he invested. An infant cannot, as against his partners, insist that in taking the partnership's accounts he shall be credited with profits and not debited with losses, and as against the firm's creditors he has no higher rights in the firm's property than an adult partner. His only immunity is from personal liability. *Elm City Lumber Co. v. Haupt*, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 489.

<sup>82</sup> *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572; *Clark v. Goddard*, 39 Ala. 164, 84 Am. Dec. 777; *Harney v. Owen*, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 337, 30 Am. Dec. 662; *Cain v. Garner*, 169 Ky. 633, 185 S. W. 122, L. R. A. 1916E, 628, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 824; *Ping Min. & Mill. Co. v. Grant*, 68 Kan. 732, 75 Pac. 1044. The rule that no promise will be implied to pay for services rendered when it was mutually understood that they were to be gratuitous applies to rendition of services by an infant to an adult. *Ramsdell v. Coombs Aeroplane Co.* (Sup.) 161 N. Y. Supp. 360.

<sup>83</sup> *Goodsell v. Myers*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 479; *Fetrow v. Wiseman*, 40 Ind. 148; *Wamsley v. Lindenberger*, 2 Rand. (Va.) 478; *Earle v. Reed*, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 389; *Minock v. Shortridge*, 21 Mich. 314; *Watson v. Ruderman*, 79 Conn. 687, 66 Atl. 515; *Darlington v. Hamilton Bank*, 63 Misc. Rep. 289, 116 N. Y. Supp. 678; *Wright v. Buchanan*, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53; *Heffington v. Jackson*, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 96 S. W. 108.

<sup>84</sup> *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101; *Willis v. Twambly*, 13 Mass. 204; *Frazier v. Massey*, 14 Ind. 382; *Briggs v. McCabe*, 27 Ind. 327, 89 Am. Dec. 503; *Murray v. Thompson*, 136 Tenn. 118, 188 S. W. 578, L. R. A. 1917B, 1172.

<sup>85</sup> *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burrows, 1794; *Griffith v. Schwendeman*, 27 Mo. 412.

<sup>86</sup> *Jones v. Bank*, 8 N. Y. 228; *Millsaps v. Estes*, 137 N. C. 535, 50 S. E. 227, 70 L. R. A. 170, 107 Am. St. Rep. 496; *Barnaby v. Barnaby*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 221.

<sup>87</sup> *Brown v. Caldwell*, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 114, 13 Am. Dec. 660.

<sup>88</sup> *Ware v. Cartledge*, 24 Ala. 622, 60 Am. Dec. 489; *Baker v. Lovett*, 6 Mass. 78, 4 Am. Dec. 88.

<sup>89</sup> *Worthy v. Jonesville Oil Mill*, 77 S. C. 69, 57 S. E. 634, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 690, 12 Ann. Cas. 688; *Interstate Coal Co. v. Love*, 153 Ky. 323, 155 S. W. 746; *Hollinger v. York Rys. Co.*, 225 Pa. 419, 74 Atl. 344, 17 Ann. Cas. 571; *Chicago Telephone Co. v. Schulz*, 121 Ill. App. 573.

<sup>90</sup> *Holt v. Ward Clarendieux*, 2 Strange, 937; *Hunt v. Peake*, 5 Cow. (N.

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<sup>91</sup> *WULLER v. CHUSE GROCERY CO.*, 147 Ill. App. 224, affirmed 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 522, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 262.

*Valid Contracts*

Voidable contracts are in one sense valid—that is, they are valid until avoided;<sup>92</sup> but the term “valid,” as used in reference to infants’ contracts, means such contracts as are binding on the infant as well as on the contracting party. This is the sense in which the term is used here. While most contracts made by an infant are voidable by him, there are certain contracts which bind.

Quasi contracts or contracts created by law, because of a legal duty on the part of the party bound, are as binding on an infant as on an adult. The liability of a husband to pay for necessities furnished to his wife or children, and the liability of a husband to pay his wife’s antenuptial debts, are imposed on infant as well as adult husbands.<sup>93</sup> And so it is as to any other quasi contractual liability.<sup>94</sup> These kinds of obligation do not depend upon the consent of the person bound, but are imposed by law, and therefore the reasons for which an infant is allowed to avoid his contracts do not apply. As will be seen, the liability of an infant for necessities furnished him is really a quasi contractual liability, and might properly be treated under this head. The importance of the subject, however, makes a separate treatment advisable.<sup>95</sup>

Contracts made by an infant under authority or direction of a statute<sup>96</sup>—as when he executes a bond for the support of a bastard

Y.) 475, 15 Am. Dec. 475; *Rush v. Wick*, 31 Ohio St. 521, 27 Am. Rep. 523; *Cannon v. Alsbury*, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76, 10 Am. Dec. 709; *Warwick v. Cooper*, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 650. In *McConkey v. Barnes*, 42 Ill. App. 511, it was held that a statute providing that persons under the age of 21 years “may contract and be joined in marriage” does not remove an infant’s disability, so as to render him liable for breach of his promise to marry, but merely means that an actual marriage by an infant shall be valid.

<sup>92</sup> The deed of a minor conveys a good title. *Hatton v. Bodau Lumber Co.*, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 123 S. W. 163. A minor’s declaration of trust is valid until avoided. *Eldridge v. Hoefer*, 52 Or. 241, 93 Pac. 246, 94 Pac. 563, 96 Pac. 1105. The mere fact a grantee in a deed is an infant does not prevent the title from passing. *Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial Dist.*, 41 Utah, 279, 125 Pac. 671.

<sup>93</sup> *Roach v. Quick*, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 238; *Cole v. Seeley*, 25 Vt. 220, 60 Am. Dec. 258; *Butler v. Breck*, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 164, 39 Am. Dec. 768; *Nicholson v. Wilborn*, 13 Ga. 467; *Cantine v. Phillips’ Adm’r*, 5 Har. (Del.) 428.

<sup>94</sup> Post, p. 478.

<sup>95</sup> See post, p. 480.

<sup>96</sup> *Stanhope v. Shambow*, 54 Mont. 360, 170 Pac. 752; *Clemmer v. Price*, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 125 S. W. 604. See, also, *Equitable Trust Co. v. Moss*, 149 App. Div. 615, 134 N. Y. Supp. 533; *Hamm v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 137 App. Div. 504, 122 N. Y. Supp. 35.

child,<sup>97</sup> gives a recognizance for appearance in court,<sup>98</sup> enters into a contract of enlistment in the army,<sup>99</sup> or makes an assignment under a statute allowing "every person" to assign<sup>1</sup>—cannot be avoided by him. So, too, it is provided by statute in some states that an infant cannot disaffirm contracts entered into with one who, by reason of the infant's having engaged in trade or business as an adult, had reason to believe him capable of contracting.<sup>2</sup>

A contract executed by an infant which the law could have compelled him to execute is binding, and cannot be avoided by him, though actually executed without the intervention of the law.<sup>3</sup> It was accordingly held in the leading case of *Zouch v. Parsons*,<sup>4</sup> where lands had been conveyed to an infant as security, and a reconveyance made by the infant on payment of the debt, that the reconveyance could not subsequently be avoided. So, where a father caused lands to be placed in his minor son's name to defraud his creditors, and thereafter sold the lands to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and the infant executed a deed to such purchaser, it was held that the infant could not avoid the conveyance on coming of age.<sup>5</sup> So, where an infant fraudulently obtained the legal title to real estate under such circumstances as to create a constructive trust in favor of another, and thereafter deeded the property to the beneficiary, it was held that he could not disaffirm his deed in execution of the trust, since it was a duty which a court of equity would have compelled him to perform.<sup>6</sup> So, generally,

<sup>97</sup> *People v. Moores*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 518, 47 Am. Dec. 272.

<sup>98</sup> *Tyler*, Inf. § 122; *State v. Weatherwax*, 12 Kan. 463; *Dial v. Wood*, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 296.

<sup>99</sup> *Rex v. Inhabitants of Rotherfield Greys*, 1 Barn. & C. 345; *U. S. v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mason, 71, 83 Fed. Cas. No. 14,497; *In re Hearn* (D. C.) 32 Fed. 141; *Com. v. Murray*, 4 Bin. (Pa.) 487, 5 Am. Dec. 412; *U. S. v. Blakeney*, 3 Grat. (Va.) 405; *Com. v. Gamble*, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 93; *In re Higgins*, 16 Wis. 351.

<sup>1</sup> *People v. Mullin*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 698.

<sup>2</sup> *BEICKLER v. GUENTHER*, 121 Iowa, 419, 96 N. W. 895, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 256; *Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Dukes*, 121 Ga. 787, 49 S. E. 788. But it is held in these cases that the infant must have been carrying on business of his own and as a regular employment for a livelihood or profit. An infant working for wages is not engaged in business as an adult, within Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 4235. *Pearson v. White & Cochran*, 13 Ga. App. 117, 78 S. E. 864.

<sup>3</sup> *Sims v. Gunter*, 201 Ala. 286, 78 South. 62.

<sup>4</sup> 3 Burrows, 1801.

<sup>5</sup> *Elliott v. Horn*, 10 Ala. 348, 44 Am. Dec. 488; *Prouty v. Edgar*, 6 Iowa, 353; *Starr v. Wright*, 20 Ohio St. 97.

<sup>6</sup> *Nordholt v. Nordholt*, 87 Cal. 552, 26 Pac. 599, 22 Am. St. Rep. 268.

an infant cannot, on his majority, avoid an act which he could have been compelled to perform.<sup>7</sup>

When an infant is under a legal obligation to do an act, he may bind himself by a fair and reasonable contract made for the purpose of discharging the obligation, as under a contract for necessities furnished his wife and children, where the parent is held liable for his child's support,<sup>8</sup> or on a promissory note given for such necessities.<sup>9</sup> Money advanced at the request of an infant to procure his release from arrest for a debt incurred for necessities,<sup>10</sup> or to pay a debt for necessities,<sup>11</sup> can be recovered from him. An agreement by an infant with the mother of his illegitimate child, to support it, was held a valid claim against the minor's estate, on his decease, as being an agreement to perform an obligation which he was legally bound to perform.<sup>12</sup> A note given by an infant in settlement of his liability for a tort has, on the same principle, been held enforceable against him.<sup>13</sup>

Acts performed by an infant as executor, agent, officer of a corporation, or in any other representative capacity, which do not touch his own interest, but which are in the exercise of authority intrusted to him, are binding.<sup>14</sup> Such a contract is not a contract of the infant. He does not attempt to bind himself. There is no reason why he should not act as agent so as to bind another who has duly authorized him.

In some jurisdictions it is held that, if the contract is so far executed that the infant has received the consideration, he cannot repudiate the contract, and recover what he has paid, unless he can and does place the other party in statu quo.<sup>15</sup> This doctrine is not generally accepted, as we shall presently see, in cases where the consideration cannot be returned.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>7</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 242; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 9 L. Ed. 345; *Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton*, 3 Ohio St. 494; *Trader v. Jarvis*, 23 W. Va. 100.

<sup>8</sup> *People v. Moores*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 518, 47 Am. Dec. 272.

<sup>9</sup> *Sawyer v. Cutting*, 23 Vt. 486.

<sup>10</sup> *Clarke v. Leslie*, 5 Esp. 28.

<sup>11</sup> *Randall v. Sweet*, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 460.

<sup>12</sup> *Stowers v. Hollis*, 83 Ky. 544; *Gavin v. Burton*, 8 Ind. 69.

<sup>13</sup> *Ray v. Tubbs*, 50 Vt. 688, 28 Am. Rep. 519.

<sup>14</sup> *Metc. Cont.* 66; *Schouler, Dom. Rel.* 416; *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burrows, 1794, 1802.

<sup>15</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 240; *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379.

<sup>16</sup> *Post*, p. 508.

### LIABILITY FOR NECESSARIES

200. An infant is liable for the reasonable value of necessities furnished to him, or to his wife or, in some, but not all, jurisdictions, to his children, where he refuses or neglects to provide for them. As he is liable only for the reasonable value of the necessities furnished him, he cannot bind himself by an express contract of such a nature that the consideration cannot be inquired into; but, if the consideration can be inquired into, an express contract is binding to the extent of the value of the necessities.
201. The infant is not liable at law, though it is otherwise in equity, for money borrowed by him, though expended for necessities; but he is liable, even at law, where the lender applies the money himself, or sees it applied, in payment for necessities, or pays it for necessities already furnished.
202. What are "necessaries" will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. The term includes whatever is reasonably needed for subsistence, health, comfort, or education, taking into consideration his state, station, and degree in life. The term does not include
- (a) What is purely ornamental.
  - (b) What contributes solely to pleasure.
  - (c) What he is already fully supplied with.
  - (d) Articles which might otherwise be necessities, when he is living under the care of his parent or guardian, and is supplied by him with such things as he considers necessary.
  - (e) What concerns his estate or business, and not his person.
  - (f) Persons supplying an infant act at their peril, and cannot recover if the actual circumstances were such that the things furnished were not necessities.
203. It is the province of the courts to determine whether the particular article furnished falls within the definition of "necessaries," and of the jury to say whether they are necessities under the circumstances of the particular case.

The most important valid contracts of an infant—that is, contracts which cannot be avoided by him—are his contracts for neces-

saries. The privilege of avoiding his contracts, which the law recognizes in certain cases, is for the protection of the infant, and there is no reason to relieve him from his contracts for necessities.<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, it might be a great hardship if he could not pledge his credit for necessities. Accordingly, the cases are uniform in holding infants bound to a certain extent by such contracts.<sup>18</sup> An infant is also liable for necessities supplied his wife,<sup>19</sup> on the theory that he is answerable for her support; and he has also been held liable for necessities supplied his child.<sup>20</sup> His liability for his child's necessities must be based on the parent's duty of support; and in England, and in some states in this country, where it is held that a parent is under no common-law duty to support his children,<sup>21</sup> a parent, in the absence of some contract, express or implied, is not liable for their necessities.<sup>22</sup>

An infant is not only liable on his contract for necessities, but, the contract being one implied in law, he is liable without any express contract. Moreover, his express contract, which is other than the contract implied in law, will not bind him.<sup>23</sup> For instance, the law implies an agreement on his part to pay what the necessities are reasonably worth, and his agreement to pay more is voidable.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> An infant binds himself by a contract for necessities, if equitable and reasonable, on the theory that he may make contracts beneficial to himself. *Smoot v. Ryan*, 187 Ala. 396, 65 South. 828.

<sup>18</sup> Infant is bound by his contract for necessities in view of Rev. Codes, § 3593. *Stanhope v. Shambow*, 54 Mont. 360, 170 Pac. 752.

<sup>19</sup> *Turner v. Trisby*, 1 Strange, 168; *Chapple v. Cooper*, 13 Mees. & W. 252; *Cantine v. Phillips' Adm'r*, 5 Har. (Del.) 428; *People v. Moores*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 518, 47 Am. Dec. 272. Or family, *Chapman v. Hughes*, 61 Miss. 339; *Price v. Sanders*, 60 Ind. 310; *Land v. State*, 71 Fla. 270, 71 South. 279, L. R. A. 1916E, 720.

<sup>20</sup> *Van Valkinburgh v. Watson*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 480, 7 Am. Dec. 395; *Ex parte Ryder*, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 185, 42 Am. Dec. 109; *McConnell v. McConnell*, 75 N. H. 385, 74 Atl. 875.

<sup>21</sup> Ante, p. 321.

<sup>22</sup> "In point of law, a father who gives no authority, and enters into no contract, is no more liable for goods supplied to his son than a brother or an uncle or a mere stranger would be." Lord Abinger, C. B., in *Mortimore v. Wright*, 6 Mees. & W. 481. Accord, *Shelton v. Springett*, 11 C. B. 452; *Kelley v. Davis*, 49 N. H. 187, 6 Am. Rep. 499; *Gordon v. Potter*, 17 Vt. 348.

<sup>23</sup> *Jones v. Valentine's School of Telegraphy*, 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043; *Appeal of Ennis*, 84 Conn. 610, 80 Atl. 772; *Plummer v. Northern Pac. R. Co.*, 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73.

<sup>24</sup> *Earle v. Reed*, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 387; *Davis v. Gay*, 141 Mass. 531, 6 N. E. 549; *Beeler v. Young*, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 519; *Parsons v. Keys*, 43 Tex. 557; *Hyer v. Hyatt*, 3 Cranch, C. C. 276, Fed. Cas. No. 6,977; *Sims v. Gunter*, 201

He cannot be liable on an executory contract for necessities.<sup>25</sup> So, too, he may avoid any contract for necessities the consideration of which cannot be inquired into. Some cases go so far as to hold that negotiable paper given for necessities, even as between the original parties, is void, though the consideration can be inquired into, since it could not be inquired into if it should pass into an innocent third party's hands for value.<sup>26</sup> There are other cases which hold that a note given for necessities is merely voidable as between the original parties, since the consideration is open to inquiry, and that the value of the articles can be ascertained, and judgment given *pro tanto*.<sup>27</sup>

An infant is liable for money expended in payment of necessities furnished to him, but not for money supplied to him, to be by him expended, although it is actually laid out for necessities.<sup>28</sup> "The reason for this distinction is that in the latter case the contract arises upon the lending, and that the law will not support contracts which are to depend for their validity upon a subsequent contingency."<sup>29</sup> This objection does not arise, however, where the lend-

Ala. 286, 78 South. 62; *Dubose v. Wheddon*, 4 McCord (S. C.) 221; *Locke v. Smith*, 41 N. H. 346. In *Stone v. Dennison*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 654, when an infant entered into an agreement to labor until of age, in consideration of being furnished with board, clothing, and education, it was held that, the agreement being fair and reasonable when entered into, the infant could not maintain a quantum meruit for his services, on their turning out to be worth more than the agreed compensation.

<sup>25</sup> *MAULDIN v. SOUTHERN SHORTHAND & BUSINESS UNIVERSITY*, 3 Ga. App. 800, 60 S. E. 358, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 259; *Jones v. Valentine's School of Telegraphy*, 122 Wis. 818, 99 N. W. 1043; *International Text-Book Co. v. McKone*, 133 Wis. 200, 113 N. W. 438.

<sup>26</sup> *Williamson v. Watts*, 1 Camp. 552; *Trueman v. Hurst*, 1 Term R. 40; *In re Solytkoff*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 413; *Swasey v. Vanderheyden's Adm'r*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 33; *Fenton v. White*, 4 N. J. Law, 111; *McMinn v. Richmonds*, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 9; *Bouchell v. Clary*, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 194; *McCrillis v. How*, 3 N. H. 348; *Henderson v. Fox*, 5 Ind. 489; *Morton v. Steward*, 5 Ill. App. 533.

<sup>27</sup> *Earle v. Reed*, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 887; *Bradley v. Pratt*, 23 Vt. 378; *Dubose v. Wheddon*, 4 McCord (S. C.) 221; *Conn v. Coburn*, 7 N. H. 368, 26 Am. Dec. 746; *Aaron v. Harley*, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 26; *Askey v. Williams*, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S. W. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176; *Guthrie v. Morris*, 22 Ark. 411.

<sup>28</sup> *Ellis v. Ellis*, 5 Mod. 368; *Earle v. Peale*, 10 Mod. 67; *Clarke v. Leslie*, 5 Esp. 28; *KILGORE v. RICH*, 83 Me. 305, 22 Atl. 176, 12 L. R. A. 859, 23 Am. St. Rep. 780, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 257; *Randall v. Sweet*, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 460; *Swift v. Bennett*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 438; *Lein v. Centaur Motor Co.*, 194 Ill. App. 509; *Beeler v. Young*, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 519;

<sup>29</sup> *Swift v. Bennett*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 438. Accord, *Earle v. Peale*, 10 Mod. 67.

er applies the money himself, or sees it applied, to the purchase of necessities; and in such case the infant is bound.<sup>30</sup> In equity, however, the infant is liable for money borrowed to pay for necessities, when it is so applied, even by the infant, because the lender by subrogation stands in the place of the person paid.<sup>31</sup>

#### *What are Necessaries*

The principal items included under infant's necessities are his, food, clothing, lodging, medical attendance, and education.<sup>32</sup> Accordingly, an infant has been held liable for board supplied him,<sup>33</sup> for food and lodging at an hotel;<sup>34</sup> for clothing,<sup>35</sup> medicine,<sup>36</sup> a horse, where horseback exercise was prescribed by a physician;<sup>37</sup>

*Genereux v. Sibley*, 18 R. I. 43, 25 Atl. 345; *Haine's Adm'r v. Tarrant*, 2 Hill (S. C.) 400; *Conn v. Coburn*, 7 N. H. 368, 26 Am. Dec. 746.

<sup>30</sup> *Smith v. Oliphant*, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 306; *Randall v. Sweet*, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 460; *Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Moss*, 149 App. Div. 615, 134 N. Y. Supp. 533.

<sup>31</sup> *Marlow v. Pitfield*, 1 P. Wms. 558; *Price v. Sanders*, 60 Ind. 310; *Hickman v. Hall's Adm'rs*, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 338.

<sup>32</sup> *Co. Litt.* 172a; *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. 285; *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. § 411. See, also, *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Greer*, 115 Tenn. 368, 89 S. W. 327, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 525, holding that a contract between an infant and a telegraph company for the transmission of a telegram to the infant's parents requesting money for the infant, who was practically destitute and without work, was a contract for necessities. A contract to perform services in return for food, clothing, and lodging in a contract for necessities which the infant could make. *Starke v. Storm's Ex'r*, 115 Va. 651, 79 S. E. 1057.

<sup>33</sup> *Bradley v. Pratt*, 23 Vt. 378; *Barnes v. Barnes*, 50 Conn. 572; *Rivers v. Gregg*, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 274; *Sculer v. Hydliiff*, 9 Mich. 274. But, when undergraduates were supplied by the college with what is generally necessary, dinners supplied at private rooms were held, *prima facie*, not necessities. *Wharton v. Mackenzie*, 5 Q. B. 606; *Brooker v. Scott*, 11 Mees. & W. 67.

<sup>34</sup> *Watson v. Cross*, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147.

<sup>35</sup> *Makarell v. Bachelor*, Cro. Eliz. 583; *Glover v. Ott's Adm'r*, 1 McCord (S. C.) 572. But not for clothing to an unnecessary amount. *Burghart v. Angerstein*, 6 Car. & P. 690; *Johnson v. Lines*, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542.

<sup>36</sup> *Glover v. Ott's Adm'r*, 1 McCord (S. C.) 572; *Werner's Appeal*, 91 Pa. 222; *Harris v. Crowley*, 161 Mich. 383, 126 N. W. 421. A physician's services are necessities, for which an infant is liable. *Gibbs v. Poplar Bluff Light & Power Co.*, 142 Mo. App. 19, 125 S. W. 840.

<sup>37</sup> *Hart v. Prater*, 1 Jur. 623; *Cornelia v. Ellis*, 11 Ill. 585. But a buggy is not necessary for an infant not engaged in any business requiring the use of a buggy, nor attending school, so as to make it necessary for him to ride to and from school. *Heffington v. Jackson*, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 98 S. W. 108. A note for \$100, given by a boy having an estate of less than \$1,000, for a horse which he used in going to school and in hauling wood, is invalid; the horse not being a necessary. *Rhodes v. Frazier's Estate* (Mo. App.) 204 S. W. 547.

for dentist's services;<sup>38</sup> and for a common-school education.<sup>39</sup> Though it has been said that a college education cannot be a necessary,<sup>40</sup> there would seem to be no reason why a college education might not be classed as a necessary, if suitable to the infant's situation in life. As was said in an English case: "A knowledge of the learned languages may be necessary for one; a mere knowledge of reading and writing may be sufficient for another."<sup>41</sup> Yet a professional education has been held not to be a necessary,<sup>42</sup> although the opposite has been held as to instruction in a trade.<sup>43</sup>

An infant's necessities vary according to the person. They are not restricted to what is necessary to support life, but extend to articles fit to maintain the particular person, in the state, situation, and degree in life in which he is.<sup>44</sup> In *Hands v. Slaney*,<sup>45</sup> Lord

<sup>38</sup> *Strong v. Foote*, 42 Conn. 203; *McLean v. Jackson*, 12 Ga. App. 51, 76 S. E. 792.

<sup>39</sup> *Co. Litt.* 172; *Middlebury College v. Chandler*, 16 Vt. 686, 42 Am. Dec. 537; *Price v. Sanders*, 60 Ind. 310; *International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly*, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 939, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125; *Pickering v. Gunning*, W. Jones, 182; *International Text-Book Co. v. Doran*, 80 Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255 (where the question whether instruction in arithmetic and other common branches was necessary to a youth who had finished two years in high school was held to be one of fact). Board while at school. *KILGORE v. RICH*, 83 Me. 306, 22 Atl. 176, 12 L. R. A. 859, 23 Am. St. Rep. 780, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 257.

<sup>40</sup> *Middlebury College v. Chandler*, 16 Vt. 689, 42 Am. Dec. 537. See, also, *Gayle v. Hayes' Adm'r*, 79 Va. 542; *International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly*, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 939, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125; *Smith*, Cont. 269.

<sup>41</sup> *Peters v. Fleming*, 6 Mees. & W. 42.

<sup>42</sup> *Turner v. Galtner*, 83 N. C. 357, 35 Am. Rep. 574; *Bouchell v. Clary*, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 194; *Wallin v. Highland Park Co.*, 127 Iowa, 131, 102 N. W. 839, 4 Ann. Cas. 421. Nor religious instruction. *St. John's Parish v. Bronson*, 40 Conn. 75, 16 Am. Rep. 17. A contract for a complete course in steam engineering is not a necessary. *International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly*, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 939, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125.

<sup>43</sup> *Cooper v. Simmons*, 7 Hurl. & N. 707. And see *Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand & Business University*, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 922, 8 Ann. Cas. 130.

<sup>44</sup> *Parke, B.*, in *Peters v. Fleming*, 6 Mees. & W. 42; *Hands v. Slaney*, 8 Term R. 578; *Ryder v. Wombwell*, L. R. 4 Exch. 32; *Coates v. Wilson*, 5 Esp. 152; *Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand & Business University*, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 922, 8 Ann. Cas. 130; *Wallace v. Leroy*, 57 W. Va. 263, 50 S. E. 243, 110 Am. St. Rep. 777; *McKanna v. Merry*, 61 Ill. 177; *Jordan v. Coffield*, 70 N. C. 110; *Nicholson v. Spencer*, 11 Ga. 607. The word "necessaries" is a relative term, except when applied to such things as are obviously requisite

<sup>45</sup> 8 Term R. 578.

Kenyon said: "But, as to the other article furnished—namely, the livery—I cannot say that it was not necessary for a gentleman in the defendant's situation to have a servant; and, if it was proper for him to have one, it was equally necessary that the servant should have a livery. The general rule is clear that infants are liable for necessities, according to their degree and station in life." In a Massachusetts case<sup>46</sup> it was said: "It would be difficult to lay down any general rule upon this subject, and to say what would or what would not be necessities. It is a flexible, and not an absolute, term, having relation to the infant's condition in life, to the habits and pursuits of the place in which, and the people among whom, he lives, and to the changes in those habits and pursuits occurring in the progress of society. Articles which are purely ornamental are not necessities, though, if useful as well as ornamental, they may be, if necessary to support the infant properly in his station in life."<sup>47</sup> "Articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases allowed."<sup>48</sup> Likewise, those things which contribute only to enjoyment as a journey taken for pleasure, cannot be considered as necessities.<sup>49</sup>

To come under the head of necessities, the articles supplied an infant must be suitable to his estate and degree, not only in point of quality, but also in point of quantity;<sup>50</sup> and if a minor is already supplied, no matter from what quarter, any further supply of goods

for the maintenance of existence, and depends on the social position and situation in life of the infant, as well as on his own fortune and that of his parents. *International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly*, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 939, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125. Articles purchased for or by an infant are not necessities merely because useful or beneficial to him, and a \$100 note given by a 16 year old boy, having an estate of less than \$1,000, for a horse which he used in going to school and hauling wood, was invalid; the horse not being a necessary. *Rhodes v. Frazier's Estate* (Mo. App.) 204 S. W. 547.

<sup>46</sup> *Breed v. Judd*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 455.

<sup>47</sup> *Peters v. Fleming*, 6 Mees. & W. 42.

<sup>48</sup> *Chapple v. Cooper*, 13 Mees. & W. 252.

<sup>49</sup> *Harrison v. Fane*, 1 Man. & G. 550; *McKanna v. Merry*, 61 Ill. 179; *House v. Alexander*, 105 Ind. 109, 4 N. E. 891, 55 Am. Rep. 189; *Glover v. Ott's Adm'r*, 1 McCord (S. C.) 572; *Beeler v. Young*, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 519; *Miller v. Smith*, 26 Minn. 248, 2 N. W. 942, 37 Am. Rep. 407; *Pyne v. Wood*, 145 Mass. 558, 14 N. E. 775; *Howard v. Simpkins*, 70 Ga. 322.

<sup>50</sup> *Burghart v. Angerstein*, 6 Car. & P. 690; *Johnson v. Lines*, 6 Watts & S. 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542; *Nicholson v. Spencer*, 11 Ga. 607.

of the same description will not be necessities.<sup>51</sup> Where a minor is living with parent or guardian who provides the real necessities of life, the minor cannot bind himself for what might ordinarily be classed as his necessities, for the parent or guardian has the right to decide in what way the minor shall live;<sup>52</sup> and, when a minor is so residing, a presumption arises, rebuttable by proof, that he is supplied with necessities.<sup>53</sup>

Among necessities can be included only such things as concern the person, and not the estate.<sup>54</sup> As was said in a Massachusetts case:<sup>55</sup>

"The wants to be supplied are, however, personal—either those for the body, as food, clothing, lodging, and the like; or those necessary for the proper cultivation of the mind." Articles used by him in business are not necessities, although essential thereto. "His buying to maintain his trade, although he gain thereby his living, shall not bind him."<sup>56</sup> Building material used in the erection

<sup>51</sup> *Burghart v. Angerstein*, 6 Car. & P. 690; *Barnes v. Toye*, 13 Q. B. Div. 410; *Davis v. Caldwell*, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 512; *Nicholson v. Willborn*, 13 Ga. 467; *Perrin v. Wilson*, 10 Mo. 451; *McAllister v. Gatlin*, 3 Ga. App. 731, 60 S. E. 355; *Potter v. Thomas* (Sur.) 164 N. Y. Supp. 923; *Guthrie v. Murphy*, 4 Watts (Pa.) 80, 28 Am. Dec. 681. But see *Ryder v. Wombwell*, L. R. 3 Exch. 90. An infant who has an allowance sufficient to supply himself with necessities has been held not to be liable for articles supplied on credit. *Rivers v. Gregg*, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 274. For collection of cases on this point, see *Ewell*, *Lead. Cas. note*, pp. 63, 64.

<sup>52</sup> 2 Kent, *Comm.* 240; *Bainbridge v. Pickering*, 2 W. Bl. 1325; *Hoyt v. Casey*, 114 Mass. 397, 19 Am. Rep. 371; *Kline v. L'Amoureux*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 419, 22 Am. Dec. 652; *Elrod v. Myers*, 2 Head (Tenn.) 33; *Jones v. Colvin*, 1 McM. (S. C.) 14; *Pearson v. White & Cochran*, 13 Ga. App. 117, 78 S. E. 864; *Perrin v. Wilson*, 10 Mo. 451; *Wailing v. Toll*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 141; *Guthrie v. Murphy*, 4 Watts (Pa.) 80, 28 Am. Dec. 681; *Kraker v. Byrum*, 13 Rich. (S. C.) 163. An infant, who voluntarily leaves the house of her father, who has ability and willingness to support her, cannot make a binding contract for necessities. *Goodman v. Alexander*, 28 App. Div. 227, 50 N. Y. Supp. 884.

<sup>53</sup> *Hull's Assignees v. Connolly*, 3 McCord (S. C.) 6, 15 Am. Dec. 612; *Perrin v. Wilson*, 10 Mo. 451; *Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand & Business University*, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 922, 8 Ann. Cas. 130; *McAllister v. Gatlin*, 3 Ga. App. 731, 60 S. E. 355; *Freeman v. Bridger*, 49 N. C. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 258.

<sup>54</sup> *Burton v. Anthony*, 46 Or. 47, 79 Pac. 185, 68 L. R. A. 826, 114 Am. St. Rep. 847, holding that an infant was not bound as for necessities on a loan of money to redeem land from mortgage sale. Money advanced to pay off a prior mortgage is not a necessary. *Magee v. Welsh*, 18 Cal. 155; *Bicknell v. Bicknell*, 111 Mass. 265; *West v. Gregg's Adm'r*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 53.

<sup>55</sup> *Tupper v. Cadwell*, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 559, 46 Am. Dec. 704.

<sup>56</sup> *Whittingham v. Hill*, Cro. Jac. 494. *Accord*, *Dilk v. Keighley*, 2 Esp. 480; *Wallace v. Leroy*, 57 W. Va. 263, 50 S. E. 243, 110 Am. St. Rep. 777;

of a house on the infant's land does not come under the head of necessities,<sup>57</sup> and a mechanic's lien therefor cannot be enforced against the property.<sup>58</sup> On the same principle, an infant cannot be bound by a contract for repairs to be made on his real estate, though necessary to prevent immediate injury;<sup>59</sup> nor for protection by insurance against fire;<sup>60</sup> nor for life insurance;<sup>61</sup> nor for legal services to protect his property,<sup>62</sup> though he would be liable for such services in defending him on a criminal charge.<sup>63</sup>

What are necessities is a mixed question of law and fact. It is for the court to say whether the articles in question can be necessities, and for the jury to say whether they are.<sup>64</sup> As was said in a

*Lamkin & Foster v. Le Doux*, 101 Me. 581, 64 Atl. 1048, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104; *Mason v. Wright*, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 306; *Paul v. Smith*, 41 Mo. App. 275; *House v. Alexander*, 105 Ind. 109, 4 N. E. 891, 53 Am. Rep. 189; *Decell v. Lewenthal*, 57 Miss. 331, 34 Am. Rep. 449; *Wood v. Losey*, 50 Mich. 475, 15 N. W. 557; *Crew-Levick Co. v. Hull*, 125 Md. 6, 93 Atl. 208, *Lein v. Centaur Motor Co. of Illinois*, 194 Ill. App. 509. Where infant was engaged in business of operating automobile as common carrier, whatever was furnished to him to enable him to carry on such business did not come within description of "necessaries." *La Rose v. Nichols*, 91 N. J. Law, 355, 103 Atl. 390. But this question is regulated by statute in some states. See ante, p. 478.

<sup>57</sup> *Freeman v. Bridger*, 49 N. C. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 258; *Wornack v. Loar*, 11 S. W. 438, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 6.

<sup>58</sup> *Jones, Liens*, § 1239; *Price v. Jennings*, 62 Ind. 111; *Bloomer v. Nolan*, 36 Neb. 51, 53 N. W. 1039, 38 Am. St. Rep. 690.

<sup>59</sup> *Tupper v. Cadwell*, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 559, 46 Am. Dec. 704; *Wallis v. Bardwell*, 126 Mass. 366; *PHILLIPS v. LLOYD*, 18 R. I. 99, 25 Atl. 909, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 261; *West v. Gregg's Adm'r*, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 53. But see *James v. Sasser*, 3 Ga. App. 568, 60 S. E. 329.

<sup>60</sup> *New Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes*, 32 N. H. 345.

<sup>61</sup> *Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America*, 184 Mass. 348, 68 N. E. 673, 63 L. R. A. 741, 100 Am. St. Rep. 560, holding that the fact that such a contract was reasonable and prudent was immaterial. See, also, *Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. Fuller*, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 415. For a full discussion of the status of contracts of insurance taken out by an infant, see *Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance*, vol. 1, pp. 72-77.

<sup>62</sup> *Phelps v. Worcester*, 11 N. H. 51; *Watts v. Houston* (Okla.) 165 Pac. 128; *McIsaac v. Adams*, 190 Mass. 117, 76 N. E. 654, 112 Am. St. Rep. 321, 5 Ann. Cas. 729. But see *Epperson v. Nugent*, 57 Miss. 45, 34 Am. Rep. 434; *Slusher v. Weller*, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W. 684.

<sup>63</sup> *Barker v. Hilbard*, 54 N. H. 539, 20 Am. Rep. 160; *Askey v. Williams*, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S. W. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176. In *Munson v. Washband*, 31 Conn. 303, 83 Am. Dec. 151, attorney's services in a civil suit were held necessities. To the same effect, see *Burns v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.*, 190 Ill. App. 191; *Hickman & Wells v. McDonald*, 164 Iowa, 50, 145 N. W. 322; *Sutton v. Heinze*, 84 Kan. 756, 115 Pac. 560, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238, rehearing denied 85 Kan. 332, 116 Pac. 614, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 239; *Slusher v. Weller*, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W. 684.

<sup>64</sup> *Anson*, Cont. 111, 112; *Clark*, Cont. 237; *Merriam v. Cunningham*, 11

Massachusetts case: "It is the well-settled rule that it is the province of the court to determine whether the articles sued for are within the class of necessities, and, if so, it is the proper duty of the jury to pass upon the question of the quantity, quality, and their adaption to the condition and wants of the infant."<sup>65</sup>

### SAME—RATIFICATION AND DISAFFIRMANCE

204. A promise to perform an isolated act, or a contract that is wholly executory, is of no effect until it has been ratified; but an executed contract, or a contract that involves continuous rights and obligations, is valid until it has been disaffirmed.

Of course, the contract of an infant, if absolutely void, is not subject to ratification,<sup>66</sup> and need not be disaffirmed.<sup>67</sup> Some voidable contracts of an infant bind him unless he disaffirms them, while others do not bind him unless he ratifies them. A promise to perform some isolated act, or a contract that is wholly executory, has no effect until it is ratified.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, voidable contracts which are wholly or partially executed, and contracts involving continuing rights and obligations, need no ratification, but are binding until they are disaffirmed.<sup>69</sup> In other words, it may be laid down as a general rule that when an interest in property of a fixed and permanent nature is vested either in the infant, or in the other party to the contract, under an executed contract, as by a conveyance of real estate or transfer of personal property, or when the infant enters into a continuing contractual relation, as where he becomes a partner or a stockholder, there must be some distinct act of disaffirmance on the part of the infant to avoid the contract. Thus, conveyances of land to an infant are valid until disaffirmed,<sup>70</sup> and an infant lessee of land becomes liable, until disaffirmance,

Cush. (Mass.) 40; *McKanna v. Merry*, 61 Ill. 177; *Jordan v. Coffield*, 70 N. C. 110; 1 Pars. Cont. 296, and cases in note v.

<sup>65</sup> *Merriam v. Cunningham*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40.

<sup>66</sup> *Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons*, 166 Cal. 557, 137 Pac. 911.

<sup>67</sup> *Chambers v. Chattanooga Union Ry. Co.*, 130 Tenn. 459, 171 S. W. 84.

<sup>68</sup> *O'Donohue v. Smith*, 130 App. Div. 214, 114 N. Y. Supp. 536, affirming 57 Misc. Rep. 448, 109 N. Y. Supp. 929.

<sup>69</sup> *Clemmer v. Price*, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 125 S. W. 604.

<sup>70</sup> *Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District*, 41 Utah, 279, 129 Pac. 671. An infant is capable of being donee of property, and in case of

for all obligations attached to the estate, as to pay rent under a lease rendering rent,<sup>71</sup> and, when he continues in possession after becoming of age, he is chargeable with the arrears which have accrued during his minority.<sup>72</sup> An important class of contracts which are binding upon an infant until he disaffirms them are his sales and conveyances of real estate. His conveyances pass a good title to the purchaser, subject only to be divested by his disaffirmance.<sup>73</sup> And the vendee may convey his title to some one else, subject to the infant's right of disaffirmance.<sup>74</sup>

When an infant enters into a partnership, he contracts a continuing obligation, and must disaffirm the relation on reaching his majority, or he will remain a partner, and be liable as such. His mere failure to disaffirm will render him liable for the debts of the firm contracted subsequent to his becoming of age, without proof of any act on his part as a partner after his majority.<sup>75</sup> But, to render him liable for debts of the firm contracted during his minority, there must be a ratification of them, express or implied.<sup>76</sup> His mere failure to disaffirm on reaching his majority, without proof of subsequent acts as a partner, will not constitute a ratification, but failure to disaffirm, followed by acts as a partner, may. We will con-

gift to infant no formal acceptance is necessary, but, if gift is for his advantage, the law accepts it for him, and will hold the donor bound; while, if gift is not for infant's advantage, the law will repudiate it, at his instance, even though he in terms has accepted it. *Youngblood v. Hoefle* (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1057. And see *Petre v. Petre* (Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 285.

<sup>71</sup> *Bottiller v. Newport*, 21 Hen. VI. p. 31; *Northwestern Ry. Co. v. McMichael*, 5 Exch. 114, 123; *Ketsey's Case*, Cro. Jac. 320. But see, contra, *Flexner v. Dickerson*, 72 Ala. 315.

<sup>72</sup> Bac. Abr. "Infancy and Age," (1) 8; Rolle, Abr. 731.

<sup>73</sup> *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800; *HAYNES v. BENNETT*, 53 Mich. 15, 18 N. W. 539, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 276; *Parrish v. Treadway*, 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580; *McReynolds v. Stoats*, 288 Ill. 22, 122 N. E. 860; *Tunison v. Chamblin*, 88 Ill. 378; *Dixon v. Merritt*, 21 Minn. 196; *Scranton v. Stewart*, 52 Ind. 68; *Green v. Green*, 69 N. Y. 533, 25 Am. Rep. 233, and cases cited in notes 75-78, pp. 515, 516, post. For one to maintain ejectment for land deeded by him while an infant, he must disaffirm the deed before, and otherwise than by bringing the action. *Tomczek v. Wieser*, 58 Misc. Rep. 46, 108 N. Y. Supp. 784.

<sup>74</sup> *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 340, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Searcy v. Hunter*, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372, 26 Am. St. Rep. 837; *Miles v. Lingerman*, 24 Ind. 385; *Palmer v. Miller*, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 399.

<sup>75</sup> *Goode v. Harrison*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 147.

<sup>76</sup> *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; *Todd v. Clapp*, 118 Mass. 495; *Bush v. Linthicum*, 50 Md. 344.

sider this further when we come to ascertain what constitutes a ratification.<sup>77</sup>

A further illustration of an infant's contract which requires some act of disaffirmance to avoid it is the position of an infant who has become a stockholder in a corporation. "In the cases already decided upon this subject, infants having become shareholders in railway companies have been held liable to pay calls made whilst they were infants. They have been treated, therefore, as persons in a different situation from mere contractors, for then they would have been exempt; but, in truth, they are persons who have acquired an interest not in a mere chattel, but in a subject of a permanent nature, \* \* \* and with certain obligations attached to it which they are bound to discharge, \* \* \* unless they have elected to waive or disagree to the purchase altogether."<sup>78</sup> When an infant has become a stockholder, he may repudiate the contract before or after majority;<sup>79</sup> but he must disaffirm within a reasonable time after his majority, or he will be held to have ratified the contract,<sup>80</sup> and will be liable for calls.<sup>81</sup>

There is a difference of opinion whether an infant may disaffirm his contract when he has induced the other party to contract with him by false representations that he is of age. The general rule seems to be that he is not, by reason of such false representations, estopped from pleading his infancy, if sued on the contract,<sup>82</sup> nor

<sup>77</sup> Post, p. 497.

<sup>78</sup> Parke, B., in *London & N. W. Ry. Co. v. McMichael*, 20 Law J. Exch. 97, 5 Exch. 114.

<sup>79</sup> *London & N. W. Ry. Co. v. McMichael*, 20 Law J. Exch. 97; *Ebbetts' Case*, 5 Ch. App. 302; *Lumsden's Case*, 4 Ch. App. 31; *WULLER v. CHUSE GROCERY CO.*, 147 Ill. App. 224, affirmed 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 522, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 262; *Seeley v. Seeley-Howe-Le Van Co.*, 128 Iowa, 294, 103 N. W. 961. See *Cook, Stock & S.* §§ 66, 250, 318, for collection of cases on infant stockholders.

<sup>80</sup> *Lumsden's Case*, 4 Ch. App. 31; *Cork & B. Ry. Co. v. Cazenove*, 10 Q. B. 935; *Ebbetts' Case*, 5 Ch. App. 302; *Mitchell's Case*, L. R. 9 Eq. 363.

<sup>81</sup> *Dublin & W. Ry. Co. v. Black*, 8 Exch. 181.

<sup>82</sup> *Burley v. Russell*, 10 N. H. 184, 34 Am. Dec. 146; *Brown v. McCune*, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 224; *Studwell v. Shapter*, 54 N. Y. 249; *Merriam v. Cunningham*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40; *Conrad v. Lane*, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N. W. 695, 37 Am. Rep. 412; *McKamy v. Cooper*, 81 Ga. 679, 8 S. E. 312; *New York Building Loan Banking Co. v. Fisher*, 23 App. Div. 363, 48 N. Y. Supp. 152; *Beauchamp v. Bertig*, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659; *International Text-Book Co. v. Doran*, 80 Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255; *Miller v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.*, 188 Mo. App. 402, 174 S. W. 166; *International Text-*

is he estopped from avoiding the contract, and seeking affirmative relief, as the recovery of property which he has parted with.<sup>83</sup> But there are cases to the contrary.<sup>84</sup>

### SAME—TIME OF AVOIDANCE

205. Executory contracts or executed contracts relating to personality may be avoided by an infant either before or after attaining his majority; but conveyances of real estate cannot be avoided during minority, though he may enter and take the profits.
206. As a rule, mere lapse of time after attaining his majority will not bar an infant's disaffirmance of his executory contract, but in a few states he is required to disaffirm within a reasonable time.
207. As a rule, executed contracts must be disaffirmed within a reasonable time after attaining majority; but in some states it is held that the right to avoid a conveyance of real estate is not barred by acquiescence for any period short of that prescribed by the statute of limitations.

In this section we are to consider the time within which an infant may avoid his contracts, and the time within which he must avoid them. An infant's executory contract may be avoided by him at any time, either before or after attaining his majority, by refusing to perform it, and pleading his infancy when sued for a

*Book Co. v. Connelly*, 206 N. Y. 188, 90 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 939, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125. And see *Sims v. Everhardt*, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87.

<sup>83</sup> *Whitcomb v. Joslyn*, 51 Vt. 79, 31 Am. Rep. 678; *Raymond v. General Motorcycle Sales Co.*, 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359; *Norris v. Vance*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 164. His false representation that he is of age will not prevent him from avoiding his contract of service, and from recovering on a quantum meruit. *Burdett v. Williams* (D. C.) 30 Fed. 697. Nor will a recital in a deed that he is of age estop him from disaffirming the deed. *Wieland v. Koblick*, 110 Ill. 16, 51 Am. Rep. 676. But see *Bradshaw v. Van Winkle*, 133 Ind. 134, 32 N. E. 877. He may be estopped to disaffirm under such circumstances where he stands by, after majority, knowing that the land is being conveyed to subsequent purchasers. *Lacy v. Pixler*, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206.

<sup>84</sup> *Turner v. Stewart*, 149 Ky. 15, 147 S. W. 772; *Pace v. Cawood* (Ky.) 110 S. W. 414; *First Nat. Bank v. Casey*, 158 Iowa, 349, 138 N. W. 897; *Lake v. Perry*, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569; *La Rosa v. Nichols*, 92 N. J. Law, 375,

breach of it.<sup>85</sup> In the case of executed contracts, a distinction is made between contracts relating to his real estate and contracts relating to his personalty. A conveyance of his land by an infant cannot be disaffirmed during his minority.<sup>86</sup> He may enter on the land, and take the profits until the time arrives when he has the legal capacity to affirm or disaffirm the conveyance. But the conveyance is not rendered void by the entry. It may still be affirmed after he reaches his majority.<sup>87</sup>

This rule does not apply to a sale and manual delivery of chattels by an infant. Such a contract may be avoided by him while he is still an infant. In *Stafford v. Roof*,<sup>88</sup> a leading New York case, it was said: "The general rule is that an infant cannot avoid his contract, executed by himself, and which is therefore voidable only, while he is within age. He lacks legal discretion to do the act of

105 Atl. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412, reversing 91 N. J. Law, 355, 103 Atl. 390; *Putnal v. Walker*, 61 Fla. 720, 55 South. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33 (if representations are fraudulent); *GRAUMAN, MARX & CLINE CO. v. KRIENITZ*, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 251 (if contract is beneficial to him, but not otherwise). But, if grantee of deed knew grantor was an infant, the latter was not estopped by his false representations. *Asher v. Bennett*, 143 Ky. 361, 136 S. W. 879.

<sup>85</sup> *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. 254; *Rice v. Boyer*, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420, 58 Am. Rep. 53; *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; *Covault v. Nevitt*, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959; *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572; *Ray v. Haines*, 52 Ill. 485; *Whitmarsh v. Hall*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 375; *Aborn v. Janis*, 62 Misc. Rep. 95, 113 N. Y. Supp. 309, affirmed 121 App. Div. 923, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1115; *WUL- LER v. CHUSE GROCERY CO.*, 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 522, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 262, affirming 147 Ill. App. 224; *Gage v. Menczer* (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 717; *Petty v. Roberts*, 7 Bush (Ky.) 410.

<sup>86</sup> *Shreeves v. Caldwell*, 135 Mich. 323, 97 N. W. 764, 106 Am. St. Rep. 396; *White v. Sikes*, 129 Ga. 508, 59 S. E. 228, 121 Am. St. Rep. 228; *O'Donohue v. Smith*, 130 App. Div. 214, 114 N. Y. Supp. 536, affirming 57 Misc. Rep. 448, 100 N. Y. Supp. 929; *Syck v. Hellier*, 140 Ky. 388, 131 S. W. 30; *DAMRON v. RATLIFF*, 123 Ky. 758, 97 S. W. 401, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 274; *Watson v. Ruderman*, 79 Conn. 687, 66 Atl. 515, holding, further, that a mortgagee cannot invoke equity to compel an infant to exercise his right to affirm or disaffirm; *Slater v. Rudderforth*, 25 App. D. C. 497, holding that the institution of a suit for cancellation of the conveyance is a sufficient disaffirmance. Disaffirmance must be before and otherwise than by bringing suit. *Tomczek v. Wieser*, 58 Misc. Rep. 46, 108 N. Y. Supp. 784.

<sup>87</sup> *Welch v. Bunce*, 83 Ind. 382; *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burrows, 1794; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 5 Minn. 61 (Gil. 44); *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; *Hastings v. Dollarhide*, 24 Cal. 195; *Baker v. Kennett*, 54 Mo. 88; *Stafford v. Roof*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; *McCormic v. Leggett*, 53 N. C. 425.

<sup>88</sup> 9 Cow. 626.

avoidance. But this rule must be taken with the distinction that the delay shall not work unavoidable prejudice to the infant, or the object of his privilege, which is intended for his protection, would not be answered. When applied to a sale of his property, it must be his land—a case in which he may enter and receive the profits until the power of finally avoiding shall arrive. \* \* \* Should the law extend the same doctrine to sales of his personal estate, it would evidently expose him to great loss in many cases; and we shall act up to the principle of protection much more effectually by allowing him to rescind while under age, though he may sometimes misjudge, and avoid a contract which is for his own benefit. The true rule, then, appears to me to be that, where the infant can enter and hold the subject of the sale till his legal age, he shall be incapable of avoiding till that time; but where the possession is changed, and there is no legal means to regain and hold it in the meantime, the infant, or his guardian for him, has the right to exercise the power of rescission immediately.”<sup>89</sup> The rule is very general, almost universal, that an infant may avoid any contract in relation to his personal property before he is of age.<sup>90</sup> Some courts have held that he cannot avoid a partnership agreement, and recover what he has put into the firm, until he attains his majority.<sup>91</sup> Other courts hold the contrary, on the ground that it is a contract in relation to his personalty, and that all contracts of an infant in relation to his personal property may be disaffirmed during his minority.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> *Reeve*, Dom. Rel. 254; *Schouler*, Dom. Rel. 409; *Stafford v. Roof*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Hoyt v. Wilkinson*, 57 Vt. 404; *Riley v. Mallory*, 33 Conn. 201; *Carr v. Clough*, 26 N. H. 280, 59 Am. Dec. 345; *Towle v. Dresser*, 73 Me. 252; *Willis v. Twambly*, 13 Mass. 204; *Cogley v. Cushman*, 16 Minn. 397 (Gil. 354); *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 45 Ind. 142. But see *Armitage v. Widoe*, 36 Mich. 124. And see the cases cited in *Clark*, Cont. 245.

<sup>90</sup> See *Shirk v. Shultz*, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N. E. 12; *Rice v. Boyer*, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420, 58 Am. Rep. 53; *Shipley v. Smith*, 162 Ind. 526, 70 N. E. 803 (disaffirmance of a lease, a leasehold being regarded as personalty in Indiana); *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Hoyt v. Wilkinson*, 57 Vt. 404; *Willis v. Twambly*, 13 Mass. 204; *Stafford v. Roof*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 628; *Boal v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; *In re Huntenberg* (D. C.) 156 Fed. 768; *Patterson v. Kasper*, 182 Mich. 281, 148 N. W. 690, L. R. A. 1915A, 1221; *Cogley v. Cushman*, 16 Minn. 397 (Gil. 354).

<sup>91</sup> *Dunton v. Brown*, 31 Mich. 182; *Armitage v. Widoe*, 36 Mich. 130; *Bush v. Linthicum*, 59 Md. 344. But see *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379.

<sup>92</sup> *Shirk v. Shultz*, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N. E. 12; *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379.

As to whether a contract must be disaffirmed by an infant within a reasonable time after he attains his majority, the authorities are conflicting. In the case of executory contracts requiring ratification to render them binding, the right to avoid them cannot be barred by mere silence, without more. But it may be otherwise where the circumstances are such as to make it the infant's duty to speak, for in such a case silence or acquiescence may amount to a ratification.<sup>93</sup> In the case of those contracts which require disaffirmance after the infant becomes of age,<sup>94</sup> such as conveyances of land, sales and delivery of chattels, and the like, the infant must, according to the weight of authority, disaffirm the contract within a reasonable time after he attains his majority, or it cannot be avoided at all.<sup>95</sup> Many courts, however, hold that a conveyance of land by an

<sup>93</sup> Post, p. 497.

<sup>94</sup> Ante, p. 491.

<sup>95</sup> *Delano v. Blake*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 25 Am. Dec. 617; *GOODNOW v. EMPIRE LUMBER CO.*, 31 Minn. 468, 18 N. W. 283, 47 Am. Rep. 798, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 287 (collecting the cases); *Robinson v. Allison*, 192 Mo. 366, 91 S. W. 115; *In re Huntenberg* (D. C.) 153 Fed. 768; *Lawder v. Larkin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. 171; *Bigelow v. Kinney*, 8 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; *Kline v. Beebe*, 6 Conn. 494; *Wallace's Lessee v. Lewis*, 4 Har. (Del.) 75; *Hastings v. Dollarhide*, 24 Cal. 195; *Scott v. Buchanan*, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468; *Harris v. Cannon*, 6 Ga. 382; *Langdon v. Clayson*, 75 Mich. 204, 42 N. W. 805; *Chambers v. Chattanooga Union R. Co.*, 130 Tenn. 459, 171 S. W. 84; *Criswell v. Criswell*, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N. W. 302, L. R. A. 1917E, 1103; *Brown v. Staab*, 103 Kan. 611, 176 Pac. 113; *Clyde v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 192, 95 S. E. 734; *Krbel v. Krbel*, 84 Neb. 160, 120 N. W. 935; *Darlington v. Hamilton Bank*, 63 Misc. Rep. 289, 116 N. Y. Supp. 678; *Stone v. Wolfe*, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 109 S. W. 981; *Pedro v. Pedro*, 71 Misc. Rep. 296, 127 N. Y. Supp. 997; *Baggett v. Jackson*, 160 N. C. 26, 76 S. E. 86 (must disaffirm within 3 years); *Clemmer v. Price*, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 125 S. W. 604. Disaffirmance must be within one year in some states. *Helland v. Colton State Bank*, 20 S. D. 325, 106 N. W. 60; *Luce v. Jestrab*, 12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848. In *DAMRON v. RATLIFF*, 123 Ky. 758, 97 S. W. 401, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 274, it was held that an infant may ratify a conveyance of real estate by failure to disaffirm. But see *Gaskins v. Allen*, 137 N. C. 426, 49 S. E. 919, holding that a deed executed by a married woman while a minor was not ratified by lapse of time with no disaffirmance for more than 20 years. There is no definite fixed time within which a minor must disaffirm after majority. *Hobbs v. Hinton Foundry, Machine & Plumbing Co.*, 74 W. Va. 443, 32 S. E. 267, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 410. What constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact. *Salser v. Barron* (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 1039. It depends on the circumstances of the case. *Darlington v. Hamilton Bank*, 63 Misc. Rep. 289, 116 N. Y. Supp. 678. For examples of reasonable and unreasonable delay, see the following cases: *Stone v. Wolfe*, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 109 S. W. 981 (2 years reasonable); *Hobbs v. Hinton Foundry, Machine & Plumbing Co.*, 74 W. Va. 443, 32 S. E. 267, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 410 (3 months' delay not un-

infant need not be disaffirmed within any period short of that prescribed by the statute of limitations, and that acquiescence for any shorter time will not bar his right to avoid it.<sup>96</sup> In some states it is provided by statute that an infant is bound by all his contracts unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time.<sup>97</sup>

### SAME—WHO MAY AVOID CONTRACT

208. The privilege of infancy is personal to the infant, and he alone can take advantage of it during his life and sanity. On his death, or if he becomes insane, his right of avoidance passes to his heirs, personal representatives, or conservator, or guardian.

209. The other party to the contract, not being himself under disability, is bound if the infant chooses to hold him.

The right to avoid a contract on the ground of infancy is a right given to the infant for his protection. It is a personal privilege, and during his life and sanity the infant alone can take advantage

reasonable); *Hogan v. Utter*, 175 N. C. 332, 95 S. E. 565 (within 3 years reasonable); *Gannon v. Manning*, 42 App. D. C. 206 (18 days after attaining majority reasonable); *Daimwood v. Driscoll* (Tex. Civ. App.) 151 S. W. 621 (3 years unreasonable); *Kline v. Galland*, 53 Wash. 504, 102 Pac. 440 (1 year, lacking 3 days, unreasonable delay).

<sup>96</sup> *Drake's Lessee v. Ramsay*, 5 Ohio, 251; *Weeks v. Wilkins*, 134 N. C. 516, 47 S. E. 24; *Prout v. Wiley*, 28 Mich. 164; *Sims v. Everhardt*, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800; *Lacy v. Pixler*, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206; *Boody v. McKenney*, 23 Me. 517; *Richardson v. Pate*, 93 Ind. 423, 47 Am. Rep. 374; *Wells v. Seixas* (C. C.) 24 Fed. 82, and note collecting cases; *Putnal v. Walker*, 61 Fla. 720, 55 South. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33; *Justice v. Justice*, 170 Ky. 423, 186 S. W. 143; *Barker v. Fuestal*, 103 Ark. 312, 147 S. W. 45; *Lake v. Perry*, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569; *Blake v. Hollandsworth*, 71 W. Va. 387, 76 S. E. 814, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 714; *Lanning v. Brown*, 84 Ohio St. 385, 95 N. E. 921, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 772; *Watson v. Peebles*, 102 Miss. 725, 59 South. 881. In *Chicago Telephone Co. v. Schulz*, 121 Ill. App. 573, the rule was applied to the disaffirmance of a release of damages. Contingent remaindermen are not obliged to disaffirm a deed conveying their interest on attaining majority until the termination of the life estate. *Steele v. Poe*, 79 S. C. 407, 60 S. E. 951. Compare *Parrish v. Treadway*, 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580, holding that minors, who executed deeds to their contingent remainders in lands which their mother held as life tenant, could not, after 10 years after they reached their majority, disaffirm.

<sup>97</sup> *Leacox v. Griffith*, 76 Iowa, 89, 40 N. W. 109; *McCullough v. Finley*, 60 Kan. 705, 77 Pac. 696; *Johnston v. Gerry*, 34 Wash. 524, 76 Pac. 253, 77 Pac. 503; *Johnson v. Storie*, 32 Neb. 610, 49 N. W. 371.

of it.<sup>88</sup> Thus, where an infant payee of a negotiable note transferred it by indorsement to a third party, and the maker subsequently paid the note to the infant, and pleaded such payment in a suit against him by the indorsee, it was held that he could not avoid the infant's indorsement.<sup>89</sup> So, in an action for enticing away a servant, it was held that the defendant could not escape liability by showing that the servant was an infant, and therefore was not bound by the contract of service.<sup>1</sup>

The right to avoid a contract on the ground of infancy does not pass to an assignee of the infant, and this is for the same reason.<sup>2</sup> Thus, where an assignee in insolvency sought the aid of a court of equity to relieve his assignor's estate from the incumbrance of a mortgage executed while the assignor was an infant, it was held that, since the right of avoidance was for the infant's protection, he alone could have the benefit of it, and that the right did not pass to the assignee.<sup>3</sup> Though there are a number of cases to the contrary,<sup>4</sup> it has often been held that the right of avoidance does not pass to those who are the infant's privies in estate.<sup>5</sup> If the infant becomes insane, his right to avoid his contracts passes to his guardian or conservator;<sup>6</sup> and, by the weight of authority, on his death, the right passes to his heirs<sup>7</sup> or his personal representa-

<sup>88</sup> *Keane v. Boycott*, 2 H. Bl. 511; *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101; *Riley v. Dillon & Pennell*, 148 Ala. 283, 41 South. 768; *Chapman v. Duffy*, 20 Colo. App. 471, 79 Pac. 746; *Hill v. Well*, 202 Ala. 400, 80 South. 536; *Crosby v. Ardoin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 709; *Wright v. Buchanan*, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53; *Smoot v. Ryan*, 187 Ala. 396, 65 South. 828; *Latrobe v. Dietrich*, 114 Md. 8, 78 Atl. 983.

<sup>89</sup> *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101.

<sup>1</sup> *Keane v. Boycott*, 2 H. Bl. 511.

<sup>2</sup> *Whittingham's Case*, 8 Coke, 43; *Riley v. Dillon & Pennell*, 148 Ala. 283, 41 South. 768; *Austin v. Trustees*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 196, 203, 41 Am. Dec. 497; *Mansfield v. Gordon*, 144 Mass. 168, 10 N. E. 773; *Hill v. Well*, 202 Ala. 400, 80 South. 536; *Levering v. Heighe*, 2 Md. Ch. 81; *Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby*, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 236, 19 Am. Dec. 71; *Tyler, Inf.* § 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Mansfield v. Gordon*, 144 Mass. 168, 10 N. E. 773.

<sup>4</sup> *Jackson v. Burchin*, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 124; *Beeler's Heirs v. Bullitt's Heirs*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 280, 13 Am. Dec. 161. See *Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby*, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 236, 19 Am. Dec. 71, for discussion of this question, and *Ewell*, *Lead. Cas.* 90, for collection of authorities.

<sup>5</sup> *Whittingham's Case*, 8 Coke, 43; *Austin v. Trustees*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 196, 41 Am. Dec. 497; *Hoyle v. Stowe*, 19 N. C. 320; *Harris v. Ross*, 112 Ind. 314, 13 N. E. 873; *Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb*, 81 Mo. 221; *Levering v. Heighe*, 2 Md. Ch. 81.

<sup>6</sup> *Chandler v. Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117.

<sup>7</sup> *Bac. Abr.* "Infancy and Age" (I) 6; *Tyler, Inf.* § 19; *Illinois Land & Loan*

tives.<sup>8</sup> The reason of the rule extends only to them, it has been said, because the privilege is conferred for the sole benefit of the infant. While living, he should be the exclusive judge of that benefit; and, when he is dead, those alone should interfere who legally represent him. If his contracts could be avoided by third persons, the principle would operate, not for his, but for their, benefit; not when he chose to avail himself of his privileges, but when strangers elected to do it.

The other party to the contract, if he is not under any disability himself, cannot avoid it, either on the ground of the other's infancy, or on the ground that there is no mutuality.<sup>9</sup> He is bound if the infant chooses to hold him. A court of equity, however, will not grant an infant specific performance of the contract by the adult, for it does not exercise its power to compel specific performance, unless there is mutuality of remedy.<sup>10</sup> What has been said above applies, of course, only to the voidable contracts of infants. A contract which is held to be void is an absolute nullity, and may be attacked by any one.

### SAME—WHAT CONSTITUTES RATIFICATION

210. In some jurisdictions, by statute, ratification of a contract by an infant must be in writing. In the absence of such a provision, ratification may be by an express new promise, either written or oral, or, by the weight of authority, it may be implied from declarations or conduct showing an intention to adopt the contract as binding.
211. By the weight of authority, the promise must be made or the acts done by the infant with knowledge of his legal right to avoid the contract.

Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Levering v. Helghe, 2 Md. Ch. 81; HARVEY v. BRIGGS, 68 Miss. 60, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 62, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 270; Blake v. Hollandsworth, 71 W. Va. 387, 76 S. E. 814, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 714; Veal v. Fortson, 57 Tex. 482.

<sup>8</sup> Tyler, Inf. § 16; Ewell, Lead. Cas. 90, with collection of cases.

<sup>9</sup> Bac. Abr. "Infancy and Age" (I) 4; 2 Kent. Comm. 236. See, also, Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53; Youngblood v. Hoeffle (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1057.

<sup>10</sup> Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298. And see Watson v. Ruderman, 79 Com. 687, 66 Atl. 515.

In some jurisdictions it has been expressly provided by statute that, except in certain cases, no action shall be maintained on any contract made by an infant, unless he, or some person lawfully authorized, shall have ratified it in writing after he attained his majority.<sup>11</sup>

In the absence of such a provision as this—and it exists in very few jurisdictions—there need be no writing at all to constitute a ratification of a contract made by an infant. Ratification may be by words or by acts. As to the sufficiency of particular words or acts to constitute a ratification, the authorities are not agreed. On the contrary, there is an irreconcilable conflict in the decisions, and what would be sufficient in one state might not be so in another. The importance of this branch of our subject, and the uncertainty in the decisions, require that it be considered at some length. The authorities seem to agree that there must be a new promise by the infant after he attains his majority.<sup>12</sup> They also seem to agree, however, that there need not be an express promise, but that the promise may be implied from his declarations or his conduct, just as an original promise may be implied from words or conduct. The conflict in the cases is as to the inference to be drawn from particular acts or declarations.

Many of the courts hold that a mere acknowledgment of the contract or debt, whether by words or by acts, as by a part payment, which would be sufficient to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations, will not constitute a ratification, but that there must be a new promise.<sup>13</sup> It was said by the Massachusetts court: "By

<sup>11</sup> It was so provided by the English statute (St. 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, § 5) known as "Lord Tenderden's Act." This statute has been repealed by St. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 66. There are similar provisions in a few of our states. See *Thurlow v. Gilmore*, 40 Me. 378; *Lamkin & Foster v. Le Doux*, 101 Me. 581, 64 Atl. 1048, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104; *Exchange Bank of Ft. Valley v. McMillan*, 76 S. C. 561, 57 S. E. 630. And see *Barnes v. American Soda Fountain Co.*, 32 Okl. 81, 121 Pac. 250; *Steele v. Poe*, 79 S. C. 407, 60 S. E. 951.

<sup>12</sup> But there need not be a new consideration. *Bill v. Buckhalter*, 176 Ala. 62, 57 South. 460; *Edmunds v. Mister*, 58 Miss. 765.

<sup>13</sup> *Edmunds v. Mister*, 58 Miss. 765; *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229; *Smith v. Mayo*, 9 Mass. 62, 6 Am. Dec. 23; *Thrupp v. Fielder*, 2 Esp. 628; *Proctor v. Sears*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 95; *Hale v. Gerrish*, 8 N. H. 374; *Tibbets v. Gerrish*, 25 N. H. 41, 57 Am. Dec. 307; *Wilcox v. Roath*, 12 Conn. 550; *Catlin v. Haddox*, 49 Conn. 492, 44 Am. Rep. 249; *Stokes v. Brown*, 3 Pin. (Wis.) 311; *Kendrick v. Neisz*, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245; *Fetrow v. Wiseman*, 40 Ind. 148. In *Edmunds v. Mister*, *supra*, it was said that executory contracts of infants "can be ratified at common law only by an act or agreement

the authorities, a mere acknowledgment of the debt, such as would take a case out of the statute of limitations, is not a ratification of a contract made during minority. The distinction is undoubtedly well taken. The reason is that a mere acknowledgment avoids the presumption of payment which is created by the statute of limitations; whereas the contract of an infant may always, except in certain cases sufficiently known, be voided by him by plea, whether he acknowledges the debt or not; and some positive act or declaration on his part is necessary to defeat his power of avoiding it."<sup>14</sup> This rule is clearly right if it is intended to hold that a mere acknowledgment that the contract was made by the infant is not a ratification; but it is not sound if it is intended to hold that an infant does not ratify his contract by acknowledging, after he has attained his majority, that it is then binding upon him. This is a ratification.<sup>15</sup> By the great weight of opinion, the question is, in all cases, whether the words or acts of the infant after he has attained his majority show an intention on his part to adopt the contract as binding upon him, and, if they do show such an intention, a new promise or ratification is to be implied.<sup>16</sup> As was said by the Vermont court in a late case: "Where the declarations or acts of the individual after becoming of age fairly and justly lead to the inference that he intended to, and did, recognize and adopt as binding an agreement executory on his part, made during

which possesses all the ingredients necessary to a new contract, save only a new consideration. The contract made during minority will furnish the consideration, but it will furnish nothing more. All else must be supplied by the new agreement. A mere acknowledgment of the debt is not sufficient, but there must be an express promise to pay, voluntarily made."

<sup>14</sup> *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229.

<sup>15</sup> *Henry v. Root*, 33 N. Y. 526; *American Mortg. Co. of Scotland v. Wright*, 101 Ala. 658, 14 South. 399; *Little v. Duncan*, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 55, 64 Am. Dec. 760. A declaration by the promisor, after attaining his majority, that he would not take advantage of his infancy, is not effective as a ratification, if made after action on the contract has been begun. *Merriam v. Wilkins*, 6 N. H. 432, 25 Am. Dec. 472.

<sup>16</sup> *HATCH v. HATCH'S ESTATE*, 60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 271; *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; *Harris v. Wall*, 1 Exch. 130; *Henry v. Root*, 33 N. Y. 526; *Middleton v. Hoge*, 5 Bush (Ky.) 478; *Baker v. Kennett*, 54 Mo. 88; *Kendrick v. Neisz*, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245; *Wheaton v. East*, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 62, 26 Am. Dec. 251; *Hale v. Gerrish*, 8 N. H. 374; *Emmons v. Murray*, 16 N. H. 385; *Drake v. Wise*, 36 Iowa, 476; *Thomasson v. Boyd*, 13 Ala. 419. A qualified promise, depending on a contingency, is not sufficient. *Edgerly v. Shaw*, 25 N. H. 514, 57 Am. Dec. 349; *Proctor v. Sears*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 95.

infancy, and intended to pay the debt then incurred, we think it is sufficient to constitute ratification, provided the declarations were freely and understandingly made, or the acts in like manner performed, and with knowledge that he was not legally liable."<sup>17</sup> So, in a late Massachusetts case, it was said: "Ratification may be shown either by proof of an express promise to pay the debt, made by the infant after he became of age, or by proof of such acts of the infant, after he became of age, as fairly and justly lead to the inference that he intended to ratify the contract, and pay the debt."<sup>18</sup> And in an English case it was said: "Any act or declaration which recognizes the existence of the promise as binding is a ratification of it."<sup>19</sup>

To illustrate: It has been held, and very properly, that a mortgage given by an infant is ratified by payment of the interest coupon notes after becoming of age,<sup>20</sup> and that giving a watch in part payment of a note executed during minority is a ratification of the note.<sup>21</sup> This is clearly a recognition of the contract, not merely as having been made, but as binding. So, it has been held that bringing a suit to enforce payment of a note is a ratification of the contract in which the note was given.<sup>22</sup>

The cases are uniform to the effect that, where an infant purchases or otherwise acquires property under a contract, he ratifies the contract if he retains and uses the property after he becomes of age, or if he disposes of it by sale, mortgage, or otherwise. The reason of this is that he cannot honestly retain or dispose of the property except upon the assumption that the contract by which he acquired it is valid, and therefore such conduct, if unexplained, fairly and justly leads to the inference of a promise or undertaking after becoming of age, to pay for the property.<sup>23</sup> The New York

<sup>17</sup> *HATCH v. HATCH'S ESTATE*, 60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 271.

<sup>18</sup> *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27.

<sup>19</sup> *Harris v. Wall*, 1 Exch. 130.

<sup>20</sup> *American Mortg. Co. of Scotland v. Wright*, 101 Ala. 658, 14 South. 399. Contra, *Rapid Transit Land Co. v. Sanford* (Tex. Civ. App.) 24 S. W. 587.

<sup>21</sup> *Little v. Duncan*, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 55, 64 Am. Dec. 760.

<sup>22</sup> *Morrill v. Aden*, 19 Vt. 505.

<sup>23</sup> *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 89, 25 Am. Rep. 27; *Boyden v. Boyden*, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 519; *Chandler v. Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; *Smith v. Kelley*, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 309; *Aldrich v. Grimes*, 10 N. H. 194; *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561; *Lawson v. Lovejoy*, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 405, 23 Am. Dec. 526; *Luce v. Jestrab*, 12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848; *Ward v. Ward*, 143 Ky. 91, 136 S. W. 187; *Boody v. McKenney*, 23 Me. 517; *HATCH v. HATCH'S ESTATE*,

court even went so far as to hold, in applying this doctrine, that where an infant, who had taken the note of a third person in payment for work, retained the note for eight months after attaining his majority before offering to return it, and in the meantime the maker of the note became insolvent, such retention of the note was a ratification of the contract under which it was taken.<sup>24</sup>

Acquiescence after majority, if for an unreasonable time, is held in some jurisdictions to amount to a ratification of certain contracts requiring disaffirmance;<sup>25</sup> but, in the case of executory contracts, mere silence or acquiescence, unaccompanied by acts indicating an intention to abide by the contract, will not amount to a ratification.<sup>26</sup> While in some jurisdictions mere acquiescence is not evidence of the affirmance of an infant's deed,<sup>27</sup> yet, where this is accompanied by other circumstances indicating a clear intention

60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 271; Robinson v. Hoskins, 14 Bush (Ky.) 393; Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McCord (S. C.) 241, 17 Am. Dec. 735. If the retention, use, or disposal of the property is not inconsistent with the repudiation of the contract, there is no ratification. Todd v. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495; Tobey v. Wood, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109, 4 N. E. 891, 55 Am. Rep. 189. Thus, retention of the property, after tendering it and being met by a refusal, is not to be construed as a ratification. House v. Alexander, *supra*. But see Fried v. Overland Motor Co., 202 Ill. App. 203, holding that one who purchases an automobile during his minority and uses it for nearly a month after he becomes of age before he tenders it to the seller, and continues to retain possession of it and use it for nearly a year after arriving at legal age and after refusal of the seller to accept the machine, must be deemed to have ratified the purchase. Where an infant gave a note and mortgage to secure the purchase price of land conveyed to him, his retention of the land under claim of ownership after majority is a ratification of the transaction. Callis v. Day, 38 Wis. 643. See, also, Uy Soo Lim v. Tan Unchuan, 38 Phil. Rep. 552, holding that the right of a minor to rescind, upon attaining his majority, a contract entered into during his minority is subject to the conditions (1) that the election to rescind must be made within a reasonable time after majority and (2) that all of the consideration which was in the minor's possession upon his reaching majority must be returned. The disposal of any part of the consideration after the attainment of majority imports an affirmance of the contract.

<sup>24</sup> Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 25 Am. Dec. 617. And see Thomas v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 419.

<sup>25</sup> Ante, p. 494.

<sup>26</sup> Durfee v. Abbott, 61 Mich. 471, 28 N. W. 521; Tyler v. Gallop's Estate, 68 Mich. 185, 35 N. W. 902, 13 Am. St. Rep. 336; Tobey v. Wood, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; Watson v. Peebles, 102 Miss. 725, 59 South. 881; International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, affirming 140 App. Div. 839, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125.

<sup>27</sup> Syck v. Hellier, 140 Ky. 388, 131 S. W. 30. And see ante, p. 494.

to affirm, the deed cannot thereafter be disaffirmed.<sup>28</sup> Thus, a person who has conveyed land during minority loses his right to disaffirm if he stands by and sees his grantee make extensive improvements on the land,<sup>29</sup> or if he rents the land from his grantee.<sup>30</sup> When an infant gives a lease of lands, and, after majority, accepts rent, this will amount to a ratification of the lease,<sup>31</sup> and acceptance after majority of the proceeds of a sale of real estate is a ratification of the conveyance.<sup>32</sup> If an infant purchases or exchanges land, and remains in possession after majority, this will constitute an affirmance of the contract.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, the sale after majority of

<sup>28</sup> 1 Pars. Cont. 323; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 9 L. Ed. 345; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800. A deed by a married woman, not properly executed, and with no probate, or privy examination taken, was no ratification of a prior deed executed by her while a minor. *Gaskins v. Allen*, 137 N. C. 426, 49 S. E. 919.

<sup>29</sup> *Wallace's Lessee v. Lewis*, 4 Har. (Del.) 75; *Wheaton v. East*, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 62, 26 Am. Dec. 251; *Davis v. Dudley*, 70 Me. 236, 35 Am. Rep. 318; *Hartman v. Kendall*, 4 Ind. 403; *Henson v. Culp*, 157 Ky. 442, 163 S. W. 455; *Dolph v. Hand*, 156 Pa. 91, 27 Atl. 114, 36 Am. St. Rep. 25. But see *Brantley v. Wolf*, 60 Miss. 420.

<sup>30</sup> *Ingram v. Ison*, 80 S. W. 787, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 48.

<sup>31</sup> *Ashfield v. Ashfield*, W. Jones, 157; *Paramour v. Yardley*, Plowd. 539, 545a; *Wimberly v. Jones*, Ga. Dec. 91, pt. 1.

<sup>32</sup> *Darraugh v. Blackford*, 84 Va. 509, 5 S. E. 542; *DAMRON v. RATLIFF*, 123 Ky. 758, 97 S. W. 401, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 274; *Kinard v. Proctor*, 68 S. C. 279, 47 S. E. 390; *Pursley v. Hays*, 17 Iowa, 310; *Clark v. Kidd*, 148 Ky. 479, 146 S. W. 1097; *La Cotts v. Quertermous*, 84 Ark. 610, 107 S. W. 167; *Davidson v. Young*, 38 Ill. 145; *Ferguson v. Bell's Adm'r*, 17 Mo. 347. An offer to give a confirmatory deed on payment of the balance of the purchase money is not an affirmance. *CRAIG v. VAN BEBBER*, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 278. Where both children of deceased were minors, acceptance by them of part of proceeds of illegal sale by administrator of their deceased father's leasehold did not constitute ratification of such sale. *Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co. (Mo.)* 197 S. W. 42. Payments in accordance with the terms of a contract are not a ratification, if it appears they were made out of payor's county and not in recognition of any legal obligation. *Parsons v. Teller*, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930, reversing 111 App. Div. 637, 97 N. Y. Supp. 808.

<sup>33</sup> *Co. Litt. 2b*; *Cecil v. Salisbury*, 2 Vern. 225; *Henry v. Root*, 33 N. Y. 526; *Hubbard v. Cummings*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 11; *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561; *Cheshire v. Barrett*, 4 McCord (S. C.) 241, 17 Am. Dec. 735; *Ellis v. Alford*, 64 Miss. 8, 1 South. 155; *Ihley v. Padgett*, 27 S. C. 300, 3 S. E. 468; *Buchanan v. Hubbard*, 119 Ind. 187, 21 N. E. 538. Where the infant, after arriving at majority, with full knowledge of all facts relating to exchange of his land for other land, mortgaged that received in exchange, transaction was ratified. *Perkins v. Middleton (Okla.)* 166 Pac. 1104.

land purchased by an infant,<sup>34</sup> or its continued use and occupation,<sup>35</sup> is a ratification of a mortgage given to secure the purchase money; and this is true although the mortgage is given to a third person, provided the conveyance and mortgage are made at the same time, so as to constitute one transaction.<sup>36</sup> If an infant makes a mortgage, and after majority conveys the land, stating that the conveyance is made subject to the mortgage, this recital is a confirmation of the mortgage.<sup>37</sup>

Mere failure of an infant, on attaining his majority, to disaffirm a partnership agreement entered into during his minority, without any acts as a partner, will not constitute a ratification of contracts entered into by the firm; but a failure to disaffirm, followed by acts as a partner, may. The cases are at variance as to what acts will amount to such a ratification. It has been held that transaction of the firm business after majority, payment of firm debts, and participation in the profits, is not sufficient;<sup>38</sup> but there are cases to the contrary.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *Uecker v. Koehn*, 21 Neb. 559, 32 N. W. 583, 59 Am. Rep. 849; *Hubbard v. Cummings*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 11; *Young v. McKee*, 13 Mich. 552; *Lynde v. Budd*, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 191, 21 Am. Dec. 84. A minor's contract to deed to her mother lands received from her mother in a divorce settlement is voidable, and is ratified by the daughter deeding such property to her mother after becoming of age. *Haldeman v. Weeks*, 90 Or. 201, 175 Pac. 445.

<sup>35</sup> *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561; *Callis v. Day*, 38 Wis. 643; *Gulf, O. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lemons (Tex.)* 206 S. W. 75, 5 A. L. R. 943; *Hubbard v. Cummings*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 11. When an infant took a deed of land, and gave back a purchase-money mortgage, which was subsequently foreclosed, by bringing ejectment against the purchaser, she was held to have confirmed the mortgage. *Kennedy v. Baker*, 159 Pa. 146, 28 Atl. 252; *Bigelow v. Kinney*, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589.

<sup>36</sup> *Dana v. Coombs*, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 89, 19 Am. Dec. 194; *Heath v. West*, 28 N. H. 101. When the conveyance and mortgage are not one transaction, then it is no such ratification. *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561.

<sup>37</sup> *Boston Bank v. Chamberlin*, 15 Mass. 220; *Phillips v. Green*, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 344; *Losey v. Bond*, 94 Ind. 67; *Allen v. Poole*, 54 Miss. 323. A recital in a mortgage made after majority, that the property is subject to a prior mortgage, is a ratification of such prior mortgage. *Ward v. Anderson*, 111 N. C. 115, 15 S. E. 933. See, also, *Allen v. Anderson & Anderson (Tex. Civ. App.)* 96 S. W. 54, holding that where an infant conveyed land which by mesne conveyances passed to a third person as a remote grantee, and on attaining majority, conveyed the land for a valuable consideration to such third person, the conveyance did not ratify the former deed, but vested in the third person the infant's title.

<sup>38</sup> *Minock v. Shortridge*, 21 Mich. 304; *Martin v. Tobin*, 123 Mass. 85.

<sup>39</sup> *Miller v. Sims*, 2 Hill (S. C.) 479; *Salinas v. Bennett*, 33 S. C. 235, 11 S. E. 968.

The acts relied upon as constituting a ratification must be unequivocal, and must reasonably lead to the inference that there was an intention to adopt and be bound by the contract. Unless they show such an intention, ratification cannot be implied.<sup>40</sup> Thus, where an infant becomes a member of a firm, his remaining in the firm after becoming of age, and sharing in the profits, is not a ratification of debts contracted by the firm during his minority, of which he is ignorant,<sup>41</sup> or which he thinks have been paid.<sup>42</sup>

A new promise to a stranger is not sufficient to constitute a ratification; it must be made to the other party or to his agent.<sup>43</sup> If the promise is conditional, as in the case of a promise to pay when able, no action can be maintained without showing performance or happening of the condition.<sup>44</sup>

In an early English case it was said, in effect, that a person will not be bound by a ratification of his contract made during infancy, unless he knows that he not liable in law.<sup>45</sup> This proposition was mere dictum,<sup>46</sup> but it has frequently been approved, and there are many decisions supporting it.<sup>47</sup> There are some cases, how-

<sup>40</sup> *Todd v. Clapp*, 118 Mass. 495; *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; *House v. Alexander*, 105 Ind. 109, 4 N. E. 891, 55 Am. Rep. 189; *Crabtree v. May*, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 289; *Fletcher v. A. W. Koch Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 501; *Grollier Soc. of London v. Forshay* (Sup.) 157 N. Y. Supp. 776; *Coe v. Moon*, 260 Ill. 76, 102 N. E. 1074; *Hobbs v. Hinton Foundry Machine & Plumbing Co.*, 74 W. Va. 443, 82 S. E. 267, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 410; *Martin v. Tobin*, 123 Mass. 85; *Parsons v. Teller*, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930, reversing 111 App. Div. 637, 97 N. Y. Supp. 808. Where a minor after becoming of age does any act clearly showing an intention to affirm a contract made by him during his minority, he cannot afterwards repudiate it. *Fried v. Overland Motor Co.*, 202 Ill. App. 203.

<sup>41</sup> *Crabtree v. May*, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 289.

<sup>42</sup> *Tobey v. Wood*, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27.

<sup>43</sup> *Bigelow v. Grannis*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 120; *Goodsell v. Myers*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 479.

<sup>44</sup> *Everson v. Carpenter*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 419; *Thompson v. Lay*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 48, 16 Am. Dec. 325; *Kendrick v. Nelsz*, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245.

<sup>45</sup> *Harmer v. Killing*, 5 Esp. 102.

<sup>46</sup> *Morse v. Wheeler*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 570.

<sup>47</sup> *Hinely v. Margaritz*, 3 Pa. 428; *Curtin v. Patton*, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 305; *Trader v. Lowe*, 45 Md. 1; *Davidson v. Young*, 38 Ill. 145; *Turner v. Gaither*, 83 N. C. 357, 35 Am. Rep. 574; *Thing v. Libbey*, 16 Me. 55; *Burdett v. Williams* (D. C.) 30 Fed. 697; *Reed v. Boshears*, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 118; *Norris v. Vance*, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 164; *Fletcher v. A. W. Koch Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 501; *Manning v. Gannon*, 44 App. D. C. 98; *Petty v. Roberts*, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 410; *Smith v. Mayo*, 9 Mass. 62, 6 Am. Dec. 28; *Ford v. Phillips*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 202; *Owen v. Long*, 112 Mass. 403. A confirmatory deed given after majority, in ignorance of legal rights, has been set aside in equity. *Wilson v. Insur-*

ever, which hold that such knowledge on the part of the infant is not necessary, on the ground that ignorance of law cannot avail.<sup>48</sup> In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the late infant will be presumed to have had knowledge of his legal rights.<sup>49</sup>

### SAME—WHAT CONSTITUTES DISAFFIRMANCE

**212. A contract is disaffirmed by any conduct which is inconsistent with the existence of the contract, and shows an intention to repudiate it.**

Disaffirmance of a contract, like ratification, may be implied, and it will generally be implied from any conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the existence of the contract.<sup>50</sup> Where, for instance, a person who has sold or mortgaged land or goods while an infant sells, leases, or mortgages the same to another after attaining his majority, this is a disaffirmance of his contract.<sup>51</sup> The bringing of

ance Co., 60 Md. 150. But see *Morse v. Wheeler*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 570; *Anderson v. Soward*, 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. Rep. 687, and *Rubin v. Strandberg*, 288 Ill. 64, 122 N. E. 808, 5 A. L. R. 133, where it is shown that, in most of the cases cited as supporting the rule that knowledge of the right to disaffirm is essential, the holding was not necessary to the decision, and the principle is stated in general language only, not being involved in the case.

<sup>48</sup> *Anderson v. Soward*, 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. Rep. 687; *Clark v. Van Court*, 100 Ind. 113, 50 Am. Rep. 774; *Rubin v. Strandberg*, 288 Ill. 64, 122 N. E. 808, 5 A. L. R. 133; *American Mortg. Co. of Scotland v. Wright*, 101 Ala. 658, 14 South. 399; *Ring v. Jamison*, 66 Mo. 424; *Morse v. Wheeler*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 570.

<sup>49</sup> *Taft v. Sergeant*, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 320; *HATCH v. HATCH'S ESTATE*, 60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 271.

<sup>50</sup> *Pyne v. Wood*, 145 Mass. 558, 14 N. E. 775; *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572; *Whitmarsh v. Hall*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 375; *Dallas v. Hollingsworth*, 3 Ind. 537; *Putnal v. Walker*, 61 Fla. 720, 55 South. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33; *Hatton v. Bodon Lumber Co.*, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 123 S. W. 163; *Stanhope v. Shambow*, 54 Mont. 360, 170 Pac. 752. An infant, desiring to avoid a contract, must signify his desire and intent to do so, not only by refraining from any act of affirmance, but by performing some positive act of disaffirmance, which is of such character as to clearly show his intention not to be bound by his contract. *Casement v. Callaghan*, 35 N. D. 27, 159 N. W. 77. There must be, not only act of repudiation, but intent to repudiate. *Strain v. Hinds*, 277 Ill. 598, 115 N. E. 563. Where a minor 20 years old executed a note and mortgage payable in one year, and a year after majority refused to sign the note again, it did not constitute a disaffirmance of the note and mortgage. *Brown v. Staab*, 103 Kan. 611, 176 Pac. 113.

<sup>51</sup> *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 9 L. Ed. 345; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Phillips v. Hoskins*, 128 Ky. 371,

a suit for personal injuries is a sufficient disaffirmance of a previously executed release of his right to sue for such injuries.<sup>52</sup> So an infant, by suing for his wages on a quantum meruit, repudiates his contract for the services,<sup>53</sup> and an action to set aside an

108 S. W. 283, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 378; *Vallandigham v. Johnson*, 85 Ky. 288, 3 S. W. 173; *Corbett v. Spencer*, 63 Mich. 731, 30 N. W. 385; *HAYNES v. BENNETT*, 53 Mich. 15, 18 N. W. 539, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 276; *Dawson v. Helmes*, 30 Minn. 107, 14 N. W. 462; *Chapin v. Shafer*, 49 N. Y. 407; *Phillips v. Hoskins*, 128 Ky. 371, 108 S. W. 283; *Peterson v. Lalk*, 24 Mo. 541, 69 Am. Dec. 441; *Cresinger v. Welch's Lessee*, 15 Ohio, 156, 45 Am. Dec. 565; *Pitcher v. Laycock*, 7 Ind. 398; *McGan v. Marshall*, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 121; *Den ex dem Hoyle v. Stowe*, 19 N. C. 323; *Jackson ex dem Wallace v. Carpenter*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 539; *Buchanan v. Hubbard*, 119 Ind. 187, 21 N. E. 538. In some jurisdictions a person is not allowed to convey land which is in the adverse possession of another. Here, therefore, an infant cannot avoid his deed of land by a second deed, executed while his first grantee or another is in the adverse possession of the land. He must first make an entry. *Harrison v. Adcock*, 8 Ga. 68. See *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 133, 31 Am. Dec. 285. But see *Cresinger v. Welch's Lessee*, supra. Where an infant mortgages land, and, after obtaining his majority, conveys the land by warranty deed, without excepting the mortgage, the deed is a disaffirmance of the mortgage. *Dixon v. Merritt*, 21 Minn. 196; *Allen v. Poole*, 54 Miss. 323. When the deed executed after the infant is of age is of such a nature that it is not inconsistent with the prior conveyance, there is no disaffirmance. *Leitensdorfer v. Hempstead*, 18 Mo. 269; *McGan v. Marshall*, supra; *Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent*, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 635. Thus, a quitclaim deed has been held not to amount to a disaffirmance of a prior mortgage. *Shreeves v. Caldwell*, 135 Mich. 323, 97 N. W. 764, 106 Am. St. Rep. 396, 3 Ann. Cas. 592; *Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb*, 81 Mo. 221. And see *Palmer v. Miller*, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 399. But see *Bagley v. Fletcher*, 44 Ark. 153, where a quitclaim deed was held a disaffirmance of a prior deed. And to the same effect is *Beauchamp v. Bertig*, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659. Mortgages ratified or executed after one became of age are superior to a deed made during his minority, but not ratified until after ratification or execution of such mortgages. *Tolor v. Marion County Lumber Co.*, 93 S. E. 274, 75 S. E. 545, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 844. At one time disaffirmance of a deed of land was required to be by some act of as high and solemn nature as the deed, and the doctrine has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by some of the state courts. *Pars. Cont.* 323; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 9 L. Ed. 345. By the weight of authority, this solemnity is no longer to be regarded as necessary; but it is held that a deed may be effectually avoided or disaffirmed by any acts or declarations disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate it. *HAYNES v. BENNETT*, 53 Mich. 15, 18 N. W. 539, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 276 (collecting the cases); *Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb*, supra; *Tunison v. Chamblin*, 88 Ill. 378. Re-entry with notice of intention to disaffirm, and also a written notice of disaffirmance, have been held sufficient. *Green v. Green*, 69 N. Y. 553, 25 Am. Rep. 233; *Scranton v. Stewart*, 52 Ind. 68.

<sup>52</sup> *Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. Carillo*, 17 Ariz. 115, 149 Pac. 313.

<sup>53</sup> *Fisher v. Kissinger*, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 13.

oil and gas lease and certain deeds is a disaffirmance.<sup>54</sup> An action by a person after becoming of age to recover land or goods sold by him during his minority is a disaffirmance of the sale,<sup>55</sup> and a contract is disaffirmed by merely pleading infancy when suit is brought to enforce it.

### SAME—EXTENT OF RATIFICATION OR DIS-AFFIRMANCE

**213. The ratification or disaffirmance must be in toto. The contract cannot be ratified or disaffirmed in part only.**

The disaffirmance or ratification must go to the whole contract. An infant cannot ratify a part which he deems for his benefit, and repudiate the rest.<sup>56</sup> He cannot, for instance, ratify a lease to himself, and avoid a covenant in it to pay rent; nor can he hold lands conveyed to him in exchange, and avoid the transfer of those with which he parted;<sup>57</sup> nor can he hold land conveyed to him, and repudiate a mortgage given at the time as part of the same transaction to secure the purchase money.<sup>58</sup> So, too, an infant cannot sue

<sup>54</sup> *Ryan v. Morrison*, 40 Okl. 49, 135 Pac. 1049.

<sup>55</sup> *Clark v. Tate*, 7 Mont. 171, 14 Pac. 761; *CRAIG v. VAN BEBBER*, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 278; *Parrish v. Treadway*, 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580; *Slater v. Rudderforth*, 25 App. D. C. 497 (holding that a suit for cancellation of the conveyance is a sufficient disaffirmance); *Phillips v. Green*, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 7, 13 Am. Dec. 124; *Stotts v. Leonhard*, 40 Mo. App. 336; *Scott v. Buchanan*, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 469; *Hughes v. Watson*, 10 Ohio, 134. It is not necessary to go into equity, but he may bring ejectment. *Conn v. Boutwell*, 101 Miss. 353, 58 South. 105. Where, however, the action is based on the assumption that defendant is wrongfully in possession, as in the case of ejectment, the weight of authority seems to require that there shall have been some previous act of disaffirmance on the part of the infant, for until disaffirmance the defendant is rightfully in possession. See *Law v. Long*, 41 Ind. 586; *McClanahan v. Williams*, 136 Ind. 30, 35 N. E. 887; *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 135, 31 Am. Dec. 285; *Tomczek v. Wieser*, 58 Misc. Rep. 46, 108 N. Y. Supp. 784; *Clawson v. Doe*, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 300; *Wallace's Lessee v. Lewis*, 4 Har. (Del.) 75.

<sup>56</sup> *Badger v. Phinney*, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; *Pecararo v. Pecararo* (Sup.) 84 N. Y. Supp. 581; *Bigelow v. Kinney*, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; *Lowry v. Drake's Heirs*, 1 Dana (Ky.) 46.

<sup>57</sup> *Buchanan v. Hubbard*, 119 Ind. 187, 21 N. E. 538.

<sup>58</sup> *Hubbard v. Cummings*, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 11; *Uecker v. Koehn*, 21 Neb. 559, 32 N. W. 583, 59 Am. Rep. 849; *Bigelow v. Kinney*, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; *Heath v. West*, 28 N. H. 108; *Young v. McKee*, 13 Mich. 556; *Skinner*

for damages or statutory penalties for the negligent transmission of a telegraph message, without complying with a stipulation of the contract as to the time when claims must be presented.<sup>59</sup>

### SAME—RETURN OF CONSIDERATION

214. An infant may disaffirm his executory contract without first returning the consideration received by him; but, after disaffirmance, he must return the consideration, if he has it.

215. As a rule, if the contract has been executed by him, he cannot avoid it, and recover what he has paid, or for what he has done, without returning the consideration, if he has it. But it is otherwise, by the weight of authority, if he has squandered or otherwise disposed of the consideration during his minority. However—

**EXCEPTIONS**—(a) Though he has the consideration, he may effectually disaffirm his executed contract, without first returning it, if he does not seek relief from the courts, as, for instance, where he disaffirms his conveyance of land by conveying to another.

(b) Some courts hold that an infant cannot recover what he has paid, or for what he has done, under a contract by which he has received a substantial benefit, unless he can and does place the other party in statu quo. This probably does not apply to his conveyances of land.

Since a person cannot disaffirm in part only a contract made by him during infancy, but must disaffirm in toto, if at all, it is a general rule that, on disaffirming a contract, the party must return the consideration which he has received.<sup>60</sup> Whether or not he

v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45; Cogley v. Cushman, 16 Minn. 402 (Gil. 354); Callis v. Day, 38 Wis. 643.

<sup>59</sup> Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Greer, 115 Tenn. 368, 89 S. W. 327, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 525.

<sup>60</sup> Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; Wilhelm v. Hardman, 13 Md. 140; Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; Combs v. Hawes (Cal.) 8 Pac. 597; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 107, 42 Am. Dec. 101; Bartlett v. Cowles, 15 Gray (Mass.) 446. Especially is this true, if the infant has been guilty of any fraud in the procuring of the contract. Ackerman v. Hawkins, 45 Ind. App. 483, 88 N. E. 616; International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okl.

must do so as a condition precedent to disaffirmance, or whether the other party must be left to his action to recover the consideration after disaffirmance, and whether or not the consideration or an equivalent must be returned where it has been wasted or otherwise disposed of, are questions upon which the decisions are conflicting.

As has already been seen, if a person who, during his minority, has received the consideration for his contract, has the consideration in kind when he attains his majority, and afterwards disposes of it, either by consuming it himself, or by selling it, or otherwise putting it beyond his control, or if he retains it for an unreasonable time without seeking to avoid the contract, he thereby ratifies the contract; and this applies whether the contract is executed or executory on his part.<sup>61</sup>

Where the contract is executory on the part of the infant, and he has not ratified it by his conduct, it cannot, according to the weight of authority, be enforced against him, even though he has the consideration received by him in kind. He need not return the consideration as a condition precedent to repudiating the contract, and pleading his infancy in an action brought against him to enforce it.<sup>62</sup> When he repudiates the contract, however, he no longer has any right to the consideration he has received; and, if he still

693, 98 Pac. 951, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056. And see *Smith v. Cole*, 148 Ky. 138, 146 S. W. 30.

<sup>61</sup> Ante, p. 497. Of course, if through no fault on his part, nor conduct amounting to a ratification, consideration which is possessed in kind on attaining his majority subsequently becomes incapable of return, he will occupy the same position as if this state of things existed when he attained his majority.

<sup>62</sup> *Craighead v. Wells*, 21 Mo. 409; *Shipley v. Smith*, 162 Ind. 526, 70 N. E. 803; *White v. Sikes*, 129 Ga. 508, 59 S. E. 228, 121 Am. St. Rep. 228; *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Wallace v. Leroy*, 57 W. Va. 263, 50 S. E. 243, 100 Am. St. Rep. 777; *Oneonta Grocery Co. v. Preston* (Sup.) 167 N. Y. Supp. 641; *International Text-Book Co. v. McKone*, 133 Wis. 200, 113 N. W. 488; *Johnson v. Insurance Co.*, 56 Minn. 365, 59 N. W. 992, 26 L. R. A. 187, 45 Am. St. Rep. 473; *Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy* (Ind. App.) 119 N. E. 177. A minor who has entered into a contract to work for a manufacturing corporation for six months, and not to leave without giving two weeks' notice, is not liable in damages, to be deducted from his wages, if he leaves without giving such notice. *Derocher v. Continental Mills*, 58 Me. 217, 4 Am. Rep. 286. An infant under the age of 18 years may disaffirm an insurance contract and recover the premiums paid, without restoring or offering to restore the consideration. *Flittner v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.*, 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 Pac. 630.

has it, the other party may maintain an action to recover it.<sup>63</sup> By the weight of authority, if he has wasted or otherwise disposed of the consideration during his minority, so that he cannot return it in kind, he cannot be held liable for it. The other party is remediless.<sup>64</sup> It must be borne in mind in this connection that retaining the consideration may amount to ratification.

When the contract is executed on the part of the infant, and he has the consideration received by him in kind, it is the almost universal rule that he cannot repudiate the contract, and recover what he has parted with, or for what he has done, unless he returns, or offers to return, the consideration.<sup>65</sup> Some cases go to the extent

<sup>63</sup> *Badger v. Phinney*, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209. Where an infant purchased property under fraudulent representations that he was of age, and failed to pay for it, the seller could recover the property as against attaching creditors of the infant. *Wray v. Wrightsman*, 139 Mo. App. 635, 124 S. W. 38.

<sup>64</sup> See *Brawner v. Franklin*, 4 Gill (Md.) 470; *Boody v. McKenney*, 23 Me. 517, 525.

<sup>65</sup> *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Blair v. Whittaker*, 31 Ind. App. 664, 69 N. E. 182; *In re Huntenberg* (D. C.) 153 Fed. 768; *Zuck v. Turner Harness & Carriage Co.*, 106 Mo. App. 566, 80 S. W. 967; *Millsaps v. Estes*, 137 N. C. 535, 50 S. E. 227, 70 L. R. A. 170, 107 Am. St. Rep. 496; *Lemmon v. Beeman*, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. 476; *Dickerson v. Gordon*, 52 Hun, 614, 5 N. Y. Supp. 310; *HARVEY v. BRIGGS*, 68 Miss. 60, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 62, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 270; *Chandler v. Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; *Carr v. Clough*, 26 N. H. 280, 59 Am. Dec. 345; *Robinson v. Weeks*, 56 Me. 102; *Johnson v. Insurance Co.*, 56 Minn. 365, 59 N. W. 992, 26 L. R. A. 187, 45 Am. St. Rep. 473; *Towle v. Dresser*, 73 Me. 252; *WULLER v. CHUSE GROCERY CO.*, 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 522, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 262; *In re Huntenberg* (D. C.) 153 Fed. 768; *Bell v. Burkhalter*, 176 Ala. 62, 57 South. 460; *Stanhope v. Shambow*, 54 Mont. 360, 170 Pac. 752; *Putnal v. Walker*, 61 Fla. 720, 55 South. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33; *Alfrey v. Colbert*, 168 Fed. 231, 93 C. C. A. 517; *Webb v. Reagan*, 160 Ala. 537, 49 South. 580; *Foy v. Salzano*, 152 App. Div. 47, 136 N. Y. Supp. 699; *Hatton v. Bodan Lumber Co.*, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 123 S. W. 163. Under the Oklahoma statute (Comp. Laws 1909, § 5037), an infant may disaffirm a conveyance made by him when under the age of 18 years without returning or offering to return the consideration. *Rice v. Anderson*, 39 Okl. 279, 134 Pac. 1120. But he is not obliged to return consideration when he cannot return in kind. *International Text-Book Co. v. Doran*, 80 Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255. To the same effect, see *Pennsylvania Co. v. Purvis*, 128 Ill. App. 367, holding that the acceptance by a minor of a railroad pass containing an exemption from liability for negligence does not operate to relieve the company from liability for an injury resulting to such minor from the negligence of the company. An actual tender is not required as a condition precedent when it is known in advance that such tender will be refused, but restoration should be made on the trial as a condition of the judgment. *Starr*

of saying without qualification that the return of the consideration in such a case is not a condition precedent to the right to disaffirm.<sup>66</sup> This is so where the disaffirmance by the infant is by dealing with the property he has parted with as his own, and where he is not seeking the aid of a court to recover it; as where, having sold land and received the purchase money, he disaffirms by conveying the land to another. The latter deed is effectual though he has not returned the consideration for his prior deed.<sup>67</sup> But an infant cannot maintain an action to recover what he has parted with, or for what he has done, without returning the consideration, if he has it.<sup>68</sup>

v. *Watkins*, 78 Neb. 610, 111 N. W. 363. Where an infant purchases real estate, and disaffirms the contract and restores the property on reaching his majority, the vendor cannot defeat the right to disaffirm by refusing to take back the property. *Evarts v. Taylor*, 18 N. M. 371, 137 Pac. 583, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113. Where an infant borrows money secured by mortgage, for the purpose of discharging a prior mortgage on his land, he cannot disaffirm the loan contract and mortgage without returning the money thus acquired. *Berry v. Stigall*, 253 Mo. 690, 162 S. W. 126, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 118. The rule that the infant is required to return the consideration if it is in his possession is not applicable to a suit by a guardian to recover possession of personal property which his infant ward has sold and delivered. *Hughes v. Murphy*, 5 Ga. App. 328, 63 S. E. 231.

<sup>66</sup> *Born v. Chicago City R. Co.*, 159 Ill. App. 585. In an action against the administratrix of the grantor to set aside the deed and cancel a note given for the price of the land, on the ground that plaintiff was a minor when the deed was made to him, a tender of the deed to the persons in whom the title to the land is vested is unnecessary. *Forsee's Adm'x v. Forsee*, 144 Ky. 169, 137 S. W. 836. When an infant has been paid in money, the tender or repayment of the money is not a condition precedent to the right to rescind; but it should be allowed towards infant's claim. *Heath v. Stevens*, 48 N. H. 251; *Sparman v. Keim*, 83 N. Y. 245. One who elects to disaffirm an executed contract on the ground that he was an infant when contract was made, if he is in position to return the consideration, will be treated in equity as a trustee for the other party and required to restore the same, not as a condition precedent to disaffirmance, but on the ground that he is in possession of property which in equity and good conscience he will not be permitted to retain. *Gannon v. Manning*, 42 App. D. C. 206.

<sup>67</sup> *Chandler v. Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 73, 9 L. Ed. 345; *Dawson v. Helmes*, 30 Minn. 107, 14 N. W. 462; *Shaw v. Boyd*, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 309, 9 Am. Dec. 368; *McCarty v. Woodstock Iron Co.*, 92 Ala. 463, 8 South. 417, 12 L. R. A. 136.

<sup>68</sup> *Jones v. Valentine's School of Telegraphy*, 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043. When an infant seeks the aid of a court of equity to relieve him from liability on his contract, he must do equity, and must restore what he received. *Hillyer v. Bennett*, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 222. But not so, if he has disposed of it while yet a minor. *Eureka Co. v. Edwards*, 71 Ala. 248, 46 Am. Rep. 314. Where one seeks to rescind an exchange of lands made while he was an in-

According to the weight of authority, an infant, on attaining his majority, may disaffirm his contract, whether it is executory or executed, and in the latter case may recover back what he has parted with, or for what he has done, without returning, or offering to return the consideration received by him, if, during his minority, he has squandered or otherwise disposed of it, so that he cannot return it.<sup>69</sup> He is not bound to return an equivalent. Some of

fant, he must quitclaim the land received in exchange. *Coe v. Moon*, 280 Ill. 78, 102 N. E. 1074.

<sup>69</sup> *Gibson v. Soper*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 282, 66 Am. Dec. 414; *Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Dukes*, 121 Ga. 787, 49 S. E. 788; *White v. Sikes*, 129 Ga. 508, 59 S. E. 228, 121 Am. St. Rep. 228; *Braucht v. Graves-May Co.*, 92 Minn. 116, 99 N. W. 417; *BEICKLER v. GUENTHER*, 121 Iowa, 419, 96 N. W. 895, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 256; *Chandler v. Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508, 98 Am. Dec. 117; *Morse v. Ely*, 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E. 577, 26 Am. St. Rep. 263; *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Boody v. McKenney*, 23 Me. 517; *Lemmon v. Beeman*, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. 476; *Reynolds v. McCurry*, 100 Ill. 356; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Putnal v. Walker*, 61 Fla. 720, 55 South. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33; *Alfrey v. Colbert*, 168 Fed. 231, 93 C. C. A. 517; *Beauchamp v. Bertig*, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659; *WULLER v. CHUSE GROCERY CO.*, 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 123, 132 Am. St. Rep. 216, 18 Ann. Cas. 522, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 262; *First Nat. Bank of Titonka v. Casey*, 158 Iowa, 349, 138 N. W. 897; *Lake v. Perry*, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569; *Barr v. Packard Motor Car Co.*, 172 Mich. 299, 137 N. W. 697; *Gray v. Grimm*, 157 Ky. 603, 163 S. W. 762; *Bickle v. Turner*, 133 Ark. 536, 202 S. W. 703; *Walsh v. Young*, 110 Mass. 899; *Dawson v. Helmes*, 30 Minn. 107, 14 N. W. 462; *Miller v. Smith*, 26 Minn. 248, 2 N. W. 942, 37 Am. Rep. 407; *Green v. Green*, 69 N. Y. 553, 25 Am. Rep. 233; *Mordecai v. Pearl*, 63 Hun, 553, 18 N. Y. Supp. 543; *Petrie v. Willimas*, 69 Hun, 589, 23 N. Y. Supp. 237; *Brawner v. Franklin*, 4 Gill (Md.) 463; *Brandon v. Brown*, 106 Ill. 519; *CRAIG v. VAN BEBBER*, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 278; *Lacy v. Pixler*, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206; *Shirk v. Shultz*, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N. E. 12; *HARVEY v. BRIGGS*, 68 Miss. 60, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 62, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 270; *Englebert v. Troxell*, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N. W. 852, 26 L. R. A. 177, 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; *Manning v. Johnson*, 26 Ala. 446, 62 Am. Dec. 732. It was said in *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194: "A distinction is to be observed between the case of an infant in possession of such property after age, and when he has lost, sold, or destroyed the property during his minority. In the former case, if he has put the property out of his power, he has ratified the contract, and rendered it obligatory upon him. In the latter case the property is to be restored if it be in his possession and control. If the property is not in his hands, nor under his control, that obligation ceases. To say that an infant cannot recover back his property which he has parted with under such circumstances, because, by his indiscretion, he has spent, consumed, or injured that which he received, would be making his want of discretion the means of binding him to all his improvident contracts, and deprive him of that protection which the law designed to secure to him." As the contract of an infant is voidable

the courts extend this rule to cases in which the infant was even benefited by disposing of the consideration.<sup>70</sup> The principle on which this rule is based is that the privilege of the infant to avoid his contracts is intended to protect him against the improvidence which is incident to his immaturity, and that to require him to return the consideration received and squandered or otherwise disposed of during his minority would be to withdraw this protection, and frustrate the object of the law. This rule has been applied, not only where the contract was a sale and conveyance of land by the infant, but to sales of personalty and other contracts as well.

Many courts, on the other hand, applying the principle that the privilege of an infant is intended as a shield, and not as a sword—or, in other words, as a protection to the infant, and not as an instrument of fraud and injustice to others—hold that an infant cannot avoid his executed contracts, whereby he has benefited, and recover what he has parted with, or for what he has done, unless he can and does restore the consideration he has received; and that it is immaterial that the consideration has been disposed of by him, or for any other reason cannot be returned. In other words, they hold that an infant who receives a substantial consideration for his executed contract cannot, on attaining his majority, avoid the con-

and not void, if money paid to an infant on a contract is consumed or wasted, he may recover full amount due under contract on attaining majority, but if money is used for his benefit and he has the property in which it was invested, he cannot retain property without allowing credit. *Chandler v. Jones*, 172 N. C. 569, 90 S. E. 580. An infant may disaffirm a release of a claim for personal injury without returning the consideration expended by him. *Britton v. South Penn Oil Co.*, 73 W. Va. 792, 81 S. E. 525. He need not return consideration paid to a parent who joined in the settlement. *Turney v. Mobile & O. R. Co.*, 127 Tenn. 673, 156 S. W. 1085. The consideration may be considered in mitigation of damages. *Born v. Chicago City R. Co.*, 159 Ill. App. 585. Where plaintiff, upon becoming of age, was paid his share of money in settlement of litigation, he must, in order to maintain an action to set aside the settlement for fraud, repudiate the settlement and repay the money received. *Laffer v. Oelrichs*, 173 App. Div. 759, 160 N. Y. Supp. 119.

<sup>70</sup> It has been held in a late Massachusetts case that a minor who contracts with his employer that the price of articles, not necessities, purchased by him from his employer, shall be deducted from his wages, may, on becoming of age, repudiate his contract, and recover his wages without deduction; and this, even though he may have disposed of the articles to his benefit. *Morse v. Ely*, 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E. 577, 26 Am. St. Rep. 263. And see *Genereux v. Sibley*, 18 R. I. 43, 25 Atl. 345.

tract, and recover what he has parted with, unless he can and does place the other party in statu quo.<sup>71</sup>

### SAME—EFFECT OF RATIFICATION OR DIS-AFFIRMANCE

216. Ratification renders the contract absolutely binding *ab initio*.

217. Disaffirmance renders the contract absolutely void *ab initio*.

Third parties, therefore, can acquire no rights under an avoided contract.

The effect of ratification is to render the contract binding *ab initio*.<sup>72</sup> The new promise is not a new contract, but simply a ratifi-

<sup>71</sup> *Holmes v. Blogg*, 8 Taunt. 508 (but see *Corpe v. Overton*, 10 Bing. 252); *Ex parte Taylor*, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 254; *Valentini v. Canali*, 24 Q. B. Div. 166; *Adams v. Beall*, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; *Succession of Sallier*, 115 La. 97, 38 South. 929; *Breed v. Judd*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 455; *Wilhelm v. Hardman*, 13 Md. 140; *Holden v. Pike*, 14 Vt. 405, 39 Am. Dec. 228; *Heath v. Stevens*, 48 N. H. 251; *Womack v. Womack*, 8 Tex. 397, 417, 58 Am. Dec. 119; *Bailey v. Barnberger*, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 113; *Locke v. Smith*, 41 N. H. 346; *Lown v. Spoon*, 158 App. Div. 900, 143 N. Y. Supp. 275; *Johnson v. Insurance Co.*, 56 Minn. 365, 59 N. W. 992, 26 L. R. A. 187, 45 Am. St. Rep. 473. In *Johnson v. Insurance Co.*, *supra*, the court says: "But if the contract was free from any fraud or bad faith, and otherwise reasonable, excepting that the price paid by the infant was in excess of the value of what he received, his recovery should be limited to the difference between what he paid and what he received." See, also, *Medbury v. Watrous*, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 110, 115; *Petrie v. Williams*, 68 Hun, 589, 23 N. Y. Supp. 237. When the benefits received by the infant are of such nature that he cannot restore them, he may rescind and recover what he parted with, unless it appears that the contract was a fair, reasonable, and provident one, free from fraud or over-reaching on the part of the other party. *Braucht v. Graves-May Co.*, 92 Minn. 116, 99 N. W. 417. And see *Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co.*, 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W. 191; *Link v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 107 Minn. 33, 119 N. W. 488; *Klaus v. A. C. Thompson Auto & Buggy Co.*, 131 Minn. 10, 154 N. W. 508. A minor, who receives no benefit from the leased premises, may recover from the lessor any money which he has paid as rent. *Ex parte McFerren*, 184 Ala. 223, 63 South. 159, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 672, reversing *Edgewood Highland Land Co. v. McFerren*, 9 Ala. App. 275, 63 South. 157. A minor, who has received practically no benefit under his contract of registration in college, is entitled, on disaffirmance, to a return of the tuition fee paid by him. *Kamil v. New York College of Dentistry (Sup.)*, 168 N. Y. Supp. 527. Where the net results of purchases and sales of property for an infant by agents appointed for that purpose are less than his first advancement to them, he was not benefited thereby, within the rule that an executed contract beneficial to an infant cannot be rescinded by him, unless he returns the consideration. *Benson v. Tucker*, 212 Mass. 60, 98 N. E. 589, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219.

<sup>72</sup> *Ward v. Anderson*, 111 N. C. 115, 15 S. E. 933; *McCune v. Goodwillie*,

cation of the original contract; and a suit, if brought, must be on the original contract, and not on the new promise. The ratification renders the contract absolutely binding.<sup>73</sup> It cannot be retracted, and the contract disaffirmed.<sup>74</sup>

A voidable contract, if executed by the infant, vests the other party with an interest subject to be defeated by the infant's election to rescind. A sale and conveyance of land, for instance, or a sale and delivery of chattels, vest the purchaser with a defeasible title, subject to being defeated or confirmed by the infant. The purchaser may therefore deal with the property, until disaffirmance, by sale or otherwise, and it is important to ascertain the effect which a disaffirmance will have. It is well settled that disaffirmance of a contract relates back to the date of the contract, and renders it void on both sides *ab initio*;<sup>75</sup> and it follows that the rights of the parties must be determined just as if there never had been

204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997; *Palmer v. Miller*, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 399; *Minock v. Shortridge*, 21 Mich. 316; *Hall v. Jones*, 21 Md. 439. But where an infant gave a deed, and, after majority, ratified it, and gave a second deed to one not having notice of the ratification, the second vendee was held to have good title. "While it is true that the title, after ratification, is held, for most purposes, to relate back to the original deed, yet it is the ratification which is the effective act, and which rescues the deed from its liability, at any moment, to be made a nullity. We have no doubt that, if the ratification is by means of a written instrument, it is within the policy of the registry laws. It is the object of those laws to disclose to all the world the exact condition of a title, and written instruments relating to land not appearing there are to be taken as not existing, unless the knowledge of them is brought home in some other way. If the ratification is by acts in pais, then a subsequent purchaser must be affected with notice of those acts." *Black v. Hills*, 36 Ill. 376, 87 Am. Dec. 224.

<sup>73</sup> *Tillery v. Land*, 136 N. C. 537, 48 S. E. 824, holding that specific performance of a contract to sell real estate may be enforced after ratification. The ratification after majority of a deed made during infancy is as effective as if the grantor had then made a new deed. *Ward v. Ward*, 143 Ky. 91, 136 S. W. 137.

<sup>74</sup> *Hastings v. Dollarhide*, 24 Cal. 195; *Luce v. Jestrab*, 12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848; *North American Coal & Coke Co. v. O'Neal*, 82 W. Va. 186, 95 S. E. 822. See *Houlton v. Mantouffell*, 51 Minn. 185, 53 N. W. 541.

<sup>75</sup> *Rice v. Boyer*, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420, 58 Am. Rep. 53; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *French v. McAndrew*, 61 Miss. 187; *Boyden v. Boyden*, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 519; *Badger v. Phinney*, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; *Hoyt v. Wilkinson*, 57 Vt. 404; *Mette v. Feltgen* (Ill.) 27 N. E. 911; *Id.*, 148 Ill. 357, 36 N. E. 81; *Yancey v. Boyce*, 28 N. D. 187, 148 N. W. 539, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 258; *Grissom v. Biddleman*, 35 Okl. 343, 129 Pac. 853, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 411, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 599; *Derocher v. Continental Mills*, 58 Me. 217, 4 Am. Rep. 286; *Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.*, 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73; *Oneida County Sav. Bank v. Saunders*, 179

any contract between them.<sup>16</sup> One, therefore, who has occupied land under a conveyance by an infant, which is avoided by him on attaining his majority, is liable for use and occupation during the time of his occupation, just as he would be if there had been no conveyance.<sup>17</sup> If the infant's vendee has sold the land to some third person, the latter occupies no better position than the vendee, and the property may be recovered from him, even though he was a purchaser for value, and without notice of the defeasible nature of the title.<sup>18</sup>

Since an infant has this absolute right to avoid his conveyances, the disaffirmance will inure to the benefit of any person who may stand in the infant's shoes by virtue of a subsequent conveyance of the land. Thus, where a person, who has conveyed his land during his minority, executes a conveyance to another person on attaining his majority, the first grantee cannot escape the effect of this disaffirmance by showing that the second grantee knew of the first conveyance when he took his. As was said by the Illinois court: "It can in no just sense be said that the grantee of a person who had conveyed during his infancy is not to be deemed an innocent

App. Div. 282, 166 N. Y. Supp. 280; *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572; *Lufkin v. Mayall*, 25 N. H. 82.

<sup>16</sup> *Smoot v. Ryan*, 187 Ala. 396, 65 South. 828; *Yancey v. Boyce*, 28 N. D. 187, 148 N. W. 539, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 258. It has been held in some cases that, on disaffirmance of a contract for the purchase of personal property, the infant must account for the use and deterioration of the property. *Rice v. Butler*, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275, 47 L. R. A. 303, 73 Am. St. Rep. 703; *Wooldridge v. La Vole* (N. H.) 104 Atl. 346. In the latter case, where the infant rescinded a purchase of an automobile, it was held that he was chargeable with the value of the benefits received, including the pleasure derived in driving the car, and for any damage to the car caused by his tortious acts, but not for damage due to unskillfulness or mere negligence. The right to recover for the use of the machine on rescission of a purchase of a multi-graph was recognized in *Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co.*, 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W. 191, and *Wanisch v. Wuertz*, 79 Misc. Rep. 610, 140 N. Y. Supp. 573. On the other hand the right to hold the infant for use and deterioration is denied in *Gillis v. Goodwin*, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N. E. 813, 91 Am. St. Rep. 265; *Hauser v. Marnon Chicago Co.*, 208 Ill. App. 171; *Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy* (Ind. App.) 119 N. E. 177.

<sup>17</sup> *French v. McAndrew*, 61 Miss. 187. But he is entitled to set off value of improvements placed on the property. *Coe v. Moon*, 260 Ill. 76, 102 N. E. 1074. To the same effect, see *Tobin v. Spann*, 85 Ark. 556, 109 S. W. 534, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672.

<sup>18</sup> *Hill v. Anderson*, 5 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 216; *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; *Searcy v. Hunter*, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372, 28 Am. St. Rep. 837; *Downing v. Stone*, 47 Mo. App. 144; *Miles v. Lingerman*, 24 Ind. 385.

purchaser, if he has notice of the first deed. He has as perfect a legal right to purchase land which his grantor had sold during minority as he would have to purchase land that had never been conveyed at all. The moment the second deed is made, the deed made in infancy is disaffirmed, and becomes void. It is as if it had never been. This right of disaffirmance is necessarily given by the law to prevent great frauds. Yet the right would be practically of little value to the minor if the person buying of him after he becomes of age is to be considered as incurring, in any way, the censure of the law, and to be therefore denied the position of an innocent purchaser."<sup>79</sup>

A conveyance by an infant may be avoided, not only as against the grantee, but also as against creditors of the grantee<sup>80</sup> and bona fide purchasers for value from him.<sup>81</sup> In like manner, personal property disposed of by an infant may be followed into the hands of bona fide purchasers.<sup>82</sup> And negotiable instruments executed by an infant may be avoided in the hands of bona fide holders for value.<sup>83</sup>

Where services have been rendered by an infant under a voidable contract, and he has received nothing under it, he may, on disaffirming the contract, recover the value of the services as on an implied contract.<sup>84</sup> And in such a case he may, according to the better opinion, recover without any deduction for damages caused by his failure to carry out the contract, for to allow such a deduction would be, in effect, to enforce the contract.<sup>85</sup> So, also, if

<sup>79</sup> *Black v. Hills*, 86 Ill. 376, 87 Am. Dec. 224.

<sup>80</sup> *Seed v. Jennings*, 47 Or. 464, 83 Pac. 872.

<sup>81</sup> *Conn v. Boutwell*, 101 Miss. 353, 58 South. 105; *Jackson v. Beard*, 162 N. C. 105, 78 S. E. 6.

<sup>82</sup> *Downing v. Stone*, 47 Mo. App. 144; *Hill v. Anderson*, 5 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 216.

<sup>83</sup> *Seeley v. Seeley-Howe-Le Van Co.*, 128 Iowa, 294, 103 N. W. 961.

<sup>84</sup> *Medbury v. Watrous*, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 110; *Gaffney v. Hayden*, 110 Mass. 137, 14 Am. Rep. 580; *Price v. Furman*, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; *Whitmarsh v. Hall*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 375; *Vent v. Osgood*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 572; *Ray v. Haines*, 52 Ill. 485; *Dallas v. Hollingsworth*, 3 Ind. 537; *Judkins v. Walker*, 17 Me. 88, 35 Am. Dec. 229; *Derocher v. Continental Mills*, 58 Me. 217, 4 Am. Rep. 286; *Lufkin v. Mayall*, 25 N. H. 82. See *Clark*, Cont. 259.

<sup>85</sup> *Derocher v. Continental Mills*, 58 Me. 217, 4 Am. Rep. 286; *Whitmarsh v. Hall*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 375. But see *Moses v. Stevens*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 332; *Thomas v. Dike*, 11 Vt. 273, 34 Am. Dec. 690. But the master may show any facts which affect the value of the infant's services, such as lack of skill, or negligence or disobedience of orders, or injury resulting therefrom, *Vehue v. Pinkham*, 60 Me. 142; and will be credited with payments made

an infant has been paid money or parted with property under a voidable contract, and has himself received nothing, he may recover what he has parted with on avoiding the contract.<sup>86</sup> Even where he has received something under the contract, he may return it, and recover what he has parted with; and, as has been seen, according to the weight of authority, he may so recover without returning what he has received, if he has lost, wasted, or used it during his minority, so that he cannot return it. A disaffirmance cannot be retracted. A ratification after a disaffirmance comes too late.<sup>87</sup>

### REMOVAL OF DISABILITIES

218. The emancipation of an infant by act of the parent or by marriage, while removing some of the disabilities of infancy, does not enlarge the capacity to contract. In some states, however, the disabilities of infancy may be removed by judicial proceedings.

An infant may be emancipated by the act of his parent or by marriage;<sup>88</sup> and, while emancipation will to some extent remove the disabilities of infancy,<sup>89</sup> it does not enlarge or affect his capacity to contract,<sup>90</sup> or his capacity to sue without a next friend or guard-

under the contract, *Hagerty v. Lock Co.*, 62 N. H. 576; or with the value of necessities furnished the infant, *Meredith v. Crawford*, 34 Ind. 399.

<sup>86</sup> *Stafford v. Roof*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; *Corpe v. Overton*, 10 Bing. 252; *Millard v. Hewlett*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 301; *Shurtleff v. Millard*, 12 R. I. 272, 34 Am. Rep. 640; *Ross P. Curtice Co. v. Kent*, 89 Neb. 496, 131 N. W. 944, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 723 (holding that, where an infant disaffirms a conditional sale contract, the title to the property remains in the vendor, and the infant may recover any payments made).

<sup>87</sup> *Edgerton v. Wolf*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 453; *McCarty v. Woodstock Iron Co.*, 92 Ala. 463, 8 South. 417, 12 L. R. A. 136.

<sup>88</sup> Ante, p. 353.

<sup>89</sup> *Inhabitants of Bucksport v. Inhabitants of Rockland*, 56 Me. 22; *Person v. Chase*, 37 Vt. 647, 88 Am. Dec. 630; *Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Plymouth*, 15 Mass. 203; *Trammell v. Trammell*, 20 Tex. 406; *Grayson v. Lofland*, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 52 S. W. 121; *Lawder v. Larkin* (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. 171; *Robinson v. Hathaway*, 150 Ind. 679, 50 N. E. 883; *Ward v. Laverty*, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393; *Hoskins v. White*, 13 Mont. 70, 32 Pac. 163. And see *Genereux v. Sibley*, 18 R. I. 43, 25 Atl. 345.

<sup>90</sup> *Mason v. Wright*, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 306; *Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Plymouth*, 15 Mass. 203; *Tyler v. Gallop's Estate*, 68 Mich. 185, 35 N. W. 902, 13 Am. St. Rep. 336; *Genereux v. Sibley*, 18 R. I. 43, 25 Atl. 345; *Person v. Chase*, 37 Vt. 647, 88 Am. Dec. 630; *Hudson's Guardian v. Hudson*, 160 Ky. 432, 169 S. W. 891; *Fields v. Mitchell*, 112 Me. 368, 92 Atl.

ian,<sup>81</sup> or give him political rights not belonging to infants generally.<sup>82</sup> Even statutes which confer on married women the power to contract generally, and to convey their separate real estate with or without the consent of their husbands, do not operate to remove the disability of infancy, but only that of coverture.<sup>83</sup>

In some states, however, provision is made by statute for the removal of the disabilities of infancy by judicial proceedings;<sup>84</sup> the power being usually vested in courts of chancery,<sup>85</sup> or of probate.<sup>86</sup> On a proper showing of the infant's ability to manage his own affairs,<sup>87</sup> the court may in its discretion enter an order or decree emancipating the infant and removing his disabilities.<sup>88</sup> The effect of the order or decree is to invest the infant with all the powers and capacities, and to subject him to all the liabilities, he would have or be subject to if he had actually attained his majority.<sup>89</sup>

293; *Hoskins v. White*, 13 Mont. 70, 32 Pac. 163. Except as to necessities, *Chapman v. Hughes*, 61 Miss. 339.

<sup>81</sup> *Hoskins v. White*, 13 Mont. 70, 32 Pac. 163. But see *Ex parte Hollopeter*, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159, 21 L. k. A. (N. S.) 847, 132 Am. St. Rep. 952, 17 Ann. Cas. 91. And see, also, *Hays v. Bowdoin*, 159 Ala. 600, 49 South. 122.

<sup>82</sup> *Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Plymouth*, 15 Mass. 203.

<sup>83</sup> *Shipley v. Smith*, 162 Ind. 526, 70 N. E. 803; *Sims v. Gunter*, 201 Ala. 286, 78 South. 62; *Burr v. Wilson*, 18 Tex. 367. But see *Ward v. Lavery*, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393.

<sup>84</sup> *Boykin v. Collins*, 140 Ala. 407, 37 South. 248; *Young v. Hiner*, 72 Ark. 299, 79 S. W. 1062; *Doles v. Hilton*, 48 Ark. 305, 3 S. W. 193; *Marks v. McElroy*, 67 Miss. 543, 7 South. 408; *Cunningham v. Robison*, 104 Tex. 227, 136 S. W. 441. Under Kirby's Dig. § 1309, a court cannot remove the disabilities of minors under 14 years of age to enable them to convey an interest in land. *Dalton v. Bradley Lumber Co.*, 135 Ark. 392, 205 S. W. 695.

<sup>85</sup> *Boykin v. Collins*, 140 Ala. 407, 37 South. 248; *Young v. Hiner*, 72 Ark. 299, 79 S. W. 1062; *Marks v. McElroy*, 67 Miss. 545, 7 South. 408. By the district court in Texas. *Buckley v. Herder* (Tex. Civ. App.) 133 S. W. 703.

<sup>86</sup> *Doles v. Hilton*, 48 Ark. 305, 3 S. W. 193.

<sup>87</sup> *In re Pochelu's Emancipation*, 41 La. Ann. 331, 6 South. 541; *Doles v. Hilton*, 48 Ark. 305, 3 S. W. 193; *Young v. Hiner*, 72 Ark. 299, 79 S. W. 1062; *Brown v. Wheelock*, 75 Tex. 385, 12 S. W. 111, 841.

<sup>88</sup> *Boykin v. Collins*, 140 Ala. 407, 37 South. 248; *Ketchum v. Faircloth-Segrest Co.*, 155 Ala. 256, 46 South. 476; *Doles v. Hilton*, 48 Ark. 305, 3 S. W. 193; *Brown v. Wheelock*, 75 Tex. 385, 12 S. W. 111, 841. The function of the court being in the nature of a special authority to the judge as commissioner, and not to the court, no presumption in favor of the order is indulged in case of collateral attack. *Buckley v. Herder* (Tex. Civ. App.) 133 S. W. 703. A void decree may be attacked anywhere. *Lake v. Perry*, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569.

<sup>89</sup> *Young v. Hiner*, 72 Ark. 299, 79 S. W. 1062; *Succession of Gaines*, 42 La. Ann. 699, 7 South. 788. But the decree or order has no extraterritorial

### ACTIONS IN TORT BY INFANTS

219. An infant has the same right as an adult to sue for tortious injuries. Such actions are governed by the ordinary rules of law, and, if the infant fails to exercise due care, his contributory negligence may bar his right of recovery.

220. The due care required by law, being due care under the circumstances of the case—

(a) A less degree of care will ordinarily be required of an infant than of an adult, and accordingly—

(1) An infant too young to be capable of exercising due care is held, as a matter of law, incapable of contributory negligence.

**EXCEPTION**—In some jurisdictions the negligence of the parent or guardian will be imputed to the child.

(2) In general, only such care will be required of an infant as is due care in one of his years and experience.

(b) A greater degree of care is required of an adult in dealing with an infant than with an adult.

(c) An adult who places a dangerous agency, which, from its nature, is attractive to children, where it is accessible to them, may be liable for injuries caused thereby, though the children are trespassers.

In the case of an injury to the person of an infant by the tortious act of another, two causes of action may arise—one, as has been seen, in favor of the parent for loss of services;<sup>1</sup> and one in favor of the infant for the injury to his person.<sup>2</sup> In actions by the infant the ordinary rules of law governing the question of negligence apply, except in so far as they must necessarily be modified to meet the changed conditions arising from the infant's want of discretion and experience. A child of very tender years has been held, as a

effect, *State v. Bunce*, 65 Mo. 349; *Wilkinson v. Buster*, 124 Ala. 574, 28 South. 940; and does not affect contracts executed in other jurisdictions.

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 365.

<sup>2</sup> *Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Propst*, 83 Ala. 518, 3 South. 764; *Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyons*, 156 Ky. 222, 160 N. W. 942, denying rehearing 155 Ky. 396, 159 S. W. 971, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667; *McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.*, 232 Mass. 347, 122 N. E. 278; *Hartfield v. Roper*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273. But in an action by a minor for damages for injury to his person he cannot recover for loss of time, since his services belonged to

matter of law, incapable of contributory negligence;<sup>3</sup> and, in general, a less degree of care is required of an infant than of an adult. The degree required depends on his age and knowledge, and is such as would be ordinary care in one of his years and experience, under the same circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, an adult will be held to a higher degree of care in dealing with an infant than with one of mature age and understanding.<sup>5</sup> To the general rule, that one injured while trespassing or guilty of contributory negligence has no right of action for the injury, there is an exception in favor of children in case they are injured by dangerous agencies which are in their nature likely to be tempting to them, and which are left where they are accessible. The theory on which these cases proceed is that the temptation of an attractive plaything to a child is a thing which must be expected and guarded against, and that the placing of such objects where

his father. *Burke v. Ellis*, 105 Tenn. 702, 58 S. W. 855; *Cole v. Searfoss*, 49 Ind. App. 334, 97 N. E. 345; *Helm v. Phelps*, 157 Ky. 795, 164 S. W. 92. But compare *Harris-Irby Cotton Co. v. Duncan*, 57 Okl. 761, 157 Pac. 746. He may maintain an action for other torts such as slander. *Stewart v. Howe*, 17 Ill. 71; *Hurst v. Goodwin*, 114 Ga. 585, 40 S. E. 764, 88 Am. St. Rep. 43. A child cannot after its birth recover from a railroad company for a deformity caused by the company's negligence in transporting its mother, who was then encephalic. *Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.*, 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp. 867; *Id.*, 154 App. Div. 953, 139 N. Y. Supp. 372, appeal dismissed 209 N. Y. 515, 102 N. E. 1107. To the same effect, see *Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co.*, 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, L. R. A. 1917B, 334.

<sup>3</sup> *Fink v. Furnace Co.*, 10 Mo. App. 61; *American Tobacco Co. v. Pollsco*, 104 Va. 777, 52 S. E. 563; *Erie City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Schuster*, 113 Pa. 412, 6 Atl. 269, 57 Am. Rep. 471; *Hartfield v. Roper*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273; *Mangan v. Railroad Co.*, 38 N. Y. 455, 98 Am. Dec. 66; *Schmidt v. Railway Co.*, 23 Wis. 186, 99 Am. Dec. 158; *Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Grable*, 88 Ill. 441; *Morgan v. Bridge Co.*, 5 Dill. 96, Fed. Cas. No. 9,802; *Bay Shore R. Co. v. Harris*, 67 Ala. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout*, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745; *Union Pac. R. Co. v. McDonald*, 152 U. S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L. Ed. 434; *Byrne v. Railroad Co.*, 83 N. Y. 620; *Lynch v. Smith*, 104 Mass. 52, 6 Am. Rep. 188; *Dowling v. Allen*, 88 Mo. 293; *Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Becker*, 76 Ill. 29; *Evansich v. Railway Co.*, 57 Tex. 126, 44 Am. Rep. 586; *Huff v. Ames*, 16 Neb. 139, 19 N. W. 623, 49 Am. Rep. 716; *Lynch v. Nurdin*, 1 Q. B. 29; *Fishburn v. Burlington & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 127 Iowa, 483, 103 N. W. 481; *Slattey v. Lawrence Ice Co.*, 190 Mass. 79, 76 N. E. 459. It has been held that boys 10 or 12 years of age, who are permitted to go about unattended, may fairly be presumed to have sense enough to take care of themselves from the ordinary and usual dangers of street traffic. *U. S. v. Wright*, 26 Phil. Rep. 217.

<sup>5</sup> *Carter v. Towne*, 98 Mass. 567, 96 Am. Dec. 682; *Binford v. Johnston*, 82 Ind. 426, 42 Am. Rep. 508; *Bransom's Adm'r v. Labrot*, 81 Ky. 638, 50 Am. Rep. 193.

they are accessible to children is an implied invitation to them.<sup>6</sup> When a child is too young to be capable of exercising care, it is held in some jurisdictions that contributory negligence on the part of his parent or guardian will prevent recovery by the child.<sup>7</sup> By the weight of authority, however, this rule is expressly repudiated.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup>An owner has been held liable, on this principle, for injury to a child caused by the caving in of a sandpit, attractive to and frequented by children, *Fink v. Missouri Furnace Co.*, 10 Mo. App. 61 (contra, *Ratte v. Dawson*, 50 Minn. 450, 52 N. W. 985); for leaving dangerous explosives accessible to children, as a single torpedo unguarded on a railway track, *Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.*, 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N. E. 451, 4 Am. St. Rep. 507; and dynamite in an open shed, near where children were in the habit of playing, *Powers v. Harlow*, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257, 51 Am. Rep. 154. In this case the court said: "If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose that they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken." On the same principle, railroads have been held liable for injuries caused to children from playing on turntables. *Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout*, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745; *Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 21 Minn. 211, 18 Am. Rep. 393. In the last case the court said: "Now, what an express invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an attractive plaything is to a child of tender years. If the defendant had left this turntable unfastened for the purpose of attracting young children to play upon it, knowing the danger into which it was thus alluring them, it certainly would be no defense to an action by the plaintiff, who had been attracted upon the turntable and injured, to say that the plaintiff was a trespasser, and that his childish instincts were no excuse for his trespass." See, also, *Nagel v. Railway Co.*, 75 Mo. 653, 42 Am. Rep. 418; *Evansich v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co.*, 57 Tex. 126, 44 Am. Rep. 586; *Kansas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fitzsimmons*, 22 Kan. 686, 31 Am. Rep. 203; *Union Pac. R. Co. v. McDonald*, 152 U. S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L. Ed. 434.

<sup>7</sup>This doctrine was first laid down in *Hartfield v. Roper*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273. Cowen, J., said: "It is perfectly well settled that, if the party injured by a collision on the highway has drawn the mischief upon himself by his own neglect, he is not entitled to an action, even though he be lawfully in the highway pursuing his travels, which can scarcely be said of a toppling infant, suffered by his guardians to be there, either as a traveler, or for the purpose of pursuing his sports. The application may be harsh when made to small children. As they are known to have no personal discretion, common humanity is alive to their protection; but they are not, therefore, exempt from the legal rule, when they bring an action for redress, and there is no other way of enforcing it except by requiring due care at the hands of those to whom the law and the necessity of the case has delegated the exercise of discretion. An infant is not *sui juris*. He belongs to another, to whom discretion in the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is keeper and agent for this purpose, and, in respect to third persons, his act must be deemed that of the infant; his neglect, the infant's neglect." And see *Holly v. Gaslight Co.*, 8 Gray (Mass.) 123, 69 Am. Dec.

<sup>8</sup> See note 8 on following page.

### LIABILITY OF INFANTS FOR TORTS

221. An infant must answer for his torts as fully as an adult, and the fact that the tort is committed under authority or command of his parent is no defense.
222. Since an infant is not bound by his contract, except in certain cases, a breach of contract, except in those cases, cannot be treated as a tort, so as to make him liable. The tort must be separate and independent of it.

Infancy is no defense for a tort committed by a minor. He is liable for injuries caused to the person or property of another as

233; *Leslie v. City of Lewiston*, 62 Me. 468; *Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Wolf*, 59 Ind. 89; *Schmidt v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 23 Wis. 186, 99 Am. Dec. 158; *Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Grable*, 88 Ill. 441; *Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co.*, 52 Cal. 602; *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, to Use of Fryer*, 30 Md. 47; *Hathaway v. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co.*, 46 Ind. 25; *Well v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co.*, 119 N. Y. 147, 23 N. E. 487.

\* *Robinson v. Cone*, 22 Vt. 213, 54 Am. Dec. 67. In this case the court said: "Here the jury have found that the plaintiff was properly suffered by his parents to attend school at the age and in the manner he did, and that injury happened through the ordinary neglect of the defendant, or, if not properly suffered to go to school, then that the defendant was guilty of gross neglect; for the judge put the case in the alternative to the jury, and they have found a general verdict for the plaintiff. And we are satisfied that although a child or idiot or lunatic may, to some extent, have escaped into the highway through the fault or negligence of his keeper, and so be improperly there, yet if he is hurt by the negligence of the defendant, he is not precluded from his redress." And see *Daley v. Norwich & W. R. Co.*, 26 Conn. 591, 68 Am. Dec. 413; *Erie City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Schuster*, 113 Pa. 412, 6 Atl. 269, 57 Am. Rep. 471; *Bellefontaine & I. R. Co. v. Snyder*, 18 Ohio St. 390, 98 Am. Dec. 175; *Government St. R. Co. v. Hanlon*, 53 Ala. 70; *Whirley v. Whiteman*, 1 Head (Tenn.) 610; *Huff v. Ames*, 16 Neb. 139, 19 N. W. 623, 49 Am. Rep. 716; *Mattson v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co.*, 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443, 70 L. R. A. 503, 111 Am. St. Rep. 483, overruling *Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.*, 29 Minn. 336, 13 N. W. 168, 43 Am. Rep. 212; *Wilmot v. McPad-den*, 78 Conn. 276, 61 Atl. 1069; *Boehm v. City of Detroit*, 141 Mich. 277, 104 N. W. 626; *Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Adams*, 50 Fla. 429, 39 South. 183, 7 Ann. Cas. 241; *Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox*, 138 Ill. 370, 27 N. E. 890, 21 L. R. A. 76; *Walters v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*, 41 Iowa, 71; *Battighill v. Humphreys*, 64 Mich. 494, 31 N. W. 894; *Boland v. Missouri R. Co.*, 36 Mo. 484; *Winters v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co.*, 99 Mo. 509, 12 S. W. 652, 6 L. R. A. 536, 17 Am. St. Rep. 591. The Missouri cases are, however, somewhat conflicting. There is also some doubt as to the rule in Kansas, Maryland, and Wisconsin. *Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.*, 25 Kan. 742; *McMahon v. Northern Cent. R. R. Co.*, 39 Md. 439; *Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 38 Wis. 613; *Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 61 Wis. 357, 21 N. W. 227.

fully as is an adult.<sup>9</sup> Thus, an action in tort will lie against an infant for an injury caused by his negligence;<sup>10</sup> for conversion,<sup>11</sup> trespass,<sup>12</sup> assault,<sup>13</sup> or slander.<sup>14</sup> "The law with respect to liability of infants has proceeded rather on the theory of compensating the injured party than of consistently maintaining any logical doctrine as to the mental attitude of the wrongdoer, and of basing the responsibility on the wrongful intention or inadvertence. The cases proceed on the propriety of holding all persons liable for ac-

<sup>9</sup> *Daugherty v. Reveal*, 54 Ind. App. 71, 102 N. E. 381; *Briese v. Maechtle*, 146 Wis. 89, 180 N. W. 893, 85 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 176; *Laggy v. Miller*, 180 Iowa, 1146, 162 N. W. 854.

<sup>10</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 159, and cases there cited; *Bac. Abr. "Infancy and Age,"* H; *School Dist. No. 1 v. Bragdon*, 28 N. H. 507; *Conklin v. Thompson*, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 218; *Bullock v. Babcock*, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 391; *Peterson v. Haffner*, 59 Ind. 130, 26 Am. Rep. 81; *Conway v. Reed*, 66 Mo. 346, 27 Am. Rep. 354; *House v. Fry*, 80 Cal. App. 157, 157 Pac. 500; *Huchting v. Engel*, 17 Wis. 230, 84 Am. Dec. 741. On the question of negligence, the jury has a right to take into consideration the childhood of the parties. *Harvey v. Dunlop*, *Lalor's Supp.* (N. Y.) 193. In *Bullock v. Babcock*, *supra*, it was said: "Where infants are the actors, that might probably be considered an unavoidable accident which would not be so considered where the actors are adults." Where defendants were 13 and 16, it was held that their youth was not to be taken into consideration on the question of negligence. *Neal v. Gillett*, 23 Conn. 437. A minor may reasonably be expected to exercise that degree of care which a person of his age, capacity, discretion, and experience would naturally and ordinarily use. *Briese v. Maechtle*, 146 Wis. 89, 180 N. W. 893, 85 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 176. And see *Harnett v. Boston Store of Chicago*, 265 Ill. 331, 106 N. E. 837, L. R. A. 1915C, 460, affirming 185 Ill. App. 332. Owner of motor car having loaned it to infant cannot recover in tort for injuries to car occasioned by infant's unskillful driving. *Brunhoezel v. Brandes*, 90 N. J. Law, 31, 100 Atl. 163. An infant owner of a store building is not liable for the negligence of a janitor employed by him, where the janitor failed to give warning of an opening in the sidewalk of the premises. *Covault v. Nevitt*, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959.

<sup>11</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 159; *Mills v. Graham*, 1 Bos. & P. 140; *Vasse v. Smith*, 6 Cranch. 226, 3 L. Ed. 207; *Walker v. Davis*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 506; *Baxter v. Bush*, 29 Vt. 465, 70 Am. Dec. 429; *Fitts v. Hall*, 9 N. H. 441; *Pledge v. Griffith*, 199 Mo. App. 303, 202 S. W. 460; *Lewis v. Littlefield*, 15 Me. 235.

<sup>12</sup> *Campbell v. Stakes*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 137, 19 Am. Dec. 561; *O'Leary v. P-ooks Elevator Co.*, 7 N. D. 554, 75 N. W. 919, 41 L. R. A. 677; *Munden v. Harris*, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076; *Jag. Torts*, 159. But see *Huggett v. Erb*, 182 Mich. 524, 148 N. W. 805, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 352.

<sup>13</sup> *Watson v. Wrightsman*, 26 Ind. App. 437, 59 N. E. 1064.

<sup>14</sup> *Defries v. Davis*, 1 Bing. N. C. 692; *Fears v. Riley*, 148 Mo. 49, 49 S. W. 836; *Jag. Torts*, 159. An infant under 7 years of age is not liable for slander or libel, and if he is over 7 and under 14 he is not liable unless he is capable of entertaining the malice essential to slander and libel. *Munden v. Harris*, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076.

tual damages committed by them, and of ignoring volition as a necessary element of a juridical cause."<sup>15</sup> As was said by Lord Kenyon in a leading English case: "If an infant commit an assault, or utter slander, God forbid that he should not be answerable for it in a court of justice."<sup>16</sup> The fact that a tort is committed by an infant under authority or command of his parent may render the parent also liable, but it will not excuse the infant.<sup>17</sup>

Infants cannot empower an agent or attorney to act for them, nor, by the weight of authority, affirm what another may have assumed to do on their account; and therefore they are not liable for torts alleged to have been committed by their agent. They cannot be held liable for "torts by a prior or subsequent assent, but only for their own act."<sup>18</sup>

There are cases in which tenderness of age may be available as a defense. "In certain classes of cases, the inability of very young infants to be intelligent actors, and therefore their inability to judicially cause a wrong, has been recognized. In such cases the wrong is considered due to unavoidable accident."<sup>19</sup> And, where malice is a necessary element, an infant may or may not be liable, according as his age and capacity may justify imputing malice to him, or may preclude the idea of his indulging it."<sup>20</sup>

#### *Tort or Contract*

While an infant is liable for his torts, yet if the tort arises from a breach of contract, and is not separate from and independent of the contract, he cannot be deprived of his defense of infancy, by the plaintiff's merely changing the form of action, and suing in tort.<sup>21</sup> If however, the tort, though in a sense connected with

<sup>15</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 159, where the subject is discussed, and numerous cases collected.

<sup>16</sup> *Jennings v. Rundall*, 8 Term R. 335.

<sup>17</sup> *Scott v. Watson*, 46 Me. 362, 74 Am. Dec. 457; *O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co.*, 7 N. D. 554, 75 N. W. 919, 41 L. R. A. 677; *Humphrey v. Douglass*, 10 Vt. 71, 33 Am. Dec. 177; *Smith v. Kron*, 96 N. C. 392, 2 S. E. 533; *Wilson v. Garrard*, 59 Ill. 51; *Jag. Torts*, 160.

<sup>18</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 160; *Burnham v. Seaverns*, 101 Mass. 360, 100 Am. Dec. 123; *Cunningham v. Railway Co.*, 77 Ill. 178.

<sup>19</sup> *Bullock v. Babcock*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 391; *Jag. Torts*, 160; *Ames & S. Cas. Torts*, 30; *Whart. Neg.* § 88; note 10, p. 524, *supra*.

<sup>20</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 160; *Cooley, Torts* (2d Ed.) 120; *Johnson v. Pye*, 1 Sid. 258; *Stephens v. Stephens*, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S. W. 1143; *Munden v. Harris*, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076.

<sup>21</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 162; *Clark, Cont.* 260; *Jennings v. Rundall*, 8 Term R. 335; *Lowery v. Cate*, 108 Tenn. 54, 64 S. W. 1068, 57 L. R. A. 673, 91 Am. St. Rep.

the contract, is not a mere breach of it, but a distinct wrong of itself, the infant is liable.<sup>22</sup> Where an infant hired a horse to ride, and injured it by overriding, it was held that he could not be made liable upon the contract by framing the action in tort for negligence.<sup>23</sup> Where, on the other hand, an infant hired a horse expressly for riding, and not for jumping, and then lent it to a friend who killed it in jumping, he was held liable, because what he had done was not an abuse of the contract, but an act which he was expressly forbidden to do, and was therefore independent of the contract.<sup>24</sup> In other words, "if an infant bailee does any willful or positive act, amounting to an election on his part to disaffirm the contract, or to convert the property to his own use, or if he wantonly and inten-

744; *Brunhoezl v. Brandes*, 90 N. J. Law, 31, 100 Atl. 163; *Collins v. Gifford*, 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 202, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 969, reversing 134 App. Div. 988, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1100; *Frank Spangler Co. v. Haupt*, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 545; *Eaton v. Hill*, 50 N. H. 235, 9 Am. Rep. 189, and cases hereafter cited.

<sup>22</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 162; *Clark, Cont.* 260; *Burnard v. Haggis*, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 45; *Homer v. Thwing*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 492; *Ray v. Tubbs*, 50 Vt. 688, 28 Am. Rep. 519, and cases hereafter cited. Although a minor's contract for the purchase of a piano on installments is not binding, she cannot take advantage of her minority to commit a fraud on the seller by making a sale of the instrument to a third person. *Dorothy v. Salzberg*, 207 Ill. App. 133.

<sup>23</sup> *Jennings v. Rundall*, 8 Term R. 335; *YOUNG v. MUHLING*, 48 App. Div. 617, 63 N. Y. Supp. 181, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 282. The infant cannot be held liable for injuries to the thing bailed caused by his mere lack of skill or experience. *Moore v. Eastman*, 1 Hun (N. Y.) 578; *Eaton v. Hill*, 50 N. H. 235, 9 Am. Rep. 189. In the latter case it was said: "When the infant stipulates for ordinary skill and care in the use of the thing bailed, but fails for want of skill and experience, and not from any wrongful intent, it is in accordance with the policy of the law that his privilege, based upon his want of capacity to make and fully understand such contracts, should shield him. A failure in such a case, from mere want of ordinary care or skill, might well be regarded as, in substance, a breach of contract, for which the infant is not liable, even although in ordinary cases an action ex delicto might be sustained. But when, on the other hand, the infant wholly departs from his character of bailee, and, by some positive act, willfully destroys or injures the thing bailed, the act is in its nature essentially a tort, the same as if there had been no bailment, even if assumption might be maintained in the case of an adult, or a promise to return the thing safely."

<sup>24</sup> *Burnard v. Haggis*, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 45. The same is true where an infant hires a horse to go to one place, but goes elsewhere, and injures the horse by overriding. He is liable in trover or trespass. *Homer v. Thwing*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 492. And see *CHURCHILL v. WHITE*, 58 Neb. 22, 78 N. W. 369, 76 Am. St. Rep. 64, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 285; *Campbell v. Stakes*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 137, 19 Am. Dec. 561; *Hall v. Corcoran*, 107 Mass. 251, 9 Am. Rep. 30; *Woodman v. Hubbard*, 25 N. H. 73, 57 Am. Dec.

tionally commits a trespass, his infancy is no protection."<sup>25</sup> A good illustration of the application of the principle under consideration is in the case of seduction under a promise of marriage. A promise by an infant to marry is not binding on him, and he could not be sued for the mere breach thereof; but he may, nevertheless, be held liable in an action *ex delicto* for seducing a woman under a promise of marriage.<sup>26</sup>

This question frequently arises in actions against an infant for fraud in connection with a contract. If the action proceeds on the idea that the contract exists, it cannot be maintained. Thus, an action will not lie against an infant for false warranty in the sale of goods;<sup>27</sup> nor will an action lie for falsely warranting a horse to be sound.<sup>28</sup> It has been held that, if an infant obtains goods by false representations—and this includes false representations that he is of age—the other party may avoid the contract on the ground of the fraud; and in such event the property may be considered as never having passed from him, or as having reverted in him, and therefore he may maintain *replevin* to recover the goods, or *trover* for their conversion.<sup>29</sup> Many cases hold that false representations by an infant that he is of age, inducing the other party to contract with him, do not estop him from pleading his infancy if sued upon the contract,<sup>30</sup> and that such false representations will not estop him from avoiding his contract, and seeking affirmative relief, as to

310; *Towne v. Wiley*, 23 Vt. 355, 56 Am. Dec. 85; *Ray v. Tubbs*, 50 Vt. 688, 28 Am. Rep. 519; *Freeman v. Boland*, 14 R. I. 39, 51 Am. Rep. 340; *Lewis v. Littlefield*, 15 Me. 233. Contra, *Penrose v. Curren*, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 351, 24 Am. Dec. 356; *Wilt v. Welsh*, 6 Watts (Pa.) 9. And see *Schenk v. Strong*, 4 N. J. Law, 97. That *trover* will lie for goods converted by an infant, although in his possession by virtue of a contract, see, also, *Vasse v. Smith*, 6 Cranch, 226, 3 L. Ed. 207; *Fitts v. Hall*, 9 N. H. 441; *Mathews v. Cowan*, 59 Ill. 341.

<sup>25</sup> *Jag. Torts*, 162.

<sup>26</sup> *Becker v. Mason*, 93 Mich. 336, 53 N. W. 361.

<sup>27</sup> *Prescott v. Norris*, 32 N. H. 101; *Doran v. Smith*, 49 Vt. 353; *Studwell v. Shapter*, 54 N. Y. 249.

<sup>28</sup> *Gilson v. Spear*, 38 Vt. 311, 88 Am. Dec. 659; *Green v. Greenbank*, 2 Marsh. C. P. 485; *Howlett v. Haswell*, 4 Camp. 118. But see *Vance v. Word*, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 197, 9 Am. Dec. 683. And see *Patterson v. Kasper*, 182 Mich. 281, 148 N. W. 690, L. R. A. 1915A, 1221, holding that, where an infant sold a horse misrepresenting his character, the infant could not escape liability for tort on the theory that the matter arose *ex contractu*.

<sup>29</sup> *Badger v. Phinney*, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; *Neff v. Landis*, 110 Pa. 204, 1 Atl. 177.

<sup>30</sup> *Ante*, p. 490.

recover property which he has parted with.<sup>81</sup> By the weight of authority, if an infant fraudulently induces another to deal with him by falsely representing that he is of age, and afterwards avoids the contract, the other party may maintain an action of deceit against him.<sup>82</sup> There are cases, however, which hold the other way.<sup>83</sup>

In equity an infant stands in a very different position as to his fraudulent representations; and where he has falsely represented that he is of age, or been guilty of other fraudulent acts, whereby, he has entrapped others into selling or purchasing property, or advancing money on it, he will not be heard to plead his infancy to the other's prejudice; and the general tendency of courts of equity is to refuse to recognize the disability of infancy when taken advantage of to commit a fraud.<sup>84</sup>

Where the substance of the action is in tort, it cannot be defeated by the plea of infancy, though it is in form an action *ex contractu*, for, as has been seen, an infant is bound by obligations *quasi ex contractu*, or contracts created by law.<sup>85</sup> Thus, if he embezzles or

<sup>81</sup> *Ante*, p. 490.

<sup>82</sup> *Fitts v. Hall*, 9 N. H. 441; *Rice v. Boyer*, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420, 58 Am. Rep. 53; *Wallace v. Morss*, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 391; *Eckstein v. Frank*, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334.

<sup>83</sup> *Johnson v. Pie*, 1 Lev. 169 (approved by Parke, B., in *Price v. Hewett*, 8 Exch. 146); *Brooks v. Sawyer*, 191 Mass. 151, 76 N. E. 953, 114 Am. St. Rep. 594; *Slayton v. Barry*, 175 Mass. 513, 56 N. E. 574, 49 L. R. A. 560, 78 Am. St. Rep. 510; *Nash v. Jewett*, 61 Vt. 501, 18 Atl. 47, 4 L. R. A. 561, 15 Am. St. Rep. 931. See *Ferguson v. Bobo*, 54 Miss. 121. Infants are not liable in tort to company which sold them motorcycles for deceit arising from false representations as to their age, or for damages to machines while in their possession and used by them under contracts of sale. *Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co.*, 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359.

<sup>84</sup> *Savage v. Foster*, 9 Mod. 35; *Cory v. Gertcken*, 2 Madd. 40; *Ex parte Unity Joint-Stock Mut. Banking Ass'n*, 3 De Gex & J. 63; *Overton v. Banister*, 3 Hare, 503; *Ferguson v. Bobo*, 54 Miss. 121; *Evans v. Morgan*, 69 Miss. 328, 12 South. 270; *Hayes v. Parker*, 41 N. J. Eq. 630, 7 Atl. 511; *Schmitheimer v. Eiseman*, 7 Bush (Ky.) 298. *Contra*, *Geer v. Hovy*, 1 Root (Conn.) 179. And see *Sims v. Everhardt*, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; *Brown v. McCune*, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 224. False representations, known by the party to whom they were made to be false, will not estop the infant. *Charles v. Hastedt*, 51 N. J. Eq. 171, 26 Atl. 564. Mere failure to disclose his age has been held not to estop a minor from avoiding his contract, even in equity. *Baker v. Stone*, 136 Mass. 405; *Sewell v. Sewell*, 92 Ky. 500, 18 S. W. 162, 36 Am. St. Rep. 606; *Davidson v. Young*, 38 Ill. 145; *Price v. Jennings*, 62 Ind. 111; *Thormaehlen v. Kaepfel*, 86 Wis. 378, 56 N. W. 1089. *Ferguson v. Bobo*, *supra*, apparently *contra*, is distinguished in *Brantley v. Wolf*, 60 Miss. 420.

<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 477.

converts money, the party injured may waive the tort, and maintain assumpsit for money had and received, and infancy will be no defense.<sup>36</sup>

### RESPONSIBILITY OF INFANTS FOR CRIME

223. At common law a child under the age of 7 years is conclusively presumed to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent, and cannot commit a crime. Between the ages of 7 and 14 the presumption still exists, but may be rebutted. After the age of 14 he is presumed to have sufficient capacity, and must affirmatively show the contrary.
224. At common law a boy under the age of 14 is conclusively presumed physically incapable of committing rape. In some jurisdictions, though the presumption exists, it may be rebutted.

The ground of an infant's general exemption from criminal responsibility for his acts is the want of sufficient mental capacity to entertain the criminal intention which is an essential element of every crime. If a child, when he commits a wrongful act, is under the age of 7 years, not even the clearest evidence—not even his own confession, indeed—will be received on the part of the state to show that he was of a mischievous discretion. Under that age he is absolutely irresponsible.<sup>37</sup> If, however, he has reached the age of 7, the state is permitted to prove that he was of sufficient capacity to entertain a criminal intention. In the absence of such

<sup>36</sup> *Bristow v. Eastman*, 1 Esp. 172; *Elwell v. Martin*, 32 Vt. 217. In the latter case the court says: "As infancy does not protect him from the consequences of his tortious acts, why should it furnish him with a defense when sued *ex contractu*, instead of *ex delicto*? \* \* \* It is not a contract in which he may have been cheated, and against which infancy shields him, but a willful wrong which he has committed against another, and in which the law implies the obligation to make restitution." And see *Shaw v. Coffin*, 58 Me. 254, 4 Am. Rep. 290.

<sup>37</sup> 4 Bl. Comm. 22; 1 Hale, P. C. 26, 27; Clark, Cr. Law, 49; Clark, Cr. Cas. 77; *State v. Fisk*, 15 N. D. 589, 108 N. W. 485, 11 Ann. Cas. 1061; *State v. Davis*, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 S. W. 122; *United States v. Behrendsohn* (D. C.) 197 Fed. 953; *Hampton v. State*, 1 Ala. App. 156, 55 South. 1018; *Beason v. State*, 96 Miss. 105, 50 South. 488; *People v. Townsend*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 479. The statutes in some few states have raised the age of absolute incapacity to 10 years. *Angelo v. People*, 96 Ill. 209, 36 Am. Rep. 132; *Singleton v. State*, 124 Ga. 136, 52 S. E. 156. A child eight years of age cannot be guilty of any crime or misdemeanor. *Harrold v. Clinton Gas & Electric Co.*, 205 Ill. App. 12.

proof, he is not responsible, and the proof, to warrant a conviction, must be clear and convincing.<sup>38</sup> It has been held that a conviction cannot be had on his own mere naked confession,<sup>39</sup> but there are cases holding the contrary, where the corpus delicti is otherwise proved.<sup>40</sup> When a child has reached the age of 14, he is presumed capable of committing crime,<sup>41</sup> and, to escape responsibility, he must affirmatively show want of capacity.<sup>42</sup> In England, a boy of 10 years, who, after killing a little girl, hid her body, was held criminally liable, because the circumstances showed a mischievous discretion;<sup>43</sup> and a boy of 8 years was hanged for arson.<sup>44</sup> In this country, a boy of 12 has been hanged for murder.<sup>45</sup>

There are some exceptions to these rules in case of certain crimes of omission, such as negligently permitting felons to escape, fail-

<sup>38</sup> *Rex v. Owen*, 4 Car. & P. 236; *State v. Davis*, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 S. W. 122; *State v. Flak*, 15 N. D. 589, 108 N. W. 485, 11 Ann. Cas. 1061; *Hampton v. State*, 1 Ala. App. 156, 55 South. 1018; *Garner v. State*, 97 Ark. 63, 132 S. W. 1010, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1059; *Singleton v. State*, 124 Ga. 136, 52 S. E. 156; *Angelo v. People*, 96 Ill. 209, 36 Am. Rep. 132; *Carr v. State*, 24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S. W. 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 905; *State v. Barton*, 71 Mo. 288; *Wusnig v. State*, 33 Tex. 651; *People v. Domenico*, 45 Misc. Rep. 309, 92 N. Y. Supp. 390; *Harrison v. State*, 72 Ark. 117, 78 S. W. 763; *State v. Adams*, 76 Mo. 355; *State v. Fowler*, 52 Iowa, 103, 2 N. W. 983. Assault and battery by 12 year old child, *State v. Goin*, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 175. See, also, *State v. Tice*, 90 Mo. 112, 2 S. W. 269; *State v. Pugh*, 52 N. C. 61; *Hill v. State*, 63 Ga. 578, 36 Am. Rep. 120. Sale of liquor by child, *Com. v. Mead*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 398. Burglary by a child under 13, *Simmons v. State*, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 527, 97 S. W. 1052. To convict an infant under 14 years of homicide, it is necessary to show that he knew or understood the nature and consequence of his act and showed design and malice in its execution. *State v. Vineyard*, 81 W. Va. 98, 93 S. E. 1034.

<sup>39</sup> *State v. Aaron*, 4 N. J. Law, 231, 7 Am. Dec. 592; *People v. Domenico*, 45 Misc. Rep. 309, 92 N. Y. Supp. 390. But see *Ex parte White*, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 473, 98 S. W. 850.

<sup>40</sup> *State v. Guild*, 10 N. J. Law, 163, 18 Am. Dec. 404. And see *Fost. Crown Law*, 72; *State v. Bostick*, 4 Har. (Del.) 563.

<sup>41</sup> *Brown v. State*, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 326, 83 S. W. 378; *Neal v. State* (Tex. Cr. App.) 101 S. W. 212; *Gilchrist v. State*, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S. W. 260; *Hampton v. State*, 1 Ala. App. 156, 55 South. 1018; *Vinson v. State*, 124 Ga. 19, 52 S. E. 79.

<sup>42</sup> *Irby v. State*, 32 Ga. 496; *State v. Thrailkill*, 73 S. C. 314, 53 S. E. 482; *Law v. Com.*, 75 Va. 885, 40 Am. Rep. 750. His own testimony that he did not know the act was wrong is not enough. *State v. Kluseman*, 53 Minn. 541, 55 N. W. 741.

<sup>43</sup> *York's Case*, *Fost. Crown Law*, 70.

<sup>44</sup> *Emlyn* on 1 Hale, P. C. 25.

<sup>45</sup> *State v. Guild*, 10 N. J. Law, 163, 18 Am. Dec. 404. And see *State v. Aaron*, 4 N. J. Law, 231, 7 Am. Dec. 592; *Godfrey v. State*, 31 Ala. 323, 70 Am. Dec. 494; *Martin v. State*, 90 Ala. 602, 8 South. 858, 24 Am. St. Rep. 844.

ure to repair highways, etc.; infants being held exempt from responsibility in such case until they reach the age of 21 years, on the ground that until then, not having command of their fortune, they are unable to do these acts as required by law.<sup>46</sup>

At the common law a boy who has not attained the age of 14 years is conclusively presumed not to have sufficient physical capacity to commit the crime of rape.<sup>47</sup> Some of the courts in this country, while they recognize the presumption, hold that it is not a conclusive presumption, but one that may be rebutted by proof of capacity.<sup>48</sup> A boy under the age of 14 may be guilty as principal in the second degree or accessory to the crime committed by another, if of sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his crimes, though lacking in physical capacity to commit the crime himself.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> 4 Bl. Comm. 22. A minor who has not been emancipated or is not possessed of property cannot be held criminally liable for failure to support his wife. *People v. Todd*, 61 Mich. 234, 28 N. W. 79. A minor under 16 cannot be convicted of vagrancy. *Johnson v. State*, 124 Ga. 421, 52 S. E. 737. Nor can a minor be convicted of selling mortgaged goods, as he has a right to disaffirm the mortgage, and in effect does so by the sale. *Jones v. State*, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 252, 20 S. W. 578. But he may be held liable in bastardy proceedings. *Chandler v. Com.*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 66.

<sup>47</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 191; *Reg. v. Philips*, 8 Car. & P. 736; *Com. v. Green*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 380; *McKinny v. State*, 29 Fla. 565, 10 South. 732, 30 Am. St. Rep. 140.

<sup>48</sup> *Williams v. State*, 14 Ohio, 222, 45 Am. Dec. 536; *People v. Randolph*, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 174; *Heilman v. Com.*, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S. W. 731, 4 Am. St. Rep. 207; *Wagoner v. State*, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 352, 40 Am. Rep. 36; *State v. Jones*, 39 La. Ann. 935, 3 South. 57.

<sup>49</sup> 1 Hale, P. C. 630; *Law v. Com.*, 75 Va. 885, 40 Am. Rep. 750.

## CHAPTER XV

## PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS AND ALIENS

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  - 242-246. Drunken Persons.
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    - 245. Responsibility for Crimes.
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## PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS

225. A person is non compos mentis who is of unsound mind; the term being a generic one, and including all forms of insanity.

Insanity is "a manifestation of disease of the brain, characterized by a general or partial derangement of one or more faculties of the mind, and in which, while consciousness is not abolished, mental freedom is perverted, weakened, or destroyed."<sup>1</sup> The term is used broadly in the law, to denote all kinds of mental alienation, and as synonymous with the phrase "non compos mentis." Coke enumerates four classes of persons who are deemed in law to be insane or non compos mentis, namely: (1) An idiot or fool natural—that is, a person who has been of unsound mind since his birth; (2) he who was of good and sound mind and memory, but, by the act of God, has lost it; (3) a lunatic, lunaticus, qui gaudet in lucidis intervallis, who sometimes is of good sound mind and memory, and sometimes non compos mentis; and (4) one who is non com-

<sup>1</sup> Black, Law Dict. tit. "Insanity"; Ham. Nerv. Sys. 332. A deaf mute is not presumed to be an idiot. *Alexier v. Matzke*, 151 Mich. 36, 115 N. W. 251, 123 Am. St. Rep. 255, 14 Ann. Cas. 52.

pos mentis by his own act, as a drunkard.<sup>2</sup> The last class will be considered separately, for drunkenness is not generally understood as a phase of insanity in law, and in many respects the rules relating to insanity do not apply in the case of drunkenness.

The status of an insane person is peculiar. As an incompetent person he is subject to the control of, and entitled to protection by, the state. As he is lacking in mind, he can do no act which requires an intelligent mental operation.<sup>3</sup> In the following sections we shall consider his capacity to contract, his capacity to make a will, his liability for torts, and his responsibility for crime.

<sup>2</sup> Black, Law Dict. tit. "Non Compos Mentis"; Co. Litt. 247a; *In re Beverley*, 4 Coke, 124; *Johnson v. Phifer*, 6 Neb. 404; *Somers v. Pumphrey*, 24 Ind. 231. Drunkenness is not in itself, necessarily a species of insanity. *Searles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Milwaukee*, 148 Iowa, 65, 126 N. W. 801, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 405. "The most common forms in which it [insanity] presents itself are those of mania, monomania, and dementia. All these imply a derangement of the faculties of the mind from their normal or natural condition. Idiotcy, which is usually classed under the general designation of 'insanity,' is more properly the absence of mind than the derangement of its faculties. It is congenital—that is, existing in birth—and consists not in the loss or derangement of the mental powers, but in the destitution of powers never possessed. Mania is that form of insanity where the mental derangement is accompanied with more or less of excitement. Sometimes the excitement amounts to a fury. The individual in such cases is subject to hallucinations and illusions. He is impressed with the reality of events which have never occurred, and of things which do not exist, and acts more or less in conformity with his belief in these particulars. The mania may be general, and affect all or most of the operations of the mind; or it may be partial, and be confined to particular subjects. In the latter case it is generally termed 'monomania.' Dementia is that form of insanity where the mental derangement is accompanied with a general enfeeblement of the faculties. It is characterized by forgetfulness, inability to follow any train of thought and indifference to passing events. 'In dementia,' says Ray, a celebrated writer on medical jurisprudence, 'the mind is susceptible of only feeble and transitory impressions, and manifests but little reflection even upon these. They come and go without leaving any trace of their presence behind them. The attention is incapable of more than a momentary effort, one idea succeeding another with but little connection or coherence. The mind has lost the power of comparison, and abstract ideas are utterly beyond its grasp. The memory is peculiarly weak, events the most recent and most nearly connected with the individual being rapidly forgotten. The language of the demented is not only incoherent, but they are much inclined to repeat isolated words and phrases without the slightest meaning.'" *Per Field, C. J., in Hall v. Unger*, Fed. Cas. No. 5,949.

<sup>3</sup> An insane person has no power to appoint an agent. *Amos v. American Trust & Savings Bank*, 125 Ill. App. 91, affirmed 221 Ill. 100, 77 N. E. 462; *Gillet v. Shaw*, 117 Md. 508, 88 Atl. 394, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87.

## INQUISITION

226. The mode of ascertaining the insanity of a person is by a commission in lunacy in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo.

In England commissions in the nature of writs de lunatico inquirendo issue in chancery on the petition of the Attorney General or a friend of the insane person. The practice is substantially the same in American courts of chancery or probate having insanity jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the commission is to determine, first, whether the subject of the inquiry is a lunatic or not, and, if he is found to be a lunatic, then to provide for the safeguarding of both his person and his property.<sup>5</sup> The proceeding may be instituted by a relative of the person,<sup>6</sup> the commonwealth's attorney,<sup>7</sup> but not by a mere stranger,<sup>8</sup> unless authorized by statute.<sup>9</sup>

The inquisition is conclusive of the insanity of the person at the time of the finding,<sup>10</sup> but not of the existence of insanity at a later

<sup>4</sup> *Burke v. Wheaton*, 3 Cranch, C. C. 341, Fed. Cas. No. 2,164; *Halett v. Patrick*, 49 Cal. 590; *Hogg v. Board of Com'rs of San Miguel County*, 57 Colo. 463, 141 Pac. 478; *Ex parte Scudamore*, 55 Fla. 211, 46 South. 279; *Ex parte Zorn*, 241 Mo. 267, 145 S. W. 62; *Cox v. Osage County*, 103 Mo. 385, 15 S. W. 763. It is held in some states that the court has no jurisdiction where the insane person is a nonresident, though temporarily within the jurisdiction of the court. *State v. Servier*, 136 La. 45, 66 South. 392; *Laird v. Dickirson*, 241 Ill. 380, 89 N. E. 795. But in *Chaloner v. Sherman*, 215 Fed. 867, 132 C. C. A. 96, affirmed in 242 U. S. 455, 37 Sup. Ct. 136, 61 L. Ed. 427, it was held that, where the insane person is physically present in the state, the court has jurisdiction, though he is a resident of another state. In *Hundley v. Sumrall*, 144 Ky. 73, 137 S. W. 842, it was held that, where an insane person confined in a sanitarium in another state had property in Kentucky, the courts of the latter state had jurisdiction to appoint a committee to take charge of the estate. And see *Carter v. Bolster*, 122 Mo. App. 135, 98 S. W. 105.

<sup>5</sup> *In re Misselwitz*, 177 Pa. 359, 35 Atl. 722.

<sup>6</sup> *Treasurer of Insane Hospital v. Belgrade*, 35 Me. 497; *State ex rel. Gardiner v. Dickman*, 175 Mo. App. 543, 157 S. W. 1012; *In re Hannah*, 76 N. J. Eq. 237, 73 Atl. 849.

<sup>7</sup> *Coleman v. Commissioners of Lunatic Asylum*, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 239.

<sup>8</sup> *In re Covenhoven*, 1 N. J. Eq. 19.

<sup>9</sup> *Jessup v. Jessup*, 7 Ind. App. 573, 34 N. E. 1017; *Gerke v. Colonial Trust Co.*, 117 Md. 579, 83 Atl. 1092; *Baum v. Greenwald*, 95 Miss. 765, 49 South. 836; *In re Burke*, 125 App. Div. 889, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1004.

<sup>10</sup> *Soules v. Robinson*, 158 Ind. 97, 62 N. E. 999, 92 Am. St. Rep. 301; *Logan v. Vanarsdall* (Ky.) 110 S. W. 321. It is, however, questionable whether the adjudication is conclusive as against strangers to the proceedings.

time,<sup>11</sup> though it does substitute for the general presumption of sanity a presumption of insanity.<sup>12</sup> The adjudication is not conclusive as to the existence of insanity prior to the time of the finding;<sup>13</sup> but, if the inquiry covered the anterior period, it raises a presumption of prior insanity.<sup>14</sup>

## GUARDIANSHIP

**227. The guardianship of persons non compotes mentis is provided for by statute in most jurisdictions. Generally the probate or some similar court is given the power to appoint a guardian or committee of the persons and estates of insane persons; and in some states the power is extended to include drunkards or spendthrifts.**

**228. The guardianship of persons non compotes mentis is governed by substantially the same rules of law as the guardianship of infants.**

The crown as *parens patriæ* had authority over the care and custody of infants, but this authority did not originally extend to persons non compotes mentis. It was, however, conferred on the crown by Parliament, and intrusted under the sovereign's sign manual to the Lord Chancellor.<sup>15</sup> In this country the guardianship of persons non compotes mentis is regulated by statute, jurisdiction being generally conferred on the probate or other similar court. Guardianship over spendthrifts was unknown at common law, but

*Hill v. Day*, 34 N. J. Eq. 150; *Slaughter v. Heath*, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S. E. 69, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Lucas v. Parsons*, 23 Ga. 267; *Clark's Ex'r v. Trail's Adm'rs*, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 35; *Johnson's Committee v. Mitchell*, 146 Ky. 382, 142 S. W. 675. An inquest of lunacy is conclusive as to subsequent occurrences only when made so by statute. *In re Weedman's Estate*, 254 Ill. 504, 48 N. E. 956.

<sup>12</sup> *Redden v. Baker*, 86 Ind. 191; *In re Nelson*, 148 Iowa, 118, 126 N. W. 973, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 974; *Ex parte McWilliams*, 254 Mo. 512, 164 S. W. 221; *Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Wiswell*, 56 Kan. 765, 44 Pac. 996, 35 L. R. A. 258.

<sup>13</sup> *Shirley v. Taylor's Heirs*, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 99; *Sharbero v. Miller*, 72 N. J. Eq. 248, 65 Atl. 472, affirmed 74 N. J. Eq. 453, 77 Atl. 1088; *Uecker v. Zuercher*, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 289, 118 S. W. 149.

<sup>14</sup> *Small v. Champeny*, 102 Wis. 61, 78 N. W. 407; *Hughes v. Jones*, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446, 5 L. R. A. 632, 15 Am. St. Rep. 386.

<sup>15</sup> The Legislature is the successor of the crown of England as *parens patriæ* in the case of idiots and lunatics. *In re Thaw*, 138 App. Div. 91, 122 N. Y. Supp. 970.

is not uncommon under statutes in this country. In some jurisdictions a person to whom the court has intrusted the guardianship of an insane person or spendthrift is called a "guardian," while in others he is called a "committee." The principles and rules of law governing the relation of guardian and insane ward are substantially the same as those which govern the relation of guardian and infant ward. These have already been explained.<sup>16</sup> The effect of guardianship on the capacity of the ward to contract and to make a will will be considered in the following sections.<sup>17</sup>

### CUSTODY AND SUPPORT

229. The state has power through the courts to control and regulate the custody of insane persons, to provide for their support, and to enforce the liability therefor.

While the guardian of an insane person has general custody of the person, and may care for and control him in ordinary circumstances,<sup>18</sup> this power is subject to the general authority of the state, which may, if the public welfare or the welfare of the incompetent demands it, commit the insane person to a proper asylum,<sup>19</sup> or in a proper case direct the removal of the person from the state.<sup>20</sup>

Generally the relatives of an indigent insane person are charged by statute with his support,<sup>21</sup> or, if the insane person has a guardian, that duty devolves on him.<sup>22</sup> By statute the duty of support-

<sup>16</sup> Ante, p. 394.

<sup>17</sup> Post, pp. 542, 552.

<sup>18</sup> *State v. Lawrence*, 86 Minn. 310, 90 N. W. 769, 58 L. R. A. 931; *Anderson v. Anderson's Estate*, 42 Vt. 350, 1 Am. Rep. 334.

<sup>19</sup> *Brickway's Case*, 80 Pa. 65; *Board of Com'rs of Madison County v. Moore*, 161 Ind. 426, 68 N. E. 905; *Ex parte Harcourt*, 27 Cal. App. 642, 150 Pac. 1001; *Baum v. Greenwald*, 95 Miss. 765, 49 South. 836; *Ex parte Dagley*, 35 Okl. 180, 128 Pac. 699, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389; *Ex parte Allen*, 82 Vt. 365, 73 Atl. 1078, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 232; *In re Doyle*, 17 R. I. 37, 19 Atl. 1083.

<sup>20</sup> *Parsee Merchant's Case*, 11 Abb. Prac. N. S. (N. Y.) 209.

<sup>21</sup> *Watt v. Smith*, 89 Cal. 602, 26 Pac. 1071; *Wapello County v. Elkelberg*, 140 Iowa, 736, 117 N. W. 978; *Minnehaha County v. Boyce*, 30 S. D. 226, 138 N. W. 287; *Richardson v. Stuesser*, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N. W. 261, 69 L. R. A. 829, 4 Ann. Cas. 784.

<sup>22</sup> *Creagh v. Tunstall*, 98 Ala. 249, 12 South. 718. He is not, however, personally liable, unless he makes himself so by contract. *Merrimack County v. Kimball*, 62 N. H. 67. And see *In re Clanton's Estate and Guardianship*, 171 Cal. 381, 153 Pac. 459.

ing insane persons is under certain conditions imposed on the public authorities.<sup>23</sup>

### CONTRACTS OF INSANE PERSONS

230. As a general rule, a contract entered into by a person when he is so insane as to be incapable of understanding its nature and effect is voidable at his option. The rule is subject, however, to the following exceptions:

(a) The following contracts are valid and binding:

- (1) Contracts created by law, or quasi contracts.
- (2) Contracts for necessities furnished to himself, or, by the weight of authority, to his wife or children.
- (3) In most, but not all, jurisdictions, where the other party to the contract acted fairly and in good faith, without actual or constructive knowledge of the other's insanity, and the contract has been so far executed that he cannot be placed in statu quo.

(b) The following contracts are absolutely void:

- (1) In most, but not all, jurisdictions, contracts by a person who has been judicially declared insane, and placed under guardianship.
- (2) In a few jurisdictions, deeds and powers of attorney or other appointments of an agent.

It was at one time said to be a maxim of the common law that no man of full age should be allowed by plea to stultify himself by pleading insanity, and thereby avoid his deed or contract;<sup>24</sup> but if this was ever the law, which is very doubtful,<sup>25</sup> it is so no longer. It is universally held that a contract made by a person who is so lacking in mental capacity from defect or disease of the mind as to be incapable of understanding its nature and effect is, as a general rule, voidable, at least where the other party knew of his condition, and in most cases whether there was such knowledge or

<sup>23</sup> The state has the common-law duty of the care and custody of idiots and lunatics, and it is the policy of the state, as shown by its statutes, to appropriate the estates of such persons for their maintenance before they can be supported by the public. *State v. Ikey's Estate*, 84 Vt. 363, 79 Atl. 850, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 575.

<sup>24</sup> *Veverley's Case*, 4 Coke, 123b; Co. Litt. 147; 2 Bl. Comm. 292.

<sup>25</sup> *Fitzh. Nat. Brev.* 202; *Yates v. Boen*, 2 Strange, 1104; *Webster v. Woodford*, 3 Day (Conn.) 90; *Mitchell v. Kingman*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 431.

not.<sup>26</sup> The reason is that a contract requires the assent of two minds, and an insane person has no mind, and is therefore incapable of assenting.

It makes no difference what the form of the insanity may be, or what caused it.<sup>27</sup> It must be something more than mere weakness of intellect,<sup>28</sup> but it need not be so great as to dethrone reason, or to amount to an entire want of reason.<sup>29</sup> It must be such as to render the person incapable of comprehending the subject of the contract, and its nature and probable consequences.<sup>30</sup> If the party is insane at times only, the contract, to be voidable, must have been made while he was insane. If made during a lucid interval, it is binding.<sup>31</sup> Permanent insanity need not be shown. It is enough if insanity existed at the time the contract was made, though the party may have been perfectly sane both before and afterwards.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Webster v. Woodford*, 3 Day (Conn.) 90; *Mitchell v. Kingman*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 431; *Rice v. Peet*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 503; *Morris v. Clay*, 53 N. O. 216; *Burnham v. Mitchell*, 34 Wis. 117; *Clark*, Cont. 264, and cases there cited.

<sup>27</sup> *Idiocy*, *Burnham v. Kidwell*, 113 Ill. 425; *Ball v. Mannin*, 3 Bligh (N. S.) 1; *Ewell*, Lead. Cas. 534. *Lunacy*, *Jackson v. Gumaer*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 552. *Senile dementia*, *Stone v. Wilbern*, 83 Ill. 105; *Jeneson v. Jeneson*, 66 Ill. 259; *Guild v. Hull*, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N. E. 665; *Lynch v. Doran*, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N. W. 882; *Arnold v. Whitcomb*, 83 Mich. 19, 46 N. W. 1029; *Keeble v. Cummins*, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 43; *Clark*, Cont. 264, 265, and cases there cited.

<sup>28</sup> *Dennett v. Dennett*, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; *Saffer v. Mast*, 223 Ill. 108, 79 N. E. 32; *Miller v. Craig*, 36 Ill. 110; *Stone v. Wilbern*, 83 Ill. 105; *Guild v. Hull*, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N. E. 665; *Simonton v. Bacon*, 49 Miss. 582; *Lawrence v. Willis*, 75 N. O. 471; *Farnam v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 212; *West v. Russell*, 48 Mich. 74, 11 N. W. 812; *Davis v. Phillips*, 85 Mich. 198, 48 N. W. 513; *Clark*, Cont. 265, and cases there cited. So, where a person is not entirely without understanding, and makes a contract, comprehending its full force and effect, and no fraud or deceit has been practiced upon him, such a contract will not be rescinded. *Ratliff v. Baltzer's Adm'r*, 13 Idaho, 152, 89 Pac. 71.

<sup>29</sup> *Ball v. Mannin*, 3 Bligh (N. S.) 1; *Ewell*, Lead. Cas. 534.

<sup>30</sup> *Dennett v. Dennett*, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; *Swartwood v. Chance*, 131 Iowa, 714, 109 N. W. 297; *Bond v. Bond*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 1; *Brown v. Brown*, 108 Mass. 386; *Lilly v. Waggoner*, 27 Ill. 396; *Baldwin v. Dunton*, 40 Ill. 188; *Titcomb v. Vantyle*, 84 Ill. 371; *Perry v. Pearson*, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636; *Burnham v. Mitchell*, 34 Wis. 136; *Clark*, Cont. 266, 267, and cases there cited.

<sup>31</sup> *Hall v. Warren*, 9 Ves. 605; *Critchfield v. Easterday*, 26 App. D. C. 89; *Lilly v. Waggoner*, 27 Ill. 395; *McCormick v. Littler*, 85 Ill. 62, 28 Am. Rep. 610; *Beckwith v. Butler*, 1 Wash. (Va.) 224; *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 8 Bush (Ky.) 283; *Staples v. Wellington*, 58 Me. 453; *Clark*, Cont. 266. As to burden of proof in such cases, see cases cited in *Clark*, Cont. 266, note 201.

<sup>32</sup> *Curtis v. Brownell*, 42 Mich. 165, 3 N. W. 936; *Peaslee v. Robbins*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 164; *Jenners v. Howard*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 240.

Neither need it be shown that the insanity was general. A person who is laboring under an insane delusion is incapable of making a contract if his delusion is so connected with the subject-matter of the particular contract as to prevent him from comprehending its nature and probable consequences. If such was his condition, he may avoid the contract, though he may have been perfectly sane in respect to other matters, and might have been able to make a binding contract in reference to some other subject-matter.<sup>33</sup> The delusion must have been so connected with the subject-matter of the contract to avoid it.<sup>34</sup>

*Whether Contracts are Void or Voidable*

It has been held by some courts that the deed of an insane person,<sup>35</sup> or a power of attorney or other appointment of an agent,<sup>36</sup> or the transfer of a note,<sup>37</sup> is absolutely void and of no effect whatever. In most states however, no distinction is made in this respect between the deed of an infant and that of an insane person, or between the deed of an insane person and any other kind of contract; and it is held to be simply voidable.<sup>38</sup> As a general rule, almost

<sup>33</sup> Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen (Mass.) 1; Riggs v. American Tract Soc., 95 N. Y. 503; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; Searle v. Galbraith, 73 Ill. 269; Alston v. Boyd, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 504; Samuel v. Marshall, 3 Leigh (Va.) 567; Boyce's Adm'r v. Smith, 9 Grat. (Va.) 704, 60 Am. Dec. 313; West v. Russell, 48 Mich. 74, 11 N. W. 812.

<sup>34</sup> Boyce's Adm'r v. Smith, 9 Grat. (Va.) 704, 60 Am. Dec. 313.

<sup>35</sup> Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378; Rogers v. Blackwell, 49 Mich. 192, 13 N. W. 512; Lewis v. Alston, 176 Ala. 271, 58 South. 278; McEvoy v. Tucker, 115 Ark. 430, 171 S. W. 888; Bowman v. Wade, 54 Or. 347, 103 Pac. 72; In re Desilver's Estate, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 111, 28 Am. Dec. 645; Farley v. Parker, 6 Or. 105; 25 Am. Rep. 504; Elder v. Schumacher, 18 Colo. 433, 33 Pac. 175.

<sup>36</sup> Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 21 L. Ed. 73; Amos v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 125 Ill. App. 91, decree affirmed 221 Ill. 100, 77 N. E. 462; Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co. v. McLaughlin, 73 Law J. P. O. 95, [1904] App. Cas. 776, 91 Law T. 233, 20 Times Law R. 674.

<sup>37</sup> Walker v. Winn, 142 Ala. 560, 39 South. 12, 110 Am. St. Rep. 50, 4 Ann. Cas. 537.

<sup>38</sup> Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451, 80 Am. Dec. 705; Rathff v. Baltzer's Adm'r, 13 Idaho, 152, 89 Pac. 71; De Vries v. Crofoot, 148 Mich. 183, 111 N. W. 775; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 217, 16 Am. Dec. 391; Vogel v. Zuercher (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 737; Beeson v. Smith, 149 N. C. 142, 62 S. E. 888; Smith v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452, 84 N. E. 402, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 123 Am. St. Rep. 609, 14 Ann. Cas. 505, reversing 116 App. Div. 397, 101 N. Y. Supp. 1011; Wolcott v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 137 Mich. 309, 100 N. W. 569; Key's Lessee v. Davis, 1 Md. 32; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.) 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414; Allis v. Billings, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 415, 39 Am. Dec. 744; Evans v. Horan, 52 Md. 602; Burnham v. Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425;

universally recognized, all his contracts other than such as the law holds binding upon him are not void, but simply voidable at his option.<sup>39</sup> They are binding on the sane party if the insane party chooses to hold him.<sup>40</sup>

*Valid Contracts—Quasi Contracts*

Some contracts are binding upon an insane person. As in the case of an infant, the rule that a person may avoid a contract made by him while insane does not apply to contracts created by law, for in these contracts the obligation is imposed by law without regard to the consent of the party bound.<sup>41</sup>

*Same—Necessaries*

Nor does the rule apply to the contracts of an insane person for necessities furnished to him or his wife, or, by the weight of authority, to his children.<sup>42</sup> The rules as to necessities are substantially the same as in the case of an infant's contracts for necessities, except, it seems, that, unlike an infant, an insane person is liable for labor and materials furnished for the necessary preservation of his estate.<sup>43</sup> In all cases, to render the insane person liable, the credit must have been given to him, and not to some third person. If it is otherwise, no contract will be implied.<sup>44</sup> The fact that the

*Snowman v. Herrick*, 111 Me. 587, 90 Atl. 479; *Green v. Hulse*, 57 Colo. 238, 142 Pac. 416; *Jordan v. Kirkpatrick*, 159 Ill. App. 231, affirmed 251 Ill. 116, 95 N. E. 1079; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 37 N. J. Law, 108, 18 Am. Rep. 716; *Boyer v. Berryman*, 123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. 249; *Somers v. Pumphrey*, 24 Ind. 234; *Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby*, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 245, 19 Am. Dec. 71; *Allen v. Berryhill*, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. Rep. 309.

<sup>39</sup> See cases cited in the preceding note. And see, also, *Carrier v. Sears*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 336, 81 Am. Dec. 707; *Chew v. Bank of Baltimore*, 14 Md. 318; *Burke v. Allen*, 29 N. H. 106, 61 Am. Dec. 642; *Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 434; *Riley v. Carter*, 76 Md. 581, 25 Atl. 667, 19 L. R. A. 489, 35 Am. St. Rep. 443.

<sup>40</sup> *Harmon v. Harmon* (C. C.) 51 Fed. 113; *Allen v. Berryhill*, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. Rep. 309.

<sup>41</sup> *Reando v. Misplay*, 90 Mo. 251, 2 S. W. 405, 59 Am. Rep. 13.

<sup>42</sup> *Read v. Legard*, 6 Exch. 636; *State Commission in Lunacy v. Eldridge*, 7 Cal. App. 298, 94 Pac. 597, 600; *Key v. Harris*, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S. W. 235, 8 Ann. Cas. 200; *Smith's Committee v. Forsythe*, 90 S. W. 1075, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1034; *Hancock v. Haile* (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 1053; *Ratliff v. Baltzer's Adm'r*, 13 Idaho, 152, 89 Pac. 71; *La Rue v. Gilkyson*, 4 Pa. 375, 45 Am. Dec. 700; *Richardson v. Strong*, 35 N. C. 106, 55 Am. Dec. 430; *McCormick v. Littler*, 85 Ill. 62, 28 Am. Rep. 610; *Van Horn v. Hann*, 39 N. J. Law, 207; *Shaw v. Thompson*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 198, 26 Am. Dec. 655; *Sawyer v. Lufkin*, 56 Me. 308; *Sceva v. True*, 53 N. H. 627; *Clark*, Cont. 267.

<sup>43</sup> *Williams v. Wentworth*, 5 Beav. 325.

<sup>44</sup> *Massachusetts General Hospital v. Fairbanks*, 129 Mass. 78, 37 Am. Rep. 303; *Id.*, 132 Mass. 414.

party has been judicially declared insane, and placed under guardianship, does not affect the question of his liability for what are in fact necessities.<sup>45</sup> The liability of an insane person for necessities, like the liability of an infant, is not a strictly contractual obligation. It is imposed by law, and is quasi contractual.<sup>46</sup>

*Same—Ignorance of Insanity and Good Faith of the Other Party*

By the weight of actual decision, where a contract with an insane person has been executed in part, and the other party cannot be placed in statu quo, it will be enforced, unless it is shown that he did not act in good faith, or that he knew of the other's condition. The leading case holding this doctrine is *Molton v. Camroux*,<sup>47</sup> an English case. In this case an insane person had purchased annuities of a society, paid the money, and died, whereupon his administratrix sued the society to recover back the money paid it, on the ground that the contract was void. The jury found that at the time of the contract the deceased was insane, but that there was nothing to indicate this to the society, and that the transaction was in good faith; and it was held that the money could not be recovered. "The modern cases show," it was said, "that when that state of mind was unknown to the other contracting party, and no advantage was taken of the lunatic, the defense cannot prevail, especially where the contract is not merely executory, but executed in whole or in part, and the parties cannot be restored to their original positions."<sup>48</sup> If the lunatic has received no benefit under the contract,

<sup>45</sup> *McCrillis v. Bartlett*, 8 N. H. 569; *Sawyer v. Lufkin*, 56 Me. 308; *Reando v. Misplay*, 90 Mo. 251, 2 S. W. 405, 59 Am. Rep. 13; *Fruitt v. Anderson*, 12 Ill. App. 421. One who furnishes necessities to a lunatic and his family may recover their value, even though he knew the lunatic's mental condition. *Smith's Committee v. Forsythe*, 90 S. W. 1075, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1034.

<sup>46</sup> *Sceva v. True*, 53 N. H. 627; *Hartley v. Hartley's Estate*, 173 Mo. App. 18, 155 S. W. 1099; *Ratliff v. Baltzer's Adm'r*, 13 Idaho, 152, 89 Pac. 71.

<sup>47</sup> 2 Exch. 489; 4 Exch. 17.

<sup>48</sup> See, also, *Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 599; *Kent v. La Rue*, 136 Iowa, 113, 113 N. W. 547; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 37 N. J. Law, 108, 18 Am. Rep. 716; *National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Vanderveer*, 85 Vt. 488, 82 Atl. 837, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 343, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 865; *Walton v. Malcolm*, 264 Ill. 389, 106 N. E. 211, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1021; *Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt*, 79 N. Y. 541; *Ingraham v. Baldwin*, 9 N. Y. 45; *Shoulters v. Allen*, 51 Mich. 529, 16 N. W. 888; *Scanlan v. Cobb*, 85 Ill. 296; *Burnham v. Kidwell*, 113 Ill. 425; *McCormick v. Littler*, 85 Ill. 62, 28 Am. Rep. 610; *Studabaker v. Faylor*, 170 Ind. 498, 83 N. E. 747, 127 Am. St. Rep. 397; *Boyer v. Berryman*, 123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. 249; *Fay v. Burditt*, 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am. Rep. 142; *Wilder v. Weakley's Estate*, 34 Ind. 181; *Northwestern Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakenship*, 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. Rep. 185; *Barkley v. Barkley*, 182 Ind. 322, 106 N. E. 609, L. R.

it has been held that this doctrine does not apply, and that he can recover what he has parted with, notwithstanding the other party's good faith.<sup>49</sup>

Some courts have refused to recognize the doctrine of *Molton v. Camroux*, but, on the contrary, hold that, even though a contract with an insane person has been executed in whole or in part, it may, nevertheless, be avoided by the insane party, though it was entered into by the other party in perfect good faith, and in ignorance of the insanity, and though the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. In *Seaver v. Phelps*,<sup>50</sup> for instance, it was held by the Massachusetts court that, in trover for a note pledged to the defendant by the plaintiff while insane, it was no defense that the defendant, when he took the note, did not know the plaintiff was insane, and had no reason to suspect it, and did not practice any fraud or unfairness. "The fairness of the defendant's conduct," it was said, "cannot supply the plaintiff's want of capacity."

#### *Insane Persons under Guardianship*

In some states it is provided by statute, and in others it is held independently of any statute, that where a person has been judicially determined to be insane, under a regular inquisition, and placed under guardianship, his contracts while under guardianship are absolutely void, and that no inquiry can be made into the question whether he was in fact insane or not.<sup>51</sup> In other states it has been

A. 1915B, 678; *Smith v. Ryan*, 191 N. Y. 452, 84 N. E. 402, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 123 Am. St. Rep. 609, 14 Ann. Cas. 505, reversing 116 App. Div. 397, 101 N. Y. Supp. 1011; *Beals v. See*, 10 Pa. 56, 49 Am. Dec. 573; *Lancaster County Nat. Bank v. Moore*, 78 Pa. 407, 21 Am. Rep. 24; *Lincoln v. Buckmaster*, 32 Vt. 652; *Young v. Stevens*, 48 N. H. 136, 2 Am. Rep. 202, 97 Am. Dec. 592; *Schaps v. Lehner*, 54 Minn. 208, 55 N. W. 911; *Abbott v. Creal*, 56 Iowa, 175, 9 N. W. 115; *Behrens v. McKenzie*, 23 Iowa, 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; *Gribben v. Maxwell*, 34 Kan. 8, 7 Pac. 584, 55 Am. Rep. 233; *Myers v. Knabe*, 51 Kan. 720, 33 Pac. 602; *Matthiessen & Welchers Refining Co. v. McMahon's Adm'r*, 38 N. J. Law, 536; *Carr v. Holliday*, 21 N. C. 344; *Riggan v. Green*, 80 N. C. 236, 30 Am. Rep. 77. Contracts of a lunatic, founded on an adequate consideration, of which the lunatic has had the benefit, and made by the other party without fraud or undue influence and in good faith, in ignorance of the mental condition of the lunatic, and before any inquisition of lunacy has been had, will be upheld where the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. *D. M. Smith's Committee v. Forsythe*, 90 S. W. 1075, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1034.

<sup>49</sup> *Lincoln v. Buckmaster*, 32 Vt. 658; *Van Patton v. Beals*, 46 Iowa, 63.

<sup>50</sup> 11 Pick. 304, 22 Am. Dec. 372. And see *Anglo-Californian Bank v. Ames* (C. C.) 27 Fed. 727; *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; *Fitzgerald v. Reed*, 9 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 94; *Sullivan v. Flynn*, 20 D. C. 396.

<sup>51</sup> *Wait v. Maxwell*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 217, 16 Am. Dec. 391; *Leonard v. Leon-*

held that an adjudication of lunacy and guardianship only raise a presumption of incapacity to contract, which may be rebutted by clear proof of capacity.<sup>52</sup> To bring a case within the doctrine first stated above, there must not only have been an adjudication of lunacy, but the lunatic must be actually under guardianship when the contract is made. For instance, it has been held that if the guardian is discharged as being an unsuitable person, and no other guardian is appointed, the adjudication is not conclusive as to incapacity after the guardian's discharge.<sup>53</sup> As has been stated, the fact that an insane person is under guardianship does not affect his liability for necessities.<sup>54</sup>

### SAME—RATIFICATION AND AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACTS

231. The voidable contract of an insane person may be ratified or disaffirmed by himself when sane, or by his guardian during insanity, or by his personal representatives or heirs after his death.
232. By the weight of authority, the right to disaffirm is personal to the insane party or his representatives, and does not extend to the other party or to strangers.
233. In a few jurisdictions the consideration received by the insane person need not be returned as a condition precedent to avoidance if he is unable to return it, but the weight of authority is the other way. In all jurisdictions it must be returned if it can be.

ard, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 280; *Rannells v. Gerner*, 80 Mo. 474; *Fitzhugh v. Wilcox*, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 235; *Church v. Rosenstein*, 85 Conn. 279, 82 Atl. 568; *Burgdorf v. Hamer*, 96 Neb. 113, 145 N. W. 250; *Bradbury v. Place* (Me.) 10 Atl. 461; *Mohr v. Tulip*, 40 Wis. 66; *Knox v. Haug*, 48 Minn. 58, 50 N. W. 934; *Griswold v. Butler*, 3 Conn. 227.

<sup>52</sup> See *Mott v. Mott*, 49 N. J. Eq. 192, 22 Atl. 997; *Hart v. Deamer*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 497; *Parker v. Davis*, 53 N. C. 460; *Hopson v. Boyd*, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 296; *Snook v. Watts*, 11 Beav. 105; *In re Gangwere's Estate*, 14 Pa. 417, 53 Am. Dec. 554. It may be shown that contract was made during a lucid interval. *Stitzel v. Farley*, 148 Ill. App. 635. The acts of an adult incompetent under guardianship are legal, if beneficial to him and not prohibited by statute. *Taylor v. Superior Court*, 30 R. I. 560, 76 Atl. 644.

<sup>53</sup> *Willwerth v. Leonard*, 156 Mass. 277, 31 N. E. 299.

<sup>54</sup> *Ante*, p. 540.

234. In most jurisdictions the right of disaffirmance can be exercised against bona fide purchasers of land or goods sold by the insane person, or of negotiable instruments executed by him.

The voidable contracts of a person non compos mentis may be ratified or disaffirmed by him when he becomes sane, or during a lucid interval;<sup>55</sup> or, during the continuance of his infirmity, by his committee or guardian;<sup>56</sup> or, after his death, by his personal representative<sup>57</sup> or his heirs.<sup>58</sup> The privilege is personal to the insane person, or those who thus represent him; and neither the other party to the contract nor third persons can avoid it.<sup>59</sup> Ratification or disaffirmance need not be in express words, but may be by conduct, as in the case of ratification or disaffirmance by a person of a contract made during infancy.<sup>60</sup>

#### *Return of Consideration on Avoidance*

In those jurisdictions where an insane person's contract is voidable, whether it is executed or not, and whether or not the other

<sup>55</sup> *Alms v. Billings*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 416, 39 Am. Dec. 744; *Gibson v. Soper*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414; *Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 434; *Turner v. Rusk*, 53 Md. 65; *Spicer v. Holbrook*, 96 S. W. 571, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 865; *Merry v. Bergfeld*, 264 Ill. 84, 105 N. E. 758; *Lawrence v. Morris*, 167 App. Div. 186, 152 N. Y. Supp. 777; *De Vries v. Crofoot*, 148 Mich. 183, 111 N. W. 775. Ratification or disaffirmance must be within reasonable time. *West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.*, 151 N. C. 231, 65 S. E. 979; *Weber v. Bottger*, 172 Iowa, 418, 154 N. W. 579.

<sup>56</sup> *Moore v. Hershey*, 90 Pa. 196; *Halley v. Troester*, 72 Mo. 73; *McClain v. Davis*, 77 Ind. 419.

<sup>57</sup> *Beverley's Case*, 4 Coke, 123b; *Campbell v. Kuhn*, 45 Mich. 513, 8 N. W. 523, 40 Am. Rep. 479; *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; *Schuff v. Ransom*, 79 Ind. 458.

<sup>58</sup> *Allis v. Billings*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 415, 39 Am. Dec. 744; *Schuff v. Ransom*, 79 Ind. 458.

<sup>59</sup> *Carrier v. Sears*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 336, 81 Am. Dec. 707; *Allen v. Berryhill*, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. Rep. 309; ante, p. 537. Contra, *Burke v. Allen*, 29 N. H. 106, 61 Am. Dec. 642. Sureties are liable on a note executed by an insane person. *Lee v. Yandell*, 69 Tex. 34, 6 S. W. 665. One merely in privity of estate with an alleged insane grantor, who was the common source of title, cannot attack such grantor's deed for alleged incapacity. *Porter v. Brooks*, (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 192.

<sup>60</sup> *Gibson v. Soper*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 283, 66 Am. Dec. 414; *Newton v. Evers*, 77 Misc. Rep. 619, 137 N. Y. Supp. 507; *Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 434. Disaffirmance by action to avoid. *Hull v. Louth*, 109 Ind. 315, 10 N. E. 270, 58 Am. Rep. 405; *Ashmead v. Reynolds*, 127 Ind. 441, 26 N. E. 80.

party acted in good faith and in ignorance of his mental infirmity, a person is not required to restore, or offer to restore, the consideration received by him as a condition precedent to the avoidance of a deed or other contract made by him while insane, though retention and use of the consideration after restoration to sound mind may, as in the case of infants, furnish evidence of ratification of the contract. One of the obvious grounds, it was said by the Massachusetts court, on which the deed of an insane man or an infant is held voidable, is not merely the incapacity to make a valid sale, but the incapacity prudently to manage and dispose of the proceeds of the sale; and the same incapacity which makes the deed voidable may have wasted the price, and rendered the restoration of the consideration impossible. "The law makes this very incapacity of parties their shield. In their weakness they find protection. It will not suffer those of mature age and sound mind to profit by that weakness. It binds the strong while it protects the weak. It holds the adult to the bargain which the infant may avoid; the sane to the obligation from which the insane may be loosed. It does not mean to put them on an equality. On the other hand, it intends that he who deals with infants or insane persons shall do it at his peril. \* \* \* If the law required restoration of the price as a condition precedent to the recovery of the estate, that would be done indirectly which the law does not permit to be done directly, and the great purpose of the law in avoiding such contracts—the protection of those who cannot protect themselves—defeated."<sup>61</sup>

As we have already seen, however, most courts do not allow an insane person to avoid his contracts at all where the other party acted in good faith, and in ignorance of his insanity, and cannot be placed in statu quo.<sup>62</sup>

#### *Avoidance as Against Third Persons*

The fact that third persons have acquired an interest under the contract of a person non compos mentis, in good faith, for value, and without notice of his infirmity, cannot defeat his right to avoid the contract.<sup>63</sup> This rule applies to deeds<sup>64</sup> and negotiable instru-

<sup>61</sup> *Gibson v. Soper*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414; *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 453, 89 Am. Dec. 705.

<sup>62</sup> *Ante*, p. 541.

<sup>63</sup> *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; *Hull v. Louth*, 109 Ind. 315, 10 N. E. 270, 58 Am. Rep. 405; *Long v. Fox*, 100 Ill. 43; *Rogers v. Blackwell*, 49 Mich. 192, 13 N. W. 512.

<sup>64</sup> *Rogers v. Blackwell*, 49 Mich. 192, 13 N. W. 512. In North Carolina it  
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ments<sup>65</sup> as well as to other contracts, and it applies whether the contract be regarded as void or merely voidable. To protect bona fide purchasers in such cases would be to withdraw protection from the insane person.

### LIABILITY OF INSANE PERSON FOR TORTS

235. An insane person is liable, to the extent of the actual damage, for torts involving no mental element; but he is not liable for torts of which malice is an essential element; nor is he liable for exemplary damages.

The general rule is that an insane person is liable for his torts, which involve no mental element, to the extent of the actual damage.<sup>66</sup> He is liable, for instance, in tort for causing the death of another,<sup>67</sup> for trespass on land,<sup>68</sup> for conversion,<sup>69</sup> for assault and battery,<sup>70</sup> for false imprisonment,<sup>71</sup> for negligence.<sup>72</sup> In a late Illinois case it was said: "There certainly can be nothing wrong or unjust in a verdict which merely gives compensation for the ac-

is held that the deed of a lunatic, duly recorded, cannot be avoided as against bona fide purchasers. *Odom v. Riddick*, 104 N. C. 515, 10 S. E. 609, 7 L. R. A. 118, 17 Am. St. Rep. 686.

<sup>65</sup> *Anglo-Californian Bank v. Ames* (C. C.) 27 Fed. 727; *Wirebach's Ex'r v. First Nat. Bank*, 97 Pa. 543, 39 Am. Rep. 821; *McClain v. Davis*, 77 Ind. 419.

<sup>66</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 154; *Weaver v. Ward*, Hob. 134; *McIntyre v. Sholty*, 121 Ill. 600, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140; *Morse v. Crawford*, 17 Vt. 499, 44 Am. Dec. 349; *Young v. Young*, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S. W. 155; *Gibson v. Pollock*, 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W. 874; *Behrens v. McKenzie*, 23 Iowa, 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; *Cross v. Kent*, 32 Md. 581; and cases hereafter cited.

<sup>67</sup> *McIntyre v. Sholty*, 121 Ill. 600, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140; *Young v. Young*, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S. W. 155; *Ballinger v. Rader*, 153 N. C. 488, 69 S. E. 497; *Jewell v. Colby*, 66 N. H. 399, 24 Atl. 902.

<sup>68</sup> *Amick v. O'Hara*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 258.

<sup>69</sup> *Morse v. Crawford*, 17 Vt. 499, 44 Am. Dec. 349.

<sup>70</sup> *Taggard v. Innes*, 12 U. C. C. P. 77; *Feld v. Borodofski*, 87 Miss. 727, 40 South. 816.

<sup>71</sup> *Krom v. Schoonmaker*, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 647.

<sup>72</sup> *Williams v. Hays*, 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449, 26 L. R. A. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 743; *Morain v. Devlin*, 132 Mass. 87, 42 Am. Rep. 423; *Behrens v. McKenzie*, 23 Iowa, 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428. An insane person cannot, however, be held liable for the negligence of his guardian or committee in the care of the incompetent's property. *Reams v. Taylor*, 31 Utah, 288, 87 Pac. 1089, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 436, 120 Am. St. Rep. 930, 11 Ann. Cas. 51; *Ward v. Rogers*, 51 Misc. Rep. 299, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1058. An insane person is not liable for the tort of an employé of the guardian in operating an automobile, not in the presence of the lunatic. *Gillet v. Shaw*, 117 Md. 508, 83 Atl. 394, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87.

tual loss resulting from an injury inflicted by a lunatic. He has properly no will. His acts lack the element of intent or intention. Hence it would seem to follow that the only proper measure of damages in an action against him for a wrong is the mere compensation of the party injured. Punishment is not the object of the law when persons unsound in mind are the wrongdoers. There is, to be sure, an appearance of hardship in compelling one to respond for that which he is unable to avoid, for want of the control of reason. But the question of liability in these cases is one of public policy. If an insane person is not held liable for his torts, those interested in his estate, as relatives or otherwise, might not have a sufficient motive to so take care of him as to deprive him of opportunities for inflicting injuries on others. There is more injustice in denying to the injured party the recovery of damages for the wrong suffered by him than there is in calling upon the relatives or friends of the lunatic to pay the expense of his confinement, if he has an estate ample enough for that purpose. The liability of lunatics for their torts tends to secure a more efficient custody and guardianship of their persons. Again, if parties can escape the consequences of their injurious acts upon the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong temptation to simulate insanity, with a view of masking the malice and revenge of an evil heart."<sup>73</sup>

An insane person, being incapable of entertaining malice, cannot commit a tort in which malice is an essential element, like malicious prosecution, libel, and slander.<sup>74</sup> As was said by the Indiana court: "Slander must be malicious. An idiot or lunatic, no matter from what cause he became so, cannot be guilty of malice. He may indulge the anger of the brute, but not the malice of one who 'knows better.'"<sup>75</sup>

In no case can more than actual damages be recovered from a lunatic for his torts. Exemplary damages being allowed on the ground of malice or evil intent, and an insane person being incapable of malice, they can never be recovered.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>73</sup> *McIntyre v. Sholty*, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140.

<sup>74</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 157; *Gates v. Meredith*, 7 Ind. 440; *Bryant v. Jackson*, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 199; *Horner v. Marshall's Adm'x*, 5 Munf. (Va.) 466.

<sup>75</sup> *Gates v. Meredith*, 7 Ind. 440.

<sup>76</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 158; *Avery v. Wilson* (C. C.) 20 Fed. 856; *Krom v. Schoonmaker*, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 647; *Moore v. Horne*, 153 N. C. 413, 69 S. E. 409, 138 Am. St. Rep. 675, 21 Ann. Cas. 1350.

**RESPONSIBILITY OF INSANE PERSON FOR CRIME**

236. Since a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime, no person is criminally responsible for an act if, at the time it is committed, he is so insane as to be incapable of entertaining such an intent.
237. Insanity may have the following effects:
- (a) It may render a person incapable of determining between right and wrong, in which case there is no criminal responsibility.
  - (b) It may render him incapable of knowing what he is doing in the particular instance only, as in the case of insane delusions or partial insanity, in which case his responsibility depends upon the facts as they appear to him.
  - (c) It may deprive him of freedom of will, as in the case of irresistible impulses, where the party knows what he is doing, but is irresistibly driven to do it. Perhaps most courts refuse to recognize such a phase of insanity as a ground of exemption; but, by the better opinion, such an impulse, if shown to have been caused by disease of the mind, does exempt the victim from responsibility.
238. Moral or emotional insanity, as distinguished from mental, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility.
239. A person cannot be tried if he is insane, though he may have been sane when he committed the act, as he is deemed incapable of conducting his defense. Nor can an insane person be sentenced or punished, though he may have been convicted while sane.

The leading case on the subject of insanity as a defense in criminal prosecutions is *McNaghten's Case*, which arose in England in 1843.<sup>17</sup> After the defendant had been acquitted in that case on the ground of insanity, the question came up on debate in the House of Lords, and the opinion of the judges was asked. They answered, among other things, that jurors should be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on

<sup>17</sup> 10 Clark & F. 200.

the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved (1) that, at the time the act was committed, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong; or (2) that if a person is laboring under a partial delusion, not being in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts in respect to which the delusion exists were real; that if, for example, a person, under the influence of his delusion, supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment, but if his delusion was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.

*Inability to Distinguish between Right and Wrong*

This answer of the judges, it will be noticed, holds that a person is not criminally responsible for his act if he was so insane that he did not know the nature and quality of the act, or if he did not know it was wrong. This rule is universally recognized.<sup>78</sup> The incapacity in such cases may arise from idiocy, as well as from mania.<sup>79</sup> The defect of reason need not be general nor permanent. It is enough if the party did not know that the particular act was wrong at the time he committed it, though he may have had his reason shortly before the act, and may have recovered it afterwards, and though he may have been able to distinguish between right and wrong as to other acts.

*Insane Delusions*

The answer of the judges in *McNaghten's Case* on the question of insane delusions has been since recognized as the law in this country, as well as in England. If, when a man commits an act, he is laboring under an insane delusion as to that particular act, not being otherwise insane, his responsibility depends upon the

<sup>78</sup> *Flanagan v. People*, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; *Dunn v. People*, 109 Ill. 635; *Hornish v. People*, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237; *Perkins v. United States*, 228 Fed. 408, 142 C. C. A. 638; *State v. Riddle*, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S. W. 1044, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 884; *Oborn v. State*, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966; *Clark, Cr. Law*, 53, 54, where cases are collected.

<sup>79</sup> *Com. v. Heath*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 303; *Ortwein v. Com.*, 76 Pa. 414, 18 Am. Rep. 420.

facts as they seemed to him.<sup>80</sup> If a man kills another under the insane delusion that the other is attempting to take his life, he is excused. But, where a man killed another under the insane delusion that the latter was trying to marry his mother, he was held responsible for the murder, since this fact, even if it really existed, would be no defense.<sup>81</sup> So, where a convict killed a fellow convict, it was rightly held, on the same principle, that a delusion that the deceased had divulged a plan of escape was no defense.<sup>82</sup>

There must have been an actual delusion, and the act must have been immediately connected with it. If a person knows all the facts as to which he acts, he is not exempt, though he may have had insane delusions as to other facts.<sup>83</sup>

### *Irresistible Impulse*

Where a person, from disease of the mind, and not from mere moral depravity and long indulgence in vice, is incapable of restraining himself, many of the courts hold that he is exempt from responsibility, though he may have known that he was doing what was wrong. In other words, it is held that a person may know that he is doing wrong when he commits an act, but, by reason of the duress of a mental disease, he may have lost the power to choose between the right and the wrong, and to avoid doing the act, and that when this is shown to be the case, he is not criminally responsible.<sup>84</sup> Most of the courts, perhaps, have refused to recognize any such ground of exemption, and limit the test of responsibility to ability to distinguish between right and wrong.<sup>85</sup> If such

<sup>80</sup> McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200; Hadfield's Case, 27 How. State Tr. 1282; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 571; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241; Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338; Clark, Cr. Law, 54, 55, and cases there cited. Partial insanity does not excuse, unless the derangement is such that the person is incapable, at the time of committing the act, of distinguishing between the right and the wrong in reference to that particular act. State v. Porter, 213 Mo. 43, 111 S. W. 529, 127 Am. St. Rep. 589. And see People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124.

<sup>81</sup> Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658.

<sup>82</sup> People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275.

<sup>83</sup> Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; Clark, Cr. Law, 55, and cases there cited.

<sup>84</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 56, 57, and cases there cited; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 South. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 83 Am. Dec. 231; Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555, 6 N. E. 165.

<sup>85</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 56, and cases there cited; Reg. v. Stokes, 3 Car. & K. 185;

a condition can exist—and the doctors say that it does—it ought to exempt from responsibility as fully as any other kind of insanity. Great care should be taken in recognizing such a ground of exemption; and it should be clear that the irresistible impulse is due to disease of the mind, and not to moral depravity.

#### *Moral and Emotional Insanity*

A perverted condition of the moral system is sometimes spoken of as "moral insanity." It is never a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility. Though, from low associations and constant indulgence in vice, a man's moral system has become so morbid, and his passions so uncontrollable, that his conscience or sense of right and wrong will not restrain him, he is, nevertheless, responsible for his acts, if his mind is sound.<sup>86</sup> So, "emotional insanity," as it is called, or temporary passion, arising from excitement or anger, and not from mental disease, is no defense.<sup>87</sup>

#### *Insanity after Commission of Crime*

If a person becomes insane after he has committed a crime, this does not render him any the less guilty. But he cannot be arraigned and put upon his trial while he is insane; and if he becomes insane after he has been arraigned but before judgment the trial must end.<sup>88</sup> The reason of this is that an insane person cannot properly defend himself. So, if he becomes insane after a conviction and sentence, he cannot be punished.<sup>89</sup> Such insanity, how-

Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 8 S. E. 440, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879; Thomas v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 293, 116 S. W. 600; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966; State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S. W. 1044, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 844.

<sup>86</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 57, 58, and cases there cited; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. Rep. 638. But see Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461.

<sup>87</sup> Clark, Cr. Law, 58, and cases there cited; People v. Mortimer, 48 Mich. 37, 11 N. W. 776; People v. Foy, 138 N. Y. 664, 34 N. E. 396; Beel v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916D, 519, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 978, rehearing denied 216 N. Y. 762, 111 N. E. 1095.

<sup>88</sup> In re Wright, 74 Kan. 406, 89 Pac. 678; Clark, Cr. Proc. 427, 428, and cases there cited.

<sup>89</sup> State v. Snell, 46 Wash. 327, 89 Pac. 931, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191; Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S. W. 327, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; Ex parte Wright, 74 Kan. 406, 89 Pac. 678.

ever, does not prevent his being tried and punished if he subsequently becomes sane.

### CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

240. A person who is of unsound mind to such an extent as to be incapable of comprehending the condition of his property and his relations to the persons who are or might be the objects of his bounty, and of collecting in his mind, without prompting, the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them there until their relation to each other can be perceived, and a rational judgment in respect thereto formed, is incapable of making a will.
241. A person under guardianship is prima facie wanting in testamentary capacity, but his will is valid if it be shown that he was in fact of sound mind.

To be capable of making a valid will, a person must be of sound mind. Blackstone says that "mad men, or otherwise non compotes, idiots or natural fools, persons grown childish by reason of old age or distemper, such as have their senses besotted with drunkenness, all these are incapable, by reason of mental disability, to make any will so long as such disability lasts."<sup>90</sup> Where it is shown that a testator was an idiot or totally insane, there can be no difficulty in declaring the will void.<sup>91</sup> The question of testamentary capacity, however, is often very difficult, where it is sought to show partial insanity or insane delusions, or to show a slight degree of mental disorder.

The degree of mental capacity has been variously stated. In a New York case it was said: "The testator should be capable of comprehending the condition of his property, and his relations to the persons who are or might have been the objects of his bounty. He should be able to collect in his mind, without prompting, the elements of his business to be transacted, and hold them there until their relations to each other can be perceived, and a rational judgment in respect thereto be formed."<sup>92</sup> And in a Pennsylvania

<sup>90</sup> 2 Bl. Comm. 497.

<sup>91</sup> Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461.

<sup>92</sup> Van Guysling v. Van Kuren, 35 N. Y. 70. And see Converse's Ex'r v. Converse, 21 Vt. 168, 52 Am. Dec. 58; American Bible Soc. v. Price, 115 Ill. 623, 5

case it was said: "A man of sound mind and disposing memory is one who has a full and intelligent knowledge of the act he is engaged in, a full knowledge of the property he possesses, an intelligent perception and understanding of the disposition he desires to make of it, and of the persons and objects he desires shall be the recipients of his bounty. It is not necessary that he collect all these in one review. If he understands, in detail, all that he is about, and chooses with understanding and reason between one disposition and another, it is sufficient for the making of a will. If, from any cause, he is so enfeebled in mind as to be incapable of knowing the property he possesses, of appreciating the effect of any disposition made by him of it, and of understanding to whom he intends to bequeath it, he is without the requisite testamentary capacity."<sup>33</sup>

A man is presumed to have been sane until the contrary is proved. Therefore, where a will is proved, and is objected to on the ground of want of mental capacity, the burden of proof is on the contestant.<sup>34</sup> But, when settled insanity is proved to have existed prior to the date of the will, its continuance will be presumed, and the burden is on the proponent to show that the will was made in a lucid interval.<sup>35</sup>

If the testator, at the time of making his will, was laboring under an insane delusion as to the natural objects of his bounty, which affected its provisions, it will be held invalid.<sup>36</sup> Thus, a will disinheriting a son would be invalid if the testator was under an insane delusion that the son was not his own. But a delusion not aris-

N. E. 126; *In re Blakely's Will*, 48 Wis. 294, 4 N. W. 337; *Harrison v. Rowan*, 3 Wash. C. C. 580, Fed. Cas. No. 6,141; Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 227.

<sup>33</sup> *Wilson v. Mitchell*, 101 Pa. 495. And see *Shaver v. McCarthy*, 110 Pa. 339, 5 Atl. 614. Partial insanity, if of such character as to affect the provisions of the will, invalidates it. *Thomas v. Carter*, 170 Pa. 292, 33 Atl. 81, 50 Am. St. Rep. 770; *Blough v. Parry*, 144 Ind. 463, 40 N. E. 70, 43 N. E. 560.

<sup>34</sup> *Brooks v. Barrett*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 94.

<sup>35</sup> *Attorney General v. Parnter*, 3 Brown, Ch. 443. "Lunacy being once established, the burden is on the party claiming through some act of the lunatic to show that it was done in a lucid interval; and, a return to insanity being proved, the burden is upon the party claiming a relapse into insanity." *Wright v. Jackson*, 59 Wis. 569, 18 N. W. 486.

<sup>36</sup> *American Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Hopper*, 33 N. Y. 619. And see *Dew v. Clarke*, 5 Russ. 163; *Stanton v. Wetherwax*, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 259; *Ballantine v. Proudfoot*, 62 Wis. 216, 22 N. W. 392; *Smee v. Smee*, 32 Moak, 311, 5 Prob. Div. 84, Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 205; *Morse v. Scott*, 4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 507, Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 209.

ing from mental disorder would be immaterial. Thus, the testator's mistaken opinion that his child is illegitimate will not invalidate his will.<sup>97</sup> A will is not affected even by an insane delusion that has no connection with it.<sup>98</sup>

Wills are most frequently contested for mental incapacity on the ground of senile dementia, which results from a decay and wearing out of the mental faculties in old age. If, from such a cause, a person has not sufficient mental capacity, within the rules above stated, he cannot make a valid will.<sup>99</sup> A person is not rendered incompetent to make a will by deafness, dumbness, or blindness, if his mind is sound.<sup>1</sup> Nor does mere eccentricity render him incompetent.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that a testator was under guardianship as non compos mentis at the time he made the will does not render the will invalid, if it can be shown that he was in fact of sound mind. But the fact of guardianship is prima facie evidence of insanity and incapacity to make a will, and the burden of showing the contrary is on the proponent.<sup>3</sup>

### CONTRACTS OF DRUNKEN PERSONS

242. A contract or conveyance made by a person when he is so drunk that he is incapable of understanding its nature and effect is voidable at his option. He is liable, however, on contracts created by law, and for necessities.

243. The rules as to ratification and avoidance are substantially the same as in the case of infants and insane persons. Some courts, however, hold that the right of avoidance cannot be exercised against bona fide purchasers for value.

<sup>97</sup> *Clapp v. Fullerton*, 34 N. Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681. And see *Stackhouse v. Horton*, 15 N. J. Eq. 202.

<sup>98</sup> See *Banks v. Goodfellow*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 549, Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 211; *Smee v. Smee*, 32 Moak, 311, 5 Prob. Div. 84, Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 205; *In re Kendrick's Estate*, 130 Cal. 360, 62 Pac. 605; *Snell v. Weldon*, 243 Ill. 496, 90 N. E. 1061; *Whitney v. Twombly*, 136 Mass. 145.

<sup>99</sup> As to senile dementia, and incapacity on that ground, see *Van Alst v. Hunter*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 148; *Blanchard v. Nestle*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 37.

<sup>1</sup> *Brower v. Fisher*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 441; *In re Barber*, 39 Ch. Div. 187.

<sup>2</sup> *In re Smith's Will*, 52 Wis. 543, 8 N. W. 616, 38 Am. Rep. 756.

<sup>3</sup> *Stone v. Damon*, 12 Mass. 488; *Breed v. Pratt*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 115.

A drunken person is in exactly the same position as an insane person with respect to his capacity to enter into contracts. It was formerly considered that a man should not be permitted to stultify himself by pleading drunkenness when sued upon a contract, or for the purpose of avoiding a deed; but this doctrine has long since been exploded, and it is now perfectly well settled that a contract or conveyance made by a drunken person is voidable at his option if his drunkenness was so excessive as to render him incapable of comprehending its nature and effect, or, in other words, of knowing what he was doing.<sup>4</sup> The contract or conveyance is not void, but simply voidable, at the option of the drunken party. It makes no difference that the intoxication was voluntary, and not fraudulently induced or caused by the other party.<sup>5</sup> The defense of drunkenness to defeat a contract is personal, like the defense of infancy and insanity, and can only be set up by the party or his representative. The other party cannot avoid the contract, nor can it be attacked by third persons.<sup>6</sup>

Some courts make no distinction between cases in which the drunken person is under guardianship and other cases; but hold the contract or conveyance merely voidable in both cases.<sup>7</sup> Other

<sup>4</sup> Clark, Cont. 274, and cases there cited; *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 Mees. & W. 623; *Spoonheim v. Spoonheim*, 14 N. D. 380, 104 N. W. 845; *Barrett v. Buxton*, 2 Aikens (Vt.) 167, 16 Am. Dec. 691; *Carpenter v. Rodgers*, 61 Mich. 384, 28 N. W. 156, 1 Am. St. Rep. 595; *Miller v. Finley*, 26 Mich. 254, 12 Am. Rep. 306; *Foss v. Hildreth*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 76; *Van Wyck v. Brasher*, 81 N. Y. 260; *Shackelton v. Sebree*, 86 Ill. 616; *Bates v. Bail*, 72 Ill. 108; *Newell v. Fisher*, 11 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 431, 49 Am. Dec. 66; *Broadwater v. Darne*, 10 Mo. 277. Slight intoxication is not enough to render a contract voidable. It must be so excessive as to render the party incapable of knowing what he is doing. *Van Wyck v. Brasher*, 81 N. Y. 260; *Kuhlman v. Wieben*, 129 Iowa, 188, 105 N. W. 445, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666; *Conley v. Nailor*, 118 U. S. 127, 6 Sup. Ct. 1001, 30 L. Ed. 112; *Van Horn v. Keenan*, 28 Ill. 445. The test whether intoxication is such as to render the subject thereof incompetent to contract is whether his condition is such that he does not know what he is about, and is incapable of appreciating what he is doing. Mere imbecility of mind, or inability to act wisely or discreetly or to effect a good bargain, is insufficient. *CAMERON-BARKLEY CO. v. THORNTON LIGHT & POWER CO.*, 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E. 695, 107 Am. St. Rep. 532, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 290.

<sup>5</sup> *CAMERON-BARKLEY CO. v. THORNTON LIGHT & POWER CO.*, 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E. 695, 107 Am. St. Rep. 532, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 290; *Fowler v. Meadow Brook Water Co.*, 208 Pa. 473, 57 Atl. 959. See, also, the cases above cited. But see *Youn v. Lamont*, 56 Minn. 216, 57 N. W. 478.

<sup>6</sup> *Matthews v. Baxter*, L. R. 8 Exch. 132; *Eaton's Adm'r v. Perry*, 29 Mo. 96.

<sup>7</sup> *Donehoo's Appeal* (Pa.) 15 Atl. 924.

courts hold that in the former case it is absolutely void.<sup>8</sup> A drunken person, like an infant or an insane person, is liable for necessities furnished to him, or to his wife or children.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Ratification and Avoidance*

The principles governing the ratification or avoidance of a contract and conveyance by a person who was drunk when he made it are the same as in the case of insane persons. He may either ratify or avoid it when he is sober. And ratification may be by conduct, as by retaining the consideration, or failure to disaffirm for an unreasonable time.<sup>10</sup> After the contract or conveyance has been ratified, it is binding absolutely, and cannot then be avoided.<sup>11</sup> On avoidance, the consideration must be returned, or an offer be made to return it,<sup>12</sup> unless, perhaps, it was wasted before the party became sober.<sup>13</sup>

Some courts hold that drunkenness is no defense as against innocent third persons who acquire rights under or through the contract or conveyance for value and without notice; that a party to a negotiable instrument, or the grantor of land, cannot set up his intoxication at the time he delivered the instrument or conveyance, as against a bona fide holder or a bona fide purchaser of the land, for value.<sup>14</sup> Other courts allow such a defense even as against them, to the same extent as if the party had been insane.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen*, 8 N. Y. 388, 59 Am. Dec. 499; *Cockrill v. Cockrill*, 92 Fed. 811, 34 C. C. A. 254; *Anderson v. Hicks*, 150 App. Div. 289, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1018; *Ralph v. Taylor*, 33 R. I. 503, 82 Atl. 279; *Id.* (R. I.) 82 Atl. 495; *Philadelphia Trust, Safe & Deposit Ins. Co. v. Allison*, 108 Me. 326, 80 Atl. 833, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 39.

<sup>9</sup> *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 Mees. & W. 623; *McCrillis v. Bartlett*, 8 N. H. 569.

<sup>10</sup> *Williams v. Inabnet*, 1 Bailey (S. C.) 343; *Reinskopf v. Rogge*, 37 Ind. 207; *Smith v. Williamson*, 8 Utah, 219, 30 Pac. 753; *Mansfield v. Watson*, 2 Iowa, 111.

<sup>11</sup> *Matthews v. Baxter*, L. R. 8 Exch. 132; *Joest v. Williams*, 42 Ind. 565, 13 Am. Rep. 377.

<sup>12</sup> *Joest v. Williams*, 42 Ind. 565, 13 Am. Rep. 377.

<sup>13</sup> *Thackrah v. Haas*, 119 U. S. 499, 7 Sup. Ct. 311, 30 L. Ed. 486.

<sup>14</sup> *Johnson v. Medlicott*, 3 P. Wms. 130, note; *State Bank v. McCoy*, 69 Pa. 204, 8 Am. Rep. 246; *McSparran v. Neeley*, 91 Pa. 17. See *Norton, Bills & N.* 216-223.

<sup>15</sup> *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 Mees. & W. 623; *Wigglesworth v. Steers*, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 70, 3 Am. Dec. 602; *Jenners v. Howard*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 240; *Hawkins v. Bone*, 4 Fost. & F. 311.

### LIABILITY OF DRUNKEN PERSON FOR TORTS

244. A drunken person is liable for his torts to the same extent as if he were sober, except that the fact of drunkenness may mitigate the damages by excluding the question of malice.

The fact that a man is drunk when he commits a tort may in some cases mitigate the damages, by excluding the question of malice,<sup>16</sup> but otherwise it is no defense. He is liable in damages for any tortious conduct, even though he may have been so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.<sup>17</sup>

### RESPONSIBILITY OF DRUNKEN PERSON FOR CRIME

245. Voluntary drunkenness furnishes no ground of exemption from responsibility for crime, unless the act is committed while the party is laboring under settled insanity or delirium tremens, resulting from intoxication. But, where a specific intent is an essential ingredient of the particular crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its existence; and in homicide cases it may be material in determining whether, in the case of adequate provocation to reduce the killing to manslaughter, the party acted under the provocation or from malice.

Nothing is better settled in the criminal law than that voluntary drunkenness does not exempt a man from responsibility for his crimes.<sup>18</sup> In England, nearly 500 years ago, it was said that, "if a man that is drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it; and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no understanding nor memory; but inasmuch as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he

<sup>16</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 166; *Dawson v. State*, 16 Ind. 428, 79 Am. Dec. 439.

<sup>17</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 165; *Reed v. Harper*, 25 Iowa, 87, 95 Am. Dec. 774; *Casady v. Magher*, 85 Ind. 228; *McKee v. Ingalls*, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 30; *Alger v. City of Lowell*, 3 Allen (Mass.) 402.

<sup>18</sup> *Clark*, Cr. Law, 60; *Beverley's Case*, 4 Coke, 125a; *Ryan v. United States*, 26 App. D. C. 74, 6 Ann. Cas. 633; *Byrd v. State*, 76 Ark. 286, 88 S. W. 974; *People v. Rogers*, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484; *U. S. v. Drew*, 5 Mason, 28, Fed. Cas. No. 14,933; *People v. Garbutt*, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. 162; *People v. Walker*, 38 Mich. 156; *Alford v. State*, 110 Ark. 300, 161 S. W. 497; *State v. Guthridge*, 88 Kan. 846, 129 Pac. 1143; *Com. v. Hawkins*, 3 Gray

might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby."<sup>19</sup> The rule does not apply where settled insanity or delirium tremens results from voluntary drunkenness; but in such a case the party is in the same position as if he were insane from any other cause.<sup>20</sup> Nor does the rule apply to crimes of which a specific intent is an essential element,<sup>21</sup> like burglary, where the specific intent to commit a felony is essential, or robbery, or larceny, or assault with intent to kill. Nor, in some states, does it apply to murder in the first degree, as a specific intent to kill is necessary, and general malice is not sufficient, as at common law.<sup>22</sup> Where a man, when he commits an act, is too drunk to entertain a specific intent which is necessary to make that act a particular crime, and did not first form such intent, and then become intoxicated, he cannot be guilty of that particular crime.<sup>23</sup> But he may be guilty of some other crime for which no specific intent is necessary. Thus drunkenness may prevent a man from being guilty of assault with intent to kill, but he may be convicted of common assault, for in the latter case no specific intent is necessary.<sup>24</sup> Drunkenness is no defense in a

(Mass.) 463; *McIntyre v. People*, 38 Ill. 514; *Rafferty v. People*, 66 Ill. 118; *Upstone v. People*, 109 Ill. 169; *State v. Welch*, 21 Minn. 22; *Choice v. State*, 31 Ga. 424.

<sup>19</sup> *Renlger v. Fogossa*, Flaw. 19.

<sup>20</sup> *People v. Hammill*, 2 Parker, Cr. R. (N. Y.) 223; *Reg. v. Davis*, 14 Cox, Cr. Cas. 563; *U. S. v. McGlue*, 1 Curt. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; *Beasley v. State*, 50 Ala. 149, 20 Am. Rep. 292; *State v. Robinson*, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799; *Perkins v. United States*, 228 Fed. 408, 142 C. C. A. 638; *Martin v. State*, 100 Ark. 189, 139 S. W. 1122; *Cochran v. State*, 65 Fla. 91, 61 South. 187.

<sup>21</sup> *State v. Yates*, 132 Iowa, 475, 109 N. W. 1005; *State v. Truitt*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 466, 62 Atl. 790; *Collins v. State*, 115 Wis. 596, 92 N. W. 266; *State v. Blodgett*, 50 Or. 329, 92 Pac. 820; *Sabens v. United States*, 40 App. D. C. 440; *Terhune v. Commonwealth*, 144 Ky. 370, 138 S. W. 274; *People v. Eggleston*, 186 Mich. 510, 152 N. W. 944. But see *State v. Stebbins*, 188 Mo. 387, 87 S. W. 400, where the crime was robbery. If the intent is first formed, and the accused drank to intoxication prior to committing the crime, drunkenness is no excuse. *People v. Koerner*, 117 App. Div. 40, 102 N. Y. Supp. 93; *State v. Truitt*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 466, 62 Atl. 790.

<sup>22</sup> *State v. Adams*, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 178, 65 Atl. 510. In manslaughter, specific intent is not an element and drunkenness is no defense. *Laws v. State*, 144 Ala. 118, 42 South. 40. Voluntary intoxication, not resulting in fixed or settled frenzy or insanity, either permanent or intermittent, does not excuse or mitigate any degree of unlawful homicide below murder in the first degree. *Thomas v. State*, 47 Fla. 99, 36 South. 161.

<sup>23</sup> *Reg. v. Doody*, 6 Cox, Cr. Cas. 463.

<sup>24</sup> *State v. Truitt*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 466, 62 Atl. 790.

prosecution for murder at common law;<sup>25</sup> but evidence of drunkenness is material on the question whether a homicide is statutory murder in the first degree, in those jurisdictions where an actual intent to kill is necessary.<sup>26</sup> And, by the weight of opinion, evidence of drunkenness is admissible on the question whether, where there was sufficient provocation to reduce a homicide to manslaughter, the accused acted under the influence of passion caused by the provocation, or from malice.<sup>27</sup> If a person is made drunk by the stratagem or fraud of another, he is not responsible.<sup>28</sup>

### CAPACITY OF DRUNKEN PERSON TO MAKE A WILL

**246. Drunkenness renders a person incompetent to make a will, if it affects his mind to such an extent that he would be incompetent in case of insanity.**

The mere fact that a person is addicted to drink, and is under guardianship, as incapable of managing his estate, does not render him incompetent to make a will.<sup>29</sup> Nor does the mere fact of drunkenness at the time of making a will render it invalid, unless it was so great as to render the testator incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the will, within the rules shown in treating of insanity.<sup>30</sup> If it has this effect, the will is void.<sup>31</sup> Inebriety, although long continued, and resulting occasionally in temporary insanity, does not require proof of lucid intervals to give validity to the party's will, as is required where general insanity is proved. Therefore, where habitual intoxication is shown, there will be no

<sup>25</sup> *State v. McCants*, 1 Speer (S. C.) 384; *Kelly v. State*, 3 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 518.

<sup>26</sup> *State v. Johnson*, 40 Conn. 136; *People v. Walker*, 38 Mich. 156; *Hopt v. Utah*, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. Ed. 873; *Wills v. Com.*, 32 Grat. (Va.) 929; *Swan v. State*, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 136; *Pirtle v. State*, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663, Clark, Cr. Law, 63, 64, and cases there cited.

<sup>27</sup> *People v. Rogers*, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484; *Pearson's Case*, 2 Lewin, Crown Cas. 144; *McIntyre v. People*, 38 Ill. 514; Clark, Cr. Law, 65.

<sup>28</sup> *Pearson's Case*, 2 Lewin, Crown Cas. 144.

<sup>29</sup> *In re Slinger's Will*, 72 Wis. 22, 37 N. W. 236; *Harrison v. Bishop*, 131 Ind. 161, 30 N. E. 1069, 31 Am. St. Rep. 422.

<sup>30</sup> *Andress v. Weller*, 3 N. J. Eq. 604; *Kahl v. Schober*, 35 N. J. Eq. 461; *Starrett v. Douglass*, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 48; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 526, 84 Am. Dec. 340; Abb. Desc., Wills & Adm. 236; *Hewitt's Appeal*, 55 Md. 509.

<sup>31</sup> See cases cited above.

presumption that there was incapacitating drunkenness at the time the will was made. Such a condition must be affirmatively proved, or the presumption of capacity will prevail.<sup>22</sup>

### ALIENS

247. An alien is a person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, subject to some foreign government, and who has not been naturalized under their constitution and laws. Children of citizens of the United States born abroad are citizens.
248. An alien domiciled in the United States is subject to the laws of the United States and of the state in which he resides to the same extent as a citizen.
249. An alien has the same rights as a citizen with respect to acquiring, holding, and disposing of personal property, and may contract in relation thereto, and sue and be sued on his contracts.
250. An alien may also sue and be sued for torts.
251. At common law, an alien cannot take or transmit land by descent. But he can take by devise or purchase subject to the right of the state to enforce a forfeiture by inquest and office found. His title is good as against all persons but the state, and is good as against the state until office found. And an alien can dispose of land acquired by purchase or devise, and his grantee or devisee will take a good title against every person but the state. The common law in this respect has been abolished in some states, and modified in others, by statute.
252. An alien enemy cannot, without leave of the government, make any fresh contract, or enforce any existing contract, during the continuance of war between his government and the United States. Some courts require adherence to the enemy by a resident alien to disqualify him. He may be sued on existing contracts, and in such a case he may defend. Pre-existing contracts are not dissolved by the war unless they are of a continuing nature, and antagonistic to the rules governing a state of war.

<sup>22</sup> In re Lee's Will, 46 N. J. Eq. 193, 18 Atl. 525. See, also, Swygart v. Willard, 186 Ind. 25, 76 N. E. 755.

An alien is a person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, subject to some foreign government, and who has not been naturalized under their constitution and laws.<sup>33</sup> A citizen of the United States does not cease to be a citizen merely by residing in a foreign country; and even at common law, as well as by an act of Congress, children of citizens of the United States, though born abroad, are citizens of the United States, and not aliens.<sup>34</sup> Whether a citizen has a right to expatriate himself is a question upon which there has been much conflict of opinion. By the better opinion, a citizen may renounce his allegiance at pleasure, if he acts in good faith, and becomes a citizen and subject of a foreign government.<sup>35</sup> Some authorities say that he cannot do so without the consent of the government.<sup>36</sup> It seems that none of the authorities hold that a citizen casts off his allegiance before he becomes a citizen or subject of a foreign government.<sup>37</sup> The question has been set at rest in this country, and in some others, by statutes de-

<sup>33</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 50; *Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey*, 4 Cranch, 321, 2 L. Ed. 634; *Ainslie v. Martin*, 9 Mass. 454. A foreigner, who holds only a declaration of intention, is still subject of the foreign country. *United States v. Bell* (D. C.) 248 Fed. 992.

<sup>34</sup> *Ludlam v. Ludlam*, 26 N. Y. 356, 84 Am. Dec. 193; *Crane v. Reeder*, 25 Mich. 303; *Davis v. Hall*, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 292; *Campbell v. Wallace*, 12 N. H. 362, 37 Am. Dec. 219; Rev. St. U. S. 1878, § 1993 (U. S. Comp. St. § 3947), declares: "All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States." The child of one who has renounced his citizenship of the United States, and become a citizen and subject of a foreign government, born after such renunciation, is not a citizen, but an alien. *Browne v. Dexter*, 66 Cal. 89, 4 Pac. 913.

<sup>35</sup> In a Kentucky case it was said: "The government, for the purpose of preventing abuse, and securing the public welfare, may regulate the mode of expatriation. But where it has not prescribed any limitation on this right, and the citizen has in good faith abjured his country, and become a citizen or subject of a foreign nation, he should, as to his native government, be considered as denationalized." *Alsberry v. Hawkins*, 9 Dana, 178, 33 Am. Dec. 546. Secretary Cass went so far as to deny the right of governments to prohibit expatriation, except where the act of expatriation, if recognized, would deprive the government of the power to punish the citizen or subject for an offense previously committed. He said: "The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized, his allegiance to his native country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad and impassable line separates him from his native country." Hal. Int. Law, c. 29, § 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ludlam v. Ludlam*, 26 N. Y. 356, 84 Am. Dec. 193, collating the authorities.

<sup>37</sup> *Ludlam v. Ludlam*, 26 N. Y. 356, 84 Am. Dec. 193.

claring the right of expatriation to exist.<sup>38</sup> An alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes a citizen;<sup>39</sup> and the same is true of an alien woman whose husband becomes naturalized.<sup>40</sup>

*Aliens are Subject to the Laws*

As a general rule, aliens domiciled in this country are just as much subject to the laws of the United States, and of the state in which they reside or may be, as citizens.<sup>41</sup> As was said by Mr. Justice Field in *Carlisle v. U. S.*,<sup>42</sup> the alien, while domiciled in the country, owes a local and temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence. He is bound to obey all the laws of the country not immediately relating to citizenship, during his sojourn in it, and he is equally amenable with citizens for any infractions of those laws. It was said by Daniel Webster, when Secretary of State, in a report to the President: "Independently of a residence, with intention to continue such residence, independently of any domiciliation, independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance, or of renouncing any former allegiance, it is well known that, by the public law, an alien or a stranger born, for so long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason or other crimes as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulation."<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Rev. St. U. S. § 1909 (U. S. Comp. St. § 3955). See, on this question, Glenn, *Int. Law*, 129-131.

<sup>39</sup> *Luhrs v. Eimer*, 80 N. Y. 171. Evidence that an alien was married in Pennsylvania, without showing whether the man she married was a citizen or an alien did not show that she had lost her status as an alien. *Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Washko*, 231 Fed. 42, 145 C. C. A. 230.

<sup>40</sup> *Headman v. Rose*, 63 Ga. 458.

<sup>41</sup> An alien residing within the United States has a legal right to frame and circulate a petition to the President of the United States and to comment fairly upon governmental policies and actions. *Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co.*, 203 Mich. 570, 170 N. W. 93.

<sup>42</sup> 16 Wall. 147, 21 L. Ed. 426.

<sup>43</sup> 6 Webst. Works, 526, quoted with approval in *Carlisle v. U. S.*, 16 Wall. 147, 21 L. Ed. 426. And see *Olcott v. Maclean*, 73 N. Y. 223; *People v. McLeod*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 377, 37 Am. Dec. 328; *Id.*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328; *State v. Nelbekier*, 184 Mo. 211, 83 S. W. 523. Notwithstanding the comity extended to war vessels and their commanders, the commander of an interned German war vessel may be punished for violation of Mann Act occurring within United States, and he is subject to jurisdiction of United States courts for offense of smuggling from vessel into United States dutiable articles. *United States v. Thierichens* (D. C.) 243 Fed. 419.

This rule does not apply to foreign friendly sovereigns and their attendants, nor to foreign ambassadors, ministers, and diplomatic agents, and their servants; but it does apply to consuls, who are mere commercial agents.<sup>44</sup>

*Rights and Liabilities of Alien Friends*

An alien at common law, as well as under the statutes of the different states, has substantially the same powers as a citizen with respect to acquiring, holding, and disposing of personal property; and, like a citizen, he may make contracts with respect to personal property, and sue and be sued thereon.<sup>45</sup>

If he commits a tort, he may be sued therefor, and he may sue to recover for a tort committed against him, to the same extent as a citizen.<sup>46</sup> It has even been held that one alien may sue another in our courts upon a contract made abroad, or for a tort committed abroad, if both parties are transiently here.<sup>47</sup>

At common law an alien is under disabilities with respect to acquiring and holding land; and the common law in this respect is still in force in some jurisdictions, or has been declared in whole or in part by statute. An alien at common law can take land by purchase or by devise, but he takes the title subject to the right of the sovereign—with us the state—to enforce a forfeiture. He can hold the same against all persons but the state, and he holds as against the state until office found; that is, until proper proceedings have been instituted, and a judgment rendered declaring a forfeiture. Upon inquest and office found, but not before, the land is forfeited

<sup>44</sup> 1 Kent, Comm. 38 et seq.; *State v. De La Foret*, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 217; *Respublica v. De Longchamps*, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. Ed. 59.

<sup>45</sup> Thus, an alien mortgagee, independently of any statute or any treaty stipulations, may come into a court of equity, and have the land sold to satisfy the mortgage debt; the demand being merely a personal one. *Hughes v. Edwards*, 9 Wheat. 489, 6 L. Ed. 142. The right to reside in a foreign country implies the right to labor there for a living. *Baker v. Portland*, 5 Sawy. 566, Fed. Cas. No. 777.

<sup>46</sup> *Crashley v. Press Pub. Co.*, 179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258, 1 Ann. Cas. 196, affirming 74 App. Div. 118, 77 N. Y. Supp. 711; *Malorano v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 216 Pa. 402, 65 Atl. 1077, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 271, 116 Am. St. Rep. 778, affirmed 213 U. S. 268, 29 Sup. Ct. 424, 53 L. Ed. 792; *Lewicki v. John C. Wiardl & Co. (D. C.)* 213 Fed. 647. A citizen of Mexico there converting to his own use property of a citizen of Texas, and then coming to the state, is there amenable to the state citizen for the wrong. *Mendiola v. Gonzales (Tex. Civ. App.)* 185 S. W. 389.

<sup>47</sup> *Roberts v. Knights*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 449; *Dewitt v. Buchanan*, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 31.

to the state.<sup>48</sup> At common law, and unless, as is the case in some jurisdictions, he is restrained by statute, an alien can devise or convey land acquired by purchase or devise, and the grantee or devisee will take a good title as against every person except the state. The title remains voidable, however, by the state.<sup>49</sup>

But an alien, at common law, cannot take land by descent.<sup>50</sup> He may take, as it is said, by act of the party, but not by operation of law. Nor can an alien transmit land by descent. No one—not even a citizen—can claim by inheritance from or through an alien. On the death of an alien intestate his land vests in the state immediately and without office found.<sup>51</sup> Nor, at common law, can an alien wife claim dower,<sup>52</sup> or an alien husband claim as tenant by the curtesy.<sup>53</sup>

The doctrine of equitable conversion enables a devise or conveyance of land to a trustee to sell the same, and pay over the proceeds to an alien; for such a devise or conveyance is not of land, but of personalty.<sup>54</sup> Under the same doctrine, a devise of money

<sup>48</sup> See *Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee*, 7 Cranch, 603, 620, 3 L. Ed. 453; *Doe v. Robertson*, 11 Wheat. 332, 6 L. Ed. 498; *Fox v. Southack*, 12 Mass. 143; *Donaldson v. State*, 182 Ind. 615, 101 N. E. 485; *In re Palmer Window Glass Co. (D. C.)* 183 Fed. 902; *Johnson v. Eversole Lumber Co.*, 144 N. C. 717, 57 S. E. 518, rehearing granted 147 N. C. 249, 60 S. E. 1129; *Wadsworth v. Wadsworth*, 12 N. Y. 376; *Harley v. State*, 40 Ala. 689; *Jackson v. Beach*, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 399.

<sup>49</sup> *Crane v. Reeder*, 21 Mich. 24, 4 Am. Rep. 430; *Marx v. McGlynn*, 88 N. Y. 357; *Emmett v. Emmett*, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 369; *Jones v. McMasters*, 20 How. 21, 15 L. Ed. 805; *Harley v. State*, 40 Ala. 689; *Hepburn v. Dunlop*, 1 Wheat. 198, 4 L. Ed. 65.

<sup>50</sup> See cases above cited. And see *Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey*, 4 Cranch, 321, 2 L. Ed. 634; *Orr v. Hodgson*, 4 Wheat. 453, 4 L. Ed. 613; *Mooers v. White*, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 360; *Crane v. Reeder*, 21 Mich. 24, 4 Am. Rep. 430; *Goodrick v. Russell*, 42 N. Y. 177; *Connolly v. Reed*, 22 Idaho, 29, 125 Pac. 213; *Ahrens v. Ahrens*, 144 Iowa, 486, 123 N. W. 164, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1098; *Scottish American Mortgage Co. v. Butler*, 99 Miss. 56, 54 South. 666, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1236; *Moody v. Hagen*, 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704, L. R. A. 1918F, 947, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 933.

<sup>51</sup> *Slater v. Nason*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 345; *Foss v. Crisp*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 121; *Jackson v. Fitz Simmons*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 24 Am. Dec. 198. As to the effect of a common ancestor's alienage, see, also, *Jackson v. Green*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 333; *McCreery's Lessee v. Somerville*, 9 Wheat. 354, 6 L. Ed. 109; *McCarthy v. Marsh*, 5 N. Y. 263; *McGregor v. Comstock*, 3 N. Y. 409; *McLean v. Swanton*, 13 N. Y. 535.

<sup>52</sup> *Sutliff v. Forgey*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 89.

<sup>53</sup> *Foss v. Crisp*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 121; *Quinn v. Ladd*, 37 Or. 261, 59 Pac. 457; *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Mussey v. Pierre*, 24 Me. 559.

<sup>54</sup> *Meakings v. Cromwell*, 5 N. Y. 136. A devise of land to executors, who

to trustees to invest the same in land to be conveyed to an alien would be a devise of land, and not of money, and would vest him with a defeasible title at common law, or would be void under a statute declaring void a devise of land to an alien.<sup>55</sup>

Such are the rules of the common law; but in most states they have been either altogether abolished, or greatly modified by statute. In some states the common law is still in force, while in others it is expressly declared by statute.<sup>56</sup> In others, nonresident aliens are not given the right to acquire or hold real property, while resident aliens are.<sup>57</sup> And, in others, aliens, whether resident or nonresident, are given the same right as native-born subjects as to acquiring and holding real property, either by descent or by purchase, and of disposing of the same or transmitting by descent.<sup>58</sup> The laws of the states in respect to the disability of aliens is to some extent controlled by treaties between the United States and foreign governments. Though the right of aliens to hold real property is dependent upon the laws of the state in which the property is situated, the state law must give way if it conflicts with any existing treaty between the government of the United States and the government of the country of which such alien is a subject or citizen. "If the citizen or subject of a foreign government is disqualified under the laws of a state from taking, holding, or trans-

are citizens, in trust to pay the income to aliens, is valid. *Marx v. McGlynn*, 88 N. Y. 357; *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 Wheat. 563, 4 L. Ed. 460.

<sup>55</sup> *Beekman v. Bonsor*, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269.

<sup>56</sup> See *Wunderle v. Wunderle*, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84; *Zundell v. Gess* (Tex.) 9 S. W. 879.

<sup>57</sup> *Furenes v. Mickelson*, 86 Iowa, 508, 53 N. W. 416; *Donaldson v. State*, 182 Ind. 615, 101 N. E. 485; *Bennett v. Hibbert*, 88 Iowa, 154, 55 N. W. 93. And see *Dougherty v. Kubat*, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N. W. 317, construing the Nebraska statute, which excepts from the rule land within the corporate limits of cities and towns. Under Rev. St. 1913, §§ 6273, 6274, relating to escheats, nonresident aliens cannot inherit title nor right of possession of lands in the state. *State v. Thomas*, 103 Neb. 147, 170 N. W. 839, rehearing denied 103 Neb. 147, 172 N. W. 690. Statutes changing the common law and allowing aliens to take by will are not a recognition or extension of any previously existing right, but a new grant or right or statutes of grace. *Moody v. Hagen*, 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704, L. R. A. 1918F, 947, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 933.

<sup>58</sup> *Hanrick v. Gurley*, 93 Tex. 458, 54 S. W. 347, 55 S. W. 119, 56 S. W. 330; *Blythe v. Hinckley*, 127 Cal. 431, 59 Pac. 787, affirmed in 180 U. S. 333, 21 Sup. Ct. 390, 45 L. Ed. 557; *Sparks v. Bodensick*, 72 Kan. 5, 82 Pac. 463; *Kelly v. Pratt*, 41 Misc. Rep. 31, 83 N. Y. Supp. 636; *Price v. Greer*, 89 Ark. 300, 116 S. W. 676, 118 S. W. 1009; *Connolly v. Reed*, 22 Idaho, 29, 125 Pac. 213; *Criswell v. Noble*, 61 Misc. Rep. 483, 113 N. Y. Supp. 954, affirmed 134 App. Div. 994, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1122.

ferring real property, such disqualification will be removed if a treaty between the United States and such foreign government confers the right to take, hold, or transfer real property."<sup>59</sup> In some states the Constitution expressly prohibits the Legislature from depriving resident foreigners of the rights enjoyed by native-born citizens with respect to the acquisition, enjoyment, and transmission of property.<sup>60</sup> Doubtless, in all of the states, aliens may acquire, hold, and dispose of personal property, and make and enforce contracts relating to personal property to the same extent as citizens.<sup>61</sup>

### *Alien Enemies*

An alien enemy is one who is a subject of some government with which the United States is at war.<sup>62</sup> Though he may reside in the United States, yet, by reason of his owing allegiance to the hostile state, he becomes impressed with the character of an enemy. Under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798,<sup>63</sup> an alien enemy may be arrested and restrained or removed from the country.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless an alien enemy, resident in the United States and conducting himself properly, is entitled to the protection of the law and may assert the

<sup>59</sup> *Wunderle v. Wunderle*, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84, and cases there cited. See *Hauenstein v. Lynham*, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628; *Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee*, 2 Wheat. 259, 4 L. Ed. 234; *LEHMAN v. STATE*, 45 Ind. App. 330, 88 N. E. 365, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 293; *Ahrens v. Ahrens*, 144 Iowa, 486, 123 N. W. 164, *Ann. Cas.* 1912A, 1098; *Fischer v. Sklenar*, 101 Neb. 553, 163 N. W. 861; *Pierson v. Lawler*, 100 Neb. 783, 161 N. W. 419; *Cohen v. Cohen*, 47 App. D. C. 129.

<sup>60</sup> See *State v. Smith*, 70 Cal. 153, 12 Pac. 121; *Nicrosi v. Phillippi*, 91 Ala. 299, 8 South. 561.

<sup>61</sup> See *Taylor v. Carpenter*, 3 Story, 458, *Fed. Cas. No.* 13,784; *Cleveland, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Osgood*, 36 Ind. App. 34, 73 N. E. 285; *Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Chaptive (Tex.)* 3 S. W. 31. An alien may take a devise of realty, which by the terms of the will is converted into personalty, at the time the devise takes effect. *Appeal of Emery*, 83 Conn. 235, 76 Atl. 529.

<sup>62</sup> *Taylor v. Albion Lumber Co.*, 176 Cal. 347, 168 Pac. 348, L. R. A. 1918B, 185; *Ex parte Graber (D. C.)* 247 Fed. 882; *Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co.*, 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851, L. R. A. 1918E, 801, *Ann. Cas.* 1918E, 340. A New Jersey corporation, though composed entirely of German stockholders, did not, on declaration of war between the United States and Germany, cease to be a domestic corporation and become an alien enemy. *Fritz Schulz, Jr., Co. v. Ralmes & Co.*, 99 Misc. Rep. 626, 164 N. Y. Supp. 454, affirmed 100 Misc. Rep. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp. 567.

<sup>63</sup> Rev. St. U. S. §§ 4067-4070 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 7615-7618).

<sup>64</sup> *De Lacey v. United States*, 249 Fed. 625, 161 C. C. A. 535, L. R. A. 1918E, 1011; *Minotto v. Bradley (D. C.)* 252 Fed. 600.

right in the courts.<sup>65</sup> As a general rule, an alien enemy cannot, during the continuance of hostilities, make any fresh contract, or enforce an existing contract.<sup>66</sup> If he is sued on his contract, however, he may defend.<sup>67</sup> In New York it has been held that, to defeat a suit by a resident subject of a foreign hostile power, it must appear that he is adhering to the enemy; that aliens resident in the United States at the time of war breaking out between their country and the United States, or who come to reside in the United States after the breaking out of war, under an express permission, or permission implied from their being allowed to remain, may sue and be sued as in time of peace, since a license and protection will be implied from their being allowed to remain.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> *Mittelstadt v. Kelly*, 202 Mich. 524, 168 N. W. 501.

<sup>66</sup> *Scholefield v. Eichelberger*, 7 Pet. 586, 8 L. Ed. 793; *The Rapid*, 8 Cranch, 155, 3 L. Ed. 520; *Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard*, 37 N. J. Law, 444, 18 Am. Rep. 741; *Wright v. Graham*, 4 W. Va. 430; *Masterson v. Howard*, 18 Wall. 99, 21 L. Ed. 764; *Phillips v. Hatch*, 1 Dill. 571, Fed. Cas. No. 11,004; *Brooke v. Filer*, 35 Ind. 402; *Blackwell v. Willard*, 65 N. C. 555, 6 Am. Rep. 749; *Semmes v. City Fire Ins. Co.*, 36 Conn. 543, Fed. Cas. No. 12,651.

<sup>67</sup> *Dorsey v. Thompson*, 37 Md. 25; *McVeigh v. U. S.*, 11 Wall. 259, 20 L. Ed. 80; *Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca Di Navigazione*, 248 U. S. 9, 39 Sup. Ct. 1, 63 L. Ed. 100, 3 A. L. R. 323, reversing 229 Fed. 136, 143 C. C. A. 412; *The Oropa* (D. C.) 255 Fed. 132; *Mixer v. Sibley*, 53 Ill. 61; *McNair v. Toler*, 21 Minn. 175.

<sup>68</sup> *Clarke v. Morey*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 69. Declaration of existence of war is not alone sufficient *ex proprio vigore* to suspend remedies for the enforcement of debts and dues between citizens and subjects of an alien enemy. Nor can the courts declare a public policy as to permitting alien enemies to sue during the war for debts contracted during peace; that being a function of Congress. *Fritz Schulz, Jr., Co. v. Ralmes & Co.*, 99 Misc. Rep. 626, 164 N. Y. Supp. 454, affirmed 100 Misc. Rep. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp. 567. A nonresident alien enemy cannot sue. *Rothbarth v. Herzfeld*, 179 App. Div. 865, 167 N. Y. Supp. 199, reversing 100 Misc. Rep. 470, 166 N. Y. Supp. 744; *Speidel v. N. Barstow Co.* (D. C.) 243 Fed. 621. His rights are suspended during the war. *Rothbarth v. Herzfeld*, supra; *Taylor v. Albion Lumber Co.*, 176 Cal. 347, 168 Pac. 348, L. R. A. 1918B, 185. The disability to sue does not attach to a resident alien. *Speidel v. N. Barstow Co.* (D. C.) 243 Fed. 621; *Arndt-Ober v. Metropolitan Opera Co.*, 182 App. Div. 513, 169 N. Y. Supp. 944. A pending suit may, however, be stayed during the war. *Speidel v. N. Barstow Co.* (D. C.) 243 Fed. 621; *City Nat. Bank of Selma v. Dresdner Bank of Bremen* (D. C.) 255 Fed. 225; *In re Henrichs' Estate* (Cal.) 179 Pac. 883. The Alien Property Custodian appointed under the Trading with the Enemy Act (Act Oct. 6, 1917 [U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115½a-3115½j]) may intervene in an action by an alien enemy and continue its prosecution. *Nord Deutscher Ins. Co. of Hamburg, Germany, v. John L. Dudley, Jr., Co.* (Sup.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 303, affirmed 183 App. Div. 887, 169 N. Y. Supp. 1106.

Whether a pre-existing contract is dissolved by the war depends upon whether it is essentially antagonistic to the laws governing a state of war. If it is of a continuing nature, like a contract of partnership, or of an executory character merely, and in the performance of its essential features would violate such laws, it is dissolved; but if not, and rights have become vested under it, the contract will either be qualified, or its performance suspended, according to its nature, so as to strip it of its objectionable features, and save such rights. The tendency of adjudication is to preserve, and not to destroy, contracts existing before the war.<sup>69</sup>

#### *Naturalization*

An alien may cease to be such, and become a citizen by naturalization in compliance with our laws. The Constitution of the United States provides that "Congress shall have power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization."<sup>70</sup> This grant of power is exclusive, and deprives a state of the power to enact laws on the subject.<sup>71</sup> But, so far as a state alone is concerned, it may pass laws entitling an unnaturalized alien to all the rights which the Constitution and laws of the state attach to the character of a citizen.<sup>72</sup> Under this grant, Congress has enacted naturalization laws, by which aliens may be admitted to citizenship.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Clark, Cont. 218. See *Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard*, 37 N. J. Law, 444, 18 Am. Rep. 741; *Griswold v. Waddington*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 57; *Semmes v. City Fire Ins. Co.*, 36 Conn. 543, Fed. Cas. No. 12,651; *Bank of New Orleans v. Matthews*, 49 N. Y. 12; *Cohen v. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 50 N. Y. 610, 10 Am. Rep. 522; *Washington University v. Finch*, 18 Wall. 106, 21 L. Ed. 818; *Whelan v. Cook*, 29 Md. 1; *Dorsey v. Kyle*, 30 Md. 512, 96 Am. Dec. 617; *Dorsey v. Thompson*, 37 Md. 25. Declaration of existence of war is not sufficient, *ex proprio vigore*, to avoid all obligations between citizens and subjects of an alien enemy. *Fritz Schulz, Jr., Co. v. Ralmes & Co.*, 99 Misc. Rep. 626, 164 N. Y. Supp. 454, affirmed 100 Misc. Rep. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp. 567. Powers of attorney for collection of money, executed prior to declaration of war, rendering principals enemy aliens, continue to be valid, notwithstanding state of war. *Keppelmann v. Keppelmann*, 89 N. J. Eq. 390, 105 Atl. 140. As to the commercial rights of alien enemies generally, see *Trading with the Enemy Act* Oct. 6, 1917 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115½a-3115½j).

<sup>70</sup> Article 1, § 8, cl. 4.

<sup>71</sup> *Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee*, 2 Wheat. 259, 4 L. Ed. 234; *Thutlow v. Massachusetts*, 5 How. 585, 12 L. Ed. 256.

<sup>72</sup> Per Taney, C. J., in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691.

<sup>73</sup> U. S. Comp. St. 1901, §§ 2165-2174. And see Act June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596.

When an alien is naturalized under the laws of the United States, he becomes not only a citizen of the United States, but also a citizen of the state in which he resides. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which overrides state laws, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside."

Naturalization has a retroactive effect, and removes the effect of the party's alienage, so as to confirm his title to land acquired prior thereto, and to waive all liability to forfeiture by the state.<sup>74</sup> But it cannot remove his disability to inherit retroactively, for the capacity to take by descent must exist at the time the descent happens.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> *Jackson v. Beach*, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 399.

<sup>75</sup> *People v. Conklin*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 67. "Naturalization," it was said in this case, "though it may confirm a defective title, will not confer an estate."

## PART V

### MASTER AND SERVANT

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#### CHAPTER XVI

##### MASTER AND SERVANT

- 253-255. The Relation Defined.
- 256. Statutory Regulation.
- 257-258. Creation of the Relation.
- 259-261. Termination of the Relation.
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- 265-271. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities Inter Se.
- 272-275. Master's Liability for Injuries to Servant.
- 276. Rights of Master against Third Persons.
- 277. Rights of Servant against Third Persons.
- 278-279. Master's Liability to Third Persons.
- 280-281. Servant's Liability to Third Persons.

#### THE RELATION DEFINED

- 253. Servants may be classified as—
  - (a) Apprentices and
  - (b) Hired servants.
- 254. An apprentice is a person, usually a minor, bound to a master to learn an art or trade, and to serve him during the time of his apprenticeship.
- 255. The relation of master and servant, other than apprentices, depends entirely upon agreement between the parties, express or implied. It exists where one person enters into the service of another, and devotes to him his personal labor.

The relation of master and servant has from a very early period been classed with that of husband and wife, parent and child, and guardian and ward, as one of the domestic relations; and it is still so treated in modern text-books, and in some of the modern codes. This classification is accurate enough when applied to slaves, apprentices, and domestic servants, but it is not accurate

when applied to other servants, like clerks in stores and offices, laborers, employés of railroad companies, and many other employés who are subject to the law governing the relation of master and servant.<sup>1</sup> Accuracy in classification, however, must, in this as in many other cases, yield to usage, and the law applicable to all kinds of servants will be considered.

Blackstone after referring to slavery, and showing that it cannot exist in England, divides servants into (1) menial servants, so called from being intra mœnia, or domestics, who are generally hired by the year; (2) apprentices, who are usually bound for a term of years, by deed indented or indentures, to serve their masters, and to be maintained and instructed by them; (3) laborers, who are only hired by the day or the week, and do not live intra mœnia, as part of the family; and (4) stewards, factors, and bailiffs, who are employed rather in a superior and ministerial capacity, and whom the law considers as servants pro tempore, with regard to such of their acts as affect their master's or employer's property.<sup>2</sup> Reeve divides servants into (1) slaves, (2) apprentices, (3) menial servants, (4) day laborers, and (5) agents of any kind.<sup>3</sup> Kent divides them into (1) slaves, (2) hired servants, and (3) apprentices.<sup>4</sup> This is the best classification, as hired servants include all the other kinds mentioned by Blackstone and Reeve, except slaves and apprentices. Under the constitution of the United States, slavery can no longer exist in this country,<sup>5</sup> and it is therefore unnecessary to consider that class. There remain, then, to be considered apprentices and hired servants.

### *Apprentices*

Apprentices are persons, generally infants, bound to a master for a term of years to learn some art or trade, and to serve the master and be maintained by him during the term of the apprenticeship. It has been said that at common law an apprentice, to be

<sup>1</sup> Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152, where it is said that any person who works for another for a salary is a servant in the eye of the law.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Bl. Comm. 425-427.

<sup>3</sup> Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 418.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Kent, Comm. 247.

<sup>5</sup> Amend. art. 13, of the federal Constitution, declares that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

holden, must be bound by deed; <sup>6</sup> but this is doubtful, and there are cases which hold that a writing not under seal is sufficient.<sup>7</sup> At common law, indentures of apprenticeship are executed by the father or guardian of the minor and the master. The former are bound that the apprentice shall render the services contracted for and the master is bound to teach the art or trade agreed upon, and do whatever else he may have bound himself to do. For a breach by either party, the other may maintain an action for damages. At common law the minor need not join the indenture; and by the better opinion, even were he to do so, he would not be bound. For a breach on his part, the remedy is against the parent.<sup>8</sup> The common law in relation to apprenticeship is no longer of much importance, for the subject is almost entirely regulated by statute both in England and in this country. There are statutes in most states, if not in all, providing for the binding out of apprentices by contract between the parent or guardian and the master. And in most states, if not in all, there are statutes providing for the binding out of poor persons by the overseers of the poor or other public officers. The master has a right to the services of his apprentice, and to all wages earned by the apprentice from others; <sup>9</sup> but he cannot assign the services of the apprentice to another.<sup>10</sup> The right to the services of the apprentice gives the master, as in the case of other servants, a right of action against any person who entices the apprentice away from him, or knowingly harbors him if he has left without cause.<sup>11</sup> It also gives him a right of action against any one who wrongfully injures the apprentice, and thereby causes a loss of his services.<sup>12</sup>

### *Hired Servants*

The relation of master and servant, other than master and apprentice, depends upon a contract of hiring, express or implied, between the parties.<sup>13</sup> The servant agrees with the master to render certain services, and the master agrees to pay therefor. Or the service may be gratuitous. "A servant is one who is employed to

<sup>6</sup> Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 420.

<sup>7</sup> Cromble v. McGrath, 139 Mass. 550, 2 N. E. 100.

<sup>8</sup> See Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 420-423, and American notes.

<sup>9</sup> Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 423. And see *Bardwell v. Purrington*, 107 Mass. 419.

<sup>10</sup> Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 425, 426, and notes; *Randall v. Rotch*, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 107; *Turner v. Smithers*, 8 Houst. (Del.) 430.

<sup>11</sup> Post, p. 642.

<sup>12</sup> Post, p. 642.

<sup>13</sup> Post, p. 574.

render personal services to his employer, otherwise than in the pursuit of an independent calling, and, who in such service, remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter, who is called his 'master.'"<sup>14</sup> The term "servant" includes, not only menial and domestic servants, but all other employes who are hired or who volunteer to perform services for their employer, and who remain under his direction and control during the time for which they are hired.<sup>15</sup> Thus, it includes a bookkeeper or clerk in a business office, a salesman in a shop, railroad employes, workmen in factories, etc. All such employes are subject to the law governing the relation of master and servant.

### STATUTORY REGULATION

256. The state, by virtue of the police power, may make such regulations controlling the relation of master and servant as may be necessary to preserve the public health, safety, or general welfare.

In many states statutes have been enacted regulating the relation of master and servant in matters pertaining to the employment of children and women, and the hours of labor, and intended to insure the public welfare and the health and safety of employes.<sup>16</sup> There are also federal statutes relating to hours of labor of railroad employes,<sup>17</sup> the character of appliances used in railroads,<sup>18</sup> and the liability of employers.<sup>19</sup> Such statutes have been held to be valid

<sup>14</sup> Civ. Code Cal. § 2009. The relation of master and servant exists when the master not only has the right to select his servant, but has power to remove and discharge him. A master is one who stands to another in such relation that he not only controls the result of the work of that other, but also may direct the manner in which it shall be done. *McColligan v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 214 Pa. 229, 63 Atl. 792, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, 112 Am. St. Rep. 739.

<sup>15</sup> *Frank v. Herold*, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152; *McColligan v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 214 Pa. 229, 63 Atl. 792, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, 112 Am. St. Rep. 739.

<sup>16</sup> See the statutes of the various states.

<sup>17</sup> Hours of Service Act March 4, 1907 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8677-8680); Adamson Law (Act Sept. 3, 5, 1916 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8680a-8680d]), fixing an eight hour day as the basis of computing compensation for train men.

<sup>18</sup> Safety Appliance Act March 2, 1893 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8612).

<sup>19</sup> Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665.)

exercises of the police power,<sup>20</sup> and unless open to some special objection are constitutional.<sup>21</sup>

Of similar character are the Workmen's Compensation Acts adopted by many states, materially modifying the common-law rules as to the liability of the master for injuries to a servant.<sup>22</sup>

### CREATION OF THE RELATION

257. The relation of master and servant, except in the case of apprenticeship, is created by a contract of hiring between the parties. This contract is governed by the principles of law which apply to contracts generally.

(a) The contract may be either—

(1) Express, as where it is evidenced by written or spoken words, or

(2) Implied, as where it is evidenced by conduct.

(b) To be binding as between the parties, there must be a consideration.

(c) The contract is subject to the general rules in regard to the capacity of parties to contract.

(d) And it is subject to the general rules concerning mistake, fraud, etc.

(e) The object of the agreement must not be unlawful.

(f) Under the statute of frauds, a contract of hiring that cannot be performed within a year must be in writing.

258. If a person enters the service of another at the other's request, the relation of master and servant exists for the time being, though the services are intended to be gratuitous; but in such a case there is no right to wages.

<sup>20</sup> *People v. Smith*, 108 Mich. 527, 66 N. W. 382, 32 L. R. A. 853, 62 Am. St. Rep. 715; *Andricus' Adm'r v. Pineville Coal Co.*, 121 Ky. 724, 90 S. W. 233; *Green v. American Car, etc., Co.*, 163 Ind. 135, 71 N. E. 268; *Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Min. Co.*, 218 Pa. 311, 67 Atl. 642, 12 L. R. A. 461, 120 Am. St. Rep. 885.

<sup>21</sup> *Ex parte Kair*, 28 Nev. 425, 82 Pac. 453, 6 Ann. Cas. 893 (construing Laws 1903, p. 33, c. 10); *State v. Livingston Concrete Bldg. & Mfg. Co.*, 34 Mont. 570, 87 Pac. 980, 9 Ann. Cas. 204 (construing Laws 1905, p. 105, c. 50); *Wenham v. State*, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N. W. 421, 58 L. R. A. 825 (construing Act March 31, 1899 [Laws 1899, p. 362, c. 107] relating to employment of women); *People v. City of Chicago*, 256 Ill. 558, 100 N. E. 194, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 305 (relating to hours of labor of women); *Holden v. Hardy*, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780, affirming

<sup>22</sup> See post, p. 635.

The relation of master and apprentice has already been explained. To constitute the relation of master and servant in other cases, a contract or agreement between them, express or implied, is essential.<sup>23</sup> The relation can only arise upon an agreement between the parties. A man cannot compel another to labor for him; nor, on the other hand, can a person perform services for another without his consent, and compel him to pay for them.<sup>24</sup> So, it has been held that if a servant of one man engages in temporary work for another, on the false representation of the latter that his master has directed him to do so, he does not thereby become a servant of the other, so as to be held to assume the risk of negligence on the part of the other servants of such person.<sup>25</sup> A person may be a servant of another though his services are merely gratuitous. If a person engages in the service of another at the latter's express or implied request, though only for a temporary purpose, and with the understanding that he is to receive no compensation, he will not be entitled to wages, but the relation of master and servant will exist, for other purposes. For instance, he will be entitled to recover like any other employé for personal injuries caused by the master's negligence;<sup>26</sup> and he will become a fellow servant of other employés so as to assume the risk of their negligence;<sup>27</sup> and the master will be liable to third persons for his negligence or wrongful acts in the course of the employment.<sup>28</sup>

*State v. Holden*, 14 Utah, 71, 46 Pac. 756, 37 L. R. A. 103 (holding Utah "eight-hour law" constitutional); *People v. Lochner*, 177 N. Y. 145, 60 N. E. 373, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773; *Green v. Appleton Woolen Mills*, 162 Wis. 145, 155 N. W. 958 (Laws 1911, c. 479, § 1, subd. 2, relating to employment of children); *United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.* (D. C.) 226 Fed. 220 (Hours of Service Act [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8677-8680]). See, also, *Sumey v. Craig Mountain Lumber Co.*, 27 Idaho, 721, 152 Pac. 181, and *Indiana Quarries Co. v. Farmer*, 184 Ind. 411, 110 N. E. 549, relating to Employers' Liability Acts. But see *People v. Williams*, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, 121 Am. St. Rep. 854, 12 Ann. Cas. 798 (declaring unconstitutional a statute relating to the employment of women between 9 p. m. and 8 a. m.).

<sup>23</sup> *Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan*, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. Rep. 289; *Sax v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co.*, 125 Mich. 252, 84 N. W. 314, 84 Am. St. Rep. 572; *Parker v. Wilson*, 179 Ala. 361, 60 South. 150, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pendleton's Adm'r*, 126 Ky. 605, 104 S. W. 382, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1025.

<sup>24</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 30; *Bartholomew v. Jackson*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 28, 11 Am. Dec. 237; *Taylor v. Laird*, Law J. 25 Exch. 329; *Caldwell v. Eneas*, 2 Mill, Const. (S. C.) 348, 12 Am. Dec. 681.

<sup>25</sup> *Kelly v. Johnson*, 128 Mass. 530, 35 Am. Rep. 398.

<sup>26</sup> *Johnson v. Water Co.*, 71 Wis. 553, 37 N. W. 823, 5 Am. St. Rep. 243.

<sup>27</sup> Post, p. 621.

<sup>28</sup> Post, p. 645.

*Implied Contract*

The contract need not be express—that is, it need not be evidenced by written or spoken words; but, like other contracts, it may be implied from the conduct of the parties. Thus, if a man labors for another, at the other's request, or with the other's knowledge and acquiescence, and under such circumstances that the other ought reasonably to know that compensation is expected, the law will imply a contract, and compensation may be recovered.<sup>20</sup> The contract in such cases is implied as a matter of fact, and there must be nothing to show that no contract was intended.<sup>20</sup> If services are performed for another without his knowledge, no contract will be implied.<sup>21</sup> If the parties stand in a family or quasi family relation towards each other, and the services consist in household or other family duties performed by one for the other, the presumption is that no compensation was intended; and, in order to recover therefor, a contract must be shown affirmatively.<sup>22</sup> The presumption in

<sup>20</sup> Clark, Cont. 25; Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 518, 20 Am. Rep. 347; Huck v. Flentye, 80 Ill. 258; Tucker v. Preston, 60 Vt. 473, 11 Atl. 726; McMillan v. Page, 71 Wis. 655, 88 N. W. 173; Jincey v. Winfield's Adm'r, 9 Grat. (Va.) 708; Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367, 7 Atl. 61.

<sup>20</sup> See note to Orr v. Brown, 16 C. C. A. 201; Clcotte v. Catholic Church, 60 Mich. 552, 27 N. W. 682; Gross v. Cadwell, 4 Wash. 670, 30 Pac. 1052. Thus, it has been held that where parties are in the habit of mutually receiving and rendering services, with no present thought of charging or paying therefor, no recovery can be had by either for services rendered, unless a special contract is shown, or there are circumstances which rebut the inference arising from their course of conduct that the services were intended to be gratuitous. Gross v. Cadwell, supra. See, also, Potter v. Carpenter, 76 N. Y. 157; Dunlap v. Allen, 90 Ill. 108; Covell v. Turner, 74 Mich. 408, 41 N. W. 1091. In Raysor v. Lumber Co., 26 S. C. 610, 2 S. E. 119, the plaintiff, who was already employed by defendant, demanded an increase of wages to commence January 1, 1885, and gave due notice to defendant's agent that he would leave unless such increase was made. The agent did not assent, but said that he would give an answer in two or three days. He failed to give any answer for several months, and allowed plaintiff in the meanwhile to continue at work. Then plaintiff was told that his salary would be increased as demanded, but to commence May 1, 1885. It was held that the silence of the agent did not raise any implication of assent on the part of the defendant to an increase of salary from January 1st, since the services, in the absence of an express new contract, would be referred to the existing contract.

<sup>21</sup> Taylor v. Laird, Law J. 25 Exch. 329; Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 28, 11 Am. Dec. 237; Willis v. Railway Co., 72 Mich. 160, 40 N. W. 205.

<sup>22</sup> Clark, Cont. 28, and cases there cited; note to Orr v. Brown, 16 C. C. A. 202, collecting cases; Ulrich v. Arnold, 120 Pa. 170, 13 Atl. 831; Heffron v. Brown, 155 Ill. 322, 40 N. E. 583; Dunlap v. Allen, 90 Ill. 108; Harris v.

such cases may be rebutted, however, not only by showing an express contract, but also by showing circumstances and conduct from which it may be inferred that there was an agreement for compensation.<sup>33</sup>

If, after expiration of a contract of hiring for a specified period, the servant continues in the master's service with his consent or acquiescence, without any further express agreement, a new contract of hiring, on the same terms and for the same period as the former one, will be implied, unless there are special circumstances showing a contrary intention.<sup>34</sup> Thus, if the nature of the services to be rendered is entirely different, the presumption will not, as a rule,

Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 44 N. W. 169, 6 L. R. A. 702. This principle is clearly applicable where the parties occupy the relation of parent and child. See *Ulrich v. Arnold*, 120 Pa. 170, 13 Atl. 831; *Bantz v. Bantz*, 52 Md. 693; *Cowan v. Musgrave*, 73 Iowa, 384, 35 N. W. 496; *Howe v. North*, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N. W. 213; *Allen v. Allen*, 60 Mich. 635, 27 N. W. 702; *Bostwick v. Bostwick's Estate*, 71 Wis. 273, 37 N. W. 405; *Curry v. Curry*, 114 Pa. 367, 7 Atl. 61. The same presumption arises where one of the parties stands in loco parentis to the other. *Harris v. Smith*, 79 Mich. 54, 44 N. W. 169, 6 L. R. A. 702; *Dodson v. McAdams*, 96 N. C. 149, 2 S. E. 453, 60 Am. Rep. 408; *Ormsby v. Rhoades*, 59 Vt. 505, 10 Atl. 722; *Barbite's Appeal*, 126 Pa. 404, 17 Atl. 617. And it arises where the parties are but distantly related, or not related at all, but the connection between them is of a household or family nature. *Felertag v. Felertag*, 73 Mich. 297, 41 N. W. 414; *Bruner v. Mosner*, 116 App. Div. 298, 101 N. Y. S. 538; *Collar v. Patterson*, 137 Ill. 403, 27 N. E. 604; *Cone v. Cross*, 72 Md. 102, 19 Atl. 391; *Disbrow v. Durand*, 54 N. J. Law, 343, 24 Atl. 545, 33 Am. St. Rep. 678; *Gerz v. Weber*, 151 Pa. 396, 25 Atl. 82; *Collyer v. Collyer*, 113 N. Y. 442, 21 N. E. 114; *Covel v. Turner*, 74 Mich. 408, 41 N. W. 1091.

<sup>33</sup> See *Heffron v. Brown*, 155 Ill. 322, 40 N. E. 583; *McMillan v. Page*, 71 Wis. 655, 38 N. W. 173; *Guild v. Guild*, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 129.

<sup>34</sup> *Appleton Waterworks Co. v. City of Appleton*, 132 Wis. 563, 113 N. W. 44; *Fish v. Marzluff*, 128 Ill. App. 549; *Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Nicolini* (Tex. Civ. App.) 96 S. W. 84; *Mendelson v. Bronner*, 124 App. Div. 396, 108 N. Y. Supp. 807; *Treffinger v. M. Groh's Sons*, 112 App. Div. 250, 98 N. Y. Supp. 291; *Douglass v. Merchants' Ins. Co.*, 118 N. Y. 484, 23 N. E. 806, 7 L. R. A. 822; *INGALLS v. ALLEN*, 132 Ill. 170, 23 N. E. 1026; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 300; *Weise v. Supervisors*, 51 Wis. 564, 8 N. W. 295; *Wallace v. Floyd*, 29 Pa. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620; *Nicholson v. Patchin*, 5 Cal. 474; *Huntingdon v. Claffin*, 38 N. Y. 182; *Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert*, 84 Ga. 714, 11 S. E. 491, 8 L. R. A. 410; *Lalande v. Aldrich*, 41 La. Ann. 307, 6 South. 28; *Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bulkley*, 48 Ill. 189; *Sines v. Superintendents of Poor*, 58 Mich. 503, 25 N. W. 485; *Adams v. Fitzpatrick*, 56 Super. N. Y. 580, 5 N. Y. Supp. 181; *Hodge v. Newton*, 14 Daly (N. Y.) 372; *McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter*, 67 Md. 554, 11 Atl. 176; *Lister's Agricultural Chemical Works v. Pender*, 74 Md. 15, 21 Atl. 686.

arise.<sup>35</sup> And generally the presumption, being one of fact, may be rebutted by evidence of circumstances, showing a contrary intention.<sup>36</sup>

*Validity of the Contract—Mutual Assent—Consideration—Capacity of Parties—Reality of Consent—Illegality*

The contract of hiring is governed by all the principles of law which apply to other contracts. In the first place, there must be mutual assent, or offer and acceptance.<sup>37</sup> As has just been seen, however, mutual assent may be implied from the conduct of the parties.<sup>38</sup>

There must also be a valid consideration. The promise of one party to serve, and the promise of the other to permit him to do so, and to pay him, are each a sufficient consideration for the other, for a promise is a sufficient consideration for a promise.<sup>39</sup> The promises must be mutually binding, however; for, if there is no mutuality, a contract of hiring is as void as any other contract would be.<sup>40</sup>

The principles of law in regard to the capacity of the parties to a contract apply with full force to a contract of hiring.<sup>41</sup> A contract of hiring by an infant does not bind him, but is voidable at his option.<sup>42</sup> He may at any time repudiate the contract, and recover on the quantum meruit for the services rendered. The adult is bound if the infant chooses to hold him.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *INGALLS v. ALLEN*, 132 Ill. 170, 23 N. E. 1026, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 300; *Burton v. Behan*, 47 La. Ann. 117, 16 South. 769; *Ewing v. Janson*, 57 Ark. 237, 21 S. W. 430; *Reed v. Swift*, 45 Cal. 255.

<sup>36</sup> *INGALLS v. ALLEN*, 132 Ill. 170, 23 N. E. 1026, Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 300; *Hale v. Sheehan*, 41 Neb. 102, 59 N. W. 554; *Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber*, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024, 60 L. R. A. 927, 108 Am. St. Rep. 716; *Dickinson v. Norwegian Plow Co.*, 96 Wis. 376, 71 N. W. 606; *Id.*, 101 Wis. 157, 76 N. W. 1108.

<sup>37</sup> *Hooker v. Hyde*, 61 Wis. 204, 21 N. W. 52; *King v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.*, 140 N. C. 433, 53 S. E. 237; *International Harvester Co. v. Campbell*, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 421, 96 S. W. 93; *Smith v. Williams*, 123 Mo. App. 479, 100 S. W. 55. See, as to offer and acceptance generally, *Clark*, Cont. p. 21.

<sup>38</sup> *Ante*, p. 576. And see *Smith v. Williams*, 123 Mo. App. 479, 100 S. W. 55.

<sup>39</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 165. The dismissal of a suit of damages, brought by an injured employé of a railroad company, is a sufficient consideration for a contract for his future employment so long as his services are satisfactory. *Lake Erie & W. Ry. v. Tierney*, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 83.

<sup>40</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 168-171.

<sup>41</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 210 et seq.

<sup>42</sup> As to contracts of infants generally, see *ante*, p. 471.

<sup>43</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 221 et seq.; *Derocher v. Continental Mills*, 58 Me. 217, 4 Am. Rep. 286.

The contract of hiring is affected, like other contracts, by fraud, duress, and mistake,<sup>44</sup> and, like other contracts, it must not be illegal.<sup>45</sup> For instance, a contract to serve another in a business which is unlawful, as in selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law, or in conducting a gambling house or lottery or bawdy house, could not be enforced,<sup>46</sup> unless the servant were ignorant of the purpose or object rendering the agreement unlawful. In the latter case he could recover for services rendered.<sup>47</sup>

*Necessity for Written Contract—Statute of Frauds*

Unless writing is required by some statute, a contract may be either in writing or oral, or as we have seen, it may be implied from conduct. Under the statute of frauds, a contract not to be performed within a year must be in writing, or no action can be maintained upon it.<sup>48</sup> This applies, of course, to contracts of hiring. A contract for a year's service, to commence on a future day, is within the statute;<sup>49</sup> and so is a contract to begin as soon as the employé can, and actually beginning a week after the agreement.<sup>50</sup> If the service is for a year, and it is agreed that it is to commence at once, or if no time for commencement of the service is named, in which case it is to commence at once, the contract is not within the statute.<sup>51</sup> It has been held that a contract for a year's service, to commence the day after the agreement is made, is within the statute, for the law does not regard fractions of a day;<sup>52</sup> but there are decisions to the contrary.<sup>53</sup> If the agreement may be perform-

<sup>44</sup> See Clark, Cont. 288 et seq.

<sup>45</sup> A contract to give one permanent employment is not contrary to public policy. *Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan*, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. Rep. 289.

<sup>46</sup> See Clark, Cont. 374; *Spurgeon v. McElwain*, 6 Ohio, 442, 27 Am. Dec. 266; *Sullivan v. Horgan*, 17 R. I. 109, 20 Atl. 232, 9 L. R. A. 110; *Bierbauer v. Wirth* (C. C.) 5 Fed. 336; *The Pioneer*, Deady, 72 Fed. Cas. No. 11,177.

<sup>47</sup> Clark, Cont. 475; *Emery v. Kempton*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 257; *Roys v. Johnson*, 7 Gray (Mass.) 162.

<sup>48</sup> Clark, Cont. 109.

<sup>49</sup> *Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 19; *Bracegirdle v. Heald*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 723; *Sutcliffe v. Atlantic Mills*, 13 R. I. 480, 43 Am. Rep. 89; *Kleeman v. Collins*, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 460; *Nones v. Homer*, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 116; *Broadwell v. Getman*, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 87; *Comes v. Lamson*, 16 Conn. 246; *Sharp v. Rhlel*, 55 Mo. 97; *Hearne v. Chadbourne*, 65 Me. 302.

<sup>50</sup> *Sutcliffe v. Atlantic Mills*, 13 R. I. 480, 43 Am. Rep. 89.

<sup>51</sup> *Russell v. Slade*, 12 Conn. 455.

<sup>52</sup> *Dickson v. Frisbee*, 52 Ala. 165, 23 Am. Rep. 565; *Cawthorne v. Cordrey*, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 406.

<sup>53</sup> *Billington v. Cahill*, 51 Hun, 132, 4 N. Y. Supp. 660.

ed within the year, it is not within the statute.<sup>54</sup> If services are performed under a contract within the statute, there may be a recovery on the quantum meruit.<sup>55</sup>

### TERMINATION OF THE RELATION

259. A contract of hiring is discharged or terminated like any other contract. It may be discharged, for instance—

- (a) By agreement. And this may be—
  - (1) By waiver, cancellation, or rescission.
  - (2) By substituted agreement.
  - (3) By the happening of conditions subsequent in accordance with the express or implied terms of the contract.
- (b) By performance.
- (c) By breach.
- (d) By impossibility of performance under some circumstances.

260. A breach of the contract by the master entitles the servant to leave. Such a breach may be—

- (a) By renouncing the contract.
- (b) By rendering performance or further performance impossible.
- (c) By breach of particular terms of the contract, express or implied, as by failure to pay the wages agreed, or by ill treatment of the servant.

261. A breach of the contract by the servant entitles the master to discharge him. Such a breach may be—

- (a) By renunciation of the contract.
- (b) By rendering performance or further performance by him impossible.
- (c) By breach of particular terms of the contract, express or implied, as—
  - (1) By incompetency.
  - (2) By criminal or grossly immoral conduct.
  - (3) By willful disobedience.
  - (4) By habitual neglect.

<sup>54</sup> Clark, Cont. 109-111. As an agreement to work for a company "for five years, or so long as A. shall continue to be agent for the company," *Roberts v. Rockbottom Co.*, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 47; or an agreement to employ a person so long as he may be disabled from an injury which he has received. *East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Staub*, 7 Lea. (Tenn.) 397.

<sup>55</sup> Clark, Cont. 111, 112, notes, and cases cited; *Baker v. Lauterbach*, 68 Md. 64, 11 Atl. 703; *Towsley v. Moore*, 30 Ohio St. 185, 27 Am. Rep. 434.

The relation of master and servant may be determined in various ways. It is determined whenever the contract of hiring is discharged, and therefore we must refer to the principles of law in regard to the discharge of contracts generally.

*Discharge of Contract by Agreement*

In the first place, a contract of hiring may, like other contracts, be discharged by agreement between the parties. And this may be either (1) by subsequent agreement waiving, canceling, or rescinding the contract, or substituting a new agreement; or (2) by the happening of conditions subsequent expressed or implied in the contract.<sup>56</sup>

*Same—Waiver, Cancellation, or Rescission—Substituted Agreement*

A contract of hiring may always be discharged by an agreement between the parties to it that it shall no longer be binding upon them;<sup>57</sup> but this agreement is subject to the rule, which governs all other simple contracts, that there must be a consideration.<sup>58</sup> So, too, a resignation, tendered by the employé and accepted by the employer, is, in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, a binding contract, which terminates the employment.<sup>59</sup> A substitution of a new contract of hiring is a waiver of the prior contract, and the rights of the parties are thereafter determined by the new contract.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>56</sup> See Clark, Cont. 607-627.

<sup>57</sup> Pray v. Standard Electric Co., 155 Mass. 561, 30 N. E. 464. Therefore, if a servant hired for a specified term is discharged with his consent, he cannot complain, nor recover salary for the remainder of the term. Southmayd v. Insurance Co., 47 Wis. 517, 2 N. W. 1137; Grannemann v. Kloepper, 24 Ill. App. 277.

<sup>58</sup> Clark, Cont. 608.

<sup>59</sup> New York Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 150, 103 S. W. 423; Ivey v. Bessemer City Cotton Mills, 143 N. C. 189, 55 S. E. 613. If a resignation is not accepted as offered, the acceptance is not binding on the employé. Capps v. University of Chicago, 166 Ill. App. 485.

<sup>60</sup> Clark, Cont. 610. A contract of hiring may be thus discharged either by the making of an entirely new and independent contract, or by the introduction of new terms. In the latter case the new contract consists of the new terms and so much of the original contract as remains unchanged. Clark, Cont. 611. There need be no express waiver of the old contract, or of some of its terms, to constitute a discharge by substituted agreement. A new contract inconsistent with the original impliedly discharges the latter. Clark, Cont. 611, 612, and cases there collected. A mere change in the duties of the servant in no wise affects a contract prescribing a period of service. Kinney v. Calumet Pub. Co., 167 Ill. App. 369.

*Same—Happening of Conditions Subsequent*

A contract of hiring, like other contracts, may contain within itself express or implied provisions for its determination under certain circumstances. Such provisions are called "conditions subsequent."

The contract may give one of the parties the right to terminate it upon the nonfulfillment of a specified term. If the term is not fulfilled, and the party terminates the contract, there is no breach, but the contract is rightfully determined.<sup>61</sup> If a servant is employed for a specified time to carry on the master's business, or do other work, "to the master's satisfaction," the master has a right to discharge him whenever he becomes, in good faith, dissatisfied with him.<sup>62</sup> Some courts hold that the master is the sole judge whether the servant is satisfactory, and that the courts cannot determine whether his dissatisfaction was reasonable.<sup>63</sup> A hiring to last so long as each party is satisfied is a hiring at will, and may be terminated at any time by either.<sup>64</sup> So the parties may in-

<sup>61</sup> Clark, Cont. 622-627.

<sup>62</sup> Corgan v. Geo. F. Lee Coal Co., 218 Pa. 396, 67 Atl. 655, 120 Am. St. Rep. 891, 11 Ann. Cas. 838; Beissel v. Vermillion Farmers' Elevator Co., 102 Minn. 229, 113 N. W. 575, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 403; Frary v. American Rubber Co., 52 Minn. 264, 53 N. W. 1156, 18 L. R. A. 644; Anvil Min. Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540, 14 Sup. Ct. 876, 38 L. Ed. 814. It is sufficient if the master was in good faith dissatisfied, though his dissatisfaction is unreasonable. Starkweather v. Emerson Mfg. Co., 132 Iowa, 266, 109 N. W. 719. But see Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Tierney, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 83 (judgment affirmed in 75 Ohio St. 565, 80 N. E. 1128), where it is held that dissatisfaction with the services of an employé engaged to render services as long as they were satisfactory such as to justify a discharge must be a reasonable dissatisfaction, and not an arbitrary one, and the good faith of the company in claiming such services to be unsatisfactory will not alone justify the discharge, if the services rendered were, in fact, such as ought to have been satisfactory to a reasonable employer. The master is liable as for a wrongful discharge, if the alleged dissatisfaction is not in good faith. Farmer v. Golde Clothes Shop, 225 Mass. 260, 114 N. E. 303.

<sup>63</sup> International Harvester Co. v. Boatman, 122 Ill. App. 474; Krompner v. Spivek, 170 Ill. App. 621; Saxe v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 57 Misc. Rep. 620, 108 N. Y. Supp. 683; Watkins & Thurman v. Napier, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 98 S. W. 904; Allen v. Mutual Compress Co., 101 Ala. 574, 14 South. 362; Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496, 54 N. W. 157; Crawford v. Mail & Express Pub. Co., 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. 616, distinguishing Smith v. Robson, 148 N. Y. 252, 42 N. E. 677, in which the contract expressly provided that there must be good faith on the part of the master in determining the question of dissatisfaction.

<sup>64</sup> Evans v. Bennett, 7 Wis. 404; Booth v. Ratcliffe, 107 N. C. 6, 12 S. E. 112; Wilmington Coal Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Lamb, 90 Ill. 465.

introduce into their contract a provision that the occurrence of a specified event shall terminate the contract, and discharge them both from further liability under it.<sup>65</sup>

A contract of hiring may contain a provision, express or implied, making it determinable at the option of one or either of the parties upon certain terms. Where the contract expressly provides that it may be terminated by either party on giving a specified notice, and the servant is dismissed on such notice, the contract is discharged, and not broken.<sup>66</sup> Terms like this need not necessarily be expressed in the contract; but they may be imported into it by custom and usage.<sup>67</sup> A custom or usage, however, can never affect a contract if it is inconsistent with its terms.<sup>68</sup> If the contract fixes no time during which it is to last, and no time is fixed by law or by usage, it may be determined at the will of either party at any time; the hiring being construed as a hiring at will.<sup>69</sup> The circumstances may show a contrary intention, and the intentions

<sup>65</sup> *Fuller v. Downing*, 120 App. Div. 36, 104 N. Y. Supp. 991, where the contract authorized the employer to terminate the contract on four months' notice, in case he wished to form a combination with other manufacturers in the same line of business, and it was held that the master was bound to exercise good faith in terminating the contract under such provision.

<sup>66</sup> *Jenkins v. Long*, 8 Md. 132; *White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Shaddock*, 79 Ark. 220, 95 S. W. 143. Provisions as to notice must as a rule be strictly complied with. *Basse v. Allen*, 43 Tex. 481; *City of Indianapolis v. Bly*, 39 Ind. 373. The provision may, of course, be waived. *Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Paige*, 135 Mass. 145.

<sup>67</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 580-586 (where the requisites of a custom or usage are shown); *Parker v. Ibbetson*, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 347.

<sup>68</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 566; *Baltimore Baseball Club & Exhibition Co. v. Pickett*, 78 Md. 375, 28 Atl. 279, 22 L. R. A. 690, 44 Am. St. Rep. 304; *Greenstine v. Borchard*, 50 Mich. 434, 15 N. W. 540, 45 Am. Rep. 51; *Seavey v. Shurick*, 110 Ind. 494, 11 N. E. 597.

<sup>69</sup> *The Pokanoket*, 156 Fed. 241, 84 C. C. A. 49; *Odom v. Bush*, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S. E. 1013; *Frank v. Manhattan Maternity & Dispensary (Sup.)* 107 N. Y. Supp. 404; *Summers v. Phenix Ins. Co.*, 50 Misc. Rep. 181, 98 N. Y. Supp. 226; *Coffin v. Landis*, 46 Pa. 426; *Peacock v. Cummings*, Id. 434; *Greenburg v. Early*, 4 Misc. Rep. 99, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1009; *Attrill v. Patterson*, 58 Md. 226; *Walker v. Denison*, 86 Ill. 142; *Fawcett v. Cash*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 904; *Hathaway v. Bennett*, 10 N. Y. 108, 61 Am. Dec. 739; *Evans v. Bennett*, 7 Wis. 404. A contract for a specified period, "unless sooner determined," is not a hiring at will, but is a hiring for the period named. *Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Whittaker*, 21 Wis. 329. An agreement to give a person "permanent" employment means nothing more than that the employment is to continue indefinitely, and until one or the other of the parties desires, for some good reason, to sever the relation. *Lord v. Goldberg*, 81 Cal. 596, 22 Pac. 1126, 15 Am. St. Rep. 82; *Bentley v. Smith*, 3 Ga. App. 242, 59 S. E. 720.

of the parties must govern, of course.<sup>70</sup> The fact that the wages are payable at specified periods does not necessarily show that the hiring was for the specified period, and not a hiring at will, nor, on the other hand, that it was not a hiring for a longer period than specified.<sup>71</sup> As we have seen, where a servant who is hired for a specified period continues to serve after expiration of the term with the master's consent, but without any new arrangement, a contract for another similar period will be implied, and not a hiring at will.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup>A. addressed a letter to B., offering him \$100 per month for his services, and stated: "If you give me satisfaction at the end of the first year, I will increase your wages accordingly." The offer was accepted by B. The court, in construing the contract, held it a hiring for one year. *Norton v. Cowell*, 65 Md. 359, 4 Atl. 408, 57 Am. Rep. 331. In *Smith v. Theobald*, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S. W. 394, a letter engaging an hotel manager "at \$125 per month" showed upon its face that the engagement contemplated his giving up another position, removing with his family to another place, several hundred miles away, and undertaking there, besides his duties as manager, those of secretary and treasurer of the hotel company. It was held that the letter could not be construed as an employment by the month or at will, but must be held to import an engagement by the year.

<sup>71</sup>*Frank v. Manhattan Maternity & Dispensary* (Sup.) 107 N. Y. Supp. 404; *The Pokanoket*, 156 Fed. 241, 84 C. O. A. 49; *Summers v. Phenix Ins. Co.*, 50 Misc. Rep. 181, 98 N. Y. Supp. 226; *Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Moore*, 62 Md. 161; *McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter*, 67 Md. 554, 11 Atl. 176; *Beach v. Mullin*, 34 N. J. Law, 343; *Tatterson v. Manufacturing Co.*, 106 Mass. 56; *Prentiss v. Ledyard*, 28 Wis. 131; *Thomas v. Hatch*, 53 Wis. 296, 10 N. W. 393; *Haney v. Caldwell*, 35 Ark. 156; *Larkin v. Hecksher*, 51 N. J. Law, 133, 16 Atl. 703, 8 L. R. A. 187. Payment of wages quarterly, monthly, or weekly is not inconsistent with a yearly hiring. *Norton v. Cowell*, 65 Md. 359, 4 Atl. 408, 57 Am. Rep. 331; *Tatterson v. Manufacturing Co.*, 106 Mass. 56. Or with a hiring at will. *Marquam v. Domestic Engineering Co.*, 210 Ill. App. 337. Agreement to pay at a yearly rate is not necessarily a hiring for a year. *Prentiss v. Ledyard*, 28 Wis. 131; *Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros.*, 216 N. Y. 591, 111 N. E. 249, reversing 158 App. Div. 628, 143 N. Y. Supp. 967. But the time for payment of wages will determine the duration of the employment, if there is nothing in the case to rebut the inference arising therefrom. *Crone-millar v. Duluth-Superior Milling Co.*, 134 Wis. 248, 114 N. W. 432; *Doolittle v. Pacific Coast Safe & Vault Works*, 79 Or. 498, 154 Pac. 753. Thus, a hiring for a certain sum per month or per week is a hiring by the month or week, as the case may be, if nothing is said as to the length of time the service is to continue, and no other circumstances appear. *Magarahan v. Wright*, 83 Ga. 773, 10 S. E. 584; *Odom v. Bush*, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S. E. 1013. A contract that the servant's "salary from Nov. 1st will be per month, at the rate of \$500 a year," makes the employment by the month. *Pinckney v. Talmage*, 32 S. C. 364, 10 S. E. 1083.

<sup>72</sup>*Ante*, p. 577, and cases there cited. One who hires himself on a contract for a year, and afterwards continues without any new contract, is again impliedly hired by the year, and neither he nor his employer can terminate the engagement at his pleasure. *McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter*, 67 Md.

In every contract of hiring, certain provisions for discharge are implied. If the servant proves incompetent, or wrongfully acts in such a way as to injure the master's business, or is otherwise guilty of breach of duty, the master may rightfully discharge him. This, however, is a breach of contract by the servant discharging the master from further liability under the contract, and will therefore be considered in treating of discharge by breach.<sup>73</sup>

*Discharge of Contract by Performance*

The contract of hiring is discharged by full performance by both parties. If a person is hired for a specified time, and he works for that time, and is paid, the contract is at an end without the necessity of any notice.<sup>74</sup> The parties may, however, make a new contract for a further term; and such a contract will be implied if the servant continues to labor, and the master acquiesces.<sup>75</sup> The question as to what constitutes sufficient performance is considered in treating of breach of contract. As to tender and payment, reference must be made to works on the general law of contracts.<sup>76</sup>

*Discharge of Contract by Breach*

A breach, by either party, of the obligations imposed by the contract of hiring, gives the other party a right of action for any damages he may have sustained, and as a rule, though not always, discharges the other party from any further liability under the contract.<sup>77</sup>

*Same—Breach by Master*

If the master renounces the contract either before the time for performance, or in the course of performance, as by wrongfully discharging the servant, the servant may treat the contract as broken and discharged, and sue at once for damages, without holding himself ready or offering to perform or further perform the contract on his part.<sup>78</sup> The same is true where the master, either be-

554, 11 Atl. 176. *Curtis v. Dodd & Struthers*, 172 Iowa, 521, 154 N. W. 872; *Morris v. Z. T. Briggs Photographic Supply Co.*, 192 Mo. App. 145, 179 S. W. 783.

<sup>73</sup> Post, p. 588.

<sup>74</sup> *Ewing v. Janson*, 57 Ark. 237, 21 S. W. 430. And see *Whitmore v. Werner* (Sup.) 88 N. Y. Supp. 373, and *Dodson-Braun Mfg. Co. v. Dix* (Tex. Civ. App.) 76 S. W. 451, when the hiring was by the month.

<sup>75</sup> Ante, p. 577.

<sup>76</sup> See Clark, Cont. 629-643.

<sup>77</sup> Clark, Cont. p. 643.

<sup>78</sup> Clark, Cont. 646-648; *Hochster v. De la Tour*, 2 El. & Bl. 678; *Howard*

fore the time for performance or in the course of performance, does some act by which he makes performance or further performance impossible.<sup>79</sup> If a master wrongfully discharges his servant, he cannot, by subsequently ordering the servant to return to work, put the servant in default. After a wrongful dismissal the contract is discharged, and the servant need not return, though requested to do so.<sup>80</sup>

It is a general principle of the law of contracts that renunciation of the contract by one of the parties does not discharge the other unless he choose to treat it as a discharge; that it is optional with him to treat the contract as still in force.<sup>81</sup> This principle has been applied by some of the courts to contracts of hiring, and it has been held that, where the master discharges the servant without cause, the servant need not treat the contract as at an end, but may hold himself in readiness to perform, and recover each installment of wages, as it falls due, during the period for which he was employed.<sup>82</sup> Other courts refuse to recognize this doctrine—the doctrine of constructive service, as it is called—but hold, on the contrary, that, where the master renounces the contract and dismisses the servant before the end of the term, the

*v. Daly*, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285; *Burtis v. Thompson*, 42 N. Y. 246, 1 Am. Rep. 516; *Ryan v. Dayton*, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 560; *Grau v. McVicker*, 8 Biss. 13, Fed. Cas. No. 5,708; *Hosmer v. Willson*, 7 Mich. 294, 74 Am. Dec. 716; *Jones v. Transportation Co.*, 51 Mich. 539, 16 N. W. 893; *Nilsson v. Morse*, 52 Wis. 240, 9 N. W. 1; *Hartman v. Rogers*, 69 Cal. 643, 11 Pac. 581. Where a servant is told by his master that their relations had better be discontinued immediately, and thereupon the servant, no work being assigned to him, leaves, he is discharged. *Bennett v. Morton*, 46 Minn. 113, 48 N. W. 673. And see *Paine v. Hill*, 7 Wash. 437, 35 Pac. 136. A request by the master for the servant's resignation, which is given, is a discharge of the servant. *Jones v. Transportation Co.*, 51 Mich. 539, 16 N. W. 893. But see *WHARTON v. CHRISTIE*, 53 N. J. Law, 607, 23 Atl. 258, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 303. Where the servant is employed as a manager reduction to the grade of mere clerk is a breach of the contract. *Cooper v. Strong & Warner Co.*, 111 Minn. 177, 126 N. W. 541, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1011, 20 Ann. Cas. 663.

<sup>79</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 649; *Planché v. Colburn*, 8 Bing. 14; *W. U. Tel. Co. v. Semmes*, 73 Md. 9, 20 Atl. 127; *Seipel v. Trust Co.*, 84 Pa. 47.

<sup>80</sup> See *Mitchell v. Toale*, 25 S. C. 238, 60 Am. Rep. 502. But see *Best v. Lizarraigo*, 37 Phil. Rep. 491, where it is held that, where employer subsequently offers in good faith to take back discharged employee, it is the duty of employee to return.

<sup>81</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 645.

<sup>82</sup> *Gandell v. Pontigny*, 4 Camp. 375, 1 Starkie, 198; *Strauss v. Meertief*, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; *Isaacs v. Davies*, 68 Ga. 169.

servant cannot go on and do the work, or hold himself in readiness to do it, and then recover the contract price as on a full performance, but that he must treat the hiring as at an end, and pursue his remedy, either on the quantum meruit, or for damages for breach of contract.<sup>83</sup>

If the master ill treats the servant by assaulting and beating him, he breaks an implied term of the contract, and the servant may leave, and recover as upon a wrongful discharge.<sup>84</sup> And of course nonpayment of the wages as agreed, is a breach by the master.

*Same—Breach by Servant*

If the servant willfully renounces and abandons the service without just cause, or, by his inexcusable conduct, renders further performance impossible, such a breach terminates the contract,<sup>85</sup> and, if the contract is entire, will discharge the master from all liability under the contract, even for services actually rendered, since performance by the servant is a condition precedent to his right to compensation. An action for the services rendered in such a case clearly cannot be brought on the contract.<sup>86</sup> Whether there can be a recovery on the quantum meruit is a different question. Such a recovery, as will be seen in a subsequent section, is allowed by some courts, but denied by others.<sup>87</sup> Whether or not a mere partial failure on the part of one of the parties to perform the contract discharges the other altogether from liability on the contract is a question upon which the decisions are conflicting. If there

<sup>83</sup> *Clark v. Marsiglia*, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670; *Lord v. Thomas*, 64 N. Y. 107; *Hosmer v. Wilson*, 7 Mich. 294, 74 Am. Dec. 716; *Gibbons v. Bente*, 51 Minn. 490, 53 N. W. 756, 22 L. R. A. 80; *Collyer v. Moulton*, 9 R. I. 90, 98 Am. Dec. 370; *Heaver v. Lanahan*, 74 Md. 493, 22 Atl. 263; *Owen v. Frink*, 24 Cal. 178.

<sup>84</sup> *Ward v. Ames*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 138; *Bishop v. Ranney*, 59 Vt. 316, 7 Atl. 820. But see *Morgan v. Shelton*, 28 La. Ann. 822, a case in which it was held that a servant who was knocked down by his master in a fit of passion was not justified in leaving. An assault on a servant or his child by one who is not connected with the master, and without any direction or authority from the master, does not entitle the servant to leave. *Mather v. Brokaw*, 43 N. J. Law, 587. Compare *Patterson v. Gage*, 23 Vt. 558, 56 Am. Dec. 96.

<sup>85</sup> *Leopold v. Salkey*, 89 Ill. 412, 31 Am. Rep. 93; *Newkirk v. New York & H. R. Co.*, 38 N. Y. 158.

<sup>86</sup> *Hill v. Balkcom*, 79 Ga. 444, 5 S. E. 200; *Scheuer v. Monash*, 35 Misc. Rep. 276, 71 N. Y. Supp. 818.

<sup>87</sup> *Post*, p. 603.

is an express and entire contract to pay a certain lump sum for the services contracted for, then, by the better opinion, the servant must perform in full in order to recover anything. If he performs in part only, he cannot recover on the quantum meruit for what he has done.<sup>88</sup>

Breach by one of the parties of a subsidiary term in the contract does not discharge the other, but merely entitles him to damages.<sup>89</sup> This is a well-established principle of the general law of contract. So, if the contract is not entire, but divisible, breach as to part will not prevent recovery for performance of the remainder. It has been held that if services are to be paid for in installments as where the wages are to be paid weekly or monthly on a hiring for a year, the contract will be regarded as divisible, unless such a construction is expressly excluded; and a recovery for services rendered may be had by the servant if he leaves before the end of the term.<sup>90</sup>

There is an implied contract upon the part of a servant that he is competent to discharge the duties for which he is employed; and, if he proves incompetent, it is a breach of contract, for which he may be dismissed.<sup>91</sup> A servant may be discharged if, by in-

<sup>88</sup> *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 Term R. 320.

<sup>89</sup> In *Bettini v. Gye*, 1 Q. B. Div. 183, the plaintiff, a professional singer, had entered into a contract with the defendant, director of an opera, for his services as a singer for a considerable time, and upon a number of terms, one of which was that plaintiff should be in London without fail at least six days before the commencement of his engagement, for the purpose of rehearsing. The plaintiff broke this term by arriving only two days before the commencement of the engagement, and the defendant treated this breach as a discharge of the contract. The court held, however, that, in the absence of any express declaration that the term was vital to the contract, it must "look to the whole contract, and see whether the particular stipulation goes to the root of the matter, so that a failure to perform it would render the performance of the rest of the contract by the plaintiff a thing different in substance from what the defendant has stipulated for; or whether it merely partially affects it, and may be compensated for in damages." And it was held that the term did not go to the root of the matter, so as to constitute a condition precedent. On the other hand, where a singer who had agreed to take the principal part in an opera failed to perform in the opening and early performances, it was held that the other party was discharged. *Poussard v. Spiers*, 1 Q. B. Div. 410.

<sup>90</sup> *Chamblée v. Baker*, 95 N. C. 98. The application of the rule to this particular contract is contrary to the decisions in many other states. See post, p. 603.

<sup>91</sup> *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *United Oil & Refining Co. v. Grey*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 102 S. W. 934; *Ivey v. Bessemer City Cotton Mills*,

toxication, even outside of working hours, and not on his master's premises, he unfits himself to fully and properly perform his duties.<sup>92</sup> And drunkenness on the master's premises may be ground for dismissal, though it does not incapacitate the servant for the performance of his duties.<sup>93</sup>

A servant may be dismissed by the master before the expiration of the term either for criminal or immoral conduct, willful disobedience, or habitual neglect.<sup>94</sup> He may be dismissed for larceny or embezzlement, either from the master or a third person,<sup>95</sup> and he may be dismissed for cheating or defrauding, or attempting to cheat or defraud, his master.<sup>96</sup> Habitual neglect of duty is always sufficient ground for discharge.<sup>97</sup> So if a servant handling his master's money, as a cashier, for instance, largely overdraws his sal-

143 N. C. 189, 55 S. E. 613; *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Searle v. Ridley*, 28 Law T. (N. S.) 411; *Harmer v. Cornelius*, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 236; *Waxelbaum v. Limberger*, 78 Ga. 43, 3 S. E. 257; *Baltimore Baseball Club & Exhibition Co. v. Pickett*, 78 Md. 375, 28 Atl. 279, 22 L. R. A. 690, 44 Am. St. Rep. 304; *Woodrow v. Hawving*, 105 Ala. 240, 16 South. 720. But not because he is incompetent to perform duties which were not within the terms of his contract. *Pringle v. Producers' Turpentine Co.*, 126 La. 1095, 53 South. 359.

<sup>92</sup> *McCormick v. Demary*, 10 Neb. 515, 7 N. W. 283; *Ulrich v. Hower*, 156 Pa. 414, 27 Atl. 243; *E. I. Du Pont Co. v. Waddell*, 178 Fed. 407, 101 C. C. A. 335; *Smith v. Railroad Co.*, 60 Minn. 330, 62 N. W. 392.

<sup>93</sup> *Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock*, 82 Ala. 452, 2 South. 315, 60 Am. Rep. 748; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cox*, 145 Ky. 716, 141 S. W. 59; *Dunkell v. Simons*, 15 Daly, 353, 7 N. Y. Supp. 655; *Speck v. Phillips*, 5 Mees. & W. 279.

<sup>94</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 258.

<sup>95</sup> *Libhart v. Wood*, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 265, 37 Am. Dec. 461; *Cunningham v. Fonblanque*, 6 Car. & P. 44, 49; *Spotswood v. Barrow*, 5 Exch. 110; *Krueger v. Roxford Knitting Co.*, 209 Ill. App. 496 (peculation in expense account). See, also, *Butterick Pub. Co. v. Whitcomb*, 225 Ill. 605, 80 N. E. 247, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1004, where the servant, after the termination of his employment, retained a book issued by the employer and delivered it to a competitor. Thereafter the employer hired the employé for a specified term, and it was held that the act of the employé while not in defendant's employ did not justify him in terminating the contract of employment.

<sup>96</sup> *Singer v. McCormick*, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 267.

<sup>97</sup> *Callo v. Brouncker*, 4 Car. & P. 518; *Robinson v. Hindman*, 3 Esp. 235; *Wright v. Lake*, 48 Wash. 469, 93 Pac. 1072; *Armour-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hart*, 36 Neb. 166, 54 N. W. 262; *Elliott v. Wanamaker*, 155 Pa. 67, 25 Atl. 826. The employer is the sole judge whether his interests have been jeopardized by neglect. *International Harvester Co. v. Boatman*, 122 Ill. App. 474. Disregard of orders as to time of coming to work justifies dismissal. *Mac-auley v. Press Pub. Co.*, 170 App. Div. 640, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1044.

ary, the master may discharge him.<sup>88</sup> Gross moral misconduct is always good ground for dismissal.<sup>89</sup>

Willful disobedience by a servant of the master's orders is a breach of his contract, and ground for dismissal, unless the disobedience is in a slight matter, and involves no serious consequences.<sup>1</sup> Even in the latter case there are authorities holding a dismissal justified,<sup>2</sup> but the better opinion is to the contrary.<sup>3</sup> A dismissal has been held justified where a house servant went to see her sick mother, who was supposed to be in danger of death;<sup>4</sup> but this case goes too far.<sup>5</sup> A dismissal has also been held justified where a servant refused to go on an errand without having had his dinner;<sup>6</sup> where a farm hand refused to go to work without beer;<sup>7</sup> where an employé smoked in the shop, in violation of rules, and, when remonstrated with, left the shop in working hours, to finish the smoke.<sup>8</sup> But the contrary was held where the ground relied upon for dismissal of a teacher was the failure to return

<sup>88</sup> *Smith v. Baker*, 101 Mich. 155, 59 N. W. 394.

<sup>89</sup> As the pregnancy of a maid servant, *Connors v. Justice*, 13 Ir. Com. Law, 451; or being the father of a bastard child, *Rex v. Inhabitants of Welford*, Cald. 57; or an attempt to ravish a maid servant, *Atkin v. Acton*, 4 Car. & P. 208.

<sup>1</sup> *Lilley v. Elwin*, 11 Q. B. 742; *Spain v. Arnott*, 2 Starkie, 256; *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *Standidge v. Lynde*, 120 Ill. App. 418; *Von Heyne v. Tompkins*, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524; *Dunkell v. Simons*, 15 Daly, 352, 7 N. Y. Supp. 655; *Tullis v. Hassell*, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 391; *Matthews v. Park Bros. & Co.*, 146 Pa. 384, 23 Atl. 208; *Id.*, 159 Pa. 579, 28 Atl. 435; *MacIntosh v. Abbott*, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N. E. 383; *Fisher v. Monroe* (City Ct.) 17 N. Y. Supp. 837; *Hamlin v. Race*, 78 Ill. 422. If the order is a reasonable one, the servant is not justified in refusing to obey merely because it was given in bad faith and is distasteful to the servant. *Development Co. v. King*, 161 Fed. 91, 88 C. C. A. 255, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 812.

<sup>2</sup> *Matthews v. Park Bros. & Co.*, 146 Pa. 384, 23 Atl. 208; *Id.*, 159 Pa. 579, 28 Atl. 435; *Forsyth v. McKinney*, 56 Hun, 1, 8 N. Y. Supp. 561; *Turner v. Mason*, 14 Mees. & W. 112, 14 Law J. Exch. 311.

<sup>3</sup> *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712; *Hamilton v. Love* (Ind.) 43 N. E. 873; *Id.*, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181, 54 N. E. 437, 71 Am. St. Rep. 384; *McIntosh v. Abbott*, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N. E. 383; *Callo v. Brouncker*, 4 Car. & P. 518; *Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell*, 60 Fed. 583, 9 C. C. A. 138.

<sup>4</sup> *Turner v. Mason*, 14 Mees. & W. 112, 14 Law J. Exch. 311.

<sup>5</sup> *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712.

<sup>6</sup> *Spain v. Arnott*, 2 Starkie, 256.

<sup>7</sup> *Lilley v. Elwin*, 11 Q. B. 742.

<sup>8</sup> *Forsyth v. McKinney*, 56 Hun, 1, 8 N. Y. Supp. 561.

within a day or two after vacation;<sup>9</sup> where a factory employé absented himself for a day.<sup>10</sup>

By the better opinion, especially in the case of mechanics, clerks in stores, and other servants not menial, the act of disobedience, to justify dismissal, must involve injury to the master. " 'Willful' disobedience, in the sense in which the word is used in the authorities, means something more than a conscious failure to obey. It involves a wrongful or perverse disposition, such as to render the conduct unreasonable, and inconsistent with proper subordination. We are not prepared to hold that, even in what is known as 'menial service,' every act of disobedience may be lawfully punished by the penalty of dismissal, and the serious consequences which it entails upon the servant put out of place. No doubt, domestic discipline may be closer than that in business employments; but there must be a limit to the arbitrary power of masters."<sup>11</sup> Unless the dismissal was clearly justifiable within these rules, the question should be left to the jury.<sup>12</sup>

Where the disposition and deportment of the servant are such as to seriously injure the custom and business of the master, or his other interests, he may be dismissed; but slight discourtesies, hasty words, and occasional exhibitions of ill temper, are not sufficient cause for dismissal, where there are many petty causes for annoyance and irritation in the business.<sup>13</sup>

If a servant, without the consent of his master, engage in any employment or business, for himself or another, which may tend to injure his master's trade or business, this is ground for his dismissal. "This is so because it is the duty of the servant, not only to give his time and attention to his master's business, but, by all lawful means at his command, to protect and advance his master's interests. But, when the servant engages in a business which

<sup>9</sup> *Milleul v. Armstrong*, 7 Adol. & E. 557. See, also, *Thrift v. Payne*, 71 Ill. 408.

<sup>10</sup> *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712. If a day's absence involves serious consequences, it will justify dismissal. See *Ford v. Danks*, 16 La. Ann. 119. A general superintendent of a factory may be dismissed for willful absence which results in injury to the business. *Farmer v. First Trust Co.*, 246 Fed. 671, 158 C. C. A. 627, L. R. A. 1918C, 1027.

<sup>11</sup> *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712.

<sup>12</sup> *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712; *Edwards v. Levy*, 2 Fost. & F. 94.

<sup>13</sup> *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *Lalande v. Aldrich*, 41 La. Ann. 307, 6 South. 28.

brings him in direct competition with his master, the tendency is to injure or endanger, not to protect and promote, the interests of the latter."<sup>14</sup> It is not essential that the servant should engage in a business directly competing with that of the master, but the misappropriation of the time belonging to the master is a sufficient ground for dismissal.<sup>15</sup>

The master may condone or waive a breach of contract by the servant; and, if he does so, he cannot afterwards rely upon it as a discharge, either to justify a dismissal of the servant, or to defeat an action for wages.<sup>16</sup> Retention of the servant after knowledge of misconduct or a breach of contract on his part is *prima facie* a waiver,<sup>17</sup> but the master may show circumstances excusing his delay.<sup>18</sup> The retention of a servant after knowledge of a specific breach of duty will not waive or condone subsequent continued breaches of the same character.<sup>19</sup>

If there is sufficient ground for dismissing a servant, the motive of the master in taking advantage of it is altogether immaterial.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Dieringer v. Meyer*, 42 Wis. 811, 24 Am. Rep. 415; *Glaser v. National Alumni* (Sup.) 97 N. Y. Supp. 984; *Hibbard v. Wood*, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 513; *Thompson v. Havelock*, 1 Camp. 527. Cf. *Chaddock College v. Bretherick*, 36 Ill. App. 621. The fact that the servant in such a case continues to give his whole time and attention to his master's business is immaterial. *Dieringer v. Meyer*, *supra*. Compare *Day v. American Machinist Press*, 86 App. Div. 613, 83 N. Y. Supp. 263.

<sup>15</sup> *Atlantic Compress Co. v. Young*, 118 Ga. 868, 43 S. E. 677; *Vidalia Compress & Power Co. v. Mathews*, 1 Ga. App. 56, 57 S. E. 902. In the latter case it was, however, said that, while a servant has no right to appropriate any part of his employer's time to his own use, yet where the work at which he is employed has been suspended, a temporary absenting himself where no injury results to the employer will not justify his discharge.

<sup>16</sup> *Bast v. Byrne*, 51 Wis. 531, 8 N. W. 494, 37 Am. Rep. 841; *Sharp v. McBride*, 120 La. 143, 45 South. 41; *Fitzpatrick Square Bale Ginning Co. v. McLaney*, 153 Ala. 586, 44 South. 1023, 127 Am. St. Rep. 71; *Reynolds v. Hart*, 42 Colo. 150, 94 Pac. 14; *Prentiss v. Ledyard*, 28 Wis. 131; *Butterick Pub. Co. v. Whitcomb*, 225 Ill. 605, 80 N. E. 247, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1004; *McGrath v. Bell*, 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 195; *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *Jones v. Field*, 83 Ala. 445, 3 South. 893.

<sup>17</sup> Cases above cited.

<sup>18</sup> *Jonas v. Field*, 83 Ala. 445, 3 South. 893; *McMurray v. Boyd*, 58 Ark. 504, 25 S. W. 505.

<sup>19</sup> *United Oil & Refining Co. v. Grey*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 102 S. W. 934; *JEROME v. QUEEN CITY CYCLE CO.*, 163 N. Y. 351, 57 N. E. 435, *Cooley* Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations, 309.

<sup>20</sup> *Von Heyne v. Tompkins*, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524; *Jackson v. Hospital*, 6 Misc. Rep. 101, 26 N. Y. Supp. 27; *Corgan v. Geo. F. Lee Coal Co.*, 218 Pa. 386, 67 Atl. 653, 120 Am. St. Rep. 891, 11 Ann. Cus. 538.

Any adequate cause for dismissal known to the master at the time of dismissal will justify him, whether such cause was assigned or not, and even though a different cause may have been assigned.<sup>21</sup> It has even been held, and very properly, that good and sufficient reasons for dismissal, existing at the time of dismissal, will justify him, though he did not even know of them until afterwards.<sup>22</sup>

*Discharge of Contract by Impossibility of Performance*

Impossibility of performance arising subsequent to the formation of the contract does not discharge either party from his obligation, even though he may not be at all in fault,<sup>23</sup> except (1) where the impossibility arises from a change in the law,<sup>24</sup> or from the action

<sup>21</sup> *Sterling Emery Wheel Co. v. Magee*, 40 Ill. App. 340; *Von Heyne v. Tompkins*, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524; *Corgan v. Geo. F. Lee Coal Co.*, 218 Pa. 386, 67 Atl. 655, 120 Am. St. Rep. 891, 11 Ann. Cas. 838; *Ball v. Mining Co.*, 8 Misc. Rep. 333, 28 N. Y. Supp. 537; *Odenial v. Henry*, 70 Miss. 172, 12 South. 154; *Baillie v. Kell*, 4 Bing. N. C. 638; *Ridgeway v. Market Co.*, 3 Adol. & E. 171. But see *Shaver v. Ingham*, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712; *Cussons v. Skinner*, 11 Mees. & W. 161; *Smith v. Allen*, 3 Fost. & F. 157.

<sup>22</sup> *Odenial v. Henry*, 70 Miss. 172, 12 South. 154; *Von Heyne v. Tompkins*, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524; *Willets v. Green*, 3 Car. & K. 59; *Spotswood v. Barrow*, 5 Exch. 110. But see *Cussons v. Skinner*, 11 Mees. & W. 161. In *Willets v. Green*, 3 Car. & K. 59, Alderson, B., said: "If an employer discharge his servant, and at the time of the discharge a good cause of discharge in fact exists, the employer is justified in discharging the servant, although at the time of the discharge the employer did not know of the existence of the cause. This point has been much discussed in the house of lords and elsewhere, but what I have stated is the result."

<sup>23</sup> See *Clark*, Cont. 678 et seq.; *Leopold v. Salkey*, 89 Ill. 412, 31 Am. Rep. 93. A servant is not discharged from liability to perform his contract by the fact that he is arrested, even without his fault, and confined in jail. In such a case the master may rescind. *Leopold v. Salkey*, supra. Where performance becomes impossible by reason of contingencies which should have been foreseen and provided against in the contract, the promisor is not discharged. It was therefore held by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that where the plaintiff agreed that he and his wife should work for the defendant for a year, and four months afterwards the wife, being about to give birth to a child, left, and the plaintiff was thereupon discharged, the plaintiff could not recover for his wages on the quantum meruit, as he should have foreseen and provided for his wife's sickness when he made the contract, and therefore his nonperformance was not excused. *Jennings v. Lyons*, 39 Wis. 553, 20 Am. Rep. 57.

<sup>24</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 681. See *Cordes v. Miller*, 39 Mich. 581, 33 Am. Rep. 430; *Jones v. Judd*, 4 N. Y. 411. As where the object for which the services are engaged are prohibited by statute. *Cordes v. Miller*, supra. There is no discharge if the change in the law merely makes performance more burdensome. *Baker v. Johnson*, 42 N. Y. 126.

of a court, as by injunction where the party claiming to be discharged thereby is not in fault;<sup>25</sup> or (2), in some states, where the object on which the services are to be performed is destroyed without fault on the part of either party;<sup>26</sup> or (3) where either one of the parties dies,<sup>27</sup> or the servant is permanently incapacitated by illness or personal injury,<sup>28</sup> or where the prevalence of a contagious and fatal disease in the vicinity of the place where the servant is to work renders it unsafe for him to remain there.<sup>29</sup> As heretofore stated, impossibility cannot be relied upon as a discharge if it was created by the party himself; but such impossibility will operate as a discharge of the other party.<sup>30</sup> The fact that the master becomes insolvent, and is obliged to cease business, does not discharge him from his obligation to pay the servant's wages for the full term, or to pay damages for refusal to carry out the con-

<sup>25</sup> *People v. Insurance Co.*, 91 N. Y. 174.

<sup>26</sup> *Cook v. McCabe*, 53 Wis. 250, 10 N. W. 507, 40 Am. Rep. 765; *Butterfield v. Byron*, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667, 12 L. R. A. 571, 25 Am. St. Rep. 654; *Hindrey v. Williams*, 9 Colo. 371, 12 Pac. 436. But see *Brumby v. Smith*, 8 Ala. 123.

<sup>27</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 683, collecting cases. The death of the master discharges the contract. *Yerrington v. Greene*, 7 R. I. 589, 84 Am. Dec. 578; *Lacy v. Getman*, 119 N. Y. 109, 23 N. E. 452, 6 L. R. A. 728, 16 Am. St. Rep. 806; *Campbell v. Faxon*, *Horton & Gallagher*, 73 Kan. 675, 85 Pac. 760, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002; *Farrow v. Wilson*, L. R. 4 C. P. 744. But it has been held by some courts that the death of one only of two joint employers, as of a partner, does not terminate the hiring. *Martin v. Hunt*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 419; *Ferreira v. Sayres*, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 210, 40 Am. Dec. 496. The better opinion, however, is to the contrary. *Griggs v. Swift*, 82 Ga. 392, 9 S. E. 1062, 5 L. R. A. 405, 14 Am. St. Rep. 176; *Louis v. Elfelt*, 89 Cal. 547, 26 Pac. 1065; *Tasker v. Shepherd*, 6 Hurl. & N. 575. The death of the servant discharges the contract. *Wolfe v. Howes*, 20 N. Y. 197, 75 Am. Dec. 388.

<sup>28</sup> The authorities all agree that the incapacitating sickness of the servant, or incapacitating personal injuries, will operate as a discharge of the contract if permanent, or, if temporary, excuse nonperformance or delay in performance on the part of the servant. *Robinson v. Davison*, L. R. 6 Exch. 269; *Wolfe v. Howes*, 20 N. Y. 197, 75 Am. Dec. 388; *Clark v. Gilbert*, 26 N. Y. 279, 84 Am. Dec. 189; *Spalding v. Rosa*, 71 N. Y. 40, 27 Am. Rep. 7; *Harrington v. Iron Works Co.*, 119 Mass. 82; *Fuller v. Brown*, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 440; *Fenton v. Clark*, 11 Vt. 557; *Hubbard v. Belden*, 27 Vt. 645; *Green v. Gilbert*, 21 Wis. 395. Temporary sickness is no ground for dismissal unless the nature of the contract is such that a temporary illness makes it necessary to employ another servant. See *Cuckson v. Stones*, 23 Law J. Q. B. 25, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 337, 1 El. & El. 248; *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 929.

<sup>29</sup> *Lakeman v. Pollard*, 43 Me. 463, 69 Am. Dec. 77. But see *Dewey v. School Dist.*, 43 Mich. 480, 5 N. W. 646, 38 Am. Rep. 203.

<sup>30</sup> *Ante*, p. 585.

tract.<sup>81</sup> The appointment of a receiver has, however, been held to terminate the contract.<sup>82</sup>

### REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT—DAMAGES

262. A breach of the contract of hiring by the servant gives the master a right of action for any damages he may have sustained.
263. Upon a breach of the contract by the master by wrongfully discharging the servant, the servant has the following remedies:
- (a) He may bring an action on the contract of hiring, and recover whatever damages he may have sustained; the measure of his damages being the amount already earned and unpaid, and whatever he would have earned during the remainder of the term, less any sums actually earned in other employment, or which he might have earned by the exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking similar employment.
  - (b) Or he may treat the contract as rescinded, and recover on the quantum meruit for services actually rendered.
  - (c) Either of these actions is a bar to the other.
  - (d) A few courts allow him to treat the contract as still in force, and recover wages as they fall due, upon the theory of constructive service; but in most states this doctrine is repudiated.

If the servant breaks his contract by renouncing it before the time for performance has arrived, or by abandoning the service after a part performance, or by otherwise failing to perform it according to its terms, the remedy of the master is by action of special assumpsit to recover damages for the breach; or he may set up such damages if sued by the servant for services rendered.

If the master renounces the contract before the time for performance, and therefore before any services are rendered, the only remedy of the servant, by the better opinion, is an action of special assumpsit to recover damages for the breach. Some courts, as we

<sup>81</sup> *Vanuxem v. Bostwick* (Pa.) 7 Atl. 598.

<sup>82</sup> *Eddy v. Co-operative Dress Ass'n*, 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 442. And see *In re Sweetser Pembroke & Co.*, 142 Fed. 131, 73 C. C. A. 349, when the contract expressly provided that it might be terminated by the corporation in case of its dissolution and the corporation was declared bankrupt.

shall presently see, permit him to treat the contract as still in force, and to recover the wages, on the theory of constructive service, when they fall due under the contract.<sup>33</sup>

If the master breaks the contract in the course of performance, either by discharging the servant without cause, or by giving the servant cause to leave and refuse further performance, the servant has an election of remedies:

First. He may bring special assumpsit against the master for his breach of the contract; and this remedy he may pursue whether his wages are paid up to the time of his discharge or not. And he may either bring this action immediately, or he may wait until the period for which he was hired has expired. In such an action he will be entitled to recover the wages, if any, earned up to the time of the discharge, and, in addition, the actual damages he has sustained by the master's breach of the contract.<sup>34</sup> In case he has, by the exercise of due diligence, been unable to secure other employment during the entire term, he can recover the entire wages. He cannot remain idle during the term for which he was hired, but must seek for other employment. The measure of his damages, therefore, is the wages he would have earned under the contract, less any amount he has actually earned in other employment, or which he might have earned by the exercise of proper diligence in seeking employment in the same line of business.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Post, p. 598, and cases there cited.

<sup>34</sup> *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co.*, 31 Vt. 162; *Texarkana Lumber Co. v. Lennard*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 104 S. W. 506; *Smith v. Cashle & Chowan R. & Lumber Co.*, 142 N. C. 26, 54 S. E. 788, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439. Though, according to its terms, a contract of employment was terminable at any time, a refusal to let the employé begin work was a breach of the contract entitling the employé to at least nominal damages. *Cronemillar v. Duluth-Superior Milling Co.*, 134 Wis. 248, 114 N. W. 432. He cannot recover exemplary damages. *Consumers' Lignite Co. v. James* (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 719.

<sup>35</sup> *Fitzpatrick Square Bale Ginning Co. v. McLaney*, 153 Ala. 586, 44 South. 1023, 127 Am. St. Rep. 71; *C. D. Smith & Co. v. Ohler* (Ky.) 104 S. W. 995; *Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Tierney*, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 83 (judgment affirmed 75 Ohio St. 565, 30 N. E. 1128); *Kansas Union Life Ins. Co. v. Burman*, 141 Fed. 835, 73 C. C. A. 69; *Semet-Solway Co. v. Wilcox*, 143 Fed. 839, 74 C. C. A. 635; *Peterson v. Drew*, 2 Alaska, 560; *Elderton v. Emmens*, 6 C. B. 160; *Goodman v. Pocock*, 15 Q. B. 576; *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co.*, 31 Vt. 162, 179; *Howard v. Daly*, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285; *Willoughby v. Thomas*, 24 Grat. (Va.) 521; *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 841; *Fuller v. Little*, 61 Ill. 21; *Mahon v. Daly*, 70 Ill. 653; *Dana v. Short*, 81 Ill. 468; *Litchenstein v. Brooks*, 75 Tex. 196, 12 S. W. 975; *Bennett v. Morton*, 46 Minn. 113, 48 N. W. 678;

Second. If the servant's wages are not paid up to the time of his discharge, he may treat the contract of hiring as rescinded, and maintain general assumpsit on the quantum meruit, to recover for the services he has actually rendered. He recovers in such an action what the services were reasonably worth, and is not bound by the rate of compensation fixed by the contract. He can only recover in this form of action for services actually rendered.<sup>88</sup>

The servant must elect between these actions. He cannot maintain both. If he elects to sue upon the quantum meruit, he treats the contract as rescinded, and he cannot afterwards treat it as

*Allen v. Maronne*, 93 Tenn. 161, 23 S. W. 113. That the servant must use reasonable diligence in seeking other employment, and that the amount earned, or which should have been earned, in other employment, will be deducted from his claim, see *Howard v. Daly*, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285; *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *Fuller v. Little*, 61 Ill. 21; *Champlain v. Stamping Co.*, 68 Mich. 238, 36 N. W. 57; *Stevens v. Crane*, 37 Mo. App. 487; *Troy Fertilizer Co. v. Logan*, 96 Ala. 619, 12 South. 712. He is only bound to use reasonable diligence in seeking other employment, and is only required to seek employment in the same or a similar line of business, in the same grade, and in the same place. *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *Strauss v. Meertief*, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; *Fuchs v. Koerner*, 107 N. Y. 529, 14 N. E. 445; *Costigan v. Railroad Co.*, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 609, 43 Am. Dec. 758; *Hinchcliffe v. Koontz*, 121 Ind. 422, 23 N. E. 271, 16 Am. St. Rep. 403; *Simon v. Allen*, 76 Tex. 398, 13 S. W. 296. The plaintiff is not required to allege and prove that he was unable to procure other employment. *Beissel v. Vermillion Farmers' Elevator Co.*, 102 Minn. 229, 113 N. W. 575, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 403. That he might have found other employment by the exercise of due diligence is a matter of defense. *Graff v. Blumberg*, 53 Misc. Rep. 296, 108 N. Y. Supp. 184. And the burden of proving that other employment could have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence is on the master. *American China Development Co. v. Boyd* (C. C.) 148 Fed. 258; *Milage v. Woodward*, 186 N. Y. 252, 78 N. E. 873; *Monroe v. Proctor*, 51 Misc. Rep. 632, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1021; *San Antonio Light Pub. Co. v. Moore*, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 101 S. W. 867; *Costigan v. Railroad Co.*, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 609, 43 Am. Dec. 758; *Howard v. Daly*, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285; *Leatherberry v. Odell* (C. C.) 7 Fed. 641; *City of Jacksonville v. Allen*, 25 Ill. App. 54; *Brown v. Board of Education*, 29 Ill. App. 572; *Odeneal v. Henry*, 70 Miss. 172, 12 South. 154; *Allen v. Whitlark*, 99 Mich. 492, 58 N. W. 470; *Van Winkle v. Satterfield*, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S. W. 1113, 23 L. R. A. 853. Evidence as to what he might have earned in another employment is admissible only in mitigation of damages. *Fisher v. Massillon Iron & Steel Co.*, 209 Ill. App. 616, affirmed *Gorham v. Same*, 284 Ill. 594, 120 N. E. 467. As to the effect of intoxication of the servant after dismissal, and when he should have been seeking other employment, see *Hinchcliffe v. Koontz*, 121 Ind. 422, 23 N. E. 271, 16 Am. St. Rep. 403.

<sup>88</sup> See *Ryan v. Dayton*, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 560; *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Smith v. Cashie & Chowan R. & Lumber Co.*, 142 N. C. 26, 54 S. E. 788, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439; *Peacock v. Coltrane*, 44

binding, in order to maintain special assumpsit on it for damages for its breach. And so, conversely, if he brings special assumpsit, he treats the contract as binding, and he cannot afterwards treat it as rescinded for the purpose of suing on the quantum meruit. And one action for breach of the contract is a bar to any further action.<sup>37</sup>

✧ Third. It was at one time held in England that, where a servant is wrongfully discharged, he may, if he chooses, treat the contract of hiring as continuing, notwithstanding the master's breach, and if he holds himself in readiness to perform the contract on his part, and is able and willing to do so, recover his wages for the whole term, upon the ground of constructive service; either by one action after the expiration of the term, or by a separate action for each installment of wages as it falls due by the terms of the contract; and this doctrine has been recognized and applied by some of our courts.<sup>38</sup> In England, however, and in most of our states, the doctrine of constructive service has been repudiated; and it is held that, where a servant is wrongfully discharged, the relation ceases to exist, and that only one action can be maintained against the master, which must be either special assumpsit for breach of the contract, to recover for services rendered and damages for the breach, or general assumpsit for the services rendered, and that one action is a bar to any other.<sup>39</sup> So long as the relation of master

Tex. Civ. App. 530, 99 S. W. 107; *Brown v. Crown Gold Milling Co.*, 150 Cal. 376, 89 Pac. 86; *Rogers v. Parham*, 8 Ga. 190; *Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co.*, 31 Vt. 162; *Rye v. Stubbs*, 1 Hill (S. C.) 384; *Clark v. Manchester*, 51 N. H. 594; *Hartman v. Rogers*, 69 Cal. 643, 11 Pac. 581.

<sup>37</sup> *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Litchenstein v. Brooks*, 75 Tex. 196, 12 S. W. 975. And see *Booge v. Railroad Co.*, 33 Mo. 212, 82 Am. Dec. 160; *Wiseman v. Railroad Co.*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 300.

<sup>38</sup> *Gandell v. Pontigny*, 4 Camp. 375, 1 Starkie, 198; *Strauss v. Meertief*, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; *Isaacs v. Davies*, 68 Ga. 169; *Smith v. Cashie & Chohan R. & Lumber Co.*, 142 N. C. 26, 54 S. E. 783, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439; *Markham v. Markham*, 110 N. C. 356, 14 S. E. 963; *Sharp v. McBride*, 120 La. 143, 45 South. 41.

<sup>39</sup> *Elderton v. Emmens*, 6 C. B. 160; *Goodman v. Pocock*, 15 Q. B. 576; *James v. Allen Co.*, 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N. E. 246, 58 Am. Rep. 821; *McMULLAN v. DICKINSON CO.*, 60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W. 120, 27 L. R. A. 409, 51 Am. St. Rep. 511, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 314; *Derosia v. Ferland*, 83 Vt. 372, 76 Atl. 153, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1092; *Howard v. Daly*, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 235; *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759; *Olmstead v. Bach*, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R. A. 74, 44 Am. St. Rep. 273; *Richardson v. Machine Works*, 78 Ind. 422, 41 Am. Rep. 584; *Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen*, 84 Ind. 347, 43 Am. Rep. 91; *Willoughby v. Thomas*, 24 Grat. (Va.) 521; *Jones v. Duntton*, 7 Ill. App. 580. Thus, where a servant who was engaged for a year at a fixed salary,

and servant actually continues, the servant may sue the master for each installment of wages as it becomes due.<sup>40</sup>

### SAME—IN EQUITY—SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—IN-JUNCTION

264. Ordinarily, a suit cannot be maintained in equity to enforce performance of a contract of hiring, either directly, by decree for specific performance, or indirectly, by enjoining a threatened breach. But a promise not to serve elsewhere, and other negative promises, may be enjoined, if necessary to prevent irreparable injury.

A court of equity will not decree specific performance of a contract where the matter of the contract is such that it cannot supervise or insure its execution.<sup>41</sup> It will not, therefore, decree specific performance of a contract of hiring, for it could not, from the nature of the contract, insure execution of its decree.<sup>42</sup> Such a suit would also be defeated in most cases by the principle that a suit for specific performance will not lie where there is an adequate remedy at law. Nor, for the same reasons, will a court of equity ordinarily enjoin the breach of a contract of hiring, and thus negatively or indirectly enforce specific performance of it.<sup>43</sup>

payable monthly; was discharged at the end of two months, and sued for and recovered his salary up to that time, it was held that he could not afterwards sue for the breach of contract by the master, and recover for wages after the discharge. *Keedy v. Long*, supra.

<sup>40</sup> *Clossman v. Lacoste*, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 140; *McMULLAN v. DICKINSON CO.*, 60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W. 120, 27 L. R. A. 409, 51 Am. St. Rep. 511, *Coolley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 314; *Keedy v. Long*, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759. But see *Olmstead v. Bach*, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R. A. 74, 44 Am. St. Rep. 273.

<sup>41</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 701; *Fetter*, Eq. 267.

<sup>42</sup> *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 616; *Webb v. England*, 29 Beav. 44; *H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby*, 132 Iowa, 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; *Clark's Case*, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 122, 12 Am. Dec. 218; *Marble Co. v. Ripley*, 10 Wall. 339, 19 L. Ed. 955; *Iron Age Pub. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co.*, 83 Ala. 498, 3 South. 449, 3 Am. St. Rep. 758; *Wm. Rogers Manuf'g Co. v. Rogers*, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; *Lindsay v. Glass*, 119 Ind. 301, 21 N. E. 897; *Wakeham v. Barker*, 82 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 1131; *Campbell v. Rust*, 85 Va. 653, 8 S. E. 664. Thus, a person will not be compelled to perform his contract to sing at a theater. *Lumley v. Wagner*, supra.

<sup>43</sup> *Fetter*, Eq. 296; *H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby*, 132 Iowa, 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; (containing a full discussion). *Arthur v. Oakes*, 63 Fed. 318, 11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414; *Wm. Rogers Manuf'g Co. v. Rog-*

But where the contract contains negative promises, and a breach thereof would result in irreparable injury, a breach of such negative promises may be enjoined. Thus, a contract to serve another for a certain period, and not to serve any one else during that time, could not be specifically enforced by compelling the party to serve, or enjoining him from abandoning the employment; but he could be enjoined from serving any one else.<sup>44</sup>

### RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES INTER SE

- 265. The master cannot chastise his servant.
- 266. The master is not bound to give the servant a character,
- 267. The master, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, is entitled to the entire time and services of the servant.
- 268. The servant is bound to exercise reasonable care not to injure his master's property, or property of others in his master's care.
- 269. A conspiracy between servants to injure the master's business gives the master a right of action against them.
- 270. The master may justify a battery in defense of the servant, and vice versa.
- 271. It is the duty of the master to pay the servant the wages agreed upon, unless the servant has forfeited his right to them. By the better opinion, if the servant abandons the service without excuse, or is discharged for good cause, he forfeits the right to wages, even for the time he has served. Some courts, however, even in these cases, allow a recovery on the quantum meruit.

ers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; *Cort v. Lassard*, 18 Or. 221, 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726; *Burney v. Ryle*, 91 Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 986.

<sup>44</sup> *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 616; *H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby*, 132 Iowa, 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; *Cort v. Lassard*, 18 Or. 221, 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726; *Daly v. Smith*, 49 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 150; *McCaull v. Braham* (C. C.) 16 Fed. 37; *Duff v. Russell*, 60 N. Y. Super. Ct. 80, 14 N. Y. Supp. 134, 16 N. Y. Supp. 958; *Id.*, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622; *Hoyt v. Fuller* (Super. N. Y.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 962. In *Lumley v. Wagner*, *supra*, a professional singer was sued for specific performance of a contract to sing at complainant's theater on certain terms, and during a certain period to sing nowhere else. The court refused to enforce so much of the contract as related to the promise to sing, but enjoined a breach of the

It has been said that the master may give moderate corporal correction to his servant, while employed in his service, for negligence or misconduct; but this doctrine has long ago become obsolete. If a master chastises his servant, whether the servant be an adult or a minor (other than an apprentice), he is guilty of an assault and battery; and he is not only liable to respond to the servant in damages, but is also liable to criminal prosecution.<sup>45</sup>

No master is legally bound to give his servant a character.<sup>46</sup> If the master does make to a third person, in confidence, a communication in the nature of a character, such communication is *prima facie* privilege; and no action can be maintained by the servant against him on account of it, if made *bona fide* and without malice.<sup>47</sup>

On a contract of hiring for a fixed compensation, the master, unless such a result is excluded by the terms of the agreement, is entitled to the entire time and services of the servant during the time for which he has engaged to work.<sup>48</sup> If, during this time, he

promise not to sing elsewhere. In *H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby*, 132 Iowa, 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, the court, after a full consideration of the authorities, arrived at the conclusion that, even when there is an express negative covenant, injunction will not be granted save in exceptional cases, where by reason of the peculiar or extraordinary character of the promised service a violation of the agreement will cause injury to the other party for which an action at law will afford no adequate remedy.

<sup>45</sup> 2 Kent, Com. 260; *Com. v. Baird*, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 267; *Cooper v. State*, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 324, 35 Am. Rep. 704; *Matthews v. Terry*, 10 Conn. 455.

<sup>46</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 940 (where the subject is discussed at length); *Carrol v. Bird*, 3 Esp. 201; *Cleveland, C., O. & St. L. R. Co. v. Jenkins*, 174 Ill. 398, 51 N. E. 811, 62 L. R. A. 922, 66 Am. St. Rep. 296; *New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schaffer*, 65 Ohio St. 414, 62 N. E. 1086, 62 L. R. A. 931, 87 Am. St. Rep. 628.

<sup>47</sup> *Eversley*, Dom. Rel. 940 et seq. (collecting English cases); *Gardner v. Slade*, 13 Q. B. 801; *Toogood v. Spyring*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 181; *Weatherston v. Hawkins*, 1 Term R. 110; *Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behee*, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107, 21 S. W. 384. If the communications are false, and made maliciously, an action will lie. See *Rogers v. Clifton*, 3 Bos. & P. 587; *Pattison v. Jones*, 8 Barn. & C. 578, 3 Man. & R. 101; *Kelly v. Partington*, 4 Barn. & Adol. 700; *Fountain v. Boodle*, 3 Q. B. 5; *McCauley v. Elrod* (Ky.) 27 S. W. 867; *Vallery v. State*, 42 Neb. 123, 60 N. W. 347.

<sup>48</sup> *Seaburn v. Zachmann*, 99 App. Div. 218, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1005; *Stebbins v. Waterhouse*, 58 Conn. 370, 20 Atl. 480. See the federal statutes relating to hours of service of railway trainmen. Hours of Service Act March 4, 1907 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8677-8680), and Adamson Law Sept. 3, 5, 1916 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8680a-8680d), fixing an Eight-hour Day for computing compensation for trainmen. The expression "on duty," as used in the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, means actually engaged in the work or charged with responsi-

works for others, the compensation earned for such work belongs to the master.<sup>49</sup> This doctrine does not prevent the servant working for others outside of the hours for which the servant is engaged.<sup>50</sup> The master, however, has no exclusive right to the inventions of the servant,<sup>51</sup> unless there is an agreement to that effect,<sup>52</sup> or the servant is employed solely to exercise his inventive ability for the master's benefit.<sup>53</sup>

The servant is always liable to his master for a violation of his duty whereby the master is injured. He is bound to perform the business of the master with due diligence and fidelity, and with the degree of skill usually possessed by persons of ordinary capacity engaged in the same business or employment; and if he fails in this duty, to the master's injury, he is liable to the master in damages.<sup>54</sup> A servant is as much bound to exercise reasonable care not to injure the property of his master as he is to exercise such care in relation to the property of other persons, and if he fails in this duty he is liable to the master for the resulting damages.<sup>55</sup> In like manner, he is liable to the master for injury, caused by his negligence, to property of third persons, intrusted to the master, and for which the master is liable to such third persons; and it is not necessary that the claim of the latter against the master shall

bility for such as may arise. *United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.* (D. C.) 197 Fed. 629. Brief layoffs for meals do not break the continuity of service within the act. *United States v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co.* (D. C.) 197 Fed. 624.

<sup>49</sup> See *Leach v. Railroad Co.*, 86 Mo. 27, 56 Am. Rep. 408; *Sumner v. Nevin*, 4 Cal. App. 347, 87 Pac. 1105; *Stebbins v. Waterhouse*, 58 Conn. 370, 20 Atl. 480; *Hoyt v. Fuller* (Super. N. Y.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 962.

<sup>50</sup> *Wallace v. De Young*, 98 Ill. 638, 38 Am. Rep. 108; *Stone v. Bancroft*, 139 Cal. 78, 70 Pac. 1017, 72 Pac. 717. But see *Hughes v. Toledo, etc., Scale Co.*, 112 Mo. App. 91, 86 S. W. 895.

<sup>51</sup> *Joliet Mfg. Co. v. Dice*, 105 Ill. 649, affirming *Dice v. Joliet Mfg. Co.*, 11 Ill. App. 109; *Ft. Wayne, C. & L. R. Co. v. Haberkorn*, 15 Ind. App. 479, 44 N. E. 322.

<sup>52</sup> *Portland Iron Works v. Willett*, 49 Or. 245, 89 Pac. 421, 90 Pac. 1000; *Hopedale Mach. Co. v. Entwistle*, 133 Mass. 443.

<sup>53</sup> *Connelly Mfg. Co. v. Wattles*, 49 N. J. Eq. 92, 23 Atl. 123; *Detroit Lubricator Co. v. Lavigne Mfg. Co.*, 151 Mich. 650, 115 N. W. 988.

<sup>54</sup> *Smith v. Foran*, 43 Conn. 244, 21 Am. Rep. 647; *Brewer v. Wright*, 25 Neb. 305, 41 N. W. 159; *Child v. Detroit Mfg. Co.*, 72 Mich. 623, 40 N. W. 916; *Alpaugh v. Wood*, 53 N. J. Law, 638, 23 Atl. 261; *Mobile & M. Ry. Co. v. Clanton*, 59 Ala. 392, 31 Am. Rep. 15; *Woodrow v. Hawving*, 105 Ala. 240, 16 South. 720; *Prescott v. White*, 18 Ill. App. 322.

<sup>55</sup> *Mobile & M. Ry. Co. v. Clanton*, 59 Ala. 392, 31 Am. Rep. 15; *Smith v. Foran*, 43 Conn. 244, 21 Am. Rep. 647; *Walker v. Association*, 18 Q. B. 277.

have been judicially enforced or determined before suit is brought against the servant.<sup>56</sup> If a servant uses in his own business property of his master, delivered to him for use in his master's business, he is liable to the master for the value of the use.<sup>57</sup> So, too, the servant impliedly contracts not to divulge the secret processes or other trade secrets of the master.<sup>58</sup> It has also been held to be a violation of his duty if in his capacity as an employé he learns that the master wishes to acquire certain property, and secretly purchases the same in order to sell it to the master at an advanced price.<sup>59</sup>

A conspiracy between servants to injure the master in his business gives the master a right of action against them for any damages sustained by him. Thus, where 18 journeymen tailors, working for a merchant tailor, by conspiracy between them, stopped work simultaneously, and returned their work to him unfinished, and worthless in that condition, and he was unable to get others to finish the work, it was held that he might maintain an action against them for damages.<sup>60</sup>

Master and servant have a right to defend each other, and either can justify a battery in defense of the other.<sup>61</sup>

### *The Right to Wages*

Of course, a servant is entitled to recover his wages if he performs the contract of hiring. If he does not perform in full, he is nevertheless entitled to recover for the services rendered, if he has a legal excuse for nonperformance in full.<sup>62</sup> Thus, if either

<sup>56</sup> *Smith v. Foran*, 43 Conn. 244, 21 Am. Rep. 647.

<sup>57</sup> *Stebbins v. Waterhouse*, 58 Conn. 370, 20 Atl. 480.

<sup>58</sup> *Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols* (N. J. Ch.) 65 Atl. 695; *O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski*, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 140, 38 L. R. A. 200, 68 Am. St. Rep. 469. Injunction will lie to prevent an employé from disclosing secret processes; and formulas. *American Stay Co. v. Delaney*, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N. E. 911, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 509; *Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnellbach*, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688. Injunction will lie to prevent an employé from disclosing to a new employer a list of customers furnished him when he entered the service of complainant. *Empire Steam Laundry Co. v. Lozier*, 165 Cal. 95, 130 Pac. 1180, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159.

<sup>59</sup> *American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson*, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N. E. 133, 126 Am. St. Rep. 409.

<sup>60</sup> *Mapstrick v. Ramge*, 9 Neb. 390, 2 N. W. 739, 31 Am. Rep. 415.

<sup>61</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 261; 1 Bl. Comm. 429.

<sup>62</sup> *Clark*, Cont. 683, 684; *Robinson v. Davison*, L. R. 6 Exch. 269; *Magida v. Wiesen*, 114 App. Div. 866, 100 N. Y. Supp. 263. He may recover if prevented by the master from performing in full. *Blood v. Enos*, 12 Vt. 625, 36 Am. Dec. 363.

party dies before the end of the term, the wages may be recovered by or against his personal representative, as the case may be, for the services actually rendered.<sup>63</sup> So incapacitating illness excuses further performance, and past wages may be recovered.<sup>64</sup> The question of what operates as an excuse is explained in another section.<sup>65</sup>

In England, and in most of our states, contracts of hiring for a specified term are regarded as entire, and the servant is not allowed to recover for his services unless he alleges and proves full performance on his part; such performance being held a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the master. And it is therefore held that if a servant willfully abandons the service, without cause, before the end of the term, or if he is guilty of such a breach of the contract as justifies the master in discharging him, he cannot recover on an entire contract, even for the services actually rendered prior to the abandonment or discharge.<sup>66</sup> If the contract is divisible, the rule is different. Other courts regard this doctrine as harsh, and, upon equitable principles, allow the servant, even in case of willful abandonment, or dismissal for cause, to recover on the quantum meruit for the services rendered. He has not performed on his part, and therefore he cannot recover on the contract; but the action is based on a contract implied, or rather created by law, because of the benefit received by the mas-

<sup>63</sup> *Yerrington v. Greene*, 7 R. I. 589, 84 Am. Dec. 578.

<sup>64</sup> *Fenton v. Clark*, 11 Vt. 557; ante, p. 594, and cases there cited.

<sup>65</sup> Ante, p. 598.

<sup>66</sup> *Lilley v. Elwin*, 11 Q. B. 742; *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 Term R. 320; *Ridgway v. Market Co.*, 3 Adol. & El. 171; *Stark v. Parker*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425; *Olmstead v. Beale*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 528; *Miller v. Goddard*, 34 Me. 102, 56 Am. Dec. 638; *Erving v. Ingram*, 24 N. J. Law, 520; *Mather v. Brokaw*, 43 N. J. Law, 587; *Curlee v. Reiger*, 45 Ill. App. 544; *Badgley v. Heald*, 4 Gilman (Ill.) 64; *Hansell v. Erickson*, 28 Ill. 257; *Diefenback v. Stark*, 56 Wis. 462, 14 N. W. 621, 43 Am. Rep. 719; *NELICHKA v. ESTERLY*, 29 Minn. 146, 12 N. W. 457, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 318; *Kohn v. Fandel*, 29 Minn. 470, 13 N. W. 904; *Helm v. Wilson*, 4 Mo. 41, 28 Am. Dec. 336 (but see, contra, *Lee v. Ashbrook*, 14 Mo. 378, 55 Am. Dec. 110); *Timberlake v. Thayer*, 71 Miss. 279, 14 South. 446, 24 L. R. A. 231; *Hutchinson v. Wetmore*, 2 Cal. 310, 56 Am. Dec. 337; *Keane v. Liebler* (Sup.) 107 N. Y. Supp. 102; *McMillan v. Vanderlip*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 165, 7 Am. Dec. 299; *Jennings v. Camp*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 94, 7 Am. Dec. 367; *Reab v. Moor*, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 337; *Lantry v. Parks*, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 63. If the servant is not guilty of any willful deviation from the terms of the contract, but fails to fulfill them, and has performed work beneficial to the master, he may recover on the quantum meruit. *Blood v. Enos*, 12 Vt. 625, 36 Am. Dec. 363.

ter from the services rendered.<sup>67</sup> In such an action the recovery is the reasonable value of the services, and not the contract price, but it cannot exceed the contract rate of compensation; and the master may, by counterclaim, set up any damages sustained by him by reason of the servant's breach.<sup>68</sup>

Where there is no agreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for services, the law implies an obligation to pay what they are reasonably worth.<sup>69</sup> If the rate of compensation, or a mode of determining the compensation, is fixed by the agreement, it must govern.<sup>70</sup> It is competent for the parties to leave it to the master—or, indeed, to the servant, either—to fix the compensation, after the services are rendered, at such a sum as he may think right and proper; and his determination as to the amount will be controlling, in the absence of fraud or bad faith.<sup>71</sup>

While a servant cannot as a rule recover additional compensation for extra work performed within the scope of his employment, in the absence of an express agreement,<sup>72</sup> yet for work outside of the scope of his regular employment, performed at the request of the master, he is entitled to additional compensation, though there was no express agreement therefor.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>67</sup> *Britton v. Turner*, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 718; *Lee v. Ashbrook*, 14 Mo. 378, 55 Am. Dec. 110; *Lowe v. Sinklear*, 27 Mo. 310; *Coe v. Smith*, 4 Ind. 79, 58 Am. Dec. 618.

<sup>68</sup> *Taylor v. Paterson*, 9 La. Ann. 251; *Newman v. Reagan*, 63 Ga. 755; *Coe v. Smith*, 4 Ind. 79, 58 Am. Dec. 618.

<sup>69</sup> *Millar v. Cuddy*, 43 Mich. 273, 5 N. W. 316, 38 Am. Rep. 181; *Elwell v. Roper*, 72 N. H. 585, 58 Atl. 507; *Hendrickson v. Woods*, 77 App. Div. 644, 78 N. Y. Supp. 949; *Ryan v. Dayton*, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 560; *Tucker v. Preston*, 60 Vt. 473, 11 Atl. 726; *Farrell v. Dooley*, 17 Ill. App. 66. Where the master agreed to pay "the same wages as shall be paid to other employes filling similar positions," and it does not appear that there were other men filling similar positions, the servant may recover what the services were reasonably worth. *Kent Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Ransom*, 46 Mich. 416, 9 N. W. 454. See, also, *Crusoe v. Clark*, 127 Cal. 341, 59 Pac. 700.

<sup>70</sup> *Smith v. The Joshua Levines (D. C.)* 4 Fed. 846. And see *Laubach v. Cedar Rapids Supply Co.*, 122 Iowa, 643, 98 N. W. 511.

<sup>71</sup> *Butler v. Mill Co.*, 28 Minn. 205, 9 N. W. 697, 41 Am. Rep. 277; *Millar v. Cuddy*, 43 Mich. 273, 5 N. W. 316, 38 Am. Rep. 181. To the same effect, see *Alford v. Cook (Sup.)* 107 N. Y. Supp. 710. The mere fact that the master, under such an agreement, fixes the compensation at an amount considerably less than the court, upon the evidence, finds that the services were reasonably worth, is not of itself sufficient to justify an inference of fraud or bad faith. *Butler v. Mill Co.*, supra.

<sup>72</sup> *Cany v. Halleck*, 9 Cal. 198; *Schurr v. Savigny*, 85 Mich. 144, 48 N. W. 547.

<sup>73</sup> *Brown v. Crown Gold Milling Co.*, 150 Cal. 376, 89 Pac. 86; *Dull v. Bram-*

### **SAME—MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT**

- 272 It is the duty of the master—which he cannot delegate, and for a breach of which he is liable to the servant, in the case of personal injuries—to use ordinary care—
- (a) To provide reasonably safe and suitable tools and appliances.
  - (b) To provide reasonably safe premises.
  - (c) To provide competent fellow servants, and a sufficient number of them.
  - (d) To promulgate rules, where the nature of the work requires them.
  - (e) To instruct and warn young and inexperienced servants.
273. The master is liable only for failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of these duties. He is not an insurer.
274. On entering the service a servant impliedly contracts that he possesses the ordinary skill and experience of those engaged in the occupation he undertakes, that he will exercise ordinary care to protect himself while engaged in that occupation, and that he will assume the risks of the employment, including the risks arising from the negligence of fellow servants. But to this rule there are a number of exceptions.
275. In many states the general rules as to the liability of the master for injuries to his servant have been modified by statutes, which in most instances enlarge the liability of the master.

A master is under an obligation, implied in the contract of hiring, to use reasonable and ordinary care to provide suitable means and appliances to enable the servant to do his work as safely as the hazards incident to the work will permit.<sup>74</sup> If he fails to

hall, 49 Ill. 364; Cincinnati, I. & O. R. Co. v. Clarkson, 7 Ind. 595. See, also, Alford v. Cook (Sup.) 107 N. Y. Supp. 710, holding that, under a contract to pay a salesman an additional sum if his sales were satisfactory, it lay with the employer alone to determine whether the sales were satisfactory.

<sup>74</sup> Bailey, Mast. Liab. 2, 13; Kotera v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 80 Neb. 648, 114 N. W. 945; Carter v. McDermott, 29 App. D. C. 145, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103, 10 Ann. Cas. 601; Newton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.,

perform this duty, and by reason of his neglect the servant is injured, he is liable in damages. As we shall see, ordinary care, and such care only, is required. A master does not insure the absolute safety of the tools and appliances furnished. He is bound to use ordinary care to provide appliances that are reasonably safe and suitable.<sup>75</sup> He is not bound to supply the best, safest, or newest.<sup>76</sup> The test is general use in the business.<sup>77</sup> He must

96 App. Div. 81, 89 N. Y. Supp. 23, affirmed 183 N. Y. 556, 76 N. E. 1102; *Gibson v. Railroad Co.*, 46 Mo. 163, 2 Am. Rep. 497; *Hough v. Railway Co.*, 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. Ed. 612; *Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Burke*, 37 Ind. App. 518, 77 N. E. 409, 117 Am. St. Rep. 337; *Pagan v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 1105; *Gomez v. Tracey*, 115 La. 824, 40 South. 234; *Flike v. Railway Co.*, 53 N. Y. 549, 13 Am. Rep. 545; *Cone v. Railway Co.*, 81 N. Y. 207, 37 Am. Rep. 491; *Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Jackson*, 55 Ill. 492, 8 Am. Rep. 681; *Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Ingraham*, 77 Ill. 309; *Ford v. Railway Co.*, 110 Mass. 240, 14 Am. Rep. 598; *Stephenson v. Duncan*, 73 Wis. 406, 41 N. W. 337, 9 Am. St. Rep. 806.

<sup>75</sup> *Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade*, 135 U. S. 554, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed. 235; *Monsen v. Crane*, 99 Minn. 186, 108 N. W. 933; *McDonald v. California Timber Co.*, 7 Cal. App. 375, 94 Pac. 376; *Conroy v. Morrill & Whiton Const. Co.*, 194 Mass. 476, 80 N. E. 489; *Dunn v. Nicholson*, 117 Mo. App. 374, 93 S. W. 869; *Bauman v. Cowdin*, 75 N. J. Law, 193, 66 Atl. 914; *Armour & Qo. v. Russell*, 144 Fed. 614, 75 C. C. A. 416, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery*, 109 Ill. 314; *Pennsylvania Co. v. Lynch*, 90 Ill. 333; *Richardson v. Cooper*, 88 Ill. 270; *Marsh v. Chickering*, 101 N. Y. 400, 5 N. E. 56; *Lytle v. Railway Co.*, 84 Mich. 289, 47 N. W. 571. In *Bauman v. Cowdin*, 75 N. J. Law, 193, 66 Atl. 914, it was said that a master is not liable when an accident happens to a servant on the first occasion when the apparatus purchased of a reliable manufacturer is used, if the method of use is the same method as would be required to make a proper test. A master is not liable if the machinery was in a reasonably safe condition or if there was some defective part, but such defective part did not cause the injury. *Atoka Coal & Mining Co. v. Miller*, 7 Ind. T. 104, 104 S. W. 555. The employer must use reasonable care to provide safe appliances and to discover defects therein. *Rio Grande Southern R. Co. v. Campbell* (Colo.) 176 Pac. 275. The duty of the master to provide safe machinery is not affected by knowledge of the servant of the defect under the Employers' Liability Act of 1911 (St. 1911, p. 796). *La Fleur v. M. A. Burns Lumber Co.*, 38 Cal. App. 279, 176 Pac. 58. In view of the federal Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8612) and the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), the duty of a railroad company to furnish safe appliances is absolute. *Thayer v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.*, 21 N. M. 330, 154 Pac. 691; *Noel v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co.* (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 787. See Safety Appliance Act March 2, 1893 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8612), as to railway appliances.

<sup>76</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 23 et seq.; *Vinson v. Willingham Cotton Mills*, 2 Ga. App. 53, 58 S. E. 413; *Smith v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co.*, 127 Ill. App. 89; *Blust v. Pacific States Telephone Co.*, 48 Or. 84, 84 Pac. 847; *Monsen v. Crane*, 99 Minn. 186, 108 N. W. 933; *Belk v. Lee Roy Myers Co.*, 17 Ga. App. 684, 87

<sup>77</sup> See note 77 on following page.

keep his appliances in repair, and provide against liability to decay from age, or wear out from use;<sup>78</sup> but this does not apply to appliances which the servant is employed to repair.<sup>79</sup> He is not liable for hidden defects, which were unknown, and which could not have been discovered in the exercise of ordinary care.<sup>80</sup>

While the proper fulfillment of his obligations imposes on the master the duty of inspection,<sup>81</sup> he is not bound to inspect simple

S. E. 1089; *Guyer v. Sterling Laundry Co.*, 171 Cal. 761, 154 Pac. 1057; *Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Hayes*, 128 Pa. 294, 18 Atl. 387, 5 L. R. A. 441, 15 Am. St. Rep. 680. The master is not bound to furnish any particular make of machinery. *Imhoof v. Northwestern Lumber Co.*, 43 Wash. 387, 86 Pac. 650.

<sup>77</sup> Cases cited in preceding note; *SPARKS v. RIVER & HARBOR IMPROVEMENT CO.*, 74 N. J. Law, 818, 67 Atl. 600, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 820; *Filbert v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.*, 96 App. Div. 199, 88 N. Y. Supp. 438, affirmed 184 N. Y. 522, 76 N. E. 1095; *Central Granaries Co. v. Ault*, 75 Neb. 249, 106 N. W. 418, 107 N. W. 1015; *Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Husson*, 101 Pa. 1, 47 Am. Rep. 690; *The Maharajah (D. C.)* 40 Fed. 784; *Vinton v. Schwab*, 32 Vt. 614. But this test is not conclusive. *Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co.*, 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139.

<sup>78</sup> *Richardson v. Cooper*, 88 Ill. 270; *International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Fleming*, 151 Fed. 203, 80 C. C. A. 479; *Armour & Co. v. Russell*, 144 Fed. 614, 75 C. C. A. 416, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602; *Gomez v. Tracey*, 115 La. 824, 40 South. 234; *Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Burke*, 37 Ind. App. 518, 77 N. E. 409, 117 Am. St. Rep. 337; *Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Blevins*, 46 Kan. 370, 26 Pac. 687; *Carter v. McDermott*, 29 App. D. C. 145, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103, 10 Ann. Cas. 601; *Haney v. St. Regis Mining & Smelting Co. (Mo. App.)* 205 S. W. 93; *Newton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 96 App. Div. 81, 89 N. Y. Supp. 23, affirmed 183 N. Y. 556, 76 N. E. 1102; *Pagan v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 1105; *Indiana Car Co. v. Parker*, 100 Ind. 193; *Rapho v. Moore*, 68 Pa. 404, 8 Am. Rep. 202.

<sup>79</sup> *Murphy v. Railway Co.*, 88 N. Y. 146, 42 Am. Rep. 240; *Howland v. Railway Co.*, 54 Wis. 226, 11 N. W. 529; *Carlson v. Railway Co.*, 21 Or. 450, 28 Pac. 497. See, also, *Healy v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co.*, 111 App. Div. 618, 97 N. Y. Supp. 801, where the defect was easily discoverable and could have been repaired by the servant. Where power company does not furnish gloves to its linemen handling wires electrically charged, it is not liable because of defects in gloves which the linemen himself supplies. *Clements v. Elizabeth City Electric Light & Power Co.*, 176 N. C. 14, 96 S. E. 652.

<sup>80</sup> *Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. Co. v. Troesch*, 68 Ill. 545, 18 Am. Rep. 578; *New Castle Bridge Co. v. Steele*, 38 Ind. App. 194, 78 N. E. 208; *Bennett v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co.*, 116 Mo. App. 699, 94 S. W. 808; *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Scheuring*, 4 Ill. App. 533; *Gutridge v. Railway Co.*, 105 Mo. 520, 16 S. W. 943; *Hart v. Naumburg*, 123 N. Y. 641, 25 N. E. 385.

<sup>81</sup> *Ferris v. Shandy (Okla.)* 174 Pac. 1060; *Rio Grande Southern R. Co. v. Campbell (Colo.)* 176 Pac. 275; *Levesque v. Charlton Mills*, 222 Mass. 305, 110 N. E. 307; *Wochner v. Pennsylvania Engineering Works*, 251 Pa. 188, 96 Atl. 471; *Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Burke*, 37 Ind. App. 518, 77 N. E. 409, 117 Am. St. Rep. 337; *Gomez v. Tracey*, 115 La. 824, 40 South. 234; *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hagan*, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 93 S. W. 1014; *Gal-*

tools,<sup>82</sup> or to make unusual inspections and tests to discover defects.<sup>83</sup> The master is not bound to provide against danger from an unnecessary or inappropriate use of appliances by the servant.<sup>84</sup>

It is also one of the implied duties of the master to provide a suitable and reasonably safe place for the doing of the work to be performed by the servant, and to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.<sup>85</sup> Thus he may be liable for leaving danger-

veston, *H & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Parish* (Tex. Civ. App.) 98 S. W. 682. A servant is not obliged to pass judgment on his master's method of transacting his business, but may assume that reasonable care will be used in furnishing appliances necessary for its operation. *Carter v. McDermott*, 29 App. D. C. 145, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103, 10 Ann. Cas. 601.

<sup>82</sup> *Koschman v. Ash*, 98 Minn. 312, 108 N. W. 514, 116 Am. St. Rep. 373; *Olson v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*, 141 Minn. 73, 169 N. W. 482; *Turkey Foot Lumber Co. v. Wilson*, 182 Ky. 42, 206 S. W. 14; *Meyer v. Ladewig*, 130 Wis. 566, 110 N. W. 419, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684. But the rule that a master is not liable for injuries resulting from defects in very simple tools has no application where the master has actual knowledge of the defect and the employé has not. *Stork v. Charles Stolper Cooperage Co.*, 127 Wis. 318, 106 N. W. 841, 7 Ann. Cas. 339.

<sup>83</sup> *Brossman v. Drake Standard Mach. Works*, 232 Ill. 412, 83 N. E. 936. He is chargeable with knowledge of defects which a proper inspection would have disclosed. *Rio Grande Southern R. Co. v. Campbell* (Colo.) 176 Pac. 275. And see *Kimberlin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.* (Mo. App.) 206 S. W. 430.

<sup>84</sup> *Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Mahoney*, 4 Ill. App. 262; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Abend*, 7 Ill. App. 130; *Jayne v. Sebewaing Coal Co.*, 108 Mich. 242, 65 N. W. 971. See, also, *Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Sporleder*, 39 Colo. 142, 89 Pac. 55, holding that, where the servant discarded the tools furnished him by the master, not because they were unsafe, but because they were not handy, and did not request the master to furnish other tools, but procured tools which seemed to him to be more convenient by which he was subsequently injured, he was not entitled to claim that the master was negligent in failing to furnish him with safe tools.

<sup>85</sup> *Balley, Mast. Liab.* 2, 34; *Pagan v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 1105; *Armour & Co. v. Russell*, 144 Fed. 614, 75 C. C. A. 416, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602; *Gay v. Hocking Coal Co.*, 184 Iowa, 949, 169 N. W. 360; *Starkweather v. Dunlap*, 103 Kan. 425, 173 Pac. 1122; *Kotera v. American Smelting & Refining Co.*, 80 Neb. 648, 114 N. W. 945; *Coombs v. Cordage Co.*, 102 Mass. 572, 3 Am. Rep. 506; *Bessex v. Railway Co.*, 45 Wis. 477; *Swoboda v. Ward*, 40 Mich. 423; *Smith v. Car Works*, 60 Mich. 501, 27 N. W. 662, 1 Am. St. Rep. 542; *Van Dusen v. Letellier*, 78 Mich. 502, 44 N. W. 572; *Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Prezedziankowski*, 170 Ind. 1, 83 N. E. 626, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, 127 Am. St. Rep. 352; *St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Andrews*, 79 Ark. 437, 96 S. W. 183; *Williams v. Sleepy Hollow Min. Co.*, 37 Colo. 62, 86 Pac. 337, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170, 11 Ann. Cas. 111; *Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply Co.*, 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460; *Foreman v. Eagle Rice Mill Co.*, 117 La. 227, 41 South. 555. The master must exercise reasonable care. *The Erie Lighter* 108 (D. C.) 250 Fed. 490; *Turner v. Buchsbaum*, 207 Ill. App. 323; *Coral Ridge Clay Products Co. v. Collins*, 181 Ky.

ous machinery, such as cogwheels, knives, saws, etc., so exposed that it may cause injury, when it ought to be covered or protected,<sup>86</sup> or where, unknown to the servant, he allows stairways to remain in a dangerous condition.<sup>87</sup> But the rule requiring the master to furnish a safe place to work does not apply when the servant is

818, 205 S. W. 958; *Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co.*, 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139. He must furnish lights if necessary. *Long v. Foley*, 82 W. Va. 502, 96 S. E. 794. A higher degree of care in providing a safe place in which to work is imposed on an employer whose employes are underground, with scant means of escape in case of danger, than where the employes are not subject to unseen dangers, or are in a position to escape readily. *Williams v. Sleepy Hollow Min. Co.*, 37 Colo. 62, 86 Pac. 337, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170, 11 Ann. Cas. 111. The duty to furnish a safe place to work is a continuing one. *Clegg v. Seaboard Steel Casting Co.*, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 63; *Gillespie v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.*, 150 Mich. 303, 113 N. W. 1116. But see *Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co.*, 129 Wis. 98, 108 N. W. 48, where it is held that, while a master is absolutely required to furnish a servant with a safe place to work, he is required to exercise only ordinary care to keep the place safe, and if it becomes unsafe and the servant is injured before the master has knowledge of the existence of the danger or a reasonable opportunity to obtain such knowledge and remedy the defect, he is not liable. A telephone company is not bound to furnish a lineman a reasonably safe place to work, as against dangers inherent in the work of repair; but it is liable if the danger arises incident to the place where the work is done, as when it is made dangerous by adjacent electric power wires. *Kimberlin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.* (Mo. App.) 206 S. W. 430.

<sup>86</sup> *Nadau v. Lumber Co.*, 76 Wis. 128, 43 N. W. 1135, 20 Am. St. Rep. 29; *Chopin v. Combined Locks Paper Co.*, 134 Wis. 35, 114 N. W. 95; *Flynn v. Prince, Colliers & Marston Co.*, 198 Mass. 224, 84 N. E. 321, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568; *Jones v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 141 N. C. 202, 53 S. E. 849; *Westman v. Wind River Lumber Co.*, 50 Or. 137, 91 Pac. 478; *Roff v. Summit Lumber Co.*, 119 La. 571, 44 South. 302; *Wolff v. Foote Bros. Gear Mach. Co.*, 207 Ill. App. 311; *Landrum v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co.* (Mo. App.) 204 S. W. 930; *Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co.*, 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139; *Guyer v. Sterling Laundry Co.*, 171 Cal. 761, 154 Pac. 1057; *Maurer v. Rogers*, 250 Pa. 447, 95 Atl. 593. The employer is not bound to guard all dangerous places, but only such places as he may reasonably anticipate will cause injury to servants. *National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Padgett*, 251 Fed. 30, 163 C. C. A. 280. The covering of dangerous machinery is provided for by statute in most states. It has been held in Indiana that a failure to comply with the statute is negligence per se. *United States Cement Co. v. Cooper* (Ind. App.) 82 N. E. 981. In Iowa it has been held that the statute does not impose any greater duty on the master than would have existed without it. *Sutton v. Des Moines Bakery Co.*, 135 Iowa, 390, 112 N. W. 836. Violation of the terms of the Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, Or., p. 16), relating to guarding machinery is negligence per se. *Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co.*, 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139.

<sup>87</sup> *Sweet v. Coal Co.*, 78 Wis. 127, 47 N. W. 182, 9 L. R. A. 861; *Conrad v. Charles A. Stevens & Bros.*, 205 Ill. App. 494.

engaged in actually creating the place,<sup>88</sup> nor to servants whose duty it is to make dangerous places safe,<sup>89</sup> nor when the work in itself constantly changes the character for safety of the place where the servant is employed.<sup>90</sup>

It is also the implied duty of the master to provide other servants sufficient in number, and reasonably skilled and competent for the performance of the service, so that the servant will not be exposed to unnecessary risk from unskillful or incompetent fellow servants, or from a lack of a sufficient number of them.<sup>91</sup> If he knowingly employs or retains a careless person or drunkard, for instance, he may be liable if injury results to a fellow servant. If there is no negligence, there is no liability for injuries caused by an incompetent servant.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>88</sup> *Bertolami v. United Engineering & Contracting Co.*, 120 App. Div. 192, 105 N. Y. Supp. 90; *Calumet Fuel Co. v. Rossi* (Colo.) 173 Pac. 943.

<sup>89</sup> *Kellyville Coal Co. v. Bruzas*, 223 Ill. 595, 79 N. E. 309; *Norman v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 119 Tenn. 401, 104 S. W. 1088; *Houston's Adm'x v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.*, 123 Va. 290, 96 S. E. 270; *Bird v. Utica Gold Min. Co.*, 2 Cal. App. 674, 84 Pac. 256.

<sup>90</sup> *Village of Montgomery v. Robertson*, 229 Ill. 466, 82 N. E. 396; *Norman v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 119 Tenn. 401, 104 S. W. 1088; *Falla v. Pine Mountain Granite Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 651, 97 S. E. 114; *Kancevich v. Cudahy Packing Co.*, 184 Iowa, 799, 169 N. W. 186; *Reid v. Medley's Adm'r*, 118 Va. 462, 87 S. E. 616; *Bird v. Utica Gold Min. Co.*, 2 Cal. App. 674, 84 Pac. 256. Where a servant is engaged in the business of wrecking a building, his master is not obligated to furnish him with a safe place to work. *William Grace Co. v. Kane*, 129 Ill. App. 247.

<sup>91</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 3, 46; *Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hartell*, 157 Fed. 667, 85 C. C. A. 335; *Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Pring*, 41 Ind. App. 247, 83 N. E. 733; *Laning v. Railroad Co.*, 49 N. Y. 521, 10 Am. Rep. 417; *Booth v. Railroad Co.*, 73 N. Y. 38, 29 Am. Rep. 97; *Baulec v. Railway Co.*, 59 N. Y. 356, 17 Am. Rep. 325; *Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels*, 107 U. S. 454, 2 Sup. Ct. 932, 27 L. Ed. 605; *Horton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.*, 145 N. C. 132, 58 S. E. 993; *Carter v. McDermott*, 29 App. D. C. 145, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103, 10 Ann. Cas. 601; *Hamann v. Milwaukee Bridge Co.*, 127 Wis. 550, 106 N. W. 1081, 7 Ann. Cas. 458; *Markinovich v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.*, 55 Mont. 139, 174 Pac. 183; *Lusk v. Phelps* (Okl.) 175 Pac. 756; *James v. Winifred Coal Co.*, 184 Iowa, 619, 169 N. W. 121; *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda*, 108 Ill. 576; *Moss v. Railroad*, 49 Mo. 167, 8 Am. Rep. 126; *Gilman v. Railway Corp.*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 233, 87 Am. Dec. 635; *Harper v. Railway Co.*, 47 Mo. 567, 4 Am. Rep. 353; *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Dolan*, 32 Mich. 513; *Hilts v. Railway Co.*, 55 Mich. 440, 21 N. W. 878; *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Gilbert*, 46 Mich. 179, 9 N. W. 243. A master, in selecting employes, must exercise reasonable care, considering the nature of the employment, and, if that involves special knowledge, only men of special knowledge should be engaged. *Woodward Iron Co. v. Curl*, 153 Ala. 215, 44 South. 969.

<sup>92</sup> *Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. Co. v. Troesch*, 68 Ill. 545, 18 Am. Rep. 578; *Stone-Webster Engineering Corporation v. Collins*, 199 Fed. 581, 118 C. C. A.

While it is generally sufficient if the master adopts the usual and customary methods of work,<sup>55</sup> it is not his duty to adopt the most approved methods;<sup>56</sup> and negligence will not be imputed to him, though he has not adopted methods used by others in the same business.<sup>57</sup> If, however, the master adopts a dangerous method of work, he should take correspondingly appropriate precautions to guard against the increased danger.<sup>58</sup> So it is the duty of a master, where the nature of his business requires it, as in the case of railroad companies, to promulgate rules for the protection of employés.<sup>59</sup>

It is the master's duty to inform the servant of latent dangers, or dangers arising from extraneous causes, known to him, where the servant has no knowledge of them, and knowledge cannot be

55; *Santiago v. John E. Walsh Stevedore Co.*, 152 App. Div. 697, 137 N. Y. Supp. 611; *Woodward Iron Co. v. Curl*, 153 Ala. 215, 44 South. 969. The fact that the employé did not understand English does not show negligence on the part of the master in employing him. *Date v. New York Glucose Co.*, 114 App. Div. 789, 100 N. Y. Supp. 171, affirmed 190 N. Y. 510, 83 N. E. 1124.

56 *Larson v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.*, 43 Minn. 423, 45 N. W. 722; *Allen v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co.*, 64 Iowa, 94, 19 N. W. 870.

57 *O'Neill v. Karr*, 110 App. Div. 571, 97 N. Y. Supp. 148.

58 *Pearsall v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 189 N. Y. 474, 82 N. E. 752.

59 *Smith v. Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co.*, 119 La. 537, 44 South. 290.

57 *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 71; *Slater v. Jewett*, 85 N. Y. 62, 39 Am. Rep. 627; *Abel v. Canal Co.*, 103 N. Y. 581, 9 N. E. 325, 57 Am. Rep. 773; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whittemore*, 43 Ill. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 138; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McLallen*, 84 Ill. 109; *Lewis v. Selfert*, 116 Pa. 628, 11 Atl. 514, 2 Am. St. Rep. 631; *Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills*, 127 Ga. 609, 56 S. E. 839, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772; *Ryan v. Delaware & Hudson Co.*, 114 App. Div. 268, 99 N. Y. Supp. 794, affirmed 188 N. Y. 559, 80 N. E. 1119; *Morrison v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co.*, 32 Utah, 85, 88 Pac. 998; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Paneblango*, 129 Ill. App. 1, affirmed 227 Ill. 170, 81 N. E. 53; *St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Ames* (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. 1112. An employer is required to make rules to guard against only such accidents as may reasonably be foreseen. *Dzkowski v. Reynoldsville Carting Co.*, 216 N. Y. 173, 110 N. E. 442, reversing 155 App. Div. 943, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1117. Failure to make a rule will not constitute negligence when no occasion had ever arisen to show the necessity therefor prior to the injury complained of. *St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. Co. v. Conway*, 156 Fed. 234, 86 C. C. A. 1. To bind the servant the rule must be properly published or brought to his attention. *Anderson v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*, 102 Minn. 355, 113 N. W. 913. When the duties to be performed are simple and the appliances easily understood, the promulgation of rules is not necessary. *Blust v. Pacific States Telephone Co.*, 48 Or. 34, 84 Pac. 847. Though the master makes an express rule prohibiting certain acts by his servants, if they constantly disregard the rule with his knowledge and acquiescence, it is a waiver of the rule by the master. *Powhatan Lime Co. v. Whetzel's Adm'x*, 118 Va. 161, 86 S. E. 898.

imputed to him.<sup>88</sup> And he must inform the servant of obvious dangers, where the servant cannot be presumed to appreciate or understand them. This is peculiarly applicable to servants of tender years.<sup>89</sup> It applies also, however, to inexperienced persons of mature years.<sup>1</sup> It is not enough to inform the servant generally that the service is dangerous, but the particular perils and dangers must be pointed out.<sup>2</sup> There is no duty to give information as to dangers which are known or obvious, and which he has

<sup>88</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 109 et seq.; *Coombs v. Cordage Co.*, 102 Mass. 572, 3 Am. Rep. 506; *Baxter v. Roberts*, 44 Cal. 187, 13 Am. Rep. 160; *Markle-witz v. Olds Motor Works*, 152 Mich. 113, 115 N. W. 999; *Swiercz v. Illinois Steel Co.*, 231 Ill. 456, 83 N. E. 168; *Hardy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 139 Iowa, 314, 115 N. W. 8, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997; *Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Skipper*, 125 Ga. 368, 54 S. E. 110; *Edington v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.*, 204 Mo. 61, 102 S. W. 491; *Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Gladman*, 1 Ga. App. 259, 58 S. E. 249; *Kemp v. McNeill Cooperage Co.* (Del. Super.) 104 Atl. 639; *Murphy v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co.*, 230 Mass. 333, 120 N. E. 361; *Casey-Hedges Co. v. Oliphant*, 228 Fed. 636, 143 C. C. A. 158. If the master fails to warn the servant of a danger known to the master, he is also liable for any injury to the servant from an unknown danger connected with the same appliance or material. *Collins v. Pecos & N. T. R. Co.* (Tex. Com. App.) 212 S. W. 477. But see *Pinkley v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co.*, 246 Ill. 370, 92 N. E. 896, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 679.

<sup>89</sup> *Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan*, 46 Ohio St. 283, 20 N. E. 466, 15 Am. St. Rep. 596; *Tagg v. McGeorge*, 155 Pa. 368, 26 Atl. 671, 35 Am. St. Rep. 889; *Dowling v. Allen*, 74 Mo. 13, 41 Am. Rep. 298; *Ford v. Anderson*, 139 Pa. 263, 21 Atl. 18; *Steller v. Hart*, 65 Mich. 644, 32 N. W. 875; *Chopin v. Paper Co.*, 83 Wis. 192, 53 N. W. 452; *Burrows v. Ozark White Lime Co.*, 82 Ark. 343, 101 S. W. 744; *Beck v. Standard Cotton Mills*, 1 Ga. App. 278, 57 S. E. 998; *Long v. Folwell Bros. & Co.*, 228 Pa. 314, 77 Atl. 557; *Chambers v. Woodbury Mfg. Co. of Baltimore County*, 106 Md. 496, 68 Atl. 290, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 383; *Woodstock Iron Works v. Kline*, 149 Ala. 391, 43 South. 362. But where an infant employé who had reached the age of discretion gave assurances that he understood the duties of his position, the employer was not obliged to give him any special instructions. *King v. Woodstock Iron Co.*, 143 Ala. 632, 42 South. 27.

<sup>1</sup> *Fox v. Color Works*, 84 Mich. 676, 48 N. W. 203; *Metayer v. Grant*, 222 Mass. 254, 110 N. E. 310; *Chopin v. Paper Co.*, 83 Wis. 192, 53 N. W. 452; *Parkhurst v. Johnson*, 50 Mich. 70, 15 N. W. 107, 45 Am. Rep. 28; *Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hartell*, 157 Fed. 667, 85 C. C. A. 335; *Coughlan v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co.*, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 242, 67 Atl. 148; *American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Toluszis*, 125 Ill. App. 622; *Sias v. Consolidated Lighting Co.*, 79 Vt. 224, 64 Atl. 1104; *Vohs v. Shorthill & Co.*, 130 Iowa, 538, 107 N. W. 417; *Wikstrom v. Preston Mill Co.*, 48 Wash. 164, 93 Pac. 213; *Swiercz v. Illinois Steel Co.*, 231 Ill. 456, 83 N. E. 168.

<sup>2</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 112; *Bradburn v. Wabash R. Co.*, 134 Mich. 575, 90 N. W. 929; *Addicks v. Christoph*, 62 N. J. Law, 786, 43 Atl. 196, 72 Am. St. Rep. 687.

a right to presume the servant understands.<sup>3</sup> The master cannot be held liable, however, for failure to warn the servant of every transitory risk, when the only thing the servant does not know is the precise time when the danger will supervene.<sup>4</sup>

The master is not an insurer of his servant's safety;<sup>5</sup> but in the performance of the above duties he is bound only to use ordinary, reasonable care.<sup>6</sup> The question arises, what is ordinary care? It was said in a late case, by the Supreme Court of the United States: "There is no fixed standard in the law by which a court is enabled to arbitrarily say in every case what conduct shall constitute ordinary care under any and all circumstances. The terms 'ordinary care,' 'reasonable prudence,' and such like terms, as applied to the conduct and affairs of men, have a relative significance, and cannot be arbitrarily defined. What may be deemed care in one case may under different surroundings and circumstances be gross negligence. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and

<sup>3</sup> *Kancevich v. Cudahy Packing Co.*, 184 Iowa, 799, 169 N. W. 186; *E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Hipp*, 123 Va. 280, 96 S. E. 280; *Marshall v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 131 Minn. 392, 155 N. W. 208; *National Drainage Co. v. Bell*, 121 Ark. 633, 180 S. W. 984.

<sup>4</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 112, 118; *Smith v. Car Works*, 60 Mich. 506, 27 N. W. 662, 1 Am. St. Rep. 542; *Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Adams*, 105 Ind. 152, 5 N. E. 187; *Crowley v. Mills*, 148 Mass. 228, 19 N. E. 344; *Cross v. Boston & M. R. Co.*, 223 Mass. 144, 111 N. E. 676; *Fones v. Phillips*, 39 Ark. 17, 43 Am. Rep. 264; *Boyd v. Taylor*, 195 Mass. 272, 81 N. E. 277; *Eisenberg v. Fraim*, 215 Pa. 570, 64 Atl. 793; *White v. Owosso Sugar Co.*, 149 Mich. 473, 112 N. W. 1125; *Hardy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 139 Iowa, 314, 115 N. W. 8, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997; *Magone v. Portland Mfg. Co.*, 51 Or. 21, 93 Pac. 450; *Norman v. Southern Ry. Co.*, 119 Tenn. 401, 104 S. W. 1088.

<sup>5</sup> *Southern Ry. Co. v. Carr*, 153 Fed. 106, 82 C. C. A. 240; *Cudahy Packing Co. v. Wesolowski*, 75 Neb. 786, 106 N. W. 1007; *Meyers v. Ideal Steam Laundry*, 60 Wash. 134, 110 Pac. 803; *Guest v. Edison Illuminating Co.*, 150 Mich. 438, 114 N. W. 226; *Grace v. Globe Stove & Range Co.*, 40 Ind. App. 326, 82 N. E. 99; *Zeis v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n*, 205 Mo. 638, 104 S. W. 99; *Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Kent*, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 105 S. W. 525.

<sup>6</sup> *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 3 et seq.; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery*, 109 Ill. 314; *Richardson v. Cooper*, 88 Ill. 270; *Devlin v. Smith*, 89 N. Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311; *McDonnell v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.*, 143 Fed. 480, 74 C. C. A. 500; *American Bridge Co. v. Seeds*, 144 Fed. 605, 75 C. C. A. 407, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041; *Coughlan v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co.*, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 242, 67 Atl. 148; *Swiercz v. Illinois Steel Co.*, 231 Ill. 456, 83 N. E. 168; *Brusseau v. Lower Brick Co.*, 133 Iowa, 245, 110 N. W. 577; *Kremer v. Eagle Mfg. Co.*, 120 Mo. App. 247, 96 S. W. 726; *Blonski v. American Enamelled Brick & Tile Co.*, 72 N. J. Law, 409, 60 Atl. 1101.

surroundings of each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that case was such as should be expected of reasonably prudent men under a similar state of affairs." <sup>7</sup> "The rule," said the New York court, "is simple, practical, and easy of application. The question is, what would a majority of men of common intelligence have done under like circumstances? Ordinary care, skill, and diligence is such a degree of care, skill, and diligence as men of ordinary prudence, under similar circumstances, usually employ." <sup>8</sup> The degree of care must be proportionate to the dangers of the employment, <sup>9</sup> in so far as those dangers are known to the master. <sup>10</sup>

While the general rule applies even when the servant is a minor, <sup>11</sup> yet the age, intelligence, experience, and capacity of the servant must be taken into consideration in determining whether the master has exercised due care. <sup>12</sup>

The master's duty to furnish suitable tools and appliances, and to keep them in repair, to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place for work, to promulgate reasonable rules, where they are required by the nature of the business and to inform servants of hidden dangers, and instruct young or inexperienced servants, is personal, and he cannot delegate them. He may delegate the performance

<sup>7</sup> *Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives*, 144 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485.

<sup>8</sup> *Ernst v. Railroad Co.*, 35 N. Y. 9, 90 Am. Dec. 761; *Grace v. Globe Stove & Range Co.*, 40 Ind. App. 326, 82 N. E. 99; *Atoka Coal & Mining Co. v. Miller*, 7 Ind. T. 104, 104 S. W. 555. And see *Marsh v. Chickering*, 101 N. Y. 400, 5 N. E. 56; *Read v. Morse*, 34 Wis. 318; *Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman*, 28 Mich. 448; *Holly v. Gaslight Co.*, 8 Gray (Mass.) 131, 69 Am. Dec. 233; *Cayzer v. Taylor*, 10 Gray (Mass.) 280, 69 Am. Dec. 317; *Vinton v. Schwab*, 32 Vt. 612.

<sup>9</sup> *Bowring v. Wilmington Malleable Iron Co.*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 594, 66 Atl. 369.

<sup>10</sup> *Charron v. Union Carbide Co.*, 151 Mich. 687, 115 N. W. 718.

<sup>11</sup> *Decatur Car Wheel Co. v. Terry*, 148 Ala. 674, 41 South. 839. Under the statutes of some of the states, regulating the employment of child labor, the employment of a child under the age prescribed is negligence per se. See *Perry v. Tozer*, 90 Minn. 431, 97 N. W. 137, 101 Am. St. Rep. 416; *Telinko v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.*, 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 143; *Waterman Lumber Co. v. Beatty* (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 448; *Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co.*, 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S. E. 857, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504; *Platt v. Southern Photo Material Co.*, 4 Ga. App. 159, 60 S. E. 1068.

<sup>12</sup> *Daniels v. Johnston*, 39 Colo. 177, 89 Pac. 811; *Bare v. Crane Creek Coal & Coke Co.*, 61 W. Va. 28, 55 S. E. 907, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 284, 128 Am. St. Rep. 966; *Chambers v. Woodbury Mfg. Co.*, 106 Md. 496, 68 Atl. 290, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 383; *Beck v. Standard Cotton Mills*, 1 Ga. App. 278, 57 S. E. 998.

of them, but his responsibility remains.<sup>13</sup> There is considerable conflict between the courts in the application of this doctrine.<sup>14</sup>

*Assumption of Risk by Servant*

It is said that, when a person enters into the service of another, he impliedly contracts that he possesses the ordinary skill and experience of those engaged in the occupation which he undertakes, that he will exercise ordinary care to protect himself while engaged in that occupation, and that he will assume the risks of his employment.<sup>15</sup> Mr. Jaggard, in his work on Torts, thus states the general rules relating to the assumption of the risks of his employment by a servant.<sup>16</sup> As he points out, the risks which the servant assumes may arise (a) from circumstances exclusive of the risk of fellow servants, and may be either (1) the ordinary risks of the employment; (2) the extraordinary risks of the employment; or (b) from the negligence of fellow servants.

<sup>13</sup> Bailey, Mast. Liab. 128. Selecting tools and appliances. *Morton v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co.*, 81 Mich. 423, 46 N. W. 111; *Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills*, 127 Ga. 609, 56 S. E. 839, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772; *Russell v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. (Utah)* 174 Pac. 633; *Phillips v. Corbin & Fannin*, 186 Ky. 638, 179 S. W. 586; *Klunk v. Blue Pearl Granite Co.*, 170 N. C. 70, 86 S. E. 800; *Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Hardy*, 88 Miss. 732, 41 South. 505; *Kane v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.*, 75 N. J. Law, 698, 67 Atl. 1014; *Huber v. Whale Creek Iron Works*, 125 App. Div. 184, 109 N. Y. Supp. 177; *Anderson v. Milliken Bros.*, 123 App. Div. 614, 108 N. Y. Supp. 61; *Jemnienski v. Lobdell Car Wheel Co.*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 385, 63 Atl. 935. But the operation of appliances can be delegated. *Tilley v. Rockingham County Light & Power Co.*, 74 N. H. 316, 67 Atl. 946. Inspection of tools and appliances. *Martin v. Wabash R. Co.*, 142 Fed. 650, 73 C. C. A. 646, 6 Ann. Cas. 582; *Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Herbert*, 116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; *Newton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.*, 96 App. Div. 81, 89 N. Y. Supp. 23, affirmed 183 N. Y. 556, 76 N. E. 1102. Place of work. *Combs v. Rountree Const. Co.*, 205 Mo. 367, 104 S. W. 77; *McGrath v. Fogel (Mo. App.)* 182 S. W. 813; *Benton v. Finkbine Lumber Co.*, 118 Miss. 558, 79 South. 346; *Jemnienski v. Lobdell Car Wheel Co.*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 385, 63 Atl. 935; *Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co.*, 115 Tenn. 543, 92 S. W. 62, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180; *Antioch Coal Co. v. Rockey*, 169 Ind. 247, 82 N. E. 76. Employment of other servants. *Laning v. New York Cent. R. Co.*, 49 N. Y. 521, 10 Am. Rep. 417. Promulgation of rules. *Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills*, 127 Ga. 609, 56 S. E. 839, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772; *Gaska v. American Car & Foundry Co.*, 127 Mo. App. 169, 105 S. W. 3. Warning and instructing. *Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills*, 127 Ga. 609, 56 S. E. 839, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772; *Murphy v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co.*, 230 Mass. 333, 120 N. E. 361; *Schminkey v. T. M. Sinclair & Co.*, 137 Iowa, 130, 114 N. W. 612.

<sup>14</sup> Bailey, Mast. Liab. 128-141, where the doctrine is discussed at length. See post, p. 626.

<sup>15</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1013 et seq.; Bailey, Mast. Liab. 142 et seq.

<sup>16</sup> See 2 Jag. Torts, 1014 et seq.

*Same—Ordinary Risks*

"Excluding the negligence of fellow servants, a servant assumes the ordinary risks of his employment, with the instrumentalities, in the place, and under the rules of work for which he is engaged, which are reasonably necessary and incidental to it, and which are apparent to ordinary observation: provided (a) he knew and appreciated, or should have known and appreciated, the risks and dangers, in the prudent exercise of his senses and common sense, regard being had to his age, capacity, and experience; and provided (b) the master has exercised reasonable care to prevent them."<sup>17</sup> If a piece of machinery is obviously dangerous, ordinarily, one who undertakes to work at it assumes the risk of injuries therefrom.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See 2 *Jag. Torts*, 1014 et seq.; *Borden v. Daisy Roller Mill Co.*, 98 Wis. 407, 74 N. W. 91, 67 Am. St. Rep. 816; *Davidson v. Cornell*, 132 N. Y. 228, 30 N. E. 573; *Houston's Adm'x v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.*, 123 Va. 290, 96 S. E. 270; *Falla v. Pine Mountain Granite Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 651, 97 S. E. 114; *Whalen v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.*, 114 Mich. 512, 72 N. W. 323; *Illinois Steel Co. v. Saylor*, 129 Ill. App. 73, affirmed 226 Ill. 283, 80 N. E. 783; *Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Warring*, 37 Colo. 122, 86 Pac. 305; *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hudson (Okl.)* 173 Pac. 743; *Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Skipper*, 125 Ga. 368, 54 S. E. 110; *Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply Co.*, 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460. Negligence of the master is not one of the risks assumed by the servant. *Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Riley*, 145 Fed. 137, 76 C. C. A. 107, 7 Ann. Cas. 327; *Jensen v. Kyer*, 101 Me. 106, 63 Atl. 389; *Superior Coal & Mining Co. v. Kaiser*, 229 Ill. 29, 82 N. E. 239, 120 Am. St. Rep. 233. Neither does the servant assume the risk of a violation of an express statutory obligation imposed on the master for the protection of employes. *Murphy v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works*, 142 Mich. 677, 106 N. W. 211, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 329; *Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Walters*, 120 Ill. App. 152, affirmed 217 Ill. 87, 75 N. E. 441. While the rule as to assumption of risk applies to minors (*Decatur Car Wheel Co. v. Terry*, 148 Ala. 674, 41 South. 839), his age, intelligence, and capacity are to be considered (*Moss v. Mosley*, 148 Ala. 168, 41 South. 1012; *Magone v. Portland Mfg. Co.*, 51 Or. 21, 93 Pac. 450), and he will be held to have assumed only such risks as he could understand and appreciate (*Laverty v. Hambrick*, 61 W. Va. 687, 57 S. E. 240; *Heckwich Organ Co. v. Malone*, 106 S. W. 809, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 596). The federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) does not abolish the common-law rule as to the assumption of the ordinary risks of employment. *King v. Norfolk & S. R. Co.*, 176 N. C. 301, 97 S. E. 29, certiorari denied *Norfolk & S. R. Co. v. King*, 249 U. S. 599, 39 Sup. Ct. 257, 63 L. Ed. 795.

<sup>18</sup> *Anderson v. Lumber Co.*, 47 Minn. 128, 49 N. W. 664; *Crowley v. Pacific Mills*, 148 Mass. 228, 19 N. E. 344; *Hickey v. Taaffe*, 105 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 286; *Prentiss v. Manufacturing Co.*, 63 Mich. 478, 30 N. W. 109; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Merckes*, 36 Ill. App. 195; *United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Chadwick*, 35 Ill. App. 474; *O'Keefe v. Thorn (Pa.)* 16 Atl. 737; *Townsend v. Langles (C. C.)* 41 Fed. 919; *McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Zakzewski*, 220 Ill. 522, 77 N. E. 147, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848, reversing 121 Ill. App.

And, generally, if he works with machinery or tools which he knows, or should reasonably know, to be defective, and therefore dangerous, he assumes the risk.<sup>19</sup> The rule is the same where a servant works in a place which is obviously dangerous, or which he knows to be dangerous.<sup>20</sup>

*Same—Extraordinary Risks*

"The servant cannot recover from his employer for damages consequent upon extraordinary risks which he has knowingly assumed."<sup>21</sup> A servant does not assume extraordinary risks unless he

26; *Moran v. Mulligan*, 110 App. Div. 208, 97 N. Y. Supp. 7; *Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply Co.*, 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460. Effect of statutes providing for guarding machinery to modify the rule as to assumption of risk, see *Inland Steel Co. v. Kachwinski*, 151 Fed. 219, 80 C. C. A. 571; *Southern Pac. Co. v. Allen*, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 106 S. W. 441; *Johnson v. Far West Lumber Co.*, 47 Wash. 492, 92 Pac. 274; *Rector v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co.*, 41 Wash. 556, 84 Pac. 7.

<sup>19</sup> *Michael v. Stanley*, 75 Md. 464, 23 Atl. 1094; *Bradley v. Vandalla R. Co.*, 207 Ill. App. 592; *Loving v. Atlantic Southern R. Co.*, 184 Iowa, 435, 168 N. W. 910; *Rietman v. Stolte*, 120 Ind. 314, 22 N. E. 304; *Way v. Railway Co.*, 40 Iowa, 341; *Anderson v. Railroad Co.*, 39 Minn. 523, 41 N. W. 104; *Shaw v. Sheldon*, 108 N. Y. 667, 9 N. E. 183; *American Smelting & Refining Co. v. McGee*, 157 Fed. 69, 84 C. C. A. 573; *Kath v. East St. Louis & S. Ry. Co.*, 232 Ill. 126, 83 N. E. 533, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1109; *Banks v. Schofield's Sons Co.*, 126 Ga. 667, 55 S. E. 939; *United States Wind Engine & Pump Co. v. Butcher*, 223 Ill. 638, 79 N. E. 304, 114 Am. St. Rep. 336, affirming 126 Ill. App. 302.

<sup>20</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1017; *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 142 et seq.; *McGrath v. Railway Co.*, 60 Fed. 555, 9 C. C. A. 133; *Ragon v. Railway Co.*, 97 Mich. 265, 56 N. W. 612, 37 Am. St. Rep. 336; *Gibson v. Railway Co.*, 63 N. Y. 449, 20 Am. Rep. 552; *Feely v. Cordage Co.*, 161 Mass. 426, 37 N. E. 368; *Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Davis*, 90 Tenn. 711, 18 S. W. 387; *Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Gesswine*, 144 Fed. 56, 75 C. C. A. 214; *Welch v. Carlucci Stone Co.*, 215 Pa. 34, 64 Atl. 392, 7 Ann. Cas. 292; *Knorpp v. Wagner*, 195 Mo. 637, 93 S. W. 961; *Schillinger Bros. Co. v. Smith*, 225 Ill. 74, 80 N. E. 65; *Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply Co.*, 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460. Blasting in quarry. *Falla v. Pine Mountain Granite Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 651, 97 S. E. 114. Injury to lumberman by dislodged logs. *D. E. Hewitt Lumber Co. v. Cisco*, 181 Ky. 612, 205 S. W. 677. While the employé is bound to take notice of obvious defects in the place where he is working, he is not required to make an examination for hidden defects. *Superior Coal & Mining Co. v. Kaiser*, 229 Ill. 29, 82 N. E. 239, 120 Am. St. Rep. 233. But even when the servant is engaged in making safe a known dangerous place he does not assume the risk of the master's negligence. *Jacobson v. Hobart Iron Co.*, 103 Minn. 319, 114 N. W. 951.

<sup>21</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1019, 1020, and cases there cited. Under the Employers' Liability Act, state and federal, there is no assumption of extraordinary risks. See post, p. 634.

has actual or constructive knowledge of the danger.<sup>22</sup> But if he has such knowledge, and voluntarily undertakes the work, the risk is assumed.<sup>23</sup>

*Same—Exceptions to the Rule*

The principles under which a servant is held to assume the risks of the employment do not apply in the following cases:<sup>24</sup> (a) Where, though he may know of the defect or danger, he does not necessarily, and should not reasonably, know of or appreciate the consequent risk.<sup>25</sup> (b) Where, without proper notice of increased risk, he is put to a service outside of, and more dangerous than, the employment for which he was engaged.<sup>26</sup> (c) Where the mas-

<sup>22</sup> *Richlands Iron Co. v. Elkins*, 90 Va. 249, 17 S. E. 890; *Schminkey v. T. M. Sinclair & Co.*, 137 Iowa, 130, 114 N. W. 612; *Place v. Grand Trunk R. Co.*, 50 Vt. 196, 67 Atl. 545.

<sup>23</sup> *Goff v. Railway Co.*, 86 Wis. 237, 56 N. W. 465; *McDuffee's Adm'r v. Boston & M. R. R.*, 81 Vt. 52, 69 Atl. 124, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1019; *Sullivan v. Railroad Co.*, 181 Mass. 125, 36 N. E. 751; *Kelley v. Railway Co.*, 35 Minn. 490, 29 N. W. 173; *Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rogers*, 57 Fed. 378, 6 C. C. A. 403; *Wheeler v. Berry*, 95 Mich. 250, 54 N. W. 876; *Smith v. Railroad Co.*, 42 Minn. 87, 43 N. W. 968.

<sup>24</sup> The following statements are taken in substance from 2 Jag. Torts, 1021.

<sup>25</sup> *Coombs v. Cordage Co.*, 102 Mass. 572, 3 Am. Rep. 506; *CHOCTAW, O. & G. R. CO. v. JONES*, 77 Ark. 367, 92 S. W. 244, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837, 7 Ann. Cas. 430, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 323; *Mellor v. Manufacturing Co.*, 150 Mass. 362, 23 N. E. 100, 5 L. R. A. 792; *Steen v. Railroad Co.*, 37 Minn. 310, 34 N. W. 113; *Davidson v. Cornell*, 132 N. Y. 228, 30 N. E. 573.

<sup>26</sup> *Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Haenni*, 48 Ill. App. 115, affirmed 146 Ill. 614, 35 N. E. 162; *Union Pac. R. Co. v. Fort*, 17 Wall. 533, 21 L. Ed. 739; *American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Hank*, 129 Ill. App. 188; *Oolitic Stone Co. v. Ridge* (Ind. App.) 80 N. E. 441; *Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Sloan*, 52 Fla. 257, 42 South. 516. But "if a servant of full age and ordinary intelligence, upon being required by his master to perform other duties more dangerous and complicated than those embraced in his original hiring, undertakes such duties knowing their dangerous character, although unwillingly, and from fear of losing his employment, and he is injured, he cannot maintain an action for the injury." *Leary v. Railroad Co.*, 139 Mass. 580, 2 N. E. 115, 52 Am. Rep. 733. He assumes the risk if he voluntarily engages in a dangerous work outside the scope of his employment. *National Fire Proofing Co. v. Andrews*, 158 Fed. 294, 85 C. C. A. 526; *Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Adams*, 105 Ind. 151, 5 N. E. 187; *Prentiss v. Kent Furniture Mfg. Co.*, 63 Mich. 478, 30 N. W. 109. So, too, if he pursues a dangerous method when a safe one is provided. *Suttle v. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co.*, 144 Fed. 668, 75 C. C. A. 470; *Perry v. Michigan Alkali Co.*, 150 Mich. 537, 114 N. W. 315. Even the specific command of his superior to pursue a dangerous method will not wholly excuse him. *Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Crotty*, 141 Fed. 913, 73 C. C. A. 147, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 832. But it may be taken into consideration and weight as one of the attendant circumstances.

ter has promised to remove the peril,<sup>27</sup> unless the danger is so immediate and imminent that an ordinarily prudent man would not continue in the service.<sup>28</sup> (d) Even in the latter case, the risk will not be assumed if the duty to continue in the dangerous service is required or justified by some emergency approved by law.<sup>29</sup> (e) Where the servant does not voluntarily expose himself to the peril.<sup>30</sup> To these it may be added that the servant does not as-

*Jensen v. Kyer*, 101 Me. 106, 63 Atl. 389. If the superior assured him there was no danger, the exception will apply. *American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Jankus*, 121 Ill. App. 267; *Bush v. West Yellow Pine Co.*, 2 Ga. App. 295, 58 S. E. 529. A servant cannot be held to have assumed the risk attendant upon working in a certain place to which he was ordered to go by his foreman, as the direction itself was an assurance on the part of the employer, that the place was reasonably safe. *Olson v. Seldovia Salmon Co.*, 88 Wash. 225, 152 Pac. 1033.

<sup>27</sup> *Hough v. Railway Co.*, 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. Ed. 612; *Chicago Drop Forge & Foundry Co. v. Van Dam*, 149 Ill. 337, 36 N. E. 1024; *Greene v. Railway Co.*, 81 Minn. 248, 17 N. W. 378, 47 Am. Rep. 785. There must be a clear promise to repair. A complaint and an acknowledgment of the defect are not enough. *Breig v. Railway Co.*, 98 Mich. 222, 57 N. W. 118; *Chesapeake, O. & S. W. R. Co. v. McDowell*, 24 S. W. 607, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 1; *Willson v. Railroad Co.*, 87 Minn. 326, 33 N. W. 908, 5 Am. St. Rep. 851; *Mahan v. Clee*, 87 Mich. 161, 49 N. W. 556; *Vion v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co.*, 99 Minn. 97, 108 N. W. 891, 9 Ann. Cas. 318; *Monarch Mining & Development Co. v. De Voe*, 36 Colo. 270, 85 Pac. 633. But see *Kistner v. American Steel Foundries*, 233 Ill. 35, 84 N. E. 44, when it was held that the rule which exempts an employé from assuming the risk of injury because of defective machinery, where a promise to repair is made, applies only where particular skill and experience are necessary to appreciate the defect and the danger, or where he can have but little knowledge of the machinery, and does not apply where he is engaged in ordinary labor or the tools used are of simple construction with which he is as familiar as the master. The exemption of the servant continues only for a reasonable time, however. *Utah Consol. Min. Co. v. Paxton*, 150 Fed. 114, 80 C. C. A. 68; *Louisville Bolt & Iron Co. v. Hart*, 122 Ky. 731, 92 S. W. 951; *Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Burns*, 84 Ark. 74, 104 S. W. 535. And if he continues in the employment after a breach of the employer's promise to repair he reassumes the risk. *Andrecsik v. New Jersey Tube Co.*, 73 N. J. Law, 664, 63 Atl. 719, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 913, 9 Ann. Cas. 1006.

<sup>28</sup> *Greene v. Railway Co.*, 31 Minn. 248, 17 N. W. 378, 47 Am. Rep. 785; *Russell v. Tillotson*, 140 Mass. 201, 4 N. E. 231; *Crosby v. Cuba R. Co. (C. C.)* 158 Fed. 144; *Utah Consol. Minn. Co. v. Paxton*, 150 Fed. 114, 80 C. C. A. 68; *Leeson v. Sawmill Phenix*, 41 Wash. 423, 83 Pac. 891.

<sup>29</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1027; *Lalor v. Railway Co.*, 52 Ill. 401, 4 Am. Rep. 616; *Moore v. Railway Co.*, 85 Mo. 588; *Strong v. Railway Co.*, 94 Iowa, 380, 62 N. W. 799.

<sup>30</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1028. As where a seaman obeys the orders of his superior officer, being required by statute to do so, *Eldridge v. Steamship Co.*, 134 N. Y. 187, 32 N. E. 66; or where a convict works in a dangerous place, under control and orders of a guard, *Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Braswell*, 92 Ga. 631, 18 S. E. 1015; or where a servant, by the wrong of the master, is placed

sume the risk, where the negligence charged and proved is the disregard of some duty imposed by statute.<sup>81</sup>

*Same—Negligence of Fellow Servants*

Among the ordinary risks of the service which are assumed by a servant, as between himself and his master, is the risk of negligence upon the part of a fellow servant.<sup>82</sup> The leading case in this country is *Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.*,<sup>83</sup> decided in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1842, in which it was held that a master is not liable to his servant for an injury due to the negligence of a fellow servant engaged in the same general employment, where he has used due diligence in the selection of such fellow servant, and has furnished to his employé suitable means for carrying on the business in which they are engaged.<sup>84</sup>

in a position of imminent peril, and necessarily adopts a dangerous means of escaping therefrom, *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Shivel's Adm'x*, 18 S. W. 944, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 902.

<sup>81</sup> *Steele v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*, 103 S. C. 102, 87 S. E. 639; *Dobra v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.*, 250 Pa. 313, 95 Atl. 485; *Boone v. Lohr*, 172 Iowa, 440, 154 N. W. 591; *Inland Steel Co. v. King*, 184 Ind. 294, 110 N. E. 62; *Devine v. Chicago & C. R. R. Co.*, 168 Ill. App. 450; *Wallin v. Arcadia & B. R. Ry. Co.*, 172 Mich. 466, 138 N. W. 270; *Wright v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co.* (D. C.) 197 Fed. 94.

<sup>82</sup> *Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Callaghan*, 155 Fed. 897, 83 C. C. A. 669, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361; *King v. Ford*, 121 App. Div. 404, 106 N. Y. Supp. 50; *Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Prezezdziakowski*, 170 Ind. 1, 83 N. E. 626, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, 127 Am. St. Rep. 352; *Pagan v. Southern Ry.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32; *Grandin v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 30 Utah, 360, 85 Pac. 357. He does not assume the risk arising from the carelessness of an incompetent servant of whose incapability he is ignorant. *Baldwin v. American Writing Paper Co.*, 196 Mass. 402, 82 N. E. 1. Nor of negligence of such nature that it could not have been anticipated. *Vindicator Consol. Gold Min. Co. v. Firstbrook*, 36 Colo. 498, 86 Pac. 313, 10 Ann. Cas. 1108. Under statutes in some states the risk of negligence of a fellow servant is not assumed. *Phinney v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.*, 122 Iowa, 488, 98 N. W. 358; *Rhodes v. Des Moines, I. F. & N. Ry. Co.*, 139 Iowa, 327, 115 N. W. 503; *Malcom v. Fuller*, 152 Mass. 160, 25 N. E. 83; *Graves v. Union Oil Co.*, 36 Cal. App. 766, 173 Pac. 618; *Lusk v. Phelps* (Okl.) 175 Pac. 756. Under the federal Employers' Liability Act a railroad employé does not assume the risk of injury from the negligence of a fellow servant. *Portland Terminal Co. v. Jarvis*, 227 Fed. 8, 141 C. C. A. 562. See, also, *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Branson*, 242 U. S. 623, 37 Sup. Ct. 244, 61 L. Ed. 534, reversing 128 Md. 678, 98 Atl. 225; *Anest v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co.*, 89 Wash. 609, 154 Pac. 1100.

<sup>83</sup> 4 Metc. 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339.

<sup>84</sup> See, generally, *Johnson v. Boston & M. R. R.*, 78 Vt. 344, 62 Atl. 1021, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 856; *Lapre v. Woronco St. Ry. Co.*, 196 Mass. 363, 82 N. E. 9; *Beleal v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.*, 15 N. D. 318, 108 N. W. 33, 11 Ann. Cas. 921; *Fallon v. Mertz*, 110 App. Div. 755, 97 N. Y. Supp. 417; *Louisville*

When we seek for a rule which will determine when the relationship of fellow servants exists, so as to exempt the master from liability, we meet with a hopeless conflict in the decisions. It is impossible to state any rule that will apply in all the states, or even in any considerable number of them. There is no question in the law of master and servant upon which there is greater conflict and confusion in the cases. Not even are the decisions of the same court always consistent.

In order that the rule may apply, it is necessary that the servants shall have a common master.<sup>35</sup> It is not enough for the employment to be the same, if the masters are different.<sup>36</sup> If a mas-

& N. R. Co. v. Wyatt's Adm'r, 93 S. W. 601, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 437; *Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co.*, 125 Ga. 671, 54 S. E. 663; *McDonald v. California Timber Co.*, 7 Cal. App. 375, 94 Pac. 376; *Nebo Coal Co. v. Barnett*, 167 Ky. 170, 180 S. W. 79; *Gallant v. Great Northern Paper Co.*, 114 Me. 208, 95 Atl. 889; *Devonish v. Imperial Investing Corp.* (Sup.) 155 N. Y. Supp. 787; *Curtis Shumway v. Williams* (Va.) 86 S. E. 848; *Atoka Coal & Mining Co. v. Miller*, 7 Ind. T. 104, 104 S. W. 555; *McMahon v. Bangs*, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 178, 62 Atl. 1098. If, however, the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the master and a fellow servant, the master is not relieved from liability. *Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Prezezdziankowski*, 170 Ind. 1, 83 N. E. 626, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, 127 Am. St. Rep. 352; *Trickey v. Clark*, 50 Or. 516, 93 Pac. 457; *Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 129 Iowa, 747, 106 N. W. 177; *Moore v. St. Louis Transit Co.*, 193 Mo. 411, 91 S. W. 1060; *Root v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.*, 195 Mo. 348, 92 S. W. 621, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212; *Conine v. Olympia Logging Co.*, 42 Wash. 50, 84 Pac. 407; *Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co.*, 129 Wis. 98, 108 N. W. 48; *Ryan v. Delaware & Hudson Co.*, 114 App. Div. 268, 99 N. Y. Supp. 794. This exception applies, also when the negligence of the master is that of a vice principal. *Roebling Const. Co. v. Thompson*, 229 Ill. 42, 82 N. E. 196; *Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Kimmel*, 221 Ill. 547, 77 N. E. 936.

<sup>35</sup> *Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Callaghan*, 155 Fed. 397, 83 C. C. A. 669, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361; *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hendricks*, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 314, 108 S. W. 745; *Fisher v. Minegeaux*, 73 N. J. Law, 424, 63 Atl. 902. When the injured servant at the time of the injury occupied the position of a mere licensee in a vehicle driven by another servant of the same master, the relation of fellow servant did not exist. *Pigeon v. Lane*, 80 Conn. 237, 67 Atl. 886, 11 Ann. Cas. 371.

<sup>36</sup> 2 *Jag. Torts*, 1033, 1034; *Sullivan v. Railroad Co.*, 112 N. Y. 643, 20 N. E. 569, 8 Am. St. Rep. 793; *Powers v. Maine Central R. R.*, 114 Me. 198, 95 Atl. 879; *Ellinghouse v. Ajax Live-Stock Co.*, 51 Mont. 275, 152 Pac. 481, L. R. A. 1916D, 836; *Kelly v. Tyra*, 103 Minn. 176, 114 N. W. 750, 115 N. W. 636, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 334; *Droge v. John N. Robins Co.*, 123 App. Div. 537, 108 N. Y. Supp. 457; *Johnson v. Spear*, 76 Mich. 130, 42 N. W. 1092, 15 Am. St. Rep. 298; *Kelly v. Johnson*, 128 Mass. 530, 35 Am. Rep. 398; *Phillips v. Railway Co.*, 64 Wis. 475, 25 N. W. 544. The rule, for instance, does not apply to servants of different masters working on the same building. *Morgan v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 570, 35 N. E. 101; *McDonough v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co.*, 111

ter lends or hires his servant to another for a particular employment, he becomes, as to that employment, a servant of the person to whom he is lent or hired, and a fellow servant of the servants of such person.<sup>37</sup>

A person who, without any employment, voluntarily undertakes to perform services for another, or to assist the servants of another in the service of the master, either at the request or without the request of such servants, who have no authority to employ other servants, stands in the relation of a servant, for the time being, and is to be regarded as assuming all the risks incident to the business, including the risk of injuries from the negligence of fellow servants.<sup>38</sup>

"The English courts determine the relationship of fellow servants by the test of common employment. \* \* \* The American cases incline to adopt, as the test of whether the plaintiff and another servant are fellow servants of the same master, the doctrine of vice principal. A vice principal, as distinguished from a fellow servant, is one to whom the master has delegated some absolute duty owed by the master to his servants. For the negligence of such vice principal—at least, so long as he is engaged in the performance of such duty—the master is responsible to other

App. Div. 585, 98 N. Y. Supp. 90; *Burrill v. Eddy*, 160 Mass. 198, 35 N. E. 483. So, servants of different railroad companies, operating connecting lines, are not within the rule. *Sullivan v. Railroad Co.*, 112 N. Y. 643, 20 N. C. 569, 8 Am. St. Rep. 793; *Jennings v. Philadelphia, B. & W. Ry. Co.*, 29 App. D. C. 219, 10 Ann. Cas. 761; 2 *Jag. Torts*, 1035, and cases there cited. So, also, the servants of a man are not the fellow servants of the servants of an independent contractor employed by him on a piece of work. *Coughtry v. Woolen Co.*, 56 N. Y. 124, 15 Am. Rep. 387; *Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Erickson*, 39 Mich. 492, 33 Am. Rep. 423; *Goodfellow v. Railroad Co.*, 106 Mass. 461; 2 *Jag. Torts*, 1036, and cases cited.

<sup>37</sup> *Hasty v. Sears*, 157 Mass. 123, 31 N. E. 759, 34 Am. St. Rep. 267; *Cregan v. Marston*, 126 N. Y. 573, 27 N. E. 952, 22 Am. St. Rep. 854; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cox*, 21 Ill. 20, 71 Am. Dec. 298.

<sup>38</sup> There are some cases against this doctrine, or apparently so. It is supported, however, by the great weight of authority. *Street Ry. Co. v. Bolton*, 43 Ohio St. 224, 1 N. E. 333, 54 Am. Rep. 803; *Jackson v. Southern Ry.*, 73 S. O. 557, 54 S. E. 231; *Mayton v. Railway Co.*, 63 Tex. 77, 51 Am. Rep. 637; *New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Harrison*, 48 Miss. 112, 12 Am. Rep. 356; *Flower v. Railroad Co.*, 69 Pa. 210, 8 Am. Rep. 251; *Osborne v. Railroad Co.*, 68 Me. 49, 28 Am. Rep. 16. This doctrine applies to volunteers only. It does not apply to passengers or shippers, or their servants, assisting the employees of a carrier to remove impediments to travel, or to expedite delivery of goods. *Wright v. London & N. W. R. Co.*, 1 Q. B. Div. 252; *Street Ry. Co. v. Bolton*,

servants."<sup>39</sup> It is the well established rule that the duty which a master owes his servant to furnish safe premises and appliances, and competent fellow servants, and to promulgate proper rules, is a personal duty, of which he cannot relieve himself by delegating it to an agent or employé.<sup>40</sup> If he intrusts this duty to a servant, he makes him, to that extent, a vice principal, and not a fellow servant, of the other servants.<sup>41</sup> If the servant intrusted with such duties is negligent in the performance of them, and injury thereby results to another servant, the negligence is that of the master, and he is liable.<sup>42</sup> Thus far the courts in this country agree. But

43 Ohio St. 224, 1 N. E. 333, 54 Am. Rep. 803; *Eason v. Railway Co.*, 65 Tex. 577, 57 Am. Rep. 606. But see *Potter v. Faulkner*, 1 Best & S. 800.

<sup>39</sup> 2 Jag. Torts, 1036, 1037. And see *Bailey, Mast. Liab.* 226-393, where the question is considered at length and the doctrine in each state set forth.

<sup>40</sup> *Parry Mfg. Co. v. Eaton*, 41 Ind. App. 81, 83 N. E. 510; *Harper v. Iola Portland Cement Co.*, 76 Kan. 612, 93 Pac. 179, 93 Pac. 343; *Kiley v. Rutland R. Co.*, 80 Vt. 536, 68 Atl. 713, 13 Ann. Cas. 269; *Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co.*, 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292; *National Fire Proofing Co. v. Andrews*, 158 Fed. 294, 85 C. C. A. 526; *Gussart v. Greenleaf Stone Co.*, 134 Wis. 418, 114 N. W. 799; *Kane v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.*, 75 N. J. Law, 698, 67 Atl. 1014; *Schminkey v. T. M. Sinclair & Co.*, 137 Iowa, 130, 114 N. W. 612; *Hatch v. Pike Mfg. Co.*, 73 N. H. 521, 63 Atl. 306; *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wise* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 465; *El Paso & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith*, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 108 S. W. 988. See, also, ante, p. 615.

<sup>41</sup> *Harper v. Iola Portland Cement Co.*, 76 Kan. 612, 93 Pac. 179, 93 Pac. 343; *Bailey v. Swallow*, 98 Minn. 104, 107 N. W. 727; *Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co.*, 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292; *Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Rice*, 40 Ind. App. 726, 82 N. E. 1007; *Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Thil*, 128 Ill. App. 249, affirmed, 228 Ill. 233, 81 N. E. 857; *Illinois Steel Co. v. Ziemkowski*, 220 Ill. 324, 77 N. E. 190, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161; *Cleveland, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Austin*, 127 Ill. App. 281; *Lammi v. Milford Pink Granite Quarries*, 196 Mass. 336, 82 N. E. 26; *El Paso & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith*, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 108 S. W. 988; *Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wise* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 465; *Clegg v. Seaboard Steel Casting Co.*, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 63.

<sup>42</sup> *Donahue v. C. H. Buck & Co.*, 197 Mass. 550, 83 N. E. 1090, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 476; *Lammi v. Milford Pink Granite Quarries*, 196 Mass. 336, 82 N. E. 26; *Byrne v. Learnard*, 191 Mass. 269, 77 N. E. 316; *Sampson v. Holbrook*, 192 Mass. 421, 78 N. E. 127; *Parry Mfg. Co. v. Eaton*, 41 Ind. App. 81, 83 N. E. 510; *Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Rice*, 40 Ind. App. 726, 82 N. E. 1007; *Harper v. Iola Portland Cement Co.*, 76 Kan. 612, 93 Pac. 179, 93 Pac. 343; *Southern R. Co. v. Rutledge*, 4 Ga. App. 80, 60 S. E. 1011; *Ongaro v. Twohy*, 49 Wash. 93, 94 Pac. 916; *Stecher Cooperage Works v. Steadman*, 78 Ark. 381, 94 S. W. 41; *Archer-Foster Const. Co. v. Vaughn*, 79 Ark. 20, 94 S. W. 717. But the master is not responsible for an error in judgment or even negligence on the part of the servant in carrying out details which the master could delegate. *Vogel v. American Bridge*

when we go a step further we meet with a conflict in the decisions of the various courts.

In New York this doctrine is made the test of the relation of fellow servant, and the rank or grade of the negligent servant is immaterial. It is said in a leading New York case: "The liability of the master does not depend upon the grade or rank of the employé whose negligence causes the injury. A superintendent of a factory, although having power to employ men, or represent the master in other respects, is, in the management of the machinery, a fellow servant of the other operatives. On the same principle, however low the grade or rank of the employé, the master is liable for injuries caused by him to another servant, if they result from the omission of some duty of the master, which he has confided to such inferior employé. \* \* \* The liability of the master is thus made to depend upon the character of the act in the performance of which the injury arises, without regard to the rank of the employé performing it. If it is one pertaining to the duty the master owes to his servants, he is responsible to them for the manner of its performance. The converse of the proposition necessarily follows. If the act is one which pertains only to the duty of an operative, the employé performing it is a mere servant, and the master, although liable to strangers, is not liable to a fellow servant, for its improper performance."<sup>48</sup>

Co., 180 N. Y. 373, 73 N. E. 1, 70 L. R. A. 725; *Agresta v. Stevenson*, 112 App. Div. 367, 98 N. Y. Supp. 594.

<sup>48</sup> *Crispin v. Babbitt*, 81 N. Y. 516, 37 Am. Rep. 521. And see *McCosker v. Railroad Co.*, 84 N. Y. 77; *Slater v. Jewett*, 85 N. Y. 74, 39 Am. Rep. 627; *Brick v. Railroad Co.*, 98 N. Y. 211; *Finnigan v. New York Contracting Co.*, 122 App. Div. 712, 107 N. Y. Supp. 855; *Gallagher v. Newman*, 190 N. Y. 444, 83 N. E. 480, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 146; *Droge v. John N. Robins Co.*, 123 App. Div. 537, 108 N. Y. Supp. 457; *QUINLAN v. LACKAWANNA STEEL CO.*, 191 N. Y. 329, 84 N. E. 73, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 336; *Ozogar v. Pierce, Butler & Pierce Mfg. Co.*, 55 Misc. Rep. 579, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1087; *Castner Electrolytic Alkali Co. v. Davies*, 154 Fed. 938, 83 C. C. A. 510. See, also, *Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Barker*, 169 Ind. 670, 83 N. E. 369, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 542, 14 Ann. Cas. 375; *Tilley v. Rockingham County Light & Power Co.*, 74 N. H. 316, 67 Atl. 946; *Pagan v. Southern Ry.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 1105; *Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply Co.*, 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460; *Doerr v. Daily News Pub. Co.*, 97 Minn. 248, 106 N. W. 1044; *Chesson v. Walker*, 146 N. C. 511, 60 S. E. 422. In *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wise* (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 465, it was held that employes charged with the duty of keeping a place to work and machinery in a safe condition, and of inspecting the same, are vice principals of the employer, regardless of their rank. See, also, *New England Telephone & Tele-*

This doctrine is recognized, with some variations, in most states. All the courts agree to so much of the doctrine as holds that a master who intrusts a personal duty to a servant makes that servant, *pro hac vice*, a vice principal, and that he is liable to the other servants for his negligence in the performance of those duties.<sup>44</sup>

*graph Co. v. Butler*, 156 Fed. 321, 84 C. C. A. 217; *Williamson Iron Co. v. McQueen*, 144 Ala. 265, 40 South. 306; *Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co.*, 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292. Whether employ es are fellow servants does not depend on the rank or grade of the negligent servant, but on the nature and character of the act in the performance of which the injury occurred. *McKillop v. Superior Shipbuilding Co.*, 143 Wis. 454, 127 N. W. 1053. But see *Cody v. Longyear*, 103 Minn. 116, 114 N. W. 735, where it was held that if a vice principal orders a workman into a place of danger, and then, without warning, starts machinery by an act which would have been performed by him in the capacity of a fellow servant, he will be held to have acted as a vice principal in starting the machine, as well as in the previous act which placed the employ e in a dangerous situation.

<sup>44</sup> See the dictum in *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh*, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772. See also, *Pressley v. Incorporated Town of Sallislaw*, 54 Okl. 747, 154 Pac. 660, and the cases cited hereafter in this note. Employ es intrusted with furnishing safe premises and machinery and appliances are not fellow servants with those who use them, so as to exempt the master from liability for their negligence; but in respect to this duty they stand in the place of the master, and are vice principals. *Lewis v. Seifert*, 116 Pa. 628, 11 Atl. 514, 2 Am. St. Rep. 631; *Clegg v. Seaboard Steel Casting Co.*, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 63; *Thurber Brick Co. v. Matthews* (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 1189; *Bailey v. Swallow*, 98 Minn. 104, 107 N. W. 727; *Bensing v. Steinway*, 101 N. Y. 547, 5 N. E. 449; *Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills*, 66 Me. 420, 426; *McElligott v. Randolph*, 61 Conn. 157, 22 Atl. 1094, 29 Am. St. Rep. 181; *Brown v. Gilchrist*, 80 Mich. 56, 43 N. W. 82, 20 Am. St. Rep. 496; *Cadden v. American Steel-Barge Co.*, 88 Wis. 409, 60 N. W. 800; *Lawless v. Railroad Co.*, 136 Mass. 1; *Houston v. Brush*, 66 Vt. 331, 29 Atl. 380; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery*, 109 Ill. 315; *Nixon v. Lead Co.*, 102 Cal. 458, 36 Pac. 808; *Krueger v. Railway Co.*, 111 Ind. 51, 11 N. E. 957. Most courts apply the same rule to employ es intrusted with repairs of premises or appliances. *Fuller v. Jewett*, 80 N. Y. 46, 36 Am. Rep. 575; *Corcoran v. Holbrook*, 59 N. Y. 517, 17 Am. Rep. 369; *Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills*, *supra*; *Roux v. Lumber Co.*, 94 Mich. 607, 54 N. W. 492; *Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McMullen*, 117 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287, 10 Am. St. Rep. 67; *Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Herbert*, 116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; *Lewis v. Railroad Co.*, 59 Mo. 495, 21 Am. Rep. 385; *Tierney v. Railway Co.*, 33 Minn. 311, 23 N. W. 229, 53 Am. Rep. 35; *Calvo v. Railroad Co.*, 23 S. C. 526, 55 Am. Rep. 28; *Davis v. Railroad Co.*, 55 Vt. 84, 45 Am. Rep. 590; *Moon's Adm'r v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Va. 745, 49 Am. Rep. 401. The Massachusetts court holds that employ es intrusted with ordinary repairs are fellow servants of the employ es who use the premises or appliances. *Johnson v. Towboat Co.*, 135 Mass. 211, 46 Am. Rep. 458; *McGee v. Cordage Co.*, 139 Mass. 445, 1 N. E. 745; *Moynihan v. Hills Co.*, 146 Mass. 586, 16 N. E. 574, 4 Am. St. Rep. 348; *Mellen v. Thomas Wilson Sons & Co.*, 159 Mass. 88, 34 N. E. 96. But even in Massachusetts the master is required to use reasonable care and supervision to see that repairs

Most courts also hold that if the duty which the master delegates to a servant is not one of his own personal duties, but a duty which

are made when needed by those to whom he intrusts the duty. *Rogers v. Manufacturing Co.*, 144 Mass. 204, 11 N. E. 77, 59 Am. Rep. 68; *Babcock v. Railway Co.*, 150 Mass. 470, 23 N. E. 325. As to concurrent negligence of master and fellow servant, see *Union Cotton Mills v. Harris*, 144 Ga. 718, 87 S. E. 1029; *Budde v. United States Incandescent Lamp Co.*, 193 Mo. App. 154, 181 S. W. 1034. An employé to whom the master intrusts the duty of determining where the other employés are to work is a vice principal, and not their fellow servant in the performance of this duty, and the master is liable to the other servants for the negligence of such servant in not keeping the premises in a safe condition. *Cole Bros. v. Wood*, 11 Ind. App. 37, 36 N. E. 1074. So, also, it is held in some states, perhaps in most, that the duty of inspection, like that of repair, is one which the master cannot delegate so as to be exempt from liability for the negligence of the employé to whom he intrusts it; and that an inspector of premises, machinery, and appliances is not a fellow servant with those who use them. *Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Herbert*, 116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; *Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McMullen*, 117 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287, 10 Am. St. Rep. 67; *Kiley v. Rutland R. Co.*, 80 Vt. 536, 68 Atl. 713, 13 Ann. Cas. 269; *Fay v. Railway Co.*, 80 Minn. 231, 15 N. W. 241; *Tierney v. Railway Co.*, 33 Minn. 311, 23 N. W. 229, 53 Am. Rep. 35; *Macy v. Railroad Co.*, 35 Minn. 200, 28 N. W. 249. Thus in *Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pierman*, 4 Ohio App. 8, it was held that an inspector for a street railway company is not the fellow servant of a motorman. In other states it is held that a master performs his duty when he furnishes a competent inspector, and that the negligence of the inspector causing injury to another employé is the negligence of a fellow servant. *Mackin v. Boston & A. R. R.*, 135 Mass. 201, 46 Am. Rep. 456; *Smith v. Potter*, 46 Mich. 258, 9 N. W. 273, 41 Am. Rep. 161; *Dewey v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co.*, 97 Mich. 329, 52 N. W. 942, 56 N. W. 756, 16 L. R. A. 342, 22 L. R. A. 292, 37 Am. St. Rep. 348. But even when the master employs an inspector, if the servants are to test the machinery before using, that does not make the servant an inspector, so as to render the master liable as for the act of a vice principal, when the servant has been negligent. *Fogarty v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 151 Cal. 785, 91 Pac. 650. An employé intrusted with the duty of employing competent servants, and a sufficient number of them, is, as to such duty, a vice principal, and not a fellow servant of the other employés. *Laning v. Railroad Co.*, 49 N. Y. 521, 10 Am. Rep. 417; *Flike v. Railroad Co.*, 53 N. Y. 549, 13 Am. Rep. 545; *Core v. Railroad Co.*, 38 W. Va. 456, 18 S. E. 596; *Cheaney v. Steamship Co.*, 92 Ga. 726, 19 S. E. 33, 44 Am. St. Rep. 113; dictum in *Quincy Min. Co. v. Kitts*, 42 Mich. 34, 3 N. W. 240. Thus, where an engineer, having authority, places an inexperienced and incompetent fireman in charge of an engine, the company is liable for unavoidable injuries that result to other employés by such fireman's unskillful management of the engine, for the reason that it is a breach of the duty the company owes to its employés to exercise ordinary care in providing and retaining competent servants. *Core v. Railroad Co.*, 38 W. Va. 456, 18 S. E. 596. The duty to promulgate necessary and proper rules, as to promulgate time-tables of a railroad, is the master's duty; and, if he delegates it to a servant, the latter is a vice principal in respect to such duty. *Slater v. Jewett*, 85 N. Y. 61, 39 Am. Rep. 627; *Lewis v. Seifert*, 116

may be so delegated, he is not to be held liable to his other servants for that servant's negligence in performing it; for as to such a duty the servant is to be regarded as their fellow servant, whatever may have been his relative grade or rank.<sup>45</sup> The difficulty,

Pa. 628, 11 Atl. 514, 2 Am. St. Rep. 631. In the latter case the employé was a train dispatcher, vested with authority to change the schedule time, and make new time-tables; and he was held a vice principal as to train hands. And in a late New York case it was held that the train dispatcher of a division, who, in directing the movements of two trains, which are being run entirely on special orders, makes a mistake, whereby the trains collide, is a vice principal as to the employés on the trains. *Hankins v. Railroad Co.*, 142 N. Y. 416, 37 N. E. 466, 25 L. R. A. 396, 40 Am. St. Rep. 616. And see to the same effect, *Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. Barry*, 58 Ark. 196, 23 S. W. 1097, 25 L. R. A. 386; *Hunn v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Mich. 513, 44 N. W. 502, 7 L. R. A. 500; *Darrigan v. Railroad Co.*, 52 Conn. 285, 52 Am. Rep. 590. Contra, *Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Hoover*, 79 Md. 253, 29 Atl. 994, 25 L. R. A. 710, 47 Am. St. Rep. 392; *Robertson v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Ind. 77, 41 Am. Rep. 552. So, too, it has been held in *Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Doughty*, 77 Ark. 1, 91 S. W. 768, that a train dispatcher, who governs the movement of trains and issues running orders, and the conductor, under whose direction the train is actually run, are not fellow servants of a fireman on the train.

<sup>45</sup> A railroad company may delegate the duty of running its trains, and, under the doctrine above stated, it will not be liable to a brakeman or fireman, or to any other employé riding or working on a train, for the negligence of the conductor or engineer. They are all fellow servants. *Slater v. Jewett*, 85 N. Y. 61, 39 Am. Rep. 627; *Russell v. Railroad Co.*, 17 N. Y. 134; *Hayes v. Railroad Corp.*, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 270; *Capper v. Railroad Co.*, 103 Ind. 305, 2 N. E. 749; *Thayer v. Railroad Co.*, 22 Ind. 26, 85 Am. Dec. 409; *Evansville & R. R. Co. v. Henderson*, 134 Ind. 636, 33 N. E. 1021; *Ellington v. Lumber Co.*, 93 Ga. 53, 19 S. E. 21; *Howland v. Railway Co.*, 54 Wis. 226, 11 N. W. 529; *Smith v. Potter*, 46 Mich. 258, 9 N. W. 273, 41 Am. Rep. 161; *Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wheless*, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 741, 43 Am. Rep. 317. And see *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh*, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772. But compare this case with *Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross*, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184, 28 L. Ed. 787. And see *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley*, 54 Fla. 311, 45 South. 761, holding that a conductor is vice principal in his relation to a brakeman on the same train, to the same effect, see *Southern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Baker*, 37 Ind. App. 405, 77 N. E. 64; *Wilson v. Southern Ry.*, 73 S. C. 481, 53 S. E. 968. See, also, *Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kallock*, 140 Tenn. 391, 204 S. W. 1157, holding that a boiler maker and his assistant are fellow servants. See, however, the following cases in which the employés were held fellow servants: *Mate and common sailor upon a merchant vessel*, *Benson v. Goodwin*, 147 Mass. 237, 17 N. E. 517; *foreman or other superior employé and laborer under him*, *Duffy v. Upton*, 113 Mass. 544; *Moody v. Manufacturing Co.*, 159 Mass. 70, 34 N. E. 185, 33 Am. St. Rep. 396; *Gonsior v. Railway Co.*, 86 Minn. 385, 31 N. W. 515; *Olson v. Railway Co.*, 38 Minn. 117, 35 N. W. 866; *Brown v. Railroad Co.*, 27 Minn. 162, 6 N. W. 484, 38 Am. Rep. 285; *Morovick v. Inland Steel Co.*, 131 Minn. 53, 154 N. W. 735; *Reid v. Medley's Adm'r*, 118 Va. 402, 37 S. E. 616; *Hanna v. Granger*, 18 R. I. 507, 28 Atl. 659; *Di Mar-*

as is shown by the illustrations given in the note, is in determining, in the application of this doctrine, whether the duty in the performance of which the servant was negligent was or was not one which the master could delegate.

If the master intrusts the entire conduct and control of his business, or a part of it, to an employé, the latter stands in the master's place, and is not to be regarded as a fellow servant of the other employés. "Whenever the business conducted by the person selected by the master is such that the person selected is invested with full control (subject to no one's supervision, except the master's) over the action of the employés engaged in carrying on a particular branch of the master's business, and, acting upon his own discretion, according to general instructions laid down for his guidance, it is his province to direct, and the duty of the employés to obey, then he stands in the place of the master, and is not a fellow servant with those whom he controls." <sup>46</sup> Such an employé, it has been said, is not a servant at all, but an agent.

In a few states the New York doctrine is not recognized, but, on the contrary, the rank or grade of the negligent servant, and not merely the scope of his duties and nature of the act or omission,

cho v. Iron Foundry, 18 R. I. 514, 27 Atl. 328, 28 Atl. 661; Lawler v. Railroad Co., 62 Me. 463, 16 Am. Rep. 492; Stutz v. Armour, 84 Wis. 623, 54 N. W. 1000; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405, 13 N. W. 219; Johnson v. Water Co., 77 Wis. 51, 45 N. W. 807; Peschel v. Railway Co., 62 Wis. 338, 21 N. W. 269; Dube v. City of Lewiston, 83 Me. 211, 22 Atl. 112; Cullen v. Norton, 126 N. Y. 1, 26 N. E. 905; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 240, 42 Am. Rep. 543; Peterson v. Mining Co., 50 Iowa, 674, 32 Am. Rep. 143; Doerr v. Daily News Pub. Co., 97 Minn. 248, 106 N. W. 1044; American Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. 605, 75 C. C. A. 407, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041; Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Callaghan, 155 Fed. 397, 83 C. C. A. 660, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361. That a negligent servant is a foreman does not change the fellow servant rule, unless he is at the time representing the master. Gallant v. Great Northern Paper Co., 114 Me. 208, 95 Atl. 889.

<sup>46</sup> Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 513, 44 N. W. 502, 7 L. R. A. 500. And see Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517, 17 Am. Rep. 369; Sheehan v. Railroad Co., 91 N. Y. 332; Pantzar v. Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 368, 2 N. E. 24; Taylor v. Railway Co., 121 Ind. 124, 22 N. E. 876, 6 L. R. A. 584, 16 Am. St. Rep. 372; Mitchell v. Robinson, 30 Ind. 281, 41 Am. Rep. 812; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. 628, 11 Atl. 514, 2 Am. St. Rep. 631; Mullan v. Steamship Co., 78 Pa. 25, 21 Am. Rep. 2; Chicago Anderson Pressed-Brick Co. v. Sobkowiak, 148 Ill. 573, 36 N. E. 572; Brothers v. Cartter, 52 Mo. 373, 14 Am. Rep. 424; Dobbin v. Railroad Co., 81 N. C. 446, 31 Am. Rep. 512; Hamann v. Milwaukee Bridge Co., 127 Wis. 550, 106 N. W. 1081, 7 Ann. Cas. 458; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hartell, 157 Fed. 667, 85 C. C. A. 335; Henrietta Coal Co. v. Martin, 221 Ill. 460, 77 N. E. 902, affirming 122 Ill. App. 354; Moore v. King Mfg. Co., 124 Ga. 576, 53 S. E. 107.

is considered, in determining his character. It is held in these states that if one servant is placed in control of the others, as a foreman, for instance, he does not occupy the relation of their fellow servant. "No service is common," said the Ohio Court in applying this doctrine, "that does not admit a common participation, and no servants are fellow servants when one is placed in control over the other."<sup>47</sup> The Supreme Court of the United States

<sup>47</sup> *Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Keary*, 3 Ohio St. 201. The leading case holding this doctrine is *Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens*, 20 Ohio, 415. *Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft*, 31 Ohio St. 291, 27 Am. Rep. 510; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Collins*, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 114, 87 Am. Dec. 486; *Newport News & M. Val. Co. v. Dentzel's Adm'r*, 91 Ky. 42, 14 S. W. 958; *Miller v. Railway Co.*, 109 Mo. 350, 19 S. W. 58, 32 Am. St. Rep. 673; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Spence*, 93 Tenn. 173, 33 S. W. 211, 42 Am. St. Rep. 907; *Moon's Adm'r v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Va. 745, 49 Am. Rep. 401; *Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Lundstrom*, 16 Neb. 254, 20 N. W. 198, 49 Am. Rep. 718. And see *Madden's Adm'r v. Railway Co.*, 28 W. Va. 610, 57 Am. Rep. 695. Thus, according to this doctrine, it is held that a foreman in charge of hands engaged in a particular piece of work is not their fellow servant in respect to such work. *Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Lavalley*, 36 Ohio St. 221; *Miller v. Railway Co.*, 109 Mo. 350, 19 S. W. 58, 32 Am. St. Rep. 673; *Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Lundstrom*, 16 Neb. 254, 20 N. W. 198, 49 Am. Rep. 718. And it is held that a conductor having control of a train is not a fellow servant of the brakeman, fireman, or engineer. *Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Spangler*, 44 Ohio St. 471, 8 N. E. 467, 58 Am. Rep. 833; *Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens*, 20 Ohio, 415; *Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Keary*, 3 Ohio St. 201; *Haney v. Railway Co.*, 38 W. Va. 570, 18 S. E. 748; *Newport News & M. Val. Co. v. Dentzel's Adm'r*, 91 Ky. 42, 14 S. W. 958; *Moon's Adm'r v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Va. 745, 49 Am. Rep. 401; *Miller v. Railway Co.*, 109 Mo. 350, 19 S. W. 58, 32 Am. St. Rep. 673; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Spence*, 93 Tenn. 173, 23 S. W. 211, 42 Am. St. Rep. 907; *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley*, 54 Fla. 311, 45 South. 761. An engineer is vice principal, and not fellow servant, of his fireman. *Pagan v. Southern Ry.*, 78 S. C. 413, 59 S. E. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 1105. The fact that the foreman or superintendent sometimes acts in the capacity of a collaborer does not affect his status as a vice principal. *Chicago Anderson Pressed Brick Co. v. Sobkowiak*, 148 Ill. 573, 36 N. E. 572; *Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Kimmel*, 221 Ill. 547, 77 N. E. 936; *MARQUETTE CEMENT MFG. CO. v. WILLIAMS*, 230 Ill. 26, 82 N. E. 424; *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 335; *Hollweg v. Bell Telephone Co.*, 195 Mo. 149, 93 S. W. 262. But see *Whiters v. Mallory S. S. Co.*, 23 Ga. App. 47, 97 S. E. 453, holding that, when a vice principal enters upon duties relating solely to the work of a servant, he becomes a fellow servant. On the other hand, where the master places a servant under the command of another servant of the same grade, such other servant is a vice principal. *American Car & Foundry Co. v. Adams*, 178 Ind. 607, 97 N. E. 993. So where a general foreman told a servant to do what another servant should tell him to do, and then told such other servant to tell plaintiff what to do, such servant became a vice principal. *Bradshaw v. Standard Oil Co.*, 199 Mo. App. 688, 204 S. W. 831. And see *Day v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 284 Ill. 534, 120 N. E. 480, affirming 208 Ill. App. 351.

seems to have laid down this doctrine, in the *Ross Case*, decided in 1884, and its decision was so construed by the other courts;<sup>48</sup> but in the *Baugh Case*, decided in 1893, the contrary doctrine was recognized and affirmed.<sup>49</sup>

In England, and in most of the states in this country, servants of the same master, engaged in carrying forward the same common enterprise, are regarded as fellow servants, within the meaning of the general rule, although they may be in different and widely-separated departments. The rule "is not confined to the case of two servants working in company, or having opportunity to control or influence the conduct of each other, but extends to every case in which the two, deriving their authority and their compensation from the same source, are engaged in the same business, though in different departments of duty."<sup>50</sup> In Illinois, and several of the

<sup>48</sup> *Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross*, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184, 28 L. Ed. 787. In this case, approving the Ohio and Kentucky decisions, it was held that the conductor and engineer of a railroad train were not fellow servants. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion in this case. Mr. Justice Bradley, Mr. Justice Matthews, Mr. Justice Gray, and Mr. Justice Blatchford dissented.

<sup>49</sup> *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh*, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772. In this case it was held, purporting to distinguish the *Ross Case*, *supra*, that the engineer and fireman of a train were fellow servants, though the rules of the company declared that the engineer, under the circumstances should also be regarded as a conductor. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion in this case. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Field dissented.

<sup>50</sup> *Holden v. Fitchburg R. Co.*, 129 Mass. 268, 37 Am. Rep. 343; *Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp.*, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339; *Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co.*, 78 Mich. 288, 44 N. W. 270, 18 Am. St. Rep. 441; *Falla v. Pine Mountain Granite Co.*, 22 Ga. App. 651, 97 S. E. 114; *Lawler v. Androscoggin R. Co.*, 62 Me. 463, 16 Am. Rep. 492; *Doughty v. Penobscot Log Driving Co.*, 76 Me. 145; *Rose v. Boston & A. R. Co.*, 58 N. Y. 217; *Jenkins v. Richmond & D. R. Co.*, 39 S. C. 507, 18 S. E. 182, 39 Am. St. Rep. 750; *Neal v. Northern Pac. R. Co.*, 57 Minn. 365, 59 N. W. 312; *Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Callaghan*, 155 Fed. 397, 83 C. C. A. 669, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361; *Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Otte*, 157 Fed. 230, 84 C. C. A. 673; *Johnson v. Boston & M. R. R.*, 78 Vt. 344, 62 Atl. 1021, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 856; *Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith*, 107 Va. 553, 59 S. E. 372; *Wabash R. Co. v. Hassett*, 170 Ind. 370, 83 N. E. 705; *Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Barker*, 169 Ind. 670, 83 N. E. 369, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 542, 14 Ann. Cas. 375; *Church v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co.*, 78 Conn. 720, 63 Atl. 510; *Kenefick-Hammond Co. v. Rohr*, 77 Ark. 200, 91 S. W. 179; *Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hendricks*, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 314, 108 S. W. 745. Accordingly it has been held that the following employes are fellow servants: Locomotive engineer or conductor and switchman, *Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp.*, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339; engineer and brakeman, *Southern Ry. Co. v. Elliott*, 170 Ind. 273, 82 N. E. 1051; engineer and fireman, *Healy v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co.*, 111

other states, the rule is different; and servants employed by the same master, and in the same general enterprise, are not regarded as being fellow servants, within the rule exempting the master, unless their duties are such as to bring them into personal association, or unless they are actually co-operating at the time of the injury. If they are in entirely separate and distinct departments, the courts of these states apply the doctrine of respondeat superior, and hold the master liable.<sup>51</sup>

App. Div. 618, 97 N. Y. Supp. 801; engineer and locomotive cleaner, *Sage v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 219 Pa. 129, 67 Atl. 985; workmen in repair shop of railroad, who are being carried on a train, and a flagman or switchman, *Gilman v. Railroad Corp.*, 10 Allen (Mass.) 233, 87 Am. Dec. 635; laborers on railroad tracks or bridges and engineers or conductors of train, whether the former are injured while being carried on the train, or while at work on the road or bridge, *Seaver v. Railroad Co.*, 14 Gray (Mass.) 466; *Dick v. Railroad Co.*, 38 Ohio St. 389; *Russell v. Railroad Co.*, 17 N. Y. 134; *Evansville & R. R. Co. v. Henderson*, 134 Ind. 636, 33 N. E. 1021; *Schalble v. Railway Co.*, 97 Mich. 318, 56 N. W. 565, 21 L. R. A. 660; founder in a blast furnace, having charge of the inside work of the furnace, and the engineer of a locomotive used by the same company in moving cars on its premises, *Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co.*, 78 Mich. 288, 44 N. W. 270, 18 Am. St. Rep. 441; brakeman and car inspector, the latter being injured by the negligence of the former, *Potter v. New York, etc., R. Co.*, 136 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 603. As to the rule where the inspector is negligent, see ante, p. 624, note 39. Brakeman and men who make up trains, *Thyng v. Railroad Co.*, 156 Mass. 16, 30 N. E. 169, 32 Am. St. Rep. 425. Brakeman and switching crew, *Sonsmith v. Pere Marquette R. Co.*, 173 Mich. 57, 138 N. W. 347. Injured employé and blacksmith who dressed defective tools. *Wochner v. Pennsylvania Engineering Works*, 251 Pa. 188, 96 Atl. 471. Engineer in charge of engine operating tram cars and employé engaged in inspecting and keeping tramway in repair are fellow servants. *Larson v. Kleburtz*, 71 Wash. 231, 128 Pac. 216.

<sup>51</sup> *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda*, 93 Ill. 302, 34 Am. Rep. 168 (collecting the Illinois cases, and reviewing the doctrine); *Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Erickson*, 41 Neb. 1, 59 N. W. 347, 29 L. R. A. 137; *Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co. v. Rice*, 144 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 951; *Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co. v. Hawthorn*, 147 Ill. 226, 35 N. E. 534; *Bertelsen v. Rock Island Plow Co.*, 164 Ill. App. 459; *Irwin v. F. P. Gould & Son*, 99 Neb. 283, 156 N. W. 503; *Schlereth v. Railway Co.*, 115 Mo. 87, 21 S. W. 1110; *Card v. Eddy (Mo.)* 24 S. W. 746; *Moon's Adm'r v. Railroad Co.*, 78 Va. 745, 49 Am. Rep. 401; *Madden's Adm'r v. Railway Co.*, 28 W. Va. 610, 57 Am. Rep. 695; *St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weaver*, 35 Kan. 412, 11 Pac. 408, 57 Am. Rep. 176; *Kane v. Erie R. Co.*, 142 Fed. 682, 73 C. C. A. 672; *Lanning v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co.*, 196 Mo. 647, 94 S. W. 491; *LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BROWN*, 127 Ky. 732, 106 S. W. 795, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 552, 13 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1135, *Cooley Cas. Persons and Domestic Relations*, 331; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Tandy*, 107 S. W. 715, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 962; *St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dupree*, 84 Ark. 377, 105 S. W. 878, 120 Am. St. Rep. 74; *Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Nichols*, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 119, 92 S. W. 411; *Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Turner*, 99 Tex. 547, 91 S. W. 562. *Mo-*

### *Employers' Liability Acts*

Statutes known as "Employers' Liability Acts," defining the liability of the master for injuries to a servant, have been enacted by Congress and by the Legislatures of a number of states.<sup>52</sup> In some instances these statutes are merely declaratory of the common law,<sup>53</sup> but in others they establish rules differing in many respects from the rules laid down by the courts in the absence of statute.<sup>54</sup>

torman is not fellow servant of one repairing trolley wires. *Mansfield Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Barr*, 2 Ohio App. 367. Fallers in a logging camp are not fellow servants of members of the crew hauling logs from the woods, where they are left by the fallers. *Cunningham v. Adna Mill Co.*, 71 Wash. 111, 127 Pac. 850. Assistant millwrights, sent by employer's head millwright to repair a belt furnishing power to the machine where plaintiff is working, are not his fellow servants. *Courtols v. King Paper Co.*, 172 Mich. 305, 137 N. W. 699. In some of these cases the theory is definitely stated that only those are fellow servants who are directly co-operating with each other and who are in habitual association, so that they may observe and influence each other's conduct and exercise a mutual influence on each other promotive of proper caution. *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda*, 93 Ill. 302, 34 Am. Rep. 168; *Lyons v. Ryerson*, 242 Ill. 409, 90 N. E. 288; *Kaminsky v. Chicago Rys. Co.*, 286 Ill. 271, 121 N. E. 596, affirming 208 Ill. App. 304; *Gathman v. City of Chicago*, 127 Ill. App. 150; *Illinois Terminal R. Co. v. Chapin*, 128 Ill. App. 170, affirmed *Chaplin v. Illinois Terminal R. Co.*, 227 Ill. 166, 81 N. E. 15; *Illinois Steel Co. v. Ziemkowski*, 220 Ill. 324, 77 N. E. 190, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161; *Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co.*, 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292. Whether servants of a common master are fellow servants, within the meaning of the law, is usually a question of fact; but if the facts are not in dispute, and reasonable men would agree as to the conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts, the question whether the relation of fellow servant exists in a given case becomes a question of law. *Kamisky v. Chicago Rys. Co.*, 296 Ill. 596, 121 N. E. 596, affirming 208 Ill. App. 304. In *Linquist v. Hodges*, 248 Ill. 491, 84 N. E. 94, a cement worker was injured by the negligence of a bricklayer working in the same building. It was held that the first branch of the rule—that "they must be directly co-operating with each other," etc.—was not applicable, and the employes could not be held to be fellow servants as a matter of law under that branch of the rule. It was also held that whether they were fellow servants under the second branch of the rule—that their usual duties brought "them into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence on each other promotive of proper caution"—was a question of fact for the jury.

<sup>52</sup> U. S. Comp. St. § 8657 et seq.; Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 106; Laws N. Y. 1902, p. 1748, c. 600; Civ. Code Ala. 1907, § 3910; Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1901, §§ 7083-7087; Act Pa. June 10, 1907 (P. L. 523); Mills' Ann. St. Rev. Supp. Colo. 1891-1905, §§ 1511a, 1511f (Laws 1901, p. 161, c. 67).

<sup>53</sup> *Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Scott*, 29 Ind. App. 519, 64 N. E. 896. And see *Hess v. Adamant Mfg. Co.*, 66 Minn. 79, 68 N. W. 774, construing Gen. Laws Minn. 1895, p. 390, c. 173; *Congrave v. Southern Pac. R. Co.*, 88 Cal. 360, 26 Pac. 175, construing Civ. Code Cal. 1906, § 1970.

<sup>54</sup> *Columbus & W. Ry. Co. v. Bradford*, 86 Ala. 574, 6 South. 90. The Em-

In Massachusetts, a superintendent was regarded as the fellow servant of employ  s under him; but the employer's liability act<sup>55</sup> makes the master liable for injuries due to the negligence of a superintendent.<sup>56</sup> So, too, in some instances the master is made liable for the negligence of a superior employ   or agent.<sup>57</sup> As a general rule, under the various Employers' Liability Acts, federal and state, the servant does not assume the risk due to the negligence of the employer, extraordinary risks or the risk of negligence of a fellow servant.<sup>58</sup> The federal statute relates only to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and in many states the statutes relate only to railroad companies and their employ  s.<sup>59</sup>

employers' Liability Act takes the place of common-law liability when applicable. *Sumey v. Craig Mountain Lumber Co.*, 27 Idaho, 721, 152 Pac. 181. But in many states the act does not abolish the common-law remedy. *Kleps v. Bristol Mfg. Co.*, 189 N. Y. 516, 81 N. E. 765, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038; *St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Little*, 75 Kan. 716, 90 Pac. 447. The federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), in so far as it relates to intrastate carriers, supersedes the common law and state legislation. *Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland*, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 193, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; *Rowlands v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.*, 149 Wis. 51, 135 N. W. 156, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 714.

<sup>55</sup> Laws 1887, p. 899, c. 270; Rev. Laws 1902, c. 106.

<sup>56</sup> See *Malcolm v. Fuller*, 152 Mass. 160, 25 N. E. 83; *Davis v. Railroad Co.*, 159 Mass. 532, 34 N. E. 1070; *O'Brien v. Rideout*, 161 Mass. 170, 36 N. E. 792.

<sup>57</sup> *Evans v. Railway Co.*, 70 Miss. 527, 12 South. 581.

<sup>58</sup> *Sells v. Grand Trunk Ry.*, 206 Ill. App. 45; *Kustuvinn v. Chicago & A. R. Co.*, 209 Ill. App. 55, affirmed 287 Ill. 306, 122 N. E. 512; *Northern Alabama Ry. Co. v. Harper*, 201 Ala. 679, 79 South. 251; *Graves v. Union Oil Co.*, 36 Cal. App. 766, 173 Pac. 618; *Wood v. Danas*, 230 Mass. 587, 120 N. E. 159; *Dickinson v. Granberry* (Okla.) 174 Pac. 776. The federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) does not abolish the common-law rule as to the assumption of ordinary risks of employment. *King v. Norfolk S. R. Co.*, 176 N. C. 301, 97 S. E. 29, certiorari denied *Norfolk & S. R. Co. v. King*, 249 U. S. 599, 39 Sup. Ct. 257, 63 L. Ed. 795. Under the federal act there must be negligence to warrant a recovery. *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kemp*, 140 Ga. 657, 79 S. E. 558; *Nell v. Idaho & W. N. R. Co.*, 22 Idaho, 74, 125 Pac. 331. A violation of the Employers' Liability Act is negligence per se. *Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co.*, 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139.

<sup>59</sup> See, for example, Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 2873 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1655); *Bates' Ann. St. Ohio*, § 3365-22; *Code Iowa 1897*, § 2071; *Rev. Laws Minn. 1905*, § 2042; *Laws N. Y. 1906*, p. 1682, c. 657; *Const. Okl. art. 9, § 36*. See, also, *Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Oravage*, 229 Fed. 383, 143 C. C. A. 503 (construing the Pennsylvania act); *Basham v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co.*, 178 Iowa, 998, 154 N. W. 1019, 157 N. W. 192; *Hunter v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co.*, 110 Miss. 744, 70 South. 901; *Lusk v. Phelps* (Okla.) 175 Pac. 756. As to the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), see *Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Branson*, 242 U. S. 623, 37 Sup. Ct. 244, 61 L. Ed. 534, reversing 128 Md. 678, 98 Atl. 225; *Anest v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co.*, 89 Wash.

Whenever the question has been directly presented, the constitutionality of these statutes has been upheld.<sup>60</sup>

*Workmen's Compensation Acts*

In a large number of states statutes, known as Workmen's Compensation Acts, have been passed, which materially affect the liability of masters for injuries to their employes, arising out of or in the course of their employment.<sup>61</sup> The common-law theory of allowing recovery for the servant's injury only when the master is negligent is superseded by these acts, under which compensation for injury or death does not rest on the master's negligence, and is not defeated by the servant's contributory negligence, if it does not amount to actual misconduct.<sup>62</sup> It is not important who is at fault, or whether any one is, as the right to compensation is not based on the theory of tort.<sup>63</sup>

The Workmen's Compensation Acts are based on the broad economic theory that compensation for injury to or death of the workman is properly chargeable as part of the cost of industrial

609, 154 Pac. 1100. The Fellow Servant Act (Pub. Laws 1909, No. 104) applies to employes of street railroads. *Arends v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co.*, 172 Mich. 448, 138 N. W. 195.

<sup>60</sup> *Colorado Mill & Elevator Co. v. Mitchell*, 26 Colo. 284, 58 Pac. 28; *Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Houlihan*, 157 Ind. 494, 60 N. E. 943, 54 L. R. A. 787; *Powell v. Sherwood*, 162 Mo. 605, 63 S. W. 485; *Bucklew v. Central Iowa R. Co.*, 64 Iowa, 603, 21 N. W. 103; *Erie R. Co. v. Kane*, 155 Fed. 118, 83 C. C. A. 564; *Schradin v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.* (Sup.) 109 N. Y. Supp. 428. Federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665): *Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.*, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; *Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert*, 224 U. S. 603, 32 Sup. Ct. 589, 56 L. Ed. 911.

<sup>61</sup> The first Compensation Act enacted in the United States was the New York law of 1910 (Laws 1910, c. 674). Laws are now in force in over 30 states and territories. In Europe similar legislation took place at a much earlier date. The first legislation of this character was the German Compensation Act of 1884. Austria followed in 1887, Norway in 1894, Finland in 1895, and Great Britain in 1897. Workmen's Compensation Acts are now in force in over 25 jurisdictions outside of the United States.

<sup>62</sup> *Phil Hollenbeck Co. v. Hollenbach*, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152; *American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh*, 128 Md. 382, 97 Atl. 999, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 33.

<sup>63</sup> *State v. District Court of Hennepin County*, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185, 3 A. L. R. 1347; *Doey v. Clarence P. Howland Co.*, 224 N. Y. 30, 120 N. E. 53, affirming 182 App. Div. 152, 169 N. Y. Supp. 645. In the latter case it is said that awards under the act are not made on the theory that a tort has been committed, but on the theory that the statute empowering the commission to make an award is read into and becomes a part of the contract of employment.

activity and production.<sup>64</sup> They have been passed in response to a widespread public opinion that the common-law action to recover damages for injuries suffered by employ  s from accidents while in the performance of their duties under present industrial conditions is in most cases an imperfect and inadequate remedial instrumentality.<sup>65</sup> They are the outgrowth of the social and economic theory "that the industry which has always borne the burden of depreciation and destruction of the necessary machinery shall also bear the burden of repairing the efficiency of the human machines, without which the industry itself could not exist."<sup>66</sup> Their general purpose is to transfer the burdens resulting from industrial accidents from the individual to the industry, to be finally distributed on society as a whole, by compelling the industry, through the employer, to contribute to the support of the dependents of the injured person.<sup>67</sup> The statutes should be liberally construed to effect their purpose.<sup>68</sup>

These statutes have generally been held to be a proper exercise of the police power,<sup>69</sup> and is not open to objection on constitutional grounds.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>64</sup> *Wangler Boller & Sheet Metal Works Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 287 Ill. 118, 122 N. E. 366; *Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Knapp*, 233 Fed. 950, 147 C. C. A. 624.

<sup>65</sup> *Sayles v. Foley*, 38 R. I. 484, 96 Atl. 340.

<sup>66</sup> *Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Board of Montana*, 52 Mont. 6, 155 Pac. 268, L. R. A. 1916D, 628.

<sup>67</sup> *Scott's Case*, 117 Me. 436, 104 Atl. 794.

<sup>68</sup> *Scott's Case*, 117 Me. 436, 104 Atl. 794; *Lahoma Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission* (Okla.) 175 Pac. 836; *Karoly v. Industrial Commission* (Colo.) 176 Pac. 284; *Pater v. Superior Steel Co.*, 263 Pa. 244, 106 Atl. 202; *Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co.* (R. I.) 105 Atl. 641; *Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co.* (Iowa) 170 N. W. 532; *Holt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 168 Wis. 381, 170 N. W. 366; *United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wickline*, 103 Neb. 21, 170 N. W. 193, 6 A. L. R. 1267.

<sup>69</sup> *Sayles v. Foley*, 38 R. I. 484, 96 Atl. 340; *Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co.*, 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; *Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Commission*, 78 Or. 503, 154 Pac. 106; *Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board*, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249.

<sup>70</sup> *New York Cent. R. Co. v. White*, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629 (New York act); *Hawkins v. Bleakly*, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 639 (Iowa act); *Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington*, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642 (Washington act); *Delbekia v. Link-Belt Co.*, 261 Ill. 454, 104 N. E. 211, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 41; *Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co.*, 93 Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249; *State ex rel. Yople v. Creamer*, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694; *State*

Some of the statutes are compulsory in form, containing provisions by which the employer and employé may be compelled to submit to the terms of the statute.<sup>71</sup> But in a majority of the states the statutes are optional in form, containing provisions under which the employer and the employé may elect to come in under the statute.<sup>72</sup> Under some statutes the employer or employé must affirmatively reject the privilege of the act or he will be subject thereto automatically.<sup>73</sup> Contracts waiving or limiting the right to compensation under the act and releases from liability are invalid.<sup>74</sup>

*ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen*, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466; *Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co.*, 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554; *Sayles v. Foley*, 38 R. I. 484, 96 Atl. 340; *Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury*, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398; *Borgnis v. Falk Co.*, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; *Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co.*, 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412; *Miller & Lux, Inc., v. Industrial Accident Commission*, 179 Cal. 764, 178 Pac. 960; *Day v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co.*, 144 La. 820, 81 South. 328; *State v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co.*, 101 Wash. 630, 172 Pac. 902; *Greene v. Caldwell*, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S. W. 648, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 604; *Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ill.)* 120 N. E. 460; *Duart v. Simmons*, 231 Mass. 313, 121 N. E. 10; *Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co.*, 25 Wyo. 511, 173 Pac. 981; *Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.*, 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup. Ct. 227, 63 L. Ed. 527 (Texas statute); *Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry. Co.*, 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659.

<sup>71</sup> The statutes are compulsory in form either as to all occupations or as to some of them in the following states: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. As to the Arizona act, see *Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack*, 15 Ariz. 382, 139 Pac. 465; California act, see *Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury*, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398; Ohio act, see *State v. Industrial Commission*, 92 Ohio St. 434, 111 N. E. 299, L. R. A. 1916D, 944, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1162; Utah act, see *Industrial Commission v. Daly Mining Co. (Utah)* 172 Pac. 301.

<sup>72</sup> The statute is optional in form in Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, also, *Appeal of Hotel Bond Co.*, 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; *Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co.*, 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49; *Scott v. Payne Bros.*, 85 N. J. Law, 446, 89 Atl. 927. An employer not included in any of the classes enumerated in the act may by operating under the act free himself from common-law liabilities. *Wangler Boller & Sheet Metal Works Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 287 Ill. 118, 122 N. E. 366.

<sup>73</sup> *Rogers v. Illinois Central R. Co.*, 210 Ill. App. 577; *Young v. Duncan*, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1; *Harris v. Hobart Iron Co.*, 127 Minn. 399, 149 N. W. 662; *Dietz v. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co.*, 263 Ill. 480, 105 N. E. 289; *Gorrell v. Bottelle*, 93 Kan. 370, 144 Pac. 244.

<sup>74</sup> *In re Cox*, 225 Mass. 220, 114 N. E. 281; *Chicago Rys. Co. v. Industrial Board*, 276 Ill. 112, 114 N. E. 534; *West Jersey Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co.*, 87 N. J. Law, 102, 95 Atl. 758.

*Same—Abrogation of Common-Law Defenses*

Though in most states the statutes are optional in form and ostensibly permit the employer to elect whether he will avail himself of their provisions or not, an element of coercion is introduced into them by provisions declaring in effect that, if the employer does not elect to come in under the act or if he rejects it, the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of fellow servant shall not be available to the employer.<sup>75</sup> The constitutionality of these provisions has been upheld in numerous cases.<sup>76</sup>

*Same—Persons to Whom the Acts are Applicable*

As injuries to employes of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce are covered by the federal Employers' Liability Act,<sup>77</sup> persons thus employed do not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Acts.<sup>78</sup> These acts do not as a rule ap-

<sup>75</sup> *Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co.*, 157 Wis. 443, 146 N. W. 770; *Pope v. Heywood Bros. & Wakefield Co.*, 221 Mass. 143, 108 N. E. 1058; *Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Co.*, 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659; *National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Padgett*, 251 Fed. 30, 163 C. C. A. 280; *Splehs v. Insull*, 207 Ill. App. 256; *Bell v. Toluca Coal Co.*, 272 Ill. 576, 112 N. E. 311; *Bay State St. Ry. Co. v. Rust*, 253 Fed. 43, 165 C. C. A. 641 (Rhode Island); *Gay v. Hocking Coal Co.*, 184 Iowa, 949, 169 N. W. 360; *La Point v. Monadnock Paper Mill*, 79 N. H. 61, 104 Atl. 251; *Mitchell v. Swanwood Coal Co.*, 182 Iowa, 1001, 166 N. W. 391; *Schlehuber v. American Express Co.*, 230 Mass. 347, 119 N. E. 828. Though the employer who rejects the act is precluded from pleading contributory negligence, yet he is exonerated as to the proportional part of the damages corresponding to the amount of negligence of the employé. *Day v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 208 Ill. App. 351, affirmed 284 Ill. 534, 120 N. E. 480.

<sup>76</sup> *Hawkins v. Bleakly*, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637; *Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Co.*, 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659; *Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.*, 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412; *Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co.*, 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145; *Appeal of Hotel Bond Co.*, 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; *Borgnis v. Falk Co.*, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489. The Legislature has power to modify or abolish entirely, by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the rules of law relating to contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of fellow servants. *Strom v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.*, 271 Ill. 544, 111 N. E. 555; *Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co.*, 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412.

<sup>77</sup> Ante, p. 633.

<sup>78</sup> *Erie R. Co. v. Winfield*, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662; *Southern Pacific Co. v. Pillsbury*, 170 Cal. 782, 151 Pac. 277, L. R. A. 1916E, 916; *Young v. Duncan*, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1; *Connelly v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.*, 207 Ill. App. 25; *Thornton v. Grand Trunk-Milwaukee Car Ferry Co.*, 202 Mich. 609, 168 N. W. 410; *Flynn v. New York S. & W. R. Co.*, 91 N. J. Law, 693, 103 Atl. 1032 affirming 90 N. J. Law, 450, 101 Atl. 1034;

ply to farm laborers,<sup>79</sup> nor to minors employed in contravention of the laws relating to child labor.<sup>80</sup> So, too, the acts provide that they shall not apply to persons whose employment is merely of a "casual" nature.<sup>81</sup>

*Same—Injury must Arise Out of and in the Course of the Employment*

Under the provisions of the various Workmen's Compensation Acts, compensation is payable only for injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment."<sup>82</sup> The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous.<sup>83</sup> The words "arising out of" the employment relate to the cause or source of the injury, while the words "in the course of" the employment have reference to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.<sup>84</sup> The terms are in the conjunctive and recovery can be had only when

Spokane & I. E. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 104 Wash. 171, 176 Pac. 34; Matney v. Bush, 102 Kan. 293, 169 Pac. 1150.

<sup>79</sup> Mullen v. Little, 186 App. Div. 169, 173 N. Y. Supp. 578; Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 179 Cal. 764, 178 Pac. 960; State v. District Court of Watonwan County, 140 Minn. 398, 168 N. W. 130, L. R. A. 1918F, 198; Kelley v. Haylock, 163 Wis. 326, 157 N. W. 1094, L. R. A. 1916E, 626.

<sup>80</sup> Gutmann v. Anderson, 142 Minn. 141, 171 N. W. 303; Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co. (R. I.) 105 Atl. 641. Stetz v. F. Mayer Boot & Shoe Co., 163 Wis. 151, 156 N. W. 971, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 675; Hetzel v. Wasson Piston-Ring Co., 89 N. J. Law, 201, 98 Atl. 306, L. R. A. 1917D, 75; Zurasky v. Handy Cap Co., 210 Ill. App. 254; Secklich v. Harris-Emery Co., 184 Iowa, 1025, 169 N. W. 325, 327; Kruckowski v. Polonia Publishing Co., 203 Mich. 211, 168 N. W. 932; Acklin Stamping Co. v. Kutz, 98 Ohio St. 61, 120 N. E. 229; Waterman Lumber Co. v. Beatty (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 448.

<sup>81</sup> See Gaynor's Case, 217 Mass. 86, 104 N. E. 339, L. R. A. 1916A, 363 (holding that a waiter employed by a caterer to serve at a particular banquet is not within the act). A carpenter employed to make slight repairs on a building is a "casual" employé. La Grande Laundry Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 777, 161 Pac. 988. A workman employed to repair a tractor is a casual employé. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 748, 158 Pac. 1031.

<sup>82</sup> See the various statutes. And see Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. Law, 72, 86 Atl. 458; Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509; Cennell v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 781, 168 N. W. 1009; Hoenig v. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 646, 150 N. W. 996, L. R. A. 1916A, 339. But see Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 158 Pac. 256, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 354.

<sup>83</sup> Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152; Walther v. American Paper Co., 89 N. J. Law, 732, 98 Atl. 264; State ex rel. Duluth Brewing Malting Co. v. District Court of St. Louis County, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912.

<sup>84</sup> Walther v. American Paper Co., 89 N. J. Law, 732, 98 Atl. 264; Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152.

the injury arises "out of" and at the same time "in the course of" the employment.<sup>85</sup>

An injury "arising out of and in course of the employment" must result from a risk reasonably incidental to employment, within the period of employment, at a place where the employé may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment, or doing something incidental to it.<sup>86</sup> While it is true that, in order to be compensable, it is not essential that the injury should occur while the employé is on the premises of the employer,<sup>87</sup> yet as a general rule the acts do not cover injuries received while the employé is on his way to work or injuries received after he has actually quit work and has left the premises on his way home.<sup>88</sup> But if, while on his way to or from work, he is engaged in

<sup>85</sup> *Hulley v. Moosbrugger*, 88 N. J. Law, 161, 95 Atl. 1007, L. R. A. 1916C, 1203, reversing 87 N. J. Law, 103, 93 Atl. 79. *State ex rel. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co. v. District Court of St. Louis County*, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912.

<sup>86</sup> *N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 285 Ill. 11, 120 N. E. 457; *Pace v. Appanoose County*, 184 Iowa, 498, 168 N. W. 916; *King v. State Ins. Fund (Sup.)* 171 N. Y. Supp. 1032; *Bryant v. Fissell*, 84 N. J. Law, 72, 86 Atl. 458. Injuries arising out of employment includes injuries to servants whose services are being performed about the premises of the employer and at places where the employer's business requires their presence, and subjects them to dangers incident to the business. *Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Totzke (Ind. App.)* 121 N. E. 675. The employé is in course of employment, though performing some labor different from that in which he is usually employed. *Hartz v. Hartford Fidelity Co.*, 90 Conn. 539, 97 Atl. 1020. It is not essential that the employé shall be actually at work at the time the injury was received. *Scott v. Payne Bros.*, 85 N. J. Law, 446, 89 Atl. 927. Thus, where the employé was injured while seeking shelter from a storm, he could recover. *Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.*, 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp. 620; *State ex rel. People's Coal & Ice Co. v. District Court of Ramsey County*, 129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. 119, L. R. A. 1916A, 344. So, where a workman, in lighting a cigarette or pipe during working hours, accidentally set fire to inflammable material about his person, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. *Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission*, 178 Cal. 505, 173 Pac. 1105, 5 A. L. R. 1518; *Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co.*, 259 Pa. 578, 103 Atl. 351, L. R. A. 1918F, 888. Where an employer did not provide proper toilet facilities for employé in the building where they were at work, but they were compelled to go to another building of the employer across the street, an injury received while crossing the street arose out of and in the course of the employment. *Zabriskie v. Erie Railroad Co.*, 86 N. J. Law, 266, 92 Atl. 385, L. R. A. 1916A, 315.

<sup>87</sup> *Hills v. Blair*, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243.

<sup>88</sup> *Erickson v. St. Paul City Ry.*, 141 Minn. 166, 169 N. W. 532; *Pace v. Appanoose County*, 184 Iowa, 498, 168 N. W. 916; *N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 285 Ill. 11, 120 N. E. 457; *McInery v. Buffalo & S. R. Corp.*,

some enterprise incidental to his work for the employer, an injury received is covered by the act.<sup>89</sup> So, too, if he is being transported to or from work on the invitation of, or in accordance with custom established by the employer, an injury received arises out of and in the course of the employment.<sup>90</sup> Of course, if the employé is traveling under the orders or at the request of the employer, an injury received while so traveling arises out of and in the course of the employment.<sup>91</sup>

*Same—Willful Misconduct*

The Compensation Acts provide that no compensation is recoverable for injuries due to the willful misconduct of the employé. The term "willful misconduct" does not necessarily include negligence, though gross.<sup>92</sup> Even the violation of rules and orders is not always willful misconduct, which will bar compensation,

225 N. Y. 130, 121 N. E. 806, reversing 185 App. Div. 899, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1096; *De Constantin v. Public Service Commission*, 75 W. Va. 32, 83 S. E. 88, L. R. A. 1916A, 329; *Fumidello's Case*, 219 Mass. 488, 107 N. E. 349; *Guastelo v. Michigan Central R. Co.*, 194 Mich. 382, 160 N. W. 484, L. R. A. 1917D, 69; *Hills v. Blair*, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243. Leaving the premises to procure or eat lunch does not necessarily bar a recovery. *Sussdine's Case*, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433, L. R. A. 1916A, 318. But compare *Hills v. Blair*, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243.

<sup>89</sup> *Scully v. Industrial Commission*, 284 Ill. 567, 120 N. E. 492; *Bachman v. Waterman (Ind. App.)* 121 N. E. 8.

<sup>90</sup> *Littler v. Geo. A. Fuller Co.*, 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554, reversing 182 App. Div. 907, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1116. Where an employé, while riding in a conveyance of his employer from the place of business to the place where work was to be done, left the vehicle to enter a store to purchase tobacco for his own use, and was struck by a passing automobile, the injury did not arise out of or in course of his employment. *In re Batts (Ind. App.)* 118 N. E. 551. An employé, proceeding from shop to place where he is to work under instructions from his employer, is within the act. *City of Milwaukee v. Althoff*, 156 Wis. 68, 145 N. W. 238, L. R. A. 1916A, 327. A plumber, injured while driving his employer's horse and wagon from the job to the shop, may recover. *In re Sanderson*, 224 Mass. 558, 113 N. E. 355.

<sup>91</sup> *Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (Colo.)* 174 Pac. 589, 3 L. R. A. 1336; *State v. District Court of Hennepin County*, 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274; *Messer v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co.*, 263 Pa. 5, 106 Atl. 85; *In re Raynes (Ind. App.)* 118 N. E. 387. And see *Foley v. Home Rubber Co.*, 89 N. J. Law, 474, 99 Atl. 624, where the employé was on the *Lusitania* when it was sunk by a German submarine. Where an engineer, while on his vacation, visited a pumping station in another town at the request of his employer, for the purpose of observing the methods of operating such pumping station, any injury received while on such journey was covered. *Messer v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co.*, 263 Pa. 5, 106 Atl. 85.

<sup>92</sup> *Burns' Case*, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N. E. 601, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 787; *Nickerson's Case*, 218 Mass. 158, 105 N. E. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 790; *North Pacific S. S.*

though generally speaking, the violation of rules and orders especially designed to secure the safety of the employé will be so regarded.<sup>93</sup> And so, too, the violation of a statute has been held to be willful misconduct.<sup>94</sup> Intoxication may or may not be willful misconduct, according to circumstances.<sup>95</sup>

### RIGHTS OF MASTER AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS

276. The master may recover from third persons for any damage he may have suffered by reason of their wrongful interference with his relationship to the servant, either by enticing the servant away, abducting or harboring him, by inflicting personal injuries upon him, or falsely imprisoning him, or otherwise depriving the master, in whole or in part, of his services.

Whenever a servant is knowingly enticed<sup>96</sup> from his master's service, the master may maintain an action of trespass on the case per quod servitium amisit against the enticer; and such an action will also lie at common law against one who harbors a servant, knowing that he has wrongfully left his master. A master may also maintain an action against one who willfully, as by an assault

Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 174 Cal. 500, 163 Pac. 919; Gignac v. Studebaker Corp., 186 Mich. 574, 152 N. W. 1037.

<sup>93</sup> Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 180, 149 Pac. 35; Nickerson's Case, 218 Mass. 158, 105 N. E. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 790; Peru Basket Co. v. Kuntz (Ind. App.) 122 N. E. 349.

<sup>94</sup> Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 171 Cal. 723, 154 Pac. 834, L. R. A. 1916D, 903.

<sup>95</sup> Intoxication, which does not incapacitate the employé from following his occupation, does not defeat recovery of compensation, though it may be a contributing cause of the injury. Hahnemann Hospital v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 316, 118 N. E. 767. And see Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 105, 141 N. W. 1013, L. R. A. 1916A, 348, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 995. On the other hand, if the employé is intoxicated to such an extent that he cannot follow his work, an injury then received is not in the course of the employment. Lefens v. Industrial Commission, 286 Ill. 32, 121 N. E. 182.

<sup>96</sup> "It is a material and necessary allegation that the defendant knew, at the time of enticing, employing, or harboring, that the party enticed away, employed, or harbored was the servant of the plaintiff, or that he afterwards had notice thereof, and continued to employ or harbor the servant after such notice. And such knowledge or notice must be proved in order to support the action." Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249. And see Caughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244.

and battery, or false imprisonment, or negligently, inflicts personal injury upon his servant, resulting in loss of service to the master, or by any other wrong causes such loss of service.<sup>97</sup>

It has been said that this doctrine was confined, at common law, to menial or domestic servants and apprentices; and under this view it has been held that, as laborers employed by a man to work his crops for a share therein are not menial servants, the master cannot maintain an action for loss of service against one who injures such an employé.<sup>98</sup> The weight of authority, however, is against this view. The Massachusetts court, referring to the master's right of action for enticing away his servant, said: "It has sometimes been supposed that this doctrine sprang from the English statute of laborers, and was confined to menial service. But we are satisfied that it is founded upon the legal right derived from

<sup>97</sup> 1 Jag. Torts, 448. Enticing away servant, *Keane v. Boycott*, 2 H. Bl. 511; *Lumley v. Gye*, 2 EL. & BL. 216; *Bixby v. Dunlap*, 56 N. H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475, and note therein at pages 485-490; *Salter v. Howard*, 43 Ga. 601; *Walker v. Cronin*, 107 Mass. 555; *Scidmore v. Smith*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 322; *Woodward v. Washburn*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 369; *Caughey v. Smith*, 47 N. Y. 244; *Jones v. Blocker*, 43 Ga. 331; *Haskins v. Royster*, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; *Duckett v. Pool*, 33 S. C. 238, 11 S. E. 689; *Milburne v. Byrne*, 1 Cranch, C. C. 239, Fed. Cas. No. 9,542. Abduction of servant, *Sherwood v. Hall*, 3 Sumn. 127, Fed. Cas. No. 12,777; *Plummer v. Webb*, 4 Mason, 380, Fed. Cas. No. 11,233. Preventing a person from entering the service of another by menaces and threats or other unlawful means, *Walker v. Cronin*, 107 Mass. 555. Harboring another's servant, *Blake v. Lanyon*, 6 Term R. 221; *Sherwood v. Hall*, 3 Sumn. 127, Fed. Cas. No. 12,777; *Scidmore v. Smith*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 322. But in Massachusetts it is held that one who does nothing to entice a servant to leave his master's employment does not become liable to the master for employing him after he has left of his own accord. *Butterfield v. Ashley*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249, Id. 2 Gray (Mass.) 254. Seduction or debauching of female servant, *Edmondson v. Machell*, 2 Term R. 4; *Moran v. Dawes*, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 412. Willfully or negligently causing personal injury to servant, *Ames v. Railway Co.*, 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426; *Fluker v. Banking Co.*, 81 Ga. 461, 8 S. E. 529, 2 L. R. A. 843, 12 Am. St. Rep. 328. False arrest and imprisonment of servant, *St. Johnsbury & L. O. R. Co. v. Hunt*, 55 Vt. 570, 45 Am. Rep. 639; *Woodward v. Washburn*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 369. The statute of frauds, while it may be a good defense in an action by either of the parties on a verbal contract of hiring for a longer period than a year, is no defense in an action by the master against a third person for enticing away the servant. *Duckett v. Pool*, 33 S. C. 238, 11 S. E. 689. Nor is the infancy of the servant any defense, since he alone is entitled to avoid the contract on that ground. *Keane v. Boycott*, 2 H. Bl. 511.

<sup>98</sup> *Burgess v. Carpenter*, 2 S. C. 7, 16 Am. Rep. 643; *Huff v. Watkins*, 15 S. C. 82, 40 Am. Rep. 680. But see *Daniel v. Swearingen*, 6 S. C. 297, 24 Am. Rep. 471.

the contract, and not merely upon the relation of master and servant, and that it applies to all contracts of employment." <sup>99</sup> To entitle a master to recover from one who injures or entices away his servant, it is sufficient to show a subsisting relation of service, even though it may be determinable at will.<sup>1</sup> To induce—but not maliciously—a servant to leave his master's service when the time for which he has hired himself shall expire is not actionable, though the servant may have previously had no intention of leaving.<sup>2</sup> If a third person maliciously, and not in the exercise of any right which the law gives him, procures a servant to break his contract and leave his master, or even to leave an employment at will, and damage thereby results to the master, the latter may maintain an action against the wrongdoer.<sup>3</sup>

### RIGHTS OF SERVANT AGAINST THIRD PERSONS

**277. A servant may maintain an action against a third person for causing his discharge, if he acted gratuitously and maliciously, and damage has resulted, but not otherwise.**

A man may withhold his trade from another, or even break a contract with him, for the reason that he employs a certain person, and if the employé is discharged he has no cause of action against such person for causing his discharge; for a man does not become liable for injury to another, caused by an act which he has a legal right to do.<sup>4</sup> But a man cannot maliciously and wantonly interfere with another's rights without rendering himself liable for resulting damage. As a master has a right of action against one

<sup>99</sup> *Walker v. Cronin*, 107 Mass. 555. And see *Haskins v. Royster*, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; *Jones v. Blocker*, 43 Ga. 331; *Salter v. Howard*, 43 Ga. 601; *Daniel v. Swearengen*, 6 S. C. 297, 24 Am. Rep. 471.

<sup>1</sup> *Keane v. Boycott*, 2 H. Bl. 511; *Evans v. Walton*, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; *Haskins v. Royster*, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780.

<sup>2</sup> *Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 425.

<sup>3</sup> *Bowen v. Hall*, 6 Q. B. Div. 333; *Lumley v. Gye*, 2 El. & Bl. 216; *Walker v. Cronin*, 107 Mass. 555; *Chipley v. Atkinson*, 23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367 (collecting the cases); *Thacker Coal & Coke Co. v. Burke*, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091, 8 Ann. Cas. 885; *McBride v. O'Neal*, 128 Ga. 473, 57 S. E. 789; *George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n of United States and Canada*, 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 Atl. 953.

<sup>4</sup> *Chipley v. Atkinson*, 23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367. See *Heywood v. Tillson*, 75 Me. 225, 46 Am. Rep. 373.

who maliciously induces his servant to leave him, so, also, it is held that an action will lie on behalf of a servant against a person who has maliciously procured the master to discharge him from employment under a legal contract. And it has been further held that the fact that no contract, nor any legal right of the servant against the master, is violated by the master, or that no action will lie by the servant against the master for the discharge, does not prevent a recovery against the third person for maliciously procuring the discharge, if it would not have occurred but for such procurement.<sup>5</sup>

### MASTER'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS

278. The master is liable to third persons on contracts entered into by the servant in his name, or on his behalf, if he expressly or impliedly authorized the contract, or if he subsequently ratified it, but not otherwise.
279. The master is liable for frauds and wrong committed by the servant, if expressly or impliedly directed or authorized by him, or if committed by the servant in the course of the employment, but not otherwise. To render one liable under this rule the relation must be that of master and servant, and not that of employer and independent contractor.

The master is bound by the act of his servant, either in respect to contracts or injuries, when the act is done by authority of the master.<sup>6</sup> As to this proposition there can be no doubt. But there is much difficulty when we come to determine what acts on the part of the servant are to be deemed authorized by the master, for the authority may be either express or implied.

<sup>5</sup> *Chipley v. Atkinson*, 23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367 (collecting cases); *Lally v. Cantwell*, 40 Mo. App. 44; *Wyeman v. Deady*, 79 Conn. 414, 65 Atl. 129, 118 Am. St. Rep. 152, 8 Ann. Cas. 375; *Brennan v. United Hatters of North America*, Local No. 17, 73 N. J. Law, 729, 65 Atl. 165, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 9 Ann. Cas. 698. An employer's liability insurance company, which procures the discharge of an employé who has sued the insured employer for personal injury, with intent to injure him, is liable to such employé. *Gibson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.*, 232 Ill. 49, 88 N. E. 539. See, also, *London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn*, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526, 99 Am. St. Rep. 185.

<sup>6</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 259.

*On Contracts by the Servant*

The liability of the master on contracts entered into by the servant depends upon principles of the law of agency. If he is liable at all upon a contract made on his behalf by his servant, it must be either because he authorized the servant to make the contract, or ratified it when made. Without this there can be no liability.<sup>7</sup> The master is liable, of course, whenever he has given the servant, an express authority to contract. He is also liable if he has impliedly authorized the servant, as by holding him out as having authority.<sup>8</sup> He is also liable if he ratifies the servant's act in contracting without authority.<sup>9</sup>

*For the Servant's Torts*

If the servant does an injury fraudulently or wrongfully, while in the immediate employment of the master, and in the course of such employment, the master, as well as the servant, is liable therefor, even though the wrongful act may have been done contrary to the master's orders.<sup>10</sup> And if an injury results from the negligence or want of skill of the servant, while acting within the scope of his employment, the master, as well as the servant, is liable.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Clark, Cont. 717; *President, etc., of Mechanics' Bank v. New York & N. H. R. Co.*, 13 N. Y. 599.

<sup>8</sup> Clark, Cont. 717; *Morey v. Webb*, 58 N. Y. 350; *Bentley v. Doggett*, 51 Wis. 224, 8 N. W. 155, 37 Am. Rep. 827.

<sup>9</sup> Clark, Cont. 719, and cases there cited.

<sup>10</sup> 2 Kent, Comm. 259; *Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co.*, 1 Hurl. & C. 528; *Whatman v. Pearson*, L. R. 3 C. P. 422; *Jeffrey v. Bigelow*, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 518, 28 Am. Dec. 476; *Drew v. Railroad Co.*, 26 N. Y. 49; *Doran v. Thomsen*, 74 N. J. Law, 445, 66 Atl. 897; *Houck v. Chicago & A. R. Co.*, 116 Mo. App. 559, 92 S. W. 738; *Chicago City Ry. Co. v. McMahon*, 103 Ill. 485, 42 Am. Rep. 29; *Evans v. Davidson*, 53 Md. 245, 36 Am. Rep. 400; *Mound City Paint & Color Co. v. Conlon*, 92 Mo. 221, 4 S. W. 922; *Harris v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. (C. C.)* 35 Fed. 116; *Driscoll v. Carlin*, 50 N. J. Law, 28, 11 Atl. 482; *Lee v. Lord*, 76 Wis. 582, 45 N. W. 601; *French v. Cresswell*, 13 Or. 418, 11 Pac. 62; *Elchengreen v. Railroad Co.*, 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S. W. 219, 31 L. R. A. 702, 54 Am. St. Rep. 833. But see *Andrews v. Green*, 62 N. H. 436. The fact that signal torpedoes, negligently placed on a railroad track by trainmen, who were authorized to use them in the management of the train, were put there when there was no necessity for doing so, and contrary to the rules of the company, does not exempt the company from liability to one who is injured thereby. *Harriman v. Railroad Co.*, 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N. E. 451, 4 Am. St. Rep. 507.

<sup>11</sup> *Evans v. Davidson*, 53 Md. 245, 36 Am. Rep. 400. In this case, a general farm hand, working in his master's cornfield, undertook, in his master's absence, and without express direction, to drive out a neighbor's cow, which had broken into the field, and, in doing so, negligently struck her with a stone,

"In one sense, where there is no express command by the master, all wrongful acts done by the servant may be said to be beyond the scope of the authority given; but the liability of the master is not determined upon any such restricted interpretation of the authority and duty of the servant. If the servant be acting at the time in the course of his master's service, and for his master's benefit within the scope of his employment, then his act, though wrongful or negligent, is to be treated as that of the master, although no express command or privity of the master be shown."<sup>12</sup> If the servant, in committing the wrong, is not acting in the course

and killed her. The master was held liable. And see the cases cited in the preceding note. So, where a master sent his servant to do certain grubbing, and the servant set a fire to facilitate his work, the master was held liable for the consequences of the servant's negligence. *Ellegard v. Ackland*, 43 Minn. 352, 45 N. W. 715. See, also, the following cases, in which a master was held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of his servant: *Pike v. Brittan*, 71 Cal. 159, 11 Pac. 890, 60 Am. Rep. 527; *French v. Cresswell*, 13 Or. 418, 11 Pac. 62; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Downey*, 18 Ill. 259; *Scammon v. City of Chicago*, 25 Ill. 424, 79 Am. Dec. 834; *Andrews v. Boedecker*, 126 Ill. 605, 18 N. E. 651, 9 Am. St. Rep. 649; *Cosgrove v. Ogden*, 49 N. Y. 255, 10 Am. Rep. 361; *Mauchle v. Panama-Pacific International Exposition Co.*, 37 Cal. App. 715, 174 Pac. 400; *Ridenour v. International Harvester Co.* (Mo. App.) 205 S. W. 881; *Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson*, 152 Fed. 681, 82 C. C. A. 29; *Mattingly v. Montgomery*, 106 Md. 461, 68 Atl. 205; *Feneff v. Boston & M. R. R.*, 196 Mass. 575, 82 N. E. 705; *Wakefield v. Boston Coal Co.*, 197 Mass. 527, 83 N. E. 1116; *Sherwood v. Warner*, 27 App. D. C. 64, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 651, 7 Ann. Cas. 98. But see *Chapman v. Underwood*, 27 Phil. Rep. 374 (1914), holding, if a competent driver of an automobile in which the owner thereof is at the time present, by a sudden act of negligence, without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, violates the law, the owner of the automobile is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that he, by acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

<sup>12</sup> *Evans v. Davidson*, 53 Md. 245, 36 Am. Rep. 400. See, also, *Variety Mfg. Co. v. Landaker*, 129 Ill. App. 630; *Usher v. Western Union Telegraph Co.*, 122 Mo. App. 98, 98 S. W. 84; *Columbus R. Co. v. Woolfolk*, 128 Ga. 631, 58 S. E. 152, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1136, 119 Am. St. Rep. 404; *Lotz v. Hanlon*, 217 Pa. 339, 66 Atl. 525, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 202, 118 Am. St. Rep. 922, 10 Ann. Cas. 731; *South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland*, 100 S. W. 283, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1072, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 853; *Coal Belt Electric Ry. Co. v. Young*, 126 Ill. App. 651. But an act done by a servant, while engaged in his master's work, causing injury to a third person, but not done for the purpose of performing that work, cannot be deemed the act of the master. *Dougherty v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 137 Iowa, 257, 114 N. W. 902, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 126 Am. St. Rep. 282. The expression, "in the course of his employment," as affecting the liability of a master for the negligence of his servants, means "while engaged in the service of the master," and is not synonymous with "during the period covered by his employment." Slater

of his employment, the master is not answerable.<sup>13</sup> The difficulty is in determining, in particular cases, whether the servant was or was not so acting. The test of a master's responsibility for the act of his servant is whether the act was done in the prosecution of the master's business, not whether it was done in accordance with the instructions of the master to the servant.<sup>14</sup> When, therefore, the servant, while engaged in the prosecution of the master's business, deviates from his instructions as to the manner of doing it, this does not relieve the master from liability for his acts.<sup>15</sup>

*v. Advance Thresher Co.*, 97 Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598.

<sup>13</sup> *Stone v. Hills*, 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635. In this case the defendants had ordered their teamster to deliver a wagon load of paper to one T., in Glastonbury four miles distant, and to return, by way of Nipsic with a load of wood. On reaching T.'s, the teamster was requested by T. to carry the paper to Hartford, four and a half miles further, and, at the railway station there, to get some freight of T.'s and bring it to him. The teamster consented, and, while he was paying the freight bill at the station, the team, being left unfastened, ran away, and injured the plaintiff's property. It was held that the teamster was not engaged in the defendants' employment at the time of the injury, and the defendants were not liable. And see *Mitchell v. Crassweller*, 13 C. B. 237; *Sheridan v. Charlick*, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 338; *Cavanagh v. Dinsmore*, 12 Hun. (N. Y.) 465. Mere deviation from the route ordered by the master in these and similar cases (running a boat, for instance) is not a departure from the employment. See *Quinn v. Power*, 87 N. Y. 535, 41 Am. Rep. 392; for illustrations of injuries caused by servants when not acting in the course of their employment, see *Wilson v. Peverly*, 2 N. H. 548; *Flower v. Railroad Co.*, 69 Pa. 210, 8 Am. Rep. 251; *Snyder v. Railroad Co.*, 60 Mo. 413; *Mall v. Lord*, 39 N. Y. 381, 100 Am. Dec. 448; *McClenaghan v. Brock*, 5 Rich. Law (S. C.) 17; *Little Miami R. Co. v. Wetmore*, 19 Ohio St. 110, 2 Am. Rep. 373; *Patterson v. Kates* (C. C.) 152 Fed. 481; *Younkin v. Rocheford*, 76 Neb. 528, 107 N. W. 853, 110 N. W. 632; *Chase v. Knabel*, 46 Wash. 484, 90 Pac. 642, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1155. The fact that the servant in committing the tort in connection with his own affairs uses facilities afforded by the relation of master and servant does not render the master liable. *St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Harvey*, 144 Fed. 806, 75 C. C. A. 536; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gillen*, 166 Ind. 321, 76 N. E. 1058; *Slater v. Advance Thresher Co.*, 97 Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598.

<sup>14</sup> *Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co.* (Sup.) 105 N. Y. Supp. 1094; *Clark v. Koehler*, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 536; *Gregory's Adm'r v. Ohio River R. Co.*, 37 W. Va. 606, 18 S. E. 819.

<sup>15</sup> *Cosgrove v. Ogden*, 49 N. Y. 255, 10 Am. Rep. 361. It was said in this case: "If the owner of a building employs a servant to remove the roof from his house, and directs him to throw the materials upon his lot, where no one would be endangered, and the servant, disregarding this direction, should carelessly throw them into the street, causing an injury to a passenger, the master would be responsible therefor, although done in violation of his instructions, because it was done in the business of the master. But should the servant, for some purpose of his own, intentionally throw material upon

In *McManus v. Crickett*,<sup>16</sup> a leading English case, it was held in substance, that the master is not liable for an injury willfully committed by his servant while engaged in the master's business, without the direction or assent of the master. In that case it was held that a master was not liable in trespass for the willful act of his servant in driving the master's carriage against another without the master's direction or assent. Lord Kenyon said that when the servant quitted sight of the object for which he was employed, and, without having in view his master's orders, pursued the object which his own malice suggested, he no longer acted in pursuance of the authority given him, and it was deemed, so far, a willful abandonment of his master's business. This doctrine is very generally recognized in this country, but the courts do not always agree in applying it to particular cases.<sup>17</sup> If the act for which it is sought to hold the master liable was in fact done by the servant in the course of his employment, the fact that he acted willfully and maliciously will not prevent liability from attaching to the master. As was said by the Ohio court: "Where a person is injured by the act of a servant, done in the course of his employment, we see no good reason why the motive or intention of the servant should operate to discharge the master from liability. If the nature of the injurious act is such as to make the master liable for its consequences, in the absence of the particular intention, it is not perceived how the presence of such intention can be held to excuse the master."<sup>18</sup> It has repeatedly been held that if the

a passenger, the master would not be responsible for the injury because it would not be an act done in his business, but a departure therefrom by the servant, to effect some purpose of his own." In *Garretzen v. Duenckel*, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep. 405, a clerk in the gun store, while engaged during the proprietor's absence, in exhibiting a gun to a customer, loaded it, contrary to the proprietor's orders. In doing so, it was accidentally discharged, and shot and wounded a person on the opposite side of the street. The proprietor was held responsible. See, also, *Grant v. Singer Mfg. Co.*, 190 Mass. 489, 77 N. E. 480, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, and *Sharp v. Erie R. Co.*, 184 N. Y. 100, 76 N. E. 923, 6 Ann. Cas. 250, where the servant disregarded the master's orders.

<sup>16</sup> 1 East. 106.

<sup>17</sup> *Foster v. Bank*, 17 Mass. 508, 9 Am. Dec. 168; *Wright v. Wilcox*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 343, 32 Am. Dec. 507; *Vanderbilt v. Turnpike Co.*, 2 N. Y. 479, 51 Am. Dec. 315; *Fraser v. Freeman*, 43 N. Y. 566, 3 Am. Rep. 740; *Isaacs v. Railroad Co.*, 47 N. Y. 122, 7 Am. Rep. 418; *Cox v. Keahey*, 36 Ala. 340, 76 Am. Dec. 325; *New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Harrison*, 48 Miss. 112, 12 Am. Rep. 356; *Neville v. Chicago & A. R. Co.*, 210 Ill. App. 168; *Tuller v. Voght*, 13 Ill. 277; *Oxford v. Peter*, 28 Ill. 434.

<sup>18</sup> *Passenger R. Co. v. Young*, 21 Ohio St. 518, 8 Am. Rep. 78.

conductor or other employes on a railroad train or on a boat unlawfully assault and injure a passenger, or even a trespasser, the railroad company or owner of the boat is liable, notwithstanding the servant acted willfully and from personal and malicious motives.<sup>19</sup> His conduct is none the less in the course of his employment because of his motive. The rule would be different if the conductor or brakeman on a railroad train should willfully and maliciously assault or otherwise injure a mere stranger, to whom the company owed no duty at all,<sup>20</sup> or if the tortious act was committed while the servant was not on duty.<sup>21</sup>

A railroad company has been held liable for injuries caused by the wrongful act of its locomotive engineer in blowing the whistle.

<sup>19</sup> *Passenger R. Co. v. Young*, 21 Ohio St. 518, 8 Am. Rep. 78; *Bryant v. Rich*, 106 Mass. 180, 8 Am. Rep. 311; *Sherley v. Billings*, 8 Bush. (Ky.) 147, 8 Am. Rep. 451; *Rounds v. Railroad Co.*, 64 N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 597; *Shea v. Railroad Co.*, 62 N. Y. 180, 20 Am. Rep. 480; *Higgins v. Railroad Co.*, 46 N. Y. 23, 7 Am. Rep. 293; *Hoffman v. Railroad Co.*, 87 N. Y. 25, 41 Am. Rep. 337; *Dwinelle v. Railroad Co.*, 120 N. Y. 117, 24 N. E. 319, 8 L. R. A. 224, 17 Am. St. Rep. 611; *Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Flexman*, 103 Ill. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; *North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Gastka*, 128 Ill. 613, 21 N. E. 522, 4 L. R. A. 481; *Goddard v. Railway Co.*, 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 39; *Hanson v. Railway Co.*, 62 Me. 84, 16 Am. Rep. 404; *McKinley v. Railroad Co.*, 44 Iowa, 314, 24 Am. Rep. 748; *New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke*, 53 Miss. 200, 24 Am. Rep. 689; *Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Larkin*, 47 Md. 155, 28 Am. Rep. 442; *Carter v. Railway Co.*, 98 Ind. 552, 49 Am. Rep. 780. In *Craker v. Railway Co.*, 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504, a railroad company was held liable where its conductor kissed a female passenger against her will. In *Isaacs v. Railroad Co.*, 47 N. Y. 122, 7 Am. Rep. 418, the plaintiff, while a passenger on a street car, and wishing to alight, passed out upon the platform, and asked the conductor to stop the car, telling him she would not get out until the car should come to a full stop. The conductor thereupon, while the car was in motion, threw her from the car with great violence, breaking her leg. It was held that this was a wanton and willful trespass, for which the company was not liable. This case was severely criticized, and has been, in effect, overruled by the later New York cases. See *Hoffman v. Railroad Co.*, 87 N. Y. 25, 41 Am. Rep. 337; *Dwinelle v. Railroad Co.*, 120 N. Y. 117, 24 N. E. 319, 8 L. R. A. 224, 17 Am. St. Rep. 611; *Shea v. Railroad Co.*, 62 N. Y. 180, 20 Am. Rep. 480.

<sup>20</sup> *Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Flexman*, 103 Ill. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; *New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Harrison*, 48 Miss. 112, 12 Am. Rep. 356; *Marion v. Railroad Co.*, 59 Iowa, 428, 13 N. W. 415, 44 Am. Rep. 687; *Central Ry. Co. v. Peacock*, 69 Md. 257, 14 Atl. 709, 9 Am. St. Rep. 425; *Williams v. Car Co.*, 40 La. Ann. 87, 3 South. 631, 8 Am. St. Rep. 512.

<sup>21</sup> *St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Wyatt*, 84 Ark. 193, 105 S. W. 72. See, also, *Southern Ry. Co. v. Power Fuel Co.*, 152 Fed. 917, 82 C. C. A. 65, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472, where the servant while off duty was guilty of negligence.

or allowing steam to escape, and thereby frightening horses, though he acted willfully and maliciously.<sup>22</sup>

*Relation of Master and Servant Must Exist*

The person by whom the injury was caused must have been the servant of the person whom it is sought to charge, and in his employ, at the time of the injury.<sup>23</sup> It is not enough, in order to establish a liability of one person for the negligence of another, to show that the person whose negligence caused the injury was at the time acting under an employment by the person who is sought to be charged. It must be shown, in addition, that the employment was of such a character as to create the relation of master and servant between them. "Unless the relation of master and servant exists, the law will not impute to one person the negligent act of another."<sup>24</sup> As has heretofore been pointed out, a mere

<sup>22</sup> Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298, 95 Am. Dec. 489; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dickson, 68 Ill. 151, 14 Am. Rep. 114; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Starnes, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 52, 24 Am. Rep. 296.

<sup>23</sup> See Sawyer v. Martins, 25 Ill. App. 521; Sexton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 114 App. Div. 678, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1111; Marsh v. Hand, 120 N. Y. 315, 24 N. E. 463. "It is not necessary that he should be shown to have been in the general employment of the defendant, nor that he should be under any special engagement of service to him, or entitled to receive compensation from him directly. It is enough that at the time of the accident he was in charge of the defendant's property by his assent and authority, engaged in his business, and, in respect to that property and business, under his control. The fact that there is an intermediate party, in whose general employment the person whose acts are in question is engaged, does not prevent the principal from being held liable for the negligent conduct of the subagent or underservant, unless the relation of such intermediate party to the subject-matter of the business in which the underservant is engaged be such as to give him exclusive control of the means and manner of its accomplishment, and exclusive direction of the persons employed therefor." Kimball v. Cushman, 103 Mass. 194, 4 Am. Rep. 528. And see Ewan v. Lipincott, 47 N. J. Law, 192, 54 Am. Rep. 148; Houseman v. Philadelphia Transportation & Lighterage Co. (C. C.) 141 Fed. 385. If the master hires the services of his servant to another temporarily, but retains control, he remains the master, and is liable for the acts of the servant in the course of the employment; and it can make no difference that the services of this particular servant were requested by the third party. This question arises where a person hires a team from another, together with the driver. Ordinarily, the driver remains the servant of the owner of the team. See Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499; Joslin v. Ice Co., 50 Mich. 516, 15 N. W. 887, 45 Am. Rep. 54; Frerker v. Nicholson, 41 Colo. 12, 92 Pac. 224, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1122, 14 Ann. Cas. 730; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304; Norris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42; Crockett v. Calvert, 8 Ind. 127; Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24, 30 Am. Rep. 645; Hershberger v. Lynch (Pa.) 11 Atl. 642; Muse v. Stern, 82 Va. 33, 3 Am. St. Rep. 77.

<sup>24</sup> King v. Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 181, 23 Am. Rep. 37; Bassi v. Orth, 58

volunteer may, by assisting the servants of another in the service of the master, either at the request or without the request of such servants, stand in the relation of a servant for the time being, and may be regarded as assuming all the risks incident to the business.<sup>25</sup> Whether or not such a volunteer becomes a servant, so that the master of the other servants will be liable for his wrongful acts or negligence in the course of the employment, must depend upon the authority of the other servants to thus employ assistance. If they had such authority, express or implied, the master is liable; otherwise he is not.<sup>26</sup>

### *Independent Contractors*

There is a wide difference between a servant and an independent contractor. If a person contracts with another, who is engaged in an independent employment, for the doing of certain work by the latter, but does not personally interfere or give directions respecting the manner of the work, the relationship of master and servant does not exist, but the party employed is an independent contractor. "If one renders service, in the course of an occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished, it is an independent employment."<sup>27</sup> The fact that the contractor is

Misc. Rep. 372, 109 N. Y. Supp. 88; *Parkes v. Seasongood* (C. C.) 152 Fed. 533. The test of one's liability for the negligent act or omission of his alleged servant is his right and power to command and control his imputed agent in the performance of the causal act or omission at the very instant of the performance or neglect. *Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson*, 152 Fed. 681, 82 C. C. A. 29.

<sup>25</sup> Ante, p. 622.

<sup>26</sup> See *Althorff v. Wolfe*, 22 N. Y. 355; *Thyssen v. Davenport Ice & Cold Storage Co.*, 134 Iowa, 749, 112 N. W. 177, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 572; *Cooper v. Lowery*, 4 Ga. App. 120, 60 S. E. 1015. But he may be liable for the negligence of the servant in permitting the stranger to assist him. *Thyssen v. Davenport Ice & Cold Storage Co.*, 134 Iowa, 749, 112 N. W. 177, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 572.

<sup>27</sup> *Harrison v. Collins*, 86 Pa. 153, 27 Am. Rep. 699. And see *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 3 Gray (Mass.) 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743; *Blake v. Ferris*, 5 N. Y. 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304; *Pack v. Mayor, etc.*, 8 N. Y. 222; *Hollenback v. Hardin*, 205 Ill. App. 528; *Cole v. City of Durham*, 176 N. C. 289, 97 S. E. 33; *Clinchfield Coal Corporation v. Redd*, 123 Va. 420, 96 S. E. 836; *King v. Railroad Co.*, 66 N. Y. 181, 23 Am. Rep. 37; *Marsh v. Hand*, 120 N. Y. 315, 24 N. E. 463; *Metzinger v. New Orleans Board of Trade*, 120 La. 124, 44 South. 1007; *Wilmot v. McPadden*, 79 Conn. 367, 65 Atl. 157; *McBride v. Jerry Madden Shingle Co.*, 173 Mich. 248, 138 N. W. 1077; *McHarge v. M. M. Newcomer & Co.*, 117 Tenn. 595, 100 S. W. 700, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298; *Scammon v. City*

paid by the day does not necessarily destroy the independent character of the employment.<sup>28</sup>

It is well settled, both in England and in this country, that a person who employs an independent contractor to do work for him is not liable for the wrongful acts or neglect of the contractor or his servants in the performance of the work, where the work to be done under the contract is lawful.<sup>29</sup> In *Harrison v. Collins*<sup>30</sup>

of Chicago, 25 Ill. 424, 79 Am. Dec. 334; *Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co.*, 95 Ill. 148, 85 Am. Rep. 151; *Kepperly v. Ramsden*, 83 Ill. 354; *Schwartz v. Gilmore*, 45 Ill. 455, 92 Am. Dec. 227; *Moore v. Sanborne*, 2 Mich. 519, 59 Am. Dec. 209; *Barry v. City of St. Louis*, 17 Mo. 121; *Powell v. Construction Co.*, 88 Tenn. 692, 18 S. W. 691, 17 Am. St. Rep. 925. Whether a person employed to do certain work is to be regarded as a servant or as an independent contractor depends mainly upon whether, under the contract, the employer retains the power of directing and controlling the work. Where the employé is put in exclusive possession, and has exclusive control, furnishing his own assistants, and executing the work in detail, clear of any supervision, he is an independent contractor. It is otherwise if the employer retains the direction and control of the work. *Johnson v. Western & A. R. Co.*, 4 Ga. App. 181, 60 S. E. 1023; *Kampmann v. Rothwell* (Tex. Civ. App.) 107 S. W. 120; and cases above cited. Or if the work is done according to the direction of, or specifications furnished by, the employer. *Hedstrom v. Union Forest Co.*, 7 Cal. App. 278, 94 Pac. 386; *Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Loosley*, 76 Kan. 103, 90 Pac. 990. One who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do work according to his own methods, without being subject to the employer's control, except as to the result is an independent contractor. *Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bennett*, 36 Okl. 358, 128 Pac. 705. In *Harrison v. Collins*, 86 Pa. 153, 27 Am. Rep. 699, the owners of a sugar refinery employed a rigger to remove machinery from a railroad car to their refinery; but, though they paid him by the day, they neither interfered with nor directed the manner of the work. It was held that the rigger was an independent contractor, and not a servant. Among other employés who have been held to be independent contractors may be mentioned: A public licensed drayman, employed to haul goods, *De Forrest v. Wright*, 2 Mich. 368; lessee of coal mine, *Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. v. Morehead*, 34 Okl. 424, 126 Pac. 1033; a contractor employed to erect a building, *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 8 Gray (Mass.) 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743; *Edmundson v. Coca-Cola Co.* (Tex. Civ. App.) 150 S. W. 273; a plumber employed to repair water pipes, *Bennett v. Truebody*, 66 Cal. 509, 6 Pac. 329, 56 Am. Rep. 117; contractor employed by railroad company to build road, or to grade, *Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Conroy*, 63 Miss. 562, 56 Am. Rep. 835. A person employed by a railroad company to clear off and burn brush and rubbish from its right of way, at a certain sum per mile, who hires, pays, and controls his own help, is not a servant of the company, but an independent contractor. *St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Yonley* (Ark.) 18 S. W. 333.

<sup>28</sup> *Harrison v. Collins*, 86 Pa. 153, 27 Am. Rep. 699; *Forayth v. Hooper*, 11 Allen (Mass.) 419; *Corbin v. American Mills*, 27 Conn. 274, 71 Am. Dec. 63.

<sup>29</sup> *Reedie v. Railway Co.*, 4 Exch. 244; *Harrison v. Collins*, 86 Pa. 153, 27

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<sup>30</sup> 86 Pa. 153, 27 Am. Rep. 699.

the defendants, owners of a sugar refinery, had employed a rigger to remove machinery from a railroad car to their refinery. In doing the work he opened a coal hole in the sidewalk, and left it open a few minutes after finishing the work, and a child fell into it and was injured. It appeared that the defendants neither directed nor interfered with the manner of the work, and it was therefore held that, as the rigger was an independent contractor, they were not liable for the injury. On the same principle, it has been held that one who employs a public, licensed drayman to haul a lot of barrels of goods is not liable for injuries inflicted by the latter by rolling a barrel against a person.<sup>81</sup> And the owner of land, who employs an independent contractor to erect or repair a building on his lot, is not liable for injuries resulting from the contractor's deposit of planks in the highway, or other negligence on the part of the contractor or his servants.<sup>82</sup>

If the work contracted for is unlawful, as where it naturally constitutes or creates a public nuisance, then the rule exempting the employer does not apply, but both the employer and the contractor are liable for injuries resulting therefrom.<sup>83</sup> Thus, if a person who is not authorized to excavate in a highway employs a contractor to do so, he is liable for injuries inflicted by the contractor in doing the work, though he would not be so liable if he had first obtained a license to excavate.<sup>84</sup>

Nor does the rule apply where a public duty is imposed by law upon a public officer or public body, and the officer or body charged

Am. Rep. 699; *Cuff v. Railroad Co.*, 35 N. J. Law, 17, 10 Am. Rep. 205; *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 3 Gray (Mass.) 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743; *King v. Railroad Co.*, 68 N. Y. 181, 23 Am. Rep. 37; *Blake v. Ferris*, 5 N. Y. 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304; *Stevens v. Armstrong*, 6 N. Y. 435; *Hexamer v. Webb*, 101 N. Y. 377, 4 N. E. 755, 54 Am. Rep. 703; *Eaton v. Railway Co.*, 59 Me. 520, 8 Am. Rep. 430; *De Forrest v. Wright*, 2 Mich. 368; *Clark v. Railroad Co.*, 28 Vt. 103; *Bennett v. Truebody*, 66 Cal. 509, 6 Pac. 329, 56 Am. Rep. 117.

<sup>81</sup> *De Forrest v. Wright*, 2 Mich. 368.

<sup>82</sup> *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 3 Gray (Mass.) 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743; *McCarthy v. Second Parish*, 71 Me. 318, 36 Am. Rep. 320; *Forsyth v. Hooper*, 11 Allen (Mass.) 419; *Pearson v. Cox*, 2 C. P. Div. 369.

<sup>83</sup> *Congreve v. Smith*, 18 N. Y. 79; *Creed v. Hartmann*, 29 N. Y. 591, 86 Am. Dec. 341; *Falender v. Blackwell*, 39 Ind. App. 121, 79 N. E. 393; *McHarge v. M. M. Newcomer & Co.*, 117 Tenn. 595, 100 S. W. 700, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298.

<sup>84</sup> *Creed v. Hartmann*, 29 N. Y. 591, 86 Am. Dec. 341. But if the independent contractor is himself guilty of the unlawful act, without the knowledge or authority of the employer, the latter is not liable. *Symons v. Road Directors for Allegany County*, 105 Md. 254, 65 Atl. 1067.

with the duty commits its performance to another. For instance, a municipal corporation charged by statute with the duty to keep the streets in repair cannot escape liability for a negligent performance of this duty on the ground that the immediate negligence was that of a contractor who had been intrusted with its performance.<sup>85</sup>

### SERVANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS

**280. A servant is not personally liable to third persons on contracts made by him in the name or on behalf of the master, unless he failed to disclose the existence of his principal, or contracted without authority.**

**281. A servant is ordinarily personally liable to third persons for torts committed by him, though committed by his master's direction. But he is not liable to third persons for mere nonfeasance.**

Ordinarily a servant is not personally liable on authorized contracts entered into by him in the name of his master, or on his behalf.<sup>86</sup> It is otherwise if he contracts without disclosing either his agency,<sup>87</sup> or if he exceeds his authority.<sup>88</sup> The liability depends upon principles of the law of agency, and is not different from the liability of any other agent.

A servant is liable for criminal acts committed by him, though his master may have commanded him to commit them. In such a case both would be liable. In like manner a servant, as well as the master, is civilly liable for a tort committed by the servant by the master's command. "Although there are some cases which favor the idea that a servant is not liable for a wrong act, when done by order of his master, these cases, I apprehend, are not law. The idea that a command by a superior is to be admitted as a justification for an injury is admissible only in the case of a wife who does

<sup>85</sup> *King v. Railroad Co.*, 66 N. Y. 181, 23 Am. Rep. 37; *Storrs v. City of Utica*, 17 N. Y. 104, 72 Am. Dec. 437.

<sup>86</sup> *Clark, Cont.* 737; *Jefts v. York*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 371, 50 Am. Dec. 791; *Bailey v. Cornell*, 66 Mich. 107, 33 N. W. 50.

<sup>87</sup> *Clark, Cont.* 740, 742, and cases there cited; *Kayton v. Barnett*, 116 N. Y. 625, 23 N. E. 24; *Holt v. Ross*, 54 N. Y. 472, 13 Am. Rep. 615; *Wheeler v. Reed*, 36 Ill. 81; *Porter v. Day*, 44 Ill. App. 256; *Hubbard v. Ten Brook*, 124 Pa. 291, 16 Atl. 817, 2 L. R. A. 823, 10 Am. St. Rep. 585; *Welch v. Goodwin*, 123 Mass. 71, 25 Am. Rep. 24.

<sup>88</sup> *Clark, Cont.* 738, and cases there cited.

an injury by the command and in the company of her husband. A servant is bound to perform the lawful commands of his master, but not those which are unlawful. Such a principle would justify a servant in committing any crime. Even if the servant be ignorant that he is committing any injury, yet, if the thing done is an injury, he is liable, though done by the command of the master."<sup>39</sup> The servant is not personally liable to third persons for mere nonfeasance. In such a case he is liable to the master, and the master alone is liable to third persons.<sup>40</sup> But for negligence, as distinguished from mere nonfeasance, the servant is personally liable.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 455.

<sup>40</sup> *Delaney v. Rochereau*, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456; *Scheller v. Silbermintz*, 50 Misc. Rep. 175, 98 N. Y. Supp. 230; *McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 200 Mo. 347, 98 S. W. 590, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 880, 118 Am. St. Rep. 661, 9 Ann. Cas. 656; *Carey v. Rochereau* (C. C.) 16 Fed. 87; *Albro v. Jaquith*, 4 Gray (Mass.) 99, 64 Am. Dec. 56. But this case was afterwards overruled in *Osborne v. Morgan*, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437, on the ground that the facts did not bring it within the principle. The principle itself, however, was conceded in the latter case.

<sup>41</sup> *Osborne v. Morgan*, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437. It was held in this case, overruling *Albro v. Jaquith*, 4 Gray (Mass.) 99, 64 Am. Dec. 56, that a servant is personally liable to a third person for negligence in so placing appliances as to cause injury to him. The case overruled had erroneously held that a servant was not liable for unskillfully and negligently allowing inflammable gas to escape. In *Osborne v. Morgan*, the court, by Gray, C. J., said: "It is often said in the books that an agent is responsible to third persons for misfeasance only, and not for nonfeasance. And it is doubtless true that if an agent never does anything towards carrying out his contract with his principal, but wholly omits and neglects to do so, the principal is the only person who can maintain any action against him for the nonfeasance. But, if the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in the manner of executing it, so as not to cause any injury to third persons which may be the natural consequence of his acts; and he cannot, by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving things in a dangerous condition exempt himself from liability to any person who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them without proper safeguards. This is not nonfeasance; but it is misfeasance, doing improperly." And see *Parsons v. Winchell*, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 592, 52 Am. Dec. 745; *Bell v. Josselyn*, 3 Gray (Mass.) 309, 63 Am. Dec. 741; *Nowell v. Wright*, 3 Allen (Mass.) 166, 80 Am. Dec. 62; *Horner v. Lawrence*, 37 N. J. Law, 46; *Hinds v. Overacker*, 66 Ind. 547, 32 Am. Rep. 114; *Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.*, 100 Minn. 79, 110 N. W. 356, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675, 10 Ann. Cas. 754; *Southern Ry. Co. v. Reynolds*, 126 Ga. 657, 55 S. E. 1039; *Whalen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 73 N. J. Law, 192, 63 Atl. 993; *McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 200 Mo. 347, 98 S. W. 590, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 880, 118 Am. St. Rep. 661, 9 Ann. Cas. 656; *Scheller v. Silbermintz*, 50 Misc. Rep. 175, 98 N. Y. Supp. 230.

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